


THE KEY OF KNOWLEDGE

BY
CHAMPAT RAI JAIN

VIDYA VARIDHI
BARRISTER-AT-LAW

"Woe unto you, lawyers! for ye have taken away
the key of knowledge, ye entered not in
yourself, and them that were entering in ye
hindered."—*LUKE XI, 52.*

"Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy
laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon
you, and learn of me; for I am meek and lowly
in heart and ye shall find rest unto your souls.
For my yoke is easy, and my burden is light."—*MATTHEW XI, 28-30.*



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नं० १७६९ क दि०
 श्री ऐलक पन्नालाल दिनाथर जैन
 सरस्वती भवन काठियावाड़ मिट्टी राज०

IN THE MEMORY OF
 LATE SHRI CHAMPAT RAI JAIN
Vidya Varidhi, Bar-at-Law



CHAMPAT RAI JAIN
 VARIDHI

VARIDHI

BLESSINGS OF
The Most respected Upadhyaya Digamber Muni Shri 108.
VIDYANAND JI

A pot of water fills itself with pouring tiny drops. So also the vessel of knowledge and wisdom overflows with the sweet words of scholars, philosophers, preceptors and prophets whose experiences in life find eternal expression in their immortal works. These ancestors passed on to the present generation such an enormous treasure of knowledge which an ordinary individual cannot even glance through in his life time - let alone the question of assimilating and understanding of it. It will be a living boon to humanity if this valuable compendium of knowledge is pursued, used and practised. Every word and the concept behind it bear upon them the impress of the great genius manifested in these works and provide a ready-made path to the seekers of the eternal self. It is indeed impossible for humanity even to estimate how indebted they are to these stalwarts in literature. It is highly commendable that Jain Mitra Mandla; Sohanlal Bankeyrai Jain Academy of wisdom and Culture; and C.R. Jain Trust Funds Controlling Authority, Delhi, have taken upon themselves the huge task of bringing out the fourth edition of **KEY OF KNOWLEDGE**. I do hope that this great work would serve as the Divine Tree that blossoms ever contributing to the right building of ideals in the minds of men endowed with rightful thinking.

Shri Adishwar Prasad Jain, a lover of righteousness who has engaged himself in this publication deserves my blessings.

With blessings,

Jagadhuri (Distt. Ambala)
7th December, 1975

VIDYANAND MUNI

ABOUT THE REPRINT EDITION

This is the fourth edition (rather re print) of the author's (Champat Rai Jain, Vidya Varidhi, Bar-at-law) most notable, voluminous and self-sufficient book—THE KEY OF KNOWLEDGE. The book was written by the author for those who labour and are heavy laden and whose souls are panting for rest and for a breath of the air of freedom; to unlock the doors of wisdom to the priceless treasures of peaceful and happy life. Its chief value lies in its power of reconciling the numerous religious doctrines which are regarded as irreconcilable. The book does not blindly follow the teaching of any particular sect or creed, not even of Jainism to which sublime and noble faith, the author belonged by coincidence of birth. The views set out in the book are based on a study of the nature of things, and the interpretation of the scriptures of some of the prevailing religions which have undertaken to show that the impartial conclusions of reason are precisely those which have been set before men in the form of doctrines and myths. The theme of the book is well reflected in the foreword of the book.

"May people see, uniformity and diversity. In this hope this new work is sent out into the world that they may sink their differences which are but apparent, for it is said by the ancient, "The path is one for all, the ways that lead thereto must vary with the pilgrim".

The book was first published by the author himself in 1915. The last revised and enlarged edition was brought out about fifty years back in 1928. The author breathed his last in 1942. The book has almost been out of reach since then. There has been a consistent and persistent demand for the re-print of this book

from all quarters and its need has been most stressed during the last three years when the world had been celebrating the 25th Centenary Celebrations of Bhagwan Mahavira. The most respected Upadhyaya Digamber Muni Shree 108 Vidyanandji, learned scholars late Dr. Hira Lal and Dr. A.N Upadhyaye, and the Veteran Sahu Shanti Pershad and others were constantly reminding me and other members of the Controlling Authority of C.R. Jain Trust Funds for publication of this book. In spite of my best wishes I had not been finding an opportunity to bring out a re-print of the valuable book. In a condolence meeting held in October 1975 in Shree Digamber Jain Lal Mandirji, Delhi, to mourn the death of the learned scholar Dr. A.N. Upadhyaye to whom this book was the dearest and who always urged upon me as a member of the author's Trust Funds Controlling Authority, for the publication of this book, I took a solemn vow to re-print this book at the earliest. I conveyed this determination of mine to Upadhyaya Muni Shri 108 Vidyanand Ji, observing Chaturmas at Jagadhri, in District Ambala of Haryana State, who gave me his blessing and encouraged me to go into this venture. It is solely because of his Holiness' Ashirvad and the practical instantaneous assistance of Shri Rajinder Kumar Jain-Proprietor of the Internationally reputed 'To-day and Tomorrow's Book Agency, Original Road Karol Brgh, New Delhi, that the present edition is being brought out by the combined efforts of Jain Mittra Mandal-established in 1915 which celebrated its Diamond Jubilee this year and which had the privilege and honour of publishing the late author's books during his life time the Institution of which he was a founder Member and also President in 1929; Sohan Lal Bankey Lal Jain Academy of Wisdom and Culture'- an institution founded in 1940 during his life-time by the author himself in the memory of his forefathers.

I wish that this long awaited re-print of this book will be a welcome edition and the book will find an honoured place in the shelves of the Libraries and Reading Rooms of the entire universe.

Dated : 15th Dec. 1975

(ADISHWAR PRASHAD JAIN)

President, Jain Mittra Mandal;


Hony. Secretary, Sohanlal Bankeyrai Jain
Academy of Wisdom and Culture.

& Member - C. R. Jain Trust Funds controlling Authority,
Delhi.

FOREWORD

May people see 'uniformity amid diversity'! In this hope this new work is sent out into the world that they may sink their differences which are but apparent, for it is said by the ancients, 'The path is one for all, the ways that lead thereto must vary with the pilgrim.'

नमो सरहंताय
 नमो सिद्धाय नमो आचर्याय
 नमो स्वयंभवाय
 नमो होये सवसाहृष्य



Name Arhantanam,
Name Siddhanam, Name Acharyanam,
Name Svayambhavanam,
Name Hoye Sabha Sahunam.

८०

ARHATS, THE PERFECT SOULS EMBODIED,

POSSESSORS OF INFINITE COGNITION, KNOWLEDGE,

HAPPINESS AND POWER;

TO SIDDHAS, THE PERFECT SOULS IN NIRVANA,

FORMLESS AND BODILESS,

FREE FROM ALL KARMIC ATTACHMENT;

TO ACHARYAS, THE MASTERS OF ADEPTS

IN SPIRITUALITY;

TO UPADHYAYAS, THE ADEPTS

GUIDING THE NUMERAB-ASCETICS,

AND

TO ALL SADHUS, THE ASCETICS DEVOTED

TO THE CONTEMPLATION OF

SELF;

I

MAKE OBEDISANCE HUMBLE

AND

PLACE AT THEIR WORSHIPFUL FEET

THIS

MEBLE EXPOSITION OF THEIR PROFOUND

TEACHING.

C. R. JAIN

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PREFACE

"THE KEY OF KNOWLEDGE" does not claim to be a new Scripture, nor is it intended to found a new religion or a new sect. It is merely what its title indicates—a 'key,' with the aid of which the locked doors of wisdom might be unlocked, enabling its possessor to enter into them and to see for himself the priceless treasures which have remained hidden from common view so long. Its chief value will be found to lie in its power of reconciling the numerous religious doctrines which have hitherto been regarded as irreconcilable.

It is not likely that every reader will find its perusal interesting. There is a certain class of people who do not care to think on the vital problems of life for themselves, and are ever content to be guided by the thoughts of others. For such and others who take no interest in religion the book is not meant. It is meant only for those, in the first instance, who 'labour and are heavy laden' and whose souls are panting for rest and for a breath of the air of freedom. They will find the 'yoke easy and the burden light.'

The book lays no claim to elegance of diction, and the critic would be wasting his breath if he merely criticised its literary merit or style. Thought-stimulating criticism is, however, always wholesome, and the author would be happy to have his errors pointed out, if any.

The author does not pretend to be a learned man in any sense of the word. In the following pages he has merely put down the chain of reasoning which brought satisfaction and rest to his soul, in the hope that others also might be benefited thereby, if they have an earnest longing to understand themselves and the great mystery which surrounds existence. It is possible that in dealing with the vast range of subjects discussed in the book he may have unwittingly trodden upon the corns of some; if so, his excuse is that the causing of pain is not intentional. In an earnest search for Truth, there is no room for an apology.

The proper method of studying the "Key of Knowledge"—indeed, of any other work on education and religion—is to reflect

on its passages, not to skip over them erratically. It will be much better not to read the book at all than to read it in a hurry. It is well to bear in mind that knowledge is like food, and becomes ours only when it is absorbed, assimilated and digested by the intellect.

Serious confusion is apt to arise unless the various standpoints from which statements are made are constantly kept in mind. An endeavour has been made to point out all the different points of view as far as possible ; but the injunction is thought necessary to put the reader on his guard. A full grasp of the Jaina doctrine of *Nayavada* (the philosophy of standpoints), which finds its culmination in the *Saptabhāṅgī* (that is, the sevenfold) system of predication, is necessary to avoid all such pitfalls. Ordinarily, language fails to deal at one and the same time with any given situation, in all its aspects, and is apt to mislead the unwary. For instance, the word ' unknowable ' is a contradiction of its own sense. Herbert Spencer could not well have meant what the word signifies. What he meant was that which could not be fully known, not that which was wholly unknowable ; for the mere fact that we know that there is a thing, however unknowable be its attributes, removes it from the category of the unknowable, or unknown, and puts it in that of the known. The Jaina method is calculated to overcome this difficulty. It maintains that full knowledge of a thing is possible only when it has been looked at from all the different points of view which exhaust the categories of knowledge. For instance, to know merely what a thing is, is not enough ; we ought also to know what it is not. But as we are not here concerned with the *Saptabhāṅgī*, we need not tarry to describe it any further.


It only remains to be added that the ' Key of Knowledge ' does not blindly follow the teaching of any particular sect or creed, not even of Jainism to which sublime and noble faith the author has the privilege of belonging by a happy incident of birth. The views set out herein are based on a study of the nature of things, and the interpretation of the scriptures of some of the prevailing religions has been undertaken only to show that the impartial conclusions of Reason are precisely those which have been set before men in the form of doctrines and myths.

The reader is, however, requested to bear in mind that the author's profound admiration for the wisdom of the ancients, compared with which the much boasted knowledge of the moderns is but a mere smattering,

does not allow him to launch this book into the world except with the sincerely-felt observation that whatever is beautiful, grand or sublime in the following pages comes from the sages of the past, and all the rest which is wrong and ugly is his.

In dealing with the basic principles of religion it was not found necessary to go into a minute analysis of all the existing religions of the world, inasmuch as a survey of the principles underlying those actually dealt with sufficiently disposes of them all. Besides, a thorough treatment of each religion separately would have swelled the bulk of the book beyond all proportion, voluminous as it already is.

C. R. J.



THE KEY OF KNOWLEDGE

CHAPTER I

THE IDEAL

" They who have no central purpose in their life fall an easy prey to petty worries, fears, troubles and self-pityings."—*James Allen.*

" Be ye therefore perfect, even as your father which is in heaven is perfect."—*Jesus.*¹

A great teacher of our race has said :—

" Ask, and it shall be given you ; seek, and ye shall find ; knock, and it shall be opened unto you."²

But, unfortunately, he did not say in clear language what should one ask or seek for, or precisely where to knock and how and when. We must, therefore, ascertain what it is that we want before setting out in search of it. As to this, however, there is no need for making a very elaborate investigation or preparing a learned thesis on the subject of human requirements, for all are agreed that the enjoyment of life and the avoidance of pain are the be-all and end-all of existence. We may, therefore, say at once and without fear of contradiction that man's only want is happiness, however vague and hazy be his idea of it.

Every one in this life desires happiness ; the child seeks it in the toys which are put before it ; the schoolboy turns to books ; the young man, to making money and getting married. Thence the centre of happiness is shifted to the family. The pursuit of honour and distinction occupies the thoughts of the more advanced in age. And then ? But how many think of the 'then' ? For the materialist the ideal of old age, after a life of bustle and turmoil, consists in a peaceful, eternal repose in the grave. Poetically, the idea does not seem to be quite unattractive, but when we turn to enquire into the nature of the

¹ Matthew, v. 48.

² Matthew, vii. 7.

pleasure which such 'peaceful' repose can possibly afford, he has no idea whatever on the subject. Peace, but for whom? For a dead body! Just as if a corpse could enjoy peace. Perhaps the soul is to enjoy the ideal, peaceful repose. But the materialist's vocabulary of existing things contains no such word as soul. Here is the fulfilment of an ideal, but under what conditions? He who longs for it is no more when it falls into realization! What a contradiction in terms, what an ideal to cherish!

A vast majority of mankind perhaps think that way. There are, however, a few who think the other way. These hold that the enjoyer survives the physical death. But then the grave ceases to be a haven of rest. Repose there might be in the grave, but who can say that it would be peaceful necessarily? And if it is not, the anguish would be all the greater, for here on earth it is given us to assist each other or to devise some means whereby suffering might be alleviated, but the probabilities on the other side of the grave are against such alleviation by mutual assistance or individual exertion.

Theology steps in to point out that beyond the grave there is the land of the paradise where sickness and death and pain and misery are unknown, and where people pass their days in the fun and frolic of childhood, or in the voluptuous embraces of the heavenly nymphs, the *houris* of Islam. But it also points out that there is another region exactly the reverse of the Land of Happiness where wicked people have to go and spend their lives in awful agonies of pain. The path to the former, it is said, is hidden from the atheist, but is revealed to the worshipper of the Almighty God. He who would aspire to the attainment of heaven must follow the path of virtue, be poor in spirit, inoffensive, meek, charitable, non-injuring, and so forth. According to the Bible, 'it is easier for a camel to pass through the needle's eye than for a rich person to tread the narrow path of bliss.'

Then comes the teaching about Nirvana after death. Buddha exhorted his hearers to aspire to the attainment of emancipation in Nirvana. But one wants to be happy here and now. There is no pleasure in postponing the realisation of the ideal to a future moment of time. Why can it not be had at once?

¹ Cf. Mark, x. 25.

Let us philosophize a bit. When pain comes to us we say, 'O, what have I done to deserve this suffering?' But we make no such observation when happiness falls to our lot. Why? The reason is obvious; we look on happiness as ours by right, but on pain as something foreign and outside ourselves. Therefore it is that every one seeks his happiness first and foremost and above all other things.

But the fact that search is to be made for it indicates that happiness has to be sought out, in other words, is not readily available to us. Leaving aside, for the present, the question of the real nature of happiness, it is also obvious that it cannot reside in any one of the toys, books, money, family, children, honours, distinctions and the like, which man seeks one after another. Were it otherwise, the child would stick to his toys, the schoolboy to his books, and so forth. Volition, as a matter of fact, is the outcome of desire, and desire most distinctly points to a want which, in its turn, indicates unhappiness. One moves to secure a thing because one wants it, one wants it because it will satisfy an existing desire, and one satisfies an existing desire because satisfaction results in happiness.

All straining and striving which is going on in the world is, therefore, the outcome of a thirst for happiness, and it is on account of this insatiable thirst that ideal after ideal is conceived, adhered to for a time, and then, ultimately, when discovered to be insufficient, discarded and replaced by a seemingly better one. Some people spend their whole lives in thus trying object after object in a vain search for this Will-o'-the-Wisp, and ultimately descend into the grave with a broken heart. When all the customary ideals of happiness are exhausted by a person, and he is left without any tangible aim in life, he drifts about like a wreck, and dies of aimlessness.

The question, therefore, arises as to what is the proper ideal for mankind to cherish? Can it be money? No, for money is a means to an end, not the end in itself, and will fail to procure happiness if put to the test. Can it, then, be the toys, the books, the family, children, fame and the like, which are known to have afforded pleasure in the past? Surely not, for they are also only so many means to an end, not the end itself. Should one aspire for eminent position, then? But this, too, does not satisfy the mind, for

even the most eminent of beings are not always happy. The case with the millionaire, the poet, the philosopher and the like is also the same; they cannot be said to enjoy unalloyed happiness in any sense. Similarly, it can be shown with respect to every other occupation and object in the world that it cannot be happiness itself. Shall we, then, turn to the world beyond the grave to see if it will furnish us with a suitable ideal?

The streams of milk and honey, the shade of beautiful trees, the voluptuous company of bewitching, ravishing *houris* appeal only to the sensualist; they possess no charm for the sober-minded; neither can they, taken singly or together, constitute happiness. Some people think that happiness is to be had in heaven because of the vision of the glory of their God which is to be had there. But even this purer conception of the heaven-world implies little or no happiness for the soul, because it involves the idea of dependence on the will and pleasure of another. For, God can mar that happiness by withholding his beatific vision. Besides, the vision of another, even though that other be no other than the Supreme Being himself, cannot confer real happiness on the soul. We find happiness in the idea of our own greatness and power. One finds pleasure in such thoughts as 'I am the king,' 'I am the governor,' 'I am beautiful,' 'I am brave,' and the like, not in such as 'another is the king,' 'another is the governor,' 'another is beautiful,' 'another is brave,' and so forth. So far as the element of freedom is concerned—and without freedom it is inconceivable how there can be true happiness—it is perfectly obvious that it is our own freedom which can afford us joy; the freedom of another, when we ourselves are in bondage, can only go to deepen our anguish, however much its sight may temporarily soften our heart and thereby lighten the burden of captivity for the time being.

Happiness comes not from without; it depends on ourselves. Concerning its nature Lord Avebury observes:—

"Money cannot make us happy, success cannot make us happy, friends cannot make us happy, health and strength cannot make us happy. All these make for happiness, but none of them will secure it. Nature may do all she can: she may give us fame, health, money, long life, but she cannot make us happy. Every one of us must do that for himself. Our language expresses this admirably. What do we

say if we have had a happy day? We say we have enjoyed *ourselves*. This expression of our mother tongue seems very suggestive. Our happiness depends on ourselves."¹

This is perfectly sound, as will be shown more fully later on. For the present it is sufficient to note that happiness resides not in any outside object, but must spring up within us, if it is to be enjoyed at all. Hence, all the heavens and other worlds of bliss, put together, cannot confer it on the soul, if the latter happen to be barren in itself.

There remains the idea of Nirvana to be dealt with. Obviously, if that is a state which is reserved for the hereafter, there can be no happiness for the soul in this life on earth. Hence, if Nirvana is to be assumed to belong to the *post-mortem* world, it is an incomplete idea in itself, and means only happiness after death, but none here in this life. The idea of *jivan-mukti* (salvation while still in the flesh), however, is the necessary complement, and coupled with that of Nirvana gives a complete form of happiness attainable by man.

What the notion of Nirvana contains within it will be enquired into later; here at present it is sufficient to state that perfect freedom, which is the essence of happiness, cannot possibly be had till all obstacles to the freedom of will are removed from the path; and that means neither more nor less than the attainment of Godhood by the aspiring soul. God alone is infinitely powerful, second to none, all-knowing, blissful and free. Hence, man has to become God, if he would attain to perfect happiness.

It is a big claim for man to aspire to become God, and many might regard it as the height of blasphemy and lunacy. The possibility of its attainment forms the subject of this book, and as the thesis develops in outline and acquires definiteness and certainty it will also become evident that absolutely no blasphemy is involved in this seemingly high aspiration.

We may, therefore, hold that the proper ideal for mankind is God, the ever-living, the all-knowing, the most blissful, the *Sat-Chit-Ananda* (i.e., Existence, Intelligence or Consciousness, and Bliss), to employ the terminology of Vedanta. All other ideals fail to

¹ 'On Peace and Happiness,' pp. 1-2.

secure the full measure of happiness, and are, for that reason, unworthy of the soul.

The aim of religion, it will be pointed out as we progress with our subject, is none other than to raise mankind to the supreme status of Godhood. It owes its origin to the quest of happiness which thinking beings have ever found necessary to pursue. When one is taken ill in the flesh one goes to physicians and surgeons to be cured of one's ailment ; but since the members of the medical faculty know not of any minerals or herbs or other medicaments with which to allay mental suffering, the soul in its agony seeks out the sages of the day and pours forth its troubles before them. The means suggested by the sages have at all times consisted of such practices as are calculated to establish the soul in the state of *Sat-Chit-Anandaship*, i.e., Godhood ; hence, religion, from *re*, back, and *ligo*, to bind, becomes the recognized code of means which bind the soul to God, in other words, which lead it to realize the state of Godhood for itself.

When people talk of a high or a low religion they generally fail to understand the significance of the adjectives they employ. A high religion is one which brings the highest form of happiness to its votaries. Hence, the system which does not aspire to raise mankind to the supreme status of Godhood has no right to lay claim to be the high or the highest religion, and, not being the best, must perish, in due course of time, when intelligent men come to look into its merit.

But whence did the sages learn the truth about religion ? There were neither books nor tables nor other data available in the days of pre-historic men. Whence could they have learnt it, indeed, if not from the only source from which we all learn anything that is learnt even now-a-days. Whence did Sir Isaac Newton learn the law of gravitation ? From the falling apple ? Surely not, but from meditation and deliberation. All knowledge comes from these two sources. Nature is the open book of Truth ; he who will meditate over it will learn the secret. The sages took the hint, and applied themselves to the study of this Open Book. With the help of the torch of Intellect and Reason they pursued their search with zeal and untiring energy, and rested not till Divine Truth revealed itself to them in its full glory.

Knowledge thus acquired was gradually imparted, in diverse ways, to others who, not being so wise as their teachers, put their own interpretations on their teachings. We thus got the numerous sects and religious bodies which exist in the world. In the main, all the schools of thought fall into two great classes, namely, those which believe in the existence of the Principle of Life, that is, God, and those that do not believe in It. The former alone need be referred to here, and they are again divided into three groups. First come those who believe in a god as the creator and sustainer of the Universe, but separate from Nature and the human soul. He is regarded in this system as a capricious, whimsical, despotic monarch, easily offended at slights, however unconsciously offered, hard to please, and always to be dreaded. The highest ideal of happiness provided by this system consists in life in heaven—a sort of boarding-house on a large scale, managed by the Lord God where his children can indulge their animal passions to the full, in eating, drinking and, according to some, even in fornication. This is the lowest of the three classes. The second group believes that there is a god, but considers that the Universe cannot be separate from him. It maintains that creation took place in the sense of a projection, but not in the sense in which it is popularly understood by men, that is, a making of a something real out of nothing. According to this sect, God is himself the creator as well as the material of which beings and things are made. Accordingly, God, Nature and the individual Soul are the three aspects of the one and the same thing. Here we have the dissolution of personality, i.e., separateness, into the one Absolute Being, or Life, as the ideal of the soul. This, too, obviously, is not quite the best form of belief. The third class consists of those luminous souls who have dared to conceive the truth in its highest aspect. These regard the soul to be its own God and capable of attaining the fullest measure of perfection and bliss. This third form of belief is almost as old as humanity itself, as will be demonstrated later, and has been directly, or indirectly, ruling the hearts of men and swaying their destinies.

The belief that the soul is its own God, it is claimed, is not only the most ancient, but also the only one which gives us an ideal of Perfection neither unworthy of a rational being nor incompatible with

the highest aspiration of the soul. The first man of our times who realized this great ideal in his own life and who taught the method of its realization to others, is the first great Teacher of our race and the founder of Religion in the true sense of the word. However absurd the statement may seem at this early stage of our investigation, it is certain that religion is coeval with its own necessity and also with rational thought. It is true that the phases of rational thought have undergone certain kinds of evolutionary changes in different countries and races of men, but it is also true that these changes have added little or nothing to the knowledge of the ancients who were fully instructed in all the departments of Religion, and made familiar with the true principles of the practical method of Self-realization. As a matter of fact, there was nothing left to be discovered at the time of which we are writing, and the task of the future generations was merely to understand and dispense the divine knowledge in a simple, easy way to the suffering humanity. As time wore on, people drifted away from the high ideal set before them by the great Sages of the race, and, in consequence, became estranged from happiness, which they vainly tried to extract from their material surroundings. Warning voices rose up from time to time to exhort them to remain steadfast to their noble and ennobling ideal. Tirthankaras and saviours and swamis and prophets appeared and preached to the world in quick succession ; but their philosophy was of no value to the people, as they had no time left from the pursuit of sensual pleasures and riches to turn to religion. Mankind wanted a cheap, simple recipe like a physician's draught which could be taken once a day or so to prevent or cure the disorders of spirituality ; and the simpler the method the quicker were the people to respond to it. It was thus that every one who had a little smattering of religious lore managed to secure some followers to himself ; and if he could perform a miracle or two in addition, his success as the founder of a religion was at once put beyond dispute. Thus, interest in religion dwindled down to a mere mockery, till at last people began to believe that all talk of the divine Ideal of Perfection, was either a pure chimera, or, if true, was a piece of news which was of no marketable value, as it could not be reduced to *L. a. d.* Mammon came into existence, and just in proportion in which it

became an object of devotion, the true object of adoration and worship receded into the background and became lost to view. Devil and his companions have thus become regnant where there used to be the Kingdom of God.

As with the ancients, so is the case with us at present; we believe in money and the pleasures of the senses, and bewail our lot when these afford us disgust. The soul is athirst for happiness and is panting for a breath of the pure atmosphere of freedom, but we still adhere to the mad worship of the god Golden Calf and its co-seducers. This is our own fault. It is not too late yet, but it will be so in a short time when Death knocks at the door to claim its victim. What shall we do then? Every moment that we neglect our opportunity for self-realization, each time that we say that there is no hurry about it, and on each occasion that we think that our business matters ought not to suffer for devotion to the Ideal we seal our own doom and drive an additional nail into our coffin with our own hands. Whenever in the future we chance to evolve out an inclination for God-realization, we shall have to draw out each nail so driven in by us from our coffin. If time is money and may not be wasted in business, it is still more valuable in religion.

Again, we must not be vague about our ideal. We must know what we want and see that we have a clear, vivid impression of it, so that should we come across the good angel who grants all desires, we might be in a position to tell him precisely what we want. We should not be guided by what others have thought or said on the subject, without sifting it for ourselves. We would be nowhere if in reply to our request for an admission ticket into the Kingdom of Heaven the angel told us that he did not understand what we meant by that term. We must have a clear idea of the thing desired before we can ever expect to get it. This is so even in the realm of matter. A manufacturer would come to speedy grief if he did not happen to have a definite idea of the thing he intended to manufacture.

One must strive for the attainment of the highest ideal. If we accept a baser substitute, we shall be in need again, and shall have to ask again and again, from time to time, but one cannot go on begging all one's life through. Now, we want to be above want; we wish for that condition in which there never will be any need.

or trouble, or misery. But that condition only appertains to Godhood, and is not to be found in anything else. Godhood is, then, the proper ideal for man. But is not man likely to bring down the ire of heaven on himself by aspiring to become a God? No, indeed, not; there is no question of incurring the displeasure of heaven or of exciting the anger or jealousy of any god or goddess in this. When we understand the nature of things we shall see that Godhood is the proper ideal for the soul to aspire after.

A question which is often asked is: why should one be religious at all? In other words, why should not one go on living as usual in this world and enjoying its pleasures, rather than renounce them to become religious? It is certainly a legitimate question, and religion has got to answer it, in order to maintain its claim and to sustain its position.

Religion is the SCIENCE of Bliss; it is the department which deals with the attainment of unalloyed happiness. It sets out with an enquiry into the very nature of bliss which it proclaims to be different from the pleasures of the world. A mere tickling of the senses, worldly pleasure is essentially fleeting, transient, full of trouble in its procurement, and liable to give birth to suffering and pain in its experience. Pleasure and pain are thus opposite terms, in a sense; the one is the re-action of the other, and neither can be had alone by itself. If the action is pleasant, its re-action is not unlikely to be painful. Religion declares that pleasure which is liable to change and to be followed by pain is merely a counterfeit imitation, not the genuine article. Real bliss is very different from the pleasures of this world. It is that condition in which one experiences nothing but uninterrupted peace, tranquillity and joy, wave upon wave, as it were of life-giving ecstasy, the becoming rather than enjoying bliss itself which is God's eternal *svabhava* (nature).

Renunciation is a giving up certainly, but a giving up of what? It is a giving up of base imitations, of false ideals, of worthless substitutes, and, in place thereof, the acquisition of the genuine article, the living waters of eternal life and joy!

'Has any one ever acquired this bliss?' 'what is the proof that these statements are true?' and many other like questions will naturally arise in the mind of the reader at this stage. He must,

however, wait till he gets to the end of the book which will answer all of them, at their proper time and place.

In the meantime, we may emphasize the point that the pursuit of worldly pleasure is, sooner or later, bound to end in *ennui* and disgust, because the sense of pleasure chiefly depends on (1) the capacity to enjoy which decreases with age, and (2) the novelty of the sensation which wears off with intimacy and repetition, so that when both the capacity to enjoy and the novelty of the sensation are gone, the soul, whose thirst for happiness has nowise abated, is plunged into mourning over its lost power to enjoy itself with the objects of sense. This undesirable experience comes to every one, sooner or later in life; there is no favourite of fortune who can be said to be immune from it. When this feeling of *ennui*, or general dissatisfaction, takes possession of the soul, nothing but religion can come to its rescue. It is, however, by this time generally incapable of understanding the true principles of religion, and totally unfit to adapt itself to the life of physical and moral severity which is necessary for the attainment of Perfection and Bliss. Many persons who turn to religion late in life, thus, derive little or no benefit from its pursuit.

They have no idea of the effort necessary to rise to the sublime status of divinity, and rest content with the sweet delusion that the goal can be reached on the wings to be evolved out by prayer and psalm. As a matter of fact, it is the intelligent pursuit, amounting, in point of assiduity, to the whole-heartedness of worship, of the Ideal, and not a vague or fanatical doting upon an idol, which is required for spiritual progress; but so far as that is concerned, it is clearly a case of "many be called, but few be chosen" (Matth. xx. 16).

To the vast majority of mankind, even the very idea of worship is unintelligible and devoid of pleasure. They worship their god on account of a vague and indefinable sense of fear with which their minds are impressed, in relation with some actual or apprehended calamity. Hence, when the danger is past god is easily forgotten, as the proverb says. But worship, or devotion, in its true form, is really nothing but an imitating of the object of worship. When we worship a being, we walk in his footsteps. One must copy the object

of one's worship, if one wishes to achieve anything. Merely flattering the Deity, or offering him food, however choice, will not do. A god, surely, does not stand in need of food at any time. It will not bring us any pleasure if all the ants in our domain prostrate themselves before us, sing hallelujahs in our praise, and offer the whole or a portion of a dead cricket, or some other insect, as an ordinary or burnt offering. Similarly, our sacrifices and thanksgiving cannot possibly afford pleasure to a real divinity. And, so far as praise is concerned, it is certainly the free appreciation of one's equals which is pleasing to the ear, not the flattery or servile homage of inferiors. If a God were to suffer himself to be affected with pleasure, or anger, just as a creature offered him praise, or withheld it from him, he would never have peace of mind for a moment. And what about his worshippers? Can he who is not happy in himself ever make any one else happy by any possibility? Says the Bhagavad Gita (ix, 25) :—

"They who worship the Shining Ones, go to the Shining Ones; to the Ancestors go the ancestor-worshippers; to the Elementals go those who sacrifice to the Elementals; but My worshippers come unto Me."

Thus the worship of a *deva*, a *bhuta*, or an ancestor can only enable one to become like them in power and disposition. By worshipping them we cannot aspire to rise above desire or want. But if we worship the ever-blissful Godhood, there is no limit to the heights of bliss to which we can aspire. Godhood is the sublime ideal of Absolute Perfection; by devotion to it we can ourselves attain to Perfection. As the Bible urges :—

"Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect."—Matth. v. 48.

There is no good in seeking a condition which is not quite perfect. But while this is so in so far as the theory is concerned, it cannot be said that an intelligent worship of divinity in spirit, by focussing the mind on its material form, by one who has these principles in view, is wicked or unnecessary. The Bhagavad Gita again gives us the reason thereof :—

"The difficulty of those whose minds are set on the Unmanifested is greater, for the path of the Unmanifested is hard for the embodied to reach."—xii. 5.

Here, in a nut-shell, is given the whole philosophy of the worship of the Supreme Godhead with the aid of images. As it is difficult to concentrate the mind on the invisible Godhead, people generally make use of the visible, tangible images of Devas (Gods) to assist them in their meditation, in the beginning. Thus, by means of an intelligent use of the ladder of devotion they rise up to the highest height of aspiration. When the top is reached, the ladder is no longer required, and may be dispensed with. There is sound philosophy underlying idolatry when rightly understood; but in that case 'idol' simply means 'ideal,' and 'idolatry,' '*ideal-atry*.' Ignorant fetishism has no place in all this!

CHAPTER II

CREATION

"Nothing is commenced or ended. Everything is changed or transformed. Life and death are only modes of transformation which rule the vital molecule, from the plant upto Brahma himself."—*The Atharva Veda*.

"The one unborn (soul), for his enjoyment, approaches the one unborn (nature) which is red, white and black, of one form, and producing a manifold offspring."
—*Svetāsvatara Upaniṣad*, iv, 5.

From the moment which marked the dawn of consciousness for the thinking world, man has ever found the contemplation of the Universe, of things in general, and of himself, in particular, a study of an all-absorbing interest. The problem of the origin of the World has been the greatest theme for all kinds of thinkers, from the remotest antiquity down to the present moment; and Haeckel, writing at the end of the nineteenth century, regards it as 'the greatest, the vastest, and most difficult of all cosmic problems.' Many and various are the solutions that have been offered of this undoubtedly difficult problem; and intellectual men have not always found it easy to agree with one another on the subject. Theistic theology maintains that the first cause of the world is a spiritual Being, who is the creator of all things and of each and every individual. Muhammadans believe that a creator made the universe by uttering '*kun*,' (=let it be done), and all things were made, as it were, out of 'nothing.' Somewhat similar is the Christian story of creation which is based on the account given in the book of Genesis.

Science disputes the accuracy of these conclusions and denies the very existence of a god. It reduces everything to natural causation, and replaces the notion of an anthropomorphic Architect by the 'eternal iron laws of nature.' The Hindus also endeavoured to formulate a theory about the world-process, and accounted for it in different ways. They divide themselves into two main camps, which may be called the Realistic and the Idealistic, because of the one

pursuing the line of thought known as Realism, and of the other that of Idealism. On the border-land between them lies the system of the Sankhya, which was founded by Kapila. It is a sort of ideorealistic philosophy which is intended to explain the nature of the world process. The Sankhyas hold that the Universe is built out of an eternal cosmic matter, called *Prakriti*, in the sense of an evolution from the unmanifested into a manifested condition. The following account of the teaching of this school from Prof. P. C. Ray's ably written book, 'An Introduction to Hindu Chemistry,' will be found of great interest :—

"The manifested world is traced to an unmanifested ground, the *prakriti*, which is conceived as formless and undifferentiated, limitless and ubiquitous, indestructible and undecaying, without beginning and without end. The unit of this *prakriti* is a mere abstraction; it is in reality an undifferentiated manifold, an indeterminate, infinite continuum of infinitesimal Reals. These reals, termed *gunas*, are by another abstraction classed under three heads, namely, (1) *Sattva*, the essence which manifests itself in a phenomenon, and which is characterised by this tendency to manifestation, the essence, or, in other words, what serves as the medium for the reflection of intelligence, (2) *Rajas*, energy, that which is efficient in a phenomenon and is characterised by a tendency to do work, or overcome resistance, and (3) *Tamas*, mass or inertia, which counteracts the tendency of *Rajas* to do work, and of *Sattva* to conscious manifestation. The ultimate factors of the Universe, then, are (1) essence or intelligence-stuff, (2) energy and (3) matter characterised by mass or inertia. These *gunas* are conceived to be Reals, substantive entities,—not however as self-subsistent or independent entities, but as interdependent moments in every Real or substantive Existence."

Even energy is substantive in this sense. The *gunas* are always uniting, separating and uniting again. Everything in the world results from their peculiar arrangement and combination. Varying quantities of essence, energy and mass, in varied groupings, act on one another, and through their mutual interaction and interdependence evolve, from the indefinite or qualitatively indeterminate, the definite or qualitatively determinate. In the phenomenal product whatever energy is, is due to the element of *Rajas* and *Rajas* alone; matter, resistance and stability are due to *Tamas*, and all conscious manifestation to *Sattva*. In order that there may be a disturbance of the equilibrium, the particular *guna* which happens to be predominant in any phenomenon, becomes manifest in that phenomenon and the others become latent, e.g., in a body at rest, mass is patent.

energy latent, and conscious manifestation sub-latent. In this way does the evolution of *prakṛiti* continually proceed, building up and then destroying the worlds.

Different views prevailed in the other schools of Hindu thought. The material of the universe, according to one of these schools, consists of *Ākāśa* and *Prāṇa* (Life). Swami Vivekananda thus explains the function of *Ākāśa* :—

“At the beginning of creation there is only the *Ākāśa* (ether). It is the *ākāśa* that becomes the air, that becomes the liquids, that becomes the solids; it is the *ākāśa* that becomes the sun, the earth, the moon, the stars, the comets; it is the *ākāśa* that becomes the body, the animal body, the plants, every form that we see, every thing that can be sensed, every thing that exists. At the end of the cycle, the solids, the liquids, the gases all melt into the *ākāśa* again, and the next creation similarly proceeds out of this *ākāśa*.”

According to the Nyaya school, the atoms of earth, water, fire and air are the material cause of the visible and tangible parts of the Universe, and are themselves self-existent and eternal. The Vaiśeṣikas go minutely into the theory of atoms. The founder of their school, nick-named Kanada (literally, the atom-eater), explains the nature and aggregation of atoms in the following manner: ‘The mote which is seen in a sunbeam is the smallest perceptible quantity. Being a substance and an effect, it must be composed of what is less than itself; and this likewise is a substance and an effect, for the component part of a substance which has magnitude must be an effect. This again must be composed of what is smaller, and that smaller thing is an atom. It is simple and uncomposed, else the series would be endless, and were it pursued indefinitely, there would be no difference of magnitude between a mustard seed and a mountain, or a gnat and an elephant, each alike containing an infinity of particles.’ The ultimate atom, then, is a simple unit. Touching the qualities which manifest themselves in the effect Kanada declares them to be the same as appertain to the ingredient part, or the material cause. According to the Vaiśeṣikas, the universe is the result of the concourse of atoms brought about by an unseen peculiar virtue which might be the creative will, or time, or some other competent cause.

Thus was the creation of the Universe accounted for by the ancient Hindu sages of the Realistic school. They did not consider

it to be a creation in the sense of the making of a something out of nothing, but an evolution of the gross from the fine or less gross. Out of the primitive material, possessing the property of being transformed into all sorts of shapes and forms, they held the universe to have evolved out in accordance with certain definite laws. Matter was thus recognized as one of the two most essential factors of the universe, the other being spirit, that is, the essence of souls, whose perfection is the goal of philosophy and the *summum bonum* of life.

Let us now see what modern Science has to say on the subject. Like some of the Hindu Realists, it also reduces the universe to two factors, but calls them matter and force. Under the head of matter come all the substances, whether nebulous, gaseous, liquid or solid, while force includes the various forms of energy, such as light, heat, electricity, magnetism, chemical action, and the like. It is now held that all manifestations of existence and life are caused by evolution from these two factors. Both matter and force are indestructible; in other words, the sum total of each is a fixed quantity which it is not possible to add to, or subtract from. The force (a distinction is recognised between this term and energy; for, while force inheres in, and cannot be separated from the atoms of weighable matter, energy passes from atom to atom, and from mass to mass, its vehicle being the unweighable ethereal medium, which, it is assumed, fills the space between bodies and between particles of bodies) bound up in each atom, acting as affinity, combines atoms into molecules; acting as cohesion, it unites the molecules into masses; and acting as gravitation, it draws the masses towards their several centres of gravity. The evolution of the organic from the inorganic substance is similarly explained: for the difference between the most complex inorganic thing and the lowest form of organism is considered to lie merely in the arrangement of the molecules of matter composing them. In its lowest form the living germ is apparently lifeless, and so utterly devoid of structure that it is only by courtesy that one can be induced to call it an organism. According to the leading authorities on modern Science, the earliest form of organic life began with mere naked specks of protoplasm, non-nucleated, or with no easily recognisable nucleus, which gave rise

to the so-called unicellular creatures. These were followed by those whose bodies consisted of more cells, the multicellular. In this manner the manifestation of organic life became more and more complex, till it reached its culminating point in man. The evolution of psychic functions has also been traced out very elaborately. It has been surmised that the nervous system developed side by side with the physical body, so that when the organism became multicellular, the nervous system spread out like a network of wires and centres. In man this has reached a very extraordinary state of complexity, which accounts for his wonderful mental powers, though it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the lower animals also possess the power of thinking and reasoning in proportion to the development of the brain and the nervous system. Such, briefly, is the explanation which modern science gives of our Universe.

At this stage it is worth while to enquire into the nature of force itself. The question is, what is force? There is a great diversity of opinion on this point, and men of learning are divided amongst themselves, some thinking that it must be of the nature of matter, others denying it. But, since it is impossible to look upon anything as being altogether devoid of substantiveness, force must be held to be bound up in some kind of substance. Thus understood, force becomes an aspect or function of substance; for there can be no such thing as an immaterial entity. According to Prof. Haeckel,

"In truth these profound errors need no further refutation to-day, for experience has never yet discovered for us a single immaterial substance, a single force which is not dependent on matter, or a single form of energy which is not exerted by material movement, whether it be of mass, or of ether, or of both. Even the most elaborate and most perfect forms of energy that we know,—the psychic life of the higher animals, the thought and reason of man—depend on material processes, or changes in the neuroplasm of the ganglionic cells; they are inconceivable apart from such modifications. Even consciousness cannot be thought of as an immaterial entity, for it is affected by the state of our health, by wrong knowledge and even by certain drugs, such as tea, coffee, musk, camphor, etc."

The old notions about matter and atom have undergone considerable modification since the discovery of radium. Many distinguished physicists see in its phenomena an actual breakdown of what used to be considered the indestructible atom of matter. Electrons (units of electricity) are detached from atoms of matter

at an electrode, and it is believed that these electrons are really "bits chipped off" the atom ('The Riddle Vindicated').

The question of weight does not arise under the circumstances, since it is merely a comparative term. As a matter of fact, our experiences of matter consist only in resistant force. Therefore, there is nothing surprising in the established affinity between matter and force. For our practical requirements we may weigh or measure either of them, as we like, by our comparative methods.

As regards the cause or causes of evolution, the scientist denies that the universe is the outcome of any one's idea or design; he disputes with theology the hypothesis of a miraculous creation at the will of a creator, and ascribes the continuance of the universe to the unchanging laws of nature. Eager to maintain the claim of its Supreme Being to the creatorship of the universe, the theologically trained mind proceeds to establish it on the argument of analogy between a watch and the world, and asserts that as there could have been no watch without a watchmaker, so there could be no world without a creator. How far this argument is sound will be enquired into later, but we might avail ourselves of the present opportunity to examine two of the points involved in the claim advanced by theology. These are the notions of a creation from nothing and of a first beginning of the universe.

So far as the first of these points is concerned, the idea of nothing involves a contradiction in itself. In the popular sense, nothing is an empty concept, and, as such, inconceivable by the mind. We might describe the state of nothingness as a condition of 'existence' when this thing, that thing, the other thing, that is, when each and every and all things, were not, but we then have merely a notion of the negation of sense objects; and when we endeavour to think away substance itself, mind refuses to obey the impulse and the lips to formulate speech. Assuming, then, a beginning of the world process, we must say that the true state of existence prior to the manifestation of the universe must have been one in which all things lay unmanifested in the bosom of Existence itself. A mystic script (the Book of Dzryan) describes the idea in the following terms:—

"The eternal Parent wrapped in Her ever invisible robes had slumbered once again for seven eternities.

"Time was not, for it lay asleep in the infinite bosom of duration.

"Universal Mind was not, for there were no intelligent beings to contain it.

"The great causes of misery were not, for there was no one to produce and to get ensnared by them.

"Darkness alone filled the Boundless all, for Father, Mother, Son were once more one, and the Son had not yet awakened for the New Wheel and his pilgrimage thereon.

"The seven truths had ceased to be and the Universe, the Son of necessity, was immersed in the Absolute to be out-breathed by that which is and yet is not. Nought was.

"The causes of existence were no more; the visible that was and the invisible that is, rested in the Eternal Non-Being—One Being.

"Alone the one form of existence stretched boundless, infinite, causeless, in dreamless sleep, and life pulsed unconscious in Universal space throughout that all presence which is sensed by the opened eye of the Seer.

"But where was the Seer when the Over-Soul of the Universe was absorbed in the Absolute and the great Wheel was parentless? (In its formless, Eternal, Absolute condition)!"

The above is a passably accurate description of our conception of the state of Nought or "Nothingness." That which really and truly exists, in and for itself, can never cease to be; and even when the form of a thing lapses into the condition of non-manifestation and we say 'it is not,' the material of which it was made remains in existence, in some form or other. To put the same thing in different words, all things are causal possibilities before, and perceptible realities during, manifestation, while the true cause, or causes, which give them rise, remain unaffected by their transformations. It is thus obvious that there could never have been a moment of time, in the history of duration, with reference to which it could be said that the universe was a void and *nothing* existed with any degree of accuracy. Whence came substance itself, then? Philosophically, the question itself is absurd, for substance is existence itself, and, as such, is its own source. Besides, if we go on tracing the cause from its effect, we must ultimately halt at some existent substance; otherwise the process will be unending, or will have to depend on the creation of things miraculously from the womb of nought, which will mean a lapse from reason into irrationalism.

As regards the second point, the theologian is also wrong about his idea of a first cause or beginning. We cannot conceive a first beginning of the universe. Why should there be a change in the

state of affairs which had prevailed till then? Does the god of theology also change his attitude from a non-creative to a creative one? And what of the material of which the universe is made? Did it not exist in some form or other, prior to the making of the worlds? The theologian would like to answer this last question in the negative, but he fears the rebuke of the Scientist who has succeeded in establishing that it is not possible to make something out of nothing. The laws of conservation of matter and energy are hostile to the notion of a first beginning, and we have to recognise the fact that the process of world-making cannot possibly involve anything more than the restoring of a certain kind of order in an already existing state of affairs, that is, the making of a cosmos out of a chaos. But the chaos itself, when enquired into, would seem to owe its origin to a previous cosmos, which likewise must have succeeded an antecedent chaos, and so forth. Hence, instead of getting at a beginning of things, we find ourselves entangled in a circle of alternating chaos and cosmos, whence escape is possible only by abandoning the idea itself.

The doctrine of the first cause may afford momentary relief to a mind baffled by the sense of the vastness of the world-problem, but it is the sort of relief which one dropping into fire from the frying pan enjoys. The man of Science has understood the world-process much better than the theologian. Says Professor Haeckel :—

“It has recently been strongly confirmed and enlarged by theory that this cosmogonic process did not simply take place once, but is periodically repeated. While new cosmic bodies arise and develop out of rotating masses of nebula in some parts of the Universe, in other parts old, extinct, frigid ones come into collision and are once more reduced by the heat generated to the condition of nebulae.”

The immense quantity of heat which is generated in the collision of swiftly moving bodies represents the new kinetic energy which affects the condition of the resultant nebulae and the construction of new rotating bodies. Thus, what is the beginning to us might be the end to others in some other planet. The eternal drama goes on and on in this manner, unceasingly and for ever. On our own planet, in daily life, we see the same principle illustrated. What is the seed to-day becomes the tree to-morrow, and the seed again the day after, to become the tree once more. Can we ask, which was the first—the

seed or the tree? The tree is in the seed, and the seed is in the tree. There is no question of which was the first, the seed or the tree? There is no room for a first cause in the cycle of Eternity. One can think of a beginning of forms, but what beginning can be ascribed to the substances themselves? Sir Oliver Lodge is right when he says :—

“ We may all fairly agree, I think, that whatever really and fundamentally exists, so far as bare existence is concerned, be independent of time. It may go through many changes, and thus have a history ; that is to say, must have definite time-relations, so far as its changes are concerned ; but it can hardly be thought of as either going out of existence, or as coming into existence, at any given period, though it may completely change its form and accidents ; every thing basal must have a past and a future of some kind or other, though any special concatenation or arrangement may have a date of origin and of destruction ” (‘ Life and Matter ’).

The notion that the universe was miraculously created only about 6,000 years ago has been demonstrated to be inadequate by Scientific research. Haeckel sums up the result of scientific enquiry on this point in the following words :—

“ To the brilliant progress of modern geology we owe three extremely important results of general import. In the first place, it has excluded from the story of the earth all question of miracle, all question of supernatural agencies, in the building of the mountains and the shaping of the continents. In the second place, our idea of the length of the vast period of time which has been absorbed in their formation has been considerably enlarged. We now know that the huge mountains of the palæozoic, mesozoic, and cenozoic formations have taken not thousands, but millions of years in their growth. In the third place, we now know that all the countless fossils that are found in these formations are not ‘ sports of nature,’ as was believed 150 years ago, but the petrified remains of organisms that lived in earlier periods of earth’s history, and arose by gradual transformation from a long series of ancestors.”

Thus, whatever be the true significance of the seven-days’ creation given in the book of Genesis, it is clear that the theologian’s interpretation of the account is not one which can be regarded as satisfactory, in any sense of the word. The science of geology has demonstrated, beyond the possibility of doubt, that the world we inhabit is not less than hundreds of millions years old, and we have no alternative left but to reject the idea of its coming into being, for the first time, some six thousand years ago.

It is thus certain that there could be no beginning of the universe which, consequently, must be taken to be eternal. But this is clearly fatal to the notion of creation which is entertainable only on the supposition of a commencement of the world-process in the midst of a continuous *vacuum* and inaction. Our conclusion will, no doubt, appear highly disagreeable to theism, but there is no escape from it: for the world is crowded with features which forbid us lightly to admit a controlling Supreme Intelligence. According to Mr. Fiske, quoted by McCabe—

"The fact stands inexorably before us, that a Supreme Will, enlightened by perfect intelligence and possessed of infinite power, might differently have fashioned the universe, so that the suffering and the waste of life which characterise nature's process of evolution might have been avoided."

Mr. McCabe also quotes from Mallock's 'RELIGION AS A CREDIBLE DOCTRINE' from which we take the following extract as having a special bearing on the point under consideration:—

"We must divest ourselves of all foregone conclusions, of all question-begging reverences, and look the facts of the universe steadily in the face. If theists will but do this, what they will see will astonish them. They will see that if there is anything at the back of this vast process with a consciousness and a purpose in any way resembling our own—a Being who knows what he wants and is doing his best to get it—he is, instead of a holy and all-wise God, a scatter-brained, semi-powerful, semi-impotent monster. They will recognize as clearly as they ever did the old familiar facts which seemed to them evidences of God's wisdom, love and goodness; but they will find that these facts, when taken in connection with the others, only supply us with a standard in the nature of this Being himself by which most of his acts are exhibited to us as those of a criminal madman. If he had been blind, he had not had sin; but if we maintain that he can see, then his sin remains. Habitually a bungler as he is, and callous when not actively cruel, we are forced to regard him, when he seems to exhibit benevolence, as, not divinely benevolent, but merely weak and capricious, like a boy who fondles a kitten, and the next moment sets a dog at it. And not only does his moral character fall from him bit by bit, but his dignity disappears also. The orderly processes of the stars and the larger phenomena of nature are suggestive of nothing so much as a wearisome Court ceremonial surrounding a king who is unable to understand or to break away from it; whilst the thunder and whirlwind, which have from time immemorial been accepted as special revelations of his awful power and majesty, suggest, if they suggest anything of a personal character at all, a blackguardly larrikin kicking up his heels in the clouds, not perhaps bent on mischief, but indifferent to the

fact that he is causing it. . . . A God who could have been deliberately guilty of them [the evolutionary processes] would be a God too absurd, too monstrous, too mad to be credible."

Such is the opinion of Mr. Mallock, who, we learn from Mr. McCabe, has throughout his life been one of the ablest opponents of agnosticism and nothing less than scornful of a profession of atheism. There is the force of conclusiveness in his remarks, and, although one cannot agree with him in all respects concerning his notions about religion, still it is impossible to hold that the universe is the result of a direct volition on the part of a manlike, purposive creator.

What, then, is the guiding principle which ensures regularity of phenomena in nature? Is it chance, a pure accident, as it might be termed? A certain class of philosophers, no doubt, maintain that it is chance pure and simple which accounts for all order and regularity in the world; but it seems impossible to hold that reason is satisfied with the explanation; for, while it is certain that the universe is not the result of a direct and purposive creation by a manlike architect, it is equally certain that chance could not be the cause of its existence by any means. An accident may be defined to be an exception to the general rule but never as the general rule itself. The systematic and orderly working of the various laws of nature could not be termed accidental by any possibility. With chance at the helm there would be no certainty of verification, nor could we rely upon the recurrence of any phenomenon in Nature. The theory of an accidental spontaneity of the existence of all things, which might account for the forms and modifications of certain purely material things is, at best, a pure speculation of reason, and not a law of universal applicability. Chance and law are incompatible by nature. As a thoughtful writer points out, a series of accidents, however numerous or important, can neither cause nor adequately explain the orderly, progressive development of anything, much less the evolution of a universe, or a planet, or humanity; it requires a law to do that. This law which is manifest in the form of an inherent, irresistible inclination in the nature of things themselves we take to be the very function of substances, which none of them may refuse to perform. This inherent inclination, the will to manifest, as it were, of things, or the Supreme Will of

Nature,' as it might be termed collectively, is behind all, and it is to this 'will to manifest' that we are indebted for order and regularity in the world. With chance at the helm, we should be unable to predict anything, and life, instead of finding encouragement and joy in the pursuit of Science, would fritter itself away for pure uncertainty and worry. One cannot conceive a greater calamity, in short, than the change of the orderly working of laws into a state of chaotic chance. We must, therefore, reject the hypothesis of chance altogether. Our conclusion, however, is not to be taken as establishing the existence of an interfering deity; for the very argument which excludes the hypothesis of chance also suffices to prove that the uniformity and regularity of the laws of nature are possible only on the supposition that no one interferes with their working. The laws of nature are not at all like the written or verbal injunctions of men which may be defeated by artifice or cunning; they owe their origin to the properties of substances with which no one tries to or can interfere successfully.

It is also well to bear in mind that the word 'chance,' in its 'scientific' import, does not mean anything in the nature of a 'lawless'

'Theology, no doubt, holds that the world-process is maintained by the word of its God, without whose command nothing whatsoever can take place in the universe; but then theology has no reply to give to the question: why should things be endowed with different attributes, if they can function only in obedience to the word of a god? If we do not deceive ourselves with false assumptions and suppositions, we shall observe that different substances exercise different functions, so that none of them can perform the function of another. If it were otherwise, water might be imagined to perform the function of fire, fire of air, air of intelligence, and so forth. But the supposition is so highly absurd that no sane mind has ever considered it possible. We must, then, assume that each substance has its own special function which cannot be performed by anything else. But what is function, if not the *particular mode of existence* of a substance? This amounts to saying that no substance can exist if its function be annihilated even for a moment, e.g., fire would cease to be fire the moment it ceased to perform its specific function of burning and production of heat. Now the supposition that the substances of nature stand in need of the command of a god to perform their function is possible only on the assumption that they do not function except when ordered to do so by him. But this is a clear case of impossibility, for a substance cannot both exist and not exist at the same time, its function being only the particular mode or manner of its existence. It follows, therefore, that no one can possibly interfere with the function of existing substances.

occurrence, but only a denial of all foreign interference of a teleological type. Says Haeckel :—

"One group of philosophers affirms, in accordance with its teleological conception, that the whole cosmos is an orderly system in which every phenomenon has its aim and purpose; there is no such thing as chance. The other group, holding a mechanical theory, expresses itself thus: The development of the universe is a monistic mechanical process, in which we discover no aim or purpose whatever; what we call design in the organic world is a special result of biological agencies; neither in the evolution of heavenly bodies nor in that of the crust of our earth do we find any trace of a controlling purpose—all is the result of chance. Each party is right—according to its definition of chance. The general law of causality, taken in conjunction with the law of substance, teaches us that every phenomenon has a mechanical cause; in this sense there is no such thing as chance. Yet it is not only lawful, but necessary, to retain the term for the purpose of expressing the simultaneous occurrence of two phenomena, which are not causally related to each other, but of which each has its own mechanical cause, independent of that of the other."

In defending the position taken up by Haeckel in the "Riddle" from the attacks of theistic philosophers, Mr. Joseph McCabe describes the only sense in which science admits "chance" events, and clearly frames the issue between it and theism. According to him—

"Haeckel and his colleagues hold that the direction which the evolutionary agencies take is not 'fortuitous'; that they never could take but the one direction which they have actually taken. A stone has not a dozen possible paths to travel by when you drop it from your hand. You do not seek any reason why it follows direction A instead of direction B or C. So it is, says the monist, with all the forces in the universe. The theist says the ultimate object must have been foreseen and the forces must have been guided, or they would never have worked steadily in this definite direction. The monist says that these forces no more needed guiding than a tram-car does; there was only one direction possible for them. Here is a clear issue, and in the present state of apologetics, an important one."

There is no doubt but that this is the correct explanation, for chance is not a synonym for 'lawlessness' in the literature of science. The materialist, however, comes to grief when he maintains that his 'tram-car' of matter and force could not only guide itself so precisely as to steer clear of all turns and bends and other obstacles in its path, but could evolve out its *passengers* as well. For intelligence is not a product of matter, and no amount of weight of authority and glib talking would ever succeed in proving that the conscious could come

out of that which is unconscious by nature. The argument put in the mouth of Bishop Butler, in the famous Belfast Address, which the late Prof. Tyndall declared to be unanswerable, has in no way been refuted since :

"Take your dead hydrogen atoms, your dead oxygen atoms, your dead carbon atoms, your dead nitrogen atoms, your dead phosphorus atoms, and all the other atoms, dead as grains of shot, of which the brain is formed. Imagine them separate and sensationless; observe them running together and forming all imaginable combinations. This, as a purely mechanical process, is seeable by the mind. But can you see or dream, or in any way imagine, how out of that mechanical act and from these individually dead atoms, sensation, thought and emotion are to rise? Are you likely to extract Homer out of the rattling of dice, or Differential Calculus out of the clash of billiard-balls? . . . You cannot satisfy the human understanding in its demand for logical continuity between molecular processes and the phenomena of consciousness."

Tyndall tried to evade the difficulty by enlarging the definition of matter to include life. He said :—

"If we look at matter as pictured by Democritus, and as defined for generations in our scientific text-books, the notion of conscious life coming out of it cannot be formed by the mind. The argument placed in the mouth of Bishop Butler suffices, in my opinion, to crush all such materialism as this. Those, however, who framed these definitions of matter were but partial students. They were not biologists, but mathematicians, whose labour referred only to such accidents and properties of matter as could be expressed in their formulae. Their science was mechanical science, not the science of life. With matter in its wholeness they never dealt; and, denuded by their imperfect definition, 'the gentle mother of all' became the object of her children's dread. Let us reverently, but honestly, look the question in the face. Divorced from matter, where is life? Whatever our *faith* may say, our *knowledge* shows them to be indissolubly joined. Every meal we eat and every cup we drink, illustrates the mysterious control of the mind by Matter."

The fact, however, is that life and matter are two entirely different substances, each possessing separate and specific attributes of its own and performing functions which the other is incapable of discharging by nature. We may look into the process of the formation of the organic eye to judge the merit of the scientist's notion of evolution. Haeckel sums up the scientific conclusions on this point, in his usually terse style, as follows :—

"(1) At the lowest stage of organization the whole psychoplasm, as such, is sensitive; and reacts on the stimuli from without, that is the case with the lowest protists, with many plants, and with some of the most rudimentary animals.

"(2) At the second stage, very simple and undiscriminating *sense organs* begin to appear on the surface of the organism, in the form of the protoplasmic filaments and pigment spots, the forerunners of the nerves of touch and the eyes; these are found in some of the higher protists and in many of the lower animals and plants.

"(3) At the third stage specific organs of sense, each with a peculiar adaptation, have arisen by differentiation out of these rudimentary processes: these are the chemical instruments of smell and taste and the physical organs of touch, temperature, hearing and sight. The specific energy of these sense organs is not an original inherent property, but has been gained by functional adaptation and progressive heredity.

"(4) The fourth stage is characterised by the centralisation or integration of the nervous system, and, consequently, of sensation; by the association of the previously isolated or localised sensations, presentations arise, though they still remain unconscious. That is the condition of many, both of the lower and the higher animals.

"(5) Finally, at the fifth stage, the highest psychic function, conscious perception, is developed by the mirroring of the sensations in a central part of the nervous system, as we find in man and the higher vertebrates and probably in some of the higher invertebrates, notably in the articulate."

This, no doubt, seems very plausible, but if one reflects on the theory its defects become clear. It does not, for one thing, explain the faculty of perception itself. The eye is not the same thing as vision, nor is the organ the same as function. Besides, vision is a simple act, but none the less it involves several centres behind the eye in its performance. Unless all these centres develop internally and externally at the same time, vision would be impossible. Moreover, if the organ be the cause of the function, we ought to be aware of its exercise at all times. Constantly ought the ear to hear, the nose to smell, the eye to see, and so forth. But that this does not happen always, even in waking moments, is only too well-known. In sleep the functions of the organs of sensation are suspended even more completely. The mechanical explanation, therefore, falls short of explaining the psychic faculties.

The development of identical complex organs, such as the eye, on different and divergent 'lines of evolution,' points to an internal impetus being the real cause of variation. This impetus resides in the soul, as will be proved fully a little later. According to Bergson, Life is a flux which, at a certain point of its progress into matter, divides itself into different branches, each of which develops into a new

species, and evolves out certain characteristic features of the original impetus—the fundamental cause of variation. While not agreeing with him on every essential feature of his theory of flux and its branching off at a certain point in time, we think he is right when he says*†—

“Two points are equally striking in an organ like the eye: the complexity of its structure and the simplicity of its function. The eye is composed of distinct parts, such as the sclerotic, the cornea, the retina, the crystalline lens, etc. In each of these parts the detail is infinite. The retina alone comprises three layers of nervous elements—multipolar cells, bipolar cells, visual cells—each of which has its individuality and undoubtedly a very complicated organism: so complicated, indeed, is the retinal membrane in its intimate structure, that no simple description can give an adequate idea of it. The mechanism of the eye is, in short, composed of an infinity of mechanisms, all of extreme complexity. Yet vision is one simple fact. As soon as the eye opens, the visual act is effected. Thus, because the act is simple, the slightest negligence on the part of nature in the building of the infinitely complex machine would have made vision impossible. This contrast between the complexity of the organ and the unity of the function is what gives us pause. A mechanistic theory is one which means to show us the gradual building up of the machine under the influence of external circumstances intervening either directly by action on the tissues, or indirectly by the selection of better-adapted ones. But, whatever form this theory may take, supposing it avails at all to explain the detail of the parts, it throws no light on their correlations.

“Then comes the doctrine of finality, which says that the parts have been brought together on a preconceived plan with a view to a certain end. In this it likens the labour of nature to that of the workman, who also proceeds by the assemblage of parts with a view to the realisation of an idea or the imitation of a model. Mechanism, here, reproaches finalism with its anthropomorphic character, and rightly. But it fails to see that it itself proceeds according to this method—somewhat mutilated? True, it has got rid of the end pursued or the ideal model. But it also holds that nature has worked like a human being by bringing parts together, while a mere glance at the development of an embryo shows that life goes to work in a different way. *Life does not proceed by the association and addition of elements, but by dissociation and division.* We must get beyond both points of view, both mechanism and finalism being, at bottom, only standpoints to which the human mind has been led by considering the work of man. But in what direction can we go beyond them? We have said that in analyzing the structure of an organ, we can go on decomposing for ever, although the function of the whole is a simple thing. This contrast between the infinite complexity of the organ and the extreme simplicity of the function is what should open our eyes.

* ‘Creative Evolution,’ pp. 93 to 101

"If I raise my hand from A to B, this movement appears to me under two aspects at once. Felt from within, it is a simple, indivisible act. Perceived from without, it is the course of a certain curve, A. B. In this curve I can distinguish as many positions as I please, and the line itself might be defined as a certain mutual co-ordination of these positions. But the positions, infinite in number, and the order in which they are connected, have sprung automatically from the indivisible act by which my hand has gone from A to B. Mechanism, here, would consist in seeing only to the positions. Finalism would take their order into account. But both mechanism and finalism would leave on one side the movement, which is reality itself. In one sense *the movement is more* than the position and than their order; for it is sufficient to make it in its indivisible simplicity to secure that the infinity of the successive positions as also their order be given at once—with something else which is neither order nor positions, but which is essential, the mobility. But, in another sense, the movement is *less* than the series of positions and their connecting order; for, to arrange points in a certain order, it is necessary first to conceive the order and then to realise it with points, there must be the work of assemblage and there must be intelligence; whereas *the simple* movement of the hand contains nothing of either. It is not intelligent, in the human sense of the word, and it is not an assemblage, for it is not made up of elements. Just so with the relation of the eye to vision. Nature has had no more trouble in making an eye than I have in lifting my hand.

"It is one thing to manufacture, and quite another to organize. Manufacturing is peculiar to man. It consists in assembling parts of matter which we have cut out in such manner that we can fit them together and obtain from them a common action. The parts are arranged, so to speak, around the action as an ideal centre. To manufacture, therefore, is to work from the periphery to the centre, or, as the philosophers say, from the many to the one. Organization, on the contrary, works from the centre to the periphery. It begins in a point that is almost a mathematical point, and spreads around this point by concentric waves which go on enlarging. The work of manufacturing is the more effective, the greater the quantity of matter dealt with. It proceeds by concentration and compression. The organizing act, on the contrary, has something explosive about it: it needs at the beginning the smallest possible place, a minimum of matter, as if the organizing forces only entered space reluctantly.

"With greater precision, we may compare the process by which nature constructs an eye to the simple act by which we raise the hand. But we supposed at first that the hand met with no resistance. Let us now imagine that, instead of moving in air, the hand has to pass through iron filings which are compressed and offer resistance to it, in proportion as it goes forward. At a certain moment the hand will have exhausted its effort, and, at this very moment, the filings will be massed and co-ordinated in a certain definite form, to wit, that of the hand that is stopped and of a part of the arm. Now, suppose that the hand and arm are invisible. Lookers-on will seek the reason of the arrangement in the filings themselves and the forces within the mass. Some will account for the position of each filing by the action exerted upon it by the neighbouring filings these are the mechanists.

Others will prefer to think that a plan of the whole has presided over the detail of these elementary actions: they are the finalists. But the truth is that there has been merely one indivisible act, that of the hand passing through the filings the inexhaustible detail of the movement of the grains, as well as the order of their final arrangement, expresses negatively, in a way, this undivided movement, being the unitary form of a resistance, and not a synthesis of positive elementary actions. For this reason, if the arrangement of the grains is termed an 'effect' and the movement of the hand a 'cause,' it may indeed be said that the whole of the effect is explained by the whole of the cause, but to parts of the cause parts of the effect will in no wise correspond. In other words, neither mechanism nor finalism will here be in place, and we must resort to an explanation of a different kind. Now, in the hypothesis we propose, the relation of vision to the visual apparatus would be very nearly that of the hand to the iron filings that follow, canalize and limit its motion. According as the undivided act constituting vision advances more or less, the materiality of the organ is made of a more or less considerable number of mutually co-ordinated elements, but the order is necessarily complete and perfect. It could not be partial, because, once again, the real process which gives rise to it has no parts. That is what neither mechanism nor finalism takes into account, and it is what we also fail to consider when we wonder at the marvellous structure of an instrument, such as the eye. In reality, the cause, though more or less intense, cannot produce its effect except in one piece, and completely finished. According as it goes further and further in the direction of vision, it gives the simple pigmentary masses of a lower organism, or the rudimentary eye of a *Serpula*, or the slightly differentiated eye of the *Aleiopis*, or the marvellously perfected eye of the bird; but all these organs, unequal as is their complexity, necessarily present an equal co-ordination. For this reason, no matter how distant two animal species may be from each other, if the progress toward vision has gone equally far in both, there is the same visual organ in each case, for the form of the organ only expresses the degree in which the exercise of the function has been obtained."

"If Vision," objects Mr. Elliot, the author of 'Modern Science and the Illusions of Prof. Bergson,' "is a single elementary 'life tendency' which makes a certain kind of eye wherever it goes, there must either be two kinds of Visions and two separate 'life-tendencies'; or else the Pearly Nautilus will have to fall back on Darwinian principles for the evolution of his eye, and if Pearly Nautilus can grow an eye on materialist lines, why not Pecten?" But if Mr. Elliot had taken the trouble to find out the secret of vision in dreaming, when the natural organs of sight are closed, it is more than probable that he would not have picked up his pen in a hurry to champion the cause of materialism or to defend Darwin from the attacks of M. Bergson. Unfortunately it is not explained how the pin-hole

camera eye of the Pearly Nautilus interferes with vision being a function of Life, or Spirit. That which sees through the eye is Life, the different types of eyes merely indicating the different kinds of its movement in the direction of vision. Unless we prove the genesis of Life from purely mechanical processes, or at least make it plausible enough to be acceptable to reason, there is no use asserting that the senses have arisen on Darwinian lines of thought. What is conveniently forgotten is that perception and sensation are affections, or states, of consciousness, and not extraneous growths, somehow tacked on to Life from the outside. Attention must, therefore, be directed not to the descent of species but to life itself in the first instance. A materialism that seeks to develop higher forms of consciousness and the different faculties of perception by a process of gradual development under environmental influence must first make sure that such development is conceivable by the mind. For by no kind of wordy legerdemain is it possible to secure the mind's assent to the proposition that an originally unconscious stuff can be invested with consciousness as the result of evolution or environmental action. And the case is no wise altered by positing a crude primary *nucleus* of tactile sensitivity to form the substratum of subsequent modification, since it does not enable us to get over the difficulty about converting pure primary tactile sensitivity into such forms of perception as taste, smell, sight and hearing. For these specific sensations are not the intensified effects or multiples of a primary sensation of touch, but are totally different in their nature from it and also from one another. Their differences are not those of quantity or intensity, but of quality and kind. The chasm between a pure sensation of touch and such higher functions of life as judgment and will is too great to be bridged over by pure jugglery with confusing conceptions and terms, and demands a satisfactory explanation from those who would explain these higher faculties by simple exaggeration or magnifying of the supposed primary *nucleus*. There is not an iota of evidence to support the proposition that a bare sensation of touch can be transformed into clairvoyant perception or logical inference, and we certainly do not expect to get the highly cultured mind of a Kant or a Schopenhauer by multiplying a simple sensation of touch a thousand, a million, or even a hundred thousand

million of times by itself. These higher faculties and functions of life must, therefore, be deemed to appertain to spirit, and to arise from within the being of our consciousness under suitable conditions. We are logically debarred from regarding them as extraneous growths or acquisitions.

It is thus clear that no hypothesis which ignores the element of life can ever hope to succeed in solving the world-problem. Matter is only capable of making material bodies or tenements; it will never succeed in creating 'tenants' to occupy and enjoy the product of its labour.

The fact is that spirit is a substance' in itself, and is endowed with consciousness as its function. If we remove it from the field, there is nothing left to take its place, or to account for the phenomena of perception, memory and the like which a rigid materialism endeavours in vain to explain on lines of Haeckelian thought.

It is interesting to note that the materialist does not deny' the existence of consciousness altogether, but only its permanence as a separate entity or soul. Taking the ego to be the consciousness of 'I,' he proceeds to show that it cannot be eternal, being the consciousness

'The word substance, when used in connection with spirit, is not to be confounded with matter. In philosophy, substance is that which underlies or is the permanent subject or cause of all phenomena, whether material or spiritual; the subject which we imagine to underlie the attributes or qualities by which alone we are conscious of existence (The Imperial Dictionary). Thus every thing that exists must be a substance. Hence, souls, or spirit, and matter are both substances, though of different natures, as is evident from their attributes.

The Arabic *جاء* (*wajud*=is-ness, or be-ing), is eminently suited to express the sense of existence or subsistence, though it does not quite convey the same idea as the word substance, an almost exact equivalent of the Sanskrit *dravya* signifying the substrate of changes, or *accidents*, as they are technically called. It is this *is-ness*, or *جاء*, which, constituting, as it does, the basis of *be-ing*, furnishes the only test of reality, so that whatever is found to be *جاء مع* (*mai wajud*=with *wajud*) must be really and truly *جاء* (*maujud*=present, hence, existing).

"Should any one be found bold enough to deny the existence of consciousness altogether, he can only be told that in all philosophical search after truth, we have to take the existence of the 'knower' or 'thinker' for granted; for it is impossible to take even a single step forward without assuming this self-evident truth. If there be no Thinker or Knower, who could think or know? As Shankara says:—"The self is not contingent in the case of any person; for it is self-evident. . . . Nor is it possible to deny such a reality, for it is the very essence of him who would deny it." As a well-known philosopher maintains: "I think, therefore, I am." Max Müller puts it, "I am, therefore, I think." One cannot think unless one have some kind of being. The question, 'do I exist?' does not arise; for it is illegal to require proof of that which has been taken for granted as a postulate, and is a self-evident truth. No one has a right to open his lips to utter this question unless he admit, at the very commencement, that he who puts it is some one that exists.

of an idea gradually evolved out and developed in the individual. Certainly, if we watch the development of the sense of "I" in the child, we learn that for quite a considerable portion of its infantine existence it talks of itself in the third person and has no clear conception of his personality. Besides, personality is naturally variable. Our ideas are constantly being remodelled and changed. A grown-up man has very little of the personality of the school-boy in him; and even the latter retains but little from that of a still earlier period. When we grow old a still more radical change takes place in us; neither the tastes, nor the pursuits, nor the surroundings of the earlier phases of life have any hold on, or attraction for, us in old age. Our ideas of the self change also with the changes in our circumstances. So far as the evolution of the conception of the self is concerned, one need not differ from Haeckel who says:—

"In the important moment when it (the child) first pronounces the word 'I,' when the feeling of self becomes clear, we have the beginning of self-consciousness, and of the antithesis of non-ego."

The phenomenon of personality, however, appears perplexing only so long as we do not study it in all its stages of development. By looking at a fully developed being, we are led to imagine his personality as a sort of separate entity, and begin to think of it in the abstract. This erroneous impression can be removed at once, if we look back into the history of the development of the child from the moment of its birth, and follow its growth through the early stages of its life. Professor Haeckel has very ably discussed this point in his "Riddle of the Universe" as well as in "The Wonders of Life." But he does not confine himself to the legitimate sphere of modern science, and allows his ambition to soar in an atmosphere too rarefied for him to breathe in. Concerning the Kantian dogmas, which included the immortality of the soul, it is said in "The Wonders of Life":—

"If Kant had had children, and followed patiently the development of the child's soul (as Freyer did a century later), he would hardly have persisted in his erroneous idea that reason, with its power of attaining *a priori* knowledge, is a transcendental and supernatural wonder of life, or a unique gift to man from heaven. The root of the error is that Kant had no idea of the natural evolution of mind. He did not employ the comparative and genetic methods to which we owe the chief scientific achievements of the last century. Kant and his followers who confined themselves, almost exclusively,

to the introspective methods or the self-observation of their own mind, regarded as the model of the human soul the highly developed and versatile mind of the philosopher, and disregarded altogether the lower states of mental life which we find in the child and the savage."

As already observed, Haeckel is undoubtedly right as regards the evolution of personality, but we must not allow ourselves to be carried away by his eloquence beyond that point. This great man has fallen into the error of confounding reason with consciousness itself, whereas, in very truth, reason is but a manifestation of consciousness when working through an organism of a particular type. The true self is pure consciousness though ensouled in a body of matter; and just as electricity, as a power, is manifested in various forms, now appearing as light, again as heat, and yet again as power moving heavy bodies, and so forth, though it is only its manifold manifestations which are visible but never the power, i.e., electricity itself, so is the soul observable by us only in its manifestations. What electricity is in itself we do not know, though we do know that it is capable of being transformed into light by the employment of suitable means. Similarly, consciousness, when it works through the human brain, appears in the form of reason, though, obviously, it must transcend reason itself. Now, since the nature of the apparatus, or vehicle, determines the form of manifestation, the faculty of reason, which depends for its unfoldment on the development of the brain, must necessarily pass through a process of evolution such as that observed by Preyer. But just as electric light cannot be said to be a secretion of the lamp, the globe or its fittings, so cannot reason be described as a secretion of the physical brain. Hence, the self, if it be taken to mean consciousness, cannot possibly be said to be the outcome of the human brain, but if supposed to be merely a bundle of ideas, extracted from the physical surroundings and labelled 'personality,' in any particular incarnation, must depend on reason, and, therefore, on its vehicle, the brain. To this limited extent Haeckel is undoubtedly right.

But does the absence of the thought or idea of 'I' in the early stages of life prove the absence of the ego itself? We think, not. There is no thought of 'I' also in sleep, or in a fainting fit, but does its absence then entitle any one to say that the ego itself is non-existent under

those conditions? The animals also do not refer to or speak of themselves in the first or the third person, yet are they 'a people like unto us,' as the Qur'an correctly points out. It is true that an infant just beginning to lisp refers to itself in the third person, but it is no less true that no infant ever *feels* pleasure or pain 'in the third person,' or appropriates to itself the experiences of others, or transfers to them its own. When a little one lisps 'give the baby a biscuit,' it surely does not mean that the biscuit is to be given to some one other than itself. The reference to 'the baby,' under the circumstances, is only a delightful instance of the infantine disregard of the rules of grammar, so pleasing to the heart of every mother. Many grown-up persons, particularly those from the lower strata of society, also refer to themselves at times by name, but no one ever maintains that they do not *feel* their own existence 'in the first person.' Those who are beginning to learn a foreign tongue, likewise, make ridiculous blunders in the use of words intended to express conventional or convenient abstractions of which the pronouns form a class by themselves. The infant hears itself spoken of as 'the baby,' and, not being particularly familiar with or skilled in the use of pronouns, fails to observe the rules of grammar in its speech. The fact is that consciousness manifests itself in two different ways: firstly, in the form of feeling, and, secondly, as reason. Of these, the first form is eternal, but the second depends on circumstances and unfoldment. The same argument which leads us to the conclusion that the idea of personality is the creature of evolution, also leads us to the conclusion that its basis is eternal, though particular types of its manifestation may differ from time to time. The study of the development and growth of the child also reveals the presence of the feeling of pain which finds expression in the first cry the little one utters, on entering the world. Is this feeling of pain, together with the sense of hunger, and all those indications of likes and dislikes which the child displays from the earliest moment after birth, also the outcome of evolution? We shall be prepared to regard consciousness as a product of evolution only when it is demonstrated that lifeless things can be made to *feel* pain and cry in laboratories. A substratum of consciousness must be allowed in the first instance before we can bring in its modifications in the course of evolution.

We must endeavour to keep our minds quite clear on the distinction between 'personality' and its substratum. The former is the bundle of ideas—social, proprietary, and the like, which one appropriates to one's bodily self—hence, the sum-total of relations in which a particular body stands to other bodies in the world. But the latter, *i.e.*, the substratum of personality, is the very power itself which enables these relations to be understood and determined. This power is inherent in 'life,' though not easily observable in every one of its manifestations or forms. Hence, the substratum of consciousness can never be said to be the outcome of evolution or of the matter of the physical brain.

The investigations made by the Psychical Research Society have gone a long way to establish the existence of the soul and the continuity of life. A mass of information has been obtained about the 'organization' of the soul and its two minds, the subjective and the objective. The phenomena observed have been subjected to the most rigid tests and searching enquiry, and classified and arranged on lines of scientific thought. The investigation has brought to light some of the most astounding secrets of nature, and has resulted in the confirmation of the ancient belief in the existence of souls. Things which were regarded as quite outside the range of possibility have been proved to be facts of observation, and telepathy, telekinesis, clairvoyance, and a host of other phenomena have been made subjects of experimental research. From the facts thus ascertained, it has been inferred, —and rightly inferred—that the soul is quite independent of the body, and is composed of a substance which completely differs from the matter of the physical organism which it inhabits.

So far as recovery of the memory of past incarnations is concerned, it is conceivable that in some cases the claim might be due to suggestion, consciously or unconsciously adopted, but it is impossible to maintain that every genuine case is always the outcome of suggestion or hallucination, though in these days of fraud, chicanery and gross irreligion we must be on our guard against too readily accepting the evidence adduced. Amongst the instances in which the memory of past incarnations has been claimed is that of Mlle. Helene Smith, who had to her credit, in addition to a control from the planet Mars, a pre-incarnation as an Indian princess, and a second, as Marie

Antoinette. In dealing with her case, F. W. H. Myers observes ('The Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death') :—

"Pythagoras, indeed, was content with the secondary hero Euphorbus as his bygone self. But in our days Dr. Anna Kingsford and Mr. Edward Maitland must needs have been the Virgin Mary and St. John, the Divine. And Victor Hugo, who was naturally well to the front in these self-multiplications, took possession of most of the leading personages of antiquity whom he could manage to string together in chronological sequence. It is obvious that any number of reborn souls can play at this game, but where no one adduces any evidence, it seems hardly worth while to go on. Even Pythagoras does not appear to have adduced any evidence beyond his *ipse dixit* for his assertion that the alleged shield of Euphorbus had in reality been borne by that mythical hero. Meantime the question as to re-incarnation has actually been put to a very few spirits who have given some real evidence of their identity. So far as I know, no one of these has claimed to know anything personally of such an incident, although all have united in saying that their knowledge was too limited to allow them to generalise on the matter.

"Helene's controls and previous incarnations—to return to our subject—do perhaps suffer from the general fault of aiming too high. She has to her credit a control from the planet Mars; one pre-incarnation as an Indian princess; and a second (as I have said) as Marie Antoinette.

"In each case there are certain impressive features in the impersonation; but in each case also careful analysis negatives the idea that we can be dealing with a personality really revived from a former epoch, or from a distant planet;—and leaves us inclined to explain everything by 'cryptomnesia' (as Professor Flournoy calls submerged memory), and that subliminal inventiveness of which we already know so much."

To the student of experimental psychology the case of Mlle. Smith irresistibly suggests the handiwork of the medium's own subjective self. It has been demonstrated that experimental hypnosis produces the same phenomena. Under the influence of hypnosis the subject is constantly amenable to suggestion; thus, if he is told that he is the President of the United States, he will immediately accept the statement as true, and assume all the airs of importance and dignity that he may conceive to appertain to that exalted position. Similarly, if it is suggested to him that he is the spirit of some dead friend, or acquaintance, or other person, he will confidently believe the suggestion to be true, and will assume the characteristics of the deceased, and, if interrogated, give a full account of his surroundings in a spirit world, albeit his account of his spirit abode will be in exact agreement with his preconceived notions on the subject. In

"The Psychic Phenomena" Mr. Hudson gives a very graphic and interesting account of an interview between a slate-writing medium and a celebrated Union general at which he himself was present. The result of that interview was that in two instances the replies came from the spirits of persons whom the medium thought to be dead, but who were actually alive, and, in one instance, in which a letter had been written to a deceased person, asking a specific question, the correct answer to which neither the sitter nor the medium could possibly know, the reply received was, "A. B. is here, but cannot communicate to-day." A. B. was the person addressed. The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from the experiment is that there was no such thing as the agency of disembodied spirits at the back of the psychic phenomena which is said to have occurred during the interview."

In the East, and particularly in India, where spirits and ghosts are popularly believed to haunt the scenes of their former worldly activities, and where *sikans* (mediums), magicians, and charmers abound and carry on a lucrative profession, the most superficial observer cannot fail to notice the fact that the so-called spirits have their origin in the hysterical hallucinations of a disorganized will. In most cases the patients are women and little children whose nervous systems are most highly strung—a fact which renders them highly sensitive to all sorts of suggestions, in particular to those about ghosts, goblins, and the like. But the most remarkable feature of the spirit, or 'control,' is its terror at the 'sight' of the amulet provided for the patient, consisting generally of a piece of paper with some undecipherable hieroglyphics, or a religious text, or formula, in some obsolete language which the patient does not generally understand. As a matter of fact, he is not allowed to see the writing on the paper, owing to the belief that the charm will suffer in efficacy from such an act. The question is, what is the principle of treatment in such cases? To say that the spirit or demon is frightened by the piece of paper or the writing upon it will be childish, inasmuch as no embodied spirit is susceptible to that sort of fear in life.

¹ Pages 276—283.

² As to the doubtful nature of this kind of phenomena see Joseph McCabe's informing work entitled "Is Spiritualism Based on Fraud?"

Nor is it possible to accept the theologian's explanation that the curative power lies in the name or the word of a God, for the 'word of power' is known to fail oftener than otherwise. The true explanation is to be found in the law of suggestion. The patient is led to believe that the charm is possessed of a potency which no spirit can defy, and the subjective mind within him does the rest. It sets up strong, healthy vibrations in the body, remedying the broken-down condition of the system, with the result that the evil spirits, which had come into being in consequence of the derangement of the will and nerves, disappear with the disappearance of their cause.

The fact that 'spirits,' which, by the way, seldom fail to put in an appearance at a seance, are invariably seen clad in the clothes they used to wear on earth is suggestive enough in itself, and gives rise to the inference that they owe their existence to the ideas of the 'living' who may be present at a sitting. In other cases, the perception of spirits in a waking state is an illustration of the work of the creative faculty of imagination with the aid of memory. Memory furnishes the impression, and imagination intensifies and 'projects' it in visible form, as happens in dreams. Thus, a critical analysis will show the so-called spirits to be made of the same stuff as dreams are made of.

This conclusion, however, does not affect the point in issue in so far as the question of the survival of the soul is concerned, since that depends on the nature of the soul, rather than on its perception by men. If the opinion of men, who have devoted their lives to the study of the psychic phenomena is admissible,—and the reasoned opinion of specialists and experts is always entitled to respect,—it is available in abundance to show that the soul is an undying reality, capable of maintaining a conscious existence independently of the body of matter. T. J. Hudson whose views as to the nature of the spiritistic phenomena generally agree with those stated above, writes in the preface to "A Scientific Demonstration of Future Life":

"In demonstrating the fact of a future life, I have simply analyzed the mental organization of man, and shown that, from the very nature of his physical, intellectual, and psychical organism, any other conclusion than that he is destined to a future life is logically and scientifically untenable."

Again, in summing up the case for the future life of the soul, in the concluding chapter of the book last-named, he maintains:—

"The fundamental axiom upon which our argument is based. . . is this: there is no faculty, emotion, or organism of the human mind that has not its own use, function or object. The first fundamental fact presented to view is that man is endowed with a dual mind. This has been abundantly demonstrated by the facts of experimental hypnotism, cerebral anatomy, and experimental surgery. . . The fact of duality alone, considered in connection with our fundamental axiom is sufficient to put the intelligent observer upon an earnest inquiry into the possible use, function, and object of a dual mental organism; and his first inquiry is, 'what possible use is there for two minds, if both are to perish with the body?' A future life, therefore, is at once suggested by this one isolated fact; and the suggestion is further strengthened by the fact that, whilst one of the two minds grows feeble as the body loses its vitality and is extinguished when the brain ceases to perform its functions, the other mind grows strong as the body grows weak, stronger still when the brain ceases to act, and reaches its maximum of power to produce observable phenomena at the very hour of physical dissolution. It is simply impossible, from these two facts alone, to resist the conclusion that the mind which reaches its maximum of observable power at the moment of dissolution is not extinguished by the act of dissolution. * * * Thus we find man, as he is presented to us in the light of demonstrable facts, possessed of a dual mental organism, comprising two classes of faculties, each complete in itself. We find one class of faculties to be finite, perishable, imperfect, and yet well-adapted to a physical environment, and capable of development, by the process of evolution, to a high degree of excellence, morally, physically, and mentally, within the limits of its finite nature. We also find that the noblest faculties belonging to physical man—those faculties which alone render his existence in this life tolerable, or even possible, those faculties which give him dominion over the forces of physical nature—are faculties which pertain exclusively to this life. On the other hand, we find another set of faculties, each perfect in itself, and complete in the aggregate,—that is to say, every faculty, attribute, and power necessary to constitute a complete personality being present in perfection: and we find that most important of those faculties perform no normal function in physical life. Here, then, we have a personality, consascent with the physical organism, but possessing independent powers: a distinct entity, with the intellect of a god; a human soul, filled with human emotions, affection, hopes, aspirations, and desires: longing for immortal life with a passionate yearning that passeth understanding; possessing, in a word, all the intellectual and moral attributes of a perfect manhood, together with a kinetic force often transcending, in its visible manifestations, the powers of the physical frame; in a word, a 'perfect being, nobly planned,'—a being of godlike powers and infinite possibilities. Is it conceivable that there has been created such a manhood without a mission, such faculties without a function, such powers without a purpose? Impossible! If nature is constant, no faculty of the human mind exists without a normal function to perform. If no faculty exists without a normal function

to perform, those faculties which do exist must perform their functions, either in this life or a future life. If man possesses faculties which perform no normal function in this life, it follows that the functions of such faculties must be performed in a future life."

Myers is even more emphatic when he writes¹ :—

"I regard each man as at once profoundly unitary and almost infinitely composite, as inheriting from earthly ancestors a multiplex and 'colonial' organism—polyzoic and perhaps polypsychic in an extreme degree; but also as ruling and unifying that organism by a soul or spirit absolutely beyond our present analysis—a soul which has originated in a spiritual or metathereal environment: which even while embodied subsists in that environment; and which will still subsist therein after the body's decay . . . I claim, in fact, that the ancient hypothesis of an indwelling soul, possessing and using the body as a whole, yet bearing a real, though obscure, relation to the various more or less apparently disparate conscious groupings manifested in connection with the organism and in connection with more or less localised groups of nerve-matter, is a hypothesis not more perplexing, not more cumbersome, than any other hypothesis yet suggested. I claim also that it is conceivably provable,—I myself hold it as actually proved,—by direct observation. I hold that certain manifestations of central individualities, associated now or formerly with certain definite organisms, have been observed in operation apart from those organisms, both while the organisms were still living, and after they had decayed."

Concerning the souls of the departed, Mr. Myers is of opinion that there is ground to believe that their state is one of endless evolution in wisdom and in love.

"*Spiritual evolution* :—that, then, is our destiny, in this and other worlds ;—an evolution gradual with many gradations, and rising to no assignable close. And the passion for Life is no selfish weakness ; it is a factor in the universal energy. It should keep its strength unbroken even when our weariness longs to fold the hands in endless slumber : it should outlast and annihilate the 'pangs that conquer trust' . . . Nay, in the infinite Universe man may now feel, for the first time, at home. The worst fear is over ; the true security is won. The worst fear was the fear of spiritual extinction or spiritual solitude ; the true security is in the telepathic law . . . As to our own soul's future, when that first shock of death is passed, it is in Buddhism that we find the more inspiring, the truer view. That western conception of an instant and unchangeable bliss, or woe—a bliss or woe determined largely by a man's beliefs, in this earthly ignorance, on matters which 'the angels desire to look into'—is the bequest of a pre-Copernican era of speculative thought. In its Mahomedan travesty, we see the same scheme with outlines coarsened into grotesqueness :—we see it degrade the cosmic march and profluence into a manner of children's play."

¹ "The Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death," Chap. 14.

The fact is that the moment we get rid of the erroneous notion that consciousness can be the product of the physical matter of the brain, and assign to it its proper place as a reality, coeval with matter, and endowed with functions which matter can never perform, we are left with no other alternative than that of continuity of life in both the past and the future. A necessary corollary from the established facts of continuity of life and evolution is the possibility of a consciousness of pre-incarnations in some rare and more advanced souls than the ordinary type of mediums. The sum-total of past experiences is preserved¹ in the mind in the shape of tendencies, emotions, passions, and the like, but not as isolated fragments or bits of knowledge, floating on the surface of consciousness. Hence, the memory of past incarnations depends on the capacity of the soul to re-transform its mental inclinations and tendencies into the original experiences which had given them birth. That mind is possessed of the power to revivify evaporated impressions of past thoughts and deeds, is evident from the faculty of recollection. Hence, any one who can perform the task of self-introspection in an advanced degree can recover the memory of his past lives, though, in the case of ordinary mediums, who are generally spiritually 'passive,' this power cannot be conceded, except where the abnormality of the mind unconsciously leads to the training of the will. But even in such a case the errors of belief and the impurities of the mind and body are sure to impart their tinge to the phenomena perceived and to make things appear topsy-turvy.

One has only to read the biographies of the Holy *Tirthankaras* in some of the Jaina Puranas to be convinced of the fact that a consciousness of pre-incarnations is not only not the outcome of suggestion in each and every case, but also possible of attainment for mankind at large.

The fact that the soul is capable of maintaining an existence independently of the physical body is not difficult to prove, since it is a simple and incorruptible substance. That the soul is a substance, i.e., that which exists *per se*, is clear from the fact that it is the subject of knowledge and a condition precedent to the awareness of all things, relations, and states of feelings. All mental modifications and

¹ See Chapter IX.

states of consciousness, such as sensations of pleasure and pain, and the like, pre-suppose a subject to which they belong. As a psychologist of note says, a feeling necessarily implies a being who feels. Cognitions and emotions cannot inhere in nothing, nor can volition be the function of a pure non-entity. Hence, they must be the states of a something which exists, consequently, of a substance.

As regards the simplicity of the soul, it is sufficient to point out that it cannot be a compound, since otherwise it will be incapable of discharging the functions that it does.

"Every one's experience," says Maher, "teaches him that he is capable of forming various abstract ideas, such as those of Being, Unity, Truth, Virtue and the like, which are of their nature simple, indivisible acts. Now, acts of this sort cannot flow from an extended or composite substance, such as, for instance, the brain. This will be seen by a little reflexion. In order that the indivisible idea of, say, truth, be the result of the activity of this extended substance, either different parts of the idea must belong to different parts of the brain, or each part of the brain must be subject of an entire idea, or the whole idea must pertain to a single part of the brain. Now, the first alternative is absurd. The act by which the intellect apprehends *truth, being,* and the like, is an indivisible thought. It is directly incompatible with its nature to be allotted or distributed over an aggregate of separate atoms. But the second alternative is equally impossible. If different parts of the composite substance were each the basis of a complete idea, we should have at the same time not one, but several ideas of the object. Our consciousness, however, tells us this is not the case. Lastly, if the whole idea were located in part or element of the composite substance, either this part is itself composite or simple. If the latter, then our thesis—that the ultimate subject of thought is indivisible—is established at once. If the former, then the old series of impossible alternatives will recur again until we are finally forced to the same conclusion."

The same argument also proves the simplicity of the subject of judgment. Maher, S. J., again points out :

"The simplest judgment pre-supposes the comparison of two distinct ideas, which must be simultaneously apprehended by one indivisible agent. Suppose the judgment, 'Science is useful,' to be elicited. If the subject which apprehends the two concepts 'science' and 'useful' is not indivisible, then we must assume that one of

¹ Mr. Maher's idea of inextension will become clear to the reader by a perusal of the following foot-note to page 444 of his 'Psychology':

"The schoolmen expressed the former attribute—absence of extension or composition of interrent parts—by the term *quantitative simplicity*. The fact that the soul is not the result of a plurality of principles coalescing to form a single nature . . . they signified by asserting that it is *essentially simple—simplex quoad essentiam*."

these terms is apprehended by one part and the other by a second: or else that separate elements of the divisible subject are each the seat of both ideas. In the former case, however, we cannot have any judgment at all. The part *a* apprehends 'science,' the different part *b* conceives the notion 'useful,' but the indivisible act of comparison requiring a single agent who combines the two ideas is wanting, and we can no more have the affirmative predication than if one man thinks 'science,' and another forms the concept 'useful.' In the second alternative, if *a* and *b* each simultaneously apprehended both 'science' and 'useful,' then we should have not one, but a multiplicity of judgments. The simplicity of the inferential act of the mind by which we seize the logical sequence of a conclusion, is still more irreconcilable with the hypothesis of a composite substance. The three judgments—Every *y* is *x*: every *x* is *y*; therefore, every *x* is *x*—could no more constitute a syllogism if they proceeded from a composite substance than if each proposition was apprehended alone by a separate man."

In respect of memory, also, it is not difficult to see that it cannot be the function of matter, or of a composite substance like the brain. There can be no recollection unless the identity of the person who recalls a past experience with the one who had undergone it is present in consciousness. "To remember the experiences of another," says Maher, "would be to remember *having been somebody else*: in other words, to simultaneously affirm and deny one's own identity, a pure and absurd contradiction." Recollection, then, would be impossible for a consciousness which is constantly generated from the physical matter of the brain, and which does not, therefore, persist through life.

Again, if consciousness be regarded as a secretion of matter, it must be a composite substance, in which case the consciousness an individual has of himself can only be the result of a combination of an immense number of consciousnesses. But this is contradicted by the fact that nobody feels himself as many. As to this, Mr. J. C. Chatterji, the author of 'The Hindu Realism,' observes:—

"Not only does an individual not feel himself as many, but if really many consciousnesses formed one individual consciousness, then the body would often be either torn to pieces or absolutely inactive. For, it is comparatively a very rare thing to find a large number of conscious entities acting together absolutely with one will and purpose. They generally have different wills and purposes of their own, and if the different members and parts of the body had each a separate consciousness of its own, and at the same time were not subordinate to some other and central consciousnesses, it is pretty certain that they would often disagree and try to carry on their different wills and purposes; and the result would be a complete

disintegration of the body. Or, if the body did not disintegrate, then there would be an absolute deadlock of activity, inasmuch as the varying wills and purposes of the different parts of the body would neutralize one another. But, as neither this kind of disintegration nor stagnation is ever observed, we must conclude that it is not the separate consciousnesses of the different parts of the body which produce the one individual consciousness."

Besides, if there were many consciousnesses in the body, mental activity would be carried on in different parts simultaneously, or at least there would be as many ideas of a single object of perception as there are consciousnesses in the body or the brain. But since actual experience belies this supposition, it follows that the soul is an indivisible unit of consciousness.

The above arguments fully suffice to prove the simplicity of the substance of consciousness.

We now come to the quality of indestructibility which is also an attribute of the soul. With regard to this, it must be evident that that which is a simple, *i.e.*, a non-compound substance, can never be conceived as coming to an end, for the annihilation of that which exists can only mean the breaking up of a compound into its component parts. Hence, annihilation is not possible where a given substance is not a compound that might break up into simpler elements.

It is interesting to note that the modern science of Physiological Psychology has itself felt obliged to acknowledge the presence, in a living being, of such an entity as shall enable the elements of sensation to be fused together into psychic experience, that is perception. Mr. McDougall writes in his *Physiological Psychology* (see pages 76—78) :—

"At any moment of waking life the state of one's consciousness in so far as it is sensational . . . is due to a multitude of stimuli playing upon the sense organs . . . and exciting . . . different specific psycho-physical processes in the sensory-motor arcs of the various sensory areas of the cerebral cortex. Each of these excites an elementary quality of sensation of greater or less intensity, and all these are fused with various degrees of intimacy to form the complex sensory background of consciousness in which, by successive efforts of attention, we can discriminate different qualities. The fusion of the elementary qualities is thus a purely psychical fusion and does not imply a fusion of the nervous processes that excite the elementary qualities . . . It has always been recognized that any state of consciousness of an individual, however complex it may be, is yet in a sense a unitary whole and not a mere agglomeration of the

parts or features which we distinguish in it by introspective analysis . . . We have to recognize that in sense perception the psychical state is the unitary resultant of a multiplicity of locally separate and qualitatively unlike nervous processes, and that the fusion is purely psychical fusion, obeying laws that are purely psychical laws and have no equivalents in physiological sphere . . . We are compelled to admit . . . that the so-called psychical elements are not independent entities, but are partial affections of a single substance or being ; and since . . . this is not any part of the brain, is not a material substance but differs from all material substance in that while it is unitary, it is yet present, or can act or be acted upon, at many points in space simultaneously (namely the various parts of the brain in which psycho-physical processes are at any moment occurring), we must regard it as an immaterial substance or being. And this being thus necessarily postulated as the ground of the unity of individual consciousness, we may call the *soul* of the individual."

As a result of the foregoing considerations we are entitled to say that being a substance, that is, as a something which subsists by its own nature, the soul cannot possibly be annihilated out of existence, and is an entity quite independent of the physical body which it inhabits during its earthly life. As such it is fully capable of maintaining an existence independently of its garment of flesh.

It will not be out of place to point out, while we are still on the subject, that the error of materialism is due to its supposition that a soul will be no soul unless it remain in one and the same state always and under all conditions, so that the consciousness which is affected by musk, coffee and the like, cannot but be a product of matter. This erroneous impression has probably derived encouragement from the teachings of certain cheap and easy-going systems of religious metaphysics which actually regard the living essence as unchanging and not liable to be affected by matter. There can, however, be no greater error than that implied in the supposition ; for both spirit and matter are able to influence and operate upon each other under certain circumstances. Nor is the interaction between these two substances erratic or indefinite in any sense ; it has its own laws which are as rigid and inviolable as those to be met with in any of the apodictic sciences. We shall define some of these laws when we come to deal with the theory of *karma* ; meanwhile, it is sufficient to say that the materialist has confused the issue by confining his attention to a set of wrong alternatives for an explanation of the phenomena of consciousness. The strangest thing about this

is that while he is not prepared to deny the existence of matter, in spite of the changes which it is constantly undergoing in subjection to the forces of nature, he sees nothing but non-existence of the soul the moment he discovers it to be affected by musk and the like, altogether forgetting that the gulf between the conscious and the unconscious is too wide to be bridged over by any means. As Prof. Bowne¹ observes:—

"By describing the mind as a waxen tablet, and things as impressing themselves upon it, we seem to get a great insight until we think to ask where this extended tablet is, and how things stamp themselves on it, and how the perceptive act could be explained even if they did. . . . The immediate antecedents of sensation and perception are a series of nervous changes in the brain. Whatever we know of the outer world is revealed only in and through these nervous changes. But these are totally unlike the objects assumed to exist as their causes. If we might conceive the mind as in the light, and in direct contact with its objects, the imagination at least would be comforted; but when we conceive the mind as coming in contact with the outer world only in the dark chamber of the skull, and then not in contact with the objects perceived, but only with a series of nerve changes of which, moreover, it knows nothing, it is plain that the object is a long way off. All talk of pictures, impressions, etc., ceases because of the lack of all the conditions to give such figures any meaning. It is not even clear that we shall ever find our way out of the darkness into the world of light and reality again. We begin with complete trust in physics and the senses, and are forthwith led away from the object into a nervous labyrinth, where the object is entirely displaced by a set of nervous changes which are totally unlike anything but themselves. Finally, we land in the dark chamber of the skull. The object has gone completely, and knowledge has not yet appeared. Nervous signs are the raw material of all knowledge of the outer world, according to the most decided realism. But in order to pass beyond these signs into a knowledge of the outer world, we must posit an interpreter who shall read back these signs into their objective meaning. But that interpreter, again, must implicitly contain the meaning of the universe within itself; and these signs are really but excitations which cause the soul to unfold what is within itself. Inasmuch as by common consent the soul communicates with the outer world only through these signs, and never comes nearer to the object than such signs can bring it, it follows that the principles of interpretation must be in the mind itself, and that the resulting construction is primarily only an expression of the mind's own nature. All reaction is of this sort; it expresses the nature of the reacting agents, and knowledge comes under the same head."

¹ *Metaphysics*, pp. 407—10.

Even that great psychologist Prof. William James, found himself forced to recognise that the 'I' which knows cannot be an aggregate personality, though, as a psychologist, he did not feel called upon to pronounce judgment upon the precise question before us now. He writes :—

"The consciousness of self involves a stream of thought, each part of which as 'I' can (1) remember those which went before, and know the things they knew; and (2) emphasize and care paramountly for certain ones among them as 'me' and appropriate to these the rest. The nucleus of the 'me' is always the bodily existence felt to be present at the time. This 'me' is an empirical aggregate of things objectively known. The 'I' which knows them cannot itself be an aggregate, neither for psychological purposes need it be considered an unchanging metaphysical entity like the Soul, or a principle like the pure Ego, viewed as out of time. It is a Thought at each moment, different from that of the last moment, but appropriative of the latter, together with all that the latter called its own."¹

Prof. James maintains that personality implies

"the incessant presence of two elements, an objective person, known by a passing subjective Thought and recognized as continuing in time."

But the question is, what is this so-called Subjective Thought, and where are we to look for it? The answer to this is not to be found in the books of Materialism, but in Religious philosophy, and, in the language of Swami Abhedananda, may be expressed thus :—

"Again, this Prana or life-force is inseparable from intelligence The Self has two powers, which express themselves as intelligence and as the activity of the Prana or life-force. Intelligence is that which is the source of consciousness. The life-force or *Mukhya Prana* is something independent of the sense-powers, but the sense-powers are dependent upon the life-giving Prana. Where life-force is unmanifest, the sense-organs may remain perfect, but there will not be any expression of the sense-powers in the form of the perception of sensation. The eye of a dead man may be perfect, the optic nerve may be in good condition, the brain cells may be in a normal state, but as the life-force is not working in that body, the sense-organs must remain dead, without performing their functions, without producing any sensation. Thus we can see that all the sense-organs remain active in the body, because Prana, the source of all activity, is there, and because the life-force governs and regulates all the senses."—(*Self-Knowledge*, pp. 72, 73, 76 and 77).

¹ See 'The Principles of Psychology,' Vol. I, p. 400.

According to Theosophists, "Consciousness and life are identical, two names for one thing, as regarded from within and from without. There is no life without consciousness; there is no consciousness without life. When we vaguely separate them in thought and analyze what we have done, we find that we have called consciousness turned inward by the name of life, and life turned outwards by the name of consciousness. When it is said that life is 'more or less conscious,' it is not the abstraction life that is thought of, but 'a living thing,' more or less aware of its surroundings" ('A Study in Consciousness,' by Annie Besant, p. 32).

This, however, does not explain the part played by matter in the manifestation of conscious phenomena; but William James, whose opinion as a psychologist has been already referred to, strikes the true note when he says:—

"When the physiologist who thinks that his science cuts off all hope of immortality pronounces the phrase, 'Thought is a function of the brain,' he thinks of the matter just as he thinks when he says, 'Steam is a function of the tea-kettle,' 'Light is a function of the electric circuit,' 'Power is a function of the moving waterfall.' In these latter cases the several material objects have the function of inwardly creating or engendering their effects, and their function must be called *productive function*. Just so, he thinks, it must be with the brain. Engendering consciousness in its interior, much as it engenders cholesterolin and creatin, and carbonic acid, its relation to our soul's life must also be called *productive function*. . . . But in the world of physical nature, *productive function* of this sort is not the only kind of function with which we are familiar. . . . In the case of a coloured glass, a prism, or a refracting lens, we have *transmissive function*. The energy of light, no matter how produced, is by the glass sifted and limited in colour, and by the lens or prism determined to a certain path and shape. Similarly, the keys of an organ have only a *transmissive function*. They open successively the various pipes and let the wind in the air-chest escape in various ways. The voices of the various pipes are constituted by the columns of air trembling as they emerge. But the air is not engendered in the organ. The organ proper, as distinguished from its air-chest, is only an apparatus for letting portions of it loose upon the world in these peculiarly limited shapes. My thesis now is this: that, when we think of the law that thought is a function of the brain, we are not required to think of *productive function* only; we are entitled also to consider *permissive or transmissive function*. And this the ordinary psycho-physiologist leaves out of his account. . . . As the air now comes through my glottis determined and limited in its force and quality of its vibrations by the peculiarities of those vocal chords which form its gate of egress and shape it into my personal voice; even so the genuine matter of reality, the life of a uls,

as it is in its fulness, will break through our several brains into this world in all sorts of restricted forms, and with all the imperfections and queerinesses that characterize our finite individualities here below."—*Human Immortality*, pp. 28—36.

The truth is that Spirit, Life, or Intelligence, is a self-subsistent reality, and quite independent of matter and its forms; Materialism has taken a great leap in the dark in regarding it as a product of matter.

It will be a mistake to imagine that we are the first in the field of research; in reality, every age has produced its thinkers who have devoted themselves whole-heartedly to the study of the problem. Perhaps it is not easy to excel certain mystic researchers in their investigation into the nature of Reality, or Life, underlying all appearances of matter. We can only admire their untiring zeal and their power of discernment. They have conceived the atom of physical matter, not to be a simple unit, devoid of parts, but to be composed of smaller fragments, and these, again, to be not simple, but complex combinations of still minuter particles. When we get to what might appear to be the smallest unit or atom of physical matter, we are not at the end of our search, for, to our utter bewilderment at that point, the atom breaks up and reveals within itself a kind of finer matter, known to the occultists as the matter of the Astral 'world.' By continuing the process of breaking up in the Astral 'world,' we get to its unit of matter or atom, only to find that there is another 'world' of indescribable beauty within it. In this manner, we pass through what are described as the 'Mental,' the 'Buddhic,' the 'Nirvanic,' the 'Paranirvanic' and the 'Mahaparanirvanic' planes, each of which consists in a finer quality of matter than the one preceding it. Life, however, manifests itself on all these planes, which are described as interpenetrating one another. No particular kind of matter could these mystic investigators discover as the source of consciousness, and even to-day no one has been able to point out the particular kind of atoms from which reason and memory could be distilled or choice and volition extracted. Such is the problem of Life; however far we might push our enquiry into the origin of consciousness, the mystery only deepens, and we are brought face to face with the enigma of being, with all its tantalizing charm of elusiveness.

and insolubility. But we should not forget the one important point about it, namely, that the problem arises just because we choose to create it by refusing to accept Life or Spirit as a self-subsisting Reality. The charm of elusiveness, thus, belongs to the human intellect which creates a maze in the first instance, and then manages to lose itself in its imaginary turns and bends; and just because the perplexity is of our own making, we can allow ourselves to be as deeply entangled in its meshes as we please.

To continue with our examination of modern science, matter has been seen to be insufficient to explain the phenomena of consciousness, notwithstanding that scientists have endeavoured to evade the difficulty by exaggerating its function. This is not the only difficulty in the way of modern science; for it has little or no knowledge of even Time and Space, though it is familiar with the ubiquitous ether, the necessary medium of motion. As regards Time and Space, some idea of the confusion of thought prevailing amongst modern writers might be formed by a perusal of the following deliberate opinion of Herbert Spencer, one of England's greatest philosophers:—

"We cannot conceive Space and Time as entities, and are equally disabled from conceiving them as attributes of entities or as non-entities. . . . The immediate knowledge which we seem to have of them proves, when examined, to be total ignorance" (The First Principles).

Kant, the great German philosopher, had already, before the time of Herbert Spencer, declared Space and Time to be pure *a priori* forms of understanding; but this did not satisfy the English thinker who said:—

"The proposition with which Kant's philosophy sets out, verbally intelligible though it is, cannot by any effort be rendered into thought—cannot be interpreted into an idea properly so called, but stands merely for a pseud-idea. In the first place to assert that Space and Time are subjective conditions is, by implication, to assert that they are not objective realities; if the Space and Time present to our minds belong to the ego, then of necessity they do not belong to the non-ego. Now it is impossible to think this. The very fact on which Kant bases his hypothesis—namely, that our consciousness of Space and Time cannot be suppressed—testifies, as much; for that consciousness of Space and Time which we cannot rid ourselves of, is the

consciousness of them as existing objectively. It is useless to reply that such an inability must inevitably result if they are subjective forms. The question here is—what does consciousness directly testify? And the direct testimony of consciousness is that Time and Space are not within the mind, but without the mind; and so absolutely independent that we cannot conceive them to become non-existent even supposing the mind to become non-existent" (*The First Principles*).

Finally, Haeckel tries to tone down the rigid idealism of Kant by acknowledging the objective reality of Time and Space, though he ultimately leaves them out of his calculation in his monistic scheme of a matter-force world. This is, however, what he says as to Time and Space:—

"Since Kant explained Time and Space to be merely 'forms of perception'—Space the form of the external, Time of internal sensitivity—there has been a keen controversy, which still continues over this important problem. A large section of modern metaphysicians have persuaded themselves that this 'critical fact' possesses a great importance as the starting point of a 'purely idealistic theory of knowledge,' and that, consequently, the natural opinion of the normal healthy mind as to the reality of time and space has been swept aside. This narrow and ultra-idealistic conception of time and space has become a prolific source of error. It overlooks the fact that Kant only touched one side of the problem, the subjective side, in that theory, and recognised the equal validity of its objective side. 'Time and Space,' he said, 'have empirical reality, but transcendental ideality.' Our modern monism is quite compatible with this thesis of Kant's, but not with the one-sided exaggeration of the subjective aspect of the problem" (*The Riddle of the Universe*).

This is about all that Modern Science knows of Time and Space; and even Haeckel has nothing more to say of their nature than what is to be inferred from the statement that they possess empirical reality but transcendental ideality.

As regards the problem of the origin of movement, described as the second of the 'world enigmas' by Du Bois Reymond, the last word of science must be taken to be that it is

"solved by the recognition that movement is as innate and original a property of substance as a sensation" (*The Riddle of the Universe*).

This is, however, a misleading statement to a certain extent; for while motion is an attribute of matter, it is not a property of pure spirit, though embodied souls enjoy the power to direct their

movements into particular channels at will. This will be made clear by and by ; in the meantime it is evident that what enables them to do so is their will which is a distinct kind of force. Many persons will at once deny that will is a kind of force ; but we need only refer to the following reasoned expression of opinion from Dr. Alfred Russell Wallace's *Natural Selection and Tropical Nature* to be convinced of the fact that it cannot be regarded as a non-entity pure and simple. Says Dr. Wallace :—

“ We are acquainted with two radically distinct or apparently distinct kinds of force—the first consists of the primary forces of nature, such as gravitation, cohesion, repulsion, heat, electricity, etc.; the second is our own will force. Many persons will at once deny that the latter exists. It will be said that it is a mere transformation of the primary forces before alluded to ; that the correlation of forces includes those of animal life, and that *will* itself is but the result of molecular change in the brain. I think, however, that it can be shown that this latter assertion has never been proved, nor even been proved to be possible ; and that in making it, a great leap in the dark has been taken from the known to the unknown. It may be at once admitted that the *muscular force* of animals and man is merely the transformed energy derived from the primary forces of nature. So much has been, if not rigidly proved, yet rendered highly probable, and it is in perfect accordance with all our knowledge of natural forces and natural laws. But it cannot be contended that the physiological balance-sheet has ever been so accurately struck, that we are entitled to say, not one-thousandth part of a grain more of force has been exerted by any organised body, or in any part of it than has been derived from the known primary forces of the material world. If that were so, it would absolutely negative the existence of will ; for if will is anything, it is a power that *directs* the action of the forces stored up in the body, and it is not conceivable that this *direction* can take place, without the exercise of some force in some part of the organism. However delicately a machine may be constructed, with the most exquisitely contrived detents to release a weight or spring by the exertion of the smallest possible amount of force, *some* external force will always be required : so, in the animal machine, however minute may be the changes required in the cells or fibres of the brain, to set in motion the nerve currents which loosen or excite the pent-up forces of certain muscles, *some force* must be required to effect those changes. If it is said, ‘ those changes are automatic, and are set in motion by external causes,’ then one essential part of our consciousness, a certain amount of freedom in willing, is annihilated ; and it is inconceivable how or why there should have arisen any consciousness or any apparent will, in such purely automatic organisms. If this were so, our apparent Will would be an illusion, and Professor Huxley’s belief ‘ that our volition counts for something as condition of the course of events,’ would be fallacious, since our volition would then be but one link in the chain of events

counting for neither more nor less than any other link whatever."—(*Natural Selection and Tropical Nature*, p. 211).

This finishes our examination of modern science, which, as our investigation fully demonstrates, is still very far from perfection.

We may now revert to Hindu Realism to enumerate the causes of the world process from the standpoint of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. So far as matter is concerned, Hindu Realism is at one with the modern scientist in describing it as an atomistic substance. Modern science has discovered about seventy different kinds of atoms of matter, but has not yet been able to reduce them into fewer genera or species, but Kanada reduces them to four kinds only, namely,

- (1) those which can be discerned by sight,
- (2) those which can be discerned by the sense of touch or temperature,
- (3) those discernible by the sense of taste, and
- (4) those which appeal to, and are discernible by the sense of smell,

Kanada holds that there cannot be atoms corresponding to the sense of hearing, because he does not consider the emission of sound to be the property of any particular class of atoms, inasmuch as every thing can be conceived as silent. He maintains that sound arises by friction in *ākāśa* (the continuous medium, like the ether of modern science).

To these four kinds of atoms Hindu Realists add five other substances, and call them the nine realities, which may be enumerated as follows :—

- (1—4) the four kinds of atoms, as stated above,
- (5) *Ākāśa*, i.e., the continuous Ether,
- (6) Time, i.e., succession of moments,
- (7) *Dik*, i.e., the principle which holds things in space,
- (8) Mind, and
- (9) Soul.

In strange contrast to these nine realities of Kanada are the two ultimate *tattvas* (existences) of Kapila, namely, *Puruṣa*, which is the principle of Consciousness, or Life, and *Prakṛiti*, the root of the material and the forces of nature. With respect to them the system

of Kapila resembles, to a certain extent, the one which also reduces the universe to two substances, *Ākāśa* and *Prāṇa* (life). None of these schools of philosophy, however, tries to attain to that monistic unity which is the key-note of Vedānta, said to be the crest jewel of Hindu metaphysics.

The doctrine of Vedānta is the doctrine of Idealism. The world is regarded as an illusion, or a dream. Matter is not a subsisting reality ; and consciousness, that is mind, is the only real existence which is endowed with the qualities of Existence, Intelligence and Bliss, and is termed *Sacchidananda* (= *Sat*, Existence + *Chit*, Intelligence + *Ananda*, Bliss). This consciousness is further conceived as an all-pervading essence, and is termed Brahman (neuter). As such it is the true soul of the individual who is merely a bundle of ' name and form.' The aim of life is to become merged in this Absolute Immutable Self (Brahman) by knowledge or works or both.

The argument by which it is sought to support this system comprises the following points :

- (1) the deluding nature of the senses,
- (2) dependence of the external world on perception,
- (3) the *a priori* basis of the laws of nature,
- (4) the undeniability of mind,
- (5) the abstract unity of consciousness, and
- (6) the desirability of a monistic conclusion generally.

We shall take up each of these points one by one and ascertain the limits within which they may be said to hold good.

To begin with the deluding nature of our senses, it is true that they are at times deceitful—a rope is easily mistaken for a serpent, the stump of a tree for a human being, and a shadow for a ghost. But how do we know that an error has been committed ? By the instrumentality of the senses themselves ! This shows that the senses themselves are capable of rectifying the errors on careful observation. It is obvious that except the senses themselves remove our false impressions we possess no means of finding out whether a certain impression is a fact of observation or only a trick of the deceitful fancy.

As for the second point, that the existence of the external world depends on perception, the fact is that knowability is an attribute of things, but this does not mean that they are non-existent or purely imaginary. Berkeley, no doubt, maintains:—

“ That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist *without* the mind, is what *everybody will allow*. And it seems no less evident that the various sensations or ideas (imprinted on the sense, however blended or combined together (that is, whatever objects they compose), cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them. I think an intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this, by any one that shall attend to *what is meant by the term 'exist'* when applied to sensible things. The table I write on, I say, exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was an odour, that is, it was smelt; there was a sound, that is to say, it was heard; a colour or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can understand by these and the like expressions. For, as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their *esse est percipi*, nor is it possible they should have any existence, out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them. It is indeed an opinion, *strangely* prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and, in a word, all sensible objects have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But with how great an assurance and acquiescence so ever this principle may be entertained in the world; yet whoever shall find in heart to call it in question, may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For what are the forementioned objects but the things we *perceive* by sense, and what do we perceive *besides our own ideas or sensations*; and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these or any combination of them should exist unperceived? If we thoroughly examine this tenet it will, perhaps, be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of *abstract ideas*. For can there be a sicker strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived, so [as to conceive them existing unperceived? **Light** and colours, heat and cold, extension and figures, in a word, the things we *see* and feel, what are they but so many sensations, notions, ideas, or impressions on the sense; and is it possible to separate, even in thought, any of these from perception? For my part, I might as easily divide a thing from itself. But my conceiving or imagining power does not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. Hence, as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual sensation of that thing, so is it impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it ”—(*Principles of Human Knowledge*).

But this only means that all things are knowable. It will be rash to imagine that things cease to exist as soon as the observer's attention is called away in another direction. This is tantamount to saying that while knowability is a quality of things, they do not become dependent on the knowing faculty for their being, nor can they be classed as the contents of our consciousness for that reason. For when we perceive a thing we do not perceive it as being created by our imagination, but only as present or coming, finished and whole, into the field of perception. How and when it was made is neither felt nor perceived, which means that our consciousness is not the maker of it, for otherwise we should be aware of its genesis.

Furthermore, no real consolation is to be had even by regarding the world as the content of the perceiver's mind, because in that case every individual perceiver should be *actually* and fully all-knowing, especially as there can be, upon the basis of that supposition, no limiting or conditioning cause whatsoever. The world, then, has an existence of its own, independently of the being or beings of any or all of its perceivers, and is not contained, actually and physically, in the mind of any one, though all things are knowable by nature.

The third point is centred round the laws of nature which are said to be independent of experience and concerning which Kant delivered himself of the following expression of opinion :—

"If experience is to teach us laws to which the existence of things is subject, these laws, if they regard things in themselves, must belong to them of necessity, even outside our experience. But experience teaches us what exists and how it exists but never that it must necessarily exist so, and not otherwise. Experience therefore can never teach us the nature of things in themselves."—Kant's *Prolegomena* by Dr. Paul Carus, pp. 50-51.

But while it is true that experience never teaches us why things should exist as they do and not otherwise, understanding only finds its experiences to be governed by certain well-defined rules or laws. It follows that reflection makes good the shortcomings of experience, and must, therefore, be presumed to be endowed with the code of laws itself. In this sense the laws of understanding must be said to be given *a priori*. But, since our experiences of things only arise from contact with the things themselves, and since these experiences

tally in all cases and without exception with the laws of understanding, it follows that things in nature are also subject to the same, that is to say, to a corresponding set of laws. Hence, it is impossible that the validity of the laws of nature should ever be impaired.

The remaining points of the argument advanced by Vedanta may be taken up together. Of these the fourth is only disputed by materialism which has not been found to be quite a reliable system of thought in this respect. There can be no doubt but that consciousness is a reality independent of matter, an 'immaterial' substance that is immaterial in so far only as it is not matter, but spirit. It is the Knower himself. Vedanta is undoubtedly right when it holds that the knower is not the body, but the Reality within. This inner Reality, which is pure consciousness in essence, is present everywhere, so says Vedanta, in all its fulness and as a whole.

It follows, therefore, that from the standpoint of Vedanta, the real Atman or Soul of all creatures is absolutely identical with, and in no way different from, God. Vedanta, therefore, does not hesitate to tell its follower, "THAT THOU ART."

The immortal part of every being, we are further told, is consciousness itself, for that which is unchanging and beyond time and upon which depend the perception and knowledge of all other things, is necessarily above birth and death, which are both bounded, on two sides, by time. Hence, he alone who identifies himself with his inner Reality attains to immortality.

As for the religious aspect of the question, the world we perceive through the instrumentality of the senses has but a secondary importance among the existing realities; the Living Reality, that is, Consciousness, being entitled to the foremost place in our estimation. Hence those who pin their faith on the forms of things are little better than those who fall in love with the objects they see in their dreams, and come to grief. The true object of worship and adoration, the only one that can secure for the soul the peace, the happiness and the immortality which it is hankering after, consequently, is the inner Divinity, the Sachchidananda, the Self. He it is who is to be realized, to be rid of the anguish which is the lot of the ignorant soul.

It is in this sense that the Vedantist understands the mystery of existence. To him the whole thing is an illusion, and the only

reality is the One Conscious Existence, his own Self, which he calls Brahman and defines with the words "not that, not that." The idea underlying this quite negative definition is that Brahman is so hopelessly beyond words that it can only be defined by the negation of all things definable by language.

This one Existence persists on all planes and cannot be denied or ignored; for he who would deny consciousness would have to be conscious himself. It is the Seer, Perception itself, and not liable to death or extinction. THAT is to be known; he who does not know the 'seer' knows nothing worth knowing. And, conversely, he who has known this Reality may well say of all the knowledge of worldly things and scriptures and sciences that they are not only not necessary but a burden. What is the need of knowledge to him who has known the Reality, not the relative reality only, but the real Absolute Reality which is immortal and eternal. As the Bhagavad Gita states, all the Vedas are as useful to a learned Brahmana as is a tank in a place covered all over with water. Vedanta tells us that this Reality is not far to seek; it is the Man within, the Atman, whose presence in each and every form is the cause of life and psychic activity.

From what has been said above, it follows that, according to the philosophers of the monistic Vedanta, the only living and unchanging existence in the entire universe is pure Consciousness. Conceived as a quality, or essence, it never changes under any circumstances whatsoever, whether it be working on the waking, the dreaming, or the deep-sleep plane of empirical existence. This one eternal Existence, Vedanta teaches us, is also the consciousness within ourselves. Hence, we are all God. It is upon this foundation that the Vedantic conception of "That thou art" is built.

As regards the number of souls in existence, Vedanta is rigidly monistic even as to that, maintaining that there is and can be only one soul in existence. Since all the souls, it is urged, have consciousness in common among them, it follows that consciousness is the one and the only real Soul. Pointing out certain features of resemblance between the world and a dream, the most favourite method of argument with Vedanta, the Vedantist asks: can we call our dream-creatures spirits? If not, then where is there room for a multiplicity

of souls in this dream-like illusion which it pleases us to call our real, material world? If we refuse to dub the dream phantoms spirits, what authority have we for regarding the men and women of this world as other than phantoms? With the breaking up of the dream, the actors and actresses of the dream-stage melt into thin air, the buildings, parks, cities—nay, even whole worlds—collapse into airy nothingness, and the entire panorama is rolled away like a scroll, leaving not a multiplicity of souls, but only the one indivisible self of the dreamer. Similarly, argues the Vedantist, there is and can be only one spirit in this world of our waking consciousness. Ascribing the spatial type of infinity to consciousness, he asks: since God is but One, and within and without the universe, where is there room for a second to come in? It is in this sense that Vivekananda maintains:—

"There is but one Soul in the universe, not two. It neither comes nor goes. It neither reincarnates, nor dies, nor is reborn. How can it? How to die? Where to go? Where am 'I' not already?"—(*Sriamā Vivekananda on Atman.*)

The argument that because the contents of different minds are different, therefore, every mind is a separate entity or spirit in itself, does not find favour with Vedānta, on the ground that they differ only in respect of their contents, not with regard to their nature or essence, showing that consciousness is common to all minds, and, for that reason, only one and all-pervading. In dreaming, too, urges Vedānta, it appears that the contents of individual minds are different from one another, yet when we wake up we discover that the variety of minds and contents was an illusion, pure and simple, and that it was the mind of the dreamer which alone was the reservoir of consciousness for all the multitude of minds in the dream.

Such is the nature of the argument which Vedānta advances in support of its philosophy. What is meant by soul in Vedānta is not a self-existent unit of consciousness, but a very fine and enduring body, the *sukshma śarīra*, which is the vehicle of transmigration. Self-consciousness is, however, not regarded as the property of even this extremely subtle body, but is said to be the lustre which it borrows from the Essence of Consciousness.

In this manner does Vedānta proceed to establish its monistic doctrine. It first of all eliminates the duality of the seer and the

seen, by reducing the perceptible phenomena to an illusion pure and simple, and then takes away the multiplicity of souls, leaving the perceiving faculty or power as a solitary unit—all-pervading, eternal and unchanging. This is summed up in the well-known expression—*eko Brahman dvitīyo naṣṭi*—signifying that Brahman is one and there is no second.

The immutability of Brahman is made to rest on the nature of consciousness, conceived as the common property of souls, that is to say, as an abstract quality; for as such it is inconceivable that consciousness should ever cease to be itself, or become transformed into something which it is not. Hence, Vedānta is never weary of reiterating that it persists intact on all the planes of manifestation, i.e., the three states or conditions of existence known as waking, dreaming and deep sleep, to which later writers have added a fourth, namely, *turiyā* (super-consciousness).

Such is the doctrine of the monistic Vedānta, which, in one way or another, and with certain necessary though minor variations, will be found to lie at the bottom of all systems of Idealism that aim at unification. "

The *hamā ost* —, *hamā ost* = 'he is all') doctrine of Muslim Idealism is almost a copy of the Advaita Vedānta; it also aims at the unification of things in the unity of God.

But, unfortunately for this supposed high aim of philosophy, monism is possible only by throttling common sense, since it is opposed to concrete nature.

If we are not blinded by any pre-formed convictions on the subject, we shall not fail to perceive that the doctrine that Brahman is the only existence and all else an illusion, or *māyā*, to use a technical term of the Vedānta philosophy, is a self-contradictory one at its core since we are given the duality of Brahman and *māyā* to start with. It is permissible to ask whether this *māyā* be a thing which actually exists, or not? No other alternative is possible, since nothing can actually exist and not exist at the same time. Now, if we say that it is an actuality of existence, there is an end to our monistic aspiration at once; but, if it be urged, on the contrary, that it is not endowed with existence, then it is impossible that that which has no existence whatsoever should ever be perceived. This is the

dilemma from which Vedanta has never been able to extricate itself, except to its own satisfaction.

The "*kama ośt*" doctrine, similarly, is a stumbling block in the way of truth, and has caused as great mischief as the tenets of materialism pure and simple. With 'him' alone in existence, it is inevitable that the world should be reduced to a simple dream, with 'him' as the Dreamer, and all other living beings as phantoms of imagination. Accordingly, the soul is not the Reality, but the reflection of Reality, and the *summum bonum* is either the destruction of the reflection, or the merging in 'him' which also involves the annihilation of the individual. What sort of consolation is the soul to derive from the idea of annihilation which stares it in the face, it is difficult to imagine; but it is curious that it has never occurred to the propounders of this kind of Idealism that things cannot cease to exist because of our mentally abstracting away some of their common attributes or properties.

'All is he,' is certainly a charming formula on account of its simplicity, and if brevity be the soul of wit, it is entitled to bear away the palm. But the question is, whether brevity is also the soul of wisdom, as it is of wit? Analysis shows that the 'All' includes not only that which is living and conscious, but also that which is not living and not conscious. Whether we reduce the universe to mind and matter, or to consciousness and ideas, there is no escape from duality, for the ideas, as such, are not conscious themselves, and are, therefore, different from consciousness. It is not possible to get over this duality by any manner of means, as long as one does not prove—and, we fear, it will never be proved—that the 'ideas' are also endowed with understanding, memory and the capacity to feel pleasure and pain. The analogy of dreams is inadmissible here altogether, for while a dream resembles this world in many respects, it does not do so in every particular. It is merely the dramatization of the dreamer's ideas, which are soulless and unconscious. The proof of this lies in the fact that while the dreamer, on waking up, remembers what he himself felt, or thought, he is quite unconscious of the inner feelings and ideas of those others whom he sees in his dreams. If it be a fact that the dreamer's mind itself becomes ensouled in the bodies of his dream-phantoms, investing them with mental equipment as

a token of being, they would have their individual experiences in consciousness, namely, feelings, sensations and the like, of which he cannot but be aware. But since this is not the case, it is clear that these phantoms have no individualities of their own, and merely play the parts assigned to them in the drama of thought by the understanding of the dreamer. Hence, the dream-creatures are soulless* phantoms, and cannot be compared with men, into whose ears Vedanta unhesitatingly whispers the divine and vivifying formula of initiation, the "That thou art."

A possible reply to this objection is that we are also unconscious of the feelings and ideas of men in this world ; but this is only begging the question, since our unconsciousness of the states of consciousness of other beings in this world might be due either to the fact that our minds are separate, or to their being merely our own thought-forms. So far as dream-creatures are concerned, we know, for certain, that they are only thought-forms of a dreamer, but, unless the possibility of the other alternative be logically excluded, the same statement cannot be made in respect of the living beings in this world. It is not given us to know, or perceive, the thoughts of another under normal conditions, so that what one perceives cannot be the thoughts or

* There is nothing in the nature of a dream to upset our notions of reality and life. It is merely a pictorial mode of thinking, and differs from waking hallucination in no important particular. There can be no doubting the fact that the primary mode of thought is pictorial, since words only replace images when we become familiar with language. Those born deaf and dumb have also no other method of thinking available to them than the one by means of images. Even the words we utter and hear give rise to images, but as practice enables us to grasp their significance with extreme rapidity, the images which they tend to invoke remain nascent, and, consequently, unperceived. It is only when our feelings are concerned in any particular idea, or train of thought, that mental images become visualised. A tyrant mentally gloating over the downfall of his victim, for instance, can, owing to the intensity of the feeling of triumph, almost perceive the terror, the dismay, and the helplessness of the unfortunate object of his tyranny. And, when we allow ourselves to dwell upon the details of some highly agreeable or painful experience, the persons concerned in the affair seem to stand out before our very eyes, and in the positions which they had occupied at the time when the experience was an actuality. Under such circumstances, we are apt to forget our surroundings and to identify ourselves with the personality of the past, acting like the hero of the tale from the Arabian Nights, who, having built up a vast fortune, in imagination, from the proceeds of a basketful of eggs, and having successfully wooed, likewise in his imagination, the fairy-like daughter of his king, allowed himself to be angry with her, purposely to snub her for her high birth, and actually administered 'her' a kick which sent the basket flying out of the window, shattering his fool's paradise of a happy home along with the hopeful eggs. Our dream personality is exactly like the millionaire personality of the hero of this tale, and possesses no more *individuality* than that of a memory image visualised into perceptible form by the intensity of feelings and emotions.

ideas of an unknown supernormal entity or being, sleeping somewhere, on some higher plane, and dreaming away. Besides, only living beings are endowed with perception, memory and understanding, which no thought-form ever enjoys. Hence, if one be only a thought-form of an eternal Dreamer, how comes it that one happens to be endowed with all the qualities of consciousness which distinguish a being from a phantom of fancy?

Unless Idealism can establish the proposition that phantoms of fancy are also endowed with consciousness, it is no use relying upon the analogy of dreams. Those who maintain that the soul is only a reflection of a conscious reality, are unable also to explain how it happens to be endowed with consciousness. Since a reflected image is never found to possess the qualities of consciousness, feelings and the like, and since all living beings in this world enjoy these very qualities, the question arises as to the nature of the difference between the original and its reflected effect. If it be merely one of degree in respect of development, or manifestation, it is obviously no difference at all, since all living beings possess the capacity for the fullest unfoldment of knowledge, as will be shown later on. But if it be one of quality, then there is no proof that there is any other kind of consciousness than our own in existence, and without strict proof nothing can be admitted as established. Besides, if the types were different, it would not be possible for a reflection to become 'That' which is the end in view. It follows, therefore, that the notion that souls are the reflected images of one solitary being is untenable in philosophy. We need only add here that no system of thought has a right to be considered consistent which in one and the same breath professes to teach that the soul is a reflection, and yet whispers "That thou art" in its ear. Besides, if the universe be the dream of a being or power that is unchanging and immutable, it must be eternal; and if it be eternal, its comparison with one that is transient and passing is not allowed by reason.

Moreover, if there be only one soul in existence, and that be eternal, omnipresent and blissful, how are the feeling of pain and the longing of the individual soul to escape from the bondage of *samsara* to be accounted for? Surely, he who is enjoying the blessedness of freedom and bliss cannot by any possibility be

regarded as identical with those who are suffering the pains of this world or the torments of hell in some other region of the universe. And, yet, if the real soul is only one, the beings whose experiences are only painful must necessarily be either altogether non-existent, or only the one soul. But the latter hypothesis is not only not supported by any single fact of observation, but is also actually contradicted by experience, inasmuch as no solitary individual can possibly feel himself as many, or undergo different kinds of experience in different parts of the world at one and the same time; and the former leads to an absurdity, since an absolute non-entity cannot be endowed with feelings, memory and the like, which observation and introspection certainly show to be the properties of the individual soul. Hence, it is repugnant to the intellect to say that there is only one soul in existence in the universe.

Furthermore, the significance of the idea of *moksha* can only be the annihilation of the individual, if the speculations of Vedanta, as to the existence of only one being, be accepted as correct: for it has no meaning for one who is always free and blissful,—and so far as Brahman is concerned, he is described as eternally free and blissful,—and the individual soul, who longs to attain it, is only a bundle of illusion, which is to be destroyed, so that Brahman, the solitary being, posited by the Advaita Vedanta, might remain the sole and undisputed monarch of all he surveys. Thus for the individual extinction rather than emancipation, i.e., the realisation of a life more full and abundant, is the logical consequence of Advaitism. It is this feature of the teaching of the absolute Monism of Vedanta which has led some of the European Scholars to regard it as a form of pessimism.

Lastly, from the practical side of the question, Vedanta cannot be said to have been proved to be a practical creed, since Brahman has never needed liberation, and since the individual souls, being pure, illusory forms of subjective hallucination, are debarred, by their very nature, from its attainment. Hence, no one can be said to have ever been benefited by its teaching; and, since no religion whose doctrines have never been subjected to the test of practicability can be regarded as a practical system of God-realisation, Advaitism has no right to rank with that which has been proved to be so. Thus, its authority rests purely on the conjectures of men, and is not supported, in the

least degree, by the testimony of any one who may be said to have benefited by its wisdom.


We might now even liken the world to a dream, if we like, but the result cannot be in any way different, since the termination of a dream only means the extinction, and not the emancipation, of the dream-creatures. Hence, the soul which approaches the Advaita Vedanta, with a view to obtain everlasting happiness, must prepare itself to be wiped out of existence.

It is thus clear that the aspiration of Idealism to attain to a monistic culmination is foredoomed to failure. As for the notion that philosophy should naturally tend towards monism, the important question is what is intended by Monism? It is interesting to note what Sir Oliver Lodge said in this connection in "Life and Matter":—

"The truth is that all philosophy aims at being monistic; it is bound to aim at unification, however difficult of attainment, and a philosopher who abandoned the quest, and contented himself with a permanent antinomy—a universe compounded of two or more irreconcilable and entirely disparate and disconnected agencies—would be held to be throwing up his brief as a philosopher and taking refuge in a kind of permanent Manichæism, which experience has shown to be an untenable and ultimately unthinkable position."

According to this view what is really forbidden is the conception of an universe composed of two or more irreconcilable and entirely disparate and disconnected agencies, *i. e.*, of a permanent antinomy. This, no doubt, is the correct view; for while it is not possible to reduce all things to one substance only in point of fact, it is reprehensible to posit two or more antinomical systems of world-process, springing from entirely disparate and disconnected sources, and flourishing simultaneously with one another. This natural antagonism between concrete nature and the ambition of Philosophy is overcome by metaphysical classification which reduces all things to one genus or class and secures the desired unification. But it will be a mistake to imagine that the Pluralism of nature is got rid of by philosophical classification, inasmuch as the latter is a purely mental process and concerns only the concepts in the mind, while the former, namely, the concrete reality, which exists only in the form of units, individuals, and atoms, must ever remain untouched by any arrangement we may

be pleased to make concerning our notions and conceptions of it. The philosophical monism referred to above is attained by the following classification of existing things :—



There remains the monistic aspiration of theological origin to be considered : for obsessed, as it is, with the notion of an Almighty Architect of the world, and blinded by its ambition to attain to monistic unification, theology has no alternative but to posit an oversoul as the creator of the material and all of the universe. Accordingly, the theologians of the Christian and Muslim persuasions do not hesitate to stifle the voice of their intellect, and to assert that matter was created from nothing, at the command, or creative fiat, of their God. Even the metaphysically inclined Hindu Deism goes the length of saying that as the spider spins out its web from within its belly, so does the creator project the material, the frame-work and all of the universe from within himself ; and just as the spider withdraws its web within itself, so does the creator re-absorb the whole universe at the end of the 'cosmic day.' This is monism with a vengeance ; but it has to be ushered into the world at the cost of rationality. Even the satisfaction which the Hindu doctrine seems to afford is more apparent than real, since it implies the acknowledgment of duality in the 'spider's belly,' in the first instance.

The last stronghold of the Creationist Philosophy is the idea that its creator is pure imagination, on a somewhat enlarged scale ; but unfortunately for its validity the hypothesis, though daring to a degree, is only calculated to land its supporters in the midst of infirm land and bogs. For imagination is inseparably associated with affectivity, and affectivity is wedded to an unfulfilled wish. As to

this Baudouin has the following lucid observations to make in his "Studies on Psycho-analysis" pages 56 and 57 :—

" Frank Introspection, and psycho-analysis which is an introspection induced by the analyst, are continually giving evidence that the substratum of dreams is strongly affective. Conversely, affective states in the waking life are imaginative states and tend to induce reverie. Affectivity and Imagination run in couples. The poet's liveliest images are dictated by intense emotion. These are familiar facts; but the analysis of condensations renders our knowledge of them more precise. *Vigorous condensation, the outcome of a strong affect, is the pre-eminent characteristic of creative imagination.* Affectivity influences associations much as heat influences certain mechanical mixtures, changing the mechanical mixtures into a chemical compound. Perhaps we are wrong in using the term *creative imagination*; it is the *affect* (conscious or subconscious) which is the creator, and which synthesises the images into new unities."

Affectivity and emotion are both centered round the individual's wishes, whether these be conscious or subconsciously entertained. In other words, dreaming presupposes the existence of strong ungratified wishes, potent enough to set the mental mechanism in motion. If the wish is gratified there will be an end to the dream. Baudouin may again be quoted usefully (*Ibid.*, p. 57):—

" If the affective state is to be maintained the primary essential is that it should not be completely discharged in action. 'Possession is the death of love,' said one of my subjects. Thus we may contrast 'affectives' with 'actives.' Now it is when activity is maintained in such a fashion, i.e., when the discharge of affect into action is incomplete, that it is accompanied by imaginative production, reverie, condensation. Imagination, dreaming (in the sense of reverie), thus manifest themselves as substitutes for unrealized action; they presuppose a surcharge of affect, a surplus of undischarged affect. During sleep we have analogous conditions; sleep is characterised by the suspension of motor activity. It is then that we have dreams, which are nothing but pent-up activity."

There is thus nothing to admire in the concept of imagination as a creator, for freedom from desire, hence from imperfection, can never be regarded as a characteristic of a life abandoned to eternal and unending dreaming or to perpetual brown study, as reverie is termed. Besides this, there can be no such thing as imagination apart from a being who imagines. An imager is required to imagine dreams. What purpose will it serve to posit imagination as a pure abstraction in existence?

Moses Maimonides (1135—1204 A. D.) regarded imagination as an indication of a defect, and wrote :

"Imagination, therefore, was never employed as a figure in speaking of God, while thought and reason are figuratively ascribed to Him" (*The Guide for the Perplexed*, p. 64).

As for the notion of creation of things from pure nothing which is insisted upon by Christian and Muslim Theologians, it is easy to understand that such a notion is likely to be directly strengthened by the phenomena of dreams, which immature reason is apt to regard as devoid of all pretensions to substantiveness, hence, as originating from pure nothing. It is a remarkable fact, and one which will have very far-reaching consequences, that while the Christian and Muslim theologians are prepared to go the length of holding matter to have been created from nothing, they do not regard it as any the less material for that reason. But if matter was created from nothing, it must be endowed with a reality born of nothingness; and since mind or spirit is uncreate, the reality of a matter which is the progeny of nought can only be described as imaginary in comparison with that of spirit. Thus, the immediate and logical result of their belief about the origin of matter, will be the acceptance of the doctrine of Vedanta, which also describes the world as an illusion, i.e., a reality born of nothingness!

As a result of the foregoing discussion, we may say that neither Idealism nor any other system of philosophy can ever hope to succeed in solving the world mystery, without first recognizing the existence of two fundamentally different kinds of substances, the conscious and the unconscious. The difficulty which stares the materialist in the face, however, is even greater than that which the Idealist has to overcome, since materialism cannot possibly aim higher than the attainment of peaceful repose in the grave, together with the extinction of all those high and noble aspirations and hopes which alone go to make life worth living.

If materialists would but push their enquiries to their legitimate end, they would not fail to see that dead matter, which is their only stock-in-trade, is utterly incapable of discharging the functions of the mind, and unconscious force is equally helpless in

carrying on the processes of deliberation. We might, in passing, refer to the following memorable words of one of the leading men of science, quoted by Sir Oliver Lodge :—

"It is worth any amount of trouble to . . . know by one's own knowledge the great truth . . . that the honest and rigorous following up of the argument which leads us to 'materialism' inevitably carries us beyond . . . If the materialist affirms that the universe and all its phenomena are resolvable into matter and motion, Berkeley replies, True ; but what you call matter and motion are known to us only as forms of consciousness ; their being is to be conceived or known ; and the existence of a state of consciousness, apart from a thinking mind, is a contradiction in terms. I conceive this reasoning to be irrefragable. And, therefore, if I were obliged to choose between absolute materialism and absolute idealism, I should feel compelled to accept the latter alternative."

The denial of reality to the material world can never mean its total negation, or anything more than this that it is but a dream-like panorama composed of forms that dissolve, or begin to dissolve, as soon as they are made, and of scenes which are impermanent and constantly changing. This changing and shifting aspect of things in nature is calculated to fill the mind with a sense of their impermanence, and may be likened to a dream for that reason. For, persistence being the test of reality, mind is apt to regard all that is impermanent as unreal. As Herbert Spencer points out :—

"By reality we mean *persistence* in consciousness : a persistence which is either unconditional, as our consciousness of space, or which is conditional, as our consciousness of a body while grasping it. The real, as we conceive it, is distinguished solely by the test of *persistence* ; for by this test we separate it from what we call the unreal. Between a person standing before us and the idea of such a person, we discriminate by our ability to expel the idea from consciousness and our inability, while looking at him, to expel the person from consciousness. And when in doubt as to the trustworthiness of some impression made on our eyes in the dusk, we settle the matter by observing whether the impression persists on closer inspection ; and we predicate reality if the persistence is complete. How truly persistence is what we mean by reality, is shown in the fact that when, after criticism has proved that the real as presented in perception is not the objectively real, the vague consciousness which we retain of the objectively real, is of something which persists absolutely, under all changes of mode, form or appearance. And the fact that we cannot form even an indefinite notion of the absolutely real, except as the absolutely persistent implies that persistence is our ultimate test of the real, whether as existing under its unknown form or under the form known to us"—(*The First Principles*).

In the light of the above observations of the great English philosopher, it is easy to see that the objects of the senses—whether we call them ideas or bodies—are impermanent and fleeting, hence, endowed only with a sort of relative reality as compared with the absolute persistence of substance. They may well be called *mayavic* (illusory), by way of a figure of speech.

The error of the Idealist, on the other hand, lies in his giving undue prominence to his one-sided view of things based on a system of abstractions, and in his denial of concrete nature; for assuming that the perceptible objects are but sensations and ideas, these sensations and ideas themselves differ from one another and, therefore, must be composed of some kind of material. And, since nothing alone can be created from nothing, the material which enters into the composition of these bodies, ideas, sensations, or anything else that we may be pleased to call them, must be eternal. Hence, absolute persistence, i.e., reality, is also the characteristic of matter of which bodies are made, though not of the forms which it assumes from time to time, in consequence of the operation of the forces of nature.

Thus, true Idealism while describing the universe as a passing show, does not go the length of saying that it is altogether non-existent. Hence what it describes as an illusion is the same thing as is called the material world by the Realist. The immediate data of perception being sensation, it is immaterial whether we call the perceptible world a bundle of different kinds of sensations or of material bodies and things. It is true that sensations are only sense-affections, but it is also true that they mostly arise independently of the volition of the perceiving consciousness, and, therefore, from the action of an external stimulus on the organs of the senses. The existence of a world of some sort, apart from the perceiving consciousness, is, thus, beyond dispute, and even were we to go so far as to say that only sensations constitute the perceptible world, it must be conceded that different sensations differ *inter se* in respect of the elements which enter into their composition. This is but another way of saying that they are composed of some kind of material, which, for the sake of lucidity and uniformity of

thought, must be termed matter. Hence, when certain Idealists imagine that their philosophy implies the elimination of the material universe, they conceive an impossibility, notwithstanding the fact that the proof of the existence of matter depends on its being perceived.

It will save Idealism much trouble and humiliation to know that a fanatical insistence on the employment of wrong and inappropriate words in the description of things is only calculated to increase one's own difficulties, and that the use of such words as illusion and *maya* actually tends to shut it out from a large department of scientific thought without which truth cannot be definitely distinguished from its antithesis, the untruth. It is true that the knowledge of the soul is the primary source of the highest good from which materialism is debarred by its denial of the very existence of spirit, as a substance separate and distinct from matter; but it is equally true that only that which is free from doubt, error and ignorance, the three constituents of falsehood, is termed knowledge, the cause of which can never be furthered, but is always obstructed, by a false and vicious terminology.

It is to be added that the materialist remains entangled in the meshes of delusion only so long as he does not recognise the nature of consciousness, and describes it as a product of matter. The moment he comes round to acknowledge consciousness as an independent reality, he will find the veil of matter, which is barring his further progress, torn away from his eyes. He will then throw away his weights and measures, and the scalpel and other instruments of research in the region of a purely material science, and find himself face to face with the Living Existence, and learn the Truth. The Idealist imbued with the true spirit of enquiry, on the contrary, begins by owning allegiance to the Principle of Life from the very commencement, and thus avoids most of the laborious uphill work of the materialist. The one works in the light of Truth while the other discards this method, and has necessarily to grope in the darkness of doubt and uncertainty. But the culmination or the crowning point of both the Realistic and the Idealistic philosophy, when carried to the ultimate issue, is

the same, namely, "Life is God, and I am HE"; or, as the Bible says, "I have said, ye are gods."*

We may now take a bird's eye view of the different theories of creation which we have analyzed in the course of our investigation. The following tables will not only show, at a glance, the position and merit of each theory, but will also render the task of comparison an easy one.

(A)—*The Theistic Account.*

First Cause.	Nature of the world-process.
God (a spirit).	Creation by the word of command of a real material universe, or a making of something out of nothing.

(B)—*The Hindu Theory.*

First Cause.	Nature of the world-process.
God (a spirit).	Projection and final re-absorption of a real universe, in 'imitation' of a spider's web.

(C)—*The Materialistic Theory.*

Causes.	Nature of the world-process.
(1) Dead, unconscious matter, and (2) Mechanical Force.	Evolution, in the course of which consciousness arises from dead matter, as miraculously as the creation of the world out of nothing.

(D)—*The Vedantic (Advaita) Theory.*

Cause.	Nature of the world-process.
Sat-chit-ananda (consciousness).	Creation is caused by the <i>māyāśakti</i> (the faculty of Imagination), and is purely illusory.

* John, x. 34.

Of the above, the theistic theory, set out in Table (A), is wrong because it contradicts the daily human experience that out of nothing nothing comes.

The Hindu theory, given in Table (B), is also defective, for it merely begs the question by pushing the duality of the seer and the seen into the spider-like belly of a gorging and disgorging *Causa Causans* of worlds.

The position of the materialist, as shown in Table (C), is equally untenable. He confines his attention to the purely objective side of things, and loses sight of the subjective aspect with which Haeckel considers modern Monism to be quite compatible, and the logic of which is looked upon as simply irrefragable by Huxley. It is all very well to say that our modern Monism is quite compatible with the subjective side of the problem, but when is effect to be given to that admittedly unanswerable position?

The Vedantic theory has already been dealt with fully, and needs but little comment here. Its monistic aspiration is foredoomed to failure, like that of the modern Monist, who seeks to establish his Monism by joining matter and force with a hyphen. Even Berkeley must be supposed to have thrown up the brief when he introduced the idea of an universal mind, distinct and separate from the individual mind, though it is difficult to conceive how such an idea could ever find a place in his unbending Idealism; for the idea of the universal mind cannot but be a state of one's own consciousness, and, as such, no more an independent reality than the material world, which Idealists persist in regarding as a state of the perceiving consciousness.

To sum up, consciousness is a reality independent of matter, and in no sense its product. It is eternal, having neither beginning nor end. The universe is eternal, too, and contains material forms which are subject to evolution and change. Matter is also uncreate and eternal. The materialistic theory, culminating in the doctrine of Evolution, is necessarily imperfect, one-sided and undignified. It is imperfect, because it ignores the existence of spirit; one-sided, because it confines its survey to the objective side of things; and undignified, because it insults the Living Reality by treating it as a product

of dead matter. The theologian is wrong, because he has no true conception of God, because he ascribes an origin to the universe, and because he insists on the creation of things out of nothing. It is he who is responsible for making religion a butt of ridicule and contempt for the scientific world. When properly understood, Religion and Science would work hand in hand, without a possibility of friction, which is always the result of unreasonableness on the part of the former, and of a hasty, and, for that reason, necessarily imperfect investigation, on that of the latter.

CHAPTER III.

GOD.

"From one point of view, that is with reference to the infinity of living beings, it is characterised by manyness; looked at without distinction of attributes which never desert it, it is ever one; with respect to its changing modalities, it is evanescent and perishing; as regards its attributes and continuity of substance, it is *enduring* and eternal, being always manifest; as a subject of knowledge it is all-pervading in so far as it knows all-things; in point of form, it abides in its own extension or size;—even such is the unique natural glory of the soul."—Amrita Chandra.

"He who knoweth his own self knoweth God."—*Sayings of Muhammad*.

The conception of God in the mind of the average man has a charm of elusiveness that is the most awesome and tantalising. Many have considered the mystery as insoluble and declare it beyond the reach of human thought. An ancient Hindu scripture maintains :—

"Thou canst not see the seer of seeing, thou canst not hear the hearer of hearing, thou canst not comprehend the comprehender of comprehending, thou canst not know the knower of knowing."—*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 3. 4. 2.

Sri Ramakrishna Paramahansa used to illustrate the difficulty of God-knowledge by likening God to an infinite mountain of sugar and the sages to ants, who could not be imagined as eating up the whole mountain. "Sukhdeva and other holy sages were at best ants of the largest sort. If we say that they were able to eat up eight or ten particles of the sugar, we have said enough in their favour. It is just as absurd to say that God the absolute has been known and comprehended by anybody, as it is to say that a mountain of sugar has been carried home by some ants to be eaten up."

Hindu metaphysicians have always maintained that God, being the Knower, cannot himself be known, because the knowing subject can never become the object of knowledge.* But while it is true that Divinity cannot be subjected to the microscope, the scalpel and other similar instruments of investigation in the phenomenal world, it is not beyond the human understanding to get a tolerably accurate

* See Max Müller's 'Philosophy of Vedānta,' pages 64—71.

idea of divine virtues and attributes, by a careful analysis and critical survey of the available facts and material.

The word God is used in several different senses by mankind, though, so far as we are aware, no attempt has been made by any philosopher or theologian to explain its different significances hitherto. Some of these significations may be put down as follows :

(1) the notion of Consciousness or Life in the abstract, taken as an all-pervading Essence, or Existence ;

(2) the idea of a Liberated Soul, and collectively of all the liberated Souls, who reside above the realm of 'illusion,' that is, high up above the universe of name and form, hence the Most High ;

(3) the notion of a kind of creative force or principle, the '*kuwwat-i-khayāl*,' or Imagination ;

(4) the notion of a man-like personal creator ; and

(5) the conception of the creative *logos*, that is, thoughts of the all-knowing, unmanifest Essence, the Spirit of God.

Of these, the first two are to be found in almost all systems of religion, though generally hidden behind allegory and metaphor, the third is the outcome of a psychological and metaphysical analysis of the functions of mind, the fourth is a pure dogma of ignorant superstition, and the last is a personification of *ideas*, the collective aspect of *jñāna*. As instances of the first type, we might mention Allah, from *al* and *lah*, 'the secret one,' and Brahman, the unrevealed, as distinguished from Brahmā, the revealed Godhead, the Father who cannot be known unless revealed by the Son (Luke x. 22). The Biblical *elohim*, and the Arabic *ilah* furnish instances of the second, and Word, Logos, *Isvara* and Brahmā of the fifth significance of God.

As regards the significance of the words *elohim* and *ilah*, we may refer to the 'Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics' (Vol. vi, p. 248), which points out :

"The word *ilah* (identical with the *eloah* of Job) . . . appears from its form to be originally a plural, and, indeed, of the earlier Semitic, *il* (Heb. *el*) on the analogy of *shifah* from *shaf-at*, 'lip' (where the *at* is a feminine affix). Of *ilah* itself the Biblical *elohim* is a further plural, of which, curiously, there appears to be a trace in

the Arabic vocative of *Allah*, viz., *illakumma*, which the native grammarians find the greatest difficulty in explaining."

The fact that the word *Allah* is traceable to two different roots indicates the comprehensive nature of the derivation; it does not contradict either of the two views which, as will be fully shown, in a later chapter, are the two aspects of truth. As a matter of fact, the primary root of the word seems to be the sound *el*, represented by the letter *l*, the Sanskrit *ल*, which is an epithet of *Indra*, a poetic personification of Life, the hidden Light, i.e., consciousness. According to Harold Bayley,

"The word *hnyl* is equal to *heol*, *haul*, or *houl*, the Celtic name for the *Sun*. It is seemingly from *heol*, the eternal *Ei*, that we derive our adjectives *hale*, *whole*, and *holy*. The Teutonic for Holy is *hel*, *heli*, *heil*, or *ala*, i. e., *Ella*, God that has existed for ever, the All and the Whole. In apparently all languages the word signifying *holy* has been derived from the divinely honoured sunlight."*

El, thus, like *lah*, is a symbol for the hidden light divine. Mr. Bayley has traced many words containing this simple sound, *el*, to their primitive roots, of which we need only refer to *Israel* here.

"It is obvious," writes Mr. Bayley, "that *Jeshurun* or '*Israel*' refers frequently to something more than an historic tribe of Semitic demon-worshippers, and that *Israel*, he or she, is sometimes a personification of the individual soul wandering in the wilderness. I suggest that the name *Israel* resolves itself naturally into *Is*, 'the light of,' *ra*, 'the eternal Sun which has existed for ever,' and *El*, the First Cause, 'the principle or beginning of all things.' The poetic '*Israel*' thus appears as an extension of the name *Ezra*, 'Rising of Light,' and as another personification of the Divine Essence, Light, or Colony in the soul."†

Thus, *Allah* is the 'hidden flame,'‡ the eternal, uncreate Conscious Essence, which is manifested, most fully and perfectly, in the *Hah* or *Elohim*, whether we take the word to be *Al-lah* or a contraction of *Al-ilah*. As regards the notion of a plurality of Gods implied in the epithet, it will be premature to enter into an explanation of it at this stage; we shall, therefore, reserve it for a later and

* 'The Lost Language of Symbolism,' Vol. i, p. 329.

† 'The Lost Language of Symbolism,' Vol. i, p. 284.

‡ A flame itself is the summation of a large number of luminous points.

more fitting occasion. Meanwhile, we may proceed with our enquiry into the general idea of God.

The etymological significance of the word God is not quite clear, but in Old Norse or Icelandic, the oldest of the Scandinavian group of tongues, we find it applied 'to heathen deities (neuter and almost always plural), and afterwards changed to *gud*, to signify God' (The Imperial Dictionary).

According to Mr. Bayley,* the letter *g* was understood by the mystics as meaning self-existent, *o* as signifying the Perfect one, and *d* as representing brilliancy. Hence, in mystic philology, the word God probably means an eternal, self-existent, but hidden Essence of the nature of Light, i.e., Consciousness, which is the source of inner illumination.

The Persian *Khuda*, is really *Khud-a*, *Khud* implying self and *a*, from 'ayinda,' a comer. The idea is that of a self-subsistent being or substance, and expresses the attribute of sourcelessness. Hence, the Persian conception of God is that of Consciousness or Life, which is its own source. The word would have also applied to matter and other existing substances, no doubt, had it not been for the fact that consciousness is entitled to precedence over them, on the ground that it is necessary for their perception. The highly interesting title or name of Jehovah (a corruption of Jahweh, literally, the living Reality),† the epithet 'I am,' is also grounded on a similar conception of Consciousness or Life, and is an instance of what is known to the Jaina Philosophers as *bhava nikshepa*.‡ For divinity being an inalienable attribute of Life, and Life being characterised by *be-ing*, God may be described as that which *is*. If we were to put these words in the mouth of Life, personified as God, they would become 'I am,' or 'I am that am,' that is, 'I am he who is.' Accordingly, we find in several of the scriptures of the world Divinity revealing 'I am' as its name.

* See 'The Lost Language of Symbolism,' Vol. II, pages 364 and 365.

† See 'The Lost Language of Symbolism,' Vol. I, p. 302.

‡ *Nikshepa* bears reference to the method of naming objects, which is of four kinds as follows:

Sometimes when emphasis is to be laid on the indefinable nature of Life, 'I am' becomes 'I am that I am.' In the Zoroastrian faith, one of the most secret names of Divinity is "*Ahmi*" (I am). So is "*Ahmi yat ahmi mazdao*" (I am that I am Mazda).*

In the Old Testament, God is said to have revealed his name to Moses, saying, "I am that I am," and to have directed him to tell the people of Israel: "'I am' hath sent me unto you" (Exodus, iii. 14).

So, also, in the Hindu Scriptures the Lord is known by the great ineffable name of "*Soham Asmi*" (I am he who is).† The Sanskrit, *Asmi yad asmi* 'is literally, 'I am That I am.'‡

Jesus Christ also used "I am" (with reference to Life when he said, "Before Abraham was I am" (John viii. 58), meaning "I am" was before Abraham. Surely this is much more than an accidental concurrence of thought and expression, and betrays a substratum of sound philosophy underlying all rational systems of Religion, and, in all probability, a common origin as well.

It is to be observed, however, that the original conception of Godhood, as disclosed by the etymology of the divine names does not contain anything like the idea of a creator within it; nor do we find within its four corners aught that might be deemed to countenance the theologian's attribution of a man-like resolving and repenting personality to his deity. No wonder, then, that the present-day thinkers, finding the adulterated concept of modern theology inconsistent with rational thought, have been led to reject the idea of god altogether.

(1) at random (*nāma nishhepa*), e.g., calling a man Wolf, Krishna and the like;

(2) with reference to some special attribute mentally transferred to the object (*athāpanā nishhepa*), e.g., calling the pieces of wood used in the game of chess knights, bishops, and so forth;

(3) with reference to the potentiality residing in the thing (*dṛavya nishhepa*), e.g., calling a *raja's* son *raja*; and

(4) with reference to function or calling (*kṛmā nishhepa*), e.g., to nickname a person devoted because of his performing devotion.

* Hormazd Yasht (see Haug's Essays on Parsia, p. 196).

† Isavasya Upaniṣad, 16.

‡ See 'The Fountain-Head of Religion' by Ganga Prasad.

The controversy has centered itself round a sort of watch-maker which represents the theological conception of a creator. Just as by seeing a watch one comes to the conclusion that there is a watch-maker who made it, so by seeing the universe, the theologian jumps to the conclusion that there is a man-like world-maker whose handiwork it must be.

It has already been established in the last chapter that the notion of a creation of the world is unentertainable for rational thought; but it has not yet been ascertained whether God be the creator of individuals or not. We shall, therefore, investigate this matter before proceeding any further.

The first question which arises in connection with the idea of creation is, why should a creator take the trouble of making anything at all? This has been answered differently by different systems. One system suggests that he wanted to make the world because it pleased him to do so; another, that he felt lonely and wanted company; a third, that he wanted to create beings who would praise his glory and worship him; a fourth, that he did it in sport, and so on. But none of these answers is to the point or satisfactory. It is necessary to note at the very outset that if the creator be full and perfect in himself, he cannot have any desires or unsatisfied cravings in him; for "blissfulness," which must be an attribute of Godhood, only means a state of consciousness in which there is not only a knowledge of perfection and fulness in one's own self,

* Those who ascribe anger to their god forget that anger is not an attribute of Godhood, since Divinity must be presumed to be happy, and since anger is the antithesis of happiness, as it only arises when things do not happen as they should, and thereby upset the equilibrium and serenity of the mind. Hence, he who is angry cannot be happy at the same time. Now, if it be true that the creator sees all things, he must see every moment of his life, the full panorama of human wickedness and sin, sufficient, at times, by its bare description, to make one's blood boil with indignation. It would follow that if he be an irritable god, he would hardly ever have a moment's peace of mind, to say nothing of happiness, for himself. But a being who has no moments of happiness in his life, can hardly be of any use to any one else as a god. Himself in need of happiness, he certainly cannot confer it on others. It follows, therefore, that anger can have no place in the disposition of a god.

but an absence of all desires as well. Hence, if a God sought pleasure in the homage of his creatures, he could not be happy in himself, since his happiness would then depend on the being and actions of others.

Moreover, it is a blot on omniscience to say that it could not foresee that happiness could not be had from the company of unhappy mortals. How could an all-wise, omniscient God expect ignorant, miserable wretches, as most of us undoubtedly are, to offer him the devotion of our bleeding hearts, particularly as we know, on the authority of Deism itself, that if he had not created us there would have been no suffering and sorrow for us? Again, if the creator be omnipotent, as he is supposed to be, why should it please him to create a world where sorrow and pain are the inevitable lot of his creatures? Why should he not make happier beings to keep him company, if company be what he desires? These are some of the objections to the replies given by the various systems of theology, and their force is only too evident to be ignored.

Shall we, then, say that the creative impulse is a playful function of the god of heaven and earth, or the *lila* of the lord, as Hinduism puts it? But this, too, fails to satisfy the intellect; for on this supposition creation ceases to be the act of a responsible maker, and is reduced to a mechanical functioning of a faculty like that of imagination, which, is not a divine function, by any means, as has been already seen in the previous chapter.

It is thus clear that the idea of an anthropomorphic creator is in no way acceptable to reason. This much argument would have ordinarily sufficed to settle the point, but as deep-rooted prejudices have become associated with the notion of a personal creator, we shall examine the doctrine still further to lay bare the error of theology.

The theologian, with his notions of an anthropomorphic Architect of the world, thinks that souls are made by a god to inhabit the dwellings of flesh which he also makes for them. This amounts to saying that each and every soul is created there and then to inhabit an organism as it is made, so that it is in no way responsible

for its being, condition and environment, having had no manner of 'hand' in their designing and making. Thus, if a soul is born ignorant, it is not its fault; for it was so created by its god. But the question is: why should an omnipotent creator create ignorant souls and then be constantly sending down prophets and saviours for their enlightenment, and suffer contradictory doctrines to be circulated amongst them, so that, ordinarily, it should be well nigh impossible to know the truth? This is by no means all, for the crowning act of this comedy of errors, we are told, will take place on the Judgment Day, when the same just and omnipotent god will sit in judgment to judicially determine and pronounce upon the errors and shortcomings of men, and will punish or reward them according to their deeds; and lo! the rewards and punishments shall be eternal. It would further seem that the plea of ignorance would not be allowed, so that a soul could not plead that the understanding which it had received failed to prove to its satisfaction that the teaching of Muhammad the Prophet, was entitled to greater credence than the doctrine of Christ, the Son, or *vice versa*! And what of him who dies in his mother's womb? Alas! even he must appear to be punished or rewarded on the Judgment Day, and to be sent to heaven or hell, for there is no third place for souls to go to in the cosmogony of popular Theism. Why should it be sent to one place rather than the other, seems to be a matter of pure arbitrary will, in the absence of any rules for the exercise of a judicial discretion. But this is sufficiently absurd to be acceptable to reason. With due respect to our beloved brethren who put their faith in these doctrines, we are constrained to observe that notions such as these might have passed for good sense or sound philosophy in the dark days of the medieval period, but that in the present state of human civilization intelligent people have a right to expect consistent reason rather than a torrent of chaotic speech from those who set themselves up as the spiritual teachers of men.

Be this as it may, the main point is, whether it is reasonable to ascribe the creation of souls to a god? As to this the following argument, it is hoped, might suffice to cure us of our mad infatuation for the notion especially for the notion of creation of simple

substances, which cannot be deemed to be otherwise than as eternally existing in nature.

If soul is spirit, either the creator manufactures it out of his own body, for he is said to be pure spirit, or out of a lump of spiritual 'clay' which he might possess.* But, in the first case, each created soul would go to reduce the being of the deity which is absurd, since the deity is unchanging and immutable; and in the second, that is, on the assumption that the supposed maker is possessed of a lump of spiritual 'clay' from which he manufactures souls, this lump of spiritual 'clay' must be either composed of atoms, or be non-atomistic in its nature. If the former, then each spiritual atom is already in existence as a spirit, and the attribution of its creation to a god is purely gratuitous. Nor can it be maintained that the great fashioner of things forms spirits by combining several 'atoms' of this spiritual stuff; for spirit is a simple substance. On the latter hypothesis—that the spiritual 'clay' is non-atomistic in its structure—it would not be possible to break it up into smaller spirits, for that would be inconsistent with the nature of the substance itself. The only other hypothesis of a creation from 'nothing' is not admissible in philosophy. The nature of spirit is evident from the nature of God, who is said to be a spirit and uncreate. Now, since the nature of substances does not vary to suit individual beliefs, it follows that if spirit is uncreate in the case of God, it must be so in all other cases. Hence, all the souls are eternal and uncreate, that is, self-subsistent.

It will pay us more than we may be prepared to acknowledge at this stage to know that so far as the attributes pertaining to the substance of being are concerned, divinity can differ in no particular from any ordinary soul; for just as gold is gold all over the world, whether we come across it in the Himalayas or the prairies of North America, so is spirit never anything else but spirit howsoever and wheresoever it be found. Thus, no difference is possible between things formed of one and the same substance, except with reference to the element of

* It is worth noticing that it is simply impossible for a real, that is to say, *simple* individuality or being, to divide itself, since a simple substance is not liable to division or disruption, having no parts which might be separated off from one another.

impurity which may be found to be adhering to one individual and not to another. And this is precisely the difference between God and man, the one being pure spirit, fully evolved out into perfection, and the other still weltering in the filth of sin and uncleanness. Hence is God the ideal of perfection for the imagination of man, whose inner essence is no less pure and divine and also uncreate than that of Him whom he worships to attain salvation.

We must now ascertain if Divinity can be said to be the maker of bodies. Here also theology has nothing more than the old analogy of a watch-maker to advance in support of its doctrine, and nothing to say in reply to the objections that arise against it. To begin with, how is it that so much precious time is wasted in the course of gestation? An almighty god decides to make a being, but why is his order not obeyed at once? Again, the good lord decides to make the being, but the latter comes to an end in many instances in a foetal condition. The question is, is the miscarriage of the divine effort due to the action of some other power, or is the lord god supposed to change his mind in the middle of the process of manufacturing? If the former, we are landed in further difficulties, because the destroying power is apparently more powerful than the creator, as it can override his commands. If the latter, the divine maker must be taken to be a whimsical, capricious, changeable being, wanting in force of character and dignity, and devoid of respect for his own decrees. Thus, in the one case the attempt of the creator fails on account of his impotence, and in the other, owing to his fickle-mindedness. This is quite sufficient to show that the idea of creation is altogether an untenable one. The evidence or appearance of design, which is the strongest argument in favour of the theory of creation, is more than counter-balanced by the evidence of imperfections all round.

If the pious theologian would only reflect on the problem calmly, he would soon perceive that his explanation—that God is the maker of the body—does not tally with his own notion of the dignity of his Supreme Being, whom he thus hastily puts at the beck and call, not only of every virtuous couple but of all those who sin in adultery, fornication and incest as well. If God unequivocally condemns—and theology assures us that he does—certain departures from the code of sexual purity

laid down by him, how can he be accredited with the creation of children ushered into being in violation of his own commandments and laws? To make him bless and fructify the very act which he emphatically condemns is to put him in the category of maniacs and babes. The theologian might now take refuge behind the angels, and maintain that they are responsible for the making of the body, but the angels only do the will of the 'Father,' so that the making of the child in every case of adultery, fornication and incest must be sanctioned by him.

Besides, it will be interesting to know how the lord makes a body—with his hands, like any ordinary labourer, or without them, *i. e.*, by a mere word of command? If we now say that he makes it with his hands, then an infinity of hands are required to make all the infinity of bodies of all kinds of living beings, in the entire universe; but this is absurd, since he can only be all hands* and nothing else on this hypothesis. Neither is the dignity of a god enhanced or made manifest by his keeping his hands constantly for the full period of embryonic growth, in such unholy + places as some of the wombs—in such cases at least where the female does not resent the advances of the male after conception—must necessarily be. The other alternative is equally untenable, since there is no connection of cause and effect between the word of a god and the making of an organism.

Furthermore, if an outside agency were to create the body, it would not be an organism but a manufactured article; for its making would proceed from periphery to centre. Hence, it is impossible for God himself to make an organism unless from within, in which case he would have to become the 'soul' of the creature itself; but that would be fatal to the position taken up by Deistic theology.

Further reflection enables us to perceive that the creation of the physical organism can be ascribed to the agency of a god only in one

* According to more advanced theologians God has no hands at all.

| This argument also disposes of the untenable notion that God's agency is needed for the doing of all that is done under the sun. We then have God not only growing grass, germinating seeds, and manufacturing milk in the mammaries of the female, but also making such unsightly, filthy things as pus, saliva, urine and fæces in the human and animal organisms! But this is too ridiculous to be entertained.

of the two following ways: either he starts with the soul as a centre and then plasters it over with matter, or makes the body, in the first instance, in the same way as a man makes a house, and puts in the soul to inhabit it. But in either case, the soul would be unable to act *through* the body or to feel its affections as its own, since the warmth of actual intimacy would be lacking in both cases. In order that the soul should feel with the body, it must constantly expand with its growing size, so that at each moment of development there should be a complete harmony between the tenement and its tenant. The phenomenon of growth does not imply the plastering over of the soul with matter, nor does it resemble the occupation of a house by its lessee; it is the result of absorption and assimilation of the necessary material by the 'tenant' himself. One has only to look at the process of growth and development of organic beings, to be convinced of this fact. It follows, therefore, that the physical organism cannot possibly be made unless the soul itself becomes the builder thereof. The only other alternative left to deistic theology is to say that God only supervises the making of the body, but this also involves the acknowledgment of the soul's capacity to make its own body, since we cannot train stones into masons. Besides, when we look at the cases of malformation and deformity, to say nothing of those instances in which the child dies before birth, and of the inequalities of the material bodies in respect of physical and mental capacities, the conclusion that the making of the body cannot be the work of a perfect and impartial architect becomes irresistible and unavoidable. These difficulties vanish from our path the moment we recognize the soul to be its own God, and the maker of its own body. Thus, while, on the one hand, the tenet—that God makes the body—loses not a tittle of its true, philosophical import, the imperfections of the body and inequalities of surroundings, circumstances and conditions, on the other, are accounted for by the mechanical nature of the process and the differences of 'seeds' and 'wombs' arising from the influence of past *karmas* of the soul.

Apart from the above, the theologian's notion of a resolving and repenting Supreme Being, making things and then repenting of doing so is unentertainable on the additional ground of being in

diametrical opposition to the idea of perfection, which is the essential attribute of Divinity. We are liable to err because of our imperfections, but he who is Eternal and Omniscient, and to whom the past, the present and the future are like an open book, does not need experience to teach him wisdom. The following from the "Psychic Phenomena" is relevant to the subject under consideration :—

"We are so accustomed to boast of the 'God-like reason' with which man is endowed, that the position that the subjective mind—the soul—of man is incapable of exercising that function, in what we regard as the highest form of reasoning, seems, at first glance, to be a limitation of the intellectual power of the soul, and inconsistent with what we have been accustomed to regard as the highest attributes of human intelligence. But a moment's reflection will develop the fact that this apparent limitation of intellectual power is, in reality, a God-like attribute of mind. God himself cannot reason inductively. Inductive reason pre-supposes an inquiry, a search after knowledge, an effort to arrive at correct conclusions regarding something of which we are ignorant. To suppose God to be an enquirer, a seeker after knowledge, by finite processes of reasoning, is a conception of the Deity which negatives his omniscience, and measures infinite intelligence by purely finite standard. For our boasted 'God-like reason' is of the earth, earthy. It is the noblest attribute of the finite mind, it is true, but it is essentially finite. It is the outgrowth of an objective existence."

What is said of the finite processes of reasoning also holds good of experience, so that a bungling, blundering creator cannot possibly be regarded as an Omniscient God. The perfection of God which must be full in all respects is, thus, incompatible with the notion of a resolving and repenting deity, creating wretched, ignorant weaklings of humanity, and insisting on their offering him the devotion of their bleeding and unconvinced hearts. The true Godhead, therefore, must consist of a Being or Beings, who have risen above the weaknesses of the passionate human nature which modern theology attributes to its deity.

For the same and similar reasons Divinity can have also nothing to do with what is called the management of the world. To what earthly—or, for the matter of that, even heavenly—purpose can he whose being is the purest expression of holiness constitute himself a manager of the world? Governorship and holiness, surely, do not go well together, however much a flattering tongue might delight in describing certain kings as holy: for holiness is not constituted by

virtuous deeds, which mark the limit of a householder's *dharma* (proper conduct), and only begins with *sannyāsa* (world-renunciation). Hence, no one who has not turned his back on the world—and he who actually governs it cannot be said to have done so—is entitled to be considered holy.

As for the maker's purpose, it must surely be in the nature of a mare's nest if even with his omnipotence he has not been able to overcome the obstacles in his path by this time: or the fault must lie with his omniscience if it has failed to warn him that he is thinking of achieving it a bit too soon. Neither do the facts speak much in favour of the quality of omnipotence supposed to be enjoyed by this Supreme Ruler of the worlds. For what shall we think of a police officer if he fail to stretch his hand to protect a man knowing that a robber is going to kill him the next moment? To punish the guilty is certainly just, but should we justify the constable who stands by and does nothing to save the victim? And, if it would be unpardonably wrong in an ordinary low-paid constable to behave in this manner, how much worse would it be in a being who is all-knowing and omnipotent to allow such an outrage to be perpetrated? If we do not refuse to look the facts in the face, we shall perceive that life is only too full of calamities and catastrophes, most of which could certainly be avoided if nature were under the guidance of an all-knowing, all-powerful and merciful god. As Mr. Joseph McCabe tersely puts it in his *Bankruptcy of Religion* (p. 34).

"What would you think of the parent who would stand by and see his daughter grossly outraged, while fully able to prevent it? And would you be reconciled if the father proved to you that his daughter had offended his dignity in some way?"

Torrential downpours in oceans and deserts when a timely drop is elsewhere needed to avert a widespread famine, wholesale destruction of life, regardless of age, sex and innocence, by pestilence and sword, extensive devastations by earthquake and flood, causing untold suffering to living beings—all bear powerful witness to their causation being determined by natural law, but not by a Supreme Merciful Intelligence, able to crush all opposition, of any kind whatsoever, from his path.

Our conclusion, then, is that the notion of the Supreme Being as a Governor of the universe is as baseless and irrational as the wild conjecture that divinity consists in the creation of a world.

We must now turn our attention to the popular misconception about the immateriality of spirit which is, as often as not, taken to mean a denial of all substantiveness to it. That the idea of absolute immateriality is contradicted everywhere by nature, needs no demonstration; for that which exists must have a concrete existence which is unthinkable apart from substantiveness of some kind or other.

It is impossible to conceive even consciousness apart from a substratum of substantiveness. It may be that we shall never learn what the substance of consciousness is like, but to consider it as an existence without substantiveness is simply out of the question.

The word 'spirit' seems to have furnished a license for all sorts of rabid and fanciful speculation to unphilosophical theologians of the middle ages, and even to-day the vast majority of our race seem quite uncertain as to its precise significance. As a consequence of this philosophical obscurity which has gathered round the word, the term 'spirit' has become a prolific source of error and dispute. The truth is that by the immateriality of spirit intellect understands, not that which is devoid of all substratum of substantiveness, but that which is not matter in the popular sense. Hence, it is repugnant to intellect to maintain even a god to be devoid of all substantiveness whatsoever.

The idea of space-occupation in the case of spirit is to be understood in the same way as that in which light occupies space. As the light of a lamp exists in space, but does not offer obstruction to other lights in illumining, hence occupying, the same space, so does spirit, being finer than light itself, occupy space in an interpenetrating manner, that is to say, without obstructing anything else.

"The following from the pen of Dr. Paris Sidis (see *Normal and Abnormal Psychology*, p. 29) is relevant to the point under consideration:—" 'May not facts of consciousness be some kind of matter, some form of material substance the constitution of which we do not as yet know?' Such was the question put by a medical man, when he heard me expounding the difference in kind between physical and psychical facts. 'That might be' I answered, 'but then that substance, if it ever be discovered will not have the properties of matter; it will be a 'matter' totally different in kind from that studied by the physicist.' For the 'matter' of physical sciences is essentially one of *extension*: a matter, however that occupies no space is an existence altogether different in kind from that of extended things, and is certainly no 'matter' for the physicist."

The idea of infinity in relation to divinity is the next to demand our attention. It is sometimes surmised that a pure spirit is an all-pervading existence; but the idea is not in consonance with reason in any sense. For none of the two ways in which we can conceive the existence of a pure spirit—that is, as an individual being, or a quality or essence—can ever make him physically coincide with boundless space. As regards the former, it is sufficient to say that our conception of a living being is so radically different from the notions we have of space, that it would be an act of self-deceiving legerdemain on the part of fantasy to imagine their coinciding in respect of physical extension. This objection also holds good with regard to the omni-presence of Divinity as an essence, which is further inadmissible on the ground that it is not in the nature of a metaphysical abstraction to enjoy general pervasion in the spatial sense. However choice the words that might be used to describe its conception in our minds, howsoever elegant the phrases we might employ in alluding to it, the fact remains that our notion of the quality of consciousness is a metaphysical abstraction, out and out, and is as unthinkable as a self-subsisting substance as matter apart from the multitude of atoms which really and truly represent all that nature acknowledges to be valid in our notion of materiality. And, if nature does not allow *matter* to have a wider pervasion than the limits of a solitary atom, will it allow consciousness to extend its dominion beyond the four corners of the soul? The metaphysician who hopes to steal a march on this wide-awake 'divinity' through the tortuous by-paths of convenient unifications and purely wordy abstractions, may learn once for all that he can never succeed in turning the order of things in nature upside down, but only in perverting his own mental vision to regard what is crooked as straight.

A slight trimming of the wick of intellectualism will enable us to perceive, though we might continue to wear the coloured spectacles of prejudice, that even this pervasion which is secured by means of what might be termed the mind-befogging shells of reason predetermined to unreasoning bias, is not what we have been aspiring for all along, falling short, as it does, by far, of the

aimed at pinnacle of absolute omni-presence, conceived to be—rightly or wrongly, it matters not how—an essential element in the constitution of divinity. For the pervasion of consciousness is limited to conscious substance which does not comprise matter. The classification of substance in the following tabulated form will be useful as illustrating the point for the benefit of those not having expert familiarity with the science of mental abstractionism.

SUBSTANCE

Conscious substance (spirit)	Unconscious substance, i.e., matter, ether, etc.
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A glance here suffices to show that conscious substance is only a part of the genus substance and, therefore, cannot be identical with it. Hence, even if it were possible by some method of intellectual jugglery to convert metaphysics into physics by treating a pure abstraction as a concrete reality, the distinction between genus and species would not permit the levelling of all differences *en bloc*.

It is thus evident that the idea of divine omni-presence is unentertainable in a physical sense.

To understand the true nature of the type of infinity ascribed to consciousness, it is well to bear in mind that the word infinity is used in three different senses, namely, firstly, in the sense of boundlessness, as in the case of Space; secondly, of numerical immensity, which signifies the countlessness and inexhaustibility of number, as in the case of moments of Time, or particles of matter; and, thirdly, of limitlessness of Knowledge, or Thought, so utterly devoid of anything in the nature of limits or boundary walls as to be incapable of being considered finite by any manner of means.

Now, we have already seen that the divine infinity is not of the first type; and the second type is inappropriate to an individual, since no one can be said to be infinite in the numerical sense of the word. This leaves us with the third kind alone, which, however, is the actual type of infinity appertaining to divinity.

The infinity of Godhood is proved by the very nature of a pure Spirit, the conscious substance, free from all kinds of impurities in which the

unemancipated souls are involved ; and the infinity of the substance of consciousness is apparent from the fact that it is endowed with the power to know all things. Now, because knowledge is capable of infinite expansion and amplitude, and contains the germ of infinity in itself, consciousness cannot but be infinite by nature. Hence, the purest form of consciousness must be endowed with perfect omniscience, that is to say, with Knowledge unlimited by Time or Space.

It is not to be supposed that the denial of the spatial type of infinity to divinity in any way detracts from the holiness or perfection of a Divine Being ; on the contrary, the expression would be deprived of its true meaning if applied to one who is diffused all over. Holiness and perfection, it will be seen, have no dependence on boundlessness of size—else those of a gigantic stature will all be perfect and holy—but on freedom from impurities of *karmas*, that is, sin. The reason for the attribution of omni-presence to Divinity is to be found in the tendency of the human mind which delights in the employment of exaggerating metaphor. Because the quality of omniscience enables its possessor to know all things of all times and of all places, he is, *as it were*, present everywhere. A metaphor like this has only to become sufficiently known to be rid of the irksome demand on understanding, latent in the accompanying qualifying phrase, when the 'un-initiated' are sure to interpret it in a strictly literal sense. Clement is decidedly right when with reference to the theologian's blunder, in this regard, he points out : " They were misled by what is said in the book of Wisdom : ' He pervades and passes to all by reason of his purity ' ; since they did not understand that this was said of wisdom which was the first of the creations of God " (Ante Nicene Christian Library, Vol. xii. 274).

We must now endeavour to ascertain whether omniscience and bliss be actually the attributes of divinity, as they are said to be. As to this only a little reflection is necessary to perceive that they both appertain to the nature of the individual soul, and, therefore cannot but appertain to Godhood which stands for the perfection of the best in man.

Firstly, in respect of perfection in knowledge, that is assured by the fact that the soul is pure consciousness whose function is to

know, and because all things are knowable by nature. Consciousness being the very nature of the substance of the soul; and all things being knowable by nature, omniscience, full and perfect, must be predicated in respect of the essential nature of each and every individual. Ready assent will be lent to this proposition by any one who will give full effect to the fact that all things are knowable by nature, which means not that there is nothing unknown to us today, but that that which will never be known by any one at all is non-existent; for that which will never be known to any one will never be known, much less proved, to be existing, and without strict proof existence cannot be conceded in favour of anything whatsoever. It is not even permissible to hold that the 'unknowable' signifies an agglomeration of a certain number of attributes some of which may never be known; for we shall never have any reason whatsoever for alleging the existence of any of those unknowable attributes, beyond a wilful refusal to be reasonable. Thus, there is no escape from the position that all things are knowable.

Now, since the natural properties of a substance are to be found in all its units or individuals, it is obvious that what is known to one individual is capable of being known by all others.* It follows from this that if there be an infinity of ideas, each of which is known to only one individual at a time, the consciousness of each and every soul is potentially able to know the whole infinity of them. Hence, each and every soul is potentially omniscient, that is to say, the consciousness of every living being is endowed with the capacity to know all things, unlimited by Time and Space. There is nothing to be surprised at in this conclusion, since knowledge merely means a state of consciousness, which, being an affection or modification of the substance of its being, is felt by the soul. This amounts to saying that the soul is made of pure intelligence, in different language, the *jiva* is a pure embodiment* of knowledge.

The soul is also endowed by nature with infinite perception, that is to say, the power of infinite perception is inherent in the very

* For a further explanation of the subject, see *The Science of Thought* by the present writer.

nature of every soul. To realise the full import of what this signifies it is only necessary to understand the nature of perception which is the most wonderful phenomenon of all. For the very moment one opens one's eyes half the visible world stands before one, glowing with light and colour! This is perception; but let us pause for a moment to ask ourselves: how is the miracle effected? Does the outer show get into our being in its entirety, in some way, to become visible to us? No, certainly not; for only some fine currents of vibrations coming from without, are known to pass through the eyes. Does, then, the individual consciousness itself pass out of the eyes to stand in the midst of the fascinating panorama? No, even this is impossible; nor would it explain perceptions if true; for by merely making the perceiving faculty stand in the midst of things we are no nearer the act of perception. Is it not the greatest wonder, then, that the soul can perceive things without moving out of its place and merely through the medium of certain very fine kind of vibrations that reach it through the eye? The fact is that perception only occurs through modification of the perceiving ego, and is nothing but a kind of modification (a state of consciousness) of its being. The external stimulus itself plays but a minor part in the psychological function; it merely evokes characteristic response or resonance in the conscious substance, provided the latter attend to it. For if the perceiving faculty be otherwise engaged the incoming stimulus remains quite unproductive of results. It is thus obvious that perception is an *affection* of the ego, a feeling evoked or provoked in its being, that is, a state set up in its substance, by interaction between it and the incoming excitation. Now, if the reader will realize that the interaction between the perceiving consciousness and the incoming excitation does not occur all over the surface or substance of being of the ego, but only in an infinitesimally small and microscopical spot (namely, the point where the subtle external vibrations of light, passing along the fine optic nerve and the still finer filaments of nervous matter that connect that nerve with the soul-substance,

comes in contact with the soul), he will be able to form some idea of the incalculable infinity of perception that will be realized if the soul-substance become excited all over its being, at one and the same time. This is why Religion describes the emancipated soul as invested with infinite knowledge and infinite perception, among other divine attributes.

Secondly, as regards happiness, it must be obvious to every thinking being that if pain were an essential part of the nature of the soul, vain would be our desire for the joy of Gods. But that it is not, is proved by the fact that its causation is always due to the presence of factors external to the soul itself. It will be seen that pleasure and pain are both in the nature of an affection or modification of the soul, since nothing corresponding to them has ever been known to exist in the external world, and also since nothing but one's own states or affections can be felt by an individual. What seems to happen is that an agreeable modification of the soul-substance occasions a feeling of pleasure while an opposite kind of sensation arises from a disagreeable affection. Both pleasure and pain are transient for this reason, the latter being mostly the lot of living beings in the world, aptly described as the Vale of Tears. Even the little pleasure that is to be had here is obtained after such a lot of worry and trouble, and is generally productive of so much suffering, that it is no exaggeration to say that it is born in pain and ends in tears. Besides, gratification only goes to augment the craving, and lust invariably leads to anguish on the impairment of the senses, as in old age. Thus, if sense-gratification be the only form of pleasure to be found in nature, perfection in happiness is not to be thought of in connection with the soul. Fortunately, however, there is another kind of joy which is possible for living beings and of which they are almost wholly ignorant. This consists in the natural 'pulsation' of pure *de-light*, which being the very nature of the soul becomes an inseparable companion of it the moment an individual establishes himself fully in his own pure Self.

If we wish to understand the nature of Bliss which is the attribute of Gods, we must analyze the idea of joy first, as it

differs from bliss only in degree. To begin with, we must distinguish between pleasure and joy. The former is merely a gratification of the senses, thus, fleeting and short-lived—some delight lasting for a time and then ceasing (*Imperial Dictionary*). The word pleasure, when unqualified, expresses less excitement, or happiness, than delight, or joy. Pleasure, thus, is an affair of the senses, and its actual experience is confined to the time during which they are in contact with their objects, *e.g.*, food is palatable and toothsome only so long as the glands of taste are in actual contact with it, but not when the act of eating is over and it has passed into the stomach. Joy, on the contrary, is an emotion and has the element of freedom in it. It is a state of gladness or exultation, and indicates exhilaration of spirits. In religious terminology, it signifies a state of being at once glorious and triumphant, as in the passage :

“ Who for the joy that was set before him endured the cross ” (*Heb. xii. 2*).

In order to have a full grasp of the idea of joy, we must consider some actual instance in which it arises; for then alone we shall be able to understand its proper significance.

Let us take the case of the school-boy who has appeared in his annual examination, and who hears of his success and feels joy at the news. The question is, whence does his joy arise? What, in different language, occasions the exhilaration of spirits in him? If we analyze the mental change, effected by the news, we shall find that it is not the news itself, nor the news of the success, but the certainty thereof which is clearly the occasion of his emotion. For if the news be not authentic, the proper feeling of exultation cannot be evoked, notwithstanding the highly agreeable nature of the information. Joy, then, is a state of the mind which has its roots in mental conviction, in other words, in faith. Pleasure, it will be seen, at a glance, does not depend on faith at all, for it is not an emotion and does not spring from a mental conviction.

Again, the boy feels joyous solely and simply because something lasting has been achieved, for he is assured that he shall

not have to appear for that particular examination any more in the future. His 'bondage,' in so far, at least, as that particular task is concerned, is now over for ever. Joy, thus, is a state of exhilaration which is manifested in consequence of some lasting and permanent good, *i.e.*, by the removal of some fetters from the soul. The idea of pleasure cannot here keep pace, in any sense, with that of joy: for, while true joy is the sense of permanent freedom from some irksome liability or limitation, and, for that reason an emotion, pleasure is only temporary, and conveys no idea of freedom in its unqualified import.

Whether we apply this principle to the case of the merchant who accumulates a vast fortune, to that of the field-marshal who, laden with the booty and honours of war, retraces his steps homewards, to that of the lover who hears the softly-whispered 'yes' from the lips of his beloved, or to any other case of success, the result is the same. In each and every instance, the emotion of joy springs up in consequence of the belief that never again need the same thing be striven for. The sense of freedom from future straining and striving, therefore, is the direct and immediate cause of joy.

Man in the world is like a big school-boy in a big school, and has to pass many examinations in his life. At each examination which he passes successfully some fetters are removed from his soul, and so he feels joy at the idea of his increasing freedom. As the school-boy puts his books aside on leaving his school, so would he put aside his discriminative intellect on leaving the world, if he has been successful in his trials.

Can we, then, possibly form a correct estimate of the intensity of joy which our 'school-boy' will feel, when he acquires not only all the learning that there is to be taught in our worldly schools, but exhausting all the categories of the discriminative intellect masters that very faculty itself? Who can gauge the depth of the feeling, or rather the emotion, of freedom which such an one, who has mastered all knowledge and annihilated all doubts, will feel in his emancipated state? Its estimation

or measurement* is surely beyond the intellect, for it is an emotion, and the intellect does not pretend to deal with emotions. It can only be described feebly by language which avowedly follows the intellect, and clothes its concepts in words. Hence, the utmost that can be said in describing bliss is that it is a beatific state of being in which joy wells up in the soul, as wave upon wave of pure ecstasy, in unceasing succession, which, yet, is no succession, in the sense in which that word is commonly used by men!

From the foregoing analysis it is obvious that pure joy is a state which is not created temporarily by the absorption of any external material, but which is inherent in the very nature of the soul, and comes into manifestation by the removal of fetters from it. Now, the permanent success of man, in some particular enterprise, removes an idea of want from the soul and lifts it out, as it were, of the slough of despond into which it was thrown by virtue of the desire for attaining that particular purpose. Its fetters, thus, consist of the ideas of want, i.e., desires, which it has collected about itself; and as each idea of want, or desire, is replaced by one of fulness and success, it rises triumphant and exultant in its real inherent glory, and leaps for pure joy.

The word *delight* itself, if analyzed, conveys a very accurate idea of the feeling of joy. It is a compound word, made up of the Latin

* Feelings naturally cannot differ from one another quantitatively, since they are psychic in their nature and cannot be measured like magnitudes. But they differ in point of intensity, that is, qualitatively, as different colours, or the shades of a particular tint. The intensity of a particular feeling depends on the greater or less exclusion of all other sensations, ideas and emotions from the mind, for the time being, and on the persistence with which the mind might dwell on the details of the idea associated with it. The affections and contractions of the bodily muscles which are the outward manifestations of the inner states, no doubt, vary with different feelings and sensations, and by the greater or less extent of the area involved give rise to the notion of magnitude, enabling us, in a way, to form a quantitative estimate of the quality of the inner psychical states; but this is the work of pure intellect which interprets all phenomena in terms of magnitude in the use of which alone it is an expert. The best way to be convinced of this is to try to find out, by how much does anger weigh more than love, or by how much is virtue longer than vice, and so forth, without calling in aid their effects on the physical body.

prefix *de*, employed to denote the idea of increase or intensity, and of 'light,' used in contradistinction to 'heavy'; and means a state of feeling which is opposed to the care-laden, *i.e.*, worried, or sorrowful, attitude of the soul. Thus, delight signifies mental ease, *i.e.*, freedom from care, hence, the state of buoyancy and light-heartedness, which is a necessary concomitant of release from anxiety. The word 'release' itself only means liberation or discharge from some sort of confinement or bondage, or from care, pain, or burden of some kind, or from some obligation, responsibility, or penalty, and also signifies acquittance. The idea conveyed is that of the removal of some sort of fetters, hence, of a gaining, or regaining, of the natural state of freedom, not of the acquisition or attainment of anything foreign, or new. When a judge pronounces judgment of acquittal in favour of a prisoner, the delight of the latter is great, because he instantly experiences, or begins to experience, a complete cessation of all the mental worries which were weighing him down, on the score of the accusation levelled against him; but the fact of his acquittal adds nothing positive to his body, mind or soul, and merely leads him to feel the *status quo ante* when the troubles and anxieties, consequent on his accusation, arrest and trial, had not imposed their 'fetters' on him. It is true that he did not feel so light-hearted before his accusation as he does afterwards, but the change is due to the manifestation of joy which pushes aside, for the time being, some of the other cares and worries as well. The difference between the old and the new states of liberty, then, is that while in the former condition its enjoyment was marred by all the other existing cares and worries, in the latter it is emphasized by a sense of release from some of them, at least, for the time being. Thus, delight simply means the natural state of freedom of the soul.

Amongst the men and women of the world, however, delight itself is a short-lived condition, inasmuch as their desires, *i.e.*, ideals and pursuits, seldom leave them time to enjoy the natural joy of being; on the contrary, no sooner than is any particular burden removed from the soul they manage to impose two more

on it, in its place, by their ignorant and unnatural living. Thus it is that they find it difficult to realize that the real nature of their souls is divinely blissful and joyous. But in the course of the progress on the 'path,' these fetters are removed one after another, by the conscious exertion of a self-conscious will, leading to greater and greater experiences of the delight of freedom and joy, as earnest or foretaste of redemption; and, finally, when all the fetters have dropped off the soul, it stands revealed to the ecstatic vision of the Saved One as identical with God who is the enjoyer of perfect freedom, all-embracing knowledge and unchanging, unabating bliss. The difference between the joy or delight of the mortals and the feeling of pure bliss is only one of degree for they both express the freedom of the soul; but with the ordinary, ignorant humanity their expression is soon pushed below the surface, by perverse thinking and living. Thus, they come into express manifestation only when some weight is lifted off the soul, and then only for so long as an old or additional burden is not forced on it.

From the foregoing explanation it is obvious that what gives us delight is necessarily that which removes our worries and thereby lightens the burden with which the soul is weighted down. Now, since we feel anxiety only when our personal interests are in some way concerned, it follows that anything which diverts our attention from our personality or its mediate or immediate concerns, for the time being, is a source of joy. The sight of beautiful landscapes, of majestic mountains, of works of art, and the like, are among such objects. But their disadvantage is that they only afford temporary respite. The delight of a child at the possession of a new toy is nothing as compared with the 'leaping' emotion of the scientist who suddenly succeeds in discovering some hidden law of nature, and even the latter's feeling is colourless in comparison with the pure joy of the mystic who catches a fleeting 'glimpse' of the lustre of his effulgent soul. The degree of permanence of freedom gained thus, determines the intensity and duration of the emotion of joy. He who realizes himself to be the all-knowing, the ever free

and the very source, as it were, of blissfulness itself must, therefore, necessarily enjoy bliss : for, for him, there is an end of all anxieties and bondage. In short the relation of happiness to desire, which directly mars the manifestation of the natural delight of the soul, may be expressed mathematically as $\frac{\text{happiness}}{\text{desires}}$, so that if we keep on increasing the denominator our unit of happiness may be reduced to an infinitesimal fraction, but becomes whole by its elimination.

If our analysis is correct, grief is a condition foreign to the nature of the soul, as it is caused by the imposition of some sort of restraint or obligation, hence, burden or fetters on it. We might go further and add that grief, with all its kindred feelings, such as sorrow, anguish, and the like, arises only in consequence of the conjunction of the body and the soul : for, as we have already seen, the natural state of pure spirit is one of unalloyed bliss. Taken separately, neither the body nor the soul is capable of feeling pain or pleasure, as sensations, or grief, and the like, as emotions. For the body has no feelings of its own, and the natural feeling of the soul is that of joyousness. In proof of the first of these propositions may be adduced the fact that a dead body has no feelings whatsoever, and that if the mind be deeply engrossed elsewhere pain is not felt in the body, though its causes may continue to exist with undiminished vigour and give rise to it again after a time. The second proposition needs no further proof, and is obvious from our analysis of the nature of joy. These facts entitle us to say that pleasure and pain and all anti-joyous emotions arise in the soul only when its attention is directed to the physical body and becomes engrossed in its concerns. Hence, if the soul be rid of the physical body with which it erroneously identifies itself, it will enjoy its own natural feeling, that is pure bliss.

It is necessary to remember that grief, like fear, sorrow and other similar emotions, is the product of the mind, and is caused by the mind's dwelling on the picture arising from either the association with what is undesirable and undesired or the dissociation with an object of desire, unlike pure bliss which springs from a feeling of freedom and is independent of all kinds of mental pictures and trains of thought. For

this reason when the receipt of a message of failure in an undertaking, e.g., in an university examination, is likely to cause regret and grief. It does so only because the mind at once begins to picture to itself all sorts of unpleasant and distasteful scenes and consequences flowing from the mishap and thus sets up currents or states of feelings that are known by the name of sorrow, grief or regret. True joy, on the other hand, springs from the realization of a feeling of freedom that is not the resultant of an agreeable or disagreeable train of thought, but the manifestation of the natural attribute, characteristic or property of the soul when left to itself, free from mental imaginings as well as sensory excitements, both. Hence, while sensory excitement is productive of sensations and mental imagery of pleasant or unpleasant kind, the natural pulsation of the soul-substance, without the intrusion of any extraneous adjunct whether physical or mental, is itself the joy-giving ecstasy which is termed *paramananda* (supreme bliss) in its highest manifestation or form.

It must be now clear that so far as the place of man in nature is concerned, the ideal set before him in the first chapter is by no means too high for him to aspire to. Of the two elements of which he is composed, namely, an *atman*, or soul, and the body of matter, the former is fully endowed with all that is the noblest and best in our conception of a God. It is true that there is little if anything at all of the divine in manifestation in his present condition, but it is no less true that none of the elements that go to constitute divinity is wanting in his soul. It is a rule with nature that the attributes and functions of substances are never annihilated, however much they might remain suspended for the time being in any given condition, as is evident in the case of certain gases which lose their gaseous nature while existing in the form of water, but recover it the moment the liquid is resolved into its component parts. Similarly, whether divinity manifest itself or not, it is there, all the same, and in all its fulness in the humblest of living beings. It is a necessity with Life that it should be present as a *whole* in each and every soul; no one has yet seen *being* appear in fragments and parts!

Consciousness is both infinite and simple, and we have to recognise it as a whole, wherever and in whatever form it be found; and the conclusion to be drawn from its infinite nature is as astounding as it is true: it means that we are the infinite ourselves; it means that the real nature of all living beings in the universe is unconditionally divine; it means that the soul is its own God. If we put this thought in mystic garb, it will read that the Absolute, i.e., the Reality, is present, in all its fulness, in each and every manifestation of life, though standing behind the 'veil of illusion,' that is, names and forms. And, the cause of error is the form of illusion, the physical body, which constitutes the apparent man, the real one being none other than Brahman itself, to use the terminology of Vedanta. It is the body which prevents one from looking *within*, by keeping the attention fixed all the time on the apparent, outward form. When man comes round to realize the nature of his delusion, he will find himself none other than God whose nature is Sat-Chit-Ananda, that is, Existence-Consciousness-Bliss, which are also the attributes of the unemancipated soul, though not manifested, in its case, in fulness and perfection. Hence, the difference between God and man amounts to no more than what distinguishes a full-blown flower from a mere bud. And, as the full height of perfection is attainable by the renunciation of desire, as has been demonstrated to be true in the case of bliss, and as will be proved to be the case with respect to all other attributes of perfection when the subject comes up for treatment at its proper place, the difference between God and man may be said to consist solely and simply in regard to desire from which God must be perfectly free and in which man is more or less deeply involved. Thus, God is man *minus* desire, and man is God *plus* desire. But for this, the soul is a divinity, whole and entire and self-sufficient.

CH. "There cannot be any belief in the unity of God except by admitting that He is one simple substance, without any composition or plurality of elements: One by whatever side you view it, and by whatever test you examine it; not divisible into two parts in any way and by any cause, nor capable of any form of plurality either objectively or subjectively. . . ." (The Guide for the Perplexed by Moses Maimonides, p. 69.)

Hence the injunction conjointly imparted by all the ancient systems of thought : "*Man know thyself !*"

To sum up : the conception of God is not that of a creator or manager of the world, nor of a being anxious to be worshipped by angels and men, nor yet of a powerful personage engaged in selfish sport and indifferent to the consequences of his acts, but of the perfection of all that is the noblest and best in the constitution of Man. True Divinity is constituted by perfection in respect of Knowledge and Bliss and Holiness, which are, undoubtedly, the essential and inalienable attributes of each and every soul. Hence the statement : "*He who knoweth his own self knoweth God.*"—Sayings of Muhammad.

CHAPTER IV.

THE FALL.

"Whoever associateth *any other* with God is like that which falleth from heaven * * * This is so."—Al Qur'an, Chapter xxii.

As is evident from the heading of the present chapter, we are transporting the reader to the little-explored dark continent of mythology, where he must prepare himself for a fight with the Dragon of Superstition, whose very touch reduces all that lives to dust. This is the land of strange spectacles, of unlikely events and impossible relationships, the region where people seldom hesitate to pronounce, on little or no provocation, the most deadly and dreadful of curses, which are also immediately effective on those with whom they are displeased; it is the realm of unmannish men, of un-womanish women, of un-goddish gods, in short, of all that has its *raison d'être* in a sense of delight at the discomfiture and breaking down of poor, normal commonsense. In this quaint and uncanny region is distilled the terrible vintage of unreasoning, fanatical faith a few drops of which suffice to produce a life-long insensibility of wits, its sense-stealing properties not being the result of any physical processes of fermentation, but of the magnetism of the magic personality of its Brewer, the High Priest of Superstition and Myth. He who would free his soul from the effects of the poisonous fumes of the harmful draught must, therefore, first of all overpower this arch enemy of mankind.

The stronghold of the monster is an interminable maze of winding passages, like the Cretan labyrinth where Minos of old kept his fearsome Minotaur; and the conditions of the combat are also not unlike those which Theseus had to accept at the time except that there is no Minos' daughter to provide us with the ball of clue and the magic sword wherewith to destroy the fiend. We must, however, make the best of our opportunity, and bowing to the great Sarasvati,

the Goddess of Wisdom, accept the ball of clue of Cause and Effect and the sword of Discrimination which intellect places in our hands at Her bidding. Thus armed, we run no risk of being lost in the winding turns and blind alleys of the indiscriminate jumble of fiction and fact into which we are about to plunge, and shall also be spared the unholy dread of the residents of this strange land of Fantasy that constitutes the Foe

For, as we hope to make it clear by and by, mythology is mind's underground rendezvous for all those whose inability to bear the strong rays of the midday Sun of intellectualism forces them to wear the tinted glasses of poesy. They resemble the suppositional prisoners of Plato, who, securely tied to their seats in a cave, with their backs towards its entrance, have to rely, for their knowledge of the world, upon the shadows cast on the wall in their front by all that pass by their prison. Occasionally they also overhear what those in light say when passing the cave, and amuse themselves by robing the unadorned, matter-of-fact conceptions of truth, thus obtained, in the richest raiment of charming allegory from Fancy's flowery stores, creating, at the same time, the most picturesque scenery and realistic atmosphere for the progeny of their exuberant thought.

No doubt, the modern man, conscious of his incalculable 'book-loads' of learning, smiles in a superior way when confronted with ancient myth and legend; and certainly modern learning can never hope to find a less resentful object as a butt for its contemptuous ridicule than the 'crude' religion of the B. C. days, and especially 'Heathen Pantheism.' But we shall see that the man who is the first to laugh is not always the one to laugh the longest. For us mythology does not mean the record of humanity's childhood's thought when man may be said to be still groping his way in the dark, soon after his emergence from the monkey race, but the expression, in poetry's garb, of some of the most sober and valuable pronouncements of the only science which can raise a human being to the status and dignity of Gods. Here and there one might possibly encounter a legend or two which fall short of this estimate; but they might be due to modification through incompetent hands. The thing to be especially guarded against is the stuff of the type of nursery tales

which can be picked out almost always at a glance, on account of its not having the true ring of the genuine Aryan coinage. As regards the confusion which is likely to be caused in modern notions in certain respects from our thesis, well, they must be altered if found to be incorrect. Our notions of the origin of species, the migrations of nations and the like are not founded on a general or special revelation which cannot be altered or interfered with; they are the outcome of human speculation, hastily effected, and must yield to truth whenever good reason ordains it thus.

As for the interpretation of these myths, some of them are too plain to need elucidation; others may be solved with a little thought; there be others still that seem to defy the unravelling skill, but are sure to yield to perseverance and study.

As an instance of the first kind may be mentioned the story of Echo and Narcissus from the Greek Mythology, in which the personifications are of the plainest possible type, though by no means inelegant in a literary sense. The wood-nymph whose power of speech had been taken away from her 'unless in answer to some other voice,' is as plain a description of the phenomenon of echo, as Narcissus, who, in love with himself, comes to grief in the foolish endeavour to be embraced in the arms of his own reflection in water, is of personal vanity. The Hindu conception of Lakṣmi, the wife of Viṣṇu, is another instance of this type. She represents prosperity which is a consort of Dharma (Religion), though, in evil times, so runs the curse of Gayatri, she is 'not to remain stationary in one place and to abide constantly by the vile, the inconstant, the contemptible, the simple, the cruel, the foolish and the barbarian. It would be superfluous to say that the description is not of a person, much less of a goddess, the wife of one of the greatest divinities of the Hindu Pantheon, but a pure and simple rendering of our conception of prosperity or wealth in poetical, metaphorical speech.

The legend of the rivalry between Arachne, the daughter of a famous dyer in purple, and Pallas-Athene, the Goddess of Wisdom, is an instance of the second type, and yields its secret on a little reflection.

The legend runs that Arachne was famed for her rare skill in weaving rich and wonderful patterns on her webs, and so high rose her name that even Pallas-Athene, the goddess of such arts, one day came to examine her work. Now, Arachne was very proud of her skill, and denied that the excellence of her work had anything to do with the inspiration of the goddess, though men *generally held otherwise*. On meeting the goddess face to face, she hurled open defiance at her, on which the goddess, stung to haughty disdain, offered to match her art against her earthly rival's. The challenge was accepted, and arrangements were made for the contest which began forthwith.

"Two looms were set up, at which these eager rivals plied their best craft and cunning, with such swiftness that ere long on *each the* growing tissues shone in all the hues of the rainbow woven into marvellous devices, and shot with threads of gold. For her design Pallas chose the gods ranged upon the Acropolis at Athens, Jove's awful majesty in the midst, Poseidon smiting the rock with his trident, herself in full panoply among the rest, who was shown calling forth the olive tree that made her best gift to man. About this central group were pictured scenes of impious mortals brought to confusion, rebellious giants turned to mountains, and, for a hint to her presumptuous rival, prating girls changed to screeching fowl. Round all ran a border of olive foliage, as a sign of whose handiwork this was, with which few would dare to vie!

"The irreverent Arachne, for her part, had picked out stories that cast shame or derision upon the gods. Zeus and his brethren were seen wooing mortals in unworthy form, Appollo humbly serving, as a shepherd on earth, Dionysus playing his drunken pranks, nay, scandalous memories of old Cronos himself . . . all enclosed by a border of ivy leaves and flowers. But these scenes were worked in with so cunning art, that one could believe to see real animals and real waves standing out before the eye upon that accusing web, the more offensive for its truth. So Pallas-Athene felt when she rose to examine the other's work. With a cry . . . she snatched at the too faithfully coloured cloth, tearing it to pieces, and showering blows upon the sly maker of such a masterpiece.

" How might mortal maiden stand before the fair-haired goddess when her eyes blazed with wrath ? Thus unfairly beaten, Arachne could not bear her spiteful shame. She stole away to hang herself in despair. Nor even then was the wrath of Pallas glutted. She bid her rival live, yet in what hateful form ! For a spell was woven round her bloated body, her human features disappeared, her hair fell off, her limbs shrunk up, and thus poor Arachne hung as a spider, doomed for ever to spin as if mocking the skill that had moved Olympian envy."*

Such is the story of the rivalry between the Goddess of Wisdom and her mortal rival, which according to the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (art. Arachne) "*probably indicates the superiority of Asia over Greece in the textile arts.*"

The *italics* are ours, placed to mark the contrast between the 'scholastic' view and the spiritual interpretation of the legend which we shall now proceed to propound.

The rivals represent the two powers of the soul known as omniscience, which being associated with divinity is personified as the Goddess of Wisdom, and the limited faculty of Intellect appertaining to the human soul in its unemancipated state. The difference between the two aspects of knowledge, human and divine, is well brought out in the patterns respectively woven by the competitors, one merely representing an impious conception of the world of Life after the most approved and up-to-date manner of the learned, but the other, descriptive of the true nature of things, spiritual and material, and of the consequences that flow from impiety and foolish prating. With its 'free-thinking' proclivities, intellect cannot but resent the notion of the excellence of her handiwork being the result of the inspiration of the goddess, though there being only one source of knowledge which is infinite in its capacity and scope, finite thought cannot but derive its oil of existence from the original and, therefore, Olympian 'wells.' Hence, truth is only in accordance with the *vox populi* in this instance. Again, in so far as knowledge may be said to be a presentation of the world of reality, it is like a pattern.

* The Classic Myth and Legend, by A. R. Hope Moncrieff.

rich and variegated and woven in the web of consciousness. This explains the etymology of Arachne's name as well as the fact of the competition being held in the art of weaving. Arachne's parentage—she is the daughter of a famous dyer in purple—serves to indicate her relation to will, which, in virtue of its high aspirations and the power to achieve its end is the only factor that can be truthfully described as the maker of kings, converting, as it does, the 'white' of colourless commonalty into the 'purple' of Royalty and Power.

As regards the punishment of Arachne, it is intended to describe the true nature of the faculty of 'finite' thought, 'which, when stripped of the surplusage of false glory that has been added to it by the superabundant enthusiasm of some of its admirers, is but a simple weaver of 'presentations' in the warp and woof of consciousness. It is this very faculty which is described as intellect or understanding in modern thought, though we had better let Prof. Deussen explain its function to the 'uninitiated.' Writes the learned Professor (*Elements of Metaphysics*, pp. 25—29):—

"Every representation contains as such two supplementary halves, a representing subject and a represented object. These two make with the representation not three (as a sneering epigram of Schiller has it), but one. No representation is without a subject, none without an object. Now, nothing exists for me but representations, therefore also no subject without an object, no object without a subject. All objects of my subject are such, either immediately or mediately. As immediate objects I can never have anything else but affections of my ego, that is, sensations within me (represented physiologically as certain asperitic irritations of the sensory nerves extended in the organs of sense). All other objects, the whole external world and even my own body, as far as I regard it from without, are known to me only as mediate objects: It is only through the medium of these nerve irritations that I come in contact with them. Thus all data by which I attain to a knowledge of the external world, are restricted to these affections of the nerves which are given as immediate objects. They are the only thing which comes to my intellect from without, that is, independent of itself. Consequently all else, all that distinguishes wide-spreading nature with its immeasurable riches from those scanty affections of the nerves, must come from within, that is, must originate in my intellect itself. If we compare the perceptual world, which is our representation, to a textile fabric in which subjective and objective threads intersect as warp and woof, then all that is objective, independent of myself, given *a posteriori* is limited to those affections of the nerves and may be compared to the thin, isolated threads of the

shuttle. The warp, on the contrary, which is previously, that is, *a priori*, stretched out to receive little by little these interweaving threads and work them into a fabric, is the natural, innate form of the subject, the totality of which forms just that which we call Understanding or brain. The task of metaphysics consists in finding out what things are in themselves, that is, independent of our intellect. We must, therefore, first of all, deduct from things that which our intellect contributes to them, namely, those forms which inhere in it originally, that is, *a priori*, and in which it ranges all materials furnished from without so as to weave them into experience. The following six criteria may serve to distinguish these *a priori* elements of knowledge or innate functions of the Understanding from those which come to it *a posteriori*, or through perception. They are to us what reagents are to the chemist. They may also be regarded as six magnets, by means of which we extract the iron of our *a priori* knowledge from the mixed ore of experience.

- (1) Whatever is necessary to transform perception, given as affection, into perceptual representation, and, consequently, precedes all experience as a condition of its possibility, cannot originate in experience, but only within ourselves.
- (2) Whatever comes to the intellect from without, has the character of contingency, it might be otherwise, or it might even be not at all; that is, I can imagine it as non-existent. Now, in my representation there are certain elements which cannot be thought away like everything else, from which it follows that they do not belong to that which exists independently of myself, but must adhere to the intellect itself.
- (3) For the same reason, all data given from without merely suffice to state what is there, but not that something is necessarily so and not otherwise. Perception has no tongue for the word necessity, consequently all determinations of things, with which is associated the consciousness of necessity, must originate, not in perception, but within myself.
- (4) From this it follows that sciences the doctrines of which have apodictic certainty, cannot have obtained it from perception, and that consequently that part of the perceptual world to which they refer must belong to the elements originally inherent in my intellect.
- (5) Perception can only furnish me with sensations. These are, as such, isolated and fragmentary, for, difficult as it is to grasp at first, the materials of sensation given from without contain only the sensations themselves, but not any connection between them, for such a connection is merely the link between the different sensations and therefore not itself sensation. Consequently that faculty, which makes of the variety of perception a unity and so creates coherence between my representations, must belong to me *a priori*. Therefore, whatever serves to establish the continuity of nature, belongs to the innate functions of my intellect.
- (6) Perception can never embrace infinity. If, now, I find in my representations of things elements of which I am conscious as being infinite, it follows with certainty, that I have not taken them from perception, but must possess them as forms of intellect, wherefore, however far I proceed in representing, I can never get beyond them, in which precisely consists their infinity.

Such is the conception of Understanding, the original of the personification Arachne, which one of the "baby" progenitors of our race—and one not known to have been an abnormal or supernormal type of the tribe of the apish man, or mannish anthropoid, to which according to our most 'authentic' views he must have belonged—has bequeathed to us in the form of the story of the rivalry between the Olympian Patroness of wisdom and a conceited mortal maid. It may be that after all Narcissus is not dead, since the echo of his spirit is still to be found moving on the face of the depthless waters of modern wisdom and wit.

We must now pass on to a consideration of the legend of the fall which is the theme of the present chapter and which belongs to the most difficult type of mythical lore.

A very graphic and instructive account of the story is given in the first book of Moses, called Genesis, with which many of us are already familiar. Those who have read the account will readily confess that they were not much impressed with it as a narrative of facts, and simply remember it as a sort of nursery tale in which Adam, the hero of the story, was punished (might be a little too harshly) by the Lord God for a seemingly trivial and insignificant act of disobedience, to which considerable importance was attached. This, however, is exactly the reverse of what is actually meant by the story. We ought not to pass by this legend in a summary fashion. Remember, there is a gateway somewhere in this maze through which the powers of darkness crept in once to the ruin of man and left a legacy of sin. The importance of the subject may be judged from the serious notice which Jehovah is said to have taken of the act of disobedience. Not content with punishing the guilty, with a degree of severity which appears, at first sight, to be out of all proportion to the trivial nature of the fault committed by them, he actually condemned their whole progeny, for all eternity, to a life of suffering and sorrow on earth. Such a subject cannot be considered a nursery tale by any means, and deserves the utmost attention on our part. The failure to see that the whole secret of human wretchedness and sin lay concealed in this apparently meaningless and mythical account of the Fall of Adam has been the cause which has delayed the discovery of truth so

long, and each day augmented the estrangement between man and happiness.

The circumstances surrounding the tragedy need not be gone into in detail. Briefly put, Adam, by the favour of the Almighty Jehovah, was residing in the Garden of Eden with his Consort Eve. Now, the Garden of Eden contained two wonderful trees which are of special interest to us. One of these, which stood in the midst of the Garden, was called the Tree of Life, and the other the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil. It is the latter tree round which interest mainly centred in this little drama. The Lord Jehovah had commanded Adam, saying :—

"Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat: but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die."

For a long time neither Adam nor Eve thought of eating of the forbidden tree, and the legend adds :—

"And they were both naked, the man and his wife, and were not ashamed."

Then came the temptation. The serpent approached the woman and tempted her to eat of the tree in question. She at first refused saying :—

"God hath said, Ye shall not eat of it, neither shall ye touch it lest ye die."

With more persuasion she yielded, because she saw that it was good for food and pleasant to the eye, and a tree to be *desired* to make one wise. The immediate result of the transgression was that their eyes were opened. They knew that they were naked, and fearing to appear in nakedness before God, hid themselves. The result was that when God came to know of it, he punished all the three, the man, the woman and the serpent. To Adam, he said, "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread till thou return unto the ground; for out of it wast thou taken; for dust thou art and unto dust shalt thou return." And to himself the Lord God said, "Behold the man has become as one of us to know good and evil;" and, thinking "lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever," drove him out of the Garden of Eden, and made provision for guarding

the approaches to the Tree of Life, by placing cherubim and a flaming sword which turned in every direction round it. This, briefly, is the account of the catastrophe. We can best interpret it by observing the results which are said to have ensued from the act of transgression. Adam ate the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, but became ignorant!* That was one result. Another result was that he felt his nudity for the first time after the eating of the forbidden fruit. It was not the tree of sight, but the transgressors felt as if their eyes had been opened, and observed their nudity for the first time in their lives. Yet another result which ensued from the act of transgression was fear. Adam used to walk in the company of the Lord God, fearlessly and like a friend, but felt afraid to appear before him for the first time after the act of disobedience. The most fatal consequence of all, however, was the loss of immortality. Man was not forbidden to eat of the Tree of Life till the commission of the sin, but after that he was simply denied admission into the Garden where that Tree stood.

Now, ordinarily, it is impossible to connect the transgression with the results that are said to have ensued from it. How strange that you eat knowledge and become ignorant, and lose your immortality also in the bargain! The true interpretation of the narrative must, therefore, be different from its apparent sense. When we dive beneath the surface of words the whole thing becomes clear and intelligible at once. The Garden of Eden is a representation of the soul-substance, namely, of Spirit in its natural purity. The trees are the attributes of spirit, of which two, the tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil and the Tree of Life are the most important. Therefore, are these placed in the centre of the Garden. The serpent is the emblem of desire for the gratification of the senses, that leads one astray, and in a direction opposed to that of the Divinity within. The tree of Life signifies life eternal, and that of Knowledge of Good and Evil refers to sensuous discrimination of the good and evil of things that constitute the not-Self.

* That the general condition of humanity is one of ignorance will hardly be denied by any one today.

The fruit of the tree of knowledge of Good and Evil consequently represents the consequences of abandoning oneself to the enjoyment of the 'good things' of the world : for, metaphorically, the term fruit is merely expressive of the result or effect of an action or thought. The state of happiness and immortality prior to the fall represents the natural condition of the soul-substance, which, being simple in its essence, is all-knowing, blissful and immortal. The harmful influence of desire is evident from the warning : 'in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die !' This simply means that the foundation of the kingdom of death is constituted by desire. For death cannot touch a pure spirit, because it is simple in its essence and devoid of desire. The unredeemed soul has to spend its whole life in a deadly fear of death, and, in many cases, dies prematurely in consequence of terror.

The pith of the story is now clear, and may be expressed in a few words. The Sat-chit-ananda state is the natural condition of the soul, and is opposed to a life characterized by the turning of the attention to the phenomenal not-Self show, without. Immortality and joy appertain to the Sat-chit-ananda state, but not to its antithesis, the condition of an unemancipated life. Hence, he who remains entangled in the good and evil of the external nature must remain in subjection to ignorance and death and without happiness.

We now see why it is that man is forbidden to eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil in the allegory of the 'fall'. The injunction is not a whimsical or capricious one : but is intended in the best interests of man himself, the consequences that follow its disregard being the subjection to death and a joyless miserable life.

The world whose good and evil we fain would experience, is a mere passing show, a pure illusion of names and forms, as it were. Life alone is eternal and everlastingly good ! There are no good and evil in life : but only happiness and joy and immortality, and the true illumination of Knowledge Divine ! What, then, is the good of our knowledge of good and evil when there is in reality neither good nor evil in Life ? Thus, the prohibition is one of great

moment to man: the God within has pointed out the most fatal belief that can be entertained—the notion of the body being the man. Nudity is felt only when we put limitations on the Self, identify it with the body of matter, and consider ourselves to be other than Divine. So long as we remain engaged in distinguishing and differentiating between the pleasures and pains springing from the objects of the senses in the outside world, losing sight of the inner Reality, we must naturally feel as if we had been stripped of our robes, as if our glory had departed from us, and as if we had been picked out of the Ocean of Love, and, with a rude hand, cast into a dreary waterless wilderness, where there are lamentations and the gnashing of the teeth! These dire consequences must inevitably follow a sense of estrangement from the Self, for it is the law. For he who is ignorant of Life and its real Blessings cannot by any possibility escape from the clutches of misery and death, that are the lot of embodied existence throughout the universe. To put the same thing in different words, the failure to realize that the *Atman*, i.e., the individual soul, is the true God, is the cause of our 'nakedness.' We have left our Godhood, and set up the little body of matter in its stead. What is in reality an ocean now regards itself as a drop, and must remain a drop till it begins to think itself to be the whole ocean; because the law is: 'as one thinks so one becomes.'

The coats of skin which the Lord God is said to have made for Adam and Eve may well be taken to signify the limits put on their sense of individuality, which is regarded as extending to one's skin. In consequence of this sense of limitation, man considers himself as identical with the physical body, enveloped by the skin; and it is this false and erroneous sense of individuality which is at the root of all notions of duality between God and man, and is the selfish, grasping, appropriating, copy-righting self—the apparent man!

As regards fear, it is the creature of ignorance and the cause and forerunner of death. For he who does not believe in the immortality of the soul can never escape from the fear of death, and all its agonising terror. The physiological effect of fear is

terrible, beyond description. It paralyses healthy action, generates worry, and is exceedingly pernicious to life. Worry corrodes and pulls down the organism; fear and worry will finally tear the body to pieces. Fear is the antithesis of self-composure, and the cause of cowardice and terror. Under its influence the countenance becomes pallid, the face is pulled down, and the chest drawn in. It paralyses all the bodily muscles and consumes the vital force. When one remembers that the fear of death is a constant terror with mankind, what wonder is there that death should actually supervene?

As for the effect of the emotion of fear, Darwin observes ('The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals,' pp. 306 to 309):—

"The frightened man at first stands like a statue motionless and breathless, or crouches down as if instinctively to escape observation. The heart beats quickly and violently, so that it palpitates or knocks against the ribs . . . the skin instantly becomes pale, as during incipient faintness . . . The hairs also on the skin stand erect, and the superficial muscles shiver. In connection with this disturbed action of the heart, the breathing is hurried. The salivary glands act imperfectly; the mouth becomes dry, and is often opened and shut . . . One of the best marked symptoms is the trembling of all the muscles of the body; and this is often seen in the lips. From this cause and from the dryness of the mouth, the voice becomes husky or indistinct, or may altogether fail. As fear increases into an agony of terror, we behold, as under all violent emotions, diversified results. The heart beats wildly, or may fail to act, and faintness ensues; there is a death-like pallor; the breathing is laboured; the wings of the nostrils are widely dilated; 'there is a gasping and convulsive motion of the lips, a tremor on the hollow cheek, a gulping and catching of the throat.' . . . All the muscles of the body may become rigid, or may be thrown into convulsive movements. . . . As fear rises to an extreme pitch, the dreadful scream of terror is heard. Great beads of sweat stand on the skin. All the muscles of the body are relaxed. Utter prostration soon follows, and the mental powers fail. The intestines are affected. The sphincter muscles cease to act, and no longer retain the contents of the body."

That death should result from a constant fear of it gnawing at the vitals and constantly interfering with the healthy activity of the body, is not strange at all; indeed, what is strange in the life of man is that he should live even as long as three score years or so. M. Jean Finot, analyzing the causes of

death, in 'The Philosophy of Long Life' (pages 106 and 107) observes :

" We do not die even centenarians. Why this premature death? Why do we die? This is the eternal debate which has already given us so many explanatory treatises explaining nothing whatever. To attempt to give a *resumé* of the reasons which have been given us by writers from theologians to biologists would be a task demanding hundreds of volumes, besides being completely useless . . . Let us, then, put aside the thousand and one causes quoted by our predecessors, and let us give one which deserves more honour than is generally accorded to it. This despised cause is the fear of death. Man, arrived at a certain mental state, undergoes a sort of auto-suggestion of death. He then believes himself to have reached the end of his days, and feeds as much on the fear of death as on bodily foods. From this moment onward death fascinates him. He hears its call with terror everywhere and always. The philosophic and salutary consciousness of a hereafter gives place to a cowardly and nervous fear of separation from life. The victim feeds upon this fear, intoxicates himself with it, and dies of it. The man possessed by this thought eats badly and digests even worse. His nervous system is disorganised and his organism remains deaf to the stimulus of the outer life. Regrets for the life which he believes to be fading away make him waste the vital resources of his organism in a limitless sorrow and nameless maladies."

No need to cite further authorities on this simple matter, which any one can observe by studying the effect of the emotion on himself and others with whom he comes in contact; suffice it to say that the culmination is reached when individual will is completely paralysed and the organism left at the mercy of its natural enemies, which soon bring about its dissolution. We shall deal with the action of will on the body, and the effect of such action, in dealing with the question of immortality later on, when we come to discuss the theory of *karma*. Meanwhile let us conclude our explanation of the 'Fall'.

The curse pronounced on the erring couple and the tempter by the Lord Jehovah, after the transgression, is full of psychological import. If we would study ourselves, we should observe that we are endowed with two functions or psychical faculties, the will and intellect, which unite in the ego, or self, making it a complete whole. In the allegory of the Fall, Adam represents the ego, or the individualized will; Eve symbolizes the intellect (the Sanskrit *buddhi*).

and the serpent stands for *manas* (the lower, or sensuous mind.) Now, the intellect is the handmaid or servant of will, and, at the same time, its preceptor. It is the servant, because it has no other function than to discover, determine and adjust the relations of the will as individualized in its objective expression, the body, with other bodies, and, also, with its higher, *i.e.*, the divine aspect ; and it is its preceptor in so far as it controls and directs its activity into proper channels, and, by educating it, leads it to the realization of the Self in the highest degree, which is the final goal of education. The primary function of the intellect or understanding, however, is only that of presenting perceptions, which it spins out of the raw material of sensations furnished by the mind (*manas*). Hence, the word 'woman,' from the Saxon *wif* *mun* (*wif* in Saxon, and *weib* in German, from *weben*, to weave), signifies the one who weaves, and is, therefore, fully symbolical of the faculty of the intellect. As for the *manas*, its insidiousness is more deadly where it is backed by the intellect. Hence, in the allegory of the fall, Eve is first tempted by the serpent, and then, in her turn, tempts the ego. The compiler of the Pentateuch, struck with the more intimate connection between the ego and the intellect than that between a child and its governess, likened it to that of husband and wife. The ego depends on the intellect as a husband depends on his wife in household matters, and the latter studies its wants and comforts, and clings to it as a woman does to her husband.

With this necessary prelude we may now proceed to elucidate the nature of the awful curses pronounced on the transgressors. Adam, being accused of disobedience by the 'still small voice' of intuition, at once throws the blame on the woman, *i.e.*, the intellect ; and she, in her turn, points to the serpent as the cause of error and temptation. The anger of the Lord flashes first of all against the *manas* (serpent), and the terrible curse is uttered : " Upon thy belly shalt thou go, and dust shalt thou eat all the days of thy life. " Hence, the *manas* 'goes on its belly,' *i.e.*, lives and moves in dust, or, in other words, is confined to the phenomenal, hence, chained to matter. The food of the *manas* consists of 'vibrations' which reach it through the media of the senses ; therefore, is it doomed to eat vibrations, which, as such, are

recognized as the irreducible units of matter, hence dust. The enmity put between the woman and the serpent psychologically symbolizes the relation between the intellect and the *manas*. The latter loves to wander from place to place, and is in its element when roving about ; but the former needs rest for its higher work of forming concepts and judgments, and therefore, tries to check its fiery nature and hold it on to a point. Hence, the *manas* bites the heel of intellect to make it dance, and the latter crushes its head to stop its prancing. This is still more pronounced in the case of the seed of intellect, that is, Wisdom. Wisdom, the child of intellect, conceived in an immaculate manner, tries to break away from the *manas*, to regain his lost Godhood, but the *manas*, so long as its head is not crushed, bites his heel to drag him down to the world of the senses, each time that he endeavours to soar above it, for Self-realization. This is best illustrated by the story of the child Krishna subduing the Serpent-King Kaliya, by crushing its head, in the river Jamuna (allegorically, the mind). The lesson to be learnt from the story is that, in order to attain Nirvana, or, in Christian terminology, to be redeemed, or saved, one must subdue the 'fiery serpent' of one's mind, i.e., the desiring *manas*^{*} at an early date in life.

The curse pronounced on the woman also refers to the nature of the Intellect of which she is the earthly symbol. Conception and sorrow are her lot, as they are of the woman ; for the intellect is noted for its prolific production of concepts, as well as, for sorrow, that is, worry, in developing, i.e., forming and delivering judgments. She is the hand-maid of the ego, her husband, and, consequently, must surrender herself to him, at his sweet will and pleasure, and *conceive* for him. The identity between Eve and Intellect is put beyond doubt by Genesis, III. 20. Adam called his wife Eve, because she was *the mother of all living*. This description cannot possibly refer to the human female, because she cannot be regarded as 'the mother of *all living*,' in any sense ; but it is fully applicable and appropriate to the Intellect, on whose functioning as the weaver of

^{*} *Manas* is the Minotaur (man and beast) of the Greek mythology, its human element representing reason, the faculty of reflection, and the bovine, pure animalism that is, uncontrolled sensuality.

presentations in the warp and woof of consciousness, depends the perception, hence, in a sense, the existence, of all forms.

The punishment of Adam also is equally natural for the ego who exclusively employs his intellect to discriminate between the good and evil of phenomena. Since the pursuit of the phenomenal gives rise to the notion of duality, *i.e.*, separation between God and man, and creates fear and worry, the fallen ego, personified as Adam, has necessarily to eat his bread in the sweat of his brow. Thistle and thorns, and sorrow and tears are his lot, for, as already observed, there can be no happiness for him who leads a purely sensual life.

The curse uttered by the Lord also foreshadowed the perishable nature of the sensuous ego; yet it is not the death of the ego, but of the body alone. As a pure spirit, the ego is birthless and deathless, being eternal and uncreate; but in association with the impurities of sin, adhering to it in the shape of different kinds of vestments of matter, it is subject to birth and death both. Hence, the significance of the warning—"In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." The emphasis, it will be observed, is not on the day of death, since Adam did not die on the day that he ate of the forbidden fruit, but on the liability to death which is forced on all unemancipated souls by the companionship of matter. As matter is atomic and constantly in motion, no organism composed of it can ever be permanent. Yet it is not the demise of the soul, but of the body alone which occurs in nature; the ego regards it as his own death, on account of having identified himself most intimately with his body. But this is a point for the future.

The idea of nudity also arises with reference to embodied existence; for, as pure Effulgence, Spirit neither wears nor needs clothes.

Thus, the legend of the fall is intended to open our eyes to the great difference between a pure, perfect Soul and the ego of desires: the former is blissful and immortal, and has a raiment of glory, but the latter is nude and unhappy and is also firmly held in the claws of death. These differences, though seemingly great and unbridgeable, are nonetheless such as can be easily removed, since they are due, solely and simply, to the element of desire by the eradication of which the status of Gods can be acquired with ease.

The story of the fall of Brahmā in the Hindu Puranas, which covers larger ground than the Biblical myth, is also an allegorical account of the psychic functions of the soul. It is, however, too long to be reproduced here in its entirety ; but the student of mythology will find its interpretation easy, if he will bear in mind the numerous psychological aspects in which spirit appears in conjunction with matter, and which are personified as gods and goddesses in the Puranas. In order, however, to explain the true nature of the intellect, we shall give the ending of the legend in a somewhat abridged form. The Biblical account of the ' Fall ' stops short with the utterance of the curses, and is, therefore, likely to mislead one as regards the true position of the intellect, which is depicted there in its worst aspect. As a matter of fact redemption or emancipation is simply out of the question without its guidance, since it is the only instrument of knowledge in the condition of the " fall."

But the weakness of the intellect lies in the fact that it has no will of its own, and may not refuse to serve the ego in any way he pleases. For this reason, the Biblical legend makes the woman eat the forbidden fruit only at the will of her husband, though she had an opportunity of doing so earlier by herself. It is thus clear that it is not the intellect which is the mischief-maker in the world, but the power of choice which determines the nature of the work the intellect is required to perform for the will. As the faculty of discrimination, its function is only to impart knowledge to the ego, or will, but the kind of knowledge which it is required to impart is to be selected not by itself, but by the will. As we might use a lantern to light our footsteps to a place of worship or to a gambling den, so might we employ our intellect to impart to us the wisdom which leads to bliss, or to instruct us on matters whose knowledge is fraught only with suffering and pain. As a matter of fact, whenever and wherever the intellect has been employed in the right direction, it has never failed to lead the ego to the highest heights of glory and power, and, finally, also to Nirvana. Its influence is pernicious and harmful only when the ego employs it exclusively to define and determine the relation of its body with other bodies in the world. Hence, the lesson to be learnt from the profound teaching of the Bible is that if the error of

setting up the body in place of the Man be avoided, and the intellect employed to further the progress of the soul instead of to pander to the will," it ceases to have evil influence and becomes the most potent instrument for good.

It is worth any amount of trouble to understand that faith cannot possibly be acquired without a proper use of the intellect, since nothing but Reason is capable of destroying our doubts. It is true that testimony is also capable of affording a temporary sort of satisfaction ; but, since it is impossible for it to cover all possible points, and since its worth, reliability and interpretation have to be determined before its acceptance, it is not within its pale to remove all doubts. Hence, he who depends on testimony is like the man who builds his house on sand. It is for this reason that schisms arise endlessly when people begin to rely on the word of mouth of the founders of their faiths to the exclusion of rational thought. Even the satisfaction which testimony seems to afford is more apparent than real, because knowledge is like food, which must be digested in order to become ours. It is no use to us if somebody else eats the food, not even when it is done Brahmana-like,—in the name and for the benefit of another. Just so with knowledge. Testimony is not only usually incapable of affording a solid foundation for faith, but also goes to make the confusion worse confounded, since it at once opens the door to a whole host of questions as to the possible interpretation and explanation of the statements made, to say nothing of the reliability and trustworthiness of the witnesses from whom they emanate. And, since it is not possible to settle the differences of opinion conclusively, without the discovery of the nature of things and the laws of Nature, intellect, and intellect alone, is the final judge and the sole arbitrator of the disputes of men, in the first instance.

We can now follow the Puranic legend without difficulty. The story goes that Brahmā, desirous of performing a sacrifice, once upon

⁹ Cf. "To clear away each of these [earthly influences] and to distrust the world of becoming which is of itself wholly unworthy of confidence, and to have faith in God alone, who alone is in *truth* trustworthy, requires a large and Olympian understanding, one which is no longer enticed by our worldly interests" (Philo's Contribution to Religion by H. A. A. Kennedy, p. 126).

a time, proceeded to Puskara, and made the necessary preparations. But, his divine consort, Sāvitrī, delayed in coming, and, though the hour for the *yajna* approached nigh, she was not to be found by the side of her Lord. Incensed at her conduct, the god asked Indra to find him another bride, and the latter promptly brought the lovely milkmaid, Gayatri, who carried a jar of butter in her hand. Brahma called her the Mother of Vedas, and was united to her. Just then Sāvitrī appeared on the scene, and, enraged at the sight of her smiling rival, pronounced diverse curses on the gods who had taken part in the ceremony. She then walked away, leaving the gods in a state of consternation. The young bride, thereupon, herself modified the curses of her divine rival, and promised all kinds of blessings, including final absorption into him, to all the worshippers of her Lord. Finally, Viṣṇu and Lakshmi brought back the angry Sāvitrī, when Gayatri threw herself at her feet. Upon this Sāvitrī, having raised and embraced her, said,

"Since the virtuous wife will do nothing to displease her husband, therefore let us both be attached to Brahma."

Gayatri, too, bashfully murmured in reply :

"Thy orders will I always obey, and esteem thy friendship precious as my life - thy daughter am I, O goddess ! deign to protect me."

The explanation of this legend lies in the psychological functions of the will, personified as gods and goddesses in the Puranas. There are two tendencies in the will which appear as intuition and intellect. As Bergson says :

"The two tendencies, at first implied in each other, had to separate in order to grow. They both went to seek their fortune in the world, and turned out to be instinct and intelligence . . . Life, that is to say, consciousness launched into matter, fixed its attention either on its own movements or on the matter it was passing through; and it has thus been turned either in the direction of intuition, or in that of intellect"—(*Creative Evolution*).

Intuition is the sense which gives rise to immediate self-awareness, and in the highest sense means omniscience pure and

simple, but intellect is the faculty which chiefly studies and deals with matter and form. In the Puranas the former is personified as the goddess, and the latter as the milkmaid. The jar of butter which Gayatri carries in her hand indicates her nature, for intellect extracts principles from experience, as one extracts butter from milk. Being the two distinct tendencies of will (personified as Brahmā), they are described as the two wives of the god. But, since intuition has the preference over intellect, therefore, Gayatri is made to fall at the feet of her divine rival. However, since intellect is the only means of knowledge in the condition of the 'fall,' its personification is described as the Mother of Vedas (literally, knowledge).

Again, inasmuch as intellect alone establishes the divinity of the soul, and thereby leads it to Self-realization, and since Self-realization means the freedom of the soul from bondage and pain, therefore, intellect itself is said to have modified the curses of its rival.

We give below the curses pronounced by Savitri on some of those who took part in the ceremony, and their modifications as made by her rival, together with their interpretation. Should any difficulty be experienced with these interpretations, they should be read again after the perusal of Chapters ix, x, and xi.

Name of the god or goddess cursed.	Nature of the curse.	Nature of the modification.	Interpretation.
Brahmā ...	Not to be worshipped in a temple or sacred place.	Brahmā may cease to be worshipped, but his worshippers shall obtain all kinds of blessings, including final absorption into him.	Brahmā is the revealed aspect of that which is the unmanifested, hence the personification of individuality, or soul, which is endowed with the faculties of Intuition and Intellect. Hence, Savitri, <i>i.e.</i> , Intuitive wisdom, and Gayatri, <i>i.e.</i> , Reason, are the two wives of Brahmā. Reason at first is not directed towards Life, and therefore stands in the way of self-realization. Brahmā cannot, therefore, be worshipped as

Name of the god or goddess cursed.	Nature of the curse.	Nature of the modification.	Interpretation
Indra ...	To be bound in chains by his enemies; and to be confined in a strange country. He is also to lose his city and station.	He shall not remain in bondage for ever, and shall be released by his son.	a world-God; but since the soul is the true Redeemer itself, those who worship their own Self obtain all kinds of blessings, including the final release from the <i>samsāra</i> . Indra is life, which waxes and wanes in power, according to circumstances and beliefs. Its enemies are the different kinds of <i>karmic</i> force; or desires. The strange country is the realm of matter; and the loss of city and station signifies the state of bondage. The Liberator of the soul, i.e., Life, or <i>Jīva</i> , is Wisdom, personified as the son of the god.
Agni ...	To be a devourer of all things, clean and unclean.	*The unclean things shall become pure at his mere touch.	Agni is the personification of the fire of <i>tapas</i> (asceticism) which purifies all things. Hence, the curse and its modification.
Viṣṇu ..	To be born amongst men, and also to endure the agony of having his wife ravished from him by his enemies.	He shall regain his wife eventually.	Viṣṇu is the personification of <i>dharma</i> or <i>jaṇan</i> which incarnates amongst men. His enemy is ignorance who steals away his wife (the soul or bliss), through the doorways of the senses. But since the soul ultimately acquires perfection in happiness by the practising of <i>dharma</i> , Viṣṇu is to recover his wife eventually.
Śiva	To be deprived of his manhood	The loss of manhood shall not interfere with the worship of the	Śiva represents <i>vairāgya</i> which insists on celibacy: hence, the god is to lose his manhood. But nudity as a

* Agni is here described as the devourer of all things, clean and unclean, because it is only when the effect of its good (the clean) and evil (the unclean) actions is burnt up by the fire of asceticism (*vairāgya*) that the soul attains to *nirvāṇa*.

Name of the god or goddess cursed.	Nature of the curse.	Nature of the modification.	Interpretation.
Lakshmi...	Not to remain stationary in one place; and to constantly abide by the vile, the inconstant, the contemptible, the simple, the cruel, the foolish and the barbarian.	<i>lingum</i> , as the symbol of the god.	mark of saintship is a worshipful quality; for there are <i>nangā</i> (naked) saints in several religions. Hence the worship of the <i>lingum</i> by men. The <i>lingum</i> in association with the <i>yaṇi</i> , is the symbol of joy, which further explains Gayatri's modification.
The wives of gods collectively.	To remain barren and never to enjoy the pleasure of having children.	No regret is to be felt for the inability to bear children.	The goddess personifies prosperity or wealth, and her nature is only too well-defined in the curse of Savitri to need any further explanation. She may also signify the soul which is the special care of <i>Dharma</i> (Vignā).

The above explanation of the mythological account of the marriage and the consequent 'fall' of Brahmā, it is to be observed, furnishes a complete explanation of the nature of the faculty of intellect, and describes how *moksha* cannot be attained without it.

The story of Esther in the Old Testament of the Holy Bible would seem to be an exact counterpart of the marriage of Brahmā in the Hindu Puranas. The story is that a certain king, Ahasuerus by name, had a queen who was called Vashti. The king took to drinking and abandoned himself to feasting and revelry. Upon this the good queen refused to attend upon him, or to do his bidding. The king then chose Esther, a fair Jewess, who had been adopted by one Mordecai and brought up by him. The principal man at the

court of King Ahasuerus was one Haman who was respected by all except Mordecai, who had not revealed his connection with Esther. Mordecai used to sit at the gate of the palace, where everybody but he would get up to honour Haman when he passed. This irritated Haman. He began to devise means for ruining Mordecai, and in his hatred tried to encompass the destruction of the entire tribe and community of Jews. Mordecai, coming to know of the evil designs of Haman, appealed to Esther to plead for the Jews: but she complied with the request in great fear, for she could not appear before the king unless he wished to see her. She invited the king and Haman to a banquet at her place, and repeated the invitation for the next day. In the meanwhile Haman's preparations were progressing. But during the intervening night the king read in the Chronicles how Mordecai had saved his life from the hands of two assassins who sat at his door, and had not been rewarded till then. When Haman appeared next morning before the king, the latter at once made him the unwilling agent for honouring Mordecai. Finally, at the earnest prayer of Esther, who revealed the plot for the destruction of Mordecai to him the monarch gave authority to the Jews to destroy Haman and his people. Thus did Mordecai triumph over the hateful plotting rival.

The significance of this story can be worked out with the following correspondences:

Ahasuerus—the ego;

Queen Vashti—omniscience;

Esther—the Intellect (that cannot appear before the ego unless he desire her presence);

Mordecai—(who brought up Intellect) Dharma, who had saved the life of the king against the machinations of two of his door-keepers, *i.e.*, false belief and the world;

Haman—the lower ego;

Jews—the attributes of a pure soul.

King Ahasuerus thus stands for the ego who has acquired the right faith, that is to say, who has with the help of Dharma (Mordecai) escaped from false belief and the world. But Haman

(the lower ego) cannot stand the sight of Mordecai, who naturally has no respect for him. Through Haman's machinations the entire community of the Jews (the attributes of the pure soul) are in danger of destruction. But Mordecai is equal to the occasion: with the co-operation of Esther whom he had brought up (that is to say, of the Intellect inclined towards Dharma) Haman's downfall is achieved. Esther's banquet naturally implies an intellectual feast, which sets the king athinking, and he soon comes to the conclusion that Dharma is his saviour, and should be honoured and acclaimed. The enemies of Mordecai, that is to say, Haman and his party (who represent the attributes of the lower ego), are thus destroyed through the hands of the Jews (the natural divine virtues of the soul)!

To revert to the legend of the 'Fall,' the allegorical account of the sons of Adam, given in the fourth chapter of the book of Genesis also makes it perfectly clear that emancipation cannot be attained except through the agency of the Intellect. Eve, *i.e.*, the Intellect, conceives and brings forth Abel and Cain, who are incompatible by nature, so much so that the former is ultimately murdered by his brother. Now, Cain is reason which deals with inert matter by the dissecting, analysing and classifying processes of induction; hence, he is described as the tiller of soil which is a symbol for matter. But Abel is Faith which is directed towards Life itself. He is, therefore, described as the keeper of sheep, the symbol of live-stock, hence life. The Lord loves Faith, but is less inclined towards Reason, which can primarily only offer him the produce of matter as an offering. Hence, the offering of Abel, that is, the unfoldment of such divine attributes as meekness, mercy and the like, is acceptable to the Lord in preference to that of Cain. This upsets Reason, which makes short work of Faith and destroys it. The curse pronounced by the all-knowing God describes the principal features of Reason as distinguished from blind Faith. The riddle of the universe is a source of worry to Reason, hence is the ground not to yield her strength unto it. Another characteristic of induction is a constant wandering in search of experience, hence is Cain to become a fugitive.

Again, because all the mischief* that exists in the world is the outcome of Reason, it is called a vagabond too. Finally, because Reason alone is affected by sleep, it is said to become a dweller in the "Land of Nod."

Cain's supplication to the Lord is also symbolical of the nature of Reason. Its punishment is more than it can bear. Every one who discovers its real nature is likely to abhor it, since it leads to trouble and bondage, and entangles one in the cycle of births and deaths. It, therefore, fears to be despised. Hence, Cain is made to say: "And it shall come to pass, that every one that findeth me shall slay me." But, inasmuch as in the absence of Faith, Reason, if rightly employed, is alone capable of re-establishing the state of at-one-ment between man and God, by establishing the divinity of the soul, he who refuses to be guided by Reason, in the condition of the 'Fall,' must remain ignorant of his true nature and entangled in the cycle of births and deaths. Hence, the Lord is made to say: "Therefore, whosoever slayeth Cain, vengeance shall be taken on him sevenfold." Lastly, the statement: "From thy face shall I be hid," is also fully appropriate to Cain as representing Reason. Taken in a literal sense, it is simply absurd to say that anything can be hid from the face of an omniscient God from whom nothing can be concealed; but, philosophically, omniscience and reason are two opposite aspects of the one and the same thing, namely, the soul, the former being the function of pure spirit, and the latter an attribute of the ego involved in impurity. For this reason, so long as the soul remains in the condition of impurity it cannot exercise its natural function of omniscience; but when the impurities are removed, reason is replaced with all-embracing knowledge and Godhood attained. Hence, divinity and reason cannot co-exist together, which explains the speech of Cain.

The third son of Adam is Seth, which means the appointed, that is, he who was appointed to take the place of the murdered Abel (i.e., blind faith), hence, wisdom. Seth figures as

* It is interesting to note, as Schopenhauer points out, that in acknowledging a fault we endeavour to father it on the head in preference to the heart, thus sacrificing away reason to defend good intention.

the Messiah in later Jewish tradition (Encyclo. Brit., 11th Ed., Art. Seth) ; and Enos (Man) is the son of Seth who calls himself (by the name of) the Lord.*

Let us pause for a moment to explain the significance of the expression 'the knowledge of good and evil' as used in the Bible. Every one knows that good and evil† are only comparative terms, neither of which signifies anything in particular in itself, but, when taken in relation to some specific thing, they convey the idea of utility, benefit or advantage, in the one case, and of uselessness, harm, or disadvantage, in the other. That which determines the good or evil of any particular thing, at any particular time, is, in the first instance, our own body, or personality, so that when a thing acts, or is likely to act, on our personality, or body, in a beneficial, or advantageous, manner, we call it good, and, in the converse case, evil. Hence, 'knowledge of good and evil' means the appraisalment of the values of things from the point of view of the pleasure or pain they are capable of causing to us individually.

It will be now obvious that the Bible does not condemn the intellect itself, but only its employment for the gratification of sensual appetency. The third and fourth chapters of the book of Genesis, taken together, cover the entire field of the Hindu legend given above, and point to the power of the intellect itself, when rightly employed, to raise up the fallen humanity.

The lesson to be learnt from the doctrine of the "fall" is that those who aspire to attain to the status of Gods, to enjoy everlasting bliss, must make up their minds to control the fiery serpent of their desiring *manas*. They must also see that they do not make their intellect spend all its energy in pandering to the vanities, passions and tastes of the physical body, the seat of false personality, but should apply it to study the requirements of the soul, the real, i.e., immortal man.

* See the marginal note to Genesis, IV, 26.

† Cf. "It is things out of place that are bad; not things in themselves. All evil is relative, and its relation is with higher forms of goodness."—"Reason and Belief," by Sir Oliver Lodge, p. 140.

Man alone, of all beings, in the world, is endowed with the capacity, and enjoys the opportunity, to think of his destiny. He alone has the power of shaping his future, for weal or woe, as he pleases. But this capacity is so hopelessly crippled by his wrong desires, the worst of which is the desire for the sensual knowledge of good and evil of the phenomenal world, that unless he can crush the head of the hydra of his desiring *manas*, he has no right to hope for salvation.

Man's physical concerns may, and, indeed, do come to an end with the physical death ; but the continuity of the soul, after death, requires that the physical concerns alone should not be allowed to occupy the uppermost place in his thoughts. Sir Oliver Lodge is probably the first European of our times to get a partial inkling of the truth of the doctrine of the " fall " ; but he seems to place the emphasis on the " management of the world " rather than on ' self-conquest.' Concerning the origin of self-consciousness, he observes :—

" How it all arose is a legitimate problem for genetic psychology, but to the plain man it is a puzzle ; our ancestors invented legends to account for it—legends of apples and serpents and the like ; but the fact is there, however it be accounted for. The truth embedded in that old Genesis legend is deep ; it is the legend of man's awakening from a merely animal life to consciousness of good and evil, no longer obeying his primal instincts in a state of thoughtlessness and innocence—a state in which deliberate vice was impossible and therefore higher and purposed goodness also impossible,—it was the introduction of a new sense into the world, the sense of conscience, the power of deliberate choice ; the power also of conscious guidance, the management of things and people external to himself, for preconceived ends. Man was beginning to cease to be merely a passenger on the planet, controlled by outside forces ; it is as if the reins were then for the first time being placed in his hands, as if he was allowed to begin to steer, to govern his own fate and destiny, and to take over some considerable part of the management of the world " —(*Life and Matter*).

No doubt, a man brought up in an atmosphere full of worldly politics cannot but lay stress on the " management of the world," but religion only accepts those who are prepared to give up worldly politics for the sake of self-conquest. For the less advanced souls, religion does not altogether forbid political activity, but only makes it subordinate to spiritual evolution, so that the world-conquest may

not interfere with the conquest of the (lower) self. It is no use denying the fact that our so-called taking part in the management of the world has hitherto been a very unsatisfactory affair, and whatever we may say in our own praise, or in that of our civilization, it is abundantly clear that no such praise is merited, even if we do not deserve a strong condemnation for our behaviour towards animals and, in many instances, towards our own race. It is true that we can point out our material accomplishments to Mother Nature with a modest pride in our achievements, but she can always retort by directing our attention to those natural forces and means of which we are almost wholly ignorant even today. What are our railways and telegraphs to the faculties of telepathy and clairvoyance lying dormant within our souls? What *happiness* have they brought to the race, or to any one at all? All our vaunted boasts get ultimately reduced to this that in some instances we have succeeded both as individuals and as nations in amassing large fortunes, and in devising various means for squandering them at expensive hotels and card-tables, and on sickening carcasses of animals and intoxicating drinks, to say nothing of other degenerate forms of living only too nauseating to be specifically mentioned. These are practically, the limits of our culture, whether we spell it with a c or a big K. But surely, it is only by a mere perversity of sense and language that one may claim the modern civilization to be the outcome of the Sermon on the Mount. In very truth, it is the violation, in every essential, of the Master's philosophy that has brought about the culmination of the modern times which it pleases us to call civilization. Without violating in letter, as well as in spirit, the Messianic command, "But whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also," no one could have ever dreamt of subjugating the nations of the world: nor without trampling down the equally forcible mandate, "Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth," could any one amass wealth. The truth is that man's power of speech enables him to disguise his true feelings, not only from his fellow-beings, but, quite as often, from himself. Failing to understand the nature of the ideal set before the world by the great Propounders of Religion, the modern man seeks to hide the cancer of unhappiness at his heart

by impotent sentimentality and self-deceiving ideas of his own importance and morality. The richest nation on earth may possess the most enormous amount of wealth, its country may be very beautiful to look at, and it may boast of all the luxuries of life which the ingenuity of man has ever put at the disposal of wealth, yet the question arises and must be asked, what real happiness has been conferred upon the people constituting it? The answer in the negative is so self-evident that one need not take the trouble to record it. It is not that we deny the great advantages of such institutions as the school, the hospital and the poor-house; but, in very truth, these very institutions furnish evidence condemnatory of our civilization. Our schools impart education, it is true, but it is also true that the education they impart tends not to advance the cause of individual happiness, but leads to atheism, impiety and godlessness. The increasing necessity for hospitals and poor-houses goes to indicate that people do not live in harmony with Nature, and, consequently, suffer from poverty and disease. The greatest defect of materialism is that it prevents us from the realization of our divine nature, by unduly developing the objective and sensuous sides of life. The following comparative table, taken from Hudson's 'Divine Pedigree of Man,' will be found sufficient to show the godly nature of the subjective side of Life, from the realization of which we are at present debarred by our ungodly materialism:—

Objective Mind.			Subjective Mind.	
Pure Intellect.	Inductive reasoning.	1	Instinct or intuition.	Limitations.
	Deductive reasoning (imperfect).	2	Controlled by suggestion.	
	Memory (imperfect).	3		
	Brain memories of emotional experiences.	4	Deductive reasoning (potentially perfect).	
		5	Memory (potentially perfect).	
		6	Seat of emotions.	
		7	Telepathic powers.	
		8	Telekinetic energy.	

Some writers on New Psychology mention an additional faculty, namely, that of clairvoyance as belonging to the subjective mind; but Hudson does not assign to it a separate place in the table, holding that its phenomena are only telepathic in reality. Whether clairvoyance, be regarded as a separate faculty of the subjective mind or not, the list is sufficient to convince any one, at a glance, that the nature of the human soul is essentially divine. It is to be remembered that the subjective mind is the higher consciousness that is manifested when the lower or the Objective mind is annulled, as in hypnotism, and that even this wonder-working mind is not quite the same thing as a pure and purified spirit, so that when due allowance is made for its impurities and limitations the soul will be found to be a repository of all godly virtues and powers that only need unfoldment to bloom into perfection. By far a vast majority of mankind, however, are quite unconscious of the godly powers of their souls, and, therefore, unable to attain the perfection which is within their reach, since conscious exertion is necessary for spiritual evolution, and since conscious exertion can only be made in the case of things which are known. Our ignorance of these great powers and virtues of the soul is to be attributed, as already stated, to the employment of the intellect to pander to the will. Reason being, thus, the tenure by which man holds his free moral agency, and the power which enables him to train his soul, for weal or woe, it is not difficult to see why its employment as a procuress to the will has been described in the old Genesis legend as a 'fall.' Those who deride the ancient Indian civilization should remember that that much derided civilization was founded upon the spiritual requirements and necessities of individual life and society, and was calculated, on the one hand, not only to offer no resistance to the human soul in its spiritual evolution, but, also, to actually advance and facilitate its progress, and, on the other, to secure the greatest good of the greatest numbers, even in respect of material peace and prosperity, in so far as these are consistent with the spiritual aspirations of the real man. The same statement cannot be made in respect of modern civilization, which, if anything, is anti-spiritual in its tendency.

It is no use minimising the pernicious and harmful nature of the influence which the present-day civilisation is exerting on the souls of men, since it tends to make them disregard the teaching of religion which alone is the path of what has been described as entering into life. What with its fashions and conventions, its licensed saloons and drinking places, its niceties and novelties in food and dress, to say nothing of the thousand and one other forms of the anti-spiritual occupations and pursuits which it provides for its votaries, the modern civilization is calculated only to pamper sensualism at the cost of the spiritual nourishment of the soul. The one most marked feature of distinction between the two forms of civilization, the ancient and the modern, consists in the cost of living which is going up daily, and which the majority of men find it hard to meet, in spite of devoting their whole-time labour to its procurement. Such being the case, it is not surprising that people should have neither time nor inclination for the study of religion, not to mention the practising of those methods and means which alone lead to the attainment of the ideal of the soul. The path of sensualism—another though less repulsive name for animalism—is directly opposed to that of spiritualism, and it requires no great familiarity with the canons of Logic to predict that if the latter be the only means of attaining to the perfection of Gods, the former cannot possibly lead to aught but suffering and pain. The ancients could undoubtedly have given us a civilization equal to our own, but they very well knew that the moment prominence was given to the enjoyment of the senses, the cart would necessarily come to occupy the place of the horse, and, therefore, wisely kept down all those sensual tendencies of men which constantly try to break loose in the name of refinement and culture. We may refine sensualism as much as we like; but it will never become anything else. As black takes no other hue, so does sensualism maintain its loathsomeness, notwithstanding all the veneer of cultured refinement under which we constantly try to conceal its hideous nature.

To conclude, the elucidation of the legend of the 'fall' has shown us that it is not an historical record of the actual doings of a primitive pair of human progenitors, but an illustration of the opera-

tion of certain important psychic laws, which no one desirous of attaining immortality and bliss can afford to ignore. The object of the ancient teacher who took pains to leave a record of his views behind was not to amuse us with a nursery tale, nor yet to furnish us with an opportunity to smile at his 'crude and childish simplicity,' but to bequeath to us some of the most valuable secrets of Religion, the Science of all sciences. The thirst for happiness is a natural craving with all living beings; the man who does not long, consciously or otherwise, for the joy of the Gods is yet to be born. The ancient seer knew this full well, and left a record of his views on the subject for our guidance. What we have been accustomed to look upon as an historical narrative of Adam's disobedience and punishment is, thus, a recipe for the general complaint of suffering and pain, from which all are anxious to escape. This remedy consists, as has been demonstrated in this chapter, in the realization of the Godhood of the soul, that is divine through and through and all over.

A word about the nature of the flaming sword and the cherubim that bar man's way to the Tree of Life, and we shall pass on to a consideration of the doctrine of Redemption. The former represents the lower mind, the ego of desires and lusts which it seeks to gratify with the sensory stimulus from the external world. As restlessness is a characteristic of this mind on account of its being the seat of desires, it is described as turning in every direction. It should be borne in mind that mind is a clumsy word to be employed for the idea which is intended to be conveyed. The Sanskrit *manas* is the most appropriate word for expressing the sense. It means that organ which prevents knowledge from being acquired simultaneously, and which acts as a gate-keeper* at a show who lets in only one at a time. The cherubim apparently

* The nearest equivalent to *manas* in English is attention, which limits our perception of things to one at a time only, in other words, which prevents our taking cognizance of things simultaneously. If we study ourselves in the attitude of attention, we shall observe that our senses do not work simultaneously and together, so that when the mind is linked to a particular sense-organ, it ceases to work through the remaining channels of sensation. The same is the case with thinking, which also requires exclusive attention being paid to its object; and even the experiences of pleasure and pain are no exception to this rule. Attention, then, is the instrument

stand for and represent sense attractions.* It is, thus, the *manas* and the attractions of the world which are mounting guard over the priceless Tree of Life. Immortality is the reward of him who overpowers them both, and reaches the Life-giving Tree.

of limitation or exclusion of knowledge. The soul is like a mirror which reflects all things which exist at the same time; but it is attention which debars us from taking cognizance of them all at once, and confines the perceptive function to that in which we happen to be the most interested for the time being. It follows from this that our interests alone determine the functioning of perception and prevent us from being all-knowing.

We have said that attention signifies interest, but interest itself is nothing other than desire, since we are only interested in things which we have a desire to acquire or enjoy, or which we wish to avoid. The force of desire, then, is what is meant by attention, i.e., *manas*.

It is also easy to see that desires are only different kinds of forces, since they drag us after their objects—often against our better judgment. They cannot be immaterial altogether, for the conception of a non-entity operating on the soul, and dragging it in certain directions, thus, crippling its perception and narrowing down its field of knowledge, is a self-contradictory idea. It is as if the soul were possessed of a perceiving instrument, or rod—a kind of psychic monacle—to survey the world with. This mental monacle is the *manas*; and, since it is only the sharp end of desires, its material shape may be likened to a pencil of rays, converging to a point. Attention, then, signifies the current of different kinds of forces of desire, brought to a point and focused on the object of enquiry. Its form thus resembles that of a serpent which, on account of its crookedness and evil nature, is about the most suitable symbol for desire. Hence, he who would acquire omniscience must curb down his desires, so that his soul may put aside its knowledge-obstructing instrument of perception of which it is enamoured at present.

*The cherubim, who are to be distinguished by their knowledge from seraphim whose distinctive quality is love, probably represent the discriminative knowledge of good and evil of things and are thus symbolical of sense-attractions. From another point of view, the cherubim represent the four elements, hence, matter (see Chap. X. *post*).

CHAPTER V.

REDEMPTION.

"On the knowledge and acknowledgment of God depends the salvation of every one."—*Swedenborg*.

"This great, unborn, undecaying, immortal, fearless soul is Brahman: Brahman is verily fearless: he who thus knows, becomes the fearless Brahman."—*Bri. Up. IV. 4. 25.*

In a community dominated by deistic thought, which separates God and man by an impassable gulf, it is not surprising that the conception of salvation should be no broader, or fuller, than that of forgiveness of sin by the favour of some one nearer and dearer to the Lord than man. The Christian conception of salvation is typical of this form of belief. Whatever it may be taken to represent, whether the purchase of God's favour, by the suffering and death of Christ, or the ransom and deliverance of sinners from the bondage of sin and the consequent liability to punishment, for the violation of divine laws, by the atonement of Jesus, the idea of redemption in the modern Christian Church does not aspire higher than the securing of heaven for man, by the favour, compassion and mercy of an agency outside his own self, and, consequently, not only leaves him as finite, and limited and dependent on the will of another, as ever, but is, also, utterly incompatible with the true sense of the words 'salvation' and 'redemption,' employed to give it expression. If the blood of Jesus, which is said to have been spilt some two thousand years ago, be the sole channel and means of salvation, those for whom it was shed, and also those who claim the benefit of its having been shed, ought to enjoy the status of the redeemed from the moment they make up their minds to acknowledge his agency. But there would be nothing to support such a claim should one be ever made on behalf of the clerical views. The fact is that the generality of men today are even ignorant of the virtues and attributes which appertain to the status of the Redeemed, and of the qualifications a Redeemed One should possess.

The true conception of redemption, in religion, is not exhausted with the remission of sin, or escape from the liability to punishment, but contains, within its four corners, the additional idea of an enlargement of the spiritual personality, by the restoration of the powers and attributes hitherto held in 'pledge.' Necessarily, then, must the conception of redemption include the idea of a life fuller and more glorious and abundant than that which is the lot of man in the state of sin. The word salvation, in its true significance, conveys precisely this sense, meaning, as it does, health, safety, and *wholeness*.

It is not difficult to observe how lame and impoverished has the true teaching of the Saviour become in the hands of the generality of his followers. Unable to form a clear idea of the state of existence which is denominated blissful, these learned interpreters of the Messiah's word have reduced his conception of heaven to that of a locality, where, on a certain day, after the death of the physical body, men shall rise, in the bodies of flesh, and pass their lives in the enjoyment of Olympian luxuries. They fail to observe that the highest flights of their theological speculation do not rise higher than the idea of sense gratification, which is all that can be had from external surroundings and things. Let the heaven of the preachers of the Church be never so elegant and pretty, let its grandeur be never so imposing, let its residents be never so ravishing,—let all this be granted and more,—yet can it be conceived, or, in any way, imagined, that true joy can accrue to the soul from an abode in Olympus? All that comes from outside the self can only pass in through the media of the senses, and, for that reason, can never be anything more or less than sensation. But since sensations are not always pleasant, and since the most agreeable of them become sickening and tormenting when too often repeated, the state of the physical man, on his resurrection, in the heaven-world, will not secure for him even freedom from the liability to experience pain. Bliss is an emotion, which, as we have already shown, is the feeling of freedom from all desires, arising from the consciousness of freedom and perfection in one's own being, and quite independently of all considerations of surroundings, environment and locality. Hence, no outside agency, whether spiritual or material,

can confer it on the soul, if it happen to be devoid of the right emotion in itself.

From the practical side of the question, also, it being obvious that the word of the theologian is not entitled to any greater credit than that of any other thinking being, there arises the most important question of all as to the proof of the doctrine of redemption, as preached by the modern Christian Church. When a man pays off a pledge, he becomes immediately entitled to the possession and enjoyment of the thing pledged, and may insist on its being restored to him at once. The same ought to be the case with redemption in the spiritual sense. If the theological interpretation of the doctrine is correct, why is it that the enjoyment of benefits arising from the acknowledgment of Jesus must be postponed to an indefinite point of time in the future? Why is it, we repeat, that we do not immediately come into the realization of the redeemed bliss, here and now? As Tennyson says,—

“ ‘Tis life, not death, for which we pant ;

More life and fuller that we want. ”

Moreover, common sense shows that redemption is possible only by paying off the pledge, not by the acknowledgment of the pledgee, or his son, as a world-saviour ; and where the liability to be discharged consists in refraining from abandoning oneself to the knowledge of good and evil of external things, in other words, from sensuous living, it is absolutely inconceivable how any one else but the pledgor himself can ever acquit him of the debt. The truth is that the Church has no idea of the true significance of the doctrines of the ‘fall’ and ‘redemption,’ and is, consequently, unable to give us a foretaste of the bliss of being saved which every practical religion should be in a position to do.

The explanation of the mystery of the ‘fall’ has practically qualified us for a comprehension of the doctrine of redemption. For, just as the fall signifies mortality, imperfection and unhappiness for the living beings, so is redemption the door to immortality, perfection and joy. The former indicates a condition of existence in which the true attributes of the divinity residing in the temple of

the body are suppressed on account of an all-absorbing sense of identity between the immortal 'tenant' and his tenement, the mortal tabernacle of flesh, and the latter, the state in which the 'tenant' knows himself as not only different from his tenement, but also as the Perfect *paramatman*—Omniscient, Immortal and Blissful. As a consequence of being involved in the state of the fall, man lays all the stress he can, on his physical body—a perishable compound of matter—and ignores the God within, thus forcing the Infinite, as it were, to vacate his throne and placing the finite, bodily puppet in his place. Redemption implies a change of this weakening mental attitude to enable the soul to evolve out its divine attributes in fulness and perfection.

We have seen that the soul is of the nature of pure intelligence, the substance which knows and feels, and the relation between thought and belief is that the latter constitutes a mould for fixing the former's form. It is for this reason that the soul speedily becomes what it actually *believes* itself to be. It would follow from this that if it replaces the sense of its identity with the body with one in its own Godhood, it will actually become a God as soon as the right kind of belief becomes fully established in its consciousness. The main thing, then, is to acquire the belief in one's own divinity. But this is not an easy matter by any means. In order to achieve this result, one must have faith in what has been said above. That really means that one should have absolutely no doubt about the doctrine, and that the conviction of its truth must saturate the mind through and through; for the least doubt creeping in will neutralize whatever little faith may have been acquired by the soul. We must hold the idea of the self being the Paramatman (God) constantly before the mind, and should, in every possible manner, try to strengthen it by thought, word and deed, in daily life. On the other hand, a small amount of courage and cheerfulness will go a long way towards success, for nowhere is the law that Nature—allegorically, God—helps those who help themselves more rapid in operation than on the mental plane. To put the same thing in the metaphorical language of mysticism, when you try to establish your oneness with God, he will also do the same, and just in the degree that you show your earnestness in the matter, will

he also evince earnestness on his side. Muhammad expresses this very idea when he makes Allah declare :—

“ Whoso seeketh to approach me one span, I seek to approach him one cubit; and whoso seeketh to approach me one cubit, I seek to approach him two fathoms; and whoso walketh towards me, I run towards him.” — ‘ Sayings of Muhammad.’

Invisible hands will lead us, so to speak, by the hand over impassable and rocky foot-paths; invisible minds will lend us their experience, as it were, and put their knowledge at our service; auspicious signs and tokens will be in evidence on all sides, and we shall find whole Nature ready and eager to acknowledge the return of her Master from bondage and to proclaim him to the world mid joy and celebrations. We must not, however, falter. It is merely a question of the attitude of the mind on our part. If we determine to be free, if we resolve to shake off the bonds forged by ignorance, our Inner Glory will shine forth as soon as we cease to stand in its way. The difficulty is felt only so long as one is entangled in the world of men, where Mammon is the object of worship, and where one feels like a prisoner with all sorts of ties and bonds. The moment one rises above the world, the moment one realises that one is not the little, miserable, limited man, but the real living Existence, the *Sat-Chit-Ananda*, one will experience delights which are beyond the most extravagant expectations of men.

Perfection is the goal of evolution. Man is a perfect God in himself, though entangled in the meshes of illusion; and the natural perfection is struggling to manifest itself from within. The moment he ceases to obstruct its path, the moment he exerts himself to bring it into manifestation, it will begin to shine forth in all its glory and splendour. His onward progress will then be resplendent with Light and Love, and drawing nearer and nearer his goal every day, he will finally pass into *mukti*, liberated and free, and with the full consciousness of being the *Sat-Chit-Ananda*.

This is the true idea of Redemption. Just as by the inherent virtue of the desire to taste ‘ the fruit of good and evil ’ man is deprived of his divinity, so by the return of faith in his Godhood will he rise to perfection and glory. The cause of our downfall is our ignorance of our divine, godly nature; the bodily personality lies at the

root of the trouble. If we wish to avoid pain and suffering, if we wish to come into our own, and to realize our divine nature, we must give up our evil notions and desires, and replace them with right beliefs and *vairāgya* (renunciation). As Swami Rama Tirtha says :

"If you bring your faith to believe that you . . . [are] saved, you are the saviour of the universe. If you believe that you never were the body, that you never were in thralldom, if you be as grown-up men, and not as silly children, if you realize with Vedanta that you are the saving energy, then you are the Saviour of the whole world. . . Be no longer children. Realize yourself to be saved, and saved you are. . . In you, oh man, there is something which is pure, which is not contaminated by faults, sins and weaknesses of the body ; in this world of Sinfulness and sloth it remains pure. . . Within you is the purest of the pure, within you is the sinless One, the Atman, which makes its existence felt, which cannot be destroyed, which cannot be dispensed with, which cannot be done away with. It is there, however faulty, however sinful the body may be ; the real Self, the sinlessness of the real Self must be there ; it must make itself felt ; it is there, it cannot be destroyed. . . In you is present the divine God, and in you is present the worthless body ; but you have misplaced the things. . . You have done things upside down ; in a topsy turvy way have you put them. You have put the cart before the horse ; and that is how you make this world a hell for you. . . The only . . . way to really stamp out all misery from the world, —long faces and gloomy and tempers will not mend matters,—the only way to escape from all sins, the only way to stand above all temptations is to realize the true Self."—"In The Woods Of God-Realization," Vol. I.

The idea of redemption, thus, from whichever point of view one might study it, is that of fulness and perfection, which are not the characteristics of the bodily man, but the essence of the true Self. The same is the case with happiness ; for it is simply impossible for any outside agency to confer true bliss on the soul, since that can only arise from *within*. Immortality also falls under the category of things which cannot be had from outside, since every soul is immortal by nature.

It is, therefore, clear that our begging for Life and Joy—and all our prayers only refer to the one or the other of them, in some form or other— from 'the Heavenly Father' is a process not only devoid of sense, but also degrading and harmful to the soul. Hence, he who promises to reward us with a residence in heaven, with the companionship of beautiful nymphs, and all other pleasure-giving things after death, in lieu of devotion to himself, can be no friend

of the soul, whose inner divinity cannot possibly shine forth, so long as it remains engrossed in the enjoyment of sensuous attractions, be they of this or of the heavenly world. Redemption, then, is the doctrine of Perfection, not of a remission of sin by another; and the true Redoemer is the individual soul itself, not any outside agency, however great or sublime.

We must now turn to the Bible itself to see what it teaches us about redemption; but we shall begin our enquiry with a study of the life of the alleged founder of the Christian faith whose teachings are said to constitute the major portion of the New Testament.

The very first question which arises in connection with the Bible has reference to its authenticity as a true narrative of events that happened in the past. So far as the Old Testament is concerned, it has been made apparent, at least in respect of the third and fourth chapters of the book of Genesis, that the facts recorded are not the events of history, but those invented by the imagination of man to clothe some of its most abstruse conclusions of a psychological nature. Philo (30 B.C.—30 A.D.) and Origen (185—254 A.D.) seem to have taken a similar view. The following from 'The History Of The New Testament Criticism' is an admirable summing up of the latter's argument against an historical interpretation of the Bible:—

"He premises, firstly, that the Old Testament is divinely inspired, because its prophecies foreshadow Christ; and secondly, that there is not either in the Old or New Testament a single syllable void of divine meaning and import. But how, he asks, can we reconcile with this tenet of their entire inspiration the existence in the Bible of such tales as that of Lot and his daughters, of Abraham prostituting first one wife and then another, of a succession of at least three days and nights before the sun was created? Who, he asks, will be found idiot enough to believe that God planted trees in Paradise like any husbandman; that he set up in it visible and palpable tree-trunks, labelled the one 'Tree of Life,' and the other 'Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil,' both bearing real fruit that might be masticated with corporeal teeth; that he went and walked about the garden; that Adam hid under a tree; that Cain fled from the face of God? The wise reader, he remarks, may well ask what the face of God is, and how anyone could get away from it? Nor, he continues, is the Old Testament only full of such incidents, as no one regardful of good sense and reason can suppose to have really taken place or to be sober history. In the Gospels equally, he declares, such narratives abound; and as an example he instances the story of Devil plumping Jesus down on the top of a lofty mountain, from which he showed him all the kingdoms

of the earth and their glory. Now, he asks, can it be literally true, how a historical fact, that from a single mountain top with fleshy eyes all the realms of Persia, of Seythia, and of India could be seen adjacent and at once? The careful reader will, he says, find in the Gospels any number of cases similar to the above."

The truth is that history plays no important part in the teaching of religion proper, since it is only the record of events in the life of a nation, and since religion deals not with nations but individuals primarily. To a limited extent, certainly, history is also a valuable guide, inasmuch as it enables us to observe the working out of what might be termed national destiny, as distinguished from individual *karma*, and to perceive the errors of the statesmen and politicians of the past; but it is biography which is the more valuable of the two, since with its aid we can perceive the effects of religious training on the souls of men, and determine the degree of spiritual unfoldment attained by different prophets and saints. Hence, religion incorporates only so much of history and biography as is likely to be useful to us in the study of spiritualism.

Even were we to treat the Old Testament as wholly or partially in the nature of history, the difficulties which arise are such as cannot be easily brushed aside. Its earliest parts are now shown to have been compiled not earlier than 444 B.C., and are, therefore, the work of men who were, in no sense, eye-witnesses to the events they record. Besides, the Biblical compilers never allowed the feeling of regard, or reverence, for history to prevent them from making additions of their own whenever they felt inclined to do so. As the *Encyclopædia Britannica* points out (see Art. Bible):—

"The historical books of the Old Testament form two series; one, consisting of books from Genesis to 2 Kings (exclusive of Ruth) embracing the period from the Creation to the destruction of Jerusalem by the Chaldeans in 586 B.C.; the other comprising the books of Chronicles, Ezra and Nehemiah, beginning with Adam and ending with the second visit of Nehemiah to Jerusalem in 432 B.C. These two series differ from one another materially in scope and point of view, but in one respect they are both constructed on a similar plan; no entire book in the either series consists of a single, original work; but older writings, or sources, have been combined by a compiler—or sometimes, in stages, by a succession of compilers—in such a manner that the points of juncture are often clearly discernible, and the sources are in consequence capable of being separated from one another. The authors of the Hebrew historical books, as we now have them, do not, as a rule, as a modern author

would do, *rewrite* the matter in their own language ; they excerpt from pre-existing documents such passages as are suitable to their purpose, and incorporate them in their work, sometimes adding at the same time matter of their own. . . . Sometimes, for instance, the excerpts from the older documents form long and complete narratives ; in other cases (as in the account of the flood) they consist of a number of short passages, taken alternately from two older narratives, and dove-tailed together to make a continuous story ; in the books of Judges and Kings the compiler has fitted together a series of older narratives in a frame-work supplied by himself ; the Pentateuch and book of Joshua (which form a literary whole, and are now often spoken of together as the Hexateuch) have passed through more stages than the books just mentioned, and their literary structure is more complex."

The question which now arises is : why did the ancient chroniclers act in this manner at all ? No one who has read the Old Testament even casually can be impressed with the idea that the narrators were anxious to chronicle historical events with the historian's veracity. There is a set purpose discernible in their writings, and it seems to be to draw upon history only in so far as it can be useful for the requirements of mythology and allegory, which had apparently become the recognised language of mystic theology in their age. If our surmise be correct, it would follow that the records of the Old Testament contain mostly the hidden and secret canons of mysticism, given out in the garb of history, so that their purport be clear to those who have been initiated into the mysteries of the Spiritual science, but remain unknown to others.

The same is the case with the New Testament whose different portions are no less discrepant with and contradictory of one another than those of the older Bible. None of the Gospels was apparently the work of the apostles ; those according to Matthew and Luke seem to be elaborated versions of Mark, which itself was probably based on an unknown and simpler document, designated ' Q ' by the critics. The date of Mark has been put somewhere after A.D. 70 ; and Matthew and Luke may be said to have been composed between 80 and 100 A.D. The fourth Gospel is now frankly admitted to be anything but history ; and Matthew and Luke are both acknowledged to have largely drawn upon their imagination concerning the events which they record.

"The evidence which convicts the third evangelist," writes Prof. F. C. Burkitt in 'The Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics' (Art. Gospels), "of having used the *Antiquities* (not always with complete accuracy) is very well brought together by Schmiedel. . . The main points are : (1) the mention of Theudas in Gamaliel's speech (Acts 5*) is not only an anachronism, but further it is inexplicable if the author of the Acts drew his information from Josephus ; (2) the introduction of Lysanias of Abilene in Luke 3* as contemporary with the 15th year of Tiberius (A.D. 29) appears to be due to a similarly inaccurate use of Ant. XX. vii. 1."

Some of the many Epistles incorporated in the New Testament have also come to be reckoned as pure forgeries. The Encyclopædia Britannica concedes (Art. Bible):

"It seems on the whole most probable that 2 Peter is not a genuine work, but that it came from the same factory of pseudonymous Petrine writings as the Apocalypse which bears the same name; though the one has, and the other has not, obtained a place within the Canon. This epistle was questioned from the first, and only gained its place with much hesitation, and rather through slackness of opposition than any conclusiveness of proof. . . Even in the case of the two more important epistles, 1 Peter and James, we have to add the qualification 'if genuine.'"

We may also refer to Dr. Raimond Van Marle who sums up the result of a hundred years' scientific criticism, in 'The Theosophist', Vol. xxxv, p. 396, as follows :

"The Gospels constantly contradict each other, and *S. John's* is so different from the other three that a division has been made by all scholars between it and what are called the three synoptic Gospels. Nevertheless, at the end of the second century *S. John* was pronounced to be authentic at the same time as the three others. Apart from the fact that *S. John's* way of speaking of the Christ is very different from that we find in the synoptics, he does not mention the Lord's Supper, he gives a different day for the Lord's death, speaks of three feasts of the Passover where the others speak but of one, and relates almost all the incidents of the life of Christ as taking place at Jerusalem, whereas, according to the synoptics, only the end of His life was spent there. In *S. John's* version the character of John the Baptist loses almost all its importance ; the miracles are quite different, becoming more astonishing and, at the same time, more symbolical ; the whole character of Jesus is much more divine and more like an aspect of the LOGOS than in the synoptics ; but at the same time he speaks of Jesus as the son of Joseph, and does not mention the birth from a Virgin. There are two passages in *S. John* which clearly show that the author was not a personal witness of the life of Christ, namely, xix. 35, where he says : 'And he that saw it bare witness.' etc., and xxi 24 : 'This is the disciple which testifieth of these things . . . and we know that his testimony is true.' To several scholars it has appeared probable that the author of the Gospel according to *S. John* was a Jew of

the school of Philo of Alexandria, who knew the Gospels, but introduced the Alexandrian philosophy into the story told by them.

" But neither do the so-called synoptics agree together. To begin with, the date of the birth of Jesus is fixed by Matthew as occurring four years before our era at the very latest (under Herod). Luke makes it ten years later (during the enrolment), or in the year 6 A.D., yet states, further on, that in the fifteenth year of Tiberius—our year 29 A.D.—Christ was about thirty years old. The dates in *S. John* are in absolute contradiction with these two and make the death of Jesus much later. The miraculous birth is not related by *S. Mark*; *S. Matthew* and *S. Luke* give two quite different genealogies for Christ's descent, *through Joseph* from King David, but these, though fulfilling the Jewish traditions that the Messiah should be a descendant of David (*Mark*, xii. 35), are in contradiction with the story of His birth from a Virgin. Had Mary and Joseph known of the miraculous birth, would they have been astonished when Christ spoke in the Temple of His Father's business (*Luke* ii. 50)? The miracles related by the synoptics are much alike, but the circumstances under which they are stated to have occurred are very different, and might show that only the facts, and nothing more, were known to the authors. The greatest miracle—the raising of Lazarus—is related only by *S. John*. The other miracles are healing, exorcism and often allegories (the multiplication of loaves, the changing of water into wine, etc.). The names of the persons at the foot of the Cross are not given alike in two places. On the subject of Resurrection the synoptics differ considerably. What *Mark* says in xvi. 9-20, is an appendix added afterwards. Luke undertakes in his preface to give a historical version of the life of Christ, but fails to give a single date, contenting himself continually with such indications as 'on the Sabbath,' 'at the same time,' etc. His historical indications are false. Herod was never king, but a governor. Cyrenius, whom he brings into his history of Jesus, governed from the year 7 to 11 A.D., and had consequently nothing to do with the story. He also mentions the name of Lycanias, although he had died thirty-four years before Jesus was born. . . . The Gospel-writers cannot have been familiar with the customs of the Jews in Palestine, when they speak of baptising in a river, and especially in the Jordan, where even bathing was prohibited. In *Luke* we find two High Priests, Caiaphas and Annas, existing at the same time which is impossible. We find Jesus teaching in the Temple where only sacrifices took place, the synagogue serving for preaching. Through *Josephus* (*Antiq.* XVIII, ii. 2) we know that on the night of the Passover it was the custom for the priests to open the doors of the Temple a little after midnight, when everybody gathered in the Temple, so that the arrest of Christ at that time must have caused a great scandal, which the Jewish priests did not desire (else why arrest Him at night?). There was never any question of witnesses, who appear at once at the judgment of Christ, as predicted in *Pauline* xxvii. 12. Executed criminals were thrown into a common trench, so that the story of the tomb which was found empty after the Resurrection seems very improbable. . . If we compare the Jewish Legal Code with the Gospel stories we come across very strange con-

traditions. It was strictly prohibited to hold judicial proceedings on days of religious feasts, so Jesus can never have been judged on the day of the Passover. It was also forbidden to carry arms on such days, so that the chief priests would never have sent the Temple Guard to arrest Christ, and Peter would certainly not have worn a sword."

Dr. Marie's observations embody the expressions of opinion of men like Schleiermacher, Strauss, Bauer, Renan, Loisy and others; and many of the advanced theologians of the English and the German schools are also in entire agreement with him. Under the circumstances, the conclusion is irresistible that if the New Testament writings narrate only that which occurred, really and truly, in the physical world, their authors must have been discharged from a bedlam to write such discrepant tales. We fancy, however, that the discrepancies noticed are either caused by the employment of the allegorical style, or are the outcome of a deliberate effort, rather than of a spirit of falsehood or exaggeration.

It is not possible to lay too much stress on, or to exaggerate, the importance of a symbolical interpretation of that which is opposed to the order of nature in an historical sense. The reader should endeavour to impress on his mind the fact that the ancients would never have mutilated history purposelessly and without reason. Whoever has lost sight of this fact has invariably ended by discovering the Scriptural text to be the outpouring of the immature mind of the race, whereas, in reality, the truth lies the other way. As a matter of fact, the authors of our Scriptures were highly intellectual men, and possessed a profound knowledge of things of which we are almost wholly ignorant, in spite of our much lauded methods of research. When the modern scientist smiles at the crass ignorance and the crude superstitious faith of the Hindu who maintains that the universe rests on the back of a tortoise, he simply smiles at his own ignorance, although quite unconscious of the fact. The truth is, that it was never intended that this statement should be understood in its literal sense. The tortoise is the symbol of Life, which manifests itself or works through the five sense-holes, *i.e.*, organs of sensation, just as a tortoise extends its limbs through the holes in its shield. Besides this, the tortoise possesses the power of expansion and contraction

which is also a characteristic of the living substance or soul. Struck with the similarity between the functions of Life and the holes in the bony covering of the tortoise, the propounder of the text in question employed the animal as a symbol for the soul. Thus, what is intended by the statement is not that the world, i.e., our little globe, actually rests on the back of a giant tortoise, but that the *samsara* (the world-process) rests on or is continued by Life. It is surprising how men are blinded by their settled convictions and how they shut themselves out from the truth when propounded even by their acknowledged leaders and the writers of their Books. The Bible itself makes no mystery about the nature of its composition, and declares, in the clearest possible terms, and that on the authority of no less a personage than St. Paul, the Apostle, that the most highly cherished of the traditions of the Old Testament, the story of the great patriarch Abraham, his two wives and their respective sons, which modern clerics confidently assure us are among the most historical portions of the Holy Scripture, is an allegory, pure and simple. In his Epistle to the Galatians (Chap. iv. 21-31), St. Paul writes :—

“Tell me ye, that desire to be under the law, do ye not hear the law ?

“For it is written, that Abraham had two sons, the one by a bondmaid, the other by a freewoman.

“But he who was of the bondwoman was born after the flesh ; but he of the freewoman was by promise.

“Which things are an allegory ; for these are the two covenants ; the one from the mount Sinai that gendereth to bondage, which is Agar.

“For this Agar is mount Sinai in Arabia, and answereth to Jerusalem which now is, and is in bondage with her children.

“But Jerusalem which is above is free, which is the mother of us all.

“For it is written, Rejoice thou barren that bearest not ; break forth and cry, thou that travailest not, for the desolate hath many more children than she which hath an husband.

“Now, we, brethren, as Isaac was, are the children of promise.

“But as then he that was born after the flesh persecuted him that was born after the spirit, even so it is now.

“Nevertheless what saith the Scripture ? Cast out the bondwoman and her son : for the son of the bondwoman shall not be heir with the son of the freewoman.

“So then, we are not children of the bondwoman, but of the free.”

Here St. Paul distinctly tells us that the tradition about the sons and wives of Abraham is an allegory, and also partially lifts the veil to reveal its sense. The Jerusalem that is above represents the nature of the soul-substance that is free by virtue of the inherent glory of pure spirit, in contrast with the other Jerusalem (the condition of embodied existence) which is now and is in bondage. The step-brothers represent the two opposite personalities, the worldly and the divine. The bondswoman is matter whose 'son' is to be cast out, so that the Spiritual ego should enter upon his inheritance. This is certainly more to the point than the historical exegesis which requires a big dose of credulity to be accepted,* and leaves nobody any the better afterwards.

In 1 Timothy (Chap. i. 4) St. Paul sounds the death-knell of the entire patriarchal history when he says:—

"Neither give heed to fables and endless genealogies, which minister question; rather than godly edifying which is in faith; so do."

The apostle was fully alive all the time to the danger flowing from allegorical script, and distinctly foretold how it would be received by men in later ages:—

"For the time will come when they will not endure sound doctrines . . . and shall turn away their ears from the truth, and shall be turned unto fables" (2 Tim., iv. 3 and 4).

* Philo Judæus, who preceded St. Paul by about a century, shows how the remaining characters in the book of Genesis are also allegorical symbols. And Philo was no innovator but only the propounder of the views of a fairly large body of men who knew the purport of the Biblical language to be secret. These men had learnt, from ancient tradition, that Moses meant pure reason, and Aaron, divine Logos as speech. Melchizedek is good understanding, the king of peace; Noah is rest or righteousness; and Lot, the righteous man. On the other hand, those who are barren of wisdom and blind of understanding are the Sodomites, "running round the house of the soul, in order to disgrace and corrupt those who are entertained as guests, sacred and holy logos, its guards and keepers." The logoi "are the divine works and words whom it is customary to call angels." Esau is the vile and irrational nature, whereas Jacob is the righteous and rational. The latter represents the character that gains wisdom by self-discipline. He is called Israel (literally, the vision of God on the attainment to the right belief. As Drummond puts it, for Philo the struggle of Jacob with an angel is "not an historical incident, but the inward struggle by which a soul rises from the striving and weary Jacob to the seeing Israel, blest with the beatific vision." Abraham is first the representation of the wise man and then, by a further abstraction, 'divine reason,' the parent of laughter and joy, for this is the significance of Isaac. The scripture "symbolically calls the mind heaven, and sensation earth, alluding to the statement that the heaven and the earth were finished." The 'Logos of God' is termed a book, as in the statement "this is the book of genesis of heaven and earth" (Drummond's Philo Judæus, p. 241).

In the Bible, mystery follows on mystery ; allegory surrounds allegory ! Even such things as harps and golden vials have a hidden side to their significance. St. John it is who reveals what they mean in the fourth chapter of the Apocalypse (verse eighth), according to which they signify prayers of saints. In Romans (xvi. 25) there is mention of the mystery of Christ which "was kept secret since the world began." This is again referred to in Ephesians, iii. 3-4 and also in the Epistle to Colossians (ii. 2-3) where it is said :—

"That their hearts might be comforted, being knit together in love, and unto all riches of the full assurance of understanding, to the acknowledgment of the mystery of God, and of the Father, and of Christ ;

"In whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge."

The Gospels, in reality, only aim at uncovering this mystery in a guarded way. The Apostle's hesitation is evident from his own language (Ephesians, vi. 19-22) :—

"And for me, that utterance may be given unto me, that I may open my mouth boldly, to make known the mysteries of the Gospels.

"For which I am an ambassador in bonds ; that therein I may speak boldly as I ought to speak.

"But that ye also may know my affairs, and how I do, Tychicus, a beloved brother and faithful minister in the Lord, shall make known to you all things :

"Whom I have sent unto you for the same purpose, that ye might know our affairs, and that he might comfort your hearts."

The same spirit of mystification and guarded explanation prevails in the Old Testament. In Proverbs (iii. 7) Divine Wisdom is called the Tree of Life. The same work, in the sixth verse of the first chapter, contains a clear hint about the hidden sense of prophetic sayings :—

"To understand a proverb, and the interpretation ; the words of the wise, and their dark sayings."

In the first verse of the ninth chapter of that work again there is a reference to the seven pillars of wisdom divine which are not mentioned, and which are probably seven *tattvas* or ultimate heads or subjects in the Science of Life. More distinctly it is said (Ibid. xxv. 2) :—

"It is the glory of God to conceal a thing but the honour of kings is to search out a matter."

Philo (B.C. 20 to A.D. 30) and Moses Maimonides (1135—1204 A.D.) amongst others have shown how allegory was the prevailing style of

the O. T. literature. Almost the whole of the seventh chapter of the Book of Proverbs is devoted to the allegory of the harlot which represents the world as the seducer of souls *

* As the subject is an important one and will come up again and again for elucidation, in one form or another, we shall reproduce this allegory to be able to ascertain the true views of Judaism as to the nature of the world and of the sensuous pleasures it affords. This is how the allegory runs:—

"For at the window of my house I looked through my casement, and beheld among the simple ones, I discerned among the youths a young man void of understanding, passing through the street near her corner: and he went the way to her house, in the twilight, in the evening, in the black and dark night: and behold, there met him a woman with the attire of a harlot, and subtle of heart. (She is loud and stubborn; her feet abide not in her house: now she is without, now in the streets, and lieth in wait in every corner.) So she caught him, and kissed him, and with an impudent face said unto him, I have peace offerings with me; this day have I paid my vows. Therefore came I forth to meet thee, diligently to seek thy face, and I have found thee: I have decked my bed with coverings of tapestry, with carved works, with fine linen of Egypt. I have perfumed my bed with myrrh, aloes, and cinnamon. Come, let us take our fill of love until the morning: let us solace ourselves with loves. For the good man is not at home, he is gone a long journey: he hath a bag of money with him and will come home at the day appointed. With her much fair speech she caused him to yield, with the flattering of her lips she forced him. He goeth after her straightway, as an ox goeth to the slaughter, or as a fool to the correction of the stocks; till a dart strike through his liver; as a bird hasteth to the snare, and knoweth not that it is for his life. Hearken unto me now therefore, O ye children, and attend to the words of my mouth. Let not thy heart decline to her ways, go not astray in her path. For she hath cast down many wounded; yea, many strong men have been slain by her."

Such is the story given in the Book of Proverbs. Its interpretation is thus given by Maimonides:—"The general principle expounded in all these verses is to abstain from excessive indulgence in bodily pleasures. The author compares the body which is the source of all sensual pleasures, to a married woman who at the same time is a harlot. And this figure he has taken as the basis of his entire book . . . We shall explain how aptly he concludes that work with the praises of a faithful wife who devotes herself to the welfare of her husband and of her household. All obstacles which prevent man from attaining his highest aim in life, all the deficiencies in the character of man, all his evil propensities, are to be traced to the body alone . . . The predominant idea running throughout the figure is, that man shall not be entirely guided by his animal, or material nature: for the material substance of man is identical with that of the brute creation!"

With reference to its interpretation, it may be pointed out that this is one of those allegories, the details of which are to be taken not as embodying special or additional features of the subject matter of personification, but as merely intended to emphasise the general idea running through the whole narrative. As to this Maimonides observes:—

"An adequate explanation of the figure having been given, and its meanings having been shown, do not imagine that you will find in its application a corresponding element for each part of the figure; you must not ask what is meant by 'I have peace offerings with me' (Ver. 16), or what is added to the force of the figure by the observation 'for the good man is not at home' (Ver. 19), and so on to the end of the chapter. For all this is merely to complete the illustration of the metaphor in its literal meaning. The circumstances described here are such as are common to adulterers. Such conversations take place between all adulterous persons" (The Guide for the Perplexed, p. 45).

It is thus clear that men have departed from the truth and the purport of the Biblical teaching in insisting upon an historical interpretation of the sacred writings.

In the following pages we shall endeavour to make a study of the life of the alleged founder of the Christian faith, and see where we are landed by an historical reading of the events composing the Messianic career. The true view of things shall, however, be allowed to develop, side by side, at the same time.

To begin with the mission of Jesus, it is a natural psychological law that every one who acquires knowledge becomes charged, or deems himself to have become charged, with a mission. For it has been considered the greatest sin to know the truth and not to spread it to others. The Hindu Scripture has it :—

“They who follow after *avidyā* (ignorance) enter into gloomy darkness; into undoubtedly greater darkness than that of they who are devoted to *vidyā* (knowledge) only, that is, who do not correct the wrong notions of others”—Isa V 3y1 Upaniṣat.

It has ever been so with mankind. It is a part of the nature of man to enlighten his surroundings by sharing his knowledge with his neighbours. He is compelled to do so instinctively, which is but another way of saying that it is his inner nature. It is this which distinguishes him from a dog on the point of temperament. Man's nature compels him to help all those who are in distress; he is made to share his happiness with the rest of his race. But the dog likes to eat up what he gets himself, and even if the food be more than he requires he will not allow any one else to take it from him. To the dog it does not matter whether his surroundings are happy or miserable, beautiful or ugly, in health or diseased; so long as he is all right individually, he is happy, and wishes not to be bothered by, or worried about others. But man does not find happiness in ugly, diseased or unhealthy surroundings. He cannot fly away from a bad or nauseating scene; for what may be hidden from his physical eye cannot be so easily dismissed from his mind. Since all unhealthy pictures create a feeling of repulsion in man, it becomes necessary for him to remove the causes of disgust. Thus, the spreading of the light of knowledge has always been regarded by humanity as a divine mission. Jesus was no exception to the rule. Like

Mahavira, Buddha, and all other saviours and saints, he conceived it the one purpose of his life to dispel the darkness of ignorance by flooding the world with Light,—to exorcise the demon of superstition by the Word of Power, the Gospel of Faith. People paid little heed, however, to what he said, but were guided by what he performed. There was not room enough for goodness in their hearts, and the seed which would have yielded a harvest, a thirty-, a sixty-, or a hundred-fold, had it been sown on good soil, fell by the wayside, or on stony ground, and failed to fructify. The Saviour's doctrine fell unheeded on the ears of his congregation, who cared nothing for philosophy but were ready and anxious to worship the man who healed the sick, revived the dead, and performed miracles. Ever since the commencement of the *Panchama Kala*, which began about 2,500 years ago, the idea of securing salvation through the virtue of some one else has become world-wide. To work out one's own salvation, by one's own exertion, leaves no time for the worship of Mammon, and it is certainly convenient to believe that through some one else's grace, to be secured by flattery or hollow praise, the same object can be achieved with ease.

But the real reason why people failed to understand the true teaching lay in the fact that the teacher did not seek and dared not seek to enlighten the generality of men. In other words, he was not free to speak openly before the congregations. It was the old Hindu practice of withholding the teaching from the *Sudras* which had to be followed in the Holy Land. The teacher not only declined to enlighten the "dogs" (except when proved to be worthy to receive the truth, *vide* Matthew, vii. 6 and xv. 26-27), but also advised his followers not to cast holy things before the 'swine' (Matt. vii. 6). The fact is that the employment of the allegorical style in religious instruction gave rise to such deadly enmity amongst men, in the end, that no one could afford to jeopardise the safety of himself and his followers by open discourse* before the uninitiated masses, who

*The following extracts from the writings of a few of the exponents of different faiths throw interesting light on the point under consideration :—

1. "These things, beloved, we impart to you *with fear*, and yet readily, on account of the love of Christ, which surpasseth all. For if the blessed prophets who

only accepted the allegorical descriptions of the scriptural text in their literal sense.

And it was but natural for these unenlightened men to regard every one who differed from their views as an enemy of *dharmā* (religion), and, therefore, also of their community. The pages of the past history of almost all the nations of the world are written in

preceded us did not choose to proclaim these things, though they knew them, openly and boldly, *lest they should disquiet the souls of men*, but recounted them mystically in parables and dark sayings, . . . *how much greater risk shall we run in venturing to declare openly things spoken by them in obscure terms*"—Ante Nicene Lib., vol. ix. (Hippolytus, vol. ii.) 2nd part, page 18.

2. "For it is not required to unfold the mystery, but only to indicate what is sufficient for those who are partakers in knowledge to bring it to mind . . ." A. N. Lib., vol. xii. (Clement, vol. ii.) page 472.

3. ". . . the account given in Scripture . . . is not, as is generally believed, intended to be in all its parts literal. For if this were the case, wise men would not have kept its explanation secret, and our Sages would not have employed figurative speech . . . in order to hide its true meaning, nor would they have objected to discuss it in the presence of the common people . . . It is, however, part of the divine plan that every one who has obtained some perfection transmit it to some other persons. . . . It is, therefore, impossible for a scholar to possess knowledge of these problems, whether it be through his own researches or through his master's teaching, without communicating part of that knowledge to others; it cannot be done in clear words; it must be done sparingly by way of hints. We find in the words of some of our Sages numerous hints and notes of this kind, but mixed up with the words of the others and with other subjects. In treating of these mysteries, as a rule, I quote as much as contains the principal idea, and leave the rest to those who are worthy of it"—Guide for the Perplexed, by Moses Maimonides, page 211.

4. ". . . a person favoured by Providence with reason to understand these mysteries is forbidden by the Law to teach them except *viva voce*, and on the condition that the pupil possess certain qualifications, and even then only the heads of the sections may be communicated. This has been the cause why the knowledge has entirely disappeared from our nation, and nothing has remained of it. This was unavoidable, for the explanation of these mysteries was always communicated *viva voce*; it was never committed to writing. Such being the case, how can I venture to call your attention to such portions of it as may be known, intelligible, and perfectly clear to me? But if, on the other hand, I were to abstain from writing on this subject, according to my knowledge of it, when I die, as I shall inevitably do, that knowledge would die with me, and I would thus inflict great injury on you and all those who are perplexed (by these theological problems). I would then be guilty of . . . depriving the heir of his inheritance. I should in either case be guilty of gross misconduct . . . This is the utmost that can be done in treating this subject so as to be useful to all without fully explaining it"—Guide for the Perplexed, pp. 261-262.

5. "They must not divulge the secrets to their family (wives and children) nor to any one who is not the seeker of the truth (Talib Sadik) and ask for assistance in attaining to the path of God (Hakk). In that case violence must not be used towards him who does divulge them to another in the view of engaging him to join the order."—The Dervishes, p. 183.

blood, shed most unrelentingly, in the name of duty and *dharma*. Even the mild Hindu did not escape seizure by this exterminating spirit of religious fury, as is evident from the wholesale persecution of the Jainas (see *Studies in South Indian Jainism*, part ii, 34-35; and the *Jaina Law*, p. 18). This spirit of persecution, as a matter of fact, raged all over the world at one time or another, in the past, and led the knowers of truth divine in mystic creeds to insist on excluding the *Śūdra*, or the 'swine' as he is called in the Bible. The reason given by Jesus sufficiently explains the situation that the gnostics had to face; it was feared that the swine would trample the pearls under their feet and turn and rend the teacher (Matt. vii. 6). And it was by no means an idle fear that was thus entertained; we know how large was the number of those that were stoned to death in the name of religion. Even Jesus himself, according to the gospels, was seriously threatened with death; more than once. The injunction was adopted by the early church, and the Roman Catholics do not recommend the laity even today to read the scriptural text, except when explained by the priest. In Islam, too, we read:

"One learned man is harder on the devil than a thousand ignorant worshippers. The desire of knowledge is a divine commandment for every Muslim; and to instruct in knowledge those who are unworthy of it is like putting pearls, jewels, and gold on the necks of swine"—Hadis, quoted in *Extracts from the Holy Quran* by Abdullah Allahdin, pp. 102-103).

"The calamity of knowledge is forgetfulness; and to lose knowledge is this, to speak of it to the unworthy" (ibid. 103).

The Jews, similarly, would not allow the 'chariot' (metaphysics) to be studied except with proper safeguards against misapprehension, and the Cabbala was forbidden ground to all but the initiated. All this was due to the evil flowing directly from the allegorical lore; for nothing else is to be expected where religious doctrines are couched in a way which says one thing and means quite another.

As for the vogue of the allegorical style, it appears to have been originally employed out of poetical fervour, and spread far and wide, on account of its fascinating imagery. But as people are not born with an understanding of the allegorical symbolism, there came a time when the generality of men failed to understand the purport of the

diverse gods and goddesses and other forms of allegorical symbols, whose number in Hinduism alone rose to over three hundred million. The ignorant masses then interpreted the sacred writings in their literal, that is to say, the historical sense, and being in power, by the force of their numbers, began to ill-treat those who preached to the contrary. In course of time, the multitude of gods and goddesses gave place, in the imagination of the ignorant, to one god, who came to be regarded as the maker and creator of the world and of all that it contained. It is this conception of Godhood which has caused all the trouble that has arisen in the past in the world in the name of religion, and it is it also that is responsible for the conflict between science and religion, that is prevailing now in the world of thought. About two thousand years ago the misunderstandings between the knowers of truth divine and the uninitiated, uninstructed masses had, as already shown, arisen to the point of bitter enmity, and the knowers of truth were subjected to all conceivable forms of molestation and violence. They thus found themselves afraid to speak and yet obliged to practise and preach, and were led to adopt various secret methods of preaching and practising their faith, some even holding their assemblies behind closed and guarded doors. This is how the various orders of mystics and gnostics came into existence. On the other hand, the vulgar masses cared nothing for the outpourings of the mystics so long as the latter did not openly challenge their firmly-cherished belief in a creating and ruling god. Two things especially were intolerable to these men, namely, firstly, the setting up of any one else, whether the individual soul or some other being, as a god, in opposition to their own, and, secondly, the denial to their godhead of the creative function. Hence, no one dared openly preach the doctrine of soul's divinity and transmigration: for they both went directly to challenge—the one the being and the other, the creative function of—their favourite. The mystics, therefore, had to express themselves in the most guarded of terms, and took special care to avoid openly saying anything that might go to inflame the enemies of truth. The measures taken included, amongst others

(a) secret worship and instruction, as in Freemasonry, which sought to escape persecution under the guise of a society of men

carrying on an innocuous occupation, whereas, in reality, the Free Mason is not a common mason or builder, but the architect of the Temple of Freedom and Divinity of his own Soul ;

(b) caution in the conferment of membership ;

(c) secret, that is to say, cryptic instruction, which says one thing and means another, so that even in the hands of an enemy of the faith the composition should pass off as an example of poetical exuberance or license, without exciting adverse comment ;

and

(d) adherence to the time-old symbolism with which the masses were familiar, to maintain friendly relations with them.

The mystics fully understood the kind of trouble that was sure to arise from such wholesale employment of cryptological methods and misleading secrecy ; but they were quite helpless in the matter, and had no alternative left to protect themselves and their followers, and to preserve and preach the truth. But they took every precaution to indicate the proper direction for the ascertainment of truth. Care was taken that "certain stumbling blocks, or interruptions to the historical sense should take place, by the introduction into the midst of the narrative of certain impossibilities and incongruities, that in this way the very interruptions of the narrative might, as by the interposition of a bolt, present an obstacle to the reader, whereby he might refuse to acknowledge the way which conducts to the ordinary meaning" (Origen's Writings, Ante Nicene Christian Library, Vol. X. p. 313). Accordingly, those admitted to the inner circle were given "to understand that certain occurrences were interwoven in this 'visible' history which, when considered and understood in their inner meaning, give forth a law which is advantageous to men and worthy of God" (Ibid. 323). Such mainly are the reasons why it has become so very difficult to unravel the mystic thought in our day. Lack of an illuminating light, that is to say, of the scientific knowledge about the nature of the soul, and, to a great extent also, the pre-conceived bias and the superstitious awe born of a historical reading of mystic books, are the causes which have stood in the way of the subsequent seeker after the truth. For there is so much of chaff mixed up with the grain of truth in the outpourings of the mystic mind that it is not

always easy for even the eye that is properly trained to distinguish between the true and false gems to pick out the precious things.

It will be observed that the gospels are chiefly composed in parables, interspersed here and there with stray aphorisms of philosophical merit and worth. But neither of these are likely to yield their real sense, unless the reader has made himself familiar with the science of the Soul ; for the parables only pertain to the real side of our psychic life, while the aphorisms embody certain eternal principles of spiritual verity. For this reason the help one can expect to get from the observations of Jesus which he is said to have made in the course of his discourses with the Pharisees and others, can be but small and only fragmentary. Nevertheless, these observations are of immense value to us, in one sense ; for they enable us to test the accuracy of the conclusions to be drawn from the other available material, and in some places are full and lucid enough to be used by themselves.

As for the authors of the gospels themselves, a historical reading of their work will in no sense be complimentary to their intellectual attainments. This seems to be the general opinion of European writers, too, on the subject. According to Renan :—

"The evangelists themselves, who have bequeathed us the image of Jesus, are so much beneath him of whom they speak that they constantly disfigure him from their inability to attain to his heights. Their writings are full of errors and misconceptions. We feel in each line a discourse of divine beauty, transcribed by narrators who do not understand it, and who substitute their own ideas for those which they have only half understood. On the whole, the character of Jesus, far from having been embellished by his biographers, has been lowered by them. Criticism, in order to find what he was, need to discard a series of misconceptions arising from the inferiority of his disciples. These painted him as they understood him, and often in thinking to raise him they have in reality lowered him."—*Life of Jesus*.

From the point of view of history, no doubt, it cannot be said that the picture is overdrawn. The disciples would seem to be endowed with a pronounced capacity to misunderstand their master. Jesus himself was constantly commenting upon their want of understanding and faith. The chosen twelve were happy in the idea of being the elect, and their sole object in life, at least during the time that Jesus was with them, seems to have been the enjoyment of their

position as such. So engrossed were they with this sense of power that they actually wanted to settle who was the greatest among them, and quarrelled about it. One of the twelve was the betrayer! Peter had not the moral courage to acknowledge his master in the hour of need, and deliberately lied to preserve his skin!

We fear there is not much in this historical picture to inspire one with confidence in favour of the gospel-writers. Even Jesus himself, on the historical side of the problem, becomes, in the hands of modern biographers, a simple rustic, who saw the world not in its stern reality, but through the prism of his own simplicity. We may say at once that we do not share the views of these modern writers, though we cannot withhold praise for their fearless spirit and unbiassed criticism. They have set an example in the dispassionate application of the mind, and tried to sweep away the cobwebs of superstition, to get at the real truth. Their failure is not due to lack of genuine enterprise, but to a want of the comprehension of the kind of material of which the gospels are composed. As for the clerics, they have always insisted on the historical sense, and have ever been ready to believe the black to be white!

We must, therefore, reject all such biographies, as have been composed by clerics and modern writers both, and proceed to deal with the problem as an open question. But we must at the same time banish from our own minds the element of prejudice that may be lingering in it for or against any particular view; for unless one's own mind is free from the taint of prejudice and bigotry both, one can never be qualified for the ascertainment of truth. It is well to remember that we are so constituted that those of us who are not of the faith are always ready and eager to believe anything which can be said against it, while those who belong to it generally resent all endeavours to get at the truth, and feel in duty bound to refute any charge howsoever well founded. The proper attitude for the really enquiring mind is that it should suspend its judgment till the investigation is complete, when truth itself will be known, unaffected by individual bias and the tinge of bigotry.

We should not forget that the true aim of religion is to bring the highest form of happiness within the reach of its votaries, not to

make general or wholesale conversions at any cost. Those who are the real teachers of humanity care not for converting any one to any particular form of belief, but only to spread light and happiness, for "the hour cometh, and now is, when the true worshippers shall worship the father in spirit and in truth." It is only the man who is prepared to reject that which is not good and sound who will learn anything; prejudice and bigotry never did and never shall acquire the truth.

We shall now take up the main features of Christ's personality and teachings one by one, and test for ourselves the merit and worth of each one separately, as well as in a cumulative sense. To begin with the personality of Jesus, the point round which the entire interest of his followers is centred, is the mystery which is said to surround his birth. No need to repeat the story here; the matter has been fully investigated by some of the leading scholars and scientists of European fame; and the conclusions which have been arrived at cannot be lightly brushed aside. The evidence is all one way and is against the belief in an immaculate conception. Conspicuous among those who have declined to stifle the voice of their common-sense stands Mr. Evanson, a curate, whose candid criticism of the 'pagan fable' of the miraculous conception ultimately brought him into conflict with the Church. He wrote (see the *History of the New Testament Criticism*, pp. 91 and 92):—

"In no one apostolic Epistle, in no one discourse recorded in the Acts of the Apostles, is the history of Jesus previous to John's baptism, hinted at even in the most distant manner. On the contrary, that baptism is repeatedly referred to and mentioned as the proper commencement of evangelical instruction; and when the eleven apostles proceeded to elect a twelfth, to supply the place of Judas, the only qualification made essentially requisite in the candidates was their having been eye-witnesses to our Lord's ministry from the baptism of John to his Ascension. These two [the first two] chapters of Luke are the daring fiction of some of the *every working* interpolators, as *Origen* calls them, of the beginning of the second century, from among the pagan converts, who, to do honour as they deemed it to the author of their newly embraced religion, were willing that his birth should, at least, equal that of the pagan heroes and demigods, Bacchus and Hercules, in its wonderful circumstances and high descent; and thereby laid the foundation of the succeeding orthodox deification of the man Jesus, which, in degree of blasphemous absurdity, exceeds even the gross fables of pagan superstition."

Among the more recent writers, Professor Haeckel sums up his conclusions on the subject in the following words (The Riddle of the Universe, Chapter xvii) :—

" We have no authority in support of the gospel-narratives until more than a century after the death of Christ. No one who is acquainted with the growth of legends in an Oriental atmosphere can place the least reliance on documents of so late a date. . . . The most cherished beliefs of Christian tradition are being totally abandoned. The story of the miraculous birth of Christ is rejected by the leading Christian scholars of Germany, and by an increasing number of scholars in England, as belonging to the latest and least reliable strata of Biblical narrative—in other words, as a late and worthless interpolation. The resurrection and the ascension are now meeting the same fate. The New Testament is being broken up like the Old Testament, and the figure of Jesus is rapidly dissolving."

We are, however, not bound to accept every word of what Prof. Haeckel or any one else thinks on the subject. But when we find the above view to be held in common with him by some of the leading Christian clergy themselves who angrily resent the imputation of a belief in the miracle of Virgin-birth, there can be no doubt but that the story of the immaculate conception is either a mystic teaching of great value, given out in the garb of history, or a late and worthless interpolation, as Haeckel calls it, by a man who thought that it would cast an additional halo of sanctity on the central figure of his creed. Such legends are to be found in many other religions of the world, and Hinduism simply abounds in them. Their true interpretation is to be sought for in the region of spiritual science, but not in the domain of history. The idea of virgin-birth will be explained in a subsequent chapter ; for the present we shall content ourselves with showing that the orthodox view is not likely to commend itself to thoughtful men. The most important witness—and one of the two on whose narrative the whole controversy has risen—on the point is Luke, the supposed author of the third evangel, who writes (Luke, iii. 23) :—

" And Jesus himself began to be about thirty years of age, being (*as was supposed*) the son of Joseph, which was the son of Heli."

The *italics* are ours ; but it is impossible for language to be more emphatic and unambiguous. Luke here actually contradicts the earlier parts of the gospel after his name, and must be deemed to be acting deliberately, if the imputation of forgery is to be avoided in respect of the first two chapters of his gospel. The

contradiction cannot possibly be explained away on the orthodox view, but it finds an easy solution on the hypothesis of symbolical thought, for, as we shall see later, Christ is *always* conceived in spirit. Jesus himself never claimed an immaculate conception for his physical self; on the contrary, he said to his opponents:—

"Ye judge after the flesh; I judge no man"—(*John*, viii. 15.)

This means nothing if not that they did not err in their judgment in so far as the tabernacle of flesh was concerned. The next preceding verse—

"I know whence I came, and whither I go; but ye cannot tell whence I come, and whither I go."—

makes his position perfectly clear. Man consists of a physical body and a soul, though unthinking materialism only knows him as a bundle of flesh and bones. Jesus condemns the materialist's view, not because it is untrue in respect of the genesis of the body, but because it ignores the soul. Put in plain language, he says: 'I know about my true Self, i.e., spirit, whence it came and whither it goes; but you cannot tell that. Your wisdom exhausts itself with the body of flesh. I don't say you are wrong there, in your ideas about its origin and the like; but I do say that you have thrown away the substance and are grappling with a mere shadow.'

This is very different from what one would have expected Jesus to say if he was trying to set up a virgin-birth for himself. John has contrived another little dialogue between a section of Jews and Jesus, which also throws considerable light on the situation. The Jews, who were beside themselves with rage, sought to provoke him, saying:—

"We be not born of fornication; we have one father, even God,"—(*John*, viii. 41).

Here was the opportunity for Jesus to assert his miraculous birth, but he merely replied:—

"If God were your father ye would love me; for I proceeded forth and came from God; neither came I of myself but He sent me. Why do ye not understand my speech?"—(*John*, viii. 43-45).

It is noticeable that he did not tell them that he alone was the son of God; nor did he choose to take any notice of the insinuation

cast by the Jews. He simply told them that the matter required understanding. In plain language, he meant: 'If you believe God to be your father, you must recognize him to be the father of every one, including even a child of fornication. The soul of the so-called child of fornication is not any the less a potential divinity, because of his not being born in lawful wedlock. It is only because you do not understand me that you object to my calling myself the son of God.' Here, again, the opportunity is missed for the assertion of the virgin-birth, and the fact speaks for itself.

If it were a fact that there was a violation of some of the laws of nature on the occasion of the birth of Jesus, we should have found some historical proof of the event. On the contrary, the most remarkable thing about the matter is a total absence of all reference to it in the sayings of Jesus himself. If it were a fact that the wise men of the East had taken the trouble to travel all the way from their native land to pay homage to the 'divine baby,' we should have heard more of them. But they never took any further interest in him or his doings, and seem to have evaporated into thin air, as if they had never existed before. Surely an historical fact (if it had been one) like that of Herod putting all the children in his kingdom to death, for fear of Christ destroying his power, could not have been ignored by the contemporary historian. These are some of the circumstances which render a belief in the legend utterly impossible. The advance of civilization and the immense progress made by the natural sciences have rendered it imperative for man to build his religion on the rock of knowledge. The opposite method of superstition and mystic rite, though at times impressive and of great service in strengthening faith, must undergo thorough overhauling and modification on scientific lines. The tendency of the modern man is to know the reason *why*, before embarking on any enterprise; and who can say that he is wrong in insisting on the point. How unreasonable we are in matters religious, becomes apparent at once when we compare our attitude towards religion with that towards business. No one ever invests even a small sum of money in any concern without satisfying himself as to the safety and stability of the business; yet we never trouble ourselves to find out whether there

is any security of the concern in which we are going to invest our entire spiritual well-being! It is impossible to go further into the details of the argument against the miraculous birth of Jesus within the space at our disposal; it seems that the account is a modified version of the legend about the birth of Krishna, one of the incarnations of Vishnu in Hinduism. It is not to be supposed that it gives us any pleasure to destroy the long and fondly-cherished beliefs of a section of our race. The point, too, is not an immaterial or unnecessary one by any means, for so long as we believe in superstition and myth we stand in the way of Truth, and prevent its abiding out in the world. The proper question for the enquiring mind should be, not who or what was Jesus or Buddha, or any one else, nor even what did they teach, but what is the Truth? When we proceed to work out our salvation with a firm determination to get at truth, all differences of caste and creed, superstition and myth, and sentiment and prejudice vanish from our path, and the so-called natural sciences, instead of standing sneering by, become our torch-bearers and light our way. The criterion of truth is that it should produce immediate, certain and unchanging results. Precisely the same ought to be the case with religion, so that the system which fails to give perceptible and immediate results is not the true religion in any sense.

As regards the account of Christ's doings, the greatest confusion is found to prevail in the gospels, when read historically. As an instance in point may be mentioned the accounts in Matthew, iv. 18—20 and John, i. 35—42, which are reproduced below :—

Matthew (Chap. IV).	John (Chap. I).
<p>18. And Jesus, walking by the sea of Galilee, saw two brethren, Simon called Peter, and Andrew his brother, casting a net into the sea : for they were fishers.</p> <p>19. And he saith unto them, Follow me and I will make you fishers of men.</p> <p>20. And they straightway left <i>their</i> nets, and followed him.</p>	<p>35. Again the next day after John stood, and two of his disciples :</p> <p>36. And looking upon Jesus as he walked, he saith, Behold the Lamb of God!</p> <p>37. And the two disciples heard him speak, and they followed Jesus.</p> <p>38. Then Jesus turned, and saw them following, and saith unto them, What seek ye? They said unto him, Rabbi, (which is to say, being interpreted, Master) where dwellest thou?</p>

Matthew (Chap. IV).	John (Chap. I).
	39. He saith unto them, Come and see. They came and saw where he dwelt, and abode with him that day: for it was about the tenth hour.
	40. One of the two which heard John <i>speaking</i> , and followed him, was Andrew, Simon Peter's brother.
	41. He first findeth his own brother Simon, and saith unto him, We have found the Messiah, which is, being interpreted, the Christ.
	42. And he brought him to Jesus. And when Jesus beheld him, he said, Thou art Simon the son of Jona: thou shalt be called Cephas, which is by interpretation, a stone.

Similarly, there is a great deal of confusion about the meeting of Jesus and John (the Baptist), and about John's opinion of Jesus. The different accounts relating to this matter are to be found in

Matthew	III. 13, 14, and 15.
Do.	XI. 2 and 3.
Luke	I. 41 to 44.
John	I. 29 to 36.
Do.	III. 25 to 26.

It is not necessary to embark on a detailed criticism of these passages; it will be sufficient to reproduce a critical review of the events by a highly qualified critic.

"Now it seems absolutely impossible," writes Evanson "that John, after being from his earliest infancy personally acquainted with Jesus, and not only in possession of all the information respecting him, which he must have learnt from the two families, but so miraculously impressed with affection and reverence for him as to exult with joy, though but an embryo in the womb, at the mere sound of his mother's voice, could at any time have entertained the least doubt of Jesus being the messiah"—('The History of the New Testament Criticism,' page 91).

Here is another instance which is capable of a lot of mischief, if accepted literally:—

"And one of the malefactors which were hanged railed on him, saying if thou be Christ save thyself and us. But the other answering rebuked him, saying dost thou not fear God seeing thou art in the same condemnation? And we indeed justly for we

receive the due reward of our deeds ; but this man hath done nothing amiss. And he said unto Jesus, Lord remember me when thou comest into thy kingdom. And Jesus said unto him, verily I say unto thee to-day shalt thou be with me in paradise"—Luke, xxiii. 39 to 43.

The *italics* are ours. No other gospel gives this account. On the contrary, Mark says :—

"And they that were crucified with him reviled him."—(Mark, xv. 32).

Matthew, too, says that the *thieves* also cast the same in his teeth which was uttered by the Jews. Now, if both the thieves had reviled him, it is strange that he should have promised anything to one of them. It will be noticed that the number used by Matthew and Mark is plural, which clearly applies to both the thieves. There are other items which are open to similar objections ; but as it is not the object here to point out the evangelical contradictions but to see what the Bible teaches, we must leave the reader to find them out for himself.

CHAPTER VI.

THE KINGDOM OF GOD.

"Hari Om! Now, within this habitation of Brahman (the human body) there is a small lotus-like chamber, and within it a minute vacuity (antarakāśa). That which is within the vacuity is worthy of search : that, verily, should be enquired after."—*Chhand. Up. VIII. 13.*

"Here in the heart is a cavity, wherein He resides, the Lord of the universe, the Ruler of the universe, the Chief of the universe."—*Bṛh. Up. IV. 4, 22.*

There can be no doubt but that the message which the founders of Christianity desired to communicate to the world has not been communicated, and the blame for the failure must be laid at the door of allegorical diction. The early life of Jesus need not detain us long. According to the first gospel he was taken to Egypt to escape from the persecution of Herod, and remained there till the tyrant was dead. But this is directly contradicted by the narrative of the third evangel, according to which Jesus and his parents both remained in Nazareth, and visited Jerusalem every year at the feast of the passover. Mark is altogether silent as to the early life of the Messiah, and only opens his gospel with the appearance of John the Baptist on the Jordan. Read historically, it will be difficult to determine which of the two evangels, the first or the third, is entitled to credence; but the real explanation of the Egyptian migration and sojourn is to be found in the fulfilment of the ancient prophecy which said: "Out of Egypt have I called my son" (see Matt. ii. 15). Egypt here stands for the 'world,' so that the Conquering Soul is really called out of 'Egypt'!

We shall not linger over the other minor points of the early life of the child Jesus, except to suggest that Herod represents the physical self that is the antithesis, hence the enemy, of the true Self. He seeks to destroy all newly budding tendencies that are likely to interfere with his worldly empire and joys, which, in poetical allegorical style, stands for the idea embedded in the destruction of the little children of the empire. The true Self nevertheless develops in secret and emerges when his enemies have been sufficiently subdued, in accordance with the ancient prophecy, which said: "The Lord said unto my Lord, Sit thou at my right hand, until I make thine enemies thy footstool!" (Psalm. CX. 1).

The next important stage is the baptism of the soul. It has been seen in the last chapter how hopeless will be the endeavour to read the incident of the relationship between Jesus and John (the Baptist) and the episode of the baptism historically. We shall reserve the full esoteric import of the matter for a future occasion; but the baptism of John is really the initiation and purification of the soul that is advancing on the path of glorification. Here also it is evident that the contradictions have a purpose to serve, namely, the annulment of the historical sense, and must be deemed to have been deliberately introduced.

The effect of the baptism is that the soul is at once filled with the spirit that drives it into a forest, which is none other than that of world flight. Powers, occult and psychic, accrue to the soul now, and it has the means of the conquest and subduing of the empires of the world placed, so to speak, in its hands. Should it not go back and establish a world empire, so easily within its reach? The voice of the old Tempter, the pleasure-seeking *manas*, is heard once again; 'why not?' is the hissing interrogation. The soul has merely to use some of the occult *viddhis* (powers) to establish itself as a world-emperor, to command all its thrills and joys! The price, too, is quite insignificant! The soul need only prostrate itself before the Tempter to obtain all this glory and joy! But thy seducements, O Tempter, are in vain; they touch not the heart that is soon to emerge as a Conqueror! Such is the account of the temptation. It has no lesson for mankind if taken as an historical episode between a god and an Evil Power, but is full of real import, when taken as an incident in the career of an ardent aspirant after release from the thralldom of the senses and the world!

Thus qualified in respect of Faith, Knowledge and Conduct the soul now appears as the teacher and preacher of Truth in the world of men. We can now say of him that he is in the world, but not of the world; for the Tempter having been routed and baffled, the world has no more sway over him. His mission now is to serve; he seeks not to be ministered unto but to minister and to give his life as a ransom for the sins of the many, that is, to set an example in his

own person, that others, desirous of attaining to his heights, should follow! If all the empires of the world could not lure him away from his set purpose to find a way out of the world, would he be so far forgetful of it now as to be affected by anything man could do to please or placate him? Certainly not!

Let us now turn to the teaching of Jesus in which the foremost place is given to the Kingdom of Heaven. The question is: What did he mean by the Kingdom of Heaven which he constantly preached and referred to in his sayings? Did he mean a kingdom of the sort which we are familiar with among the nations of men? His disciples, like many other men, at the time thought that he spoke of the kingdom of Israel under the patronage and suzerainty of God, and so deeply was this idea engraven on their minds that they asked him even after the resurrection, "Lord, wilt thou at this time restore again the kingdom of Israel" (Acts i. 6)? But Jesus never encouraged such notions, and on one occasion clearly explained what he meant by the Kingdom of Heaven. He then said:—

"The kingdom of God cometh not with observation; neither shall they say, Lo here! or, lo there! for behold, the kingdom of God is within you." (Luke xvii. 20 and 21).

These words distinctly go to negative all such ideas as were held by the disciples. The kingdom which Jesus was preaching was not one that was to come with observation; it was not, and was not to be, an historical event, the coming of which could be observed by the people at large. It was likewise not going to be a geographical affair which could be pointed out as existing here, or there, or anywhere in the world. It was an affair strictly confined to the 'within' of men! On another occasion Jesus likened it to a mustard seed, which is infinitesimal in size, yet capable of an infinite amount of expansion and growth. He further tells us that it is something which increases like yeast or ferment. "To him who has, more shall be given, but from him who has little, even that little shall be taken away" (Luke xix. 26). Yet, again, Jesus likened it unto a man who had cast the seed into the ground and gone to sleep, and the seed sprang up and grew, and the man knew not how!

These are some of the most important characteristics of the Kingdom which Jesus invited mankind to enter; but the question is, what is this expanding and increasing and, withal, an incipient, infinitesimal empire within us which cannot be seen or perceived by the senses, but which is capable of multiplying like a small measure of yeast, till it permeate the whole system, and from which even the outsiders (the birds of the air) can derive benefit?

When we look at ourselves from a physical or physiological point of view we come across only the bones, blood, kidneys and other bodily organs and things in which it would be the height of absurdity to look for the promised Kingdom of Heaven. But when we look from the standpoint of higher discernment we come across, not only the promised kingdom, but also the real King, God himself, within us. The "Kingdom within us" of the Saviour, therefore, must mean the Spark of Divinity, the germ of Godhood, the presence of the Real, the Perfect, the Blessed One, within us. We now see what Jesus meant by the Gospel of the "Kingdom of Heaven." 'Go, preach the gospel of the kingdom to the world,' is as much a commandment to-day as it was two thousand years ago. What a noble mission it now appears to be. 'Go, tell the people that the God they have been searching in vain everywhere is not non-existent, nor far from but actually present within them: tell them that his kingdom is within their sanctum, for where God is there must also be his kingdom.' This is glad tidings, indeed! Look not for an external heaven; for the heaven of heavens, the source of all bliss and blessedness is within, nay is none other than the real Self, that is the soul itself. If one wants to dwell in a heaven where one can enjoy undisturbed bliss, one must help in its evolution from within. All one has to do is to sow the tiny little seed of faith, and then, like the man in the parable, one may go to sleep and rise up to find it in full bloom! This is, indeed, a gospel worthy of a Messiah!

Psychologically, the kingdom of heaven is a mental state, i.e., an emotion. If the mental emotion be a happy and blessed one, everything will adjust itself to contribute its share of bliss to the man who puts himself in that attitude. The true nature of the soul is blissful, though it is now lying buried beneath a heap of filth and

rubbish of evil passions and desire, so that one has not to go out anywhere in search of happiness, but has merely to remove the load of impurity from the precious Gem already lying within, to perceive its glory!

Belief in one's own divine nature will counteract the poison of the suggestion of inferiority and evil, and gradually establish a reign of desirelessness and dispassion, which will bring peace and the tranquillity of mind. Misery and fear arise from wrong suggestions which are accepted and acted upon by the soul. We must now determine to cure ourselves by auto-suggestions of a counter nature. Faith is the little seed which is to be sown, and it will do the rest; for belief translates itself into action without fail. It is the faith in the Godhood of the soul that will do the work of redemption; belief in the existence of a god as a solitary being sitting on high, and ruling the world, will not avail; for the suggestions of inferiority and sin will still remain in the mind and produce their evil effect. Man must approach God from within, not from without.

Such is the conception of the Kingdom of God which Jesus preached. But Christians generally consider it to be an affair of the other world, where they locate a geographical heaven into which all those who worship the God of Israel will be admitted on the Judgment Day, after this earth shall have passed away. How far this harmonizes with the promise of Jesus himself can be seen by a reference to one of his great sayings:—

“Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth.”—(Matt. v. 5.)

Now, if the earth is to pass away before the day of final judgment, what shall the meek inherit? The truth is that being incompetent to understand and realize the blessedness of the Kingdom of God and the blessings which a belief in their own Godhood can confer upon men, *here and now*, the ignorant interpreters of the word of the Saviour ascribed its fulfilment to an unseen, future world, strengthened, in their conceit, by the notion that from that misty ground, at least, they could not be easily dislodged.

Even in the promised heaven of a post-mundane type, there will be much to mar our enjoyment, if we are to be admitted there

with all our emotions and feelings, and all the rest which we call our personality. Many of us are so narrow-minded and supercilious that they would rather give up their own immortality than believe that all the hosts of 'niggers,' and the coloured people that have ever been and shall ever be should share it with them, on terms of equality, in paradise. And yet there is no escape from the 'niggers,' if they happen to adopt the faith which leads to heaven! Even here it becomes obvious that happiness depends not on any particular locality for its growth, but is a plant which has its roots in the soil of hearts well-manured and dressed by the emotions of purity and love.

The kingdom of heaven is not necessarily an event of the future; it is already within us, for Jesus assures us :—

"If I with the finger of God cast out devils, no doubt the Kingdom of God is come upon you."—(Luke xi. 20.)

This is fatal to all notions of futurity, subsequent to the Judgment Day. Nor do the expressions—

"The kingdom of Heaven is at hand [within reach]" (Matt. iii. 2);

"The law and the prophets were until John; since that time the kingdom of God is being preached, and every man presseth into it" (Luke xvi. 16); and

"From the days of John the Baptist until now the kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent [assiduous] take it by force" (Matt. xi. 12);—

lend any support to the theory of heaven as propounded by the Christian theologian.

The idea of heaven as a place of enjoyment, and of hell as that of suffering and pain, is not a new one, having been known to humanity from the earliest time when religion was first established among men. But it was never intended that the sojourn of the soul in either of these regions was to be eternal, or to take place subsequent to a general rising of the dead on a universal Day of Judgment. The eternity of hell is sufficiently refuted by the Psalmist when he sings :

"Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell."—(Ps. xvi. 10);

and the idea of a bodily resurrection is not supported by authority or reason. The following passage which seems to support the idea is, in reality, a complete refutation of it :—

"Wherefore if thy hand or thy foot offend thee, cut them off, and cast them from thee: it is better for thee to enter into life halt or maimed, rather than having two hands or two feet to be cast into everlasting fire. And if thine eye offend thee, pluck it out, and cast it from thee; it is better for thee to enter into life with one eye, rather than having two eyes to be cast into hell fire."—(Matt. xviii. 8 and 9).

Concerning the interpretation of this important passage, Mr. B. F. Barret observes (Lectures on New Dispensation, pp. 260-261):—

"Mention is here made, it is said, of the *whole body* being cast into hell. But if we are to understand it in its literal sense, that is, as denoting the *material* body, then we must also understand *literally* what is said of the *right eye* and the *right hand*. And are we to believe that literally plucking out a right eye, or cutting off a right hand, can facilitate any one's admission into heaven? And that some actually go to heaven maimed, halt, and with only one eye, as would appear from the parallel passage in Mark (ix. 43, 45, 47)? For this is the conclusion to which we are brought, if we interpret this Scripture in its strictly literal sense, and understand the *whole body* to mean the *material* body. No: the whole body means the whole man—the real, spiritual man. The offending eye and hand here mentioned, denote certain perverse propensities of the human mind, which govern the whole man. Consequently, unless these propensities be rejected or subdued (which is what is meant by *plucking out* the eye and *cutting off* the hand), the whole mind, that is, the entire and real man, is finally brought into an infernal state. This is what is meant by the whole body being cast into hell."

'Entering into life' means acquiring immortality without which even heaven, however attractive it might otherwise be, will, for ever, remain but little better than the mother earth with all the woes and miseries which are the lot of humanity on her surface. The word 'hell,' in addition to its accepted significance, also indicates a state of suffering, a wretched, miserable condition of the mind, death, and the grave. Sin is the hell begun. In the East people generally say that heaven and hell are both on this earth: according to one's deeds does one live in either of them, here and now, in this life. Even in the Bible, the word is frequently used in the sense of a grave and death.

The true sense of the passage under consideration, which becomes clear after the wrong notions about heaven and hell have been eliminated, obviously, is that blissful immortality is the reward of those who lead the life of blessed righteousness, but misery and suffering of those who are wicked: and, since the real Self is not the bodily, *i.e.*, the apparent man, the former's happiness should not be

allowed to be marred by the latter's offensive eyes and hands, which should be plucked out or cut off, if not amenable to control and correction otherwise. Immortality must begin here and now in this world, if it is to be had at all; its postponement to an indefinite and vague future, the very notion of which involves a number of contradictions in its definition, is merely begging the question. There is nothing in the passage in question to suggest that the cut-off limbs shall ever be restored to the body, which will render even heaven a place where one might come across not only that which is good, and pleasing, and beautiful, but also that which is ugly and maimed and halt!

So far as the sense of enjoyment is concerned, a geographical heaven can but afford less pain and greater and more refined pleasure than our earth; but, in reality, it is only in the Gem of the Sat-Chit-Ananda, i.e., the Soul itself, that true happiness has its centre. If the physical propensities, allegorically, the bodily limbs, offer opposition to its manifestation, they must be removed. Where Sat-Chit-Ananda shines there is bliss and 'entering into life,' that is, 'heaven'; where He is not shining, there is darkness and suffering, that is, 'hell.'

It must be further borne in mind that, unless happiness be the nature of man, it will be impossible for him to enjoy it eternally, because it will otherwise be subject to change, like the pleasures of the material world. Jesus expressed this idea when he said:—

"And no man hath ascended up to heaven, but he that came down from heaven, even the Son of man which is in heaven."—(John iii. 13).

One can have absolutely no idea of a mental emotion, and certainly no hankering after it, unless there be a possibility of its realization. The emotion of bliss is no exception to this rule, and the constant craving of the soul for happiness testifies to the fact that it is capable of realizing and enjoying bliss for itself. Man's search for happiness, thus, is a search for a lost or hidden article, not for anything new. For, however much we may deceive ourselves with false ideas and conceptions, however much we may drown our real, natural instincts in the intoxication of the transient pleasures of the world, there is no man who does not feel the poignant craving for unalloyed bliss, whenever he gets a moment to himself, for sober thinking. Whence

did he get this idea of pure bliss, if not from the innermost recesses of his real blissful Self, lying hidden beneath the impurities of sin? It is this inner or real Man who is said to be in heaven, that is, in a state of blessedness and bliss. Even if we apply the expression the 'Son of man' exclusively to Jesus, in this instance, we must come to the same conclusion, for it does not refer to the bodily Jesus, who, we know, stood in the Holy Land and not in heaven, at the time when he uttered this great truth. Therefore, the conclusion we arrive at even from this point of view, is the same, namely, that, while the bodily or physical Jesus was, at the time, in this world, the real Jesus was all the time enjoying the natural blessedness of the soul, that is to say, was in heaven, in metaphorical speech. The very word redemption signifies this much. It is the discharging of an encumbrance from a thing which belongs to us, not the purchasing of a new article. According to the Bible, man was given the freedom of choice between the enjoyment of life, *i.e.*, the Self, and the Knowledge of good and evil of things, but, unfortunately, he elected to pursue the latter, little thinking of the consequences that ensue from pursuing that path, although warned against it in clear terms. The result was the fall from the state of bliss, and the loss of immortality in the bargain. But Nature still holds these treasures in trust for him, and is ready to restore them to him the moment he gives up the pursuit of the wrong path, which leads to suffering and death. Truly, Life is divine, and the soul is the true redeemer itself. The whole of the Gospel of St. John is full of passages establishing an identity between Life and Christ. Jesus himself supported this view by such sayings as :—

" I have power to lay it (the life) down, and I have power to take it again. " —(John x. 18.)

" I am the resurrection and the life. " —(John xi. 25.)

" Whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die. Believest thou this ? " —(John xi. 26.)

Now let us substitute 'life' for 'me,' and the promise held out reads

" Whosoever liveth and believeth in life shall never die. "

We already know that the only living substance or thing is spirit or soul which is the source of life. Jehovah himself said so much when he declared :—

"That thou mayest love the Lord thy God, and that thou mayest obey his voice, and that thou mayest cleave unto him for he is thy life."—(Deut. xxx. 20.)

It is the belief in the existence of the Sat-Chit-Ananda within, which will turn this very life into a heaven, for Jehovah ordains :—

"I call heaven and earth to record this day against you that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing : therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live."—(Deut. xxx. 19.)

Here the choice distinctly lies between 'life' and 'death' ; and its significance becomes obvious the moment we understand the passage : 'for in the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die' (Genesis ii. 17). The soul is blissful and immortal by nature, but when it identifies itself completely with its body, which is perishable, it is inevitable that it should regard the dissolution of the body as its own death.

Now, since the knowledge of good and evil of things is possible only by observing their effect on our own bodies, it naturally tends to 'pamper' the body at the cost of the soul. Hence, he who abandons himself to sensualism must necessarily believe the death of the body to be his own death, and in this sense may be said to die. Obviously, then, he who knows himself to be the immortal Atman obtains the resurrection from the dead.

Thus, the true sense of redemption has nothing in common with the idea of a future rising of the dead on an universal Judgment Day. Why mankind cling so frantically to the notion of resurrection is because

"the best and most plausible ground for athanasism is to be found in the hope that immortality will re-unite us to the beloved friends who have been prematurely taken from us by some grim mischance. But even this supposed good fortune proves to be an illusion on closer enquiry ; and in any case, it would be marred by the prospect of meeting the less agreeable acquaintances and the enemies who have troubled our existence here below. Even the closest family ties would involve many a difficulty. There are plenty of men who would gladly sacrifice all the glories of the paradise if it meant the eternal companionship of their 'better-half' and the mother-in-law. It is more than questionable

whether Henry VIII would like the prospect of living eternally with his six wives; or Augustus, the Strong of Poland, who had a hundred mistresses and three hundred and fifty-two children."—(*Hasckel*).

But what can athanatism gain by the soul unless it retain its worldly personality, for according to its view all conditions minus the physical personality will be equal to annihilation? And, yet, a personality born of evil deeds and infamous actions cannot, by any means, be regarded as anything worth preserving. One can hardly go the length of saying that all unwholesome traits will be wiped off, leaving only the pleasant and agreeable traces of the earthly life adhering to the recomposed ego in resurrection. And, if this be so, one of the two things must happen—either heaven itself must become hellish for the individual, or he must be turned out to undergo the sorrowful experiences and sensations which arise from evil thoughts and inclinations elsewhere. In this connection, another question suggests itself to the enquiring mind, and it is: in what state of development will the individuals 'rise up' and pass their eternal life? Will there be the same varieties of development in the other world as there are here? Will the child in arms never develop its latent powers? Will the feeble, old man, who has filled the world with the fame of his deeds in the ripeness of youth, live for ever in mental decay? But the Theist has no answer to these and other similar questions.

The idea of an eternal punishment or reward, if analysed, would reduce the whole doctrine to a farce. In the first place, Jehovah would find it difficult to divide the entire humanity into two groups, — the one for heaven and the other for hell, — without causing heart-burning and discontent somewhere. For human beings are not alike in respect of their temperaments, passions, feelings, virtues or sins. To reduce this motley humanity into two groups, without distinction of degree in respect of the form and duration of reward, or punishment, will require an equalizing process which the human understanding refuses to recognise. And, if it be imagined that there would be distinctions and degrees of reward and punishment and of their duration in the other world, we would have a spectacle resembling our own world, and, therefore, misery would not be unknown in heaven.

The least-favoured would have occasion to envy the less-favoured, and the latter, in his turn, the most-favoured even in paradise. If this be the mode of distribution and adjustment of reward or punishment on the Judgment Day, our world has enough of heaven and hell already, and, as the materialist says, is not to be despised ; for here the grave puts an end to the misery and wretchedness of an earthly existence, sooner or later.

In the second place, justice demands that there should be apportionment of punishment according to the degree of sin, so that those who have committed a fewer number of sins ought not to undergo the same punishment as those who have sinned all their lives through. But the orthodox belief ignores the point altogether, and indiscriminately dooms all sinners to an eternal punishment in one and the same hell, irrespective of the number and nature of their sins, which is absurd.

In the third place, to deny a chance of repentance to erring humanity and to doom them to a life of eternal torment, out of all proportion to the nature and consequences of their sins, may be in harmony with the disposition of the king of hell ; but it is utterly incompatible with the mercy and dignity, to say nothing of the Justice of the Heavenly Father, as the God of the Judgment Day is said to be.

Those who have been fondly cherishing the hope of becoming re-united with their wives and children and friends in the promised land of paradise, will find the ground cut away from under their feet by no less an authority than the founder of their Faith himself. The observations which he made, while addressing the Sadducees, about the resurrection (Luke xx. 27-38 ; Mark xii. 18-27) with reference to the hypothetical case of the woman who had married several brothers in succession here on earth, are definite enough to knock all such beliefs on the head. He then said :—

“The children of this world marry and are given in marriage ; but they which shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage ; neither can they die any more : for they are equal unto the angels, and are the children of God being the children of resurrection. And as touching the dead that they rise, have ye not read in the book of Moses, how in the bush God spake unto him saying, I am the God of Abraham,

and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob? He is not the God of the dead but the God of the living: Ye therefore do greatly err."

We find not only no trace of a belief in the resurrection of the dead in this passage, but, on the contrary, a direct refutation of all such notions. The doctrine of resurrection was not unknown to the Jews, and the Pharisees actually believed in it. Before them it was well-known to the Egyptians (see the Book of the Dead), who had probably borrowed it from the Persians. But the original of the Lord of the Judgment Day is to be found in the god Yamaraja of the Hindu Mythology, who weighs the merit and demerit of creatures on their death and disposes of them accordingly. Yamaraja is, thus, a personification of Justice, in so far as he judges the respective merits and demerits of souls, and of *karma*,¹ with respect to the award of punishment and reward. The idea of a general rising of the dead on a certain day, at the end of the world-cycle, however, was never implied in any of these ancient creeds, though some of the passages of the exoteric teaching are liable to yield that interpretation, if twisted out of their strict sense, to suit the whims of the reader. What was meant was that as each individual died his future was determined by the operation of the Law of *karma*, personified as the Lord of Death, and he was directed to the region most suitable for his abode, according to the emotions evolved out by him. The sojourn of the soul in any particular region depended on the nature of its *karmanas*, stored up in the form of tendencies and forces of a subtle type, so that when the particular tendency which had secured

¹ The brilliant Hindu poetical genius to which we are indebted for the magnificent character of Yama, as the impersonation of Justice, that is to say, of natural Law than which nothing can be more unerring, has also given us the no less interesting personality of Yami, his twin-sister, who implores him to accept her hand in marriage, but is refused with righteous indignation. She is the personification of *karmaphala* (the fruit of *karma*) as distinguished from *karma*, conceived in the abstract, as the principle of causation inhering in the actions of living beings. Now, as *karmaphala* really means a modification of the condition of the soul, it cannot be thought of apart from the soul, i.e., as residing in the actions of men and other living beings, though it can never come into existence except in connection with *karma*. Thus, the relationship between *karma* and *karmaphala* is no more intimate than that they spring into being simultaneously. Hence is Yama the twin brother of Yami, but not her husband. Again, as *karma* and *karmaphala* are produced by the soul only when it is in a condition of impurity and never when the impurity is gone, they are said to be the offspring of Surya, the Sun (the symbol of omniscience, hence, pure spirit), and Saranya (impurity, *vegi* or matter) before she was forced to run away from him, on account of his excessive glory.

a residence for it in a particular region was exhausted, and was replaced by another, it was entitled to be sent to other regions suitable for its development or growth. The idea of a perpetual punishment or reward was altogether out of the question, except in the case of Nirvana; for that meant complete freedom from the bondage of *karmas*. Such was the mythological explanation of the post-mortem experiences of the soul. The Sadducees, however, understood it in the sense in which Haeckel so vehemently attacks it, and, finding it unreasonable in that sense, rejected it altogether. Coming to test the wisdom of Jesus, they propounded the problem of the woman with the seven successive husbands, which was probably a favourite and tried argument against those who believed in resurrection, in its popular sense. In his reply Jesus deals with both the questions which the proposition involved, namely, (1) the significance of resurrection, and (2) the possibility of the marital institution in the world of the Sons of God. Taking up the second point first, he declared that marriage was unknown in that region; for those who were considered worthy to obtain that world and the resurrection from the dead, became, by their own worth, like angels, or sons of God [in whom the sex function was conspicuous by its absence]. Hence, the marital relationship of husband and wife was not possible in those higher regions. The words of Jesus are very significant, for it would appear that the resurrection which he was speaking of was not open to everybody indiscriminately, but was limited to those only who were accounted worthy to obtain it. This is not the popular belief, according to which every one shall be made to rise up on the Judgment Day, irrespective of worth. Hence it is clear that the Messiah did not mean any such thing as a general 'rising of the dead,

¹ The notion of a general rising of the dead on a universal Judgment Day, is also contradicted by the doctrine of 'works' preached in the famous text:—

"And behold there are last which shall be first, and there are first which shall be last."—(Luke xiii. 30.)

For if the distribution of rewards is to take place on one and the same day, it is tantamount to a misuse of words to talk of the first being the last and the last being the first. The plain sense of the words used is consistent with the doctrine of merit or 'works' alone, and indicates that those of the aspirants who are more assiduous will outstrip, in point of time, many of their less arduous brethren who might have started on the path much earlier than themselves. Thus, many of those who start last shall be the first, and many who started first, the last.

but something very different from it. It is in unequivocal terms that Jesus points out that the Sex function has no place in the world of resurrection. People 'rise up' as angels, or Sons of the Most High, who are regarded as sexless. How and when the transformation of sexual creatures into sexless angels or sons of God takes place, popular theology is unable to answer, and even if it were possible to answer it by calling in aid the power of an Almighty God, it would be difficult to find a reason for his making risen bodies of the dead sexless, or for dividing the batch of angels, *i.e.*, sons of God, into those who are to people the heavens and those that are to become the denizens of hell. Is it not clear now that we err greatly concerning our ideas of the true sense of resurrection? The whole thing becomes perfectly plain if we reject the idea of a universal bodily resurrection on some future day, at the end of the world-cycle. The soul is sexless by nature, but it puts on bodies' of gross matter with sex-organs according to its inclinations and tendencies, so that when the male element preponderates, the body evolves out the male sex, and *vice versa*. Hence, the re-incarnationists believe that the same soul appears in different incarnations with a different sex, sometimes in a male body, sometimes in a female one, and at times also as belonging to the neuter sex. Those, therefore, who are considered worthy to obtain the resurrection from the dead, that is those who pass out of the cycle of birth and death, become sexless in consequence of the sexlessness of the soul. Resurrection, then, is to be understood in a sense different from that ascribed to it by the orthodox church. Since it is not open to every one indiscriminately, but is attainable by those only who are accounted worthy of it, and, also, because it enables the deserving to rise up like angels, or Sons of God, it is the conquest of death itself, not a resurrection of the gross body of matter. Those, therefore, who are able, by their own merit, to rise

'It is important to note that the Jews of the time of Philo of Alexandria, a great Jewish scholar who was born in B. C. 20, regarded the Sons of God as incorporeal souls, such as have the irrational parts wholly cut out, being absolutely and wholly intellectual:

"They are called by Moses Sons of God inasmuch as they were not produced by any mortal, but are incorporeal, as being spirits destitute of any body."—(The Message of Philo Judaeus by K. S. Guthrie, p. 34.)

above death, are alone entitled to be admitted into the Land of Bliss. But this is the old Indian doctrine of transmigration once more !

As regards the other point, namely, the possibility of a general resurrection, concerning which Jesus said—

“ And as touching the dead that they rise ; have ye not read in the book of Moses, how in the bush God spake unto him saying : I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob ? He is not the God of the dead, but the God of the living : ye therefore do greatly err. ” —(Mark xii. 26-27) —

is it not also clear that he did not, in any way, endorse the Sadducees' belief ? If his words had not a deeper meaning, where was the necessity for this highly mystic and ambiguous language, winding up with the utterly inconsistent expression, “ ye therefore do greatly err ? ” Does he not mean clearly that God, not being the God of the dead [i.e., divinity being the attribute of the soul which is immortal by nature], cannot be considered to be the God of [that is to say, to be an attribute of] the patriarchs, who, according to the belief of his interrogators, had died and were no more ? In different language, what he hinted at was that the venerable patriarchs, whom the Jews swore by, were simply forms of matter which had ceased to exist ages before and which could not be regarded as still living in the heaven or in some other comfortable or uncomfortable part of the post-mortem world. Even according to the popular notion of the resurrection, which is to take place on a future day, at the end of the world, the deceased patriarchs cannot have risen from the dead yet. And, yet Luke unhesitatingly adds the most pertinent words of all—“ for all live unto him,”—at the end of the passage in question, thus making the last sentence read :

“ For he is not a God of the dead, but of the living : for all live unto him. ” —(Luke xx, 38.)

What does he mean if not that the souls of the patriarchs are still living in the universe, though not in their old bodies ? Let us dwell a little longer on the denial of the Most High to be the God of the dead. This is not the only passage in the Bible, by any means, where the living God disclaims relationship with the dead. He asks (Zechariah i. 5) :

"Your fathers, where are they? and the prophets, do they live for ever?"

Jesus also said :—

"As the living Father hath sent me, and I live by the Father: so he that eateth me, even he shall live by me. This is that bread which came down from Heaven. Not as your fathers did eat manna, and are dead: he that eateth of this bread shall live for ever"—(John vi. 57 and 58).

Only one more instance will suffice for our purpose :—

"And I will make drunk her (Babylon's) princes, and her wise men, her captains, and her rulers, and her mighty men; and they shall sleep a perpetual sleep, and not wake, saith the King, whose name is the Lord of Hosts"—(Jeremiah li. 57).

Babylon, probably, is the symbol, in a wider sense, of the world, but even were we to read it in its narrower sense, the above passage, from Jeremiah, unmistakably points to the impossibility of resurrection, in the popular sense. And, yet, Luke says that all live unto God, and he cannot be ignored. Here is a dilemma from which orthodox theology is again unable to extricate itself. But if we reject the popular notions about resurrection, it is easy to get at the truth embedded in these seemingly conflicting utterances of the 'Father' and the 'Son.' Let us put down the propositions categorically, to begin with. We have—

- (1) all live in God, who is the God of the living, not of the dead,
- (2) the patriarchs are dead,
- (3) some do not wake up from perpetual sleep, and
- (4) some, who are accounted worthy of resurrection, become the Sons of God and cannot die any more.

Now, in respect of the first of these propositions, it is easy to see that death does not imply absolute extinction, in any sense; for the substances of nature subsist by their own nature, and cannot possibly be conceived as subject to annihilation. Both the soul and ultimate particles of matter are deathless for this reason. Hence, the idea of death only applies to bodies, or organisms, which are held together, for a time, by the presence of the soul, and which begin to dissolve and disintegrate on its departure. Therefore, in so far as death implies the extinction of that which was and is not now, it only means the departure of the soul from the body of matter in

which it was ensouled. Hence, the patriarchs, who were and are not now, are, in so far as their personal forms are concerned, dead, though their souls, not being perishable, still continue to live in some form or other. In plain language, the patriarchs are dead and no longer alive *as* Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and so forth; but their souls still exist, in some form or other, in the universe.

As regards the latter part of the proposition, namely, that God is not the God of the dead, its literal reading is out of the question, for the speaker certainly could not have meant that his God was in the habit of disowning a devotee the moment he was dead. What it actually means is that Godhood, being the perfection in manifestation of the potential attributes of the soul, which is immortal and blissful by nature, hence, the very essence of immortality and joy, can never be an attribute of what is essentially perishable. Therefore, all that is characterised by death, that is to say, the personal forms of the dead, are not God; and, conversely, Godhood is not a characteristic of the dead, hence, God is not the God of the dead, which term certainly includes the Jewish patriarchs.

To appreciate the full significance and subtle beauty of the mystic thought underlying the teaching, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that the phrase 'the dead' is used, in the language of Mysticism, in a special sense which is quite different from its current meaning. It refers not to the dead but to the living—to such of the living as exist in ignorance of their divine nature, in other words, to those who are spiritually dead, though alive physically. A striking instance which fully illustrates the mystic sense of the phrase is to be found in 1 Timothy v 6 where it is said:

"But she that liveth in pleasure is dead while she liveth." *

Death, then, means spiritual death; and since the soul is immortal and cannot be destroyed, spiritual death itself only signifies a kind of deadening stupor—the state of darkness and delusion

* Cf. "For this cause was the Gospel preached also to them that are dead, that they might be judged according to men in the flesh, but live according to God in the spirit,"—1 Peter iv. 6.

whereby the divine soul is debarred from the enjoyment of its divine glory. Hence, the Conquering Soul says of himself :—

"I am he that liveth, and was dead ; and, behold, I am alive for ever more." —Rev. 1. 18.

Further reflection will show that the lightless, Godless, gloryless state, described as spiritual death, can be terminated if the soul be filled with light and joy appertaining to Divinity, for where darkness and delusion are the causes of death it is but natural to treat light and wisdom as the harbingers of life. Hence the knowledge and acknowledgment of God are essential to bring the soul back to life, as the mystics say. In plain language, the soul being pure Intelligence by nature, and therefore liable to be affected by its beliefs, the moment it is filled and illumined with the knowledge of its own divine nature, it emerges from the condition of the dead, is reborn into Life, and is speedily transformed into a full and perfect God. Thus at the moment of illumination by the knowledge and acknowledgment of God the soul passes from the category of the dead into that of the living. This is tantamount to saying that no one who knows the nature of God, that is to say, who knows and acknowledges his own Godhood, can remain 'dead' any longer. For this reason Divinity and the condition of the dead are incompatible by nature—where the one is the other cannot be. Hence the statement : "God is the God of the living, not of the dead ; for all live unto him."

With respect to the third and the fourth propositions, it will suffice to point out the nature of the delusion of death in connection with the human soul. In association with the physical body with which it identifies itself, more or less completely, which is evident from such sayings as 'I am old' and the like, the soul appropriates to itself the condition of the body, as if there were a complete identity between them. In reality, the soul, being immortal and undying and free from degeneration and decay, ought to think, not 'I am old' and the like, but 'My body is old' and so forth. But so great is the power of imagination, and so far-reaching the consequences of the "fall" that by far the greatest majority of mankind seldom regard themselves as any other than the body. When the

soul is obsessed with the delusion of identity between itself and its body, it is inevitable that it should imagine the death of the body as its own. Hence, when death is about to effect a forcible separation between the immortal tenant and his perishable tenement, the ignorant soul, whose craving for life becomes stronger as the body grows weaker, clings to the fast dissolving compound of matter with all the tenacity of a drowning man. Ignorant of its own true individuality, the fountain-spring of immortality, and deluded with the false idea of the body being the man, it dreads the approach of death, and imagines it to be a complete annihilation of all that it called itself. As the coils of death tighten on the body, as the certainty of extinction becomes more and more impressed on its mind, and as the sense of its utter helplessness increases in its consciousness, it wrings its hands, as it were, in despair, at the unwelcome and inevitable calamity which stares it in the face. Its torments continue till, at last, the cords of mental equilibrium snap under the combined strain of its terrible anguish and worry, and it is thrown into the blank and dismal void of insensibility. Nevertheless, the soul does not remain permanently insensible or unconscious on shuffling off this mortal coil; for its natural consciousness is immediately readjusted to its new surroundings which have arisen mechanically in the interval, by the operation of the forces of its *karmas*. There is only one exception to this rule, and it is furnished by those who go to the 'outer darkness,' in the language of the Bible. They descend to a region of the universe which is even below the lowest hell, and pass their days in a state of existence which, though not absolutely devoid of consciousness, has yet so little of conscious manifestation in it as almost to deserve being called unconscious. The rest either go to heaven,* or hell, or re-incarnate immediately elsewhere, according to their *karmas*.

*According to Vedānta, heavens and hells are both as much forms of illusion as is the waking world, since their immediate knowledge only consists in states of consciousness. From the Realistic point of view, however, heaven and hell are just as real as our universe, and separate regions of space, the former being situated above and the latter below the part called the *Madhya-loka* of which Jambu Dvīpa, the central region, and not the little globe of our earth, as has been erroneously supposed, is a continent inhabited by men. The names of the sixteen heavens, according to Jaina Cosmogony are as follows: (1) *Saudharma*, (2) *Aśoka*, (3) *Saṁkha-*

It is not to be supposed that souls pass out of the cycle of transmigration by going to heaven or hell; on the contrary, they are all re-born in other parts of the world after undergoing experiences of pleasure or pain in those regions, and remain wandering about in the cycle of births and deaths till they evolve out sufficient excellence to attain Nirvana. So far as heaven and hell are concerned, the former is open only to those who possess the right faith or who perform self-denying austerities (*tapas*) in this life, and the latter is meant for all the rest who are cruel and vicious and who delight in doing evil deeds. Thus, with the exception of a few individuals who might be able to perform *tapas* (austerities), i. e., to observe the vows or rules of conduct becoming pious saints, all those who have no clear idea of their true Self are necessarily debarred from the heavens, not to mention Nirvana—the Happy Home beyond the turbulent sea of *samsāra* (*sa*) (transmigration).

Now, let us also observe the change of circumstances which a belief in the existence of the ego as a separate entity will effect in the life of the soul. It will, firstly, stand by, as it were, and see the body decline and disintegrate, without being affected by the sight. Secondly it will enjoy self-consciousness, instead of the body-consciousness, with which it was formerly encumbered, though the body-consciousness is never completely got rid of till the body is actually shuffled off for good. If it has perfected itself in respect of belief, knowledge and conduct, it will reach *nirvāṇa* on parting company from the physical body; otherwise it will continue to wander about from life to life, till it qualify itself for liberation.

It is, thus, evident that, so far as the soul is concerned, death is a mere delusion arising from the belief in its identity with the physical body. Hence, the terror of death loses its sting when the soul recognises itself as different and distinct from the body of matter in which it is ensouled.

māra, (4) *Mahendira*, (5) *Brahmaloka*, (6) *Brahmottara*, (7) *Lātaka*, (8) *Kāpi-
lha*, (9) *Nakra*, (10) *Mahimbara*, (11) *Sattira*, (12) *Sahasrāra*, (13) *Anata*, (14) *Prānata*,
(15) *Arana* and (16) *Achjāta*. The seven hells are known as: (1) *Ratnaprabhā*, (2)
Sarkariprabhā, (3) *Valakaprabhā*, (4) *Pankaprabhā*, (5) *Dhūmiprabhā*, (6) *Tamali-
prabhā*, (7) *Mahāmālyaprabhā*. The region of the perfected Souls is above the
heavens, on the top of the universe.

So much for the idea of death ; as regards death itself, it has been already stated that the true significance of decease consists in the separation of the soul from the body to be reborn elsewhere immediately. This is due to the fact that death does not also destroy the impurities adhering to the soul, which, consequently, immediately drag it into a new 'womb,' in subjection to chemical affinities and the magnetic forces of nature. The liability to birth and death is only destroyed at the moment of entering *nirvana* whence there is no falling back.

When the soul is fully evolved out into perfection, its delusions come to an end ; and the destruction of the *karmic* force, the cause of its transmigration, being effected, it is put beyond the snares of reincarnation for ever. It then enjoys sleepless bliss* and immortality. Hence, Luke (xx. 36) has it : "Neither can they die any more," which is capable of sound sense only on the hypothesis of re-incarnation, and means the escape of the soul from the cycle of births and deaths. †

The Sons of God, thus, are those pure and perfect Souls who have attained their high Ideal, and become Gods. They have destroyed the bondage of their *karman*s and the consequent liability to births and deaths, and are now living at the top of the universe as the Conquerors of the Dragon of Ignorance and its chief ally—Death. They are called the Sons of God, because they are, so to speak, heir to the heritage of Divinity, having attained the perfection of God, which is the goal of 'evolution.' Pure, perfect happiness, *i.e.*, eternal, unabating bliss, the power to defy Death, *i.e.*, immortality, inexhaustible energy, *i.e.*, infinite power, infinite knowledge, and infinite perception, called the *ananta chatustaya* (fourfold infinities) in Jaina Scriptures, are the attributes of their divine Souls. They are the true Teachers of mankind and the fountain-head of perfect Wisdom, hence Religion. Their chief characteristics, as given out in the Bible (Luke xx. 34—38), are : (1) the possession of spiritual merit which entitles them to attain 'that world,'

* Sleep being inconsistent with the nature of consciousness, the Perfect One who is pure consciousness, must necessarily be free from the stupor and stupefaction of insensibility and somnolence.

† Cf. "From death to death goes he who perceives diversity"—(Katha Upanishad iv. 10).

i.e., Nirvana, (2) freedom from sex, that is, the absence of all material bodies, (3) non-liability to death, and (4) the enjoyment of Godly status.

It is not possible to lay too much stress on the words '*any more*' in the Messianic observation recorded by Luke (xx. 36). The statement will lose all its merit, if souls are born and die only once in their career. The fact that it was made only in reference to those Great Ones who obtain 'that world' and the resurrection from the dead, is sufficient to show that it is not applicable to all souls indiscriminately. Thus, while all those who have not perfected themselves remain liable to repeated births and deaths, those who attain the fullest degree of spiritual unfoldment are necessarily exempt from dying *any more*.

The true interpretation of the passage about the resurrection of souls, thus, leads us to a conclusion very different from that arrived at by the orthodox Christian Church. Not the least satisfactory feature of our interpretation is that it at once reconciles the teaching of Jesus with that of almost all other ancient religions of the world. Reincarnation is a truth of philosophy, as we shall see when we come to deal with the theory of *karma*, so that the attempt to disown it can only end in bringing discredit on those who raise their voice against it.

Resurrection, then, is meant only for those who realise the nature of the delusion involved in the idea of death, and who apply themselves to conquer *samsāra* (the transmigratory condition) and their lower nature. This is why Jesus repeatedly exhorted his followers to acquire the perfection of God. He could not have said: "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect" (Matt. v. 48) unless his mind had fully grasped the possibility of attaining to the perfection of God.

The idea of the 'conquest of *samsāra*,' it must be remembered, has nothing in common with that of bringing the world under subjugation, or of lording it over one's fellow-beings. The true conqueror is he who conquers his lower nature; not he who allows himself to be overpowered by delusion, or passion or lust. Hence, those who

* Cf. "In the world ye shall have tribulations; but be of good cheer; I have overcome the world"—(John xvi. 33).

engage in warfare with their fellow-men, in vindication of real or imaginary rights and grievances, cannot be regarded as conquerors in the true sense of the word. Religion puts no value on a conquest which does not procure freedom from one's natural enemies, *i.e.*, passions, desires and the like, and warns us against all those pursuits and ideals which only go to increase the burden of captivity.

When the soul becomes a god and breaks away from the world to enter Nirvana, it feels the force of the saying: "There is one *alone*, there is not a second; yea, he hath neither child nor brother" (Ecclesiastes iv. 8); and with the joyous words: "I, *even I*, am the Lord; and beside me *there is no Saviour*" (Isaiah xlii. 11), plunges into the Ocean of Eternal Blessedness and Bliss, in its own self!

The attainment of immortality is possible for every one of the living beings in the course of one or more incarnations. If it were otherwise, it would never have been said:

"Cast away from you all your transgressions, whereby ye have transgressed, and make you a new heart and a new spirit: for why will ye die, O house of Israel? For I have no pleasure in the death of him who dieth, saith the Lord God: wherefore turn yourselves and live ye"—(Ezekiel xviii. 31-32).

Nor:

"If the wicked restore the pledge and give again that he had robbed, walk in the statutes of life, without committing iniquity, he shall surely live, he shall not die"—(Ezekiel xxxiii. 15).

About the time that the law was given to Moses, Jehovah is said to have put the matter before the people, saying:

"I call heaven and earth to record this day against you that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing; therefore choose life, that thou and thy seed may live"—(Deut xxx. 19).

To the same effect is the following:

"I will ransom them [the true believers] from the power of the grave. I will redeem them from death: O death, I will be thy plagues; O grave, I will be thy destruction: repentance shall be hid from mine eyes"—(Hosea xiii. 14).

As for the wicked, their paths are 'turned aside'—"they go to nothing, and perish" (Job vi. 18). "As the waters fail from the sea, and the flood decayeth and drieth up: so man lieth down and riseth not, till the heavens be no more, they shall not

"wake, nor be raised out of their sleep" (Job xiv. 11-12). The following is equally emphatic :

"Thus saith the Lord of hosts; even so I will break this people and this city, as one breaketh a potter's vessel, that cannot be made whole again"—(Jeremiah xix. 11).

This distinctly refers to the bodily personality which cannot be made whole again. No need to multiply references; our analysis of the resurrection text suffices to explain all such passages in all the rational religions of the world.

How hard it is for Materialism to understand the truth of some of these sayings needs no comment; nor were the hearers of Jesus, with a few honourable exceptions, any the better in this respect. John records that immediately after the parable of the heavenly bread, culminating in the most mysterious utterance: "He that eateth me, even he shall live by me" (John vi. 57), many left his following, when Jesus enlightened them a bit, saying: "Does this offend you? It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing: the words that I speak unto you they are spirit, and they are life" (John vi. 61 and 63). It is easy to understand this "hard" saying if we recollect that the word 'me' in the text "he that eateth me" has no reference to Jesus, but to Life and to Life's great Ideal.

But some one may ask: how are we to eat Life? The reply is: just in the same way as we *devour* knowledge. We can 'eat' Life by 'entering' into it, in other words, by feeling its pulsation within us, or by abandoning ourselves to enjoy its soul-enrapturing rhythm. If any one finds it difficult to understand it even now, he must try it in actual practice; and if he will but persevere a little he will find that he has not been spending his time in vain. Meanwhile, let us proceed with the sayings of Jesus.

The Master often declared that if any one would keep his teaching and live according to his doctrine he would enjoy eternal life. This was the main cause of difference between him and the Pharisees. The latter could never conceive how any one could be greater than their late lamented ancestors, and they forthwith told him what they thought of him:—

"Art thou greater than our father, Abraham, who is dead and the prophets are dead, whom makest thou thyself?"—(John viii. 53).

How could this son of a common carpenter talk to them of the conquest of death when their great ancestors, who had never been surpassed, were unable to resist it? Jesus threw them into greater convulsions by telling them that he was honoured by his Father who was their God : and as to Abraham's supposed supremacy, he added :-

" Your father, Abraham, rejoiced to see my day : and he saw it, and was glad "—(John viii. 56).

This appeared to be downright madness to the Pharisees, as it no doubt did to some of the later biographers of Jesus ; for how could a man who was not even fifty years of age be said to have existed in the time of Abraham ? But Jesus coolly threw another mystic bomb into the ranks of his opponents by saying : " Before Abraham was I am " (John, viii. 58). The Pharisees now completely lost control over themselves, and took up stones to cast at him, at which stage Jesus thought it wise to hide himself. It is a great pity that for the want of true knowledge of Divine Philosophy the beauty of the higher thought and teaching of the Bible has remained unknown to the world hitherto. To us these passages do not appear to be the ravings of a lunatic, or the musings of a deluded rustic, who saw the world through the prism of his own simplicity. The Bhagavad Gita has it :

" Nor at any time was I not, nor thou, nor these princes of men, nor verily shall we ever cease to be hereafter "—(Disc. ii. 12).

We now know that ' I am ' means Life which is eternal and independent of the notion of time, so that the text, ' before Abraham was I am,' only means that each and every soul is immortal and has existed from all eternity in the past. As regards the statement—

" Abraham rejoiced to see my day and he saw it and was glad "—

it is clear, especially with reference to the words ' my day,' that the allusion is to the glory appertaining to the status of a ' Son of God,' but not to Jesus whose ' day ' could be seen by Abraham only if it were possible to annihilate the long centuries which separated them from each other. It is thus clear that the speech of Jesus had no reference to his own personality, and that we go wrong when we begin to *idolize* Jesus, instead of *idealizing* the Messiah, or *Jina* (the

Conqueror), as he is called in Jainism ; for, so long as we do not shake off the wrong notion that Jesus wanted our homage for his own person, we stand in the way of truth and cannot come into our own. The doctrine of Sonship is a proposition of philosophy. It is, however, applicable to the whole race and not to one particular individual alone, since every soul is entitled to become a son of God the moment it evolves out its natural perfection. Hence, it was the Messiah, and not Jesus, whose day Abraham had rejoiced to see, and the speech of Jesus had reference not to his own physical person, but to the real self, *i.e.*, the Christos, which the soul becomes, on the attainment of perfection.

The Messiah also figures in Hinduism, in the guise of Krishna—the centre of a keen controversy between the Vaishnavites and their opponents, the former trying to place him on the pedestal of divinity and the latter endeavouring to pull him down therefrom. None of the disputants, however, seem to understand the real nature of the divinity associated with Krishna, and are spending their energies in a fruitless dispute over empty words and concepts. There can be no doubt that there was a great personage of the name of Krishna, for the fact that some of the Jaina Puranas contain a plain narrative of the events of his life, sufficiently proves him to have been an historical personage. It is this historical Krishna whom the Vishnu Purana and the Bhagavad Gita have clothed in the poetical garments of the Messiah. The luring of *gopis* from the beds of their husbands in the darkness of night, the giddy moon-light dance on the banks of the Jamuna, the stolen kisses and embraces, all of which would be highly condemnable from a moral point of view if ascribed to the historical Krishna, are fully appropriate to the Messiah or Christos. As such, Krishna is the divine Ideal for the soul (*gopi*) to pour forth all her affection upon. She must wander out, in the solitude of night (when thought is not occupied with worldly things), on the banks of the placid Jamuna (the unruffled mind), disregarding both her love for her husband (worldly attachments) and the fear of society. When she stands before her Lord, stripped of her clothes, *i.e.*, worldly possessions, when she gives up even the last vestige of feminine modesty, and, standing upright, joins her hands above her head,

disregardful of her nudity and the rules of worldly decorum, then is the notion of duality between the Lover and the Object of Love dispelled, and the fruit of Love enjoyed. The hopes and fears of the love-lorn *gopis*, their neglect of their household duties, their abandonment of their children and husbands, their passionate yearning to be enfolded in the arms of the Beloved—all these are pure allegories describing the degree of devotion and zeal necessary for the realization of the great Ideal of Perfection, personified as Christos, or Krishna, the Redeemer. The Song of Solomon, no less immoral from the worldly point of view, is a similar allegory of Love between the Ideal and the individual soul. Jesus, too, likened the soul to a maiden in the parable of the ten virgins (Matt. xxv. 1—13).

To revert to the Messianic teaching, another point which throws considerable light on the doctrine of the "Kingdom of God," is the nature of the qualifications which are necessary for an admission into it. On this point it is pleasant to note that there is quite a wealth of material, although most of it is a repetition of the same principle over and over again. Without going into unnecessary detail, the young Master declared that the Kingdom was intended for the poor, the meek, the merciful, the peacemaker, and for those who mourned, or hungered for righteousness, or were pure in heart. In the parable of the supper, the guests who were ultimately invited were the poor, the maimed, the halt and the blind. To literally construe the doctrine would be to put the Kingdom on a par with an alms-house, a dispensary or an infirmary where poverty and rags and deformity and disease might form the most prominent qualifications for admission. To think that it was this idea which the Saviour was preaching to the people, and over which he was constantly quarrelling with the Pharisees, is to insult our own understanding more than anything else. Obviously, the Kingdom of Heaven was not meant to be a place where wretchedness and imperfection could revel, or disease display its disgusting ugliness.

'Blessed are the poor in spirit,' not because of their material poverty, but because of their deliberate acceptance of it on spiritual grounds. It is those and only those who are the poor in spirit that will be admitted into the Kingdom. There is no room for poverty

indiscriminately there, but those who remain content with their lot, and those who are poor in spirit, that is, not arrogant but peaceful, not easily offended, but humble, and, above all, those who are happy and cheerful and virtuous are alone to be blessed. Heaven is to be claimed by the poor, the hungry, and the thirsty only when the hunger and thirst are for righteousness. There is no room there for any one who has a grumbling disposition in the least. The principle illustrated is that if one longs not for material things, and renounces them by choice (not by force of circumstances over which he has no control) he is blessed, for the renunciation of wealth is a means of attaining to the emotion of bliss. Search for righteousness, provided it is sincere, procures peace and freedom from desire, and enables the hidden state of *ananda* to come into manifestation. For, 'except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no case enter into the Kingdom of Heaven' (Matt. v, 20). From the earliest time when man applied his mind to explore and lay bare the mysteries of Time, Space and Existence, renunciation has been regarded as the only means of liberation; and the Sermon on the Mount furnishes abundant proof of the teaching of Jesus being identical with that of the great Indian Sages who had flourished and taught before his time.

It is true that renunciation appears very unattractive and unpleasant at first, and few, indeed, there be who can or do appreciate its merit; nevertheless, without renunciation no progress is possible in any department, physical, mental or spiritual. It is always confined to the giving up of such practices and habits as hinder the onward progress of the individual. The child who would acquire knowledge must give up toys and go to school; the young man who would make money must abandon the habit of late rising; the general who would conquer the enemy must take leave of his hearth and home, and so forth. Similarly, he who would tread the path which leads to bliss, must retrace his steps from that which goes hellward, for they lie in opposite directions!

From one more point of view it remains to consider the doctrine of the Kingdom of God. We have to see how any one desirous of getting an admission into Heaven was to proceed. The Saviour

declared that everything was possible by faith. But the question is : what did he mean by faith ? Was he seeking mental acquiescence in his miraculous birth ? Surely not, for he does not say so anywhere himself. We have read the Bible over and over again in search of any remark of Jesus showing that he claimed any superiority for himself on the ground of immaculate conception, or desired that he should be worshipped by his followers ; but, needless to say, in vain. As regards the allegation that he was the son of a god and on that ground entitled to worship, we think absolutely no case is made out for that view. Jesus nowhere said that he alone was the Son of God. On the contrary, over and over again do we come across the assurance that if a man keep his sayings he, too, will become the Son of God. In the Sermon on the Mount he declared (Matth. v. 16) :-

" Let your light so shine before men that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in Heaven."

About half a dozen times, at least, is the expression, " your Father which is in heaven," employed in the course of that memorable discourse. There is no distinction or reservation made in favour of any particular individual. Jesus claimed the status of divine Sonship for the self-conscious soul ; he set up no distinction of birth for himself. Thus, those who lived according to the Divine commandments were truly Sons of God, while those who followed the principle of Evil, that is, who lived in defiance of the commandments of Religion were sons of the Devil. The whole thing was merely a question of how one lived.

It is a spiritual law of universal applicability that whosoever shall save his life shall lose it, and whosoever shall lose it, shall find it. Jesus (allegorically, the soul) 'lost his life' and became Christos. He could not have remained Jesus and become a Christ, at the same time, for the law is 'as one thinks so one becomes.' Thus, if a man regard himself as a miserable sinner, he must ever remain so ; on the other hand, if he forget his small self, the ego of desires, and *believe* himself to be a God he will soon actually become the enjoyer of the status of Godhood. This is the secret of success ; and it is for this reason that the advanced ascetics and saints, who have understood and realized

the truth, neglect the first person singular, and always endeavour to preserve what may be described as a state of impersonality in their speech. A failure to understand this little truth has been the cause of a great deal of misunderstanding, and has caused a large number of beautiful aphorisms to be thrown into the waste-paper basket, so to speak. As an instance in point, may be mentioned the statement in the fourth gospel :—

“What and if ye shall see the son of man ascend up where he was before ?”
—John vi. 62.

Here if the expression is taken to refer to Jesus, it can only be at the cost of philosophical merit. Similarly, the declaration, “Verily I say unto you there be some standing here, which shall not taste of death till they see the Son of man coming in his kingdom” (Matthew xvi. 28), can have absolutely no reference to Jesus, except as a member of the human race. Mark records the statement as well, but he gives it thus :—

“Verily I say unto you, that there be some of them that stand here, which shall not taste of death, till they have seen the kingdom of God come with power.”—Mark ix. 1.

Luke also puts “The Kingdom of God” in place of the “Son of man in his kingdom.” It lands us in all sorts of absurdities to think that the “Son of man” means Jesus, and “the Kingdom of God,” heaven after resurrection in some other world. The true and natural sense is that as by the fall is understood a state of fallen degeneracy, so by ‘the coming of the son of man into his kingdom’ is meant the attainment of Godhood by the soul. This is what Jesus referred to when he said, “What and if ye shall see the Son of man ascend up where he was before ?” It is the realization by man of his glorious, divine nature which is spoken of here.

Ascension does not mean a going up to heaven, body and all, but something very different. We shall, however, reserve a consideration of this doctrine for a later and more appropriate occasion ; for the present it is sufficient to point out that it is impossible that

The Persian equivalent of ‘Son of man’ is *ādam-cād* (from *adam*, man + *cād*, born), which is used in a generic sense for man.

Jesus could have ascended to heaven in the way which a literal interpretation of the Bible would suggest. Stripped of the false surplusage of mythology, the two passages about the 'ascending of the son of man up to where he was before,' and of 'the coming of the Kingdom of God' (which last, according to Matthew, is 'the coming of the Son of man into his Kingdom'), have reference to the individual soul and predict a regaining of the 'lost paradise' by those who live up to the true teaching. They point to an entry into the 'Garden of Eden' from which 'Adam' is now shut out. They epitomize the doctrine of redemption, but furnish no excuse for the element of personal worship of Jesus or any one else. The following utterances of the great Master himself put the matter beyond dispute:—

"And why call ye me Lord, Lord, and do not the things which I say"—(*Luke vi. 46*).

"Blessed are they that hear the Word of God and keep it"—(*Luke xi. 28*).

"Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish"—(*Luke xiii. 3*).

"I receive not testimony from men: but these things I say that ye might be saved"—(*John v. 34*).

"I receive not honor from men"—(*John v. 41*).

"My doctrine is not mine, but his that sent me. If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself"—(*John vii. 16-17*).

"If ye continue in my word, then are ye my disciples indeed. And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free"—(*John viii. 31-32*).

"And I seek not mine own glory"—(*John viii. 50*).

"He that believeth on me, believeth not on me but on him that sent me. And he that seeth me, seeth him that sent me. I am come a light in the world that whosoever believeth on me shall not abide in darkness. And if any man hear my words and believe not, I judge him not: for I came not to judge the world but to save the world. He that rejecteth me and receiveth not my words, hath one that judgeth him: the word that I have spoken, the same shall judge him in the last day. For I have not spoken of myself; but the Father which sent me; he gave me a commandment, what I should say and what I should speak. And I know that his commandment is life everlasting: whatsoever I speak, therefore, even as the Father said unto me so I speak"—(*John xii. 44-50*).

So far as the idea of the 'Father' is concerned, it can be best understood by putting ourselves in the attitude of Philip, one of the twelve disciples, who said to Jesus (*John xiv. 8*):

"Lord show us the Father, and it sufficeth us."

Jesus, however, did not show the Father 'bodily' to Philip, but simply left him to draw his own conclusions from the following statement :

"Have I been so long time with you, and yet hast thou not known me, Philip? he that hath seen me hath seen the Father; and how sayest thou *then*, Shew us the Father? Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me? the words that I speak unto you I speak not of myself: but the Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works."—(*John xiv*, 9-10.)

Now, because the Lord is Life and Life is invisible to the physical eye, therefore, the Lord could not be shown to the disciple. But as Life is manifested most fully and perfectly in the being of the Perfected Soul, therefore every Son of God is entitled to say, 'If you have seen me you have seen the Father' (*John xiv*, 9).

The true significance of the Christ-life is given in the first of the Petrine Epistles where it is said: "because Christ also suffered for us, leaving us an example, that ye should follow his steps" (Chap. ii, 21). It is in this sense that a Son of God says of himself: "I am the door: by me if any man enter in, he shall be saved, and shall go in and out and shall find pasture." The same idea is expressed in a different setting in the parable of the true vine:—

"I am the vine, ye are the branches, he that abideth in me and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit, for without me ye can do nothing. If a man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a branch, and is withered; and men gather them, and cast them into the fire, and they are burned."—(*John xv*, 5-6).

As compared with the other ideals that are entertained by men, the great Ideal of Divine Perfection may well say of itself:

"All that ever came before me were thieves and robbers"—(*John x*, 8).

The absurdity of an historical reading of this text is quite obvious. For if we take the pronoun to stand for Jesus, then we shall be compelled to apply the terms thieves and robbers to the earlier seers and saints by whom he was preceded, according to the historical version of the Biblical narrative. But we are sure no one can accuse any one, least of all, all of them, of being thieves and robbers, in a wholesale fashion. The real significance of the expression has, however, nothing to do with any historical sense; but it gives us the true value of the Christ-concept in its spiritual import, at the

same time as it negatives the historical reading. Because all other concepts whatsoever than the 'Christos' one are only dissipaters of life, they are termed robbers and thieves; and because the Christos-concept is the giver of immortality and everlasting joy, it is none of the robbing and thieving fraternity, but is actually the preserver, augmenter and perpetuator of Life! Accordingly it says of itself (see *John x*, 10): "I am come that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly!" It is also certainly the door through which all those who seek salvation have to pass; and for them it is the giver of the exhilarating "sap" of life, as a vine is the nourisher of its branches! This is why it was said: "If a man love me he will keep my words; and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him"—(*John xiv*, 23).

It might be that we have been somewhat ruthless in breaking up the old idols of cherished beliefs by showing them to be grounded on purely mental abstractions; but it is certain that it is the knowledge of things as they *actually* exist, and not our fanciful beliefs concerning their nature, which can be helpful to the aspiring soul. If we ever think of asking *how* the Father and Christ will come and make their abode with the man who 'keepeth the word,' we shall perceive the absurdity of the literal interpretation—that two such beings as the heavenly Father and the 'Son of God' can come to abide or to dwell and do the works in each and every devotee all over the world!

It is thus obvious that Jesus was not speaking of himself, but of Christos, the true 'Redeemer,' which must be 'born' in the soul to enable it to attain the perfection of Gods.

Similarly, no element of Jesus-cult is to be found in the following (*John xii*, 35-36):—

"Yet a little while is the light with you. Walk while ye have the light, lest darkness come upon you: for he that walketh in darkness knoweth not whither he goeth. While ye have light, believe in the light, that ye may be the children of light."

In vain shall we be told that 'light' means Jesus and nothing but Jesus; for the passage has nothing to do with any personage, big or small, but refers to the intellect, the light of life, or spirit, which is the source of all good, and alone capable of guiding the soul to its

goal. The emphasis is here laid on the opportunity furnished by the human birth which, according to religion, is the only starting point for Nirvana. While we live we have a chance of correcting our errors and of adopting the truth ; but when once this life comes to an end, who can say how long it will be before one gets the opportunity again ? Hence the exhortation :

"Repent, ye ! for the kingdom of heaven is at hand"—(*Matt.* iii. 2).

Jesus truly offered the highest religion to mankind when he said :—

"Believe in the light that ye may be the children of light [Life]."—(*John* xii. 36.)

Humanity has always been hankering after a perpetuation of life, and the Master declared (*John* v. 24 and 26) :

"Verily, I say unto you, he that heareth my word, and believeth on him that sent me, hath everlasting life . . . For as the Father hath life in him ; so hath he given to the son to have life in himself."

The Christos within is never wearied of proclaiming :—

"Verily I say unto you, He that believeth on me has everlasting life. I am that bread of life. Your fathers did eat manna in the wilderness, and are dead. This is the bread which cometh down from heaven, that a man may eat thereof, and not die. I am the living bread which came down from heaven : if any man eat of this bread, he shall live for ever . . . This is the bread which came down from heaven, not as your Fathers did eat manna and are dead : he that eateth of this bread shall live for ever"—(*John* vi. 47-51).

The same note is struck when it is said—

"I am the light of the World : he that followeth me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life."—(*John* viii. 12.)

The Teacher may also justly maintain—

"Verily, I say unto you, if a man keep my saying, he shall never see death."—(*John* viii. 51.)

So also :—

"I am come that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly"—(*John* x. 10).

A certain class of ascetics even maintain that physical death is not an unavoidable calamity, and that it is possible to prolong life as

long as one likes to do so. Swami Vivekananda urges (Raja Yoga, pages 158—160):—

"The *Yogis* even hold that men who are able to acquire a tremendous power of good *Samskaras* do not have to die, but even in this life can change their bodies into God-bodies. There are several cases mentioned by the *Yogis* in their books. These men change the very material of their bodies; they re-arrange the molecules in such fashion that they have no more sickness, and what we call death does not come to them. Why should not this be? . . . All the bodies in the Universe are made of *tanmatras*, and it is only in the arrangement of them that there comes a difference. If you are the arranger you can arrange that body in one way or another. Who makes up this body but you? Who eats the food? If another ate the food for you, you would not live long. Who makes the blood out of it? You certainly . . . You are the manufacturer of the body, and you live in it. Only we have lost the knowledge of how to make it . . . We are the creators and we have to regulate that creation, and as soon as we can do that we shall be able to manufacture just as we like, and then we shall have neither birth nor death, disease or anything."

To what extent this view is correct will be enquired into later; but it is clear that it was not any claim to personal worship, or adoration, on the part of Jesus which was the point in issue between him and his opponents, but the power of the soul to attain to immortality. Hence, he did not claim any special and exclusive privilege for himself when he said—

"I am the light of the world, he that followeth me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life."—(John viii, 12.)

The Pharisees, who misunderstood him as usual, told him that he lied, for he bore testimony to his own record. But Jesus replied that, though he bore testimony to his own record it was true, because his assertion was in agreement with truth, but their denial was based on ignorance; for, while they could judge of the body, where it came from and whither it went, they had no knowledge of the cosmology of 'Life,' as he had. He cited the Father, i.e., the real Man, as a witness in his support, meaning thereby that they would acknowledge his miracles as indicating the perfection and divinity of the soul; but the Pharisees again failed to understand him, and enquired of him, "Where is thy Father?" (John viii 19). But they could only be told in reply:

"If ye had known me [i.e., the real man in me], ye should have known my father also."—(John viii. 19.)

It is always the case with those who do not exert themselves in the investigation of truth that they evolve out a strong tendency to misunderstand others and the longing to conceal their own ignorance by a perversion of sense. The assertion of Jesus need not have been an occasion for misunderstanding as he did not claim for himself any superiority over others when he said 'I am the light of the World.' For does he not say in the Sermon on the Mount, in unmistakable terms :—

"Ye are the light of the World."—(Math. v. 14.)

The difference between Jesus and Christ explains the rest. When man removes the 'bushel' from the 'lamp' of life and allows his inner light to shine forth in the world, so that the works of the Father within are seen by men, he becomes a Christ, and realizes the force of the observation, "I and my Father are one" (John x. 30). "Ye are the salt of the earth." (Matt. v. 13), does not apply to the body of flesh, for that is of the earth, earthy, but to the indwelling essence of Life, that is, soul, or *atman*, as it is termed in Sanskrit. All this is simple enough, yet must it ever remain unintelligible to those who do not take the trouble to meditate on the problem of Life itself.

Many wish to acquire faith without having the least idea of the difference that exists between the word of mouth and the emotion of belief. He who only hears of a thing and forces himself to put faith in it, is liable to have it destroyed when assailed by doubt, the arch-enemy which cannot be killed except with the sword of discrimination. Man must, therefore, build his house on the rock of reason which alone can withstand the severest storms and squalls of scepticism. Besides, unreasoning zeal seldom fails to degenerate into fanaticism and superstition, which are the forerunners of the worst types of evil.

It is to be noted that knowledge and its application are two different things; and, obviously, it is the capacity in respect of the latter which determines the extent of the former. Hence, those who only hear the words of wisdom from others, without meditating on them for themselves, are like the Pharisees who were unable to form a true idea of what spiritual freedom signified. It was for this reason that they resented the statement,—

"Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free"—(John viii. 32).

Taking the expression to mean national captivity, they angrily retorted that Abraham's seed was never in bondage to any one; how, then, could any one say, "Ye shall be made free" (John viii. 33) ?

One has only to turn to the doctrine of transmigration of souls to understand the full significance of the Messianic speech. In consequence of ignorance, the soul is liable to repeated births and deaths, and to the suffering and pain attendant upon them. This is the bondage; and it continues until the power to condition its circumstances is acquired by the soul. With the acquisition of mastery over its destiny, the soul becomes what is known as the 'son of God,' and ascends, emancipated and free, to the topmost part of the universe to reside there, for ever, in the enjoyment of different kinds of perfection, including those in respect of knowledge and bliss. Now, because the mastery over one's destiny cannot be acquired except by the doing of the right thing at the right moment, and because the selection of the right thing and the right moment is not possible by dependence on chance, that is, without a knowledge of what is right and what is not so, it follows that knowledge is a condition precedent to the obtainment of freedom from the liability to birth and death, that is, the bondage of *karma*. This is precisely what Jesus said on the subject. The parables which he spoke on the occasion are very instructive in themselves. All who commit sin are the servants of sin. Evil is terminable, but goodness is everlasting. That which is merely a transitory state of existence must depart when the principle of goodness is established in the heart, for the latter is eternal. Evil is darkness, ignorance; goodness is light and wisdom; where the light of wisdom shines, darkness cannot remain. Life is the Light of Wisdom itself, and, accordingly, proclaims:—

"I am the way, the truth, and the life"—(John xiv. 6).

To those who misinterpret the true doctrine, Life has nothing but condemnation to offer. Their fate is foreshadowed in the following significant words of Jesus addressed to the learned and the Doctors of Law:

"Woe unto ye lawyers! for ye have taken away the key of knowledge: ye entered not in yourselves, and them that were entering in ye hindered."—(Luke xi. 52.)

We do not know what Jesus would have said to the modern preacher, who has not only not entered in himself and stood in the way of those that were entering in, but has, also, actually misled and turned away many a well-guided soul from the right path, to follow what religion never preached, but that which is the most abominable perversion of the true doctrine. Alas ! that the world should have its Pharisees in every age.

The fourth evangel records yet another such discourse. It makes Jesus say :—

“ Verily, I say unto you, if a man keep my saying he shall never see death.”
—(John viii. 51.)

This was too much for the patience of the poor, ignorant people, who forthwith demanded :—

“ Abraham is dead, and the prophets ; and thou sayest, If a man keep my saying, he shall never taste of death. Art thou greater than our father Abraham, which is dead ? and the prophets are dead : whom makest thou thyself ?” (John viii. 52-53.)

If Jesus and his hearers had been merely talking of the resurrection of the dead in the World to come, it is difficult to see how such a misunderstanding could arise between them. It is impossible to construe this dialogue in any manner other than this that the doctrine of Jesus was so startling and new to his congregation that they were utterly unable to comprehend it, and were thus constantly at cross purposes with its propounder. The attitude of the people was not strange either. It was the attitude which ignorance always assumes under such circumstances. Whenever any new doctrine is preached or any new possibility discovered and made known, men say : ‘ Our ancestors did not know it ; art thou greater than they ? ’

There has always been what is called prejudice against all new discoveries and sciences. If the Bible is to be taken literally, it was in consequence of his miracles that Jesus increased the number of his followers, and it was due to his doctrine that he generally managed to lose them (see John vi. 66). The irresponsible simplicity of his parabolic discourse, that proceeded in utter disregard of both the dictum of nature and the experience of man, led many persons to consider him of unsound mind. Even his own brothers did

not believe him to be sane. Yet when we sit down coolly to understand the real sense of those very passages which were the main causes of misunderstanding, we find them not only consistent with one another but also with the highest form of truth, which it has ever been the privilege of mankind to know. Shall we sacrifice Truth for the sake of a false pride in our misplaced belief in the "traditions of men"? Shall we reject the Light of Wisdom, because it is grounded on Indian Thought and did not originate in Palestine? Shall we reject Jesus, because he had learnt what he preached at some time from some one else? Or shall we uncover our heads and show reverence to the real living Truth, irrespective of the channel whence it flows? We ought to rejoice that, instead of being estranged and divided amongst ourselves, we have discovered a real bond of one-ness of thought and creed that will cement our affections and sympathies and destroy the barriers of ill-will and discord. Those upon whom we have hitherto looked as strangers have been revealed to be near kinsmen! It is true that the old ideals are shattered to pieces, but in place of an idol of ignorant superstition and misunderstood myth, we have the God of real, living Truth before us to worship, and adore, and idolize.

We may now take up the question, how one desirous of getting into the Kingdom of God was to proceed? It is gratifying to observe that on this point there is a mass of injunctions and prohibitions which in some instances are quite explicit and complete in themselves. Before proceeding to discuss them, however, we shall avail ourselves of the present opportunity to repeat that Jesus himself never desired to be worshipped, for otherwise all these directions and injunctions would have been quite useless and unnecessary. It was his 'word' that he wanted the people to believe in, not his person. He never told them that they were cleansed because they had seen, or worshipped, or lived with him, but he did say to them:

"Now ye are clean through the word which I have spoken unto you"—(John xv. 3).

He loved only those who kept his word, and said:—

"If ye keep my commandments, ye shall abide in my love (John xv. 10) . . . Ye are my friends, if ye do whatsoever I command you (John xv. 14) . . . He that hath my

commandments and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me: and he that loveth me shall be loved of my Father (John xiv. 21) . . . And we will come unto him, and make our abode with him (John xiv. 23) . . . If you love me, keep my commandments (John xiv. 15) . . . Blessed are they that hear the word of God, and keep it (Luke xi. 28) . . . Why call me, Lord, Lord, and do not the things which I say (Luke vi. 46) ? . . . Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the Kingdom of Heaven; but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven (Matt. vii. 21) . . . Therefore whosoever heareth these sayings of mine and doeth them, I will liken him unto a wise man which built his house upon a rock (Matt. vii. 24) . . . And every one that heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them not, shall be likened unto a foolish man which built his house upon the sand (Matt. vii. 26) . . . And he that taketh not his cross, and followeth after me, is not worthy of me" (Matt. x. 38).

These statements leave not the least doubt in one's mind that the admission into the Kingdom of God depended not on the personal adoration and worship of Jesus, but on the faithful observance of the "word" which he preached. Thus, the most essential part of the qualification was the "doing" or "keeping" of the teaching. The true idea of worship is stated in the Bible itself (*vide* 1 Peter ii. 21) where it is said:—

"For even hereunto were ye called: because Christ also suffered for us, leaving us an example, that ye should follow his steps."

Thus there can be no manner of doubt but that the true sense of worship is to follow in the footsteps of the object of adoration and love.

Now let us see what those things were which Jesus pointed out should be observed or avoided. On this point the Sermon on the Mount* is rather interesting, as containing many instructions for the tyro. Blessed are the poor in spirit. Blessed are they that mourn. Blessed are they which hunger and thirst after righteousness. Similarly, blessed are the merciful, the peace-makers, the pure in heart. 'Thou shalt not only not kill, but shall also not be angry with any one.' Whosoever looks on a woman to lust after her commits adultery with her in his heart. 'Thou shalt not swear. Thou shalt love thy neighbour as well as thy enemy. Thou shalt not resist evil, but whosoever smite thee on thy right cheek, thou shalt turn to him the

* See Matt. Chap. v. verses 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 21, 22, 27, 28, 33, 34, 39, 40, 41, 43 and 44.

other also. And, if a man claim thy coat at law, give him thy cloak also ; if some one compel thee to go a mile, offer to go twice that distance with him.'

Such is the purport of the memorable sermon. The question is : what did Jesus mean by all this ? Why are the poor in heart blessed ? Why should one mourn ? Why should our enemies be loved ?

We have seen that the wretched condition of the soul is the result of a desire to eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. It has also been seen that the state of bliss is the natural inherent condition of the soul which lies buried beneath the filth of desires : and it has been observed that the bringing into manifestation of this buried and hidden state of blessedness is the Ideal of the soul. What we have, therefore, now got to do is to remove the mud of desires to let the inherent state of bliss shine forth. To put it in different words, the state of desirelessness is the true *ananda* which becomes an actuality of experience only by giving up all desires, one after another. When you give up the desire to be rich you become poor, and because you have done so to bring out your spiritual Self from beneath the filth of desires, you are said to be poor in spirit. The expression refers to one who has deliberately given up riches and preferred poverty ; it does not apply to all the poor indiscriminately. There is no room for one who grumbles anywhere in this system ; nor is the making a virtue of necessity to be commended. By becoming poor, by choice, we give up a number of desires, lessening the burden of worldly filth and bringing into manifestation, in due proportion, our natural state of desirelessness, which is bliss. Hence, anything which tends to make us desireless also tends to make us blithe, that is, blissful. This is how blessedness results from spiritual meekness. The same principle underlies all the other injunctions ; they all tend to make one " perfect even as the Father which is in heaven is perfect " (Matt. v. 48).

Evil increases by resistance ; wickedness and villainy cannot bear reprimanding or remonstrance, however well meant. Hence, there is no good in criticizing the actions of the malevolent. They only feel angry and irritated when told to desist, and might become bitter

enemies. The adept deals with them as does the Lord of the Day deal with those who grumble at him. He simply goes on shining and radiating and smiling, and does not withhold his light from any on the ground of enmity. The wicked are, however, unable to stand the higher vibrations of goodness and light, while the good thrive in them. The one dies of his wickedness, but the other thrives by his virtue. The fundamental basis of morality is not sentiment, or regard for public opinion, or obedience to a preceptor's injunction, but the principle we have just enunciated. He who aspires to become perfect like the Gods must not only think of becoming so, but must also act like a God. Just as the perfect Soul does not allow wickedness to mar his *ānanda*, and regards both the good and the wicked with equanimity, so should the aspirant after bliss look upon all beings alike. He should be a well-wisher of all, but a hater of none. Harsh words and ill-timed disputations can only create friction and discord; they give rise to anger which interferes with the harmony of the soul. Hence, the adept would give away his coat and cloak, both, to prevent spiritual discord.

It must, however, be said that the Bible does not make an attempt to distinguish between what is suitable conduct for the saint and what becomes the laity. Obviously the layman cannot afford to humour wickedness and evil as the saint is required to do. But scientific Religion, as we shall see later on, does take their differences fully into consideration and makes an allowance for them in the rules which it prescribes for men on the different stages of advancement.

How is a beginning to be made in respect of proper conduct? Jesus does not tell us anything definite as to this, but wants us to purify our intention. This will keep us from coveting another's property, and will also destroy our illusions. The will in itself is free and irresistible, but being enmeshed in the net of ignorance, identifies itself with its body, and imagines itself to be limited and finite in power, in consequence. This is the delusion, or bondage. Hence, anything which is calculated to dispel the delusion must also restore the will to its native glory and power. *Dharma* (religion), the eternal Law Divine, so tersely summarized in the Sermon on the Mount, aims at this goal, and, if put into practice, proves its own worth.

The whole thing is that in our blind materialism we have neglected to consider the only important thing that is to be known, namely, the Soul. We have considered the physical encasement superior to everything else, and are doing our best to study its comforts, forgetting that the real enjoyer is not the body at all, but something of which the body is merely an objectified expression. If the body were the enjoyer, it ought to go on enjoying its comforts even after death, but it is obvious that no dead body is ever anxious to be propped up on cushions, or to be clothed in purple and silk. We should not find it difficult now to comprehend why every one who looks at a woman with lust is as much guilty as if he had actually committed adultery with her. Mere entertaining of a lustful thought suffices to set up harmful vibrations which must produce their full effect, unless countermanded, in time, by more powerful vibrations of holy thought. This is how every thought is punished or rewarded. You entertain evil thoughts, and you suffer for them, here or hereafter. If, on the other hand, your thoughts are healthy, you get your reward in the increase of spiritual vigour and life. As you sow, so shall you reap. This is how the punishment of sin* is death (Romans, vi. 23).

Thus, the only way of getting into the Kingdom of Heaven is the giving up or renunciation of desires, which will make the innermost condition of desirelessness (true bliss) shine forth as a light freed from the covering of a bushel. All the Tirthankaras and Saviours and sages are agreed as to this. This is what Lord Mahavira preached, this is what Moses taught, this is actually what Jesus repeated in the Holy Land, and this is what Science is soon to discover and proclaim to the World from house-tops. People do not realize the full force of their error on this point. When the subject becomes better known, sinlessness will increase, for then mankind will learn that they have to shape their own destiny, as they think fit.

*The secret of sin is well-expressed in the following from the Akaranga Sutra:—"Certainly that man who engages in worldly affairs, who practises many tricks; who is bewildered by his own delings, acts again and again on that desire which increases his unrighteousness. Hence the above has been said for the increase of this life." And the commentator adds: "For sinful acts injure the bodies of living beings; therefore they are increased by our abstaining from sin"—(*Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. XXX).

The ancient sages while realizing that man was himself the Sat-Chit-Ananda—the condition he wanted to attain to—did not lose sight of the fact that its practical attainment was hedged in by certain difficulties inherent in his very disposition, of which the wandering nature of the mind was the most troublesome and annoying. To overcome this annoyance they prescribed mental concentration. The idea is that in order to be effective, force must be persistently applied to a single point.

So long as one does not understand the dynamics of force, one can produce but little effect. Just as the rays of the Sun, when diffused and scattered about in space, will not produce the requisite amount of heat to generate fire, but when brought to a focus will do so at once, so will not the individual will, i.e., mental energy, have any effect unless it is also brought to a focus and concentrated on to a point. All human achievements are due to concentration. Even knowledge is possible by concentration of thought, that is, meditation, not otherwise. Those who hear the doctrine and do not meditate on it for themselves, are best described in the parable of the sower, as the wayside, the stony-ground, or the field of thorns, where the seed either does not take root at all or is choked up soon after. But that alone is good ground which produces a thirty-, a sixty-, or a hundred-fold harvest. As seed sown on the wayside, the stony-ground, in a field of thorns, or in a plot where it is choked up by the weeds, produces little or no harvest, but on good ground multiplies thirty-, sixty-, and even a hundred-fold, so does knowledge increase in a thoughtful mind. When one hears the 'word' and meditates on it, it multiplies enormously. We may, for instance, take the little aphorism, 'the wages of sin is death.' In itself it consists of only six words, but it embraces within its scope the possibility of an enormous amplitude, that is, the entire range of knowledge. If we bring our concentrated thought to bear on the aphorism, we shall solve the riddle of the Universe; but if we merely content ourselves with saying, "how true it is," or "it is quite wrong," and the like, we shall not understand anything. The difference between the adept and the average man lies in the power of concentration; the entire science of Yoga is but a commentary on this one principle. It is a matter of daily experience

that even in affairs of terrestrial importance a certain amount of concentration of mind is absolutely necessary to bring an undertaking to a successful end. The necessity to stop the wandering of the mind becomes all the more important when it has to deal with such subtle and fine forces as compose the fetters of the soul. All the Saviours of mankind are agreed on this principle. Jesus, too, says:—

"The light of the body is the eye; therefore when thy eye is single, thy whole body is also full of light; but when *thine* eye is evil thy body also is full of darkness"—(Luke, xl. 34).

We should not allow our evil eye to scatter away the light of the body; nor should the mind be permitted to dissipate away life by its uncontrolled restlessness. The Bhagavad Gita has it:—

"The determinate *buddhi* is but one pointed; many branched and endless are the thoughts of the irresolute"—(Disc. ii. 34).

"When thy mind, bewildered by the scriptures, shall stand immovable, fixed in contemplation, then shalt thou attain unto Yoga"—(Disc. ii. 53).

"Even here on Earth everything is overcome by those whose minds remain balanced"—(Disc. v. 19).

This is why Jesus was constantly telling his hearers not to take thought for their food, or clothing, or other worldly matters. Why worry over such trifles? Is not there a higher Law that looks after these things? Behold, the birds of the air think not, yet they are provided for (Matt. vi. 26). Look at the lilies of the field; they never worry themselves about what they shall wear, yet the pure white robe in which Nature has clothed them may well be envied by the great and glorious Solomon (Matt. vi. 28)! What is the good of one's worrying oneself over such matters when no amount of worry will add 'an inch to one's stature' (Matt. vi. 27)? Is not life more than meat and body, more than raiment (Luke xii. 23)? Why, then, should one kill oneself by worrying over such trifles?


It was the true principle of renunciation which Jesus taught his followers. The aspirant after spirituality must even give up home and become homeless. "Foxes have holes, and the birds of the air have nests, but the Son of man hath not where to lay his head" (Matt. viii. 20). "No man can serve two masters; . . . ye cannot

serve God and mammon " (Matt. vi. 24). " Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth, but in heaven, where the moth and rust do not corrupt, and where thieves break not through and steal " (Matt. vi. 19-20). " Provide neither gold, nor silver, nor brass in your purses, nor scrip for your journey, neither two coats, nor shoes, nor yet staves : for the workman is worthy of his meat " (Matt. x. 9-10). Just as a man who finds a treasure-trove in a field, and goes and sells all he possesses, and buys the field, so he who has found the kingdom of heaven must offer his all to acquire it (Matt. xiii. 44). In the same way, when a pearl merchant comes across an invaluable pearl, he sells off all the small ones he owns and purchases that one (Matt. xiii. 45). Do not be covetous, for a man's life consists not in the abundance of things he possesses. " Sell that ye have, and give alms ; provide yourself bags which wax not old, a treasure in the heavens that faileth not " (Luke xii. 33). " Neither seek ye greatness before one another, nor dominion or authority over mankind ; but whosoever will be great among you let him be your minister, and whosoever will be a chief among you let him be your servant, like unto the Son of man who came not to be ministered unto, but to minister " (Matt. xx. 25-28). These and many other similar sayings of Jesus all point to the necessity for practising renunciation, to get into the Kingdom of Heaven. His condemnation of the traditions of men, such as salutation in markets, sitting in high places, wearing long robes, uttering long and elaborate prayers, swearing, noiseful charity, ' washing the exterior,' and other like acts is based on the same principle.

We must now endeavour to go more deeply into the root of ethics and morals to understand the full significance of the religious teaching, and to make out the true sense of such sayings as " love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you " (Matt. v. 44).

All the energy in the domain of embodied life comes from the forces of attraction and repulsion, which appear as love and hatred in relation with the will, and are governed by desire. Desire to possess a thing is love for or attraction towards it ; desire to avoid it is hatred or repulsion of it. All our desires assume the one or the

other of these two forms. Leaving the complex forms of emotions out of consideration, as foreign to our purpose for the moment, we can easily see that the effect of desire in every single instance is either to draw something towards or to drive away something from us. Desire gives rise to emotion, that is, a motion towards an object or away from it in mind. Emotion, from *e*, out or up, and *moveo*, to move, is, therefore, the resultant of mental energy *plus* desire, and implies a moving of the mind or soul (The Imperial Dictionary). The following table will show the classification of a few of the more important emotions :—



In the subjoined table are given a few of the traits of character the above emotions, or feelings, give rise to :

<i>Love (attraction)</i>		
Reverence {	Love {	Benevolence {
Obedience	Confidence	Holiness
Truthfulness	Candour	Tenderness
Trustfulness	Contentment	Charity
Loyalty	Honesty	Toleration
<i>Hatred (repulsion).</i>		
Fear {	Anger {	Pride {
Servility	Fury	Hypocrisy
Lying	Misunderstanding	Malignity
Treachery	Unkindness	Prudery
Rebelliousness	Moroseness	Exactness

Now, the rule of the correspondence of emotions is that they ordinarily tend to excite similar emotions amongst others : Every emotion produces in the mind of the man excited a characteristic vibration, and this vibration tends to set up similar vibrations in the minds of all others who happen to be in his vicinity, setting up like emotions in them. This kind of susceptibility, however, mostly depends on the character of the person to be affected, for,

"if the latter person has a peculiar individuality of his own, then, instead of allowing himself to be 'governed' by the conditions set up by the other, he will meet them with others, and stronger ones, created by himself, and so change the former's mood, instead of being changed by it : that is to say, for example, if the vibrations of anger from another's aura touch his, he will call up the mood of friendliness, initiate corresponding vibrations in his own aura, impose them strongly on the other's, and produce the mood of friendliness in the other's mind in place of anger.

"It would be possible to put the *how* of this† in terms of physical matter also, if there were more knowledge extant on the subject. But the experiments now being made with reference to the ptomaines, toxina, antitoxins, lysines, antilexines, perspirations, etc., or secretions generally, produced in the human body under various conditions and emotions—these experiments seem likely to show, later on, that the poisonous tamasa secretions, for instance, which cause a headache after a fit of anger suppressed by fear, etc., are counteracted and neutralized by the antitoxic sattvika secretions produced by the generous and beneficent emotions called up

* In proof of this statement we may cite the universally observed fact that the cheerful company of young persons dispels the gloom of moroseness and sorrow, while the society of those in extreme grief acts as a damper on all who come in contact with them.

† The words 'the *how* of this' in this quotation have been transposed from their original positions.

by reading a book of high and holy thoughts and deeds"—(*The Science of Emotions*, by Bhagwan Das, M.A., pages 155-6).

There can be no doubt whatever that emotions affect the physical body and, ultimately, even the health of the individual, for good or bad. Protracted grief effects perceptible changes in one's looks. "In grief the circulation becomes languid; the face pale, the muscle flaccid, the eyelids droop, the head hangs on the contracted chest, the lips, cheeks and lower jaw all sink downward from their own weight. The whole expression of a man in good spirits is exactly the opposite of the one suffering from sorrow" (Darwin). Blushing and pallor are usually caused by the dilation or contraction of the vessels supplying blood to the head, and it is our daily experience that blushing and pallor are caused by strong mental emotions. Commenting on the emotion of fear, Professor Metchnikoff maintains :—

"Fear and cold alike cause contraction of the superficial blood-vessels, and, in man, excite the contraction of the minute rudimentary muscles inserted at the roots of the hairs. 'Goose-skin' is caused by the contraction of these muscles, the condition being a functional rudiment, no longer serving to warm the skin nor to make the body appear larger. . . . Fear, which is occasionally able to excite the contraction of the involuntary muscles, also stimulates other muscles against the will. Under the influence of emotions that powerfully affect the nervous system, and particularly under that of fear, contractions of the bladder and intestines may be so violent that it is impossible to prevent the voiding their contents. Accidents of this kind are not infrequent in the case of youthful candidates at examinations"—(*The Prolongation of Life*, page 196).

Mr. Banaji, quoting Hufeland, says :—

"Certain habits or dispositions of mind not only deprive the body of its vital powers, but as they incessantly sharpen the gall, they are continually preparing a secret poison, and by the general irritation of the gall increasing in an extraordinary degree self-consumption.

"To these belongs that malignant disposition of mankind known by the name of *peevishness*. Nothing can so much blast the bloom of life, shut up every access to pleasure and enjoyment, and change the beautiful stream of life into a stagnated puddle, as this disagreeable habit. I advise every one who regards his life precious to fly from this deadly poison (peevishness) and never to suffer it even to approach"—(*The Greatest Discovery of Psychology*, page 54).

The Saviour's philosophy now becomes clear. Obviously, the seeker after immortality and bliss must shun the emotions of hatred

and cultivate those of love. He must meet harmful emotions from another with nobler emotions of his own, and transmute evil into good in the crucible of love. In a sacred Scripture it is said :—

"*Mokṣa* (Nirvana) lieth not hidden on the back of the heavens, or on the surface of the earth, or in the depths of *Pātala* (lower world) : the dissolution of *ahankāra* (egotism) on the disappearance of all desire—such is *mokṣa*."

By a domineering, supercilious demeanour all that one can expect to gain is a temporary sense of greatness over certain members of our race, but surely it can mean pleasure only to the most degraded intellect. There are others who are superior to us and who can treat us in the same manner. When we reflect on the harm these hateful emotions are apt to produce, we must recognize that the temporary sense of triumph, or superiority, over one's subordinates is no compensation for the evil wrought in one's own system. It is in our power to avoid the generation of the poison of hatred, and we must exert ourselves to do so, if health and happiness are to be attained. Man will find that, as he cultivates the emotions of Love, he is spared most of the headaches and other ills which the flesh is said to be heir to. The Theosophists maintain (*A Study in Consciousness*, page 367) :—

"Since the nature of the Self is bliss, and that bliss is only hindered in manifestation by resisting circumstances, that which removes the friction between itself and these circumstances and opens its onward way must lead to its Self-realization, i.e., to the realization of bliss. Virtue does this, and therefore virtue is a means to bliss. Where the inner nature of things is peace and joy, the harmony which permits that nature to unveil itself must bring peace and joy, and to bring about this harmony is the work of virtue."

Therefore, the Saviour's teaching about meeting evil with good, anger with kindness, and persecution with prayer for the welfare of the persecutor, is perfectly in accord with the scientific truths about the hygiene of life and the attainment of the beatific condition called Bliss. Nirvana is open unto him alone who brings this teaching into daily practice : unto none else.

It is even possible to work out the effect of the emotions of love and hatred with mathematical precision, so far as the attainment of bliss is concerned. For, inasmuch as the attainment of bliss depends

upon an unshakable conviction in the godly nature of the soul, no one who denies its divinity by thought, word, or deed can ever hope to reach the goal. Now, when one abuses one's neighbour one cannot be said to be showing respect to the attribute of divinity in his soul, and, therefore, must be taken to have fallen from one's high faith, and to be travelling in a direction opposed to the one in which lies the goal in view. Furthermore, when one does not show respect to Life in another's body, one cannot also regard one's own Life as divine, since they are alike in all essential respects. Thus, whether it be love for one's neighbour, friends, relations, other human beings or animals, in loving them, one really loves one's true Self, realizes one's inner divinity, and speedily acquires bliss : while in hating any one, even enemies and lower animals, one only moves away from the goal, hence, stands in the way of one's own progress, and comes to grief. Thus it appears that those who laid down "bless them that curse you, and pray for them that persecute you" (Matt. v. 44) were not lunatics, but men given to very exact and sober thinking. The Divinity of the Self is to be realized for attaining Bliss : man should, therefore, always strengthen his belief in the Godhood of the soul by thought, word and deed. It can now be seen why the slaughtering of animals is forbidden by the higher religions. None who kills the humblest of these dumb creatures, and discards their mute appeal for mercy, can ever hope to come into the realization of Life eternal, for Love is necessary for the acquisition of bliss, but killing can only go to destroy the sense of union and harmony with the Self.

In practice, Love will be found to be a great power for subduing evil, whether in a family, in society, in a nation, or amongst mankind generally in the world. While hatred would separate, Love would unite. The former causes the downfall of nations by disunion : but the latter binds mankind together in one brotherhood, however unlike they may be in other respects. History has, over and over again, proved and illustrated the fact that the biggest and most powerful nations have come to grief through the principle of hatred and contempt, which they had adopted as their guide in their dealings with others.

There are two ways of living in the world : (1) for one's own selfish ends, and (2) by carrying out the principle of love in one's life. The former path leads to pride, covetousness, tyranny, and to a short career of prosperity during which the seeds of disintegration germinate and grow apace. Then begins the reverse process which involves the selfish in trouble, wars, humiliation and defeat; and finally, also in destruction. The path of Love, on the other hand, is free from such disasters. It is one smooth, ever-peaceful, ever-joyous existence with an ever-widening circle of friends, ever-increasing power and glory, and with no fear of loss or disharmony anywhere. We may apply these principles to small families and societies, or to great nations and empires; their working is uniform throughout. Let there be mutual hatred between husband and wife, and very soon home will cease to be happy; let the feeling of mutual distrust take possession of the hearts of men, and it will soon disperse society; let disunion creep in among men in a nation, and soon there will be civil wars. Similarly, let the various races constituting an empire hate each other, and it will very soon become convulsed with wars and shaken to its very foundation. It is against the law of nature that hatred should be prosperous beyond certain limits, and because in hatred energy is dissipated needlessly, loss of power must ultimately result. We should ever try to live peacefully and happily with the other members of our race, always trying to establish a real brotherhood of man, with everyone contributing his or her share of goodwill towards the common good. Let the father not only love his family but the whole society and generation of men all over the world; let the elders propagate the interest not only of their limited community but of the whole of the human race; and let the king protect not only his own nation, but all the races in his empire and, also, the interests of mankind in general, although outside his own kingdom. When the ideal is realized, there will be one continuous millennium of unbroken peace and prosperity all over the world, in which even the animals will not be grudged an enjoyment of life which is dear to all. This seems to have been the ancient Indian ideal as the Puranas record. In more recent times, however, knowledge dwindled and selfishness took hold of the hearts of men, with the result that with the splitting up of the brotherhood the

Muhummadans appeared on the scene, and easily established their empire in the land. They too adopted the principle of hatred in their rule, and so the world witnessed their downfall, in the fulness of time. Let us now cast a glance at Europe where the principle of hatred is less in evidence in the relations between the individuals and the state. There even such small nations as the Dutch, the Spaniards and others have not only held their own, but have also extended their empires to other countries, where the dissensions engendered by hatred have given them a foothold for establishing themselves.

History thus teaches the important lesson that it is Love which builds, establishes, and makes secure, and hatred which disunites, disperses, and destroys. This is a law of nature, and all the endeavours of man to defy it are vain. Dr. Besant rightly urges (*The Universal Text-book of Religion and Morals*, pages 176-7) :—

"The study of past history may convince those who are not readily accessible to reasoning, that Brotherhood, in very truth, is a law in nature. For a law proves itself as completely by the destruction of that which disregards it, as by the support of that which is harmonious with it. Nation after nation, State after State, has fallen into ruin by the ignoring of the Brotherhood: where the strong oppress the weak, instead of protecting them; where the rich exploit the poor, instead of aiding them; where the learned despise the ignorant, instead of educating them; there the inexorable finger of nature writes over the civilization; Doomed. But a little while, and it has passed away. Only when Brotherhood is practised shall a civilization rise that shall endure."

It is open to us to so behave towards our fellow-beings as to establish the brotherhood of man or to thwart all progress towards that ideal. In the one case, we receive our share of joy under the Rule of Love, but in the other, we must be prepared for the slow but sure justice which nature has prepared for those who violate her purpose; for the Ideal of Nature is like a stone and woe unto him who falls foul of it, for :—

"Whosoever shall fall upon that stone shall be broken; but on whomsoever it shall fall, it will grind him to powder"—(Luke, xx. 18).

Perhaps in the present state of human society it is somewhat difficult to bring the ideal of brotherhood into realization all at once, but because it is difficult to do so at once furnishes no excuse for not

advancing, however slowly it may be, towards it. It only requires an endeavour from us all, the rulers and the ruled alike. The proper attitude for rulers and kings is to spread the light of Truth and Knowledge among their subjects so that they may be able to co-operate consciously for the realization of the brotherhood, while the ruled cannot do better than to advance the cause of the ideal with selfless, intelligent co-operation with their rulers. When both, the rulers and the ruled, work harmoniously together for the amelioration of the condition of the whole of the human race, the misunderstandings that so often form the causes of deeds of bloodshed, iniquity and oppression, which have disfigured the pages of the history of almost all nations in the past, and which are, after all, due to a simple ignorance of the laws of nature, will cease to exist, and mutual goodwill and trust and fellow-feeling will take their place. The idea of fear has no room here, for fear requires the maintenance of prestige, power and favouritism and cannot do without them, while love abolishes differences, turns enemies into friends, and unites the several sections and classes of society into one harmonious whole.

The notion of superiority is also a form of the emotion of hatred, and a piece of hateful falsehood, whether it be of one's physical, mental, or moral attainments. If we are superior to some, in some respects, sure enough there are others who are superior to us in others. Real superiority lies in the development of one's spiritual nature, but in that case it takes the form of humility, not of arrogance, or hauteur. According to the Bible, Jesus was one of the meekest of men of his age. He used to squat down on the ground, eat with his hands, and dress just as the poor people do today in the East, but many a preacher of his gospel now looks down upon this simple mode of life, and considers those who live in the way the great Master did as socially and mentally inferior to himself. The difference is that while the former preached the Gospel of the Kingdom of Heaven, the latter preaches that of culture and power, though there is a mechanical repetition of the great sayings of the Master in his speech. Need we wonder at a fashion-and-acquisition civilization, rather than salvation, being the ideal of mankind in our day? A mercenary, compromising attitude of priesthood is responsible for this deplorable change all over the world.

The Brahmana is no exception to the rule. Formerly the temporal power sought guidance of the church in all matters, but now the church has been separated from, and, in many instances, rendered subservient and servile to the state. The result is exceedingly deplorable, inasmuch as while formerly the moral side of things was always kept in view, now that side comes in either when it does not clash with the point of view of the world, or to hide the evil deeds of men under its cloak of hypocrisy and shame-facedness. The church, finding its power dwindling, tries to retain its hold by pandering to the evil tastes of men and by sanctioning their unrighteous deeds. What has brought this about is the lack of true knowledge, for knowledge is power which none can defy. We care not what creed the priest belongs to, but it will be generally seen that the forcible remarks of Jesus addressed to the Scribes and Pharisees are fully merited and deserved by him. When a man is not certain of his own ground and is corrupt, he cannot but be a hypocrite; he certainly cannot preach 'with authority.' Perhaps the woman who was taken before Jesus for his sanctioning her stoning would, if taken before the priesthood of our own time, meet a very different fate from the one she did at his hands.

In politics, as in all the other departments of life, we shall find that it is impossible to make any real progress except by working in harmony with the divine laws. A glance at the pages of the world's history shows that empire after empire was formed by men, in all nations, each one trying to surpass, in solidarity and strength, all others that preceded it, but the ultimate fate of each and everyone of them, without a single exception, was the same, namely, destruction. The reason for this lay in the principle of hatred which governed the hearts of kings and rulers of men. So long as they adhered to the principle of love in their dealings with mankind, their kingdoms flourished to their own and their subjects' advantage; but the moment they allowed their hearts to be swayed by pride and the love of self-aggrandizement, they were swept away from existence. Here also it is clear that the failure to observe the law of brotherhood was the cause of their downfall, for pride and self-glorification give rise to the worst kind of hypocrisy and intrigue, and, ultimately, also lead to tyranny, the mother of destruction.

The true principles of good governance have been laid down by the great moralist and poet, Sa'di of Sheeraz, in the two following couplets :

(۱) * درخت است و سلطان درخت * درخت است که پر باد از پیخ سگ

(۲) * درخت است که اگر پروری * بکام دل درختان بر خوری

[Tr. (1) The people are like the root, and the king like the tree ; the strength of the tree depends on the root, my son !

(2) The people are like a tree from which, if thou nourishest it, thou canst enjoy fruit to thine own and thine friends' satisfaction.]

These are the true principles of good government, and wherever they have been put into practice they have never failed to afford happiness and joy to all concerned. It is well to bear in mind that the aim of existence is not to fill our own pockets to the detriment of all others of our race, nor to lord it over mankind, but to so live in the world as to allow ourselves and all others to attain to the fullest measure of peace, harmony and happiness which are available here and hereafter, and to evolve out into perfect Gods which is our ultimate destiny. It is also well to remember that each step we take in the wrong direction, unless retraced in time, takes us nearer the yawning abyss of destruction, and that after a certain number of wrong steps have been taken it will be out of our power to retrace them at all.

Even today our politicians are trying to govern the world with the rule of hatred, and are leading its nations into sure destruction. They aim at 'world power' for the glorification of their own nation, forgetting that man cannot run counter to the laws of nature with impunity. The past history of great nations is there to convince all, who might be open to conviction, of the fact that stability and permanency of kingdoms are possible only when they are founded on the solid and sure basis of Love, and that in the matter of world-conquest or world-rule, no amount of diplomatic skill, heavy armament, or ships and soldiers can possibly avert the doom which follows a disregard of the spiritual Law of Love.

One consequence of the ambition of world-conquest is the feverish competition which has been going on among the different nations of the world, each one dreading the rivalry of others, and making

greater and greater sacrifice to ensure superior efficiency, with the result that peace has become possible only by being armed to the teeth. The fear of a strong combination of enemies constantly spurs us to raise the standard of strength and efficiency of our forces, and necessitates the expenditure of large sums of money every year. But where is all this money to come from? Taxation engenders internal discontent, and, unless kept within reasonable bounds, must lead to strikes, agitation, rebellion, and even civil wars. It is bad politics, indeed, which prepares the national defences by impoverishing the people. The 'mailed fist' policy cannot be expected to lead to any lasting peace and happiness, and its success may be said to depend on the constant dread, on all hands, which prevents open rupture, till some one feels stronger than some one else, so that, instead of enjoying a sense of security and peace, we live in a state of perpetual dread, which we try to meet and counteract by spreading fear among others, in our own turn. It is painful to observe the enormous sums of money which are annually spent in designing and manufacturing special types of engines of destruction. Already men are groaning under the weight of taxes which they have to pay as the price of peace, and the cost of living has gone up enormously. Yet the surface politicians who are responsible for this kind of Government fail to see that they can never establish internal and external peace and harmony by the rule of Dread, and blindly follow the course chalked out by themselves for the management of the world. If Love had been the guiding principle of our political life there would have been no such dread anywhere, and nations would have lived side by side, and co-operated with one another as friends; for Love is the power which binds together and effectively destroys fear. Where Love reigns there is no room for distrust. Religion points out that a king should fight in defence of his people and empire, using only righteous means and weapons which do not inflict harm on non-combatants; and the ancient Records (Purānas) are full of accounts of glories won on the battlefield by chiefs and warriors of old. But it does not countenance the mad policy of world-conquest, or the plunging of nations into war for the personal gratification of kings.

Since love gives rise to confidence and amity, and hatred to fear and a sense of revenge, it follows that peace and harmony, internal and external alike, are to be had only under the rule of Love. Even today, if we change our point of view, and try to replace hatred with love, we shall find that there will be peace and plenty for the whole of the human race. Under the government of Love there can never be any discontent, and the need for heavy armament and armies disappearing, the money allotted to that department of national defence can be utilized for the general welfare of the masses. The science of modern politics is at war with the science of peace, and must be modified to suit the conditions which an advancing civilization demands. Despotism is already at an end, but the system of representative government, which seems to be better suited to modern times than absolute monarchy, has not been perfected as yet. The most enlightened form of government should mean a sort of modified socialism in which the different races of mankind, the yellows, the reds, the blacks, and the whites all live in a family-like union, in which no special privileges are recognized in any particular individuals, and in which the sole test of the capacity to manage the affairs of the state consists in nothing other than love combined with competence.

Such also seems to have been the original scheme of the Christian Church in its inception. Let us not be daunted by its failure, but rather try to remove the causes which brought it about. When people like Ananias and Sapphira are drawn to the church, not by the power of Love, but by a sense of fear excited by the miracles of saints, the cause of the church is not advanced in the least thereby. True love rests on wisdom, and knows no hypocrisy; and it is true love that is required to turn the reign of powder and shot, the rule of dread, into the kingdom of God. So long as this principle is not kept in view and made the goal of all human politics, no kingdom of man, however well-backed by artillery and military skill, can be permanent, for the great Master declared :—

“Therefore say I unto you, that the Kingdom of God shall be taken from you and given to a nation bringing forth the fruits thereof”—(Matt. xvi. 43).

In this one sentence was summed up the whole philosophy of political science two thousand years ago. Its meaning is that political greatness depends on and follows the morality of the heart, and soon begins to vanish with the departure of the spirit of goodwill. So far as its application is concerned, we find actual instances in history illustrating its fundamental truth. The case of the Jews is strongly in point. Somehow the Hebrew nation had imbibed the idea of being the chosen people, and desired to remain so exclusively. Pride soon brought about their fall. The Indians, too, came to adopt a policy of reserve and indifference in respect of the truth, and did little or nothing to practise or preach it to the world. The result was that they became divided amongst themselves and lost their independence. The Muhummadans also failed to avail themselves of the true teaching of religion and, for that reason, their empires have been broken up everywhere.

In discussing the principle of political freedom, it is to be observed that national independence does not always signify individual freedom, for, while it is true that national independence presupposes the freedom of individuals, it is no less true that national freedom is more illusory than real where the element of fear has not been eliminated altogether, so that where people live in a constant dread of their neighbours, where individual freedom is subordinated to the demands of national Militarism, and where life and liberty might be jeopardized any moment at the mere wish of one's neighbour, and have nothing more solid or substantial to depend upon than powder and shot, there the state of the people can hardly be said to be free. On the other hand, it is quite conceivable that full liberty might be enjoyed by the members of a subject race, if the relations between them and their rulers are based on the principle of neighbourly love. It follows from this that the political emancipation of our race depends not on our ability, as a nation, to beat off all enemies, but on our capacity to turn these very enemies into friends. The practising of universal Love, then, is the true guarantee of peace and freedom. We can now understand why every rational religion lays considerable stress on its observance, though each gives different reasons for it. For instance, Vedanta bases it on the unity of Self, which

is fully emphasized by Prof. Deussen in his *Aspects of Vedanta* (p. 124) :—

“ The gospels fix quite correctly as the highest law of morality : Love your neighbour as yourself. But why should I do so, since by the order of nature I feel pain and pleasure only in myself, not in my neighbour ? The answer is not in the Bible (this venerable book being not yet quite free of the Semitic realism), but it is in the Veda, in the great formula ‘tat tvam asi,’ which gives in three words metaphysics and morals altogether. ‘You shall love your neighbour as yourself,—because you are your neighbour, and mere illusion makes you believe that your neighbour is something different from yourself.’ ”

The fact, however, is that the rule of neighbourly love depends entirely upon the Law of Karma which teaches us that in injuring or belittling others we do more injury to our own souls than to the object of our hatred. For the effect of actions—whether mental or physical or those originating in speech—is preserved in the constitution of the ego and bears fruit in certain characteristic forms, virtue leading to desirable and happy results and vice to all that is unpleasant, undesirable and painful. And so far as the temporal world is concerned, it is easy to see that all manifestations of the emotion of true Love carry with them a feeling of expansion, or ‘more-ness,’ and actually go to increase the vigour of life, while the opposite kind of feelings give rise to a sense of shrinkage, ‘less-ness,’ and oppression in one’s own self, and also produce mutual distrust among men ; and it is a characteristic of this kind of distrust that it seldom fails to lead to the state of tension which can only be described as ‘armed truce.’ The freedom of one’s neighbour, then, is the measure of one’s own. He who would be free himself must, therefore, set his neighbour free in the first instance !

The advantage of Love over the opposite kind of emotion appears clearly in the life-and-death struggle of nations for their independence, for while a settlement brought about by the agency of the former involves neither bloodshed nor an estrangement of relations between two contending nations, and is actually a source of strength to them both, the one arrived at through the instrumentality of the latter is only bought at the cost of blood and money, and also entails the maintenance of an armed encampment in the future. It follows from this that the political emancipation of the world is not to be achieved by forming any

community of men or nations for deeds of aggression and bloodshed, but by imparting true knowledge to mankind, so that when the spiritual perception of the race is awakened and the masses become convinced of the unreality and instability of the worldly pomp and show, and of the reality of their own godly nature, they will, of their own accord and free-will, proceed to take the necessary steps to establish the principle of equality between all classes of men. Thus will be abolished, once for all and for ever, the invidious distinction between the different sections and communities of men.

From the rise and fall of great empires in the past we might also learn the important lesson that justice is the principle of solidarity and power; for justice begets confidence, and confidence unites individuals into colonies, colonies into states, and states into empires. Where justice is wanting, there is no trust; without trust, there is no identity of interest; and without an identity of interest, there can be no *esprit de corps*, which is the root of power. It is only in the absence of justice that arbitrariness with its inseparable companion, favouritism, comes into vogue. The unjust tries to fortify himself against his enemies by the exercise of favouritism. But Nature never countenances this method, and though the clouds may seem to disperse for the time being from the horizon, they are forced back only to gather more thickly a little later. For favouritism leads to inefficiency and to rivalry of a mean sort, and no empire can hold together when the units composing it lack in efficiency and fitness to take part in the 'struggle for existence.' There is no exception to this rule. The downfall of all forms of autocracy is due to this simple law of Nature. Justice, it will be seen, goes a long way to counterbalance fear; for it inspires the heart with confidence, and maintains peace and balance in the mind; it is the mother of goodwill and order in communities, and makes concord between husband and wife and love between master and servant. As Colton said, "if strict justice be not the rudder of all our other virtues, the faster we sail, the further we shall find ourselves from the Haven where we would be."

If we look around us, we cannot fail to be impressed with the remarkable fact that the ruling races and nations in the world are those which practise the great virtue of justice, and are composed of

individuals who have implicit confidence in one another, while the rest, whose main characteristic is want of confidence in one another, simply exist as slaves. Need we wonder at this result? A house divided against itself cannot stand; for love is the great force which solidifies families as well as nations and unifies them into a well-organized whole. And the first principle of love is justice, which springs from truthfulness. For where truthfulness is lacking there is no self-respect; and in the absence of respect for one's own self, there can be no respect for any one else, except the lip-respect of a time-server, for the time being.

To the races which aspire to occupy their proper place in the council of nations, we would advise the practising of truthfulness, under all circumstances. They need not do anything else. This one virtue alone will bring about an adjustment of all their relations, of its own inherent force. Shakespeare rightly says:

"To thine own self be true,
And it must follow as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man."

But it is not the whole truth, for we ought to add to this: 'when thou art truly true to thine own Self, it must also follow that none can then be false to thee.'

Truthfulness is the power which binds nations together. Not only is its disregard fraught with national calamity and degradation, but individually, also, it can only lead to ruin. We might work out its consequences from the points of view of religion and materialism both.

Firstly, as regards religion, falsehood directly produces impurity of the heart, perverts and deadens the finer instincts, converts the nobler emotion of love into that of hatred, and renders the ego unfit for the higher forms of unfoldment. It makes the intellect cloudy, and replaces the serenity of mind with worry and anxiety, thus directly robbing the ego of *ānanda*, or bliss, the acquisition and enjoyment of which is the sole aim and aspiration of the soul. The liar wants to be happy, but does the very thing which directly gives birth to unhappiness! It is like pulling out the foundation to build

the superstructure with. Spiritual progress is impossible without peace of mind, and peace of mind cannot be had till the heart be purified: hence, lying is an immediate obstacle on the path of emancipation.

Secondly, so far as material prosperity is concerned, it is also easy to see that untruthfulness even here ultimately leads to ruin. We resort to falsehood to gain a cheap advantage by dishonest means. But dishonesty never flourishes in the long run, however much may be the immediate advantage to be gained thereby. If it were otherwise, all the thieves, and dacoits and forgers, in the world, would be millionaires in no time; but happily such is not the case. National prosperity is no exception to this rule.

The short-lived triumph, which falsehood and dishonesty secure for their votary, in some instances, is too feeble a recompense for the life-long anguish and fear which inevitably follow in their wake. The liar cannot look an honest man in the face; his features bear the stamp of wretchedness and sin; he shuffles and cringes and loses his self-reliance. Prosperity in business is impossible with such qualifications as these, and the health of the body, depending, as it does, on mental strength and purity, also suffers in consequence. This is not all; for those whom the liar defrauds, become his enemies when the fraud is discovered, and hunt him down sooner or later. Are these conditions worth purchasing in consideration of some temporary gain by falsehood and deceit? We venture to hope that no man in his senses will answer this question in the affirmative.

Truthfulness and Justice will also be found sufficient to establish peace and harmony wherever the interests of individuals and nations may clash, for they beget love, which, in the case of the body in power, takes the form of sympathy, and of loyalty in that of the other.

Every ruling nation must rely on the loyalty of the subject race, if it wishes its own rule to be perpetuated. But what does loyalty mean? Does it mean a gramophone-like reproduction of what has been put into a terrified mouth by some overbearing agency, or does it mean a spontaneous gush and bubbling up of that indefinable feeling, or emotion, of confidence in which love and respect

are blended together in a heart which delights in giving expression to its natural feeling, of its own accord? It is always possible to bully any one into an expression of a forced sentiment of loyalty, but the statesman who relies upon this kind of loyalty in his calculations will very soon find himself getting into deeper water. True statesmanship aims not at removing or suppressing the symptoms of 'disease' or friction temporarily, but at stamping out their causes.

We have said that loyalty is an emotion; so the question which now arises is: how is it to be engendered in the human heart? Now, a study of the laws which govern human emotions reveals the fact that they spring from mental conviction, and since mental conviction, in its turn, depends on the opinion one forms on mature deliberation, they may be said to depend on the opinion one is led to entertain concerning an individual or a state. Now, the emotion of loyalty, like that of friendship, belongs to the class of the emotions of Love, and, consequently, arises in the heart only when it is convinced of the relation of love existing between itself and the body in power.

But, since the mind naturally entertains a feeling of hatred for all those who impose restriction of some kind or other on it, the emotion of loyalty is opposed to the inmost nature of the heart. Luckily enough, there is a single exception to this rule, and it is furnished by Love itself. Hence, when the person who imposes restraint on another happens to be actuated by a feeling of love, the manifestation of which takes the form of action rather than of words, the heart willingly sacrifices its natural resentment and accepts the obligations and restrictions in the name of Love. We find this principle illustrated in all the dealings of mankind; whether it be the relation subsisting between parent and child, master and servant, superior and subordinate, lover and beloved, or that between the king and his subjects, it is love and love alone which induces one to cheerfully acknowledge the authority of the other. Hence, loyalty depends directly on the nature of the acts performed by the king. How little of the psychology of emotions do those statesmen who try to exact it from the people know, is obvious from our analysis. As a matter of fact, the very act of *forcing* the tongue to give expression to

an emotion of love goes to engender hatred in the heart, because the heart resents pressure of every kind whatsoever. By violence, or the fear of violence, you may force the tongue to utter and the pen to write a veritable encyclopædia on loyalty; but no amount of force can compel the heart to endorse a single word of what the tongue utters or the pen writes, for, as we have said above, hearts are impervious to the heaviest artillery, and respond only to the gentle and soothing influence of love.

Some politicians think that the policy of '*divide et impera*' is the best method of maintaining law and order. We shall see how far it is consistent with good administration. Now, rule means harmony, good government, and the existence of friendly relations among all classes and communities in the country, and its value lies in the peace and prosperity which it aims at securing for the people. But the essence of the idea underlying the policy of "divide and rule" is to set people quarrelling with one another, hence to create friction, ill-will, internal lawlessness, general chaos, and political paralysis—in plain English, misrule. Thus, to govern by the principle of 'divide and rule' means the creation of trouble for the people and the government both, in the first instance. Now, since the creation of trouble for one's self is always suicidal, he who advises any government to adopt, or adhere to, a policy of divide and rule has no right to be considered wise. The true value of this principle is to be found in its application to one's enemies in the time of war. When our enemies are thrown into a state of political confusion and paralysis by internal dissensions, it becomes easier to conquer their country. Hence, we adopt such methods as are likely to bring about mutual misunderstanding among them, although even at such times these means are not considered honourable by religion. This is because it never allows the worldly ambitions of men to mar the prospects of their souls. Therefore, the policy of weakening the enemy by creating misrule in his country, if permissible at all, is suited to a time when there is a conquest to be made; it should never be resorted to in dealing with one's friends or *protégés*. Good government necessitates the blending of all interests in the interests of the state, hence a reconciliation of all the elements of

discord and disharmony. Spiritual blessings are not meant for a country where lawlessness is the ideal set to the people to aspire to. Besides, one can hardly hope to find in the world any people so foolish as never to see through the thin veil of this policy, and the moment they come round to recognize what the real game is, confusion must necessarily become worse confounded. It works only so long as the people do not recognize that in the general good of all alone lies the good of each and every individual.

Another error which modern politicians commit, at times, is the laying of too much stress on prestige. The relations between the king and the people, however, cannot improve so long as errors of the ruling bodies are shielded on this false principle. Prestige is the creature of fear; but it is love, and not fear, which generates loyalty. For fear, as we have seen, creates discontent and provokes resentment. Under its influence people express their resentment in whispers, and form secret alliances to undermine authority. Where, therefore, the aim is to build up a stable empire, prestige should not be lightly invoked to protect the wrong-doer, or to perpetuate the wrong done. The undoing of the wrong done, with a graceful acknowledgment of the blunder committed, will at once conquer the hearts of the people and secure their active co-operation. The latter also ought to do their best to co-operate with the governing body for the preservation of law and order; for their own prosperity depends on the maintenance of peace in the land. It was for this reason that it was said: "Render unto Cæsar the things that be Cæsar's and unto God the things that be God's" (Luke, xx. 5). It should never be forgotten that fault-finding is a means of reform only when the object of criticism happens to be one's own self; to reform others, it is necessary first to make them feel their shortcomings by example rather than precept. It is no good to raise one's voice in denunciation. The voice which makes itself heard is not the voice of many persons uttering incoherent, inconsistent, selfish, bigoted or offensive speech, but the voice which speaks for all, steady, clear, inoffensive though firm, neither over-polite to border on flattery, nor lacking in courtesy to savour of rudeness or impertinence,—the voice, in short, not of any particular caste, or creed, or section of men, but of sober Reason.

Spiritual influence will, thus, be found to be the most potent means of removing the existing evil from all the departments of life.

The problem of reclaiming criminals will also be found to be one of spiritual morality. It is no use hoping to suppress crime by the enforcement of penal laws, nor is there any lasting good to be had out of the preventive methods of binding over men for good behaviour, and the like. These are merely temporary measures, and succeed on account of the fear which they excite for the time being.

Now, if we can agree as to the cause or causes which lead a certain number of hitherto honest men to turn criminals, we can lay our hand at once on the means of reclaiming them back to society and moral life. Analysis will show that the principle of morality is here also at the bottom of the trouble, for no one imbued with good moral ideas is likely to take to a dishonest mode of living. Hence, the process of reclamation must embrace moral education to be of any effect. Thus, no system is worthy to be called an administration, in the true sense of the word, in which either moral education is conspicuous by its absence, or is of a nature which turns honest men into criminals; and it is equally clear that in all good administrations provision must be made for imparting wholesome ideas on morality to convicts. Mere imparting of knowledge whereby they might earn a few *annas* a day is of no avail. The prospect of a few 'coppers' at the end of a whole day's hard work is so utterly devoid of attraction that, unless the will be strongly imbued with the principle of honesty, the earliest chance of securing a moderately small fortune, without labour, will suffice to turn the scale in favour of dishonesty. Fear of punishment is too feeble a check under the circumstances, for all criminals know that punishment follows detection, but none where there is no trace left, and they spend their energies in maturing their plans, to reduce the chances of detection to the barest possibility. Fear of punishment, thus, instead of being an incentive to good, virtuous living, acts in an exactly opposite manner. So far, then, as moral obligation is made to rest on the laws of society and government, its force is exhausted the moment one can discover some method of defeating detection. It must, therefore, be made to rest on a

foundation where detection cannot be prevented, nor punishment avoided ; and that foundation is furnished by religion alone. In order to reclaim criminals, it is necessary for the state to arrange for their religious education, so that they may begin to understand the nature of their true Self and realize the consequences which arise from a disregard of Spiritual Laws. Society is expected to help the state in this task by example rather than precept, and since the *Akte* of society is always constituted by the persons in power, — the rest of the public merely mimic them — the duty cast on the higher officials of the state is to see that the noblest and the best of the traditions of high morality and virtue are maintained by them in their daily life as members of society.

Without spiritual help one may for ever go on trying to remove the existing evil by newer and newer methods, but we shall discover that each newly invented remedy while partially suppressing the old existing evil brings two other forms of it into existence. In all the departments of life we see this unfortunate result following human endeavour ; we make laws to suppress some form of existing evil, but are soon called upon to remove the harmful results of the new enactment itself ! This is because the divine inspiration is not our guide in the selection of remedies for the removal of evil. We not only ignore such inspiration at times, but often work in defiance of it ; and some of us are so brought up and educated that there is little room in their hearts for spiritual tenderness. Religion inculcates the principle of the universal brotherhood of man, based on the solid foundation of love, and demands that equality and justice be extended to all human beings, irrespective of caste, creed or nationality ; but we, in our blind materialism, think that their application should be confined to those cases only which do not affect our individual, racial or communal interests. No one who has such narrow ideas of equality and justice can ever hope to establish a reign of peace for his own nation, or for the world ; for nature does not countenance iniquity in any form, and although we may not see the punishment following evil deeds immediately with our limited vision, still the far-sighted amongst us discern in them the beginnings of causes of great retribution, which is, in the fulness of time, sure to overwhelm

humanity and shake the very foundations of the world. The science of true politics aims, from the very commencement, at rooting out evil and establishing the reign of peace and plenty, and has breadth of view enough to include the whole world in its beneficent scheme.

To revert to the sayings of Jesus, those who are pure in heart do all good acts in secret; but the hypocrites do them in public, so that they might be considered great and holy by their fellow-beings. The hypocrite's way is, however, not the way of salvation, for it is a perverse nature that finds pleasure in the insincere praise of mankind. It is high time that those who are under the impression that spiritual merit consists in the testimony of one's neighbour, corrected their wrong belief. No one certainly will be admitted into heaven on the production of a certificate of good conduct from his neighbour.

'Be perfect like the Father' (Matt. v. 48). "Is not life more than meat, and the body than raiment" (Matt. vi. 25). "Take therefore no thought for the morrow: for the morrow shall take thought for the things of itself" (Matt. vi. 34). "And seek not ye what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink, neither be ye of doubtful mind" (Luke. xii. 29). "But rather seek ye the kingdom of God; and all these things shall be added unto you" (Luke, xii. 31). Have faith, and all will be well. The main thing to be avoided is attachment to the objects of the senses. Have no love for the outward shape or form of a thing, for that is impermanent. If you attach yourself to a thing that is not lasting, you must come to grief. Be attached to the in-dwelling *Atman* alone, which is eternal. There is no mother, nor brother, nor sister, nor any other relation of the soul in the World. One's true relation is one's own Self. All the other relations are false and elusive, like the Will-o'-the-Wisp; and the love of the false is ever fraught with evil. Hence, the Messiah declared: "He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me: and he that loveth son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me" (Matt. x. 37). To the same effect is the statement:

"If any man come to me and hate not his father, and mother, and wife and children, and brethren and sisters, yea and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple" (Luke, xiv. 26).

The reply which Jesus gave to some one who once pointed out to him that his mother and sisters were waiting to speak to him, is fully in keeping with this principle. He then said that only those who did the will of the 'Father' were his relations, none else. Accordingly the disciple who wanted leave to bury his dead father was told :—

"Follow me and let the dead bury their dead" * (Matt. viii. 22).

In the Gospel according to John is actually recorded an instance when Jesus addressed his mother by the undignified title of "woman" (John, xix. 26). The Yogis say :—

"The afflictions are nescience, egotism, attachment, aversion and love of life."

Similarly, it is written in the Bhagavad Gita :—

"Affection and aversion for the objects of sense] abide in the senses; let none come under the dominion of these two; they are obstructors of the path" (Disc. iii. 34). "He who regards impartially lovers, friends, foes, strangers, neutrals, foreigners and relatives, also the righteous and the unrighteous, he excelleth" (Disc. vi. 9).

The love of the body is likewise a source of trouble, and an obstacle to true liberation. One must realise the Ideal, regardless of everything else. Jesus always said to every one who asked him about the means of salvation :—

"If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me" (Matt. xvi. 24). †

Only those who are willing to pursue the Truth at all costs can get to it. If we love our little personality, we shall never reach it, for its path is obstructed by the love of 'Un-Truth.' If we get ready to crucify the little carnal self for the sake of the real Self, emancipation will come at once; for the law is 'that whosoever shall save his life shall lose it, and whosoever shall lose it shall find it' (Matt. 39). There is no need to propitiate any cosmic or extra-cosmic

* Cf. "The wise grieve neither for the living nor for the dead"—*Bhagavad Gita* (Disc. ii. 11).

† Cf. "And he that taketh not his cross, and followeth after me, is not worthy of me" (Matt. x. 38).

leity for this: the whole thing is a question of laws of which not a tittle shall be broken. It does seem at times that villainy and deceit triumph over virtue and honesty, but in reality this is not so. The apparent villain might have done a good act, and the virtuous and honest man one that is bad. Shall the laws of Nature cease to operate for good in favour of the former, and for harm against the latter because of their general habit or reputation to the contrary? The laws do not recognise any such thing as a generally good man or a habitually bad one; they are simply concerned with each individual thought or act by itself. Every thought, whether good or bad, sets certain forces in motion which must have their due effect. In the morality of laws good and bad do not exist. The same nature which has pointed out that the proper food for man is a fruit and nut diet has pointed out living flesh to be the only diet of tigers, wolves and other beasts of prey. Where is the principle of mercy then, in nature? This, however, is not meant to furnish a plea for the slaughter of poor dumb animals to tickle the palate of the Epicure. No wise man who has understood the laws of nature will ever think of eating meat.* For him the evil consequences arising out of such a diet furnish a sufficient argument against its use. If one only knew what evils arise out of it, one would shun it as poison. Is not its disgusting nauseating sight, in its uncooked state, a sufficient reason for its discontinuance? The Bhagavad Gita declares:—

“The foods that augment vitality, vigour, health, joy and cheerfulness, delicious bland, substantial and agreeable are dear to the pure. The passionate desire foods that are bitter, sour, saline, overhot, pungent, dry and burning, and which produce pain, grief and sickness. That which is stale and flat, putrid and corrupt, leavings also and unclean, is the food dear to the dark.”

To revert to the point of morality of nature, it is certain that she respects not our ideas of virtue and vice. With her it is all a question of causes and effects—as you sow, so shall you reap. Neither is she a respecter of persons. According to the Bible, Adam, the Son of God (Luke, iii. 38), violated one of the laws, and was promptly turned out of the Garden of Eden, while Jesus, a man (John, viii. 40), by living in harmony with the Law became Christ. If you are unhappy, who cares

* See ‘The Jain Philosophy’ by V. R. Gandhi, pp. 148—158.

for it in the Universe ? There are hundreds and thousands of others who are more unhappy than you. It is your own look-out whether you would be happy or miserable. There is no punishment or reward outside the range of the laws of nature ; and every moment is the Judgment* Day with these unerring, unfeeling laws. When we violate the law we come to grief, but when we live in harmony with it we thrive. The Sat-Chit-Ananda state is within us, and it is our own look-out whether we bury it deeper and deeper within us by our ignorance and vicious living, or by chiselling off all impurities, like a sculptor, bring the hidden treasure into view.

The only way, then, of securing freedom and happiness is the renunciation of desires which produce delusion and tighten the bonds. The Vedantic simile of a dream, which is invaluable as a means for engendering the spirit of *vairāgya* in the soul, might be availed of here for the purpose, though not quite appropriate otherwise. For just as in the state of dreaming we perform action in imagination, so might we be said to be dreaming now and acting in a huge dream. While dreaming, do we not perceive the objects created by our mind as if they had the same reality as ourselves ? Do we not associate with our dream-phantoms, as if they were real beings ? Aye, we treat them as real existent beings, and eat and drink and make merry with them ! We fall in love with them, just as we do on this plane ; and feel grief, and break our hearts when we find the course of true love not running smooth even there. We experience all sorts of sensations of joy and sorrow in the dream-land just as we do here. Sometimes the sensations are frightful : we fear, as we do on this material plane, run for dear life, hide ourselves from our enemies, and beg for mercy when unearthed and dragged out of the place of hiding. At times we even perceive the hand of the assassin rise ; the gleam of his dagger is seen. There is a movement of the descending arm ; the skin is pierced ; death now stares life full in the face ; its grip tightens ; the piercing scream of agonized terror is uttered ; hope is gone, and consciousness is departing, when, all of a sudden, something snaps, and we find

* Cf. "The Just Lord is in the midst thereof, he will not do iniquity : every morning doth he bring his Judgment to light, he faileth not ; but the unjust knoweth no shame"—(*Zeph.* iii. 6).

ourselves comfortably lying in our bed, in this material world of ours, laughing at our own dream ! What is it ? Is it not an index to what we are doing here in this world ? When the mind changes this chapter of incidents, shall we not be lying in our proper bed, the luxurious bosom of Eternity ? Let us think over the scene in the dream-land. Who was its creator ? Was it not the result of the activity of the dreamer's own mind ? Did it not exist in his imagination alone ? But did he not, all the same, consider it so real and life-like as to actually live it in his own consciousness ? All these questions must be answered in the affirmative. The dream-scene was actually created by the dreamer's own imagination, the creative faculty, the Holy Ghost, so to speak, of the mind, which also created a new light form for the dreamer to perform action through, on the dream stage. Our own imagination was the supporter and sustainer of the world of dream, and was within and without the whole dream-creation. Why were we unhappy then ? What did we fear ? Were we not afraid of the creatures of our own mind ? It is a startling pronouncement, but it is true none the less ; we *were* afraid of the creatures of our own imagination and were frightened by their monstrous looks. We had liked the scene and *desired* to take part personally in the drama which was to be enacted ; we had, so to speak, forgotten in the excitement of the play that our own mind was the Creator of it all. So, when we found ourselves in difficulties, we were unable to escape from them. We had, as it were, put off the ' Creative Power ' when falling in love with the fair heroine of the play and at the moment of entering the lists to chastise the villain. Had we known, that is to say, remembered, that our mind possessed the power of life and death over the adversary, his dagger would never have penetrated our heart ; but as it never occurred to us that neither the fair dream-land fairy, nor the villain, nor anything else had an objective reality outside our imagination, the Creative Power, which we had put off, stood aloof, and the scene brought to us all the misery and wretchedness and pain that it could, and finally terminated in ' death,' at which moment of extreme agony we turned round and found the ' put off ' Creative Principle within us, smiling placidly at our error ! The ' Holy Ghost,' the ' Creative Principle,' had never left but was within us all the time : it was merely the fault of the memory

that failed to remind us of its presence, for which reason we could not connect ourselves with it. We had placed ourselves, mentally on the same plane with the dream-images and had thus voluntarily accepted an inferior status. It was under the influence of such thoughts that we had entered the lists to chastise the villain. We had fancied him to be a real foe, whereas we ought to have looked upon him as a creation of the mind. The 'Creative Principle,' which was looking on the scene, obeyed the thought, and manifested the condition implied in the dream body. This is why we were overpowered by the villain.

We can now perceive the secret of our unhappiness. We have forgotten our real Self and are searching outside in the world for that which is within us. The source of eternal happiness is within us; it is the desire to win the fairy of the dream which stands between us and the spring of happiness within. When we put ourselves on a level with the John, Brown and others of our dream, we disconnect ourselves with the 'Creative Power,' and must share the fate of those imaginary others of our own making. In this world also the 'Creative Will' is capable of achieving the most wonderful feats; and that will is also ours! The moment we look upon the world as a stage, and on men and women as actors in disguise, we rise above it and occupy our proper place, or, in the words of Jesus, "We ascend to where we were before" (John vi, 62). It is the forgetfulness of our true nature which is causing us all the unhappiness, and misery, and sickness, and disease. When we know our real Self, we shall not make ourselves miserable in the pursuit of the shadows of the world.

Such is the lesson to be learnt from the beautiful simile of a dream. The Bible also teaches that when we cease acting and become mere spectators then will the Christ (Life divine) plead for us with the Heavenly Father within, saying: "They are not of the World, even as I am not of the World. Sanctify them through truth: thy word is truth" (John xvii. 16-17). Then it will be that miracles will be performed, at our bidding, so to speak. When we can conscientiously say like the Saviour: "In the world ye shall have tribulations, but be of good cheer: I have overcome the world" (John xvi. 33), then, indeed, will the prophecy,— "They shall speak with new tongues, they shall take up serpents, and if they drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt

them ; they shall lay hands on the sick and they shall recover" (Mark xvi. 17-18)—be fulfilled. This is all the redemption. Once more let us remember that as in a dream we became an actor by virtue of the desire to win the fair heroine, so in actual life, on this globe, it is the desire of the attractive things of the world which is the cause of our fall. The soul is Great and Glorious, and the Creator of its own world of thought ; the Universe is like the illumination of an Idea* in the mind. Let us not belittle ourselves. Let us regard the Self as above all the fair objects in the world ; we should not humiliate ourselves by coming down to their level. Do we not laugh at the idea of our love for the fair Rosalind of our dreams ? Is it not because we think it ridiculous for the Real to fall in love with the false, the unreal, the transitory ? In loving the false we become estranged from the Self, which is the Truth, and run after the Non-Truth. This is the only sin which shall be punished with death, and which cannot be forgiven. Jesus also says :—

" Verily I say unto you, all sins shall be forgiven unto the sons of men, and blasphemies wherewithsoever they shall blaspheme : but he that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost hath never forgiveness, but is in danger of eternal damnation " (Mark iii. 28-29).

How can it be forgiven ? If we have no faith in the very power which decrees forgiveness and destroys sin what forgiveness can we ask for then ?

The ' Creative Power ' in man begins to re-arrange the molecules of the body and brain, and to re-mould the emotions in the right way, when there is a sincere repentance from sin. The process of elimination of wickedness, however, requires a belief in the ability of the ' Creative Power ' to accomplish this beneficial change. Hence when you have no faith in the ability of this Power itself, how can you invoke its aid or allow it to do you any good ? In plain language, the spirit or soul is an entity which is capable of attaining the highest ideal of perfection as well as of falling into the lowest state of degradation and helplessness. Pure consciousness,

* Because all things are reflected in the *Kevala Jñāna* (omniscience) of the *Siddhātman* (God), therefore, the universe is here likened to the illumination of an idea (that is to say, the comprehensive knowledge) of a Pure Perfect Soul.

i.e., intelligence, by nature, it is affected by its beliefs so that its attainment of its high and sublime Ideal is really dependent on its own faith, which may electrify the individual will into omnipotence to sweep away all obstruction from its path, or throw it into the gutter of impotence and ineffectiveness, according as it is inspired by true wisdom or by false and untrue notions about itself. Will being, thus, the source of all good, it is impossible to undo the effect of belittling its power ; for an impotent will is incapable of doing good, and nothing but impotence can result to will by holding it in derision. It is, therefore, the only sin which cannot be forgiven, and the punishment of which is eternal damnation, that is floundering in the ' ocean ' of transmigration. Again, in so far as the will is developed by *vairāgya* (the spirit of renunciation), and is demoralized by uncontrolled living he who despises *vairāgya*, which, as we shall see later, is the true idea underlying the conception of the Holy Ghost, is in imminent danger of damnation.

The notion of baptism, which we now proceed to consider, is also a profound doctrine. The world now merely looks upon it as a sacrament ; but it was something so difficult to understand that one of the Pharisees, a man Nicodemus by name, who was a ruler of the Jews, was nonplussed by it. John the Baptist had declared : " I baptize you with water unto repentance, but he who is coming after me shall baptize you with fire " (Matt. iii. 11). When Jesus referred to the subject, saying, " Except a man be born again he cannot enter into the Kingdom of God " (John iii. 3), Nicodemus felt puzzled at this new birth and enquired, how could a man be re-born when old ? Was he to enter a second time into his mother's womb to be born again ? The reply given was : " Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the Kingdom of God. That which is born of the flesh is flesh ; and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit. Marvel not that I said unto thee, Ye must be born again " (John iii. 5 - 7). The idea conveyed is that of a birth from darkness into light, i.e., of a spiritual birth, without which redemption from sin is not possible. The idea of a second birth is well-known among the Hindus and Jainas. The three higher castes, namely, Brahmanas, Kshatriyas and Vaisyas are called ' twice-born,' or

regenerate. The investiture of the sacred thread is the ceremony which is the outward symbol of the second birth. By birth all men are considered like unto Śūdras, but the second birth is the regeneration in spirit. It is said by one of the ancient Hindu sages: "Brahmanas by birth are, however, regarded by the wise to be equal to Śūdras until they are born in the Veda (i.e., learn the sacred literature), but after that, (that is, the second birth) they are deemed Twice-born."* It is the knowledge of one's own divinity which burns up sin, and purifies and prepares the soul to manifest God-life; hence, no one who has not been purified by knowledge can aspire to get into the Kingdom of Heaven. The Bhagavad Gita declares: "Verily there is no purifier like wisdom in this world. As the burning fire reduces fuel to ashes, so doth the fire of wisdom reduce all actions to ashes" (Disc. iv. 37-38). The first birth is the birth of man in the world, but the second birth is the God-birth, or the birth of man into Godhood.

With the seed of ignorance burnt up by the fire of wisdom, the neophyte is born in faith, the only gateway to the Realm of Light and Life to which he was hitherto 'dead.' This entering into Life, or the birth of the soul in faith, i.e., the second birth, is the basic principle of the doctrine of being born again which was propounded by Jesus and which Nicodemus failed to understand, at least, in the first instance. It will not surprise modern theology a little to be told that its error of regarding God as a maker is ultimately traceable to the notion of the second birth, which, as seen above, is grounded on the doctrine of baptism, i.e., initiation into the secret science of the soul. If modern theologians will but reflect on the matter, they will not be slow to realise that the practice of addressing the clergy as father or reverend father which seems to have been in vogue all over the world in the past, can have reference not to the physical body but to the initiation of the soul into the mysteries of the spiritual side of Life poetically described as the birth of man in spirit, or, simply, as

* Cf. . . . the *sādhak* (the seeker) . . . transforms himself mentally, morally and spiritually into another character so much so that his essence, attributes and actions, become the essence, attributes, and actions of God. He is born again, not of corruptible seed, but of uncorruptible, by the word of God, which liveth and abideth for ever "Studies in Tasuwarif" (p. 78).

the second birth. It is with reference to this second birth that the idea of the fatherhood of the clergy is associated; for the *guru* (spiritual preceptor) who brings it about and who is entitled for that reason to all the respect if not to greater reverence than what is due to the progenitor of one's physical person, is its cause, or author, and must be described as 'father,' to keep up the metaphor. Now, because the Tirthamkar (Deified Teacher or God) is the greatest and the most worshipful *guru* of all, nobody is better entitled than He to the title. This was the original idea; but when the true teaching of religion was lost sight of in the underground mazes of mythology and the conception of divinity replaced with erroneous notions of the latter-day theology which insists on reading the mystery-language of its scriptures in a literal sense, the purity of the original conception of the Fatherhood of God also came to be replaced by the coarse and undignified notion of a maker in the physical sense. That the clergy should have remained unaffected by the errors affecting divinity is not surprising under the circumstances and is precisely what was to be expected; for they have never passed through the melting pot of mythology to give rise to misunderstanding, though many people are now ignorant of the precise reason why they should be addressed as 'father,' and take the appellation as merely a term of respect.

Such is the secret of baptism.* As the cause of unhappiness is ignorance, so that of redemption must be wisdom to be acquired by study and meditation. The illumined sage, consequently does not pray to any one for help, but devotes his time to study and meditation, relying on the power of his soul to effect the necessary change from within.

* Some sort of baptism seems to have been practised even in the Greek Mysteries. We are told by the author of the 'Influence of Greek Ideas on the Christian Church':—

"So early as the time of Justin Martyr we find a name given to baptism which comes straight from the Greek Mysteries—the name 'enlightenment'. . . . The effect of baptism is illumination, perfection; hence sins before and after baptism, i.e., enlightenment, are different" (pp. 295-296).

The Marcosians and some Valentinian schools also appear to have believed "in a baptism that was an absolute sundering of the baptised from the corruptible world and an emancipation into a perfect and eternal life" (Ibid., p. 306).

We are told again and again by Christian theologians that salvation in Christianity is a matter of grace, and that Jehovah's favour is to be sought by prayer and praise, but not to be bought by works. But we have seen how grievous a misinterpretation such a supposition actually is of the teaching of their faith, every word of which is compatible only with the doing of works that bear a causal connection with the ideal of perfection that has been set before them in the Sermon on the Mount. The text of Matthew, xi. 12, is a further refutation of all such notions, and may be taken to be the last word on the subject. This is how it reads :

" From the days of John the Baptist until now the kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force."

Luke also puts it equally forcibly when he says :—

" The law and the prophets were until John ; since that time the kingdom of God is being preached, and every man presseth into it " (Luke, xvi. 16).

The truth is that it is a doctrine of combating with and overpowering the forces of sin by hard spiritual work, not of getting into heaven by a movement of lips and knees in supplication. The messianic statement—

" But many that are first shall be last, and the last shall be first " (Matt., xix. 30)—

can hardly be said to accord with the dogma of prayer, or grace, but is fully intelligible on the hypothesis of ' works. '

As the materialist says, prayer is an old-womanish shedding of tears of impotent helplessness, and amounts to waste of time pure and simple, notwithstanding the sense of relief which arises in some cases of fervent praying. There is no such thing in Nature anywhere as a department for receiving and disposing of the countless millions of unreasonable, impious and self-contradictory prayers which are poured forth daily by the human race. How could any one—even a God—constitute himself the Superintendent-in-charge of what might be called an universal Prayer Bureau, and yet remain happy ? We have seen that *Ananda* (bliss) is altogether inconsistent with such activity. Besides, if there be an all-wise Ruler of the Universe, and he an omniscient God, how can he be influenced by our prayers ? It will be

monstrous to imagine that our suffering and wants have to be repeatedly brought to his notice before he may be expected to move in the matter, and yet our constant praying cannot mean aught else. An omniscient Ruler Divine must be further presumed to know all that is to happen in the future, and, consequently, to have a fixed creative purpose and scheme of governance of the world, from which it will be vain for anybody to endeavour to draw him away. Again a being who is described as the loving Father must further be deemed to grant as much as he can prudently give to his starving and otherwise needy children, without waiting to be pestered by them with petitions of appeal for his help. But if that be so, why pray at all ?

The truth is that prayer is an indication of a lapse from rationalism, for science and prayer are hostile to one another, so that the latter begins where the former, or rather our individual knowledge concerning it, ends. Prayer is nourished by superstition in the bosom of ignorance, and withers at the first touch of reason. Born at the night-time of *jāñā* (knowledge), it shines at her best in the house of Mysticism, the author of her being ; but sickens and pales if dragged into the powerful Sun of Intellectualism. It is for this reason that no one ever thinks of praying so long as he believes that he can reach his object through a chain of causes and effects, beginning with an effort on his part and ending at the goal in view. For example, we do not pray that our food may be cooked, the house built, letters posted, and so on. A superstitious man will, however, immediately fall on his knees to pray the moment there is a breakdown of the causal connection between the means employed and the end to be attained. Accordingly, we do not pray in times of war that God might send our projectiles to a greater distance than the guns are able to throw them, or that a hundred enemies be killed with each stroke of the sword ; but we do pray for victory when all we could do has been done, so far as our knowledge extends ; and this because the causal connection between the efforts of men and ultimate victory depends on factors far more numerous than we are able to take into our calculation.

So far as the feeling of relief which arises from prayer is concerned, it is the outcome of a spirit of resignation. Just as the litigant who has well-nigh worried himself to death over the intricacies of his

law-suit experiences a sudden feeling of soothing consolation on placing the matter in the hands of the most competent lawyer in the country, in the same way, and precisely for the same reason, or reasons, does the devotee, who prays for divine assistance, experience a feeling characteristic of relief. If we analyse his feeling still further, we shall find it to consist in the cessation of mental agitation coupled with a sense of satisfaction and resignation, resulting from the belief that the best that could be done has been done under the circumstances.

The response to prayer, which the superstitious seldom fail to attribute to their deity, proceeds from one of the following sources, namely,

- (1) the soul itself,
- (2) some other living being, affected by our distress and moved by sympathy to help us out of our difficulties, and
- (3) coincidence.

In the first case, the soul itself perceives the solution of its difficulties, or secures its objective ; in the second, it is assisted by some one from outside ; but in the third, it is obliged to what might be termed chance, pure and simple.

All cases of response to prayer, as a matter of fact, really fall in the third category, for the very idea of response is a pure fiction of unreasoning faith.* So far as chance is concerned, it does not mean that

* The facts of the modern European War may convince those who are not readily accessible to reason of the utter groundlessness of the belief in the existence of a beneficent Ruler of the Universe, both competent and anxious to grant the prayers of men. Its horrors lasted not a few short weeks or months, but for several years continuously, in the course of which towns were depopulated, countries devastated, kingdoms overthrown and hearth and home destroyed on a wholesale scale, plunging the whole world into misery, and transforming Europe itself into a regular shambles, reeking with the blood of no less than twenty million human beings, to say nothing of innocent beasts and birds. It is a record, in modern times, of prolonged privations, of unparalleled suffering and of bloody deeds of all conceivable shades of frightfulness, sparing neither sex nor age nor even innocence. All this, went on under the very nose, as it were, of our omniscient, omnipotent ruler of the world, and yet he did not see it fit to stir himself even to save defenceless women and innocent babes, or to put a speedy end to this world-wide calamity. It is not that his aid was not invoked or his intervention resented ; on the contrary, all conceivable forms of supplication—ordinary and special prayers, hymns, intercession service and the like—were repeatedly employed by men, all over the world, to move him in the matter. These facts speak for themselves, and prove, beyond the possibility of doubt, that the management of the world is not a function or concern of divinity, consisting as it does, in the perfection of *vairāgya* (renunciation), that is, desirelessness. For the same reason, the granting of boons to a worshipper or follower is not an attribute of godhood.

the occurrence of the event is brought about lawlessly or in violation of the natural Law, or what is the same thing in different words, by way of a miracle, but that its relation to the suppliants's wish rests upon nothing more or less than their co-existence in point of time. The event itself was bound to happen and would have happened, as an independent happening, whether any one prayed for its occurrence or not, so that even its synchronism with prayer cannot be said to be due to the interference on the part of a prayer-granting agency in heaven. There are many such coincidences always occurring in nature which even the most unreasoning deism will refuse to regard as instances of divine response to the outpouring of the human soul, *e.g.*, the occurrence of the death of an enemy or of some other form of calamity to his person or property. But if we are debarred from regarding these dark coincidences as response to prayer, because of their tendency to leave a stain on the honour and character of their 'perpetrators,' what is our warrant for ascribing any other to the agency of a god?

The origin of the idea of prayer, it may be pointed out here, is to be found in the daily meditation of the Jainas, termed *sāmāyika*, which is directly calculated to enable the soul to attain to its high ideal in the shortest possible time. The *sāmāyika* consists in an endeavour to refrain from the commission of all kinds of sin for a certain period of time—usually for an *antara-muhurta* (=about 48 minutes)—every day. During this period one should engage oneself, with a cheerful mind in subduing one's likes and dislikes, and should dissociate oneself mentally from all kinds of interests and undertakings of which the worldly personality is made up. The most valuable gain from *sāmāyika* is the cultivation of an ever-growing feeling of equanimity, that well-balanced state of mental quietude and serenity which is the foremost attribute of divinity. The necessity for *sāmāyika* will be apparent to any one who will ponder over the nature of the wide gulf which separates the actual from the potential: for he who would become a God must first learn to behave as a God before he can be allowed a seat in the Assembly of Gods. *Sāmāyika* aims at the attainment of divinity through perfection in conduct, which, consisting, as it does, in the purest and most complete form of renunciation, is the sole and the immediate cause of salvation, that is of *wholeness*

and freedom from the pain and misery of *samsāra* (births and deaths).

The layman who has just entered the path observes the *sāmāyika* meditation but once daily in the morning, for he is not able to tear himself away from business and pleasure at that early stage in his spiritual career to be able to perform it more often ; but as he progresses onwards, he takes to its observance three times—morning, noon and evening—every day, gradually extending its duration also from one *antara-muhūrta* to three times as much at each sitting. The ascetic who has successfully passed through the preliminary stages of renunciation, as a householder, is expected to be an embodiment of desirelessness itself, so that his whole life is, as it were, a continuous *sāmāyika* from one end to the other.

The quality or nature of meditation also varies with the progress of the soul, though its general aspect remains the same so long as its type is not changed from what is known as *dharma dhyāna* (religious meditation) to that termed *śukla dhyāna*, which is pure self-contemplation in the highest sense.

Sāmāyika consists in,

1. repenting for the faults committed in the past,
2. resolving to abstain from sinning in the future,
3. renunciation of personal likes and dislikes,
4. praise of *Tirthamkaras* (Perfect Teachers or Gods),
5. devotion to a particular *Tirthamkara*, and
6. withdrawal of attention from the body, and its being directed towards the soul, i.e., the cultivating of a sense of detachment from the body.

Of these, the first two aim at the elimination of evil, or sin, the third at the development of a spirit of renunciation, the fourth and the fifth at impressing the soul, with reference to the lives of the Holy Ones, with the fact of its own divinity, and the last at the correction of the error of the body being taken for the man, as well as at the subjugation of 'flesh.' Prayer, as it is understood in deistic theology, it will be seen, is incapable of achieving any of the happy results which flow from the observance of the *sāmāyika* meditation ; for prayer is not connected with the goal in view by any such

thing as a chain of causes and effects which alone can be relied upon for the realizations of our aspirations and hopes. In the subjoined table we give the analyses of modern prayer and *sāmāyika*, side by side, for facility of comparison.

<i>Prayer.</i>		<i>Sāmāyika.</i>
Begging for forgiveness of 'sins' and other boons from another.	1	Exerting oneself to avoid sinning, by repenting for the sins already committed, and by <i>resolving</i> not to commit others in the future.
	2	Renunciation of likes and dislikes, which is the cause of mental equanimity and leads to blissfulness of being.
Praise of a wrathful creator, jealous of his <i>unity</i> , by one who can never aspire to become his equal.	3	Praise of Tirthamkaras, who have attained to perfection by Their own exertion.
	4	Devotion to one particular Tirthamkara whose biography is to be taken as furnishing inspiration to one's own soul, the Perfect One having risen to the status of Divinity from the ordinary position of a sinful soul.
	5	Correcting the prevalent error of the body being taken for the man, and the conquest of 'flesh.'

A glance at the left-hand side of the table suffices to demonstrate that the two chief characteristics of prayer are :

1. one's dependence upon another than one's own self, and
2. the denial of soul's divinity.

That there is nothing commendable, but everything objectionable, in these elements will, we think, be quite plain to any one familiar with the nature of the soul and the effect of evil suggestion on its career.

Sāmāyika, on the other hand, is the very process which is directly connected with the end in view in a causal way, and is, for that reason, the true method of meditation.

But there is every reason to suppose and none to oppose the fact that the modern conception of prayer does not coincide with that of

the ancients, but has arisen, like all other errors of deistic theology, from a misinterpretation of its Scriptures, except where they are of too recent a date to be free from modern imperfections. For it is impossible to believe that those very beings whose mythology shows them to have been fully aware of the divinity of the soul could have been so inconsistent with themselves as to immediately preach that it was not.

As to the efficacy of prayer in those cases where the desired good is done by the soul itself, its *why* can be easily understood if we recall to mind the fact that the Subjective Mind is amenable to the law of suggestion,* so that any suggestion which may find its way to the adytum of the inner divinity will be at once carried out by it in so far as it is physically possible to do so. Jesus points out the proper method of 'praying,' when he says: "What things soever ye desire, when ye pray believe that ye receive them, and ye

* Suggestion has been defined by hypnotists as the insinuation of a belief or impulse into the mind by any means, as by words or gestures, usually, by emphatic declaration. The suggestion may come from outside, as from a hypnotist, or it may be what is known as auto-suggestion which means a suggestion by a person to himself. The wonderful histrionic ability displayed by hypnotized subjects in personated suggested characters has often been remarked. But it is not acting a part. It is much more than acting, for the subject believes himself to be the actual personality suggested. As for the efficacy of suggestion, the principle is that the mind is endowed with the power to act upon and influence matter, just as it is liable to be influenced by matter. As Prof. William James shows: "mental states occasion also changes in the calibre of the blood-vessels, or alteration in the heart-beats, or processes more subtle still, in glands and viscera. If these are taken into account, as well as acts which follow at some remote period, because the mental state was once there, it will be safe to lay down the general law that no mental modification ever occurs which is not accompanied or followed by a bodily change." The effect of suggestion on the soul is even more remarkable, mere thought sufficing to produce immediate depression of spirits and the like. The rule of efficacy in these cases is that a suggestion that is known by the subject in his normal condition to be absolutely false will always excite at least a momentary opposition, for suggestion works most effectively on lines of least resistance. But repetition overcomes all resistances, so that when the subjective mind is confronted by two opposing suggestions the stronger one must necessarily prevail. It is a corollary to this that suggestion becomes most effective when the subject is induced to believe in its truth in his normal condition, that is, on investigation, in the rational way. Hence the value of reasoned beliefs, that is faith.

shall have them " (Mark xi. 24). His 'miracles' furnish ample illustration of his teaching. He invariably asked those who came to him to be cured of their ailments and deformities, if they believed; and never failed to tell them, after the cure, that it was their own faith which had wrought the miracle. It is recorded that when with his own people, in his own country, he *could* do no miracle, and marvelled because of their unbelief. Thus, if a man has no faith, neither God nor man can do anything for him.

As regards the prayer known as the Lord's prayer, which was taught by Jesus to his disciples, that has nothing in common with the idea of an appeal for help which has been found to be objectionable, being nothing other than a form of mental renunciation in reality. Its best interpretation is to be found in the works of Swami Rama Tirtha from which we may quote the following :—

" 'Man shall not live by bread alone.' Look here! In the Lord's prayer we say, 'Give us this day our daily bread,' and here we say that man shall not live by bread alone. Reconcile these statements; understand them thoroughly. The meaning of that Lord's prayer, when it was stated, 'Give us this day our daily bread,' is not that you should be asking, the meaning of that is not that you should be craving, willing, and wishing; not at all. This is not the meaning. The meaning of that was that even a king, an emperor, who is in no danger of not having his daily bread, even a prince who is sure that the daily bread is guaranteed to him, even he is to offer that prayer. If so, evidently 'Give us this day our daily bread,' does not mean that they should put themselves in the begging mood, they should ask for material prosperity; it does not mean that. That prayer means that everybody, let him be a prince, a king, a monarch, anybody, he is to look upon all these things around him, all the wealth and plenty, all the riches, all the beautiful and attractive objects as not his, as not belonging to him, as God's, God's; not mine, not mine. That does not mean begging, but that means renouncing. Look here. 'Give us this day our daily bread.' That does not mean begging and asking, but it means rather renouncing and giving up; giving up; renouncing unto God: that was the meaning of that. You know how unreasonable it is on the part of a king to offer that prayer, 'Give us this day, etc.,' if it be taken in its ordinary sense. How unreasonable? It becomes reasonable enough when the king, while he is offering that prayer, puts himself in the mood where all the jewels in his house, the house itself, all these he renounces, as it were, he gives them up, as it were, he disclaims them. He breaks his connections with them, so to say, and he stands apart from them. He is the monk of monks. He says this is God's; this table, everything lying upon the table is His; not mine; I do not possess anything. Anything that comes comes from my beloved One. He realizes it

that way. And if you take the meaning of 'Give me this day, etc.,' as explained just now by Rama, then you will find it consistent with 'Man shall not live by bread alone.' Then you will find it consistent with it : otherwise inconsistent."

It is, thus, obvious that to the illumined sage prayer is a meaningless term. Who is there beside his own Self to pray to ? Whose help to ask ? Who can help the Lord of the Universe ? Who but one's own Self could have helped one in one's troubles in the dream-land ? We have created our surroundings ourselves ; if they are not what they should be, we must change them ourselves. There is absolutely no good in weeping or wailing. Even when we say that God helps us he only helps us from within. The help really comes from the soul itself though we erroneously ascribe it to an outside God. There is no without, so to speak, to the self-sufficient soul, from where any help could come. We are the masters of our own destiny, however much we may be ignorant of our powers. Even the final liberation will come through our own exertion, though we might be now hoping to attain it through the grace of another. As Vivekananda says, the soul is like a prisoner lying in a prison, barred and chained from within, waiting for the arrival of the Liberator. We have called him, begged him, prayed to him to come, and are anxiously awaiting his arrival. With faith we are sitting down, full of eager expectation and belief. When the time for redemption comes, there is a rap on the door. We open it and peep out ; there is no one without. The rap is repeated ; but again there is nobody without, only our faith is now working with redoubled vigour from within. The prison door is now open, but there is no redeemer without, for we have opened it ourselves ! Thus, all search after the gods and goddesses brings us back to the point whence we had started, that is, to one's own Self, and man finds that 'the God whom he was searching in every little brook, in every temple, in little churches, in worse heavens, that God whom he was even imagining as sitting in heaven and ruling the World, is his own Self' ;—I am He, and He is Me ! Verily, "I am in the Father, and ye in me and I in you" (John xiv. 20). None but "I am" is the God, and this little bodily 'I' is really only the cause of confusion !

" I heard a knock—a hard, hard, hard blow—
On my door and cried I : ' Who is it ? Ho !'
I wondering waited entranced, and lo !
How soft and sweet Love whispered low,
' 'Tis thou that knockest, do you not know !'"

Ancient evolutionists declare that the true secret of evolution lies in the inherent inclination for the manifestation of perfection which is already within every being, and that this perfection is barred and the infinite tide behind is struggling to express itself. In the child the man is concealed and suppressed. The moment the door is opened, outrushes the suppressed man. So in man there is the potential God, kept in by the bars and locks of ignorance. When the ' KEY OF KNOWLEDGE ' is applied to the locks, the bars and bolts fly back, and Adam stands revealed in the full glory of " I AM," the God, the SAT-CHIT-ANANDA !

CHAPTER VII

YOGA

"Each soul is potentially Divine. The goal is to manifest this Divinity within, by controlling nature, external and internal. Do this either by work, or worship, or psychic control, or philosophy, by one, or more, or all of these, and be free. This is the whole of religion. Doctrines, or dogmas, or rituals, or books, or temples, or forms, are but secondary details." — *Raja Yoga* by Vivekananda.

The foregoing treatment of the subject, it is to be hoped, has prepared the ground for further investigation into the nature of the methods that have been prescribed by different religions for the realization of the great ideal of perfection and happiness. We have now arrived at a point in our investigation into the nature of the Self when theoretical speculations must be replaced by practical achievements, when Self-realization must be brought within the domain of actual practical experience. We are now on the borders of Yoga which is the bridge between God and man. With its aid man can, not only catch glimpses of the blissful goal, but also cross the yawning abyss and enter the precincts of the heaven beyond in his own proper person.

It is not our purpose here to enter into a detailed description of the numerous methods prescribed and the rules laid down for the initiation and guidance of the novice. We shall merely content ourselves with enquiring into the nature and practicability of the science, and with making brief, but general, observations on the subject, which are to be understood as giving merely the most rudimentary and elementary principles of the practical side of Yoga.

It has been shown in the preceding pages that the cause of unhappiness, bondage and misery of the soul is purely and simply ignorance. It was on account of ignorance that Adam, instead of 'walking in the company of the Lord God in the Garden of Eden,' was turned

out of it, and it is due to ignorance that 'heaven' has hitherto remained lost to us. It has been also seen that almost all the Redeemers and Saviours of the race, who have appeared in various ages and countries, have pointed out the primary means of redemption to consist in the knowledge of the Self. But this is true only in a general way, since it is one thing to know the truth and another to realize it ; for the very first requisite for realization is a firm, unshakable belief in the Truth. One must possess what Jesus would have called an unassailable, undying Faith ; and the only test of faith is that one should not hesitate to risk one's life on it. It is only so long as faith is weak and the germ of doubt has not been annihilated that the pupil asks for leave to 'bury the dead.' When the heart becomes saturated with belief in Truth, one would understand that no man 'having put his hand to the plough, and looking back' (Luke ix. 62) is worthy of the kingdom of God, and would 'leave the dead to bury their dead' (Matt. viii. 22), without more ado. Who is there to be buried, the "I," or the body ? The man is, indeed, the "I," and the body is merely a carcass of dead matter. But the "I" never dies, nor does it ever need a burial. Hence, he who wishes to enter into Life must leave such things as the burial of corpses to those who are spiritually dead, though they might be living and moving about physically.

Yoga aims at imparting the knowledge of Truth, and, at the same time, at building up an unchanging, undying faith in the heart. It means union, or the linking together of man to God, or, more correctly, disunion, or separation from the objects of the senses, that is, from the perishable phenomenal world (Max Müller). It is the science which leads the initiate by easy steps or gradations to the loftiest heights of Self-realization, till he stand face to face with the Object of his search. This is the best proof he can have of the truth of the doctrine. But, unfortunately, it can be had only when the disciple has crossed the thorny path and landed in safety at the goal, so that he has ultimately to depend on his intellect till such time as Omniscience shall arise in his soul. If he has succeeded in grasping the truth, he will find his progress in Self-realization comparatively easy, and signs and omens and other occurrences of a 'mysterious' nature will not be generally wanting to keep up his

spirits and cheer up his heart. There is no dark mysticism in this statement. The "Fall" is due to ignorance, so the removal of ignorance must reinstate us in power, glory and joy. But the difficulty is that it is not easy to induce one to set one's foot on the path, or to investigate the subject to acquire the knowledge of the Self. Under the influence of the suggestion of identity with the outer encasement of matter, the physical body, he who is the Worshipped of the Universe, in the purity of his nature, is acting as if he were a slave; the Master is doing the work of the coolie in his own house, and resents being told that he is the Master! What is to be done to remove this fatal bondage?

Yoga teaches us that knowledge is the only means whereby the spell can be broken. Obviously, it is the state of one's belief which has to be affected, so that one may be able to purge the mind of the wrong impression of inferiority and 'duality.' But belief cannot be changed except by reason, that is, knowledge. Hence, it is clear that knowledge alone is the weapon which can attack wrong impressions and destroy false beliefs. Let us take a couple of practical instances to illustrate the principle. Suppose a child sees a rope in a dark room and fancies it to be a serpent, and is afraid to go into that room. How will you remove the erroneous impression of the child? Will you not lift him up in your arms, and take him to the fancied serpent, and let him satisfy himself in every manner that his belief was a mistaken one? Suppose, again, that a man is hypnotized to believe that he is haunted by a devil, and is consequently in a terrible plight. What will you do for him? Will you not 'wake' him up and let him see that the devil, which was haunting him, was the merest illusion?

The human race are similarly hypnotized into the belief that they are wretched ignorant beings, evil by nature and birth, and doomed to suffer all sorts of rebuffs and disappointments at the hands of destiny and the forces of Nature. What is your duty here? Will you not treat them as you have treated the two previous cases? Just wake them up, so that they may see for themselves that the whole thing is a delusion. Like the child in the illustration, man believes that there is, in the chamber of his heart, the black serpent

of Evil, and is unhappy thereby. There is only one way of removing the wrong impression from his mind, and that is to convince him that there is no serpent, but God Himself in his heart. Your assuring him that his belief is wrong, on the authority of any or all of the Buddhas, Christs, Muhammads and others will be of no avail at all. You must remove all doubt from his mind, but that can be done only when he has been led to think and experiment for himself, to his utter satisfaction. Says Swami Rama Tirtha :—

"If the sun should say to the mangoes of Bombay, as I revealed my warmth and light to the birch and cedar trees of the Himalayas, I will not do so to you, you must grow and flourish on my revelations of goodness and power to these beautiful mountainous giants, the Bombay mangoes would be no more. Neither could the lilies of the field live on the sun that shone upon the garden-apples, nor could Shakespeare, Newton or Spencer live upon a revelation made to Buddha, Christ or Muhammad. So have we to solve our own problems and to begin to see with our own eyes, rather than to continue peeping through the eyes of our most venerable Seers and the Sages of the past gone by."

It is impossible to satisfy the child by quoting authority. Perfect conviction follows only a total annihilation of doubt, which necessitates an exhaustive investigation to one's own satisfaction. A child is liable to regard his most loving authority as capable of erring; so is man. As to the degree of perfection and permanency of faith and the value of auto-suggestion based on mental conviction, Hudson well says (The Law of Mental Medicine) :—

"... faith is as essential to success... by scientific methods as by any other. But there are three advantages in this regard which are incident to scientific methods. The first is that the requisite faith can be acquired by study and reasoning: the second is that the faith is perfect, for the reason that it is acquired through knowledge and confirmed by reason; and the third is that the faith thus acquired and sanctioned becomes at once a permanent possession, because there can arise no adverse auto-suggestions from the objective mind to weaken its potency. * * * Hence it is that suggestions which are based upon scientific truths, other things being equal, are necessarily the most potent in their influence and permanent in their effect."

Yoga insists on each man working out his salvation himself. Every one according to this system has to stand on his own legs; none may claim support from his neighbour. If one person out of half

a dozen is demesmerised, it is not of any value to others who do not undergo the 'unwinding' process themselves. Each one must discover and apply the KEY OF KNOWLEDGE to his own heart where the serpent of darkness is supposed to be in hiding. You must remove your own doubts, one by one, for no one but you yourself know what your doubts are. This is the very first principle. It will, in due course of time, bring its reward, which is self-reliance. Its development is the first sign of success. The wonderful success of the man of science is due to his self-reliance.

The next essential is meditation, without which no knowledge is possible. One may believe the conclusions arrived at by others to be correct, but this is merely a second-hand method. Unless we have thought over the point for ourselves, we can never be certain of the result, and the germ of doubt cannot be said to have been killed. The only way of effectively destroying doubt is to revolve the thing to be meditated upon, in all its bearings in the mind, that is, to dissect it, to analyze it, to cut it to pieces, and to pry into it from all possible points of view. When an opinion is formed as the result of the foregoing processes, it will never admit of doubt. The difference between a conclusion arrived at after proper investigation and one heard from another is precisely that between a house founded on rock and one built on sand. Meditation is the process of classification and generalization of facts into principles, and it is obvious that no sound grounding of knowledge can be possible without it. But meditation depends on concentration, which is the real secret of success.

Concentration means the focussing of force on a point, the mobilization of the army on the frontier of the territory to be attacked. If we wish to make a conquest of Russia, we must bring our forces to bear against her on a point. It will not do to send a million soldiers to St. Petersburg, individually and one after another; for it will require only a handful of the Russians to kill each individual struggler as he emerges on the scene. A handful of soldiers properly handled will achieve great victories, but their energies must not be dissipated in all directions. Says a thoughtful writer :—

"How has all this knowledge in the world been gained but by concentration of the powers of mind? Nature is ready to give up her secrets if we only know how to

knock, to give her the necessary blow, and the strength and the force of the blow come through concentration. There is no limit to the power of the human mind. The more concentrated it is, the more power is brought to bear on one point, and that is the secret."—Vivekananda.

The question now arises, how to concentrate one's mind? A number of methods have been suggested for this purpose which Hinduism deals with under four heads, namely, Hatha Yoga, Bhakti Yoga, Raja Yoga and Jñāna Yoga. These are prescribed according to the capacity and qualifications of the aspirant. Hatha Yoga aims at producing the desired attitude of concentration by controlling the physical body, and at purifying and uplifting the mind by restraining the senses. Its severe practices are said to prepare the *Yogi* for the higher methods of Raja Yoga. Bhakti Yoga is the path of Love of the Divine, through which man becomes merged in the beatific state of a vision divine in his own soul. He thus discovers the real side of Life, and reaches the same point of indifference to the objects of the senses as does the follower on the path of Hatha Yoga. Then comes Raja Yoga, the science of God-realization by the control of the mind itself. The most important one of all these methods, however, is what is known as Jñāna Yoga, that is, the Path of union through knowledge, which deals with the great questions regarding Life and the nature of things. It is the science of the Real, which, by showing the hollow nature of the objects of the senses, enables one to renounce them with ease.

Of these four systems the aspirant may select the one which is most suited to his inclination and surroundings. However, it is Jñāna Yoga which is recommended as the true path; for knowledge alone can destroy the germ of doubt and engender overwhelming faith in the heart. In a general sort of way it has been said that the educated classes will find the Jñāna and the Raja Yoga paths more suitable to their needs than the other two. The ignorant and the less educated people, who cannot find time enough for the severe austerities of Hatha Yoga, on the one hand, and whose pursuits in life, leave them with but little inclination and time to proceed along the paths of the Jñāna, or the Bhakti Yoga, on the other, will find the path of Raja Yoga, the best means of progressing towards the goal. Bhakti Yoga

is the most suitable method for the average men and women of the world; while all the rest who are inclined that way and who can afford to bear and undergo the austerities and hard practices of Hatha Yoga may proceed along that road.

Such is the general scheme of the process of realization to be gathered from the Hindu Scriptures. This fourfold classification, however, lacks scientific validity and is quite artificial, not withstanding that it seems at first sight to provide a path to suit every temperament. For the truly scientific method of salvation, like all other scientific methods, can be but one, irrespective of the question whether it suit the fancy of all men or not? Certainly, no good can come of our abandoning the scientific path to suit different temperaments, for while all endeavours to humour individual idiosyncrasies are bound to fail to develop second-rate talent, or capacity, on the one hand, the validity of the means employed is also vitiated at once by a compromising spirit, on the other. We do not allow the soldier to select for himself whether he would undergo the necessary drill or not. He has got to do so if he wishes to join the army! The same is the case with the training of the will for spiritual progress.

Factitious as the above classification of the subject-matter has been seen to be, it is nevertheless one which is eminently useful for our requirements, since it furnishes a fairly suitable basis for the comparative study of the principles underlying the methods of self-realization laid down in different religions. We shall, therefore, adhere to it as far as possible for the purposes of the present investigation.

To proceed with the subject, the object of concentration differs in the four systems. The *jñāni* (he who follows *Jñāna* Yoga) has the self directly as the object of his concentration. The follower of Raja Yoga aims at the attainment of '*Samādhi*'—a state in which the purity of the mind enables the soul to acquire perfect *jñāna*, and to enjoy the bliss of being, arising from the expulsion of all elements of desire from its consciousness. The *bhakta's* intense, undivided, impassioned love of the Teacher (God) constitutes his concentration;*

* " Love concentrates all the powers of the will without effort, as when a man falls in love with a woman "—(*Inspired Talks*) by Vivekananda.

and the physical austerities of the Hatha-Yogi, practised with a view to curb down the *desiring manas* (mind), are sufficient concentration for him. But all this diversity of method also is merely one of form, the real object of spiritual concentration throughout being one and the same, namely, the realization of one's identity or 'sameness' with God, in other words, the establishing of the individual soul in the state of Sat-Chit-Ananda-ship.

Many people find it difficult to concentrate their mind on religious subjects, and, on that account, are inclined to find fault with it. The fault, however, does not lie with the mind, but with the association of ideas which we form for ourselves. For concentration is not opposed to the nature of the mind which entertains but one idea at a time. The difficulty which novices experience is, thus, due, not to the lack of the power of concentration in the mind, but to the lack of suitable associations. It is the association of ideas which determines the point of concentration, that is to say, the point on which the mind is generally concentrated, or on which it can be fixed with ease. A tradesman, for instance, finds his mind as a rule absorbed in matters pertaining to his particular trade, and experiences no difficulty in concentrating it on the details of his business, yet the same tradesman does not, generally and without special causes, find it easy to apply it to the business of another, and will find it difficult to make it interested even in his own if the more immediate personal interests be centred elsewhere, *e.g.*, if he happen to fall in love. In the last mentioned case, his mind will refuse to linger on the detail of his business, and will run away towards the more absorbing love affair. Nor does he need any instructions in the art of concentration, which comes spontaneously with love. It is clear from this that the subject on which the mind dwells the longest is necessarily the one which excites the liveliest interest, for the time being; in other words, the subject of concentration is determined by the most paramount inclinations, emotions, and passions in every individual case. And, since our inclinations, emotions and passions depend, to a great extent on the association of ideas, it follows that change of association is all that is required to interest the mind in any particular subject. Those who wish to develop the power of

concentration on any particular subject should, therefore, change their old modes of thought, and cultivate suitable associations for the new subject. Therefore, the company of *swamis*, devotees and others, who have renounced the world for God-realization, is about the best means of turning the mind Godward. The same result can be achieved, though with greater labour, by a constant perusal of books which deal with matters pertaining to God-realization.

Another thing to bear in mind is that the subject of concentration is neither the name, nor the form, nor the size of a thing, but its significance, or purport. The mind cannot, for long, be concentrated on a subject the paucity of whose detail renders it unworthy of contemplation. A chess-player, for example, will soon get tired of looking merely at the chess-board and 'men,' but will go on playing the game, unmindful of time and most other things, without finding his interest flagging. In this lies one of the chief objections to idolatry. If the subject for concentration be only the name and form of the devotee's idol, obviously there is nothing of much value to be obtained by such devotion; for the mind having speedily mastered the few physical details thus presented to it for concentration of thought, gradually loses all interest in the idol and wanders away from it. Few, however, are degenerate enough to worship the blocks of stone in temples or pagodas. What is actually worshipped in most cases is the *Paramâtman*—whether the devotee has a true conception of Divinity or not, is a different matter—whose symbol the image in stone becomes on consecration. It follows from this that the subject which presents the greatest variety of detail is the one on which mind can be concentrated without *ennui*. Hence, the Self or Soul, as the repository of an infinity of divine attributes is the only subject in which mind can find food for meditation and entertainment enough for all eternity.

The value of concentration has been recognized by all the founders of the religions of the world who have recommended different methods of Yoga, according to their lights. Muhammad pointed out the path of Resignation* to the will of Allah as the means of getting

* Resignation to the will of God means a complete effacement of the personal will. The *bhakta* has ears and eyes only for the Lord; he readily and cheerfully

into Heaven ; Jesus preached Faith, Knowledge, and Renunciation for bringing the Kingdom of Heaven into manifestation ; other saviours and sages have laid down, more or less, the same rules. In each and every instance stress is laid, directly or by necessary implication, on mental concentration, which religion does not hesitate to describe as the key-note of success.

The object of concentration should be, firstly, the denial of duality, which means a denial of the imaginary unbridgeable gulf, set up by modern theology between God and man, that is, of the supposed, eternal, unqualified inferiority of man and of his inability to attain to Godhood, and, secondly, the positive assertion of the Divinity of the Self. This should be the real aim and object of concentration. Whenever we can find time for it—and the oftener we do it the better—we should settle down to concentrate on these points, and, if we have faith in the teaching, we would very soon begin to feel that we are on the right path. A few moments' concentration, with faith, is all that is needed to show one that one's labour has not been in vain. It is the best proof that one can ask for, or that can be furnished by any system. As we persevere in concentration we shall realize that what we have considered happiness hitherto is a condition foreign to the very notion of bliss. The modern man looks upon the *Yogi* as an idle fanatic of chimerical dreams, but that is because he has no true

obeys all divine commands, however strongly opposed to his own personal interests. Something like the spirit of Abraham who is said to have got ready to sacrifice his son, at the command of Jehovah, is required for resignation. There must be no grumbling or murmuring against the harshness of fate, or the injustice of the commandment. The ideal devotee does not enquire into the reason why, but cheerfully, even blindly, obeys all injunctions, believing that he will thereby reach his goal. Krishna also declared : "Plee unto Him (the Self) for shelter with all thy being ; by His grace shalt thou obtain supreme peace, the everlasting dwelling place" (Bhagavad Gita, xviii. 62). The devotees hold that when the soul gives up self-interest, subdues self-conceit, crushes out all notions of self-importance, and tears out, as it were, from its heart, the very idea of egotism, then the burden of salvation becomes the burden of the Self, and, like the mother ever watchful over the child that is completely resigned in her arms, he looks upon it as his duty to do everything for the man who thus surrenders himself to his God. Such is the proper attitude of resignation, which, in its true import, simply means lofty devotion to the great spiritual Ideal.

notion of what happiness implies. Just think over what it means. What is happiness? Whether accumulating wealth, surrounding one's self with all sorts of furniture and nick-nacks, eating dinners, holding interviews, forming courts and becoming courtiers, fighting law suits, engaging in warfare and shedding the blood of one another, giving oneself airs of importance, belittling others losing one's self-composure in the vindication of real or supposed grievances, constantly seeking but never finding happiness in the insatiations of the world, and finally drowning the senses in sheer desperation in temporary artificial stimulation, and looking for consolation in each other's impotent sympathy,—whether all or any of these constitute happiness, or do breaking through the fetters of conventionality, rising above the feeling of impotent helplessness, securing freedom from mundane anxieties and cares, living at peace with each and every and all manifestations of life, radiating good-will and Love all round, unrestrained, free, enjoying nature's highest gift, that is, Life, here and now, being master of death, disease and destiny? Need we repeat which of these opposite sets of circumstances is to be considered happy?

Taking an Indian ascetic as an embodiment of idleness, an advocate of modern civilization once demanded of *Swami Rama Tirtha* when he was visiting America:

"Why do you import your Asiatic laziness to America? Go out. Do some good."*

* As to the basic principle of "doing good" of which our brethren in the West like so much to talk, it is exhausted with helping the needy, aiding the injured, and protecting the undefended till such time as they can regain strength, or stand upon their own legs, to enter into the deadly struggle for existence, which is characteristic of the purely animal side of life. Two features at once stand out in bold relief before us in the most flattering picture of this humane work of philanthropy, and these are:

1. the inability of the poor to participate in the work, and
2. the temporary nature of the relief afforded.

Now, as to the first of these, it is obvious that one without time or money cannot indulge in it to any great extent, so that those who have to earn their livelihood by daily labour are debarred, by no fault of theirs, from participating appreciably in the doing of good; and, as regards the second, it is obvious that the aim is not to put the object of philanthropy altogether above want, but, at best, to point out the way whereby he might earn a living. Besides, the good that might result from such acts of philanthropy is confined to the material side of life. The philanthropist is incapable of finding a cure for the mental ailments and spiritual disorders of the soul as is the doctor or the musician. It is religion and religion alone which can

The Swami replied :—

“As to doing good, is not that profession already chokeful, over-crowded? Leave me alone, I and my Rama (God). Laziness did you say? Oriental laziness? Why, what is laziness? Is it not laziness to keep floundering in the quagmire of conventionality and let oneself flow down the current of custom or fashion, and sink like a dead weight in the well of appearances and be caught in the pond of possession and spend the time, which should be God's, in making gold and call it doing good? Is it not laziness to practically let others live your life and have no freedom in dress, eating, walking, sleeping, laughing and weeping, not to say anything of talking? Is it not laziness to lose your Godhead? What for is this hurry and worry, this break-neck, hot haste and feverish rush? To accumulate almighty dollars like others, and what then? To enjoy as others? No, there is no enjoyment in running after enjoyment. O dear dupes of opinions, why postpone your enjoyment? Why don't you sit down here, in this Natural Garden, on the banks of this beautiful mountain stream, and enjoy the company of your real blood relations—free air, silvery light, playful water, and green earth—relations of which your blood is really formed? Hide-bound in caste are the civilized nations. They separate themselves from fellow-beings and exile themselves from free open nature and fresh, fragrant natural life into close drawing-rooms,—dens and dungeons. They banish themselves from the wide world, excommunicate themselves from all creation, ostracize themselves from plants and animals. By arrogating to themselves the airs of superiority, prestige, respectability, honour, they cut themselves into isolated stagnation. Have mercy, my friends, have mercy on yourselves. The wealth swept out of the possession of the more needy and added to your property by organized craft will enable you simply to have sickening dinners of hotels and taverns, and furnish you with pallid countenances and conventional looks, will imprison you in boxes called rooms, choked with the stink of artificiality, will keep you all the time in the restlessness of mind excited by all sorts of unnatural stimulants, physical and mental. Why all such fuss for mere self-delusion? In the name of such supposed pleasures lose not your hold on the real joy. No need of beating about the bush; come, enjoy the Now and Here. Come, lie with me on the grass.”

and does help suffering humanity in the last-named kinds of disorders, and whatever sympathy, peace, or cheerfulness philanthropy is able to evoke, or inspire, in the patient, is due to the straggling notions of religion which the mind of the philanthropist might be impressed with. Hence, philanthropy as an ideal is neither open to all alike, nor productive of permanent good. Kill the element of religion to which she is wedded, and philanthropy will sacrifice herself over its funeral pyre. She exists by religion, and for religion. But she is utterly incapable of taking the place of religion which aspires to make men not fit enough to enter into the deadly strife of existence, to kill out all their unfit brethren, but to raise them all, the fit and the unfit alike, to the supreme status of Godhood. Hence, however commendable philanthropy be in itself,—and it is certainly noble work—it is confined to a narrower sphere of activity and usefulness than religion in its purest form. Thus, while a life devoted to religion necessarily comprises philanthropic activity in all its phases, philanthropy might not always be based on the sound principles of religious piety and virtue.

How well does the Yogi poet sing :—

- " The moon is up : they see the moon,
 I drink Thine eyebrow's light.
 Big fair they hold, full crowded soon.
 I watch and watch Thee, source of Light.
 Nay, call no surgeons, doctors, none,
 For me my pain is all delight.
 Adieu, ye citizens, cities good-bye !
 Oh, welcome, dizzy, ethereal heights !
- " O Fashion and custom, virtue and vice,
 O Laws, convention, peace and fight,
 O Friends and foes, relations, ties,
 Possession, passion, wrong and right,
 Good-bye, O Time and space, good-bye ;
 Good-bye, O world, and Day and Night !
 My love is flowers, music, light,
 My love is day, my love is night,
 Dissolved in me all dark and bright.
 Oh, what a peace and joy !
 Oh leave me alone, my love and I,
 Good-bye, good-bye, good-bye."—Rama.

Such is the good-bye of the Yogi when he renounces the false world to be absorbed in the Real. It is the music of the soul which has realized the illusory nature of this world of births and deaths, and caught a glimpse of the happy home beyond the Vale of Tears.

Robed in the beautiful white *trousseau* of spirituality, veiled in the halo of virgin purity, blushing with the hope of the realization of the sweetest of expectations of a maiden passion, forgetting the father, the mother, the brother, the sister, and other distracting ties of the world, having turned her back on the toys and things and other attractions of childhood's state, immersed *gopika*-like in the sweet meditation of the Cow-herd's* all-absorbing love, with the bouquet of the orange blossoms of pure thoughts in one hand, and the lamp of *jñāna* (true wisdom), ever trimmed and ready to guide her steps towards the Bridegroom, the moment he comes, in the other, the Soul of the Yogi prepares herself for her union with the Lord. She

* Krishna or Christos.

has no fear, no uneasiness, no doubt about his coming ; and the lamp is kept constantly burning, lest he turn away on seeing the bridal chamber plunged in darkness. The idea of the wastage of oil is foreign to the notion of love. Better that all the oil in the world be consumed, in waiting and watching for the Lord, than that there should be the least disappointment in Love. The Bridegroom wants only undivided love ; he is highly jealous in his love affairs, and does not allow idols of cupidity and attachment to prevail against him. At the faintest idea of calculating commercialism he turns his back on the bridal chamber. If the bride fears the loss of oil, or allows her laziness to have the better of her love, the Bridegroom also fears the contamination of such a bride. " Therefore, take ye heed, watch and pray : for ye know not when the time is " (Mark, xiii. 33). Such is the beautiful lesson to be learnt from the parable of ten maidens propounded by Jesus (Matthew, xxv. 1—12).

If you want real happiness, it will come to you by the right use of concentration alone. So long as you do not give up your false ideals of bustling worldly life, you stand in your own way and debar yourself from true joy. When rightly understood, the inner forces of life can be rendered of valuable assistance for the uplifting of each other, and even modern civilization utilized as a means of further progress, if we only direct its future evolution on lines which are compatible with the spiritual requirements of the real Man.

We do not decri civilization at all so far as its own sphere of action is concerned. It has its good points, and has gone a long way to improve the condition of the masses in certain particulars. But we must not lose sight of the distinction between racial and individual interests nor confound salvation with railways and telegraphs, or even with sanitation and hygiene. The ' fall ' has to be reversed by each and every one of us individually ; racial civilization cannot aid us much in this direction. Civilization will not take any nation into paradise in a body ; for its doors are opened only for individuals, not for races. All our boasted railways, telegraphs, appliances and inventions, which constitute our civilization, or, at least, a major portion of it are merely for national aggrandizement ; to the individual they cannot be said to have brought anything like unalloyed

happiness. And if we add to these considerations the long list of those unfortunate beings who have fallen victim to the march of civilization, and of those who have been crushed under the wheels of the Jugger-naut car of science and culture, we shall learn to estimate modern progress at its true worth.

There is no doubt, however, that civilization can be made to uplift both the individuals and masses, and to benefit large bodies of men collectively. The idea of collective worship explains how this is possible ; for the power of concentration increases with the increase in the number of persons of one mind. Public worship owes its origin to this idea of collective concentration. A simple illustration of the power of collective concentration is to be found in the phenomenon of table-rapping. In explaining this kind of phenomena, *Swami Rama Tirtha* observes :—

“ Rama tells you that what your Scriptures say about the Gods becoming visible on the occasions of *Fajita* ceremonies is indeed literally true. But that simply proves the power of collective concentration. The latest researches of psychology show that the effect of concentration increases, as the square of the number of one-minded people present on the occasion. That is the virtue of *satsanga*. Now, if Rama alone can materialize any idea he pleases, how much more could the hundreds and thousands of people of one mind, chanting the same hymn, thinking the same form, help materializing it ? ”

The reason why our collective worship is incapable of achieving any great results nowadays, is to be found in the fact that people are lacking in the power of concentration. Of the scores of persons who generally pray in mosques, or unite in worship in churches, no two individuals can be said to have their minds concentrated on the same idea.

Is it not the want of faith in religion and a little too much interest in the mundane things which is the cause of evil amongst us? So long as we suffer ourselves to drift away from the truth, it is the merest mockery to attend the church. When we go to worship God, let it be with the purest heart and with undivided attention. It is worth while to understand the reason why temples and churches and other kinds of places of worship came into existence. The following from ‘ The Raja

'Yoga' will be found to contain a fairly accurate explanation of the matter:—

"Those of you-who can afford it will do better to have a room for this (Yoga) practice alone; do not sleep in that room, it must be kept holy: you must not enter the room until you have bathed, and are perfectly clean in body and mind. Place flowers in that room always; they are the best surroundings for a yogi; also pictures that are pleasing. Burn incense morning and evening. Have no quarrelling, or anger, or unholy thoughts in that room. Only allow those persons to enter who are of the same thought as you. Then by and by there will be an atmosphere of holiness in that room, and when you are miserable, sorrowful, doubtful, or your mind is disturbed, the very fact of entering that room will make you calmer. This was the idea of the temple and the church. . . . The idea is that by keeping holy vibrations there the place becomes and remains illumined."

We may now proceed to a consideration of the principle of non-attachment to the fruits of action. Here, again, the object is to rid the soul of its worldly desires. Work we all must perform to avoid stagnation, but it is essential that we should not make our happiness dependent on its result. The significance of work, in religion, is very different from what we ordinarily understand by the word. By work, in its religious sense, is not meant the plodding drudgery of the toiler after riches, nor the performance of labour, whether mental or physical, for the sake of gain. "Work in Vedānta," says *Swami Rama Tirtha*, "always means harmonious vibrations with the Real Self and attunement with the Universe. This unselfish union with the One Reality which is the only real work, is often times labelled and branded as no work, or idleness." Spiritual 'work,' certainly, does not mean labour for some worldly gain. The real significance of work in religion is the contemplation of one's own pure *Ātman*!

It is only a labourer who works for gain to satisfy his vulgar cravings. The Master never labours for worldly gain; his enjoyment of his true Self is sufficient return for him. The object of work is the renunciation of desires, since they keep us entangled in delusion. Desire is a confession of being wanting in fulness, and by force of the law, 'as you think, so you become,' materializes the condition of deficiency in physical terms. The Whole cannot have a desire in him. The natural perfection of the soul remains hidden only so long as we do not renounce attachment to the fruit of action. When we come

round to take the right view, we shall look upon worldly attachments as love of the fair but false objects in dreams. The love of the false ones is bound to be productive of suffering and sorrow. Knowing this, should we fall in love with them? This is the secret. Work done impersonally is of the highest merit. The moment we stake our happiness on the result of the work in hand, mind loses its tranquillity, and intellect its foresight. This is an old principle, and is well brought out in one of Lytton's interesting novels. So long as Zanoni looked on the World as a mere spectator, he could read the destinies of the race, and shape the events to his liking; but the moment he fell in love with the fair but frail and doubting Viola, he came down to her level, lost his command over the Powers and Elements, and was unable to keep the hideous monster, the Dweller on the Threshold, from obtruding itself on his thoughts.

In practice, the principle of non-attachment to the fruit of action must signify the curbing of passions and desires, if it is not to become a license for free indulgence of the senses, in the name of duty and *dharma*. For, individual motives being the main-spring of all human activity, it is idle to talk of non-attachment to the fruit of action where evil action itself is not abandoned altogether. As a matter of fact, no man ever performs what he is not interested in doing in some sort of way, so that the continuance of evil actions must be ultimately traceable to individual interest and desires. Besides this, it is also incumbent on the soul, at a certain stage of its spiritual progress, to rise above the sense of worldly duty, to attain to the highest good. The aspirant cannot then afford to return to the world even to bury a dead parent (Cf. Matt. viii. 22), notwithstanding that the sense of worldly duty unmistakably points that way. It is, thus, the curbing of passions and desires which is intended by the doctrine, not their free indulgence in the guise of religion.

In dealing with this subject, it is worth while to understand the truth about sensual enjoyment. The question is: is the sense of enjoyment in the objects or in the mind? In different words, is the sensation of pleasure or pain one experiences in connection with sense-objects in the mind, or outside it?

Now, if pleasure and pain, were the property of objects, it is obvious that every one would be affected by them in one and the same manner; but it is well-known that all persons are not affected by the same object alike. The most delicious food tastes insipid on a full stomach, and bitter and repugnant in disease; while hunger acts as a sauce to an indifferently cooked dish. 'Tastes differ,' is a very old saying, but its validity is not impaired by its age. If 'taste' really resided in food, there would be no differences in its enjoyment among men. But, since all persons do not enjoy the same dish in the same way, it follows that 'taste' is not in the food, but in the attitude or inclination of the mind towards it. The same considerations apply to the remaining senses. Out of the one and the same object different persons derive different experiences of pleasure and pain. One man esteems a beautiful woman with the reverent love of a dutiful son, another looks upon her as a daughter, a third loves her as his wife, while a fourth, fascinated by her charms, entertains thoughts of lust for her. Obviously, then, the pleasure each of them derives from her person is different from that of the others, and yet the object is one and the same. Again, all the pleasure one derives from her changes into disgust if she happen to display nasty temper, or become unchaste. Sometimes in dreams one experiences such pleasures that the sense of enjoyment lingers behind a long time even in the waking state. The *Yogi*, therefore, holds that pleasure and pain are not in the objects of the senses, but in the mind,* and are determined by the attitude which it assumes towards them. Knowing this, he discards the pursuit of the pleasures of the world, and becomes absorbed in enjoying the enjoyments of the source of joy itself.

It is now easy to understand the sense of the saying, "Every one that hath forsaken houses, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands, for my name's sake, shall receive an hundredfold, and shall inherit everlasting life" (Matt. xix. 29). It simply means that by giving up the pleasures of the

* We are not to be taken as denying certain physical properties and chemical action to material things; what is meant is the denial of the attribution of pleasure and pain as appertaining to them independently of the mind which is affected by them.

senses and the ties with which we are bound to the world for the sake of the soul (Jesus—the ideal or the soul), we become heir to the hundredfold joy of Self-realization, and come into life eternal.

The *Yogi* understands the nature of happiness, and knows it to be very different from the pleasures of the senses. He loves only the thrill of delight characteristic of Wholeness and Perfection. In the conscious enjoyment of real joy he finds it difficult, as it were, to keep back the words, "happy, happy; I am happy," which constantly rise to his lips! No royalty under the sun can lay claim to any such experience. The world reads, 'Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven' (Matt. v. 33), but it is the *Yogi* who realizes it. Men only vaguely talk of God, but the *Yogi* knows himself to be the enjoyer of the divine status, and feels his own heart-beating in harmony with the 'Divine Heart.' This is the very last stage of progress. When the aspirant gets established in this state, he is said to have attained to *samādhi* (*i.e.*, the ecstatic trance).

"When thou hast reached that state, the portals that thou hast to conquer on the path fling open wide their gates to let thee pass, and Nature's strongest might possess no power to stay thy course" (*The Voice of The Silence*).

He has touched the summit of attainment, and, like a conqueror, stands triumphant, his mind like a calm and boundless Ocean spreading out in shoreless Space, holding the powers of Life and Death in his hand. What the World regards as miracles are the most ordinary manifestations of his powers. Virtue flows from his person towards all; he becomes the centre of radiation of good-will and peace all round. All the miracles performed by the past Redeemers of mankind were performed with the aid of the powers developed in Yoga. We nowadays ridicule the idea of miracles altogether, because we see none; but there is nothing to shy at except our own ignorance in respect to them. Man's ignorance makes the supernatural; in reality all is natural. When the causes of an effect are hidden and unknown, the world considers it a miracle; when they are known, it is regarded as a natural occurrence. Why should we decry miracles at all? What is impossible under the sun? Are not all things, the faculty of understanding which enables us to acquire the mastery over nature, nay,

life itself, miracles? A century back we would have regarded wireless telegraphy as a great miracle, but we do not look upon it in that light now. Today we can hold direct converse by wireless across whole continents and seas, and no one is astonished! Nature is full of wonders all round. Does not the man of science astonish us by the exhibitions of the mysterious virtues of electricity and magnetism? When we remember that the untold millions of tons of rock, earth and other solid matter which constitute our world are suspended in Space merely by the force of attraction, we shall not marvel at the possibilities open to a 'magnetic' personality. And, after all, what is magnetism other than a change of arrangement of the particles of a substance? When a bar of steel is magnetized, it exhibits certain properties which were not active in it before magnetization, and yet nothing has been added to, or subtracted from, it. We are taught that—

"the difference between the arrangement of the particles in a magnet and an ordinary piece of steel, or iron, might be likened to the difference in the packing arrangements of two boxes of eggs—in the first (corresponding to the magnet) the eggs are carefully packed, lying side by side, parallel to each other and to the sides of the box, with their small ends all turned in the same direction, and therefore touching the larger end of the adjoining egg; while in the second (ordinary iron or steel), badly packed, the separate eggs lie in all sorts of positions with regard to each other, and at all angles of inclination to the sides of the box."*

Every particle of iron in an unmagnetized bar is supposed to contain equal quantities of two magnetic fluids, called positive and negative, which have a mutual attraction for each other; but these fluids are intimately united in the particle and neutralize each other. This is one of the two theories of magnetism known to science. The other, known as the theory of Weber, is that the particles of iron are always magnetic; that is, the extremities of every particle are always magnetic poles, but in the ordinary state of iron these poles are turned in all directions, so that they neutralize each other's effect. Magnetization, on the first hypothesis, is caused by the separation of the two fluids and their being pushed to the

*The New Popular Encyclopædia, Art. 'Magnetism.'

two poles ; but according to the second is the effect of the re-arrangement of all the particles composing the bar, like the systematic arrangement of the eggs in the box as described above.

Thus, whichever theory be regarded as correct, it is clear that the extraordinary, phenomenal powers of the magnet are the result of a systematic arrangement of the parts composing it, with regard to each other, and the 'sides of the box.' A similar change takes place in the human mind under the influence of Yoga. In the untrained state the power of the mind is neutralized owing to the bad arrangement of the particles of matter ; but under the influence of Yoga, these particles are brought under proper, magnetic arrangement, and a real, living magnet of tremendous power is the result. The act of one-pointed concentration causes these mind-particles to re-arrange themselves on the magnetic principle.

In its natural purity Life is like an immense magnet with all its constituents arranged in the proper way, so that the moment one arranges one's mind on the magnetic principle, one comes into harmony with the Whole, and may claim the full benefit of the entire 'magnet.' But the ordinary mortal is like any one of the particles of the unmagnetized bar, running counter to the lines of magnetic force. A mere drop in the stream in so far as the body is concerned, he tries to swim against the current, and in doing so receives knocks and kicks and cudgelling from his neighbours, and suffers all sorts of pain and misery. His unhappiness is the result of his own ignorance and desires. The former deprives him of the knowledge of his real Self, and the latter lead him to the pursuit of objects out of the straight course, and necessitate his turning round against the current. But in this simple act lies all the mischief. So long as we swim with the current we have the support of the whole stream, but the moment we reverse our movement, the whole tide turns against us and mercilessly destroys us. All the ills of the mind and the body are the result of our endeavour to swim against the 'current' of life. We must give up the pursuit of the shining objects which has brought us all the ills and unhappiness which the flesh is heir to. It is only delusion which makes us think that happiness is to be had from the outside ; when we 'wake up'

we shall find the Self to be the source of bliss itself, and wonder how we could have forgotten ourselves to such an extent as we did. The nervous system of man is made up of polarized cells, and the mind is the great steel bar in which, under his present condition, the particles are so badly arranged that the psycho-magnetic 'fluid' in one is neutralized by the opposite kind of 'fluid' in another. Let him rearrange the particles of his mind, let the positive poles of all the cells of the mind-stuff point, like the needle in the mariner's compass, in the same direction, and let this direction be that of Life, and there will be no limit to his power and happiness! This is the secret of health and power and wonder-working.

It is not possible to deny the effect of thought on the mind and, through it, on the physical matter of the body. The phenomena of post-hypnotic suggestion furnish the strongest basis for this belief. The most extraordinary feature of this kind of thought-influence is that, even after complete 'waking up,' the subject carries out all orders given him in the hypnotic state, at the appointed time and place, although he remembers nothing about them and has no idea of the action he is about to perform, in obedience to the order of the operator. The question is, by what power and in what manner is the obedience of the subject secured by the operator's will?

Now, there are two salient features which distinguish the hypnotic state from the normal condition. In the first place, there is no deliberation, i.e., freedom of choice, in that state, and, in the second, there is the functioning of the higher faculties of the soul, that is to say, of the subjective mind, following on the abdication or unseating of reason. Hence, whatever be the true explanation of hypnotic influence—whether it be due to suggestion pure and simple or to the agency of a magnetic fluid—it is certain that the suspension of the function of deliberative faculty has to be effected, before proper hypnotic condition can be induced in the subject. The problem then resolves itself into the simple question, how is the dethronement of the faculty of discrimination brought about?

Further analysis reveals the fact that it is the excitation of the will itself which suspends the function of deliberation, for, when it is carried away by an idea, it often leads the individual to perform

acts which he deeply regrets in his calmer moments. When people are mixed up in a crowd they often act in this manner. Perusal of literature which readily commands the assent of one's will, is another illustration of the principle. In both these instances it is the emotional nature which is appealed to, and which excites the will and makes it discard the warning of the intellect. Independently of the above, the will is also freed from the dominion of the intellect whenever it is stimulated into exaltation by internal stimulus, such as in Yoga, or when the intellect is unable to meet the situation, as in the case of some grave, immediate danger, or when its vehicle, or tool, i.e., the brain, is exhausted, whether by the poisonous secretions of brain-cells, or the over-stimulation of the sensory nerves by means of some mechanical device, or otherwise. There is, however, an important distinction between those cases in which the suspension of the discriminative function is accomplished through the exaltation of will, and those in which it is brought about by the stupefaction or gagging of the intellect, or by the paralysis of the will itself; for, in the former case, the will is conscious of its supremacy, and itself dispenses with the services of the intellect; while in the latter, it is deprived of its guidance by some outside cause. Hence, it is not only not conscious of its supremacy in the latter condition, but is also affected by the paralysis of the intellect more or less. Fascination is an instance in point.

Now, an impression of the hypnotic sort is, psychologically, a phenomenon of the same type or class as any other kind of idea. The difference between a suggestion given by one to oneself, that is, a mental resolve to do a certain act on a future occasion, and that given by the operator in the hypnotic state, lies in the fact that in the former case it reaches the individual will through the portal of the intellect, and, for that reason, is the result of the exercise of deliberate choice; while in the latter, i.e., in hypnotism, reason is held in abeyance, and, thus, not in a position to know of what passes directly between the operator and the will. Hence, the individual remains ignorant of what takes place in the hypnotic trance, unless the operator intend otherwise.

This being the only difference between the act of deliberate choosing and the hypnotic suggestion, obviously, the execution

neither of our own resolution nor of the operator's command can have anything to do with the faculty of reason, except in so far as will chooses to avail itself of its assistance; and since there is no other force capable of voluntary activity, it is will and will alone which is concerned in carrying out the idea which it adopts in one of the two ways described above. Now, because the same faculty, namely, will, is concerned in carrying out its own as well as the operator's suggestion, it is legitimate to infer that it adopts the same procedure in both cases. Hence, the same mechanism would be employed in both instances, so that, if we could know its *modus operandi* in one case, we should know it in the other as well.

Now, when we wish to do some act on a certain date in the future, we form some mental scheme of the process which will culminate in the desired act. This may be done deliberately, or merely by linking the idea of the end to some habitual act, which is to be performed about the same time, and of which the end in view may be a natural culmination. In either case, the scheme is an association of more or less complex processes. In carrying out the hypnotic suggestion it may be assumed that the will adopts a similar procedure, though unaided by reason. It links the idea of the end in view to some particular group of processes which tend that way, and leaves it to the habitual discharge of its own involuntary energy to do the rest. That will is capable of doing all this seems wonderful, but then hypnotism itself is no less wonderful! Will is not the same thing as blind or unconscious force, as it used to be supposed. Its inherent, wonderful nature is revealed only when it is freed from the tutelage of reason which holds it in leading strings. Traces of its knowledge are ordinarily to be seen even in its automatic activity where each movement is not only precise and proper, but also prefigures the end to be attained,—and all this without the accompaniment of deliberating reason. Will is an aspect of the subjective mind and, therefore, all-knowing potentially. It can take cognizance of its environment by means independent of the physical senses. Hudson points out:

"it performs its highest functions when the objective senses are in abeyance. In a word, it is that intelligence which makes itself manifest in a hypnotic subject when he is in a state of somnambulism. In this state many of the most wonderful

feats of the subjective mind are performed. It sees without the natural organs of vision; and in this, as in many other grades, or degrees, of the hypnotic state, it can be made, apparently, to leave the body, and to travel to distant lands and bring back intelligence, oft-times of the most exact and truthful character. It has also the power to read the thoughts of others, even to the minutest details; to read the contents of sealed envelopes and closed books. In short, it is the subjective mind which possesses what is popularly designated as clairvoyant power, and the ability to apprehend the thoughts of others without the aid of the ordinary means of communication. In point of fact, that which for convenience I have chosen to designate as the subjective mind appears to be a separate and distinct entity and the real distinctive difference between the two minds seems to consist in the fact that the objective mind is merely the function of the brain, while the subjective mind is a distinct entity, possessing independent powers and functions, having a mental organisation of its own, and being capable of sustaining an existence independently of the body. In other words, it is the soul."

The subjective mind also seems to possess the power to move ponderable objects without any visible physical contact, but its power and activities are inversely proportionate to the vigour of the objective mind. It controls the functions, sensations, and conditions of the body, and is itself amenable to control by suggestion. The body is like a confederation, composed of cells, permeated with life.

"Science teaches us," says Hudson, "that the whole body is made up of a confederation of intelligent entities, each of which performs its functions with an intelligence exactly adapted to the performance of its special duties as a member of the confederacy. There is indeed no life without mind, from the lowest unicellular organism up to man. It is, therefore, a mental energy that actuates every fibre of the body under all its conditions."

The physiology of the action of the two minds, the subjective and the objective, is thus explained by the author of *Medical Hypnotism* :—

"Under normal conditions, our concepts of ideas and actions are derived from two sources; one from the automatic instinctive or sub-conscious department, the acts which are done without any reasoning, without our consciousness of the acts; the other from the so-called conscious department, the acts which are reasoned and controlled by the sensory faculties. The former are the crude, natural, unchecked automatism of the brain of the child and savage, which is governed by fictitious conception of imaginative impulse of the sub-conscious state; the latter are the refined regulated sensory actions and ideas of the brain of the grown-up

and civilized man, which are developed by education and are therefore reasoned, moderated and controlled. Reason imposes a check upon brain automatism, and creates a rational state of consciousness. Nevertheless, we notice the phenomena of automatic brain activity manifested daily in the waking state, even in the rational and educated man. We walk in a mechanical way, to such an extent, that we often pass the limits assigned by the creative will of the mind, which directed our first-step. We swim or we play on the piano, our fingers wandering mechanically on the keyboard without stopping, and very frequently we converse while playing, swimming or even writing, and allow ourselves to be absorbed by foreign thoughts while doing something else. The child is impulsive and chaotic. It protects itself from injury instinctively. We raise our hands, close our eyes, on the slightest provocation, reflexly and automatically. The child jumps, screams and laughs, according to one or the other impression which it receives. We dance, make involuntary motions of our body and limbs, when a familiar melody is suggested to our mind by the harmonious accord of music. We see in our dreams existing realities, and rejoice in happy, and weep in horrible, imaginative scenes. We are made victors and victims in our dreams. Poor human reason is carried by the current stream of imagination; the proudest mind thus yields to hallucination. Real and imaginative images appear before our closed eyes, and during this sleep, that is to say, during over a quarter of our existence, we become the plaything of the dreams which imagination calls forth. Even in the waking state we notice many analogical actions and thoughts. The soldier in the army submits to orders of his superior officer, performs bodily movements, commits terrible acts mechanically, automatically, and without any reason. At the command 'fire,' his conscious faculties are paralyzed and he fires automatically. 'There exists,' says Dr. Despine, 'an automatic brain activity which manifests itself without the occurrence of the ego; for all movements possess, in accordance with the law which governs brain activity, an intelligent power without any ego and without any personality. Under hypnotic suggestion, psychic faculties are made to manifest their inherent automatic functions to their utmost capacities. That there is a nexus between the two minds that enables them to act in perfect synchronism when occasion requires, is necessarily true.' It is to this synchronism that we are indebted for what is designated as 'genius.' It is also in evidence on occasions of great importance to the individual, as when danger is imminent, or some great crisis is impending."

According to the most authoritative views, the subjective mind is invested with full control over the vital functions of the body, which accounts for the mysterious and wonderful phenomena of hypnotism and mental healing.

Hypnotism itself may be defined as the induction of a peculiar psychical condition which releases the subjective mind, for the time being, from the dominion of the lower, or the objective mind. The

'conscious' mind is, in a sense, a guard or sentinel on the sub-conscious, with reason as a check imposed on the brain automatism. Hence, we must overpower and vanquish the sentinel of reason, if we wish to set the subjective mind free to express itself. Dr. Ram Narain maintains (see *Medical Hypnotism*):—

"Suppress consciousness, suppress the voluntary brain activities, and you have a case of somnambulism which, according to Despine, is characterized physiologically by the exercise of the automatic activity alone of the brain, and the paralysis of the conscious activity of the brain which manifests the ego."

It is in this condition that the formation of blisters full of serum results from the application of postage stamps or plain paper to the body of the 'patient,' regarding whom *Medical Hypnotism* records:—

"At your suggestion he smells the strongest ammonia as camphor and eats quinine with the same relish as sugar, and what is most strange is the fact that he gets no harm at all."

When the objective mind has retired from the scene, or crawled into its shell and 'pulled in the lid' after it, suggestion takes effect and materializes the suggested condition in the body of flesh. The subjective mind does not reason; it accepts the suggestion as true and performs its functions accordingly. It is obvious, therefore, that any wrong suggestion given to the subjective mind will produce evil effect, which will continue to exist, so long as a counter-manding suggestion is not imparted to the individual will. The cure of ills and ailments, therefore, most obviously, lies in a reversal of the wrong process. Two things have to be done to counteract the evil effects of harmful suggestion, and these are: (1) the removal of the existing evil, and (2) the prevention of its recurrence. The first requires the removal of the suggestion which is the cause of trouble, and the second necessitates our being on guard against all possible evil and harmful suggestions in the future.

The suggestion of 'wholeness' may be made by one person to another, as by a mental healer to his patient; it may also be made by the patient himself, in which case it is known as auto-suggestion.

In the words of Hudson, "Other things being equal, an auto-suggestion is more potent than a suggestion from an extraneous source, for the simple reason that an auto-suggestion is generally backed by the objective convictions of the patient, whereas a suggestion by another may directly contravene the patient's objective reason and experience, — not that the latter may not be effective when it is made with force and persistence, but that the former is more easily and naturally effective, either as a moral or therapeutic agency."

As regards preventive suggestion, the same writer maintains: —

"It is always easy to prevent an adverse suggestion from taking effect in the mind; and that is by not allowing it to find an entrance. To that end one should never allow himself to think, much less to talk, on the subject of the wholesomeness or digestibility of food that is set before him."

What is true in respect of physical health is also equally true in respect of mental well-being, the rule governing them both being the same, namely, 'as one thinks, so one becomes.' We see the power of thought conspicuously in evidence during epidemics, when many persons suffer from fright.

Prevention and cure of evil, therefore, lie within the power of all, the certainty and permanency of results depending on the degree of knowledge and its legitimate use. This is precisely what the Yogis say, and is exactly what is meant by the symbology of the 'Fall' in the book of Genesis. According to the former, all power including that of controlling death and destiny comes to him who brings his little ego under his control, and establishes himself in the beatific state of *samadhi* (trance of Self-realization); and according to the latter it is the sentinel of the 'flaming sword which turns in every direction' that stands between man and Life 'more abundant and full.' Immortality is to be obtained by him who overpowers this sentinel and reaches the Tree of Life, and immortality includes all powers.

Religion summed up the entire subject ages before the dawn of modern civilization, and sent it to the World, from time to time. Different teachers have used different words, indeed, but the sense and substance have always been the same, whenever and wherever

the utterances have proceeded forth from the lips of the truly illumined sages; for Religion is neither a sect, nor a scripture, nor, indeed, anything other than Truth itself; and, although the books that contain its teachings may not be very ancient or old in so far as their writing is concerned, it is, in very truth, older than the oldest document extant, more ancient than the most ancient sage who opened his lips to discourse upon its eternity, or the earliest Saviour who saved himself with its aid—in fact, it is eternal. Unfortunately for man, his love of money and other worldly things has so hardened his heart that he has lost the power of benefiting himself by the teaching of the Saviours, and has drifted farther and farther away from truth with the advance of time. He respected the Teachers for the miracles they wrought, or are said to have wrought, but there ended his interest in them and in their teachings. By considering these God-men supernatural beings he has reduced himself to the status of wretched helplessness, altogether forgetting that what one man can do all others can achieve also. The most elementary study of the Spiritual Laws suffices to show that the God-men of the past were superhuman only in the sense that they had developed the super-conscious powers of their souls, and, for that reason, were enabled to perform deeds which to the ordinary mediocre being appear to be miraculous.

Almost all the miracles of the past saviours of mankind can be explained with the aid of the mental laws already known. Here is one of them, which though unacceptable as a historical fact, in view of the mythological nature of the Mahabharata, from which it is taken, yet affords interesting data for study. A little before the breaking out of the Great Mahabharata War, and at the time when the five Pandava brothers were living in seclusion, in the forest, with Draupadi, the wife of Arjuna, a certain Rishi, Durvāsa by name, once visited their secluded habitation with an enormous crowd of *chelas* (disciples) and others, numbering close upon ten thousand. For certain reasons, he timed his visit to an hour when it was not possible for the Pandava brothers to entertain the party to a feast; and it was well-known that the *muni's* displeasure brooded ill far beyond the power of ordinary mortals to bear. Draupadi, seeing consternation

depicted on the faces of the Pandava brothers, prayed for deliverance to Krishna, who responded by appearing in person before her. The tradition has it that Krishna himself put a little particle of some boiled herb, which was the only edible available at the time, in his holy mouth, and, chewing it with great relish, declared that his hunger was appeased. The *Rîsi* and his followers, who had been bathing in the beautiful Jamuna, in the pleasant expectation of a princely feast, now felt as if they had gorged themselves with food, and, fearing the displeasure of the Pandavas, fled away, and would not return when asked to do so. In this manner did Krishna save the honour of the Pandava brothers. Now, it does seem wonderful that Krishna ate the particle of the boiled herb, and Durvâsa lost his hunger ; but there is nothing supernatural in it. The attention of the reader is invited to an interesting experiment made by Dr. Coche which is quoted in *Medical Hypnotism*, in his own words, as follows :—

" Placing a screen between myself and my ' subject,' I made my assistant serve her a glass of water, and while fixing my thoughts on her I put some Cayenne pepper on my tongue. No sooner had the subject brought the water to her lips than she exclaimed : ' Some one has just put pepper in my mouth.' As nobody knew of my having put pepper in my mouth the experiment was certainly conclusive."

The difference between the miracle of the boiled herb and the experiment of Dr. Coche is only one of degree, the intensity of the concentrated thought of a modern investigator being to that of an advanced *yogi* as a spark to the Sun. Dr. Coche could affect only his ' subject ' with his own taste, but the sovereign power of the Lord of Yoga is able to manifest itself on a much larger scale. But as stated before this only shows that the author of the great epic was familiar with the working of the law of suggestion.

The views held by modern thinkers concerning the miraculous healing ascribed to Jesus may be summed up in a few sentences. ' There is nothing supernatural in the miraculous cures effected by Jesus. On the other hand, mental healing is a science ; the power that heals resides in the patient. This was the doctrine taught by Jesus and pitomized in the expression, " thy faith hath made thee whole." '

The whole art of mental healing consists in inducing faith in the patient and developing his latent power ; and suggestion is the most potent means for that purpose. What Jesus did, or is said to have done, can also be done by others, as he is himself reported to have said :—

" Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that believeth on me, the works that I do shall he do also ; and greater works than these shall he do ; because I go unto my father " (John xiv. 12).

The agreement between the Hindu Scriptures and the Holy Bible on the point of miracles might be shown by a single quotation from the " Yoga Vasista " :—

" Through right enquiry, the object of enquiry can be found like the essence in milk. One who has equality of vision through the enjoyment of the final beatitude will wear it as his foremost ornament ; will never degrade himself from that state ; will be able to digest all things taken in—like sugarcandy by a swan, whether such things are polluted or mixed with poison or are injurious to health or adulterated. Whether they swallow virulent poison or counter-poison or milk or sugarcane-juice or food, they will preserve a perfect equanimity of mind. Whether one plants his dagger deep in their head or preserves it, they will regard them neither as friends nor as foes. Since persons of equal vision will look upon all equally, their hearts will be filled with bliss."

This compares well with the passage in the second Evangel (see Mark xvi. 17-18) reproduced below :—

" In my name they shall cast out devils ; they shall speak with new tongues ; they shall take up serpents ; and if they drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them ; they shall lay hands on the sick, and they shall recover."

Recent research, especially that of the New Nancy School, has clearly demonstrated the fact that healing miracles are really due to the wondrous powers of the patient himself. Most wonderful results have occurred, in many cases instantaneously, where the imagination of the patient has accepted the suggested condition. Actual physical pain has been seen to depart, in less than a minute, by the mere entertainment of the thought that it is departing, accompanied by a gentle stroking of the affected part, and by the rapid and audible

repetition of the word 'going.' Any one can cure himself of his ailments in this way, no special training being required for success.

The procedure is simplicity itself, and consists in imagining the desired state of bodily health, which will be realized without anything further being done. But the idea should reach the Sub-conscious Power and not left to be debated over by the intellect, though the form of the idea (or word, as the case may be) is to be determined in the first instance by the intellect itself. The reason of this is that the intellect is not the faculty of action, but only of discrimination, while Life is normally only active and not discriminating. Hence the form of the suggestion is to be determined intellectually in the first instance, and then it is to be impressed on the Subjective Mind without the intermediation of reason. Now, there are two ways of avoiding the intermediation of reason, one of which is natural and the other artificial. In the natural way the reasoning faculty is somnolent; hence inactive, twice every day; namely, firstly, in the morning, just at the moment that we wake up from sleep and before we are fully awake, and, secondly, at the moment of falling asleep at night when the eyes are about to close in sleep. On both these occasions, when the reasoning faculty is not sufficiently active to be an obstacle in the way, a given suggestion will directly reach the Subjective Self. In the other way, the reasoning faculty is to be dethroned artificially. This is achieved easily by the closing of the eyes and the relaxation of bodily tension. With the world of phenomena shut out from the view and the tension of attention more or less completely relaxed, the intellect is left neither with an inclination for exertion nor with an idea or object on which to fasten itself, and the conditions most favourable for a trance are produced. At this moment there occurs a "welling up of virtue" in the Sub-conscious Self, and it is this 'virtue' which is potent and effective in the curing of disorders, though, as already observed, it is not discriminating in the real sense of the term. Hence the supreme importance of Reason in the selection of the proper suggestion that is to be imparted to the sub-conscious mind. As regards the question: how is an auto-suggestion to be impressed on the Subjective Mind? there is only one way of doing this, and it consists in the isolation of the idea or thought to be

imparted from all other thoughts, ideas and inclinations, and in allowing the mind to dwell on it for a while. This will result in the absorption of the new thought into the fluid dynamic substance of life which will suffice to bring about the desired condition speedily, at times almost miraculously.

As already stated, the Subjective mind does not proceed to effect a catastrophe or cure by deliberation. Its process is simple, almost automatic. The modification or change implied in the acceptance of the suggestion itself brings about a general readjustment of things. This explains why a simple thought of health suffices to remove the conditions of ill-health from the different bodily organs, without its being necessary to elaborate out a detailed suggestion for every separate part.

The procedure we have described above is that which is followed by the New Nancy School. But the greatest discovery of this school is the Law of Reversed Effort, the credit of which belongs to *Monsieur Emile Coué*. It would, however, seem that miraculous healing by suggestion and auto-suggestion is really a part of Yoga, and was known and practised in India in the days long long past. Unfortunately its scientific aspect came to be lost sight of altogether in a later age, and it has now come down to us from hoary antiquity in the unscientific way it is given in the Yoga Sūtras of Patanjali. In this form and in the hands of its unscientific "professors" it is more likely to do harm than good, and that is the reason why it has come into bad odour with men of light and learning. Nevertheless it is obvious that the entire process of imparting a given suggestion is comprised in the terms *pratyāhāra*, *dhāraṇā* and *dhyaṇa* which precede *yoga samādhi*. *M. Charles Baudouin* has the following note on this subject in his highly interesting work entitled "Suggestion and Auto-suggestion":—

"As one of the curiosities of history, and further as a lesson in humility, we may point out that the states just described under the names of collectedness [the willing up of the Sub-conscious Life], contention [effortless attention], and auto-hypnosis, are described, with considerable psychological acumen though not of course in modern psychological terminology, in the precepts by which, for centuries past, the Yogis of Hindustan have been accustomed to attain self-mastery. The two states whose

acquirement must be the novices's first aim are known as *pratyākāra* (mental examination) and *dhāraṇā* (concentration of the mind upon a thought)."

The discovery of the Law of the Reversed Effort which has been already referred to concerns the functions of the imagination and will, and proves that in cases of conflict between them the former easily triumphs over the latter. C. H. Brooks thus explains the nature of this conflict ("The Practice of Auto-suggestion," p. 66) :—

"This doctrine is in no sense a negation of the will. It simply puts it in its right place, subordinates it to a higher power. A moment's reflection will suffice to show that the will cannot be more than the servant of thought. We are incapable of exercising the will unless the imagination has first furnished it with a goal. We cannot simply will, we must will *something* and that something exists in our minds as an idea. The will acts rightly when it acts in harmony with the idea in the mind."

With reference to the Law of Reversed Effort Baudouin maintains :—

"When an idea imposes itself on the mind to such an extent as to give rise to a suggestion, all the conscious efforts which the subject makes in order to counteract this suggestion are not merely without the desired effect, but they actually run counter to the subject's conscious wishes and tend to intensify suggestion. The efforts are spontaneously reversed so as to reinforce the effect of the dominant idea. Whenever is any one in this state of mind, 'I should like to, but I cannot,' he may wish as much as he pleases; but the harder he tries the less is he able." *Suggestion and Auto-suggestion*, p. 118).

Another thing to bear in mind in connection with this Law of Reversed Effort is this that the suggestion to be given should not contradict a pre-existing conviction of the subject, for it would not then be accepted, and might even end disastrously, by augmenting the trouble which it is intended it should cure. For instance, it is no good one's saying to oneself 'I have not got headache' when one actually has it. The mind will immediately declare the statement to be false, and the headache will be aggravated as the result of the re-inforcement of fact by suggestion! What one should suggest to oneself in such a case is: 'my headache is departing' or something else to that effect.

Perhaps the class of miracles ascribed to Jesus and other saviours which one finds most difficult to believe is that of which the case of the daughter of Jairus forms a typical instance. The question,

however, is not whether any one can perform them today, and thus put their occurrence beyond the possibility of doubt and dispute, but whether the revival of the dead is an event which is altogether beyond the range of possibility? It would be harsh logic, indeed, to say that, because the secret is not known to us, therefore, it does not exist in nature at all; for it might be only waiting to be discovered by us, as it was discovered by the ancients. It might be that the conditions for the successful performance of the miracle are so rigid, that the secret, although known to and practised by certain saints of the higher order and imparted by them to their immediate disciples, could not be utilized by their remoter followers of a less developed spirituality. It might also be that the power cannot be exercised in certain cases at all, as in decapitation, where the continuity of the system is completely severed once for all.

The relation between the soul and the physical body resembles and may be likened to that between a central spring and the fields to be irrigated by it. This will be clear on a little reflection. The physical beginning of the individual organism may be taken to be the fertilized ovum which is a single cell formed in the body of the female parent, and fecundated by the spermatozoon in the father's seed. Before conception, however, neither the ovum nor the spermatozoon is complete enough in itself, and, for that reason, neither is capable of development or growth as an embryo. The fusion of their *nuclei* results in the formation of a complete cell which becomes the starting point of a fresh incarnation for the migrating soul. The cell now immediately sets out on the path of embryonic growth, and the formation of the organism begins. By the process of successive divisions, new cells are formed from this single primitive 'parent,' and come to occupy their proper places in the system. This process continues till the organism grows into a colony of cells, with numerous centres of control to regulate their function and movement. As new cells are formed and put in their proper positions in the body, life flows out from the centre to cover them up with its ramifications, and thus brings them under control. This is how the subjective mind of the individual controls and governs the functions of the cells which constitute the body. As regards health, the rule seems to be that

so long as this central spring is overflowing with the fluid of life, and its waters reach the vital organs, health and youth are maintained ; but when, owing to some cause or other, obstacles spring up which prevent the living waters from reaching the bodily cells, then such of them as receive no supply or only an insufficient quantity of it, decline to contribute their share to the general well-being of the organism, setting up all sorts of disease and other forms of unhealthy complications in the system. Hence, the choking up of the central spring must mean death to the individual. In diseased conditions, such as paralysis, the subjective mind is unable to exercise control, wholly or partially, over the affected limb, and the same thing happens in cases of atrophy, in which the affected part dries up, for want of a proper supply of the living waters of life. When a sudden shock of a violent nature occurs in the experience of the individual, and the central spring is affected, there occurs a dislocation in one or more of the many pivots connected with the channels of communication, and the connection between the central organ and some vital part of the body is cut off. This means the death of the individual ordinarily. Now, if we can induce the subjective mind, which has full control over the cells of the body, to re-establish the broken communication once more, the dead might be revived. The action of the heart, which stops owing to the deranged and ruptured condition of the channels of the nervo-vital fluid, may also, it would seem, be restored in some cases at least by artificial movements or rhythmical vibrations.* By this means the 'dislocation' caused in the chamber of the heart will gradually yield to the treatment and healthy action will ultimately be restored.

The case of the daughter of Jairus, however, was not subjected to this kind of treatment. It was not necessary for a master *Yogi* to resort to scientific appliances to effect a cure. Modern Science does not know how to control the mind without the aid of drugs and instruments ; but a *yogi's* spiritual power renders their use quite unnecessary for him, as he can influence the subject's mind by a mere

* Some French scientists are reported to have revived certain electrocuted animals by the rhythmical application of the electric current. It is regarded as "proved beyond doubt that respiration and heart-beatings—life itself—can be definitely and permanently re-instituted in a body from which, by accepted medical evidence, life had departed" (see the *Practical Medicine* for March 1908).

word of command. We shall analyze the procedure followed in raising the daughter of Jairus to understand its underlying principle.

At the very outset, Jesus assured the father of the maiden that she was not dead, but merely asleep.* Since untruth cannot be ascribed to Jesus his words could have been addressed only to keep the subjective mind of her father (who in all probability was in telepathic rapport with her) from affecting her injuriously any more. Next, he turned out the minstrels and others who were creating a disturbance, and thus exerting harmful influence on the mind of the 'dead' girl. He then took three of his most spiritually developed disciples into the chamber, to aid him in influencing the subjective mind of the maiden, and finally raised her with a powerful suggestion. She was then given something to eat, probably with a view to remove all doubt from her mind as to her revivification.

Many such miracles are mentioned in connection with the prophets and seers of the past. But it is not always clear whether they are to be taken literally or in a hidden sense.† The only fact that emerges clearly from these instances is that the death of the physical organism is merely synonymous, at least in such cases, with the breach of communications between the central fountain-spring and some vital part of the body, and that the work of restoration to life depends upon the

* Cf. "To sleep is to become disinterested. A mother who sleeps by the side of her child will not stir at the sound of thunder, but the sigh of the child will wake her. Does she really sleep in regard to her child? We do not sleep in regard to what continues to interest us."—"Dreams" by H. Bergson.

† In the allegorical sense the miracles will signify the restoration of the spiritual powers and functions that lie unmanifest in the case of the ordinary unredeemed soul (the opening out of the eyes and the unstopping of ears as in the case of Osiris *vide* the Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics (Vol. ix. 75). The curing of the paralytic and the halt and lame will also receive a similar interpretation. The seven evil spirits that were cast out of Mary Magdalene very probably represent the seven evil forces which stand in the way of the acquisition of the Right Faith, namely, three kinds of false beliefs (untruth, mixed truth and falsehood, and truth tinged with superstition) and four of the most powerful of passions (*viz.*, anger, pride, deceit and greed of the extra vicious quality). Lazarus, similarly, might well stand for a divine attribute that is unfunctioning owing to the influence of these passions of the fourth (the extra vicious) degree of intensity (technically known as the *anantanubandhi*, see the Practical Path), for he lay dead four days. Similar spiritual import will have to be read into the other miracles.

restoration of the broken communications. The law of suggestion works here just as effectively as elsewhere, and it is undoubtedly suggestion which is the cause of premature death in many cases. A life-long scepticism of the powers of the soul and a constant fear of death must produce their effect, sooner or later, on the body, so that when some illness, more serious than any other which it has been the patient's lot in life to suffer from, supervenes, he grows suspicious of life and believes that the time for death has come. Add to this the effect to be produced on the mind by the visit of specialists, the whispering of anxious relatives and friends, the solemn and scared looks of the attendants, the anxiety of the family lawyer for the disposal of property, and it can be easily seen how the combined influence of them all, to say nothing of a number of other minor depressing and dispiriting incidents and events, will act as a most powerful suggestion for death which the subjective mind will have no alternative but to adopt. The effect of such a forcible suggestion is that it renders the mind unconscious of its own operations, paralyzes the brain and breaks up nervous connections. This is death, if the rupture of communications is accompanied by the departure of the soul from the body. But it is quite conceivable that the soul may not leave the organism in certain cases immediately, notwithstanding the cessation of the functions of the vital organs. In these cases probably the channels of communication are not completely destroyed but only become clogged, so that the work of restoration to life would seem to depend on the removal of the clogging obstacle from the path. This might be done by suggestion, as in the case of the daughter of Jairus, or by artificial breathing, as in cases of drowning, or by any other suitable means. We may, therefore, conclude that the restoration of the dead to life is not, by any means, a matter which we should be justified in considering to be altogether beyond the range of possibility.

Among minor miracles we might refer to those of Swami Rama Tirtha who died not many years ago. While living, in seclusion, in the Himalayan forests he often encountered wild beasts; but they did him no harm. Once he was confronted by five bears; but they walked away without molesting him in the least. On another occasion he met a wild wolf; and again a tiger encountered him in the same

jungle. The *Swami* himself explains the reason of his remaining unmolested by these beasts. "Why was it? Simply on account of fearlessness. Rama was filled with that spirit: I am not the body. I am not the mind; the Supreme Divinity I am, I am God; no fire can burn me, no weapon wound me. They (the wild beasts) were looked straight in the eyes and they ran away."

We could cite many similar instances from ancient records, but it would serve no useful purpose to quote them here. But for the corroboration these statements have received from modern psychical research, the sceptic would have raised his voice against them, and proclaimed them to be beyond the range of possibility. He is, however, compelled to hold his peace now that some great thinkers have declared their belief, on scientific grounds, in such phenomenal occurrences. Says Mr. Hudson:—

"Facts of record are not wanting to sustain the proposition that man in a subjective, or partially subjective condition, is safe from the attacks of wild beasts. One of the first recorded instances, and the one most familiar, is the story of Daniel. Daniel was a prophet,—a seer. At this day he would be known in some circles as a spiritual medium; in other words, as a mind reader, a clairvoyant, etc.—according to the conception of each individual as to the origin of his powers. In other words, he was a man possessed of great subjective powers. He was naturally and habitually in that state in which, in modern parlance, the threshold of his consciousness was displaced, and the powers of his soul were developed. In this state he was thrown into the lion's den, with the result recorded. The sceptic as to the divine authenticity of scriptures can readily accept this story as literally true when he recalls the experiments made in Paris a few years ago. In that city a young lady was hypnotized and placed in a den of lions. The object of the experiment is not now recalled; but the result was just the same as that recorded of the ancient prophet. She had no fear of the lions, and the lions paid not the slightest attention to her. The adepts of India, and even the inferior priests of the Buddhistical faith, often display their powers by entering the jungles, so infested by man-eating tigers that ordinary man would not live an hour, and remain there all night, with no weapons of defence save the God-given powers of the soul"—(*The Law of Psychic Phenomena*).

Religion teaches us that what was done once can be done again, and by each and every one of us; and Dr. Coche's experiment is a practical demonstration of its eternal truth. When man becomes perfect, 'like the Father,' he will have the power of performing

all the miracles which have been ascribed to the numerous God-men of the past. But the acquisition of the 'Father-like' perfection depends, as has been seen before, upon the dominion one acquires over one's objective mind, which will set the subjective intelligence free, and enable the soul to realize its latent godly powers and divine potentialities. The secret of success lies in the removal of the wrong impressions which are now guiding our conduct in the numerous walks of life, and which have formed deep-rooted habits of thought with us. Religion points out that the initial cause of misery is the belief in one's identity with the body, and prescribes a renunciation of all those actions and thoughts which encourage, or confirm, the conviction. Suggestion must also be harnessed into service, since it is one of the most potent means of subjugating the lower mind. The value of suggestion is coming to be recognised on all hands. M. Jean Finot observes in 'The Philosophy of Long Life':—

"It is suggestion ill-employed which undoubtedly shortens it [life]. Arrived at a certain age, we drug ourselves with the idea of the approaching end. We lose faith in our powers, and they abandon us. Under the pretext of the weight of age upon our shoulders, we take on sedentary habits. We cease to busy ourselves with our occupations. Little by little our blood, vitiated by idleness, together with our ill-renewed tissues, open the door to all kinds of diseases. Premature old age attacks us, and we succumb sooner than we need in consequence of a harmful auto-suggestion. Now let us try to live by auto-suggestion instead of dying by it. Let us have ever before our eyes the numerous examples of robust and healthy old age. We must store up in our brains healthy, serene, and comfortable suggestions."

The *yogis* insist that we must first rub off the store of recorded unhealthy suggestions from our memory, and re-arrange our ideas in the light of the knowledge of Truth. This, however, cannot be accomplished without enormous labour, inasmuch as memory is not a thing which can be taken out, cleansed and put back in its place by any known process. Severe physical and mental drilling, necessitating the closing up of old and deeply-rooted tracks in the nervous matter of the brain and the spinal column, and the opening up of new paths, in place thereof, is required for that purpose. As Vivekananda observes:—

"We will find later on that in the study of these psychological matters there will be a good deal of action going on in the body. Nerve currents will have to be replaced

and given a new channel. New sorts of vibrations will begin, the whole constitution will be remodelled as it were. But the main part of the action will lie along the spinal column, so that the one thing necessary for the posture is to hold the spinal column free, sitting erect, holding the three parts—the chest, neck and the head—in a straight line."

Any one cultivating the habit of concentration will perceive subtle changes taking place in his nerves, particularly in those of the head and the face. It is due to these changes that the face of the *yogi* becomes calm and shining, his features refined and beautiful, and his voice melodious and musical; and it is also due to these changes that the development of the higher faculties takes place in him. It is no longer disputed that there are certain regions, or centres, within the human system which perform specific functions. The faculties and powers of man are due to the development of these centres, or regions, and his shortcomings also are to be traced to an undeveloped, or atrophied, state of one or more of them.* The *yogi* may develop any or all of these centres at will, the only thing necessary being to rearrange the nervous matter and to stimulate it into activity. How this is to be accomplished, is a secret of practical *yoga* which is usually only imparted, by word of mouth, to capable deserving men; but its principle may be taken to consist in the accomplishment of systematic relaxations of bodily tensions that are obstructing the free functioning of certain powerful nervous currents, e.g., the *kundalini* (Serpent Power), which is said to be residing in the *mulādhāra* (the basic) plexus.

A word of warning seems necessary here about practising the methods of *Yoga*. Involving, as these practices do, many important changes in the arrangement of the brain cells and nerve currents, the tyro, unless he has thoroughly understood and mastered the subject, and is extremely cautious in his method, is likely to do himself great injury by practising *Yoga* exercises without being duly instructed by a

* Injury of the motor regions in the head, for instance, causes what is known as aphemia or motor aphasia, which is not the loss of voice nor paralysis of the tongue or lips, but the inability to utter any words at all, or the utterance of a few meaningless stock phrases, as speech, mispronouncing, misplacing, and misusing one's words in various degrees—(Prof. James),

qualified teacher. A slight error in some apparently trifling detail, a little misapprehension of the natural ease of posture, and even a slight overdoing of some particular exercise have often been known to have had a most calamitous ending. Many persons have gone mad for want of proper guidance in their Yoga practice. It is for this reason that the guidance of a *guru* (preceptor), who knows the practical difficulties which the novice generally encounters, and who can help him to get over them, by means of practical suggestions, learnt in his own novitiate, is considered and prescribed as indispensable. Except in rare circumstances, no one can afford to ignore this piece of advice of the ancient *rishis*, who founded this Science. But the difficulty, it is said, does not stand much in the way of the followers of *Jnana* Yoga who aim at the attainment of right knowledge, leaving all other details to adjust themselves. Says *Swāmi* Rama Tirtha :—

"There is no necessity of your retiring into the forests and pursuing abnormal practices to realize Vedantic Yoga. You are the father of Yoga, Śiva Himself, when you are lost in activity or merged in work."

This is, no doubt, true theoretically, for as ignorance of the godly nature of the soul has been the cause of trouble in the past, the change of belief, in the right direction, now, must bring about the state of at-one-ment with the Self. All the Yoga that need be performed by the *jñāni*, therefore, consists in an unshakable conviction in the truth of the Ātman, i.e., the soul, being the *Paramātmān*, that is, God. In practice, however, it will be found that the strengthening of faith is a much harder task than many would imagine it to be. There are thousands of men in India and elsewhere who know and theoretically believe their souls to be Gods, yet they are hopelessly involved in delusion and utterly helpless against its temptations and snares. These men have no idea of what the actual enjoyment or realization of God-consciousness means. For that depends on such a degree of unshakable, unchanging conviction of Truth that one should be prepared to stake one's all, that is, to risk one's very life, if necessary, in its cause. Such a conviction necessitates a complete saturation of the mind with belief in one's own Godhood and in the harmfulness of the pleasures of the world! An early endeavour, it will be

observed, is made in every rational religion to strengthen the devotee's faith by various means. The constant reading of works like *Purānas*, which in simple, easy language teach and illustrate the great truths of the divine philosophy, the recitation of *kathās* (biographies of saints and deified beings), the constant meditation on the sense and teaching of the *Śāstras*, the daily chanting of hymns and holy *mantras*, such as *Om*, and the fixing of the mind on certain nervous centres, *not with the object of acquiring psychic powers*, but with the sole aim of realizing the great and beatific condition of liberation from the bondage of delusion and flesh, are some of the many means suggested by religion. The curbing of evil emotions and unholy passions, the giving of suitable gifts to learned and deserving men, the daily devotion and meditation, all tending to destroy personal hopes and fears and ambitions, which owe their origin to the flesh, are also acts well-calculated to lead the mind to overthrow the dominion of matter and the thralldom of the senses. The Christian doctrine of the Eucharist, too, was intended to serve the same purpose, although many have regarded it as a 'hard' saying.

As a matter of fact, it is in the very 'hardness' of the philosophy of the Eucharist that its gist is to be found. As a rule, a rude and irritating remark lingers longer in and makes a deeper impression on the mind than any ordinary philosophical maxim, or complimentary speech; and, for this reason, makes the task of meditation easier of accomplishment.* If the teacher had said, 'the bread ye eat and the wine ye drink have been provided by Nature or God,' no one would have found the statement difficult to 'digest,' and the matter would not have excited any controversial spirit. Knowing the human nature

* Cf. " . . . The mysteries were, on purpose, explained in parables and allegories, so that only those could hear—that had 'ears to hear.' The zest and relish of a doctrine is better realized, when it is presented in a foreign garb. The effort of the mind in realizing it, brings its own reward.

خرش تر آن باشد که سر دلبران - گفته آید در حدیث دیگران -

[Tr.—It will be more charming if the mysteries of the 'beloved' are discovered in the traditions of others!]

— "Studies in Tasawwuf," pp. 118-119.

full well, he gave them a problem of philosophy in the form of a 'hard' saying, and offered them bread and wine, the quality of which was so very unpalatable that they could not be readily swallowed. His object was to make the literal sense of the words employed so highly repugnant and mysterious that their minds should turn from it and become interested in searching their hidden sense, thus deepening the impression each time that bread was broken or wine tasted. All this would have indirectly acted as a strong stimulus to right meditation, but, unfortunately, none of the uninstructed hearers understood him in this light. Some of the more advanced men even grumbled at it.

The true significance of the ritual will become clear if we bear in mind the fact that allegory invaded even the domain of foods. In the Epistle of St. Barnabas, which must have been composed, at the latest, in the early part of the second century, and which might well have been written, as some thinkers have surmised, about A. D. 70—79, over two pages are devoted to the allegorical explanation of the subject. It is said there :—

"Now when Moses said : 'Ye shall not eat . . . eagle, nor crow, nor hawk . . . Thou shalt not,' he means, consort with or make thyself like unto such men as know not how to provide their food by toil and sweat, but seize other people's property in their lawlessness, and lay wait for it, as if walking in guilelessness, and look round to see whom they may strip bare in their rapacity, just as these birds alone provide no food for themselves, but sit idle, and seek how they may devour the flesh of others, being pestilent in their wickedness. Thou shalt not eat,' he says, 'lamprey nor polypus nor cuttlefish.' 'Thou shalt not,' he means, make thyself like unto such men, who are utterly ungodly and are already condemned to death, just as these fishes alone are accursed, and swim in deep water, not coming up like the others, but living on the ground below in the depths ! " (*Epistle of Barnabas*, p. 19).

In the Letter of Aristeas which is a Jewish document about three hundred years older in date than the 'Epistle of Barnabas,' the whole of the teaching concerning the clean and unclean animals had already been recognized as an allegory. The conclusion reached was :

" . . . all these ordinances have been solemnly made for righteousness' sake, to promote holy meditation and the perfecting of character. By these creatures . . . which he called unclean, the law-giver gave us a sign that those for whom the laws are ordained must practise righteousness in their hearts and oppress no one, trusting in their own strength, nor rob one of anything, but must direct their lives by righteous

motives. . . . He has, then, set forth all these rules as to what is permitted us in the case of these and other creatures by way of allegory. . . . So, then, all that is said concerning meats and . . . animals relates to righteousness and righteous dealings between man and man."—*The Letter of Ariston*, Eng. Trans. by H. St. J. Thackeray, pp. 54, 56 and 57.

Aristobulus had also advocated an allegorical interpretation of the injunctions relating to the animals declared lawful and unlawful as food (Farrar's 'History of Interpretation,' p. 169); Tertullian follows him fully when he says :—

"Literal prohibitions about the clean and unclean kinds of food would be quite contemptible" (*Ibid.*, 178).

Unfortunately Farrar was not a student of religion as a science, and failed to be impressed with the allegorical significance of the 'books' though both Clement (see *Writings of Clement*, Vol. ii, pp. 251-252 and 488) and Origen (see *Philocalia*, p. 131) definitely hold the allegorical meaning to be the true significance of the text.

It must be now obvious that the real interpretation of the text :

"Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you" (John vi. 53)—

is that man is recommended to acquire the virtues and qualities of the Ideal, not that he is to tear out the flesh of a living being and sip his blood as if it were wine. The spiritual significance is insisted upon in the Bible itself, which records (John vi. 62) :—

"It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing; the words that I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life."

Thus understood, the sacrament of the Eucharist is of immense philosophical merit, and has a practical value of its own, which is very necessary to be appreciated at its just estimation; for as Swedenborg pointed out :—

"On the knowledge and the acknowledgment of God, depends the salvation of every one; for the universal heaven, and the universal church on earth, and, in general, all religion, has its foundation in a just idea of God: because hereby there is conjunction, and by conjunction, light, wisdom and eternal happiness."

Another important means of strengthening faith is the chanting of holy *mantras*, i.e., religious formulas, or texts, of which the monosyllabic *aum* or *om*, is the most potent, since it is indicative* of the five orders of spiritually evolved beings, *arhats* (Tirthamkaras) *asāriras* (Liberated Souls), *āchāryas* (leaders of saints) *upādhyāyas* (professor saints) and *munis* (ordinary saints).

According to Hinduism, *om* is the most appropriate name of the Deity, because the three letters, *a*, *u*, and *m*, of which the word is composed, denote supremely excellent, supremely high, and supremely wise; for 'a' indicates bliss or *ānanda*, 'au' signifies power, or *aujas*, and 'ma' means supporter or protector.†

Now, since chanting is merely a means to an end, and is resorted to with the sole object of establishing the human mind in divine, godly vibrations, because of the holy ideas of virtue and goodness, which the word chanted conveys, it follows that the term which contains the most exhaustive enumeration of the divine powers and attributes, will form the best means of uplifting the soul. For this reason there is no other word which can claim precedence over *Om*. Concerning the magic potency of the *mantram* *Swami Rama Tirtha* writes:—

"To realize this idea [the divinity of the soul], and to dehypnotize into the Real Self, a beginner gets a great help from the syllable *Om*. While chanting the syllable *Om*, to the Vedantin, the sense, the meaning attached to it, is: 'I am the Light of Lights; I am the Sun, I am the real Sun, the apparent sun is my symbol only. I am the Sun, before whom the planets and all the bodies revolve. . . . I am immovable, eternal, the same yesterday, today and for ever. Before me does this whole globe, this whole universe, unfold itself.'"

Chanting the praises of the Self, thus, is the most potent means for changing the negative rhythm of the soul into the positive one. For, will is all-powerful, but unreasoning, and, for that reason, amenable to suggestion. So long as it is imbued with the idea of powerlessness and impotency, it cannot manifest its divine powers. The singing of its praises, consequently, is the most potent means of purging the individual consciousness of the harmful idea of its supposed weakness, and of lifting it out of the slough of despond and

* See the 'Jaina Philosophy,' by V. R. Gandhi, pp. 85-86.

† See the Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. III, part 1.

negativity. But let it be distinctly understood that mere counting of beads is time absolutely wasted away. Good lies only in meditation on the qualities and attributes of Divinity but not in the words, the rosary, the beads or the thread on which they are strung. He alone who knows and meditates on his soul as a God is to derive any benefit from the practice.

We may now turn our attention to *Bhakti* Yoga which is supposed to be the easiest, and, therefore, the most popular, path of Self-realization. Unfortunately, however, there is no direct causal connection between devotion or love and salvation, so that *Bhakti* must give place to some other method, if it is ever to lead to *Nirvana*. Nevertheless, *Bhakti* is said to lead to God-vision, which is regarded as the goal of evolution by the school of devotional Mysticism. What this notion of God-vision means may be gathered from a little discourse by Sri Ram Krishna Paramahansa, a Hindu saint, who flourished in recent times. Asked by a disciple as to whether it was possible to see God, he replied: "Certainly. These are some of the means by which one can see God: (1) going from time to time into solitude, (2) chanting His names and His attributes, (3) discrimination, and (4) earnest prayer, with a yearning for the Lord. Thou mayest see God, if thy love for Him is as strong as the three attachments put together, viz., the attachment of a worldly man to things of the world, the attachment of the mother to her child, and the attachment of a chaste and devoted wife to her husband. The thing is, in order to see God, one must love Him, heart and soul."

Here also no attempt whatsoever is made to establish any causal connection between the vision of God and individual salvation, nor is any explanation offered of how the sight of another is to afford true and everlasting joy to the soul. The fact is that devotionalism aspires to soar above reason, and is, consequently, not very particular as to the data upon which it rests its conclusions. Hence, the greater the sense of mystery and louder the condemnation of reason in a discourse, the more will it be applauded by the devotee. Here is a sample of a milder type of protest against the voice of the intellect:—

"Only love for the Supreme Lord is true *Bhakti*. To the true *bhakto* all the philosophical distinctions are mere idle talk. He cares nothing for argument, he

does not reason, he 'senses,' he perceives. He wants to lose himself in the pure love of God, and there have been *bhakts* who maintain that this is more to be desired than liberation ; who say, ' I do not want to be sugar, I want to taste sugar.' I want to love and enjoy the Beloved."

This is just one of those passages which serve the purpose of devotionism better than a thousand arguments, and furnish authority for discarding the voice of the intellect. There is no true devotee who does not have his fling at reason when beaten in argument !

With the voice of intellect silenced once for all, we need not feel surprised at the sayings and doings of mystical saints, some of whom even recommend the worshipping of God as one's own child, so that there might remain no feeling of awe or reverence to mar the fulness of love. This is, however, the extreme view, for the idea of devotion is not founded upon the element of fear, and does not recognize the existence of a god, or goddess, to be propitiated or appeased.

There can be no fear in love, nor can *bhakti* be said to begin so long as one is afraid to approach its object. But the remedy for fear does not consist in regarding one's God as one's child, but in transferring one's attention from an unnatural to the natural object of adoration ; for while no one can eternally entertain a feeling of love for an enemy or a chastising dignitary, however much one might 'respect' him for his might, the heart is immediately and inalienably drawn to the true object of love, the moment it is discovered to be worthy of adoration.

Similarly, there is no room in *bhakti* for begging or bargaining with the 'Beloved.' The idea of begging for favours is a sacrilege to the *bhakta*. He will not pray for help, health, wealth, or even to go to heaven. He who wishes to embark on the path of love must give up all such desires, and fill his mind with holy thoughts. He who desires to come into the presence of the 'Beloved' must make a bundle of all shop-keeping religion and cast it away from him before he can be allowed to set his foot within the shrine.

It is not that you do not get what you pray for, for that depends on the working of the laws, but it is low and vulgar—a beggar's religion. Fool, indeed, is he who living on the banks of the Ganges

digs a little well for water. Fool, indeed, is he who coming to a diamond mine begins to search for glass beads. These prayers for help, health, wealth and material prosperity are not *bhakti*; they are the lowest form of *karma*; and they stand in the way of the realization of the great Ideal.

Love is an emotion, not an exchange of goods, or bartering of property; it has nothing in common with the spirit of bargaining. The true *bhakta* cheerfully sacrifices everything for the object of his love, and would willingly give up home, family, wealth, and all else that he might own, to catch but a fleeting glimpse of his Love's resplendent, glorious 'face.' He has ears and eyes only for the object of his love, and takes no interest in the concerns of men. He avoids the company of those engrossed in the affairs of the world, and becomes a wanderer on the face of the earth in search of his 'Beloved,' unmindful of the requirements of the body and of the inclemency of seasons. He disregards both the taunts of men and the importunities of his own lower nature. In a word, he becomes mad with love.

When his love reaches this supreme state of forgetfulness of the world, when his mind is purged of all desires for sensuous enjoyment, and when the consciousness of his own personality has become merged in the emotion of pure love for his true Self, then is the veil lifted up from the ravishing face of the 'Beloved' and he is allowed to drink deep at the very fountain of love and bliss itself. He then realizes the full force of the saying, "What is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" (Matt. xvi. 26). With the dropping of the scales from his eyes, his vision becomes clarified; he hears the mellifluous, melodious voice of love softly whisper in his ear the sweet and vivifying formula—*that thou art*—of divine wisdom; he realizes the joyous import of the words, 'what thou beholdest beauteous creature is thy Self'; his heart leaps up with delight; and, with one bound, as it were, of the ecstasy of super-consciousness, he plunges into the ocean of Joy in his own Self!

We might call this intense love of the *bhakta* madness, if we please,—it is certainly disregarding of what 'soul-less' humanity regard as sound intellectualism—but we must remember that it takes

us not to tears, and sorrow, and darkness in the grave, as worldly wisdom undoubtedly does, but to the Land of Joy and Love and Immortality. Can the love of Mammon lead us an inch beyond Turkish carpets, motor cars, palaces for residence, and the like, all of which tend to expedite the approach of death, but can in no case confer immortality? Blessed is the madness which ends in bliss; who cares for the 'sanity' that leads to the grave!

Those who wish to study the nature of Love from the standpoint of mysticism, will find it beautifully described in the Nārada Sūtra. We shall here give an extract of a few of its passages from an excellent translation by Mr. E. T. Sturdy. Love is of 'three' kinds, namely, (1) where the only motive is to seek pleasure, to take all and to give nothing, (2) where there is exchange, and the loving depends on being loved — 'I love thee, because thou lovest me,' and (3) where there is unconditional devotion, the giving everything and seeking nothing, — no recognition, no return. The first is the love of the sensualist, the second that of the ordinary worldly man or woman, but the third is that of the real devotee. Love has been defined by Vyāsa as devotion to worship, by Garga, as devotion to hearing about the Ātman; Śaṇḍilya considers it the unbroken feeling of the Universal Self in one's own self, and Nārada refers to it as the surrendering of all actions to God, and feeling the greatest misery in forgetting Him. Nārada further declares that it is greater than work, knowledge or *yoga*, because it is its own reward, or end, — not merely a means to an end, as, he maintains, is the case with knowledge. Love emancipates the heart from impurity. It has no rights or property of its own; neither does it tolerate the spirit of copy-righting. Wealth, strength, abilities — all must be held in trust for the world, at the service of every straggling manifestation of Life. The fruit of Love is enjoyed by him who avoids evil company, who associates with those of great mind, who gives up all sense of possession, who frequents lonely places, who uproots the bondage of *karmas*, who abandons all anxiety as to livelihood, who renounces the fruit of works, who gives up even the Vedas, and looks upon all living beings with equanimity. The true 'lonely place' is in the depths of the heart, where, with all the doorways of interruption through the senses fastened, the devotee

sees, in unbroken solitude, nothing but his own pure Self as the 'one without a second.' " How are these doorways, through which distractions enter, to be closed? For the *bhakta*, through Love, Love, and yet again Love; by driving away everything from his thoughts, but sympathy, compassion and those ideas and emotions which lead up to a perfectly impassioned Love—quixotic it may be,—reckless, ridiculous to us in its fervour, but unconquerable and unrelenting. Giving it full play, never checking it, weeping, it may be, for the miseries of the world and the sense of separation from the one Ocean of Life and Love, day and night, in public or in solitude, caring for nothing, but attaining the realization of That: chastising himself through remorse and reproach for every shortcoming in Love, at length he reaches a great calm, a great serenity: he stands 'on the other shore.' He knows, he feels: his shoulders may become marked with the stripes that fall on those of others, but he suffers no longer; he is ever happy and satisfied. No words can explain that state, and because it cannot be expressed, except by negations, it is a mystery—'the peace which passeth all understanding.' "

When this all-powerful, all-conquering devotion, producing Love for friend and foe alike, springs up in the heart, it becomes pure, and is then prepared for God-vision. Ardour in the worship of the Self; constant contemplation of his glory, the dedication of all actions to him, and the feeling of extreme misery in losing him from memory, are some of the signs of true Devotion. It arises from knowledge, in the first instance, and itself leads to the perfection of Wisdom.

As to the *why* and the *wherefore* of *bhakti*, Love is said to arise as the climax of a course of internal action, or evolution. According to Srirupa Goswami:

" First arises faith: then follows attraction, and after that adoration. Adoration leads to suppression of worldly desires; and the result is single-mindedness and satisfaction. Then grows attachment which results in ebullition of sentiment. After this love comes into play. "

The above is the quintessence and general summary of the views of the devotional schools of religion. We shall now proceed to investigate the nature of the main principles underlying this particular

branch of Yoga. To begin with, *bhakti*, being a form of the emotion of love, cannot possibly arise in the heart so long as it remains unconvinced of the special claim of the object of devotion to one's worship. Certainly no one can force himself to love another against his heart. It follows from this that genuine *bhakti* is not possible where reason is given the go-by before it has pronounced its benediction on the idol to be installed in the sacred temple of the heart. Fanaticism may, no doubt, flourish in the absence of the light of intellect, but then fanaticism has no foundation of truth, and the pursuit of untruth is not to be desired. It is not that one cannot be devoted to a false object, for that is a matter of personal belief, but that the worshipping of the false god, or ideal, is like a structure without a solid foundation, and is sure to lead to trouble sooner or later. Thus the first essential on the path of *bhakti* is the ascertainment of the true object of devotion.

It is also important to know that spiritual love or devotion has little, or nothing, in common with the vehement, unreasoning ardour of a sensualist's passion, and that the men who endeavour to imitate the full-gushing, standard lover of an oriental love-story have no idea whatever of the kind of love implied in devotion to divinity. Love certainly does not signify unreasonableness, and irrational frenzy may be a characteristic of lunatics and fiends, but not of the worshippers of the Supreme Intelligence. The truth is that the nature of devotion has been entirely misunderstood by the generality of men, who, unable to form a rational conception of the kind of love implied in *bhakti*, have been led to confound it with the mad impetuosity of sensuality. Some have even likened it to a moth's fatal attraction for light, and oriental poetry revels in depicting the sensation of the 'painful delight' which the tiny insect-lover is supposed to experience, in the closing moments of its life, on the burning altar of love. Many persons are misled by these charming flights of fancy, and begin to interpret their own confused sensations and mental affections and the manifestations of psychic phenomena they might come across in all sorts of fanciful ways, always bent upon finding a confirmation of their own views in each and every occurrence.

That this is not *bhakti* but a form of madness, is evident from the very nature of love which is an essential ingredient of devotion. As pointed out in the last chapter, love is of three kinds, according as it is (1) for the superior, (2) the equal, or (3) the inferior. Of these, the first takes the form of respect for learning and age, respectful affection for the parent, reverence for the tutor, loyalty for the king and devotion or worship for the *Tirthamkara* (God). The second denotes equality of status, and manifests itself in the form of friendship, amity, affection and the like; and the third assumes the form of benevolence, patronage and other similar emotions. Sexual love is a form of the second type, though one of its most complex phases, since it implies the engrafting of the idea of sexual relationship on the stock of amity and good fellowship. Love of the first type is founded on respect, of the second on mutual amity, and of the third on protection or watchfulness.

It is thus clear that *bhakti* belongs to the class of emotions of love of the first kind, which are distinguishable from its remaining types on account of the element of respect. It follows from this that neither the emotion of benevolence which is characteristic of love for an inferior, nor the full-gushing, impetuous ardour of the hero of a love-tale can be the appropriate form of love for the true God, than whom no one has a better right to our respect. Nor is there room in devotion for the type of passion that exhausts itself in empty professions and protestations, and the only form that is admissible in religion is the intellectual which demonstrates its unbounded love and respect for God by intelligently walking in the footsteps of the Teacher and by understanding His word. It would seem that the confusion of thought, which has arisen among the followers of mysticism on this point, is due to a failure to discriminate between the different kinds of love which have been enumerated above, and to a vague notion of the moth type of passion being the most perfect. But it is clear that no one ever dreams of loving his parent, tutor or king after the manner of a moth; and it is also evident that a God cannot be likened to a silly, empty-headed coquette who judges the merit of her different suitors according to the amount of vehemence put in by them in their protestations of love. The fact

is that love is a motive power grounded on belief, and manifests itself by becoming translated into action, the manifestations of its activity taking different but appropriate, typical forms, according to the nature of the relationship in which the object of love stands to him who loves. Thus, we offer devotion and worship to a *Tirthamkara* (God), reverence to a tutor, loyalty to a king, friendship to our equals, and protection and patronage to those who are inferior to us. But we do not offer devotion to a king, patronage to divinity or worship to a child. Every one of these has his particular form of love, and must be loved in that very form. This is the rule of Love, the breach of which cannot but be fraught with evil consequences. One has only to picture to oneself the consequences of approaching a parent, tutor or king with the romantic sentiments of a Romeo to realize the absurdity of the situation and the amount of evil resulting from a disregard of the rule. The case with Divinity is no different; He has His own appropriate form and must be loved in that very form. The idea of putting the all-knowing, ever blissful Godhead on a par with every love-sick Juliet of romance is absolutely disgusting; and it does not improve matters a bit if we reverse the rôle of relationship. For while the idea of a God as a Romeo, madly in love with the human soul, cannot be deemed to present a picture of divine perfection either in knowledge, bliss or power, on the one hand, the disparity of class and incongruity of type is not done away with, on the other. It is thus clear that the true significance of love in reference to God has nothing in common with the idea of passion between the two sexes, nor can one's God be loved as one's child. Devotion to God really means a devotion to the attributes of divinity, which the devotee wishes to develop in his own soul, and consists in the blending of the fullest measure of love and respect for those who have evolved out those very attributes in perfection.

Thus, *bhakti* in its true sense means devotion to an ideal, and incidentally, the worshipping of those who have already attained to its realization. The causal connection between the ideal of the soul and the worshipping of those who have already realized it is to be found in the fact that the realization of an ideal demands

one's wholehearted attention, and is only possible by following in the footsteps of those who have actually reached the goal.

The analysis of the nature of *bhakti* entitles us to say that no one who does not excite, in the fullest degree, the feelings of love and reverence in our hearts is entitled to our devotion. This amounts to saying that the being to whom the heart spontaneously offers its devotion is he who is its greatest sympathiser and well-wisher. Now, since these qualifications are to be found in the *Tirthankara* alone who preaches the *dharma* (religion or path) that leads to the Perfection and Bliss of Gods, in other words, who enables the soul to attain to the sublime status of Godhood, none but He is entitled to or can command the full adoration of the heart.

According to modern theologians, however, *bhakti* implies devotion to a Supreme Being on the ground of his being the creator of the world, and the maker of souls and their bodies. But this is quite untenable, firstly, because the notion of a creator of the world and of the maker of souls and their material bodies has been seen to be illogical, and, secondly, because an act of this kind performed *voluntarily* in the past is incapable of engendering the emotion of love, much less of devotional love, though it *might* possibly give rise to a feeling of gratitude on the part of those born with a silver spoon in their mouths. But even this sense of gratitude would be entirely wanting, and might be counter-indicated by a strong feeling of hatred in the case of those unfortunate ones who find themselves placed, for no fault of theirs, in unsuitable and painful surroundings, and of those who are 'created to people the hell,' as the holy Qur'an asserts.

The case with those who believe in the existence of a creator, but make his creative activity subservient to the principle of *karma* is even worse, since on their hypothesis the creator becomes merely an artificer of *karma*, without a voice of his own, so that neither praise nor blame can ever be earned by him. Certainly no one can ever feel grateful to such a world-maker for his creative activity.

We may now turn our attention to the teaching of Mysticism which maintains that God should be worshipped to obtain his vision, or to become absorbed in him. This view also is not tenable, since the vision or contact of another cannot possibly afford anything more

than a passing sensation, which is as different from true happiness as a piece of stone from bread. As a matter of fact, true joy is the natural attribute of the soul, and becomes an actuality of experience the moment one gives up the idea of extracting it from things outside one's own Self. Hence, so long as one expects to find joy in things outside one's own soul, true joy cannot come into manifestation. Thus neither the vision nor the contact of another can ever take the place of true happiness which the soul is athirst for.

The idea of absorption in God has also nothing to commend itself to common sense, for two simple and indestructible substances or realities can never become fused into one by any possibility; and since both the soul and the alleged God are indestructible by nature, it is clearly impossible for either of them to become merged in the other. The analogy of the absorption of a drop in the sea, which Mysticism relies upon in support of its proposition, is beside the point, because analogy is no argument. It, however, actually refutes that which it is supposed to prove, since the sea is not an unit, but a collection of drops, so that the additional drop only goes to increase the number of those already there.

Apart from this, it is permissible to ask: what may be the effect of the chemical operation of absorption? Will the soul survive the event, or be wiped out in the process? No mystic has yet succeeded in giving a satisfactory reply to this all-important question, but we can see for ourselves that in the former case the idea of absorption is more imaginary than real, and in the latter the dismal prospect of extinction suffices to rob the operation of the very last vestige of attractiveness.

Those who have realized the weakness of their mystic creed on the point have tried to evade the difficulty by arguing that love is its own reward or end. But this, too, does not advance their case any further, and is clearly an endeavour to throw dust in the eyes of reason, because the end is not love but happiness. Now, since it so chances that happiness and love are not synonymous words, the use of the one for the other is not permissible in philosophy or rational literature.

As already observed, the only being who is entitled to the fullest measure of our devotion is the Teacher who preaches the 'Path'

that leads to the perfection and joy of Gods. He is worshipped not because worship or devotion is the end in itself, but because He is the only true guide to the Goal, so that devotion is primarily centred round the Ideal of the soul. Here, again, we observe that *idealatry* and not idolatry is the path to *nirvana*. Thus, in its primary sense, *bhakti* really means devotion to the Ideal of the soul, and, in a secondary one, the worshipping of those Great Ones who have already attained to its realization, and who are, therefore, best qualified to instruct and guide others.

It is this great Ideal of the Soul which demands our whole, undivided attention and full devotion. It is this which has been personified as Christos or Krishna in the mystery-language of mythology, and it is this which explains the element of unreasonableness in the mystic creeds. For what has been seen to be childish and unreasonable in love,* in relation to a Supreme Being, is quite appropriate to the Ideal of Life personified as God.

The *rationale* of *bhakti* can now be described with logical precision. First arises discernment or insight, called faith; this changes the outlook of life, transforms loose conceptions and stray notions about *dharma* into right knowledge, and is followed by an intense desire for the realization of the Ideal. This is devotion or love, and leads to the worship of the *Tirthamkara*. Finally, when conduct is purified and becomes perfect under the combined influence of knowledge and love, the binding force of *karmas* is destroyed and the soul is set free to enjoy its natural omniscience and bliss.

* The union between the 'Lord' and the Jiva is described as *Sāmarasya*, in the works on Śāktism. What is precisely meant by the term will be evident from the following explanation from the *Garland of Letters* by Sir John Woodroffe (page 172):—

"Samarasya, I may here observe, is a term which is ordinarily applied to the bliss of sexual union (*stripuṅgyogat yat saukhyam tat sāmāsyam*). For the benefit however of those who are always reading gross meanings into parts of the Śāstra alien to them it is necessary to explain that *Sāmarasyam* is both gross (*sthūla*) and subtle (*śukṣma*). Here the latter is meant. An erotic symbol is employed to denote the merger of the Jiva and Supreme Consciousness in ecstasy (*Samadhi*). The Tantras largely employ such imagery which is to be found in the Upanishads and in non-Indian Scriptures.

As regards the statement that purity of the heart enables one to have God-vision, the truth is that the effect of an intense craving for the realization of the Ideal is to make the mind one-pointed by preventing its restiveness and wandering after the pleasures and attractions of the world. This leads to purity of consciousness which then reflects its own natural effulgence—the glory of God. Just as in a storm one cannot see the objects lying at the bottom of a pond, owing to the disturbed and muddy state of its water, so is not the vision of the inner Divinity possible so long as the individual consciousness remains muddy and disturbed by the uncontrolled, tempestuous fury and mad impetuosity of a desire-ridden will. And, just as the objects at the bottom of the pond can be clearly perceived when the storm abates, so is the vision of the Self obtainable with ease when the surface of the lake of human consciousness is rendered calm and smooth by the subsidence of the activity of the desiring *manas* (lower mind). When the heart is rid of the taint of attachment to the things of the world, it reflects the natural effulgence of the soul and enables it to see itself. Hence, the statement that the pure in heart shall see God.

This finishes our survey of the path of *Bhakti*.

As regards the remaining departments of Yoga, the analysis of the methods of *Jñāna* and *Bhakti* practically disposes of them also ; for they also aim at concentration, although the Raja-yogi tries to attain it by the control of the mind itself, and the follower of Hatha Yoga by the restraint of the physical body and the avenues of the senses. Neither Raja Yoga nor Hatha Yoga, if taken by itself, can, however, achieve any great results, since the scientific method consists neither purely in the control of the mind nor exclusively in the subjugation of the body, but in the doing of the right thing at the right time, as will be seen in a subsequent chapter.

So far, however, as concentration of mind is concerned, all the departments of Yoga which have been examined here are at one on laying emphasis on it. The reason for this is obvious. If we look into the nature of the power which is exerted in all cases of concentration, without a single exception, we shall not fail to discover it to be our will. Hence, we may say that Yoga is the science which directly develops the will. Now, inasmuch as the emancipation of

will from the bondage of sin, and the possession of life more full and abundant, are the aims of the soul, obviously that whose every step is calculated to increase the power of the individual will is the only channel of liberation. In this sense, Yoga, certainly, is the science of liberation *par excellence*.

The chief obstacle on the path of Yoga, which beginners have to get over, lies in the mechanism of habit which the easy-going will likes to adhere to. It is not to be supposed that the actual, practical science of Yoga is characterized by anything resembling the ease with which we have been discussing it here. We know, from practical experience, how hard it is to break through any deep-rooted habit. How difficult it is to give up drinking, for instance, when once the craving for liquor has become a habit with will? Yoga has to get over not one or two of such habits alone, but over all those traits and tendencies and inclinations which lead in the wrong direction; and their number is legion. Few, indeed, there be who aspire to rise above the smooth-running, though destructive, mechanism of habitude, and they alone are benefited by Yoga. For the rest whose minds are steeped in the materialism of the world neither Yoga nor any other method can do anything. Hence, Yoga accepts only those disciples, in the first instance, in whom zeal and earnestness have been emancipated from the thralldom of slothfulness of habit, by *viveka* (discrimination), *vairāgya* (non-attachment), *tyāga* (renunciation), and faith. If we ponder over these last-named qualifications, we shall discover that without their aid it is not possible to enter upon the steep path of salvation. Obviously, there can be no desire for liberation unless there be present to the mind a keen sense of discrimination between the permanency of the state of Nirvana and the transitory, 'shadowy' nature of the world. Hence, the first essential is the discrimination between the Real and the 'unreal.' Next, it is also easy to see that unless the desire for liberation is intense enough to overcome all other desires which tend to prolong the bondage, it will be overpowered by them. Hence, unless the will of the Yogi is fortified by such powerful virtues, as non-attachment, renunciation and faith, it is not likely to overcome the weaknesses of the flesh, or attain to any appreciable success. Therefore, no one who, having entered the path, looks

behind at the world on which he has turned his back, is worthy of Yoga. It was for this reason that Jesus reprimanded the disciple who wanted leave to bury the dead. These principles appear foolish and silly only so long as we do not look deep into the cause of success itself. Whatever be the ideal to be attained, it is inconceivable how success can result without perseverance and concentration of the mind ; and it is equally unimaginable how concentration and perseverance can be harnessed into service without the giving up of those attractions and pursuits which distract away attention from the goal. Yoga, therefore, rightly insists on the possession of the above-mentioned qualifications.

From being accepted as a disciple to the full realization of the Self, that is, the attainment of bliss, eight steps are pointed out by Patanjali, the venerable codifier of this science ; and they are, 1. *Yama*, 2. *Niyama*, 3. *Āsana*, 4. *Prāṇāyāma*, 5. *Pratyāhāra*, 6. *Dhāraṇā*, 7. *Dhyāna* and 8. *Samādhi*. Of these, *yama* signifies non-injuring, truthfulness, non-stealing, continence and the imposing of limitations on the worldly goods ; *niyama* means purity, contentment, study and resignation ; and *prāṇāyāma* conveys the idea of controlling the vital force. The first two mean the moral training of the soul, but the third, namely, *prāṇāyāma*, is a very different thing.

We shall first of all take up the question of morality. Morality is the basis of Yoga, and it has been said, in so many words, that without it no one can attain to Nirvana. Of all the religions in the world there is none in which perjury, theft, murder, adultery and all other offences are not condemned in strong terms. They differ, however, in degree. In some, for instance, non-killing is enjoined in respect of mankind alone ; while in others, as in Jainism, it is said that 'mercy shall not be for man alone, but shall go beyond, and embrace the whole world.' But the question naturally is that although all the rational religions, which have swayed in the past and are now swaying the destinies of hundreds of millions of human beings in the world, are agreed as to the things to be performed and the deeds to be avoided, why is it that their behests are trampled under foot and disobeyed ? How is it that the Hindus now do not entertain the same respect for animal life as they did in

the past? Why is it that the Christians no longer live the life delineated in the Sermon on the Mount, or the Muhammadans abide by the doctrine of resignation to the will of God? By morality the Yogi does not mean the modern lip-morality of the world, which regards the Messianic injunction, "whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek turn to him the other also," as meant only for the high-flown style of pulpit oratory, and as quite inapplicable to the affairs of practical life, but a real, live code of Ethics which does not brook violation of its least commandment, and which, consequently, must be respected and obeyed. The difference lies in the fact that, while the Yogi aims at perfecting himself, by bringing into manifestation the good, the true, and the beautiful in his own soul, the ambition of the man of the world does not soar higher than dominion over the world and bags of gold and silver. The latter, not knowing the uses of what the former regards as a useless commodity, and not knowing where and when to stop, goes on seeking and piling up wealth, till he kill himself in its pursuit. The former, knowing the true worth of money, cares not to soil his happiness by coming in contact with it, and thus avoids all the worries and flurries and doubts and disappointments, of the money-maker, courteously nicknamed the city-magnate.

Now, let us note the different results of the two pursuits. The city-magnate might possess heaps of gold in his safe; he might have a large balance to his credit in one or more banks; he might be able to purchase, or otherwise procure, all the paraphernalia of luxury which constitute the pleasure of the worldly-minded; but all this can he boast of at the cost of health, beauty and youth, to say nothing of true happiness, which, it would seem, is beyond his understanding. For while he has been busy in the pursuit of riches, dyspepsia, gout, and rheumatism have been busy in his pursuit; and by the time he lays his hold on money, these lay their hold on him. So is the case with ugliness. No one, whether a city-magnate or not, can, with impunity, spend hours of mental torture, or toss, night after night, from side to side, in bed, in racking his brains for devising newer methods of amassing more gold, or of making good the losses already incurred. Mental anguish must leave its visible ugly marks behind, in the shape

of a wrinkled forehead, distorted features and wretched looks. Just think over it ; was man born to be a wretched, miserable being, a living, burning libel on personal beauty and a victim to all sorts of ghastly and incurable diseases, *or does he make himself so ?* The millionaire makes his pile, it is true ; but it is not in his power to enjoy it. The money which perhaps would have been more useful to some poor, needy peasant, now lies buried in his iron safe, free from the contamination of poverty ; but it carries its own curse with it,—the man who made it is not to enjoy it ! It is true that the man of money sleeps in his mansion, and his couch consists of the most luxurious, springy bed that human ingenuity can devise, while the Yogi lies down on mother earth, but it is no less true that the latter gets up in the morning, saying, 'uneasy lies the head that wears a crown,' and the former *feeling* it !

When man understands that every little departure from the strict code of morality, as laid down by Religion, goes to stamp the features with ugliness and misery, renders the system sensitive to the infection and onslaught of disease-bearing germs and also tends to shorten life, to say nothing of its evil effect on the future career of the soul, he will come to estimate the scathing condemnation of the Scribes and Pharisees by Jesus at its proper worth. The Yogi is not against our making money, provided we do not lose sight of the real aim. The true principle is to do whatever work is natural or congenial to one's station in life, but to do it unconcernedly, always remembering that wealth is not the be all and end all of existence. One need entertain no fear of poverty or starvation by working in this unconcerned manner. One fears only so long as one does not understand the truth. The moment we give up theorizing and put the statement to practical test, we shall find the Master's words, *Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you*" (Matt. vi. 33), a piece of literal truism. This is the fundamental basis of morality. There is no wrathful Supreme Being to get angry with us for our transgressions ; but they carry their punishment with them ; and each time that we violate the least commandment we are punished with ugliness and disease, and that most coveted possession of saints and sages, which Yogis call peace

of mind, is denied us, for a shorter or longer period, according to the nature of the sin and the atonement we might have made subsequently, consciously, or otherwise. When the accumulated deposit of 'disease' assumes such dimensions as preclude the idea of redemption in the particular incarnation, death destroys the body, and thus graciously puts an end to the physical suffering and torments of a worn-out, diseased, and dilapidated organism, the owner of which has signally failed to utilize his chance of life eternal.

Morality in religion means a God-like attitude of Purity and Love towards all beings. For religion aims at turning men into Gods, and there is no room in it for the hollow sentimentality of the world which exhausts itself in wordy protestations of goodness and virtue. It is not an admirer of wolves in sheep's skin, who for securing the good opinion of their stupid and insincere neighbours go down on their knees and offer up long and elaborate prayers in public, who give a small pittance of their wealth with all the noise and fuss that they can make for a mention in the press, who place large sums of money at the disposal of royalty to secure a title, or who shed crocodile tears to excite the respect of their kind. Morality, in religion, means the purification of the inner as well as the outer nature. Let no thought which is not pure and God-like ever enter the heart; let the mind dwell on nothing but what is good, and true, and beautiful. Purify the heart; talk of nothing but God; think of nothing but God; let purity surround you within and without. The Vedantist puts it:

"When thy consciousness dwelling in pure light and pure love, does not admit any other thought but that of thy beloved, thy Real self, then how is it possible to think of good or bad, of the dual throug? Then you sing nothing but thyself. Then you are speaking nothing but God's music. Then you chant nothing but God's beauty. Then you feel nothing but God's hand in all hands, God's eye in all eyes, God's mind in all minds, God's love in all loves, God's virtues in all virtues, God's presence in each and everything."—*Itana Tirtha*.

The next step is *Asana*, i.e., posture, for contemplation. Steady posture is necessary to keep the body motionless, else its unchecked restlessness would distract the mind and dissipate the energy of the will. The *asana* that is generally adopted by *yogis* is a sitting

posture, with legs crossed, after the manner of the images of the Jaina *Tirthankaras*. When the *asana* becomes firm and is no longer a source of distraction to the mind, *pranayama* may be practised with ease.

The word *pranayama* really signifies the controlling of energy, though it is generally taken to mean the regulation of breath. According to a certain class of *yogis*, it means the controlling of the cosmic energy. Says *Suami Vivekananda* :—

“Just as *Ākasa* is the infinite, omnipresent material of this universe, so is this *prāṇa*, the infinite, omnipresent manifesting power of this universe. The knowledge and control of this *prāṇa* is really what is meant by *prāṇayama*. This opens to us the door to almost unlimited power.”

But the primary object of *pranayama*, according to Yoga, is to control the wandering of the mind so as to be able to prevent the uncontrolled dissipation of energy. Apart from this, breathing is also the main source of the absorption of the vital energy. With each breath we inhale a certain amount of *prāṇa* (electricity or vital force) from the atmospheric air. This electricity is absorbed by the blood, and is stored up in the nervous system. The *yogi* aims at controlling this vital force by regulating his breath. Ordinarily, respiration is an involuntary act, although it can be partially brought under the dominion of volition, as in speaking, singing, and the like. Its movements are under the special control of that portion of the cerebro-spinal axis which is known as the medulla oblongata. By controlling the respiratory action the *Yogi* establishes control over the vital forces in his body. He begins by correcting the normal breath. According to Yoga, the proper method of breathing is neither exclusively clavicular, nor thoracic, nor even diaphragmatic, but a combination of them all. The object is to remove the condition of passivity from the system, and that can be accomplished by (1) inhaling a large quantity of the vital breath from the atmosphere, and (2) by employing it to energize the nervous centres of the spinal column and brain which control the whole system. The lung capacity increases with practice, but it also requires certain other aids. The food must be pure, wholesome and non-irritating, so that the body should acquire purity and

elasticity and lightness. Smoking and drinking must be given up with animal diet, as they actually produce the very conditions which it is the aim of Yoga to remove. Along with the regulation of diet, certain purificatory exercises in breathing have also to be practised for rendering the nerves supple and light. This generally takes a few months, at the end of which sufficient control is obtained to 'will' the *prāṇa* to any particular part of the body. This enables the *yogi* to get rid of many kinds of disease from his system.

Rhythmical breathing is a powerful ally in gaining control over the vital forces of the body. The *yogi* declares that rhythm pervades the universe. In all vibrations is to be found a certain rhythm, so that all cosmical movements and manifestations of force are rhythmical. Our bodies are as much subject to the law of rhythm as are the notes of music, or the feet of a poem. Says the author of "The Hatha Yoga" :—

"You have heard how a note on a violin, if sounded repeatedly and in rhythm, will start into motion vibrations which will in time destroy a bridge. The same result is true when a regiment of soldiers crosses a bridge, the order being always given to 'break step' on such occasions, lest the vibrations bring down both the bridge and regiment. These manifestations of the effect of rhythmic motion will give you an idea of the effect of rhythmic breathing. The whole system catches the vibrations and becomes in harmony with the will, which causes the rhythmic motion of the lungs, and, while in such complete harmony, will respond readily to orders from the will. With the body thus attuned, the *Yogi* finds no difficulty in increasing the circulation in any part of the body by an order from the will, and in the same way he can direct an increased current of the nerve force to any part of the organ, strengthening and stimulating it."

In this manner the *yogi* catches the swing, as it were, and is able to absorb and control a large amount of *prāṇa* energy. The effect of rhythmic breathing is that it sets every fibre of the body vibrating with vitality, so that when all the motions of the body become rhythmical, the body itself becomes, as it were, a gigantic battery of will.

In rhythmic breathing the main thing to be grasped is the idea of rhythm. To quote again from "The Hatha Yoga" :—

"The *yogi* bases his rhythmic time upon a unit corresponding with the beat of his heart. The heart-beat varies in different persons but the heart-beat unit of

each person is the proper rhythmic standard for that particular individual in his rhythmic breathing. Ascertain your normal heart-beat by placing your fingers over your pulse, and then count : 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ; 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, etc., until the rhythm becomes firmly fixed in your mind. . . . The yogi-rule of rhythmic breathing is that the units of inhalation and exhalation should be the same, while the units for retention and between the breaths should be one-half the number of those of inhalation and exhalation."

When the novice has mastered the preliminary exercises he will be able to regulate the vital *prāṇa* in any part of the body at will, banishing and destroying the causes of disharmony from his system. According to Vivekananda, the whole scope of Raja Yoga is really to teach the control and direction of *prāṇa* on different planes. It is said in the Yoga Vāsīṣṭha :

" If the motion of *Prāṇa* and therefore the mind be arrested, both internally and externally, then will death and doctage fly to a great distance. Then will abide in the body dhātus (spiritual substances) such as will never be expelled at any time. Those only can be said to have truly cognized the Reality who, walking in the path of Atman Jñāna, eradicate their desires, render thereby their intelligence clear, and tear asunder all the bonds of the mind. As the fluctuating mind arises through its gradual association with objects, births and deaths also arise. It is only when the mind quits all, without any attraction or repulsion towards objects, that it will cease to exist. If thoughts are destroyed through the extinction of *vīkṣanās* (desires), then quiescence will result and the mind's destruction will ensue. If there is no thought of any worldly object or of any place, how can the mind exist (separate) in the void of *ākāśa* ? . . . The wise say that the mind denudes itself of its form, even though engaged in actions, if it, after dissolving all things unto itself, becomes as cool as ambrosia."

Touching the effect of the control of *prāṇa* we are further told :—

" The control of *prāṇa* is tantamount to (or leads to) an abdication of external *vīkṣanās*. With the giving up of *vīkṣanās* the mind does not exist ; the same result accrues with the control of *prāṇa*. Through a long practice of *prāṇa*'s control and through the initiation by a *guru*, *āsana* (posture), diet and *dhyāna* (meditation), *prāṇa* is controlled. But the *vīkṣanās* will be extinguished through the performance of actions without any attraction (or desire), the non-contemplation of *saṃsāra* (or the absence of love for this mundane life) and the seeing of all things of form as formless. If there is an end to the life of our antagonist, the *vīkṣanās*, the mind too will not arise. Should the winds cease to blow, will particles of dust be seen floating in the atmosphere ? The fluctuation of *prāṇa* is that of the painful mind. Therefore, the control of *prāṇa* should be the natural and unfailing duty of all spiritually-minded persons of wisdom."

To put it in terms which are easily comprehensible to the modern mind, the object of Yoga is to remove the impurities of sin that have entered into the constitution of the soul, and have thrown it into the condition of negativity. *Prāṇāyāma* enables the soul to develop its will, by preventing the mind from wandering away after the good things of the world, and is, for that reason, a necessary part of Yoga. But it is useful only up to a certain stage, for otherwise it will itself constitute a distraction to the concentration of mind on the Self. Besides this the true causes of the development of will are renunciation and self-contemplation. It is for this reason that the higher adepts in Yoga do not concern themselves with the regulation of breath.

After *prāṇāyāma* comes *pratyāhāra*, which means "gathering towards," that is, checking the outgoing energy of the mind, and freeing it from the thralldom of the senses. Next comes *Dhāraṇā* which means the holding of the mind on a point, to the exclusion of all others, e.g., the fixing of attention on the heart. *Dhāraṇā* also signifies special forms of meditation. *Dhyāna* is the next step, and means contemplation, so that when the mind is freed from the thralldom of the senses, and does not wander outwards, it can be easily employed in the contemplation of the Ātman. This will naturally lead up to *Samādhi*, the state in which the soul enjoys its own inherent, natural bliss. Why *Samādhi* is the realization of the ideal of the soul, is because in that state all taint of attachment for the outside world, together with its concomitants, pleasure and pain, is transcended, intellect is left behind, and the soul is set free to feel its own glory and bliss. When this stage is reached, the soul no longer argues and disputes; it simply knows! It then enjoys the bliss and blessedness of perfection. What this state means, cannot be put in words; for it consists in a feeling, and human language is not capable of accurately depicting, or describing feelings. However, the following description from "The Self and Its Sheaths" (p. 71) will be found lucid enough to convey a fairly good idea of the sublime state of ecstasy:—

"There are moments, supreme and rare moments, that come to the life of the pure and spiritual, when every sheath is still and harmonious, when the senses are

tranquil, quiet and insensitive, when the mind is serene, calm and unchanging ; when fixed in meditation the whole being is steady and nothing that is without may avail to disturb ; when love has permeated every fibre, when devotion has illuminated, so that the whole is translucent ; there is a silence and in the silence there is a sudden change ; no words may tell it, no syllables may utter it, but the change is there. All limitations have fallen away. Every limit of every kind has vanished ; as stars seen in the boundless space, the self is in limitless life, and knows no limit and realizes no bound : light in wisdom, consciousness of perfect light that knows no shadow, and therefore knows not itself as light ; when the thinker has become the knower ; when all reason has vanished and wisdom taken its place ; who shall say what it is save that it is bliss ? Who shall try to utter that which is unutterable in mortal speech, but it is true and it exists."

Many instances of such ecstatic joy are to be found in the lives of mystics, and Prof. James mentions some in his "Varieties of Religious Experience." Beyond the reach of speech, it cannot be expressed in words ; it is a state on the emotional side of consciousness, and must be *felt* to be realized.

It remains to be said that from time immemorial an interesting controversy has been going on in respect of the practical merit and worth of the *Jñāna* and *Bhakti* methods of Self-realization. The subject has been discussed in the instructive little pamphlet, entitled the "Fourth Book of Practical Vedānta," by Pt. G. K. Sastri. The book is, however, not likely to interest many persons, as it does not deal with the subject philosophically. A similar intellectual controversy, it seems, prevailed amongst the several sects and schools of practical religion in the Holy Land. "Can any good come out of Nazareth ?"—was the common expression of ridicule and contempt with which the followers of the path of knowledge (*Jñāna*) were wont to look down upon the devotees of *Bhakti* (Nazareth). This did not mean that the Jews were actually foolish enough to think that the little village of Nazareth was too insignificant to be the birth-place of a World-Teacher. It is sheer prejudice which has led some of us to ascribe such crass ignorance to the Semitic race. As a matter of fact, the custodians of the wisdom of the Kabbala were intellectual men and could not be credited with the belief that greatness depended upon geographical limits, or the dimensions of towns and villages.

"The name Nazir," says Dr. Paul Carus, "has nothing to do with the village of Nazareth. Etymologically, the word means a devotee. Nazareth must have

been a very unimportant place, for it is not mentioned at all in the Hebrew literature, and we do not even know the Hebrew spelling of the word. This has given rise to the idea entertained by some hypercritical minds that a village of that name did not exist in Christ's time. In all probability, it is the place now called en-Nasira, a little village in Galilee . . . That Jesus was a Nazarene (or, according to the Hebrew term, a Nazir) we have canonical testimony. The Nazirim . . . are known, through a statement in the Acts, to have been a communistic sect who held all things in common . . . They kept the Mosaic Law and believed in Jesus as the Messiah"—(*The Age of Christ*).

Paul, though not a Nazir himself, associated with them (The Acts, xxiv. 5). Early Christians were called Nazarenes, and their descendants are still known in the East as Nasaras, or Nasarees. Dr. William Benjamin Smith writes:—

"The epithet Nazareus is not derived from a city called Nazareth; there was, in fact, no such city at the beginning of our era. The epithet is an appellation primarily of a Deity; it is formed after the analogy of Hebrew proper names ending in *iah*, as Zachariah, the *iah* representing *Jahovah* and is derived from the familiar old Semitic *nazar*, meaning *keep, guard, protect*, so that the Syriac 'Nazarya' is very nearly *Guardian-Yah*. The names Jesus and Nazareus differ about as *Salvator* and *Servator*. The Nazarenes (or Nazareus) were in all likelihood the worshippers of Nazarya, and according to Epiphanius were 'before Christ and knew not Christ.'"

The sect in question did not originate with Jesus, nor did the expression "Can there any good thing come out of Nazareth?" (John, i. 46) acquire currency, for the first time, during his career. Samuel and Samson who preceded Jesus by many centuries were both followers of this sect. There is a mention of the vow of the Nazarite in the Book of Numbers (Chap. vi. 2), and the rules of conduct becoming a Nazir are also given in the Bible.

There can be little doubt that the word Nazareth in the contemptuous expression, "can any good thing come out of Nazareth," referred to devotion, not to an actual village of that name, which might or might not have existed in the Holy Land, and is expressive of the ridicule in which the followers of Jñāna Yoga held those of the path of *Bhakti*. In order to enter fully into the spirit of the controversy, it is necessary to revert to the precise nature of *mokṣa*

* Quoted in *The Lost Language of Symbolism*, by Harold Bayley, vol. II., p. 286, foot-note.

or redemption, concerning which there does not seem to have been much difference of opinion, in the earlier days, among the ancients. It was recognized to be the attainment of the Ideal of happiness—whatever might be the views of the different schools as to its precise nature—on all hands. Hence, the difference of opinion was confined to the merit of the various means employed to achieve that devoutly wished-for end. Now, since *bhakti* is not even possible where its object has not been determined by knowledge, it is clear that the bestower of *mokṣa* is knowledge alone, in the first instance, that is to say, that without right knowledge Nirvana cannot be attained, all other efforts to the contrary notwithstanding. That being so, Raja Yoga, *bhakti* and other methods (if any) are obviously insufficient to meet the situation, though, if properly practised, meditation is sure to lead to knowledge, without it being necessary for the aspirant to go to school to study philosophy. Knowledge inheres in consciousness, and because consciousness is the function of the soul-substance, it (knowledge) also necessarily becomes innate in each and every soul. Hence, knowledge arises from within, and education is a drawing out, from *a*, out, and *duco*, to lead. Many of the past sages and prophets were quite innocent of the art of reading and writing, and yet some of us still marvel at their knowledge and insight. All this goes to show that knowledge needs only meditation and concentration to rise to the 'surface.' Thus, wherever there is concentration of thought, wisdom is sure to reveal itself there, sooner or later. Hence, the *bhaktas* hold that Brahmā (Wisdom) himself comes to teach them Truth, preparatory to their admission to Nirvana. The least commendable form of Yoga, the path of physical austerity, such as standing on one leg for a time, was also intended as a form of penance for the curbing of desire, and therefore as an aid towards concentration.

The real difficulty in respect of the question which has given rise to this discussion arises, however, when we come to look into the difference between knowledge and belief. All the scriptures are unanimous in declaring, '*believe* and be baptized,' but none actually maintains '*know* and be saved.' Psychologically, there is a great difference between superficial knowledge and belief, since motor effects are apt to follow the latter, but not the former. Hence, it is

the belief in one's Godhood, not a mere superficial acquaintance with that idea, which leads to Nirvana.

When meditation has led to the knowledge of identity between the Self and God, it becomes incumbent on the soul to raise it to the point of belief. Right belief being acquired, speedy realization is possible by combining the path of knowledge with that of proper conduct. The path of the "Jinas" (Masters) is threefold, according to Jainism, and consists in right Insight or Faith, Right Knowledge, and Right Conduct.

So far as faith, or insight, and knowledge are concerned, we need not dwell any further on their nature ; but it is clear that right action, hence conduct, is the very essence of all rational methods of attaining the desired end, for no process which consists in a series of inactions, or things done wrongly, i.e., in a topsyturvy manner, can ever be relied upon to lead us to a desired result. If we seriously think over the matter, we shall soon learn that there is no difference between the spiritual and any other kind of ideal in respect of the principles governing the method of realization. Analysis will show that the successful achievement of an object of desire depends on (1) the belief in the possibility of its attainment, (2) the knowledge of the means by which it is to be attained and (3) the actual employment of these means in the proper way, that is to say, the doing of the right thing at the right moment.

These three essentials of success give us the *why* and the *wherefore* of all scientific methods, and constitute the standard by which we may judge and determine the true nature and merit of each of the several paths, Jñāna Yoga and the like.

Thus, neither *jñāna*, nor *bhakti*, nor mental control, nor physical asceticism is by itself sufficient to translate the ideal into an actuality of experience. These are all valuable adjuncts along with one another, but, taken separately, they all lack that causal validity of scientific thought which is the hall-mark of practicability. It will be seen that knowledge and freedom are not synonymous terms, while *bhakti* (devotion) is not even possible where the object thereof is unknown. Hence, *bhakti* may be said to begin truly when knowledge reaches the degree of certitude implied in faith, and devotion to an ideal

marks the first stage of progress when faith is translated into action.

To sum up, the real Yoga for man is to know and realize his own divine nature, and to establish himself in the beatific state of blessedness and bliss, by subduing and mortifying the little, self-deluded, bodily self. The process of realization is threefold, and consists in Right Insight or Faith, Right Knowledge, and Right Conduct, that is to say, in singeing the wings of sin, *i.e.*, ignorance, by the fire of Wisdom, in destroying the delusion of duality by faith in the Godhood of the Self, and in radiating peace and goodwill and joy to all beings in the universe, in short, in settling down to the enjoyment of one's true Self, here and now. Let the world call it idleness, if it likes; what does it matter to the soul? Neither Mahavira, nor Parasva nor any other Saviour of the race kept shop, or sold merchandise. Yet who ever dared consider them idle? What is the value of the opinion of the worldly mortals to him who depends not on the opinion of others for his happiness, but who knows and feels the Self to be the very fountain-head of bliss itself?

"I tell you what is man's supreme vocation.

Before me was no world, 'tis my creation.

'Twas I who raised the Sun from out the sea,

The moon began her changeful course with me."—*Goethe*.

CHAPTER VIII

RESURRECTION

"Concerning his Son Jesus Christ our Lord, which was made of the seed of David according to the flesh; and declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the spirit of holiness by the resurrection from the dead."—*Romans* i. 3-4.

"But if there be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen. And if Christ be not risen, then ~~is~~ our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain. Yea, and we are found false witnesses of God; because we have testified of God that he raised up Christ: whom he has not raised up, if so be that the dead rise not"—(*1 Cor.* xv. 13-15).

In his first epistle to the Corinthians, St. Paul, the apostle, unhesitatingly bases the whole of the 'new' doctrine on the power of the soul to rise from the dead, for if there is to be no conquest of death in the experience of the aspiring *jīva*, vain, indeed, is the teaching of religion, and equally vain the promises of a life more full and abundant and everlasting in *nirvana*. But what does this conquest of death, without which religion would be reduced to a sorry farce, signify? Paul gives us no learned dissertation or discourse, but merely cites the instance of 'Christ' in proof of his view. He does not, however, claim for the 'Christ' any extra credit for any special, or divine birth, but puts him on a par with the rest of mankind, claiming no more merit in his resurrection than in that of any other man.

St. Paul's argument is condensed in the simple statement:—

"For if the dead rise not, then is Christ not risen"—(*1 Cor.* xv. 16).

The resurrection of the dead, then, is clearly the point in controversy, and the resurrection of Jesus himself will depend on the finding which may be arrived at on it.

To Paul's mind the matter did not present any difficulty; he clearly saw the connection between the doctrine of the 'fall' and that

of resurrection. He based the claim to resurrection on the power of 'Man' to triumph over death, and declared :—

"For since by man *came* death, by man *came* also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive"—(1 Cor., xv. 21 and 22).

It is, then, the doctrine of the 'fall' which shall also throw light on that of resurrection, and to that doctrine we must, accordingly, return to understand the precise sense of resurrection. We shall, therefore, now proceed to complete the symbolism of the 'fall' in the life of the Messiah, to find out its significance for the human race. We shall not go into the merits of the Christian belief separately, but shall consider its claims as we proceed with our own views on the subject, and shall see how far they are well-founded.

The grotesque view of modern *scholarship* which perceives nothing but savage simplicity and childlike wonder on the part of the 'primitive' man at the phenomena of nature, as the real grounding of ancient mythology, is entitled to be dismissed with little or no ceremony. Its absurdity has been noted ere this and will also be made more and more evident as we progress with our investigation. It would have doubtless amused the ancients, if they could read what modern *scholars* have said about their mental development. We shall leave the reader to determine for himself the worth of the modern view as contained in the following extract from Mr. Joseph McCabe's otherwise excellent work, the 'Bankruptcy of Religion' (p. 167) :—

"This is not the place to inquire into the real origin and nature of these (crucifixion and resurrection) myths. It has been widely believed that they refer, ultimately, to the annual death (or enfeeblement) of the sun as winter approaches, its re-birth at the solstice, and its resurrection (usually preceded by a dramatic representation of the death) in the spring. The seasons differ so much in different latitudes—the sun is so differently regarded in a tropical and a temperate clime—that confusion of dates is quite intelligible. In Egypt the annual fall and rise of the Nile was the chief factor. Sir J. G. Frazer, however, contends . . . that these myths refer to the annual death and re-birth of the spirit of Vegetation, a much more conspicuous case, to the ignorant mind, of death and resurrection. Probably both spectacles have had a share in inspiring and shaping the myths . . . What is clear is

that the naive philosophy of primitive man, his childlike wonder at the annual death and re-birth of sun and flowers and corn, is the real root of the stories that still engross millions of our neighbours at Christmas and Easter."

The real justification for the view of the moderns, if there can be any justification for the loss of the sense of relevancy and such unmitigated ignorance, is to be found in the intellectual shabbiness and bankruptcy of the counter-hypothesis put forth by the theologian, who is, however, in many cases, as much a moderner as the critic of the ancient lore himself!

To proceed with our explanation, it was seen in the chapter on the "fall" that the wretched condition of man was the result of a longing for sensual enjoyment on the part of the typical man—Adam. Without going twice over the ground already covered in our earlier chapter, it is sufficient to say that the legend of the fall contains the sublimest secrets and teachings of inestimable value for mankind. It is a warning against a purely sensuous existence; for by making the power of discrimination to pander to sense-gratification we deprive ourselves of wisdom, which results from its proper employment. The man who aspires to attain immortality must devote himself unreservedly to the God within; he must deny all other claims on his attention. He should perceive only one reality in all phenomena, and understand and realize the force of the statement, 'I and the father are one,' (John, x. 30); for the Upanisad teaches:—

"If a man sees no other (besides Himself), hears no other, knows no other, that is infinite; if he sees, hears, knows another, that is the finite. The infinite is the immortal, the finite is mortal"—(*Chhandogya Upanisad*, VII. 24).

To a man immersed in the temptations and joys of the world all this is and must ever remain to be as great an absurdity as the notion that the moon is made of green cheese. He should wait patiently till the Divine in him quickens him from within, and in the meanwhile he cannot do better than assume the attitude of Narada, one of the great *rishis* of Hindu mythology, who, in spite of having read all the Vedas, and almost all other material sciences, declared that he did not possess the knowledge of the Real, and actually sought out a Kshattriya king to learn it from him. He would also do well to

remember that a little knowledge is a dangerous thing, and that to deny, merely on the strength of learning derived from sciences whose range does not extend beyond matter, the teaching of religion and the sanity of its founders is to play with sharp-edged tools.

To proceed with our investigation. The history of the ancestor is the history of the individual, and the so-called sin of Adam is repeated by each and every one of us. It is not true to say that the ire of an Omnipotent Almighty God was excited and kindled by man's eating of a corporeal fruit to such an extent that he not only punished the guilty, but also their whole progeny *ad infinitum*. The fathers have eaten the sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on edge, not because a just and merciful God decreed it that way, but because of the wrong suggestion which parents impart to their offspring, and which moulds their lives in the wrong way. It is, however, comforting to know that the leaders of rational thought in the world in our day do not regard such cruel, 'unfatherly,' ungod-like vengeance to be an attribute of Godhood. Eminent men from the ranks of orthodox Christians themselves are now beginning to form a more accurate and dignified notion of divinity, and there is every reason to hope that in the near future such fables as that of the uncontrollable fury of an Almighty God will only make us smile at our own ignorance and ready credulity.

As the idea of the punishment of the innocent is foreign to our notions of the dignity, the justice and the mercy of God, so is the idea of the vicarious atonement of Jesus, a pure dogma of ignorant faith. We agree with Mr. Bernard Lucas when he says :—

" In the moral realm to substitute the innocent for the guilty is a conception which subverts the moral idea. To conceive of the punishment of the just for the unjust is not only an outrage on the moral sense of humanity; it is a subversion of the moral character of God. The suffering of the innocent for the guilty presents difficulties to our moral nature and to our belief in a beneficent God, but its arbitrary infliction as a penalty is a conception from which the modern mind absolutely revolts. The conception of the solidarity of the race may throw some light on the problem of suffering, but it throws no light on a suffering which is a penalty arbitrarily inflicted on the innocent in order that the guilty may escape. That which is bad morality cannot be good theology. That which the highest and best within us repudiates and condemns, God cannot approve and adopt. Vicarious punishment marks a lower

stage of man's moral development, in which it presented no difficulty to the moral sense. At the present day it would be an outrage to civilization. Our theology must transcend our morality, not fall below it. One can no longer regard the sufferings of Christ as in any sense a penalty which He endured in order that we might escape."—(*Christ for India.*)

"The revelation in Jesus," says Mr. Lucas, "has shown us not only God as he has manifested himself in Human life; but it has shown us man as conceived by the divine mind. He has shown us of what humanity is capable when its life is lived, not in isolation or opposition to God, but in harmony with him." Those who have attentively followed the preceding pages need not be reminded that within every man there are two principles, namely, the Divine, and the personal, i.e., the lower self. Of these, Christ stands for the Divine element, which is buried deep under huge deposits of sin. It is this hidden Divinity that is to be purified and released from the grip of sin, when it will reveal itself as a God. For one's Divinity is real the moment one can consciously and conscientiously say, from one's heart, "I and the father are one" (John x. 30). In different language, Godhood is at one end and animalism at the other, of existence, with the middle point denoting freedom of action, hence choice of paths, occupied by man. When the animal nature acquires ascendancy in this see-saw of life, the God-element goes down, and *vice versa*; and exactly in the proportion in which the one is forced down does the other acquire ascendancy. This is the doctrine of the Cross—crucify the ego of desires, and you become divine; suppress the real Self, and you immediately fall to the level of brutes, and become an heir to the full heritage of wretchedness and misery pertaining to an animal existence.

It is the notion of the body being the man which is the cause of our downfall. A story is told in the *Yoga Vasiṣṭha* of a war between *devas* and the powers of darkness. The leader of the latter forces one day created, by his power of *māyā*, three *asuras* without *ahamkāra*, and sent them to fight the *devas*. The latter fought hard against them, but in vain. Their egoless opponents had no fear of destruction on account of the absence of *ahamkāra*, and proved invincible. The *devas* thereupon sought the advice of Brahmā, who told them that

their enemies could not be killed unless they developed *ahankāra* within them. When asked as to how they were to proceed to create the sense of *ahankāra* in their enemies, he suggested that they should constantly draw the *asuras* into the battle-field and then retire before them. The reason assigned for this queer method of warfare was that by their constantly pretending to fight and running away the *vāsānā* of *ahankāra* would begin to reflect itself in the minds of the dreaded *asuras*, as a shadow in glass, and they would be caught, like rats, in the trap of egoity. The *devas* carried out the advice of Brahmā, and a long period of time elapsed during which this queer warfare was carried on to the great chagrin and irritation of the *asuras*. Gradually, the sense of egoity stole into the minds of the invincible demons, and fear took hold of their hearts. The *devas* no longer found them invulnerable, and speedily overpowered them.

The lesson to be learnt from the story is described in the Yoga Vasīṣṭha, in the following words :

" In the three worlds there are three kinds of *ahankāras*. Of these, two kinds of *ahankāras* are always beneficial and one always condemnable. That *jñāna* which after discrimination enables us to cognize that all the worlds and Paramātmā are ourselves, that the self or ' I ' is eternal and that there is no other to be meditated upon than our self is the Supreme *Ahankāra*. That *jñāna* which makes us perceive our own Self to be more subtle than the tail-end of paddy and to be ever existent, extender to (or above) all the universe, is the second kind of *Ahankāra*. These two kinds of *ahankāras* will certainly be found in the *Jīvan-muktas* and will enable them to attain *Mokṣha* after crossing *Samsāra* ; but will never subject them to bondage. That certain knowledge which identifies the ' I ' with the body composed of the hands, feet, etc., is the third kind of *Ahankāra*. This is common to all persons of the world and dire in its results. It is the cause of the growth of the poisonous tree of re-births. It should be destroyed at all costs. Dire, very dire are its effects. The sooner you annihilate this *ahankāra* through the abovementioned two kinds of *ahankāras*, the sooner will the Brahmic principle dawn in you. Then if you are firmly seated in that seat where even these two kinds of *ahankāras* are given up, one by one, then such a state is the ripe Brahmic state seat. The non-identification of the ' I ' with the visible body (or the visibles) is the *Nirvāṇa* proclaimed by the Vedas. "

Such is the teaching of the Yoga Vasīṣṭha. We can now easily understand what Jesus meant when he said : —

" He that findeth his life shall lose it: and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it. " — (*Matt. x. 39.*)

In plain language, it means that he who identifies his life with the lowest, i.e., the third kind of *ahamkara*, spoken of above, shall lose it, but he who sacrifices the lower *ahamkāra*, that is, the sense of "I-ness" or egotism, for the sake of the higher, or the Christ principle, will attain Nirvana.

It is the sacrifice of the lower which brings the higher Self into manifestation. While it is true that religion offers all desirable good, including peace, immortality and bliss, to its followers, it is equally true that its boons are to be had only on the payment of a price. The price to be paid is not money, or its equivalent, neither false praise, nor pretended devotion, but nothing other than an annihilation of the lower personality, that is, the total destruction of the false, personal self which sets itself up in place of the real Man and holds Him in tight bondage. Thus, it is the sacrifice of one's own lower nature, not that of another's life, which can be the means of liberation.

It is worth any amount of trouble to understand the true sense of sacrifice. We find in all religions, with one or two honourable exceptions, the injunction to offer sacrifices to the Godhead. Even the Vedas have become, in the hands of an ignorant and greedy priesthood, the source of bloodshed and slaughter of dumb and defenceless animals. The question is, do these Scriptures really enjoin the shedding of the blood of innocent animals for the glorification and redemption of the human race?

We venture to think not. It will be unnecessary to critically examine all the Scriptures extant on the point. We think that an examination of the teaching of the Holy Bible alone will suffice to show that the true sense of all such injunctions has been grossly misunderstood by mankind. In vain shall we plead the cause of our mute fellow-beings on the score of morality. When mind is steeped in selfishness and ignorance, it is not liable to be influenced by any considerations of tenderness and mercy. We, therefore, turn to the Holy Bible to see how far is the idea of an animal sacrifice supported by the authority of Jehovah. It will be noticed that the first recorded Biblical sacrifices are those of Abel* and Cain, but, as has been

* The reason why Cain's sacrifice was not while Abel's was acceptable to the Lord lies in the very nature of the faculties which they represent. Cain is reason

already demonstrated, they are not to be taken literally. There seems to be no divine injunction in support of the institution. According to Revd. F. Watson, D.D. (see the *Cambridge Companion to the Bible*):—

“No divine command can be quoted for the institution of sacrifice, but from its adoption in the earliest times by all nations, its divine origin may be inferred.”

But we shall see that, far from being supported by any divine commandment, the practice of shedding the blood of innocent beings is actually condemned in the Bible. Samuel was among the first few who raised their voice against the animal sacrifice. He demands in his mild language,

“Hath the Lord *as great* delight in burnt offerings and sacrifices, as in obeying the voice of the Lord? Behold, to obey is better than sacrifice, and to hearken than the fat of rams.”—(1 Sam. xv. 22.)

Through the mouth of the Psalmist, Jehovah declared :

“I will take no bullock out of thy house, nor he-goats out of thy folds. For every beast of the forest is mine, and the cattle upon a thousand hills . . . If I were hungry, I would not tell thee : for the world is mine, and the fulness thereof. Will I eat the flesh of bulls, or drink the blood of goats? Offer unto God thanksgiving : and pay thy vows unto the most high.”—(Ps. l. 9—11.)

Surely David does not use ambiguous language when he says :

“O Lord, open thou my lips ; and my mouth shall shew forth thy praise. For thou desirest not sacrifice, else would I give it : thou delightest not in the burnt offering.”—(Ps. li. 15 and 16.)

Even the compiler of the book of Proverbs unhesitatingly maintains :

“The sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination to the Lord : but the prayer of the upright is his delight.”—(Pro. xv. 8.)

engaged in the study of the World of matter and form, hence of the not-Self. As such, it is opposed to the well-being of the ego ; hence, the Lord, i.e., the inner Divinity, is not pleased with Cain's offering. But Abel is Faith which aspires to attain the perfection of Gods and leads to freedom and bliss. It enlarges the Spiritual Ego, and leads to the development of will in the right direction. Its sacrifice, or offering, that is, the fruit of its labour, is, accordingly, accepted by God.

Similarly,

"To do justice and judgment is more acceptable to the Lord than sacrifice."—(*Pro. xxi, 3.*)

Isaiah is equally emphatic and unequivocal in proclaiming the will of the Lord :

"To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me? saith the Lord; I am full of the burnt offerings of rams, and the fat of fed beasts; and I delight not in the blood of bullocks, or of lambs, or of he-goats . . . Bring no more vain oblations; incense is an abomination unto me; the new moons and sabbaths, the calling of assemblies, I cannot sway with; *it is iniquity even the solemn meeting.* Your new moons and your appointed feasts my soul hateth; they are a trouble unto me; I am weary to bear *them.* And when ye spread forth your hands, I will hide mine eyes from you; yea, when ye make many prayers, I will not hear: your hands are full of blood."—(*Is. i. 11 to 15.*)

Can there be anything more emphatic than this, yet has Isaiah not done with the subject, and says towards the end of the book named after him (Chap. lxvi. 3):

"He that killeth an ox is as if he slew a man, he that sacrificeth a lamb as if he cut off a dog's neck: he that offereth an oblation, as if he offered swine's blood; he that burneth incense, as if he blessed an idol. Yea, they have chosen their own ways, and their soul delighteth in their abominations."

No less emphatic is the language from the mouth of Hosea :

"I desired mercy, and not sacrifice, and the knowledge of God more than the burnt offerings."—(*Hosea, vi. 6.*)

Jeremiah also proclaims the will of the Lord in unmistakable terms :

"To what purpose cometh there to me incense from Sheba, and the sweet cane from a far country? Your burnt offerings are not acceptable, nor your sacrifices sweet unto me."—(*Jer. vi. 20.*)

Yet, again, it is declared (Hos. viii. 13):

"They sacrifice flesh for the sacrifices of mine offerings, and eat it, but the Lord accepteth them not: now will he remember their iniquity, and visit their sins; they shall return to Egypt (bondage)."

Through Amos we have it :—

"I hate, I despise your feast days, and I will not smell in your solemn assemblies. Though ye offer me burnt offerings, and your meat offerings, I will not accept them ; neither will I regard the peace offerings of your fat beasts."—(*Amos*, v. 21 and 22.)

There can, thus, be little doubt that when Moses enjoined sacrifices he did not mean the slaughter of defenceless, innocent animals ; for were it so, these expressions of abhorrence and disgust, on the part of the Lord, would be meaningless, and he would not have further declared :

"Put your burnt offerings unto your sacrifices, and eat flesh. For I spake not unto your fathers, nor commanded them in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt, concerning burnt offerings or sacrifices : but this thing commanded I them, saying, Obey my voice, and I will be your God, and ye shall be my people : and walk ye in all the ways that I have commanded you, that it may be well unto you."—(*Jeremiah*, vii. 21—23.)

Here we have direct authority to show that the passages which seem to enjoin sacrifice, in their exoteric sense, are not to be read literally, but in a hidden or inner sense. Surely, it is poor theology to maintain, and that in defiance of the dictum of one's own god, that he loves the flesh and blood of his animal creation, and is pleasurably affected by them. David understood this much better than the moderns. Addressing his deity, he sings :

"Sacrifice and offering thou didst not desire : mine ears hast thou opened : burnt offerings and sin offering hast thou not required."—(*Psa. xl. 6.*)

With the New Testament the spirit of sacrifice altogether changes. Jesus said :—

"I will have mercy, and not sacrifice."—(*Matthew*, ix. 13 and xii. 7.)

It will be noticed that the animals selected for sacrifice were invariably the bull, the ram and the he-goat. Now, if we can understand that the ancients saw a remarkable resemblance between the signs of the Zodiac and the chief limbs of the human body, and employed the zodiacal symbols to allegorize their religious conceptions, it will not be difficult to grasp the hidden sense of the passages whose

exoteric and vulgar significance leads to a slaughter of the innocent lives of animals. Three of these Zodiacal signs are of special importance for our purpose, for their symbols happen to be identical with the three animals mostly selected for sacrifice, although, in later times, other animals also came to be included in the category of sacrificial 'beasts.' These three are Aries (the ram), Taurus (the bull) and Capricornus (the he-goat). It is laid down in the *Brihajjatakam* of Varaha Mihira that

"each sign of the zodiac is characterized by a special part of the human body; thus, Meṣa is represented by the head; Vriṣa by the face . . . Makara by the knees."—(*Sacred Books of the Hindus*, vol. xli, pp. 6 and 7.)

We have omitted the description of the other parts of the body, as we are not concerned with them here. The Sanskrit Meṣa, Vriṣa and Makara are the equivalents of the Aries, Taurus and Capricornus, respectively. Thus, the ram, the bull, and the he-goat, also represent the three important limbs of the microcosm, the human body, which, as the mystics are never tired of teaching, is a perfect epitome of the macrocosm, i.e., the universe. Now, since we have the authority of Jehovah himself to show that he never commanded the burnt offerings or sacrifices (Jeremiah, vii. 22), we must try to find out what the prophets meant when they enjoined those sacrifices, for that they did enjoin some sort of sacrifice is beyond doubt. Let us see what light can be thrown on the situation by divine commandments and declarations. Here are some of them :

"But this thing commanded I them, saying, Obey my voice, and I will be your God . . . and walk ye in all the ways that I have commanded you, that it may be well unto you."—(*Jer*, vii. 23.)

"I desire mercy, and not sacrifice; and the knowledge of God more than burnt offerings."—(*Hosea*, vi. 6.)

The Psalmist chants :—

"I will praise the name of God with a song, and will magnify him with thanksgiving. *This* also shall please the Lord better than an ox or bullock that hath horns and hoofs."—(*Ps*, lxxix, 30 and 31.)

"The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit; a broken and a contrite heart, O God, thou wilt not despise."—(*Ps*, li. 17.)

The bullock that has horns and hoofs is not acceptable, but the one that has no horns and hoofs is desired—the pride of the face must be sacrificed ; the strong neck must be bent.

In the book of Proverbs we are told :

“ To do justice and judgment is more acceptable to the Lord than sacrifice. ”—
(*Chap. xxi. 3.*)

Jesus puts the case still more emphatically when he says :

“ And to love him with all the heart, and with all the understanding, and with all the soul and with all the strength, and to love *his* neighbour as himself, is more than all whole burnt offerings and sacrifices. ”—(*Mark. xii. 33.*)

Finally, Paul gives up all attempt at secrecy and divulges the long preserved secret in his epistle to the Romans. He writes :

“ I beseech you, therefore, brethren, by the mercies of God, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, which is your reasonable service. ”—(*Rom. xii. 1.*)

Just as in the astronomy of the ancients, the ram, the bull and the he-goat stand for the head, the face and the knees of the zodiacal man (*Kala Puruṣa*), so do they represent, *ahamkāra* (egotism), pride of power and carnality* in the science of symbolical correspondence. Hence, the sacrificing of the lower *ahamkāra*, pride and carnal desire is what is enjoined by the prophets, not an offering of the dead or dying bodies of animals. Life is pleased with him only who offers his body as a living sacrifice.† A broken spirit, with all traces of pride and carnality crushed out, is the sacrifice which is immediately acceptable to the Self. We must, however, see that this is not done in the spirit of Pharisees hypocrisy. When the devotee offers his little personality, or *ahamkāra*, with bowed head, bent neck and bended

* ‘ Goat typified Generative Heat or the Vital Urge. ’—(*The Lost Language of Symbolism*, vol. i, p. 347.)

† Cf. “ The camels slain for sacrifices have we appointed for you as symbols of your obedience unto God . . . Their flesh is not accepted of God, neither their blood ; but your piety is accepted of him ” (*Al Koran*, Chap. xxii). Now the camel is noted for its long neck ; hence bending one’s neck in humiliation is what is intended by its sacrifice.

knees, the sacrifice cannot but be accepted, and the sacrificer is rewarded with life eternal as its reward.

Why this is so, is easy enough to see. The soul inflated with the pride of personality, i.e., *ahamkāra*, has wound round itself a number of coils of desires, and suffers from the tightness of the 'cords.' And the strangest thing about it is this that although it smarts and shrieks, and yells from pain, its pride is not lessened, but goes on increasing, and the cords of passion and desire cut deeper and deeper into its 'flesh.' Hundreds and thousands of beings are born and die in this condition, never caring to know the reason *why* of their excruciating pain; and yet the cure is simple enough the moment the diagnosis is made. The cords cut deeper and deeper into the skin because it is inflated from within. The cause of this is *ahamkāra*. Need we prescribe the cure now? To the thoughtful it is apparent. Take off a little of the air from the *ahamkāra*, and relief will come instantaneously. Remove the *ahamkāra* completely, and the pain is gone. It is for this reason that Śaṅkarāchārya says somewhere in his writings that the *Samādhi* (trance) of self-realization removes in a few minutes the sins of a hundred years. Suppose we tightly wind a cord a couple of miles long round an inflated body, and then try to take it off as quickly as possible. There are two principal ways of doing so: one is the tedious method of removing the coils one by one; but the other, and by far the quicker method, is to take out the air from the inflated body, when all the coils will fall off at once of their own accord. The same is the case with sin, the accumulated deposit of evil *karma*, on the soul. There is this difference between an inflated body and the soul that while the former is filled with extraneous wind, the latter is puffed up with its own conceit, since the *ahamkāra* is only the pride of personality. Evil *karman*s bind the soul hand and foot with the cords of sin; and it feels greater and greater pain as its sense of *meum* and *teum* becomes enlarged in its consciousness. Life is, however, ever ready to help it in its trouble, but cannot do so till a 'sacrifice' is offered. The ignorant suggest the slaughter of dumb animals, but the God within desires not blood; for that can only tighten, still more closely, the coils of evil *karma*, in consequence of the cruelty involved in the act of sacrificial

butchery.* Thus, the only sacrifice which is acceptable is that of the head, the neck and the knees of the lower ego, which the ancients symbolized by the ram, the bull and the he-goat, respectively. This brief analysis, let us hope, will put a stop to the unnecessary and harmful butchery which takes place in the name of divinity, on the occasions of religious festivals. To the Jews and Muhammadans we would recommend a serious consideration of the divine declarations contained in the Old Testament and the Qur'an. To those of the Hindus who indulge in this inhuman ceremonial, we suggest a perusal of their own Scriptures, which, in their esoteric,† or true sense, do not enjoin the sacrifice of life on any account. How could the ancient Rishis whose precision of thought makes them ask at the very commencement: 'who is the God to whom we shall offer sacrifice?' and finds him to be the dweller in the hearts of all beings,—how could such Rishis, we ask, enjoin any animal sacrifice to such a god? Again, how could they prescribe renunciation, so complete and full as to destroy one's *ahamkara*, and yet insist on the performance of bloody sacrifices for the well-being of that very *ahamkara*?

It is in no ambiguous terms that the Vedas themselves point out the identity between the sacrificer and the sacrifice. The following texts may be cited as relevant to the point under consideration:—

1. "The sacrificer is himself the victim. It (the sacrifice) takes the very sacrificer himself to heaven."—(Tait. Br. iii. 12, 4, 8.)

* Cf. "It is not possible that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sins."—(Hebrews x. 4.)

† It is obvious to any one who has studied the Vedas that the words employed in the text in connection with animal sacrifices are capable of an exoteric as well as an esoteric interpretation. For instance, the word *asva* signifies not only a horse, but also the mind. The *manas* drags the body just as the horse moves a car. For the body is symbolically represented by a chariot so that that which drags it about may well be called an *asva* (horse). Hence, the horse is the symbol of the desiring *manas*. In like manner, the word "*ajā*" means a ram, or he-goat exoterically, but esoterically it means carnal nature. Hence, the injunction to sacrifice the horse and the he-goat esoterically means only the sacrificing of the desiring *manas* and carnality without which *moksha* cannot be attained. The *gomadha* of the Hindu Scriptures, similarly, means self-denial, *ga* (cow) being a symbol for *indriyas* (the senses), in the sense of *نفس* (sensualism).

2. "The sacrificer is the animal."—(S. P. Br. xi. 1. 8. 3.)
3. "The animal is ultimately the sacrificer himself."—(Tait. Br. ii. 2. 8. 2.)
4. "The sacrificer is indeed the sacrifice."—(Tait. Br. i. 28.)
5. "Now the sacrifice is the man. The sacrifice is the man for the reason that the man spreads it; and that in being spread it is made of exactly the same extent as the man: this is the reason why the sacrifice is the man."—(Satāpatha Brāhmaṇa, I. 2. 2. 8—Sacred Books of the East, vol. xii. p. 173.)
6. "The sacrifice is the representation of the man himself; and hence its dimensions are to be those of a man . . . the *śukla* (a kind of spoon) is supposed to represent the right, and the *apabhrū* (another kind of spoon) the left arm, and the *dharma*, the trunk."—(Sacred Books of the East, vol. xii. p. 78 note.)

Thus all the religions we have examined here are at one on the point that it is the sacrifice of one's own lower nature which is enjoined, not that of poor, inoffensive beasts.

Let us, then, offer to our Ideal the sacrifices which are pleasing and acceptable unto Life, and avoid the shedding of innocent blood in its holy name. The bull which has horns and hoofs should be replaced on the sacrificial altar with the one that has no horns and hoofs, i.e., by the neck, the symbol and seat of human pride and conceit. The ram and the he-goat, hitherto misunderstood to mean the animals of those names, now become the sense of egotism and carnal nature of the sacrificer himself. Let us in future offer to Life only the self-less praise, with bent knees and bowed head, and we shall find, ere long, that it is the offering which is the source of bliss and blessedness to the sacrificer.

To complete our explanation of sacrificial symbology, we have to observe that the zodiacal man consists of positive and negative parts, like everything else in nature (*Bṛhajjātakam*). Of the four kinds of tendencies represented by the four quadrupeds, the lion (Leo), the ram, the bull and the he-goat, the only positive one is fearlessness, symbolized by the lion. Now, since the object of sacrifice is the attainment of one's hidden Godhood, therefore, only those tendencies which are negative, that is to say, which produce negativity, hence, weakness, are to be destroyed. For this reason were the ram, the bull and the he-goat, the symbols of negative, i.e., weakening tendencies, in the nature of the soul, selected for sacrifice.

The higher Self is pure Will which comes into manifestation only when the weakening tendencies are brought under control. Hence, anything which removes weakness from the will directly goes to impart grace and strength to the soul; in other words, the soul can only be developed by a deliberate eradication of all those tendencies, inclinations and emotions which act as obstacles on the path of emancipation. Hence sensuality, pride, greed, and all other like inclinations and emotions have to be offered as a sacrifice to propitiate (develop) the God (Self).

We may, therefore, say that the sacrifice of another's life can never be the means of salvation; on the contrary, it is sure to engender the worst kind of *karmas* for the vain sacrificer; for will can never be developed by the sight or smell of blood. It is passions, and passions alone, which are excited and strengthened by it; but passions only go to obscure the intellect and harden the heart. Neither knowledge, nor purity, therefore, can spring out of animal or human sacrifice.

As already pointed out, resurrection means the conquest of death and the realization of the natural purity of the *Atman*, i.e., the Self. Now, because the realization of this natural perfection depends on one's own exertion, and not on the merit, grace or favour of another, it is inconceivable how any outside agency can possibly lead to the emancipation of the soul from the clutches of sin and death. All that another can possibly do for one, in this respect, is to call one's attention to the powers and forces lying hidden and latent in the soul; and for this reason it is necessary to take instruction from a properly qualified teacher. But neither sacrifice nor vicarious atonement tends, in the remotest degree, to draw the attention of the soul to its own divinity or nature. For this reason they are both equally devoid of merit and the seed of rebirth.

Arrived at the status of manhood, the *jiva* has the choice, hence, the power to attain salvation by the right use of his divine will. He may direct his energies in the direction of the phenomenal, and lose himself in the pursuit of the knowledge of good and evil, or, resolutely turn his back upon the world, and become absorbed in the realization of his immortal, blissful Self. The first path leads to trouble, sickness,

death, and hell, but the second is the *moksha-marga* proper—the road to bliss and blessedness unabating.

The attainment of bliss is possible only for those who push the animal-end of the see-saw of existence below the level of neutrality, thus, raising the God-end up. According to the Bible, Adam strove for the acquisition of the power of sensual discrimination, and thereby developed his lower nature, with the result that the God-end of the see-saw went down and the animal-end rose uppermost. 'Jesus,' understanding, as he did, the secret of the Genesis legend, began to push the lower end down, and succeeded in doing so at the Place of Golgotha. The blood of the Christ within, but not of any external saviour or saint, is on our hands. The ideal for the realization of which we ought to give our heart's blood is being slain by us; and it is the guilt of this crime which hangs heavy on our souls. It is only when the lower nature is slain that the higher acquires ascendancy. 'Jesus' must suffer, so that Christ might appear; and even Christ must give way to God, so that the full blaze of the glory of the 'Father' may be brought into manifestation. This is, however, a very different thing from what the clerics would have us believe is the real doctrine of the New Testament. Those who take the teaching of the Bible in the clerical sense would do well to ponder over the weighty observations of Mr. Lucas, the author of the *Christ For India*, which we reproduce here:—

"The modern mind frankly recognizes that the basis of its theology is not the Bible, regarded as an infallible book whose words and thought-forms are the moulds into which its religious thoughts must be pressed, but the religious experience of the race, and supremely of Jesus, the highest manifestation of the thought and mind of God. It finds in the Bible the richest religious experience of humanity, but it recognizes that that experience has been expressed in thought-forms which are essentially temporary, representative of the age in which the writers lived, and coloured with views of the universe which the present age has outgrown. The religious experience is of permanent value, but the expression of it is, of necessity, archaic. The religious experience can only be made a living reality for the modern mind in proportion as the expression of it is altered by replacing obsolete thought-forms by those in current use. To preserve the Biblical expression is often to sacrifice the reality of the religious experience, with consequences which are fatal to present-day religion."

There can be no doubt but that this is the correct attitude of the really zealous mind. Religion must agree with common sense (not necessarily with the common sense of the city magnate, or the materialistic professor, but with the common sense of the real sages of the race); it can never be true when it assumes a hostile attitude towards rationalism. When we look upon the Bible as a collection of the thoughts of the various prophets and seers according to their lights, and not as an infallible record of historical events or religious experience, we cannot go wrong. None of the Biblical prophets can be regarded as infallible, and the only useful purpose their writings serve for us lies in the fact that we are enabled to form an estimate of the degree of divine manifestation with their help, and also to check the conclusions we might ourselves draw from the facts within our knowledge. Man must take the religious records as he finds them, and should try to understand the truth for himself. He should be prepared to reject that which is not compatible with the facts of experience, or with good, sound common sense. It is only then that he will be able to understand religion. The doctrine of the vicarious atonement by 'the first and the only begotten Son of God,' if taken literally, comes to grief at the very commencement. There is and can be no such thing as a son begotten of God. Jehovah declares (Isaiah, xliii. 11):

"I, even I, am the Lord; and beside me there is no saviour."

To the same effect is the following from Ecclesiastes (iv. 8):—

"There is one alone, and there is not a second; yea, he hath neither child nor brother."

It will be pure waste of time to dwell any longer on the point; suffice it to say that there is not a word of proof in favour of the orthodox theory either in the Bible or outside it.

Now, if a real Son of God (in the sense in which orthodox Christianity uses that expression) had come down to the world to save mankind from sin, and to sacrifice his life so that humanity might be saved, he would have behaved in a manner quite different from that of Jésus. The very first point of difference lies in the

method of teaching. One can understand a man speaking in secret parables and concealed metaphor. The reason is to be found in the old advice of sages, namely, that the lips of wisdom are sealed except to the ear of understanding, especially ascribed to Hermes.

This course was rendered necessary :

(1) because the ultimate truth is so astounding and so utterly beyond the comprehension of the generality of mankind that it was thought hardly worth one's while to see that they too understood it ;

(2) because the sneering attitude of ignorant unbelief has been known to injuriously affect the mind of many a less advanced teacher ; and

(3) because the preacher was generally subjected to violence and lynch law, and, at times, paid the penalty with his life.

Accordingly, it is but natural that the Bible should make Jesus say :—

"Give not that which is holy unto the dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine, lest they trample them under their feet, and turn again and rend you."—(*Matt. vii. 6.*)

But it is obvious that none of the above reasons will hold good in the case of an Almighty God or in that of his Son, and one will, therefore, naturally expect a real Son of God to speak the highest truth, without fear or favour—a quality in which Jesus was certainly found wanting.

Then, again, a real Son of God would not have been found making distinctions and differences as are only too obvious from such observations of Jesus as the following :—

"I am not sent but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel."—(*Matt. x. 24.*)

"It is not meet to take the children's bread, and to cast it to dogs."—(*Matt. xv. 26.*)

In the eye of a god, surely, all his creatures are alike, so that the notion of the favoured nation cannot but be looked upon as a piece of savage self-conceit and barbarous self-glorification. If we, however, take into account what Jesus said on another occasion, his position becomes clear. "For the Son of Man has come to save that which was lost" (*Matt. xviii. 11*), gives us a clear insight into his attitude towards the rest of mankind. He knew that there were

many who were not lost, and for them he could not have come. The people from whom he had learnt his gospel were there, and he could not be presumed to be teaching his own teachers. Whatever view we may take of the historicity and teaching of Jesus, it is certain, beyond the possibility of doubt, that he was preaching nothing new to the world, and, therefore, those who knew the truth had no necessity for his help, or guidance. His position as regards the woman of Canaan also becomes clear now, and, plainly put, amounts to this that his mission in life was to carry enlightenment to those who were in the dark, but out of them those who could be considered better 'soil' were his first care, for there the seed would yield a thirty-, a sixty-, or even a hundred-fold harvest quickly, as, he thought, was the case with the Israelites. As a Jew, Jesus would naturally be led to believe that the doctrines of Moses and the commandments of Jehovah had, so to speak, prepared the ground in Israel for the reception of the seed of Truth, and for that reason he would be expected to apply himself to their uplifting. The task of preaching the philosophy of Life to those who were strangers to spiritual metaphysics would not appeal to his mind; nor is it likely to appeal to the mind of any other person. We find this principle working even in our ordinary lives daily. If an ignorant, illiterate, rustic and an educated person were to apply for instruction to some leading professor, say, in higher mathematics, it is obvious whom he would accept as his pupil. The former would be rejected not because the Professor cannot teach him, but because he must go elsewhere to acquire a fair grounding in elementary mathematics, by way of a preparation for the higher course, while the latter, presenting in his previous education the goodness and fertility of the 'soil,' would be readily instructed. Acting on this principle, Jesus refused to pay heed to the lamentations of the woman of Canaan, till her highly pertinent answer—"Truth Lord: Yet the dogs eat of the crumbs which fall from their masters' table"—(Matt. xv. 27) convinced him that she had a great capacity for faith in her heart. It requires but a comparison with the Saviour's attitude to show us the absurdity of the modern religious missionary. The former professed to save the lost sheep only, but the latter, in

his blind zeal, presumes to teach even those who are more enlightened than himself. What respect can he, then, hope to command from those who have a profound knowledge of matters with which he is, at best, most superficially and inadequately acquainted? Even in the ranks of the Christian clergy themselves there are to be found men like Revd. H. E. Sampson, the learned author of "Progressive Christianity," who have realized the weakness of the orthodox interpretation of their creed, and have burnt midnight oil in a brave and manly endeavour to put it on a higher and rational basis. He has established the fact that re-incarnation is a fundamental part of the true doctrine of the church, and, although many errors have crept into the book for want of accurate knowledge of the divine philosophy, one cannot refuse to recognize the signal service he has rendered to Christendom at large.

As a matter of fact, Mr. Sampson does not bestow on the doctrine of the 'fall' that consideration which its importance demands, and believes the origin of sin to lie in a violation of the law of segregation of species. We regret we are unable to agree with him also when he tries to interpret religious dogmas and mystic tales from the standpoint of a historian. It is impossible to criticise his elaborate reasoning, at length, in the present work, but a few of the arguments against his theory may be briefly stated as follows:—

(1) the fall of Adam, or the origin of sin, is a typical affair, not an historical event, in the physical world, and, therefore, cannot be explained on historical lines;

(2) if the fall were due to unlawful intercourse, whether sanctioned by any matrimonial tie or not, between the Sons of God and the daughters of men, the condition of humanity prior to the act of transgression ought not to have been a fallen one; but the Bible itself leaves no room for doubt on this point;

(3) it is not easy to see the unlawful nature of intermarriage between the Sons of God and the daughters of men, in the historical sense;

(4) subsequent sexual promiscuity fails to explain the origin of the evil tendency in the Sons of God which prompted them to come in unto the daughters of men; and

(5) racial sin by intermarriage or fornication, leaves no room for individual salvation, and will make redemption itself dependent on the possibility of racial regeneration.

It is not the prevention of intermarriage that will lead to the redemption of mankind, but celibacy. The particular passage in Genesis (vi. 1—6) on which Revd. Sampson has based his theory of sexual segregation, has nothing to do with the idea of Nirvana, or with that of the fall. If true, it merely shows how sexual lust perverted the hearts of men at a certain period in the history of the world, and led to the shortening of the duration of life, from a thousand* years or so to 'an hundred and twenty.' To this extent the passage in question may be said to be historical. The doctrine of the fall, as well as the 'first recorded' sacrifices of Abel and Cain, however, are purely allegorical and have no historical basis. To read them historically, therefore, can only lead to confusion.

The passage under consideration is, likewise, an allegory depicting the perversion in the natural functioning of the light divine of Reason, collectively, the Sons of God. The daughters of men are the tendencies and longings of the flesh which are the generatrices of evil passions. The great Jewish scholar Philo Judaeus, too, regards the narrative as a pure allegory. We are obliged to Drummond who has summed up Philo's views in this regard. Drummond's comment as to this may be given in his own words :—

"The angels enter after the departure of the divine spirit; for as long as pure rays of wisdom shine in the soul, through which the wise man sees God and his powers, none of those who falsely act as angels enter the reason. But when the light of understanding is overshadowed, 'the companions of darkness' unite with the effeminate passions, which scripture 'has termed daughters of men.'"—(Drummond's *Philo Judaeus*, Vol. II, p. 240.)

Sexual promiscuity, fornication, incest, over-indulgence, and all other abuses of the sex-function only go to excite and strengthen

* It is interesting to compare this period of longevity with the long lives of men at the time (about 86,500 years ago) of Sri Nemi Nathji Bhagwan, the twenty-second Tirthankara of Jainism, who, according to the Jaina Puranas, resided at Dwarka with His cousins, Sri Krishna and Balram, and lived for a thousand years in this world.

evil passions and tendencies, and, thus, actually produce weakness of the will. Even the least objectionable sex-relation of husband and wife is an obstacle on the path to Nirvana, since it diverts attention from the higher to the lower self. Therefore, so long as sexual passion is not brought completely under the control of will, it acts as an impediment to the realization of perfection and bliss, which are the ideal in view. Eradication of the sex-passion rather than the segregation of species, then, is the means of developing the will. It is for this reason that all rational religions enjoin sexual abstinence, in the end. All the great Teachers also practised absolute celibacy, and enjoined it on their followers. Of all the poisons in the universe, *kama*-exciting feminine beauty is the most fatal. Physical contact is not necessary for its action; its mere sight, even thought, is sufficient to affect the mind. Photographs, paintings, and even verbal description of beauty have been known to excite the sexual passion. It is more lasting in its effect than the other known poisons, since they only affect the physical body which the soul leaves behind on death, while its evil influence becomes incorporated in the individual character, and persists through future incarnations.

Moreover, since passion is the actual cause of mental impurity, and since redemption cannot be had so long as the mind is not purged of all impurities, no one who aspires to obtain *moksha* can afford to abandon himself to voluptuousness, or sexual love, in any form. Even thoughts of lust must be completely banished from the inner atmosphere of the soul. Total abstinence and self-control are rigidly enjoined on all who aspire for liberation in the course of one earth-life. For the rest partial control is necessary, if they would avoid hell and ugly, tormenting scenes in the hereafter. Partial control consists in the proper selection of a bride, and in the observance of the nuptial vow. The marriage-bed must be maintained pure and inviolate. The idea of a bedmate other than the married spouse should never be allowed to sully the purity of the heart; sexual fidelity should under no circumstances be jeopardized even in thought.

The husband and wife should both have the same ideal of life in common; they should share each other's beliefs and aspirations. Diversity of ideals is compatible with friction, not with co-operation.

and even when people try to 'pull-on' together, in a highly commendable spirit of toleration the differences of opinion are not reconciled thereby. Hence, active co-operation for the realization of each other's ideals is out of the question under the circumstances. It is thus clear that where the selection of the nuptial-partner is determined solely by physical charms, or some material advantage, e.g., money, marriage becomes a lottery in which more 'blanks' are drawn than 'prizes.'

It is now easy to interpret the Biblical teaching in respect of the types of eunuchs-amongst men. There are eunuchs born, eunuchs made of men, and eunuchs who have become so for the Kingdom of Heaven. The first class needs no comment; in their case impotence is congenital. In the second group fall all those unfortunate captives of war, slaves and others, whose masters, or guardians, have them operated upon to deprive them of their manhood. But the third class consists of those pure and divine souls who have completely subdued their sexual passion to enter into Life Eternal. These alone are blessed; for they have adopted the life of celibacy of their own free-will and choice, not by force of circumstances beyond their control, nor from worldly motives. Theirs is the purest motive, and, naturally, theirs, also, is the bliss of Nirvana.

To digress still further, two elements are involved in the proper functioning of the marital relation, namely, physical necessity and the spiritual need. The former alone is recognized, and forms the basis of society in Europe and among non-Indian races, where marriage is treated as a civil contract more or less binding on the parties, according to the rules and requirements of the society to which they happen to belong. True marriage, however, means the union of souls for uplifting the condition of the participants, for their mutual, spiritual advancement. There is no room for brute carnality here, and although it is not necessary to crush out, or subdue, the natural demands of human nature, the parties remain unmoved by the presence of each other, except with the common idea of co-operating with nature for the unfoldment of the best within them. And, if the law be as Jesus defined it :

"Again I say unto you, that if two of you shall agree on earth as touching anything that they shall ask, it shall be done for them of my Father which is in heaven."
—(Matt. xviii. 19.)

who can doubt the efficacy of such a spiritual union of the participants, when all the most powerful psychic forces of both the husband and the wife are directed towards one common end, when they both work in one direction, with one mind, for the realization of their most closely connected and inseparably fused and united interests? It is in respect of such marriages that one unhesitatingly thinks, 'marriages are made in heaven; those whom God has joined let no man put asunder' (Mark x, 9).

To revert to the main subject, if the 'only begotten' Son of God had come down from heaven, he would have declared at once what he meant by a 'rising from the dead,' and not left the matter enshrouded in mystery for a single moment. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Jesus was a historical figure and the Son of a god, we can easily imagine what would have been the most natural course of conduct for him. He had come down for at least three distinct purposes, namely,

- (1) to reveal the glory of the Father to mankind,
- (2) to redeem humanity from sin, and
- (3) to establish his claim to the Sonship of God by rising from the dead.

His most obvious procedure would be to tell mankind his position in as plain a language as possible. If people failed to understand him, it was not their fault; it was failure on the part of the 'Son of God' to express himself. If the Son of a god fails to make people understand him, there is an end of the matter; for there is a distinct confession of weakness, which is hardly in keeping with the notion of an all-knowing, all-powerful god. The question is, why did Jesus use ambiguous, unintelligible language when referring to his resurrection from the dead? Why did he not tell them plainly what he meant, instead of using language which, to say the least, was misleading? Now that the events are over, and we look into the sense of the various Messianic references to his death and resurrection, we may find them quite intelligible; but that before the event no one—not even the chosen twelve—had the least idea on the subject is

absolutely certain from passages like the following, in the four gospels :—

" The people answered him, we have heard out of the law that Christ abideth for ever : how sayest thou, The Son of Man must be lifted up. ? Who is this Son of Man ? " —(*John*, xii. 24.)

" For he shall be delivered unto the Gentiles; and shall be mocked, and spitefully entreated, and spitted on :

" And they shall scourge him, and put him to death : and the third day he shall rise again.

" And they understood none of these things : and this saying was hid from them, neither knew they the things which were spoken. " —(*Luke*, xviii. 32, 33 and 34.)

" And they kept the saying with themselves, questioning one with another what the rising from the dead should mean. " —(*Mark*, ix. 10.)

" For he taught his disciples, and said unto them, The Son of Man is delivered into the hands of men, and they shall kill him ; and after that he is killed, he shall rise the third day.

" But they understood not that saying, and were afraid to ask him. " —(*Mark*, ix. 31 and 32.)

No need to multiply references ; it is not a case for interpretation, for we have here the actual testimony of the chosen disciples themselves that they did not understand what was meant by these sayings. Further, it is recorded in the gospels that Jesus not only evinced fear at the very last moment before his final preparation for glorification, but also actually prayed that the " cup might pass from him " (*Matt.* xxvi. 39). It is also written that before his arrest he often hid himself from fear, when he found that the intentions of the Jews were all but friendly towards him.

" Then from that day forth they took counsel together for to put him to death.

" Jesus therefore walked no more openly among the Jews : but went thence to a country near the wilderness, into a city called Ephraim, and there continued with his disciples. " —(*John*, xi. 53 and 54.)

" Then took they up stones to cast at him : but Jesus hid himself, and went out of the temple, going through the midst of them and so passed, by. " —(*John*, viii. 59.)

The display of such fear by the Son of God is most un-God-like. Nor do we imagine it becoming the dignity of such an Exalted Being to assure his disciples :

" My soul is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death. "—(*Matt.* xxvi. 38.)

It is considered a virtue amongst civilized races to display a manly spirit of resignation in the closing moments of life, and a manifestation of old-womanish horror of death is looked upon as a sign of pagan barbarism. Why, then, did Jesus forget himself so far ?

In endeavouring to find a satisfactory explanation of these difficulties we must begin by frankly recognising the irrepressible fact that our ideas about the historicity and personality of Jesus are hopelessly wrong and the sole cause of our errors. There can be no such thing as a Son of God, to begin with. In order that there should be a son, there must be a wife first. But the God of Christianity cannot have a son, for he has no wife !

It is not even possible to regard Jesus as an historical figure, since we are not led to any really reliable or valuable results thereby. If we regard him as a man of no education, as some of his biographers do, we shall have to content ourselves with finding such attributes in him as rustic simplicity, unsophisticated candour, and the like, instead of anything that may be termed divine. On the other hand, if we credit him with learning, on the authority of certain verses (*John* viii. 6 ; *Luke* iv. 16—20) that show that he once or twice wrote something on the ground, and read the book of Isaiah, there is nothing to show that he received an extensive education, though his teachings are full of beautiful gems of esoteric wisdom throughout. Whence could he acquire this wisdom, unless it be deemed to have been ' put into his mouth ' by some one who was really learned and who understood things. But this only means that he himself is only an allegory, pure and simple.

Some writers have regarded him even as a revolutionary who wanted to bring about a social upheaval, and aimed at the levelling down of all distinctions and differences. But a supposition like that is not in harmony with such sayings as : " Render to Cæsar the

things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's " (Mark, xii. 17). Nor will it explain the element or the attitude of mystery :

" I will open my mouth in parables ; I will utter things which have been kept secret from the foundation of the world. "—(Matt. xiii. 35.)

Besides, the connection between social reform and the founding of a religion is not quite so clear as to justify the conclusion that that was the goal in view. No doubt to a certain extent social reform is covered by religious reform but the converse of this proposition is not true. Needless to add that the supposition will also fail to account for and explain a very large number of mystic sayings and esoteric truths of which the gospels are full.

The same difficulty arises with regard to crucifixion. On the historical view the crucifixion could only be the termination of a simple, idyllic life the owner of which paid the penalty for his revolutionary views with his life on the cross. But this again gives us no help in understanding the Messianic teaching, and certainly leaves us no wiser after we have accorded our assent to it than before.

We shall be coming nearer to nature and life if we regard Jesus as an advanced *yogi* who had determined upon a public demonstration of the power of *yoga* to triumph over death, in his own person (see Matt. xx. 18; Luke xiii. 32 and xxii. 22). This will enable us to sympathise with him in his mission of enlightening the Jewish nation, who had grossly misdirected themselves as to the true interpretation of the scripture. We can now appreciate his bursts of righteous indignation against the traditions of men which had come to be substituted in place of the commandments of the Law. His discourses now no longer appear to be the ravings of a deluded rustic who saw the world through the prism of his simplicity. We can even share his joy when he is surrounded by eager listeners ; and his sorrow when these misunderstand his doctrine.

We can also imagine him as engaged in devising out proper means for ensuring the success of his intended demonstration. He would naturally be anxious not to disclose the secret to any one, and with such men as Judas Iscariot amongst his followers extreme caution would naturally be the counsel of reason. For his 'death' he would prefer the manner which would be the

most suited for the demonstration of his *yoga* powers ; and very naturally he would decide upon crucifixion, because of its offering the best facilities for the suspension of animation, and because of its approaching death the nearest in point of simulation. The great feast of the Passover, when Pilate's presence at Jerusalem would prevent the Jews from taking the law into their hands, that is to say, from stoning him, would naturally strike him as the most suitable moment for the demonstration of the miraculous rising from the 'dead.' It would also be reasonable to expect that the most ignominious form of punishment, namely, crucifixion, which was chiefly reserved for slaves, would be selected for him by the Jews, who were likely to regard him as a low-born reviler of their Law : and the Romans would not be expected to show any tenderness for his person, if they were once led to regard him as a revolutionary and an enemy of the Cæsar. Let us suppose these were the plans which Jesus had formed for the enlightenment of the Jews. Let us further suppose that they have been fully matured and the time has arrived when they are to be put into execution. Jesus enters Jerusalem, riding a donkey, with his followers shouting "blessed is the king of Israel that cometh in the name of the Lord" (John, xii. 13). Surely, it all now looks like a revolt against the Cæsar !

The days that follow are crowded with events. The enemies, too, are not idle. They sought to take him by craft, to put him to death. At last a traitor is found, and arrangements are made for the arrest of the master. The co-disciples are not aware of all this : but the master knows that it is the last day and an arrest may be expected to take place any moment now. In the strain and stress of such a day of strenuous work a moment's leisure is now obtained for serious thought. There is a moment's hesitation : a strange thought lays hold of the *yogi's* mind : will the plans carry through successfully ? and without a hitch and mishap ? It sends a thrill of horror into his whole frame. The daring aspirant may well seek solitude to look over the events of his career, as the teacher of the race. Let us follow the workings of his mind more closely.

In the undisturbed solitude of the place of Gethsemane, he sought for the causation of the hapless drama of misery and woe,

and the shaping of destiny. His mind went back, through the vista of time, to the solitary couple of typical humanity, said to be responsible for the introduction of sin into the world. With the mind's eye he saw them walking in the company of 'Father,' and beheld their happiness unmarred by any of the trials and incidents common to the humanity in his own day. The vision of paradise lay stretched before him. The Garden of Eden rolled itself out before the seer's eye, with the two human figures, standing in bold relief in the foreground, the one with a countenance radiating in manhood's glory, like the noonday sun, and the other, in the fulness of womanhood's charms surpassing the shining orb of the Queen of Night, at the zenith of her majestic grace. He looked at them with awe and admiration, and his delight knew no bounds when he beheld their radiant faces lit up with the beatific glory of at-one-ment with Life Divine which he had learnt to look upon as God. The scene held him spell-bound for a moment. Then his eye wandered over to the place where the Tree of Life stood in the midst of the garden, and he presently beheld the two human figures walking leisurely towards it, and saw them stretch out their hands and eat its golden fruit, which, even as it hung from the tree, seemed to be overflowing with the nectar of immortality. There was not a single withered leaf on that tree, nor anywhere else in its vicinity, while the heavenly fragrance of its blossoms carried life and joy to all, as it was wafted on the breeze.

Entranced and enraptured, he allowed his gaze to wander from it to a still more beautiful tree in the garden.

"With root above, branches below; its leaves are hymns, virtue and vice, its flowers, and joy and grief its fruit. Downwards and upwards spread the branches of it, nourished by the qualities; the objects of sense its buds; and its roots grow downwards, the bonds of action in the world of men."—(*Bhagavad Gita*, Disc. xv.)

Jesus was fascinated; something within him seemed to point it out as the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Suddenly he noticed a dark slimy object gliding up its trunk and throw its venom into it. He instinctively shuddered at the sight, and allowed his gaze to wander away still further, when in a quiet retreat he beheld the first female form, radiant, sweet and fair, her beauteous countenance bathed in smiles of joy, her eyes sparkling with the light of innocency and love,

a perfect model of feminine grace and beauty, tripping gaily, and, in the intense lightness of her heart and the conscious delight of freedom and power, hardly seeming to touch the ground which she trod. Presently he beheld the dark slimy creature coming up to her from behind, and noticed that her fair face showed signs of instinctive repulsion at its approach. Eagerly did he strain his nerves to catch their conversation, but in vain. He only beheld a shaking of the head on the part of the fair one, and a nodding, as if in emphasizing a point, on that of the other; and then it seemed as if some understanding had been arrived at between them, for he beheld them parting company with a nod of their heads. His gaze now followed the figure of the woman, who, passing through some beautiful walks and flowerbeds, rejoined her lord. There was some conversation between them which he could not overhear, but he saw signs of anger and incredulity succeed each other on the face of the man. Next he beheld them proceeding in the direction of the attractive but poisonous tree, and it appeared to him that their talk had some reference to it, for the man shook his head vigorously when they reached it. At last the woman raised her beautiful, symmetrical hand to point out its beauty, whereupon her companion seemed to agree with her.

Then all of a sudden the heart of Jesus sank within him. He saw the woman pluck the fruit of the tree. He made as if to rush forward to warn them that the tree was poisoned, but before he could realize what had happened, the woman had eaten a piece herself and had given another to her lord and master, the man. Jesus did not want to look in that direction any more. He knew what the inevitable result of that fruit would be.

Then he turned his gaze towards Jerusalem, and saw, as if by the power of clairvoyance, the chief priests and elders gathered together, planning and plotting his own destruction. He saw Judas Iscariot sitting in their midst with what looked like some pieces of silver before him, and heard the arrangement arrived at for his betrayal. But the scene did not affect him in the least; he was only amazed (Mark, xiv. 33) at their shortsightedness. His mind had already been made up; the temporary fit of weakness had passed. In the whole of the holy land of Palestine he was the one man who

knew the secret of sin. Should he allow the handful of purblind fools of the Scribes and Pharisees to stand between him and his duty to the whole race?

When at the end of his forty days' austerities in the forest he had not yielded to the voice of temptation, which had pointed out that all the pomp and power and greatness which man can possibly desire in this world would be his, if he would but use his powers for their acquisition, and had preferred to carry out his ministry, how could he now be swayed away from the course which he had chalked out for himself? That settled the point, once for all. Having arrived at this conclusion, he became once again the Master that he was.

After the fit of momentary human weakness had passed away, Jesus applied himself to testing his powers. He exerted himself to such an extent in what seemed to his disciples the act of praying, but which, in reality, was the act of concentration and display of will-power that his sweat was as it were great drops of blood falling down to the ground (Luke, xxii. 44). Three of his most powerful disciples, namely, Peter, James and John, felt overpowered, and could not keep awake, and fancied that an angel from heaven had come to strengthen him. Thrice he told them to keep awake, and watch with him, but each time they fell asleep, and did not know what reply to give (Mark, xiv. 40) when reprimanded by him. The test was entirely successful, for if three of his well-instructed and most advanced disciples, like Peter, James and John, could not resist the influence of, but yielded to, his subjective forces, and were dumbfounded in addition, he had nothing to fear at all at the hands of his persecutors. So he stepped out of his solitude, being, now, fully prepared for the coming ordeal. He no longer said 'the spirit indeed is willing but the flesh is weak' (Mark, xiv. 38). The weakness of the flesh was a momentary sensation, which the spirit had never succumbed to. There was no longer the fear of any mishap, or calamity; he felt the power of the spirit welling up within him. The 'man' in him was completely subdued; and, rising like the divine Master that he had now become, he declared, "Rise up, let us go" (Mark, xiv. 42) to meet the assassin.

Soon the traitor arrives with the minions of the priests. The master is surrounded by the soldiery. Peter, not knowing the secrets of his master, seeks to resist the arrest, but is gently reprimanded. Thence the party proceeds to the Temple where the priests subject the Master to a heckling cross-examination.

The next day he is placed on his trial before Pilate, who is an honest man. Here an unforeseen difficulty presents itself: should he speak out the truth and risk the failure of his plans, at the last moment, or deceive the judge, who is a pious man? Falsehood, however, is out of the question before such a man! Pilate is accordingly told that the master's teaching has no reference to worldly power: the prisoner disclaims any worldly ambitions! Pilate is impressed, and is on the point of ordering the release of the prisoner before him, when the Jews threaten him with enmity for Cæsar. Fearful of his own safety, the governor at last passes the sentence of death by crucifixion, on the prisoner. A procession is now formed, and the multitude follows the condemned man to the Place of Calvary, where the sentence is carried out.

Only a few other incidents need mentioning to complete the scene at Calvary. The most important point is that Jesus was crucified at the sixth hour and 'expired' at the ninth. This even surprises Pilate (Mark, xv. 44). Before his 'death' the master was given some vinegar to deaden pain; but he would not have it. Pain, and for a yogi! Who ever heard of an adept stooping to drinking vinegar, to deaden physical pain? There is the well-known case of the yogi at Lahore who suffered himself to be buried underground for full forty days (see *The Law of the Psychic Phenomena*, by T. J. Hudson, p. 312):—

"One of the most clearly attested instances of the kind alluded to is the experiment of the fakir of Lahore, who, at the instance of Ranjit Singh, suffered himself to be buried alive in an air-tight vault for a period of six weeks. The case was thoroughly authenticated by Sir Claude Wade, the then British Resident at the Court of Ludhiana. The fakir's nostrils and ears were first filled with wax; he was then placed in a linen bag, then deposited in a wooden box which was securely locked and the box was deposited in a brick vault which was carefully plastered up with mortar and sealed with the Raja's seal. A guard of British soldiers was then detailed to watch the vault day and night. At the end of the prescribed time the vault was

opened in the presence of Sir Claude and Ranjit Singh, and the fakir was restored to consciousness."

We also learn from Dr. Drayton that Sir Monier Williams, at one time Professor of Sanskrit at Oxford, also testified to the accuracy of these details, and that Dr. McGregor, the then Resident Surgeon, also watched the case. "Every precaution was taken to prevent deception." (Human Magnetism, pages 59 and 60.)

Sensations of pain are generally absent in a trance, and the immunity from them becomes more marked when a suggestion to that effect is given by a person himself before entering that state, or, afterwards, by another, as in hypnotism. Says Prof. James in his 'Principles of Psychology,' at page 606 of the second volume:—

"Real sensations may be abolished as well as false ones suggested. Legs and breasts may be amputated, children born, teeth extracted, in fact, the most painful experiences undergone, with no other anaesthetic than the hypnotizer's assurance that no pain shall be felt."

To conclude: Jesus was removed from the cross and tenderly laid in the grave. When once there he came round. With his *yogi*-born powers of miraculous healing the healing of his own wounds required but a thought to be effected. His triumph was now complete.

How and when he emerged from the grave is not known. It would seem that he did not see many of his own disciples, after his resurrection. Certainly, he did not appear unto the public or unto any of his enemies. According to the first evangel, some of the disciples whose number was now reduced to eleven, doubted the fact of resurrection, even after they had seen their resurrected Master! (Matt. xxviii. 17.)

Such would be the main theme of the suppositional story of a master *yogi*, determined to demonstrate his powers in a public manner. But we must have reliable records on which it can be founded in the first instance. Unfortunately the gospels from which it is to be compiled are not in the least reliable. They comprise much that is only too obviously the work of simple imagination. Such, for instance, is the story of the two malefactors who are said to have been crucified with Jesus. This would certainly seem to have been

invented, so that the event ' might come to pass ' in fulfilment of the prophecy which said : ' and he was numbered with the transgressors ' (Mark, xv. 28). Unfortunately for the fulfilment of this ancient saying, as an actual event, the facts point unmistakably in the opposite direction. Luke is the most garrulous of all the gospel-writers on this point. He makes one of his malefactors revile Jesus, but lets the other chide him for his impiety, at which Jesus is pleased to such an extent that he promises the God-fearing evil-doer a lift to the paradise that very day (Luke, xxiii. 39—43). Matthew and Mark both unhesitatingly declare that the thieves, also, who were crucified with Jesus, reviled him, and naturally omit all further detail, since as they had both reviled him there was nothing to be said in the shape of a promise from Jesus to any one of them (Matthew, xxvii. 44 ; Mark, xv. 32). John, not knowing what to do with the mutually quarrelsome malefactors of Luke, thought it quite enough to bring them on to the scene. Under the circumstances it is not possible to assume a foundation of fact for the story, and the testimony of the gospel-writers is more than counterbalanced by a desire to bring about a fulfilment of as many of the prophetic utterances of the veteran Isaiah as they found it convenient to do. The circumstantial evidence is all against the story. Till the malefactors were actually crucified, nobody seemed to know anything about their very existence, so much so that one is tempted to imagine that these venerable gentlemen determined, of their own free will and accord, to join Jesus in death, so that Isaiah's word might not be broken ! Luke, indeed, does say that the malefactors were also led with him, but he is too loquacious on the point, and had best be left out of the witness-box.

There is nothing in the language of Pilate to suggest that there were any other persons besides Barabbas and Jesus to be crucified. Matthew (xxvii. 17) gives us the exact words used by him (Pilate) on the occasion, and they were :—

" Whom will ye that I release unto you ? Barabbas, or Jesus which is called Christ ? "

There is no reference to a third prisoner in this speech. Besides, it is highly incredible that persons whose only fault was that

they had been guilty of theft (Matthew, xxvii. 38 and 44 ; Mark, xv. 27) would be put to death, but Barabbas, who was a notable prisoner, as he had taken part in an insurrection against the established authority, and was also guilty of murder (Matthew, xxvii. 16)—a murderer and an insurgent (Mark, xv. 7), a seditionist and murderer (Luke, xxiii. 19)—and a robber (John xviii. 40), should be released !

As for the account of the resurrection, the same type of discrepancies are found to abound in the gospel with reference to this as to any other matter, but we shall let Dr. W. Wenzlic, M.D., state the case as to these in his own words (*The Greatest Good of Mankind*, pages 205, 206 and 207) :—

"An angel descending from heaven amid an earthquake to roll away the stone from the tomb of Christ, witnessed, according to Matthew, by Mary Magdalene and the other Mary, is certainly something so remarkable that if it had occurred, Mark, Luke and John would also have recorded the miracle as a prelude.

"Instead of merely omitting the testimony, these Apostles, three of them, testify to the contrary ; Luke, xxiv. 2, says : 'And they found the stone rolled away from the tomb and no angel outside but one within the tomb, and that 10, Joanna, was with the two Marys.' John, xx, however, says, Mary Magdalene alone went to the tomb, Mark, xvi. 4, mentions no angel from heaven, but 'They see that the stone is rolled away.'

"Thus the four records contain four different accounts.

"While the one young man angel of Luke was sitting on the right side, xvi. 5, two men in dazzling apparel stood by them according to Luke, xxiv. 4 : but John says, xx. 12, Magdalene beheldeth two angels in white sitting, one at the head, and one at the feet, where the body of Jesus had lain.

"If these several recorders were so particular in the number of angels and their postures, why do they contradict one another as to the number of witnesses that gave the testimony : Matthew saying that the two Marys went, Luke that Joanna was alone, and John that Magdalene alone went to the tomb.

"Matthew says that the two Marys met Jesus on their way to the disciples and that he spoke to them. On the appointed time Jesus met the eleven on the mountain and gave instructions. Nothing is mentioned of vanishing or rising up to heaven. His last words in this chapter are : 'I am with you always, even unto the end of the world.'

"Mark records, xvi. 9, that Jesus when he was risen appeared first to Magdalene, 12, then in another form unto two that had been with him, afterwards to the

eleven themselves. 19. After he had spoken unto them, he was *received up* into heaven and sat at the right hand of God.

" Luke xxiv. 13 narrates that Jesus first appeared unto two that were journeying, but they knew him not until they had supper : 31. and then he vanished out of sight. 34. He appeared unto Simon. 36. Then he stood in the midst of them. 39. It is I myself : handle me and see ; for *a spirit hath no flesh and bones*, as ye behold me having. 50. He led them out : 51. While he blessed them, he parted from them, and was *carried up into heaven*.

" John has Jesus appear to Magdalene in the tomb after she spoke to the angels, but she knew him not. 17. When she knew him, Jesus said, *Touch me not ; for I am not yet ascended* unto the Father. 19. On the evening of the first day of the week he appeared to the disciples in a closed room. 20. After eight days he came again, the doors being shut. 27. Then saith he to Thomas, *reach hither thy hand and put it into my side* ; John xxi. 15-27. In xxi. 24, Jesus manifested himself again to the disciples at the sea of Tiberias on the beach and filled the nets with fishes. He saith not how he vanished, and ' we know that his witness is true.'

" Jesus showed himself alive after his passion by many proofs, appearing unto the apostles by the space of forty days, says Paul in Acts I. 3-9. And when he had said these things, as they were looking, he was *taken up* ; and a cloud received him out of their sight. And while they were looking steadfastly *into heaven* as he went, behold *two men stood by them in white apparel*, which also said, Ye men of Galilee, why stand ye looking into heaven ? This Jesus, which was received up from you into heaven, shall come again in like manner as ye behold him going into heaven.

" Paul says, that Jesus appeared to Cephus ; then to the twelve ; then he appeared to above 500 brethren at once, of whom the greater part remain until now ; 7. then he appeared to James ; then to all the apostles, and, last of all, as to one born out of all time, he appeared to me also ; *1 Cor. xv. 5-7*.

" The resurrection as witnessed by the apostles is described in the Acts with all the accessories such a spectacular event would imply, whereas Mark and Luke only say that Jesus was received in heaven ; Matthew, John, and Paul, in Cor. I, say nothing about so great a miracle."

" Order of appearance. "

" Jesus appeared in the following order :

" To Mary and Magdalene, then to the 11 apostles, according to Matthew.

" To Magdalene, then to the two apostles, then to all. — *Mark*.

" To the two apostles, then to Simon, then to all. — *Luke*.

" To Magdalene, then to the disciples in 8 days again in Tiberias. — *John*.

" To the apostles in 40 days.—*Acts*.

" To Cephas, then to the 12 apostles, then to the above 500.—*1 Cor.*

" To Paul, and James.

" No two records agree as to the number of witnesses, nor as to the order of meeting Jesus.

" Slight variations in the testimony of witnesses would strengthen evidence if they express merely the differences of personal impressions, but the essentials must agree. In the above the essentials not only disagree, but contradict one another. This holds good also with reference to what was spoken by Jesus and his disciples. If closely examined it will be found that the relevant as well as the irrelevant vary with each version, *Brevi prælia*; Luke xxiv. 39, the evening of the first day, See my hands and feet, that it is myself; handle me and see: for a spirit hath no flesh and bones, as ye behold me having. In John, xx. 17, Jesus says to Magdalene, Touch me not; for I am not yet ascended unto the Father. Again, eight days later, verse 27, he asks Thomas to touch and examine him . . . We are left to draw our own conclusions."

There are many more obvious traces of the exercise of ingenuity in the gospels, in this connection. Matthew makes the Pharisees obtain the permission of Pilate to make the sepulchre secure on the second day, fearing that the deceiver might rise up again (Matthew, xxvii. 62—66). This does not read well with what John says in the fourth gospel (chapter xii, verses 32, 33 and 34). It is hardly likely that Jesus would be so careless with his speech that what remained unintelligible to his friends and disciples would be plain to his enemies. Moreover, if the Jews had entertained any fears with regard to him, they would have shown more promptitude and earnestness while his body still lay on the cross, or, at the latest, that very night. No other gospel-writer corroborates Matthew on the point. The strongest reason against the story about securing the sepulchre lies in the fact that the Jews had absolutely no knowledge of the resurrection of Jesus, or there would have been some signs of activity, or repentance, on their part. It is unlikely that such an event would have passed by without causing a tremendous stir, the absence of which the fable of a bribe is too feeble to explain.

Matthew closes his gospel with some of the disciples still doubting the resurrection of Jesus although they 'saw and worshipped him' (xxviii. 17). According to Luke, the resurrection and the

vanishing took place the same day. Certain women went and saw the empty grave, and when they had carried the news to the disciples, Peter also ran to see what had happened, and was astonished to find the linen clothes lying in the grave, but not the body of Jesus. The same day Jesus met two of the disciples, talked to them, dined with them in the evening, met the remaining body of them about an hour later, and, finally, leading them out to Bethany, parted from them, and was carried up to heaven.

According to John, both Peter and 'the other disciple' ran to see the sepulchre, and, although the 'other disciple' outran Peter, the result was that they both found the grave empty, except that it contained linen clothes and a napkin. John's anxiety to be believed practically makes it impossible for one to believe in his narration of the mysterious events which he records in connection with the resurrection of his Master.

Passing on to a consideration of the ascension, we notice that the evangelical accounts are again full of discrepancies and contradictions. Matthew and John, it will be seen, do not lend support to the ascension myth as given in the other two gospels; and it is unlikely that they would have kept silence on such a glorious event, if it were an historical fact. This one circumstance alone is sufficient to show that the 'rising up to heaven' is a doctrinal allegory,* rather than an actual event. The true import of the allegory will become clear when we come to deal with the Jaina view of *moksha*; here it suffices to point out that ascension only implies the attainment of the status of Godhood, i.e., Nirvana, or the rising up of the God-end of the see-saw of existence to the top.

*That the doctrine of resurrection is not an original Christian tenet, is well-known to students of comparative theology; but those who are not familiar with the subject will find the following observations of Mr. Joseph McCabe full of interest (see *The Bankruptcy of Religion*, p. 164):—

"The death and resurrection of Christ are probably to the average believer the central and unique truth of the Christian religion. Now, every well-informed theologian has known for ages that in the Roman world in which Christianity arose, the annual commemoration of the death and resurrection of a god was the most common religious feature. The Egyptian cult of Osiris, the Babylonian cult of Tammuz (or Adonis), and the Phrygian cult of Attis had celebrated this annual solemnity for un-

The narrative may now be deemed to be complete, and may even be taken to satisfy the historical instinct, if we do not pry too closely into the events constituting it, or look out for those items of conduct which should be present in the life of an adept in Yoga. We shall here mention a few of the incongruities which cannot be suppressed by any means. The very first question of importance is : What did Jesus eat, and what did he drink ? for fish, flesh and fowl are forbidden to a *yogi* ; so is wine. But there can be no room for doubt, on a literal reading of the Bible, that Jesus indulged habitually in both meat and wine ! Yet the gospels themselves formulate the injunction for practising mercy in no unemphatic terms :—

“ But go ye and learn what that meaneth, I will have mercy, and not sacrifice.”
—(Matt. ix. 13.)

This is emphasized again in a subsequent chapter of the first gospel :—

“ But if ye had known what this meaneth, I will have mercy, and not sacrifice, ye would not have condemned the guiltless.”—(Matt. xii. 7.)

Now, it is absolutely certain that no one who regards the sacrificial shedding of blood as cruel can ever regard the wholesale slaughter of animals for his own food as anything else. As a matter of fact, no true *yogi* will ever think of accepting a pupil, unless he first give up flesh and wine ; and it is impossible that real *yoga* powers can be developed, except by the rigid observance of the vow of *ahimsa* (non-killing). Even early Christians were advised to practise abstinence from animal flesh ; and the truly enlightened amongst them did consider it obligatory for men to refrain from animal foods. As Mr. Hatch points out (see *The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages on the Christian Church*, p. 165) :—

“ There are proofs of the existence in the very earliest Christian communities of those who endeavoured to live on a higher plane than their fellows. Abstinence from known ages, and had, in the fusion of nations in the Roman Empire, spread it over the whole eastern world. The Greeks adopted the festival centuries before Christ was born ; the Persian cult of Mithra also adopted it. It is safe to say that there was not a city of that old world, before the time of Christ, which had not one or more temples, of different religions, attracting full public attention to their annual celebration of the death and resurrection of a god.”

marriage and from animal foods was urged and practised as 'counsels of perfection.' In some communities there was an attempt to make such counsels of perfection obligatory."

In the Bible itself there are evident traces of a controversy having arisen at a very early date in the Christian church, which was referred to St. Paul. He refers to it again and again in his writings, and devotes a whole chapter comprising no less than 23 verses to the subject in the Epistle to the Romans. Why he devotes so much space to a simple question which should be capable of being answered with a simple yes or no, will be clear to any one who has understood the nature of the difficulties under which the apostle laboured, which made it inexpedient that he should express himself openly before the average reader, who knew nothing about the allegorical signification of the Biblical teaching and who had accepted the new faith on no other than the literal import of the language of the script. Such a reader would be prone to smell heathenism in the cult, if told, all too suddenly, of the inner truth. Some of these new converts showed special enthusiasm in the cause of the exoteric god, as certain of the early fathers found out from bitter experience. They even prosecuted certain bishops and elders of the church that taught the secret doctrine somewhat openly. St. Paul knew their minds full well, and dared not condemn meat openly before such men. He was, therefore, forced to frame his answers in such a way that he should avoid giving cause for dissatisfaction and discontent to the unenlightened brethren, without, at the same time, compromising the truth. We may point out in this connection that the reason why the evangelists are regarded as men of an inferior order of intelligence by the modern world consists in nothing other than their inability to express themselves freely, in plain language, in the caution which they were under a compulsion to exercise in regard to the true doctrines of the faith and which made it necessary for them to use complex, puzzling and even misleading expression to communicate their thoughts. Their writings are full of indications that go to show that they were certainly very much better acquainted with this subject than the critics of their words, who, because of their own intellectual shortcomings, see nothing but inferiority and lack of precision in their thought!

To revert to the subject under consideration, it must be now clear that it is impossible that Jesus could have ever indulged in meat and strong drink. On the contrary, it is clear that the terms meat and wine have an allegorical significance, meat implying, soul-nourishing *vairagya* (renunciation) and wine, the joy of Self-contemplation. St. Paul refers expressly to spiritual meat and spiritual wine in 1 Cor. x. 3 and 4. In 1 Cor. iii. 2 it is said :—

"And I, brethren, could not speak unto you as unto spiritual, but as unto carnal, even as unto babes in Christ. I have fed you with milk, and not with meat : for hitherto ye were not able to bear it, neither yet are ye able."

Again in Hebrews v. 12—14 it is said :—

"For when for the time ye ought to be teachers, ye have need that one teach you again in which be the first principles of the oracles of God ; and are become such as have need of milk, and not of strong meat. For every one that useth milk is unskilful in the word of righteousness : for he is a babe. But strong meat belongeth to them that are full of age, even those who by reason of use have their senses exercised to discern both good and evil."

As for the meat that is not symbolical, that is sufficiently condemned when it is said :

"For it is a good thing that the heart be filled with grace ; not with meats, which have not profited them that have been occupied therein,"—(Hebrews xiii. 9.)

The next point is about the kind of observances Jesus practised as a *yogi* or when 'the spirit' drove him into the wilderness. But there is no mention of any of them anywhere in the Bible, except that he fasted for forty days and forty nights at a stretch. Surely, a single fast prolonged for forty days and forty nights will not suffice to turn a man into an adept ! We are also told nothing definite about 'the spirit' that is said to have driven Jesus into the wilderness.

That a *yogi* could be seized by an evil spirit is possible ; but he cannot then be deemed to have successfully attained to adeptship. Besides, it certainly does not speak much for his knowledge if the evil one had need to show him all the empires of the world from the top of an 'exceedingly high' mountain ! Furthermore, only he who is not confident of his power and who is apprehensive of mishaps will use misleading speech or observe secrecy about his plans. No true *yogi* will certainly say of himself :

"My soul is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death."—(Matt. xxvi. 38.)

Nor would he pray that 'the cup might be taken away' (Mark. xiv. 36), nor ever betray the anguish of his soul; even if he could feel it, as Jesus is said to have done, when he cried out twice: "My God, My God, why hast thou thus forsaken me" (Matt. xxvii. 46). The position of an adept begging for extraneous aid would be as insipid as the one which would seek to credit the son of a god with a hide-and-seek game, like that which the gospels disclose, when read historically. For if there be a resurrection of the dead in the hereafter, men would have risen just the same whether a god sacrificed the life of his only begotten son or not. Why could not the Lord think of some other and a less tragic way to save, or inform, mankind? Are not all things possible with him? And after all the ceremony comes to a childish farce when we remember that absolutely no sort of danger was incurred in the so-called sacrifice; for it was certain that the divine victim was not really to die. At the very utmost this sacrifice of a god unto his own self, when stripped of all its poetic sentimentality came only to the suspension of animation for the space of three days! Surely the humble *fakir* at the court of Lahore outdid this several times over when he remained buried in the vault underground for forty days, as already noted.

Let us not linger over the details of an episode which not only does not hold together as a fact should do, but which is also flatly contradicted by the apostle Paul who, referring directly to Jesus, says:

"Who for the joy that was set before him endured the cross, despising the shame."—(Hebrew xii. 3.)

This is certainly very much to the point as a basic principle; for we now know that the doctrine of the cross is the doctrine of perfection, by the renunciation of desire, culminating in a world-flight that may even bring ridicule on the head of the saintly aspirant, for his stripping himself of the very last vestige of clothes and worldly goods. The text:

"And he that taketh not his cross, and followeth after me, is not worthy of me."—(Matt. x. 38.)—

surely, could not, by any conceivable stretch of imagination, be regarded as aught but a doctrinal symbolism. For assuming that a cross had been provided for Jesus by the Jews, there is no one who may be interested in providing it for the followers of Jesus. Clement of Alexandria clearly understood the doctrine to be one of renunciation, and he is undoubtedly right when he says :—

"And to bear the sign of the cross is to bear about death, by taking farewell of all things whilst still in the flesh alive."—(*Ante Nicene Christian Library*, vol. xii, p. 404.)

This is also the true sense of the text (Galatians vi. 14):—

"But God forbid that I should glory save in the cross of Lord Jesus Christ, by whom the world is crucified unto me, and I unto the world."

The same signification is to be attributed to the text :

"Knowing this that our old man is crucified with him, that the body of sin might be destroyed, that henceforth we should not serve sin."—(Romans vi. 6.)

The point will become quite clear from the following verses :—

"For he that is dead is freed from sin.

"Now if we be dead with Christ, we believe that we shall also live with him."—(Romans vi. 7-8.)

Without a doubt it was the suffering of self-denial which the doctrine implied, for it was said :

"Always bearing about in the body the dying of the Lord Jesus, that the life also of Jesus might be made manifest in our body."—(2 Cor. iv. 10.)

"For we which live are always delivered unto death for Jesus' sake, that the life also of Jesus might be made manifest in our mortal flesh.

"So then death worketh in us, but life in you."—(2 Cor. iv. 11-12.)

The subject again appears in the Epistle to Galatians (chap. ii. 19-20) where it is said :—

"For I through the law am dead to the law, that I might live unto God.

"I am crucified with Christ . . . "

And yet again in the same Epistle (chap. v. 24) it is urged :

"And they that are Christ's have crucified the flesh with the affections and lusts."

The fact is that the symbol of the cross is a silent reminder that the body is to be treated as if it were a cross of wood on which the soul was nailed and from which it was to be separated by bidding farewell to the world and to the good things it contained! The similarity between the body and the cross will become at once apparent if one stand upright, and stretch out the arms to the full on the sides.

It must be abundantly clear now that the true signification of crucifixion can only be doctrinal, not historical. And what holds good of crucifixion must also apply, with equal force, to resurrection, because that is only the fulfilment of the law that he who shall lose his life shall find it. He, therefore, who makes himself dead to all things of the world, in other words who practises *complete* renunciation, rises above the condition and category of the 'dead.' In other words, resurrection was something which was to be obtained by merit and work. This is what gives meaning to the Pauline anxiety about his condition when he says :

"If by any means I might attain unto the resurrection of the dead."—(Philippians iii. 11.)

And the same meaning is to be ascribed to the preacher when he says :—

"Awake thou that sleepest and arise from the dead."—(Ephesians v. 14.)

We have already seen (chapter vi. *ante*) that the great resurrection text in Luke xx. 35-36 bears no reference to a general rising of the dead at the end of the world process, but only signifies the attainment of Nirvana by the soul. It is thus clear that those who seek to read history into the gospel narratives wander away from the truth, misdirecting their attention from the proper course.

It seems now futile to endeavour to show that ascension, too, is a matter of pure doctrine, like crucifixion and resurrection; and obviously where the other two are rejected from historical investigation, there is nothing left on which it can be supported. The truth is that no part of an allegorical composition can be taken as intended in the historical sense; and it is quite impossible to separate one part of a connected narrative and to label it 'fact,' while tabulating the rest

as fiction. Of the allegorical interpretation, it may further be said that it is both edifying and constructive at the same time. It is true that we have been ruthlessly iconoclastic in 'pulling down cherished idols from their high pedestals ; but it is not purely destructive work that has been done. For in the place of ill-conceived misplaced insignia of idolatry, error, and untruth we now have the real Divine Truth itself to guide and lead us to the coveted heights of victory, glory and joy, which, truth to speak, could not even be said to have been known to those who had set up the false idols. It will be observed that there is little, if any, value at all, in an historical reading of what is an esoteric truth ; on the contrary, generally the method is fraught with great harm, as falsehood always is for its votaries. For instance, the account of the doings of the family of Abraham amounts, when read as a bit of history, to but little more than a piece of information which has no real cash value, as a guiding principle in any one's life ; and it may actually mislead one by impressing the mind with wrong notions about God, devotion and sacrifice. But, read allegorically, it imparts a highly useful lesson in the shape of the advice to cast out " the bond-woman and her son," so that " the son of the free-woman " may come into the inheritance that is his birth-right (Galatians iv. 30). The one version would leave the reader precisely where he was before, even if it does not stuff his mind with grotesque absurdities ; but the other, if carried out, would enable a puny mortal to turn himself into a perfect God !

Crucifixion, then, means the reversal of the temptation whereby sin is introduced, the forcing down of the man-end of the sea-saw, to raise the God-end to its proper position and place. Those who successfully accomplish the arduous task become entitled to be translated to heaven, and rise up from the ' dead,' to enter *nirvana*, the happy land above the troublous sea of *samsāra*. Their *samsāra* (the world, but, literally, the career of the soul as a transmigrating ego) has come to an end, and they shall no more experience a fall. *Neither can they die any more* (Luke xx. 36). This is precisely the sense in which it was said by St. Paul :—

" Now all these things happened unto them for ensamples : and they are written for our admonition, upon whom the ends of the world are come."—(1 Cor. x. 11.)

Mythologically, the allegory is now complete. Its chief features, in their proper sequence, are :—

- (1) the Godhood of the *jiva*, i.e., soul ;
- (2) the temptation to eat of the forbidden fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil ;
- (3) the fall, whereby the God-element went down and the lower element became uppermost ; whereby also the Immortal became the mortal ;
- (4) redemption by the 'Key of Knowledge' ;
- (5) crucifixion of the lower element ;
- (6) resurrection, or the regaining of the lost immortality ; and
- (7) ascension, or the final triumph, i.e., the going up of the God-element to the top.

The idea is so complete and full in all its details that it leaves no room for doubt as to its being the true essence of the Biblical religion.

It is now possible to reconcile many of the old prophecies contained in the Old Testament in the light of our knowledge of mythology. Even the idea of the virgin-birth of Christ becomes intelligible now. When Divine Wisdom quickens the germ of Godhood lying dormant within the soul, it is called the birth of man in spirit, not a re-entering into the mother's womb a second time, as Nicodemus thought, but a birth of the saviour within each and every human being, as Jesus taught. Truly is the teaching of the Master :

"That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit. Marvel not that I said unto thee ye must be born again."—(John iii, 6 and 7.)—

quite in accord with the utterance of the prophet :

"Behold a virgin [the soul substance] shall bring forth a child (wisdom) and his name shall be Immanuel [Saviour]."

Thus, the first birth of man is of flesh, in the manner of the flesh, but the second is that of Christ in him ; and since the birth of Christ is the result of the brooding of the Spirit over the Intellect, having no manner of resemblance to the process of procreation, it is called the virgin-birth.

That the prophecy in Isaiah (vii. 14 and 15) does not refer to Jesus is clear from the contents of the chapter in which it occurs. Its opening lines are:

"Behold, a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son, and shall call his name Immanuel. Butter and honey shall he eat, so that he may learn to refuse the evil."

So far as Jesus is concerned, the prophecy cannot be said to have been fulfilled in him, for he ate not butter and honey, but fish and bread. As he himself puts it, the Son of Man "came eating and drinking, and they say, Behold a man gluttonous, and a wine bibber, a friend of publicans and sinners" (Matthew xi. 19). Besides, Jesus was never called Immanuel at any moment of his life; and, lastly, there was wanting that setting to the fulfilment which had been prophesied by the ancient seer, and which is to be found recorded in the subsequent verses of the very same chapter which contains the prophecy.

What is not applicable to Jesus is, however, most appropriate to Christ which is always conceived of the Spirit, in an immaculate fashion. Butter (wisdom, i.e., that which is extracted from the milk of experience) and honey (*ananda*, i.e., bliss) shall he enjoy, whenever and wherever he is born. The true significance of the Virgin birth, in plain terms, is the birth of the individual soul in *dharma* (right faith); and the conceptions of Krishna, Christos and Christ are intended to convey no more than the bare idea that the acquisition of the right faith by the soul soon transforms it into a Messiah or Redeemer, who is to attain to Godhood on the crucifixion of the lower self.

When we look out for the fulfilment of symbolical prophecies as facts of history, we must come to grief. We should always search for the hidden, that is, the true sense of a teaching, beginning always with an enquiry into the attitude of the prophet, or seer, from whom it emanates. In order to understand a man, it is necessary to enquire into the state of his belief first. Many of the passages touching the life of Jesus which have to be rejected from the point of view of the historian and the biographer, contain important lessons of high mystical value, when read in the true light of wisdom. In most cases, the true import of psychical powers and spiritual functions has

been cleverly concealed, under suggestive names, by the gospel-writers. Such, for instance, is the story of the two thieves who are said to have been crucified with Jesus. They apparently represent the two currents, *Ida* and *Pingala*, of the vital 'breath,' which passes through the two chains of the sympathetic ganglia, in which is preserved the residue of the bodily tendencies and the essence of the passions and emotions and thoughts of the individual. These are also the two angels, who, according to Al Koran, are deputed to take an account of a man's behaviour, "one sitting on the right hand, and the other on the left; he uttereth not a word, but there is with him a watcher, ready to note it" (Chapter L). These two currents of the vital force are called thieves, probably because, being forms of breath, they are constantly engaged in robbing us of our 'life-breaths,' which, according to the popular view in the East, are predetermined and numbered for each individual in advance. They have to be subdued, that is to say, to be brought under the control of the will before God-consciousness can arise in the soul. In different language, they have to be crucified with the lower self in the place called Golgotha, literally, the human skull, i.e., the important nervous centre in the head which is the seat of personality. The friendly and pious thief of St. Luke is believed to be the current, which, in conjunction with the *kundalini*, the current of life passing through the *sugumya*, i.e., the spinal canal, in the advanced stages of Yoga, leads to the rousing of the higher centres and, consequently, to the development of the spiritual powers of the soul. Hence, Jesus promises paradise to it along with himself. Even according to Muhammadans, "the angel who notes down a man's good actions has the command over him who notes his evil actions" (*The Koran* by Sale, p. 384). Thus understood, these passages acquire great significance, but in the historical sense they only go to create confusion.

We may profitably utilize the present opportunity to look into the nature of the discrepancies which have gathered round the personality of John, the Baptist, whose figure is one of the most puzzling in the whole Bible. The discrepancies which are found to exist in connection with him are so serious that it is impossible to look upon his doings as historical events.

He is the cousin of the Messiah, to begin with, and jumps up with delight, while yet an unborn babe, on hearing the voice of his cousin's mother, though shortly afterwards he forgets all about him and actually sends his disciples to find out if he be the one who was to come (Matt. xi. 3). This is all the more remarkable, in view of the fact that John was fully aware of the status and dignity of Jesus at the time when he was asked to baptize him. According to Matthew (iii. 14), he had refused to baptize Jesus at first, saying :

" I have need to be baptized of thee, and comest thou to me ? "

It was only when he was assured that it behoved Christ to be baptized of him,—

" Suffer it to be so now : for thus it becometh us to fulfil all righteousness."—(Matt. iii. 15.)

that he proceeded to baptize him. Upon this the heavens were opened, and the spirit of God alighted on Jesus in the form of a dove. John actually saw all this, and declared :

" And I saw, and hear record that this is the Son of God."—(John i. 34.)

The next day John pointed out Jesus to two of his disciples, saying :

" Behold the Lamb* of God."—(John i. 36.)

Thus, John knew the nature of the personality and mission of Jesus full well about the time of his baptism. That he should have forgotten the evidence of his own senses in less than three years

* There is nothing in the expression to reflect any special or unique distinction on the person of Jesus ; on the contrary, it is clearly one which has been borrowed from ' Pagan ' creeds. Christians, too, have been struck with the close resemblance between Biblical legends and " Pagan fables," and some have even ascribed the authorship of the latter to the Evil One, out of a spirit of rivalry to Christianity. As pointed out by Mr. Joseph McCabe (*The Bankruptcy of Religion*, p. 197) :—

" The resemblance to the Christian celebration—in the Mithraic temples it went so far that the resurrected god was hailed as ' the Lamb of God that taketh away the sins of the world '—was so disturbing to Firminus Maternus that he believed that the Devil had conveyed these legends to the Pagans in order to distract them from embracing the true (Christian) version of the death and resurrection ! "

of his witnessing these great things, and in spite of his own *mission*, is certainly noteworthy under the circumstances.

John's mission in life seems to be confined to straightening the path of the Lord by the baptism of water and the doctrine of repentance. He is also the witness to the coming Messiah, whose shoes he acknowledges himself to be unworthy to bear. Asked to explain the baptism of Jesus, he declared :—

" He that hath the bride is the bridegroom : but the friend of the bridegroom, which standeth and heareth him, rejoices greatly because of the bridegroom's voice : this my joy is therefore fulfilled. He must increase, but I must decrease. He that cometh from above is above all : he that is of the earth is earthly, and speaketh of the earth : he that cometh from heaven is above all."—(John III. 29—31.)

The above description of John leaves no doubt as to his original. He stands for repentant intellect, just as the Messiah represents Life Triumphant. The one represents the lower ego, but the other the higher Self ; hence, is John the cousin of Jesus. When the lower self is tired of the pursuit of worldly pleasure and has reached the end of its tether, it begins to reflect on its destiny, and realizes that neither friends, nor riches, nor position, nor physical prowess, nor anything else can come to its rescue or relieve it of the impending gloom of death and extinction which stare it in the face. It then cries out in the anguish of its loneliness in the world, and, becoming disgusted with the pleasures and joys of the mortals, which had hitherto diverted its attention from its real nature, gradually learns that the source of all bliss, blessedness and immortality is none other than its own true Self. This is the stage which is likened to the voice of one crying in the wilderness, saying, ' Repent for the kingdom of heaven is at hand ' (Matt. iii. 2). Now, because the intellect is only concerned in imparting the right faith by removing (washing away) the impurities of wrong beliefs, and since it is the will that is the real cause of the destruction of the evil nature, the baptism of the intellect is necessarily that of water. A contrast is to be made between wisdom and *vairagya*, the former washing away the taint of impurities from the mind, and the latter burning up the accumulated deposits of sin and desire from the will, by the fire of *tapas* (asceticism). The intellectual self is of the earth, earthly ; but

the will is from heaven, heavenly. Hence, the intellect is made to say that it is unworthy to loosen the latchet of the shoes of the purified Will (Messiah). Again, because it is only through the intellect that one can become convinced of the existence of the higher Self, it is the solitary witness to the coming Messiah at whose birth it leaps with joy. But, in so far as wisdom is a necessary attribute of the Christos, he cannot do without the baptism of the intellect, in the first instance. Furthermore the intellect is not the enjoyer of bliss, hence, not the bridegroom, but it is natural for it to feel joy at the bridegroom's voice, for he is to turn the wilderness into a veritable paradise. And, lastly, because the freedom of the soul means the attainment of omniscience which arises by the destruction of the lower mental equipment—intellect, memory, and the like—as will be explained in the following chapters, intellect is described as saying, 'he must increase, but I must decrease' (Matt. xi. 2-3). The sending of his disciples by John to ascertain whether Jesus (soul) is the Messiah, i.e., the Redeemer, in spite of the fact that he had exulted with delight at his mother's voice, is in keeping with the nature of the intellect, which always doubts and hesitates, and is seldom satisfied with its own conclusions. It is thus clear that the personality of John, the Baptist, is typical of the intellectual side of the man who has become conscious of the fuller Life of the higher Self.

Similarly, Barabbas stands for the bodily, or the lower self, whose passionate nature is the cause of all sorts of evil deeds and crimes. The preference of the Jews for Barabbas is suggestive of the nature of humanity who prefer to love the body and to do away with Spirit, which in its individualized aspect is 'Jesus,' the soul.* The passage in the Sura Baqr (Al Koran)—

"When God said, O Jesus, verily I will cause thee to die, and I will take thee up unto me, and I will deliver thee from the unbelievers."

and the one in the Sura Nisa which reads—

"Yet they slew him [Jesus] not, neither crucified him, but he was represented by one in his likeness."—

* Cf. "Soul or spirit was used in several senses in Arabic, e.g., life (animal and plant), consciousness, revelation, the Arch-Angel, Jesus Christ."—(*Philosophy of Islam*, p. 30.)

are capable of sound sense only if we read them in the light of the above observation. The Essence of Life, the Soul, is immortal and undying ; hence, it can neither be killed, nor crucified. It is only the body, the objectification of will, as Schopenhauer calls it, hence the likeness of the Essence,* the Barabbas of the gospel-writers, that can be killed and crucified. The likeness between Life, Spirit, or Will, and the body is also insisted upon in the first chapter of the book of Genesis, the 27th verse of which reads :

" God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him."

When people do not take the trouble to understand each other, they indulge in mutual recrimination, of which the following expression of opinion of Dods, quoted in " Selections from the Koran " (page 132), is a fair sample :—

" His [Muhammad's] knowledge of Christianity was so meagre and confused, that it is difficult to understand how even the most illiterate and mystified sectary fed on apocryphal gospels could have conveyed to him such notions of the gospel. Of the great and enlightening history of Israel as a history, he knows nothing, and has merely caught up some childish tales from the Talmud and some garbled legends of the Hebrew Patriarchs and great men."

A writer who does not understand even the true sense of the word which became the name of the founder of his own creed must be excused if he falls into error. The word ' Jesus ' is derived from the root ' is ' which, in Hebrew, becomes ' jes,' and means ' esse,' (' to be '), in different words, that which is, or Life, that is, Atman. " The name of Jesus," say the authors of ' The Perfect Way ' (p 111), " at which every knee must bow, is the ancient and ever Divine name of all the Sons of God—Jesus or Yesha, who shall save, and Issa the Illuminated, or Initiate of Isis. For this name Isis, originally Ish Iah, was Egyptian for Light-Light, that is, light doubled, and the known and the knowing made one, and reflecting each other. "

* Muslim philosophers have always insisted upon the physical body being in the likeness of the soul. The following from the ' Kimiyn-i-Saadat,' quoted in ' The Philosophy of Islam,' may be cited as relevant to the point under consideration :—

" Verily, the creation of spirits is by God. Their forms are like the forms of their bodies."

The author of the "Lost Language of Symbolism" also observes :—

"The name Isis was understood by Plutarch as meaning knowledge. In Lapland the goddess corresponding to Isis was worshipped under the name Isa, and this word must be related to Isia, a Greek variant of Isis, signifying, according to Plato, 'Holy One,' 'Intelligence,' and 'perception.' The ambiguous Isai, Yeasi, Iase, or Issa is related to Esse, the Latin verb 'to be,' and from esse is derived the word Essence, a philosophic and poetic synonym for the soul or 'Light within.' It would thus appear probable that the Odyssey is to some extent an allegory of the Soul, and that Odysseus, the wanderer, is truly Noman, no historic personage, but like Cinderella, a personification of the soul, the spark, the 'God Within,' or 'Dweller in the Innermost.' The word-play upon Isai, the 'Light,' and Issi, 'himself,' is comparable to Cinderella's amazed awakening to the fact that the glory of her dazzling radiance is 'herself.'"

Isa is also the name of Iswara as well as of the individual soul, according to Hindu Scriptures. Mr. Harold Bayley, the author of 'The Lost Language of Symbolism,' points out that the word 'Isse' or 'Isht' appears to have anciently meant Light in many directions. This radiating Light is the Light of Intelligence, which is the soul.

It must be now obvious that the word Jesus simply means the soul, which is certainly incapable of being slain. Hence, the enigmatical statement of the Sura Nisa already quoted.

For these and similar reasons, the release of Barabbas, the securing of the sepulchre, and other such allegories, all tend to emphasize the fact that ignorant humanity care only for the body, and altogether ignore the soul,—a point which is well brought out in the account of the initiation of Indra, the *deva*, and Virochana, the *asura*, in the Upanishads.

Ordinary investigators fail to understand the merit of religion, because they try to study it on lines of historical research. But to interpret religious records in the light of history is to place the cart for the horse, oftener than not. The nature of the contradictions which exist in connection with the life of Jesus, when we try to study it from the standpoint of the historian, is so deliberate and determined, that no single fact can be seized as an actual event in the world of men. There is piling up of allegory upon allegory and metaphor upon metaphor, on the one hand, and a delightful determination to violate the order of events, invent personalities, defy facts, disregard chro-

nology, and in every possible way, to act as if history was only meant to be topsy-turvy, on the other. The inference is plain: the narrators were anxious to guard against being understood in an historical sense, and took every precaution to set it at naught. The gospels, thus, constitute the records of the spiritual progress of 'Jesus,' the soul, rather than so many editions of the 'Life and Teachings of Jesus, the Man,' written by so many writers.* That there was a great yogi or mystic—possibly, too, he was known as Jesus—who preached the doctrine of the kingdom of heaven is not improbable, though he would seem to have been the ingenious author of, rather than the chief actor in, the immortal Drama of Life, which, in all probability, would never have seen the light of the day if it could have been foreseen with reference

* Cf. the following from "Christianity and Mythology," by the Hon'ble J. M. Robertson, M. P., page 276 :—

"If the foregoing pages in any degree effect their purpose, they have shown that a number of data in the Christian gospels, both miraculous and non-miraculous, held by Christians to be historical, or at least accretions round the life and doctrine of a remarkable religious teacher and creed-founder, are really mere adaptations from myths of much greater antiquity: and that accordingly the alleged or inferred personality of the Founder is under suspicion of being as mythical as that of the demi-gods of older lore. . . Broadly, the contention is that when every salient item in the legend of the Gospel Jesus turns out to be more or less clearly mythical, the matter of doctrine, equally so with the matter of action, there is simply nothing left which can entitle any one to a belief in any tangible personality behind the name.

"Such a view, as scholars are aware, is not new in the history of criticism, though the grounds for it may be so. In the second century, if not in the first, the 'Docetæ' had come to conceive of the Founder as a kind of supernatural phantom, which only 'seemed' to suffer on the cross; and many Gnostics had all along regarded him as an abstraction. One or other view recurs in mediæval heresy from time to time. A 'Docetic' view of Jesus was professed by the secret society of clerics and others which was broken up at Orleans about 1022; and in England, as elsewhere, in the sixteenth century, sectaries are found taking highly mystical views of the Founder's personality. In the eighteenth century, again, Voltaire tells of disciples of Bolingbroke who on grounds of historical criticism denied the historicity of Jesus; and in the period of the French Revolution we have not only the works of Volney and Dupuis, reducing the gospel biography to a set of astronomical myths, but the anonymous German work mentioned by Strauss as reducing it to an ideal which had a prior existence in the Jewish mind, though admitting divergences."

to it that it might pass current as a narrative of actual facts. It is to be noted that we are not dealing here with a case where an historical *nucleus* is needed to account for subsequent deification; the documents before us are purely mythological in their nature and cannot be construed as history. The only real personage at the back of this huge tangle of mythical lore is the composer of the original work which seems to have furnished the source and substratum of the elaborate and mutually contradictory accounts of the gospels; but unfortunately he has not deemed it fit to reveal himself to the world. That he was a man of considerable wisdom and enlightenment and familiar with some of the most abstruse doctrines of mysticism and *yoga* is evident from his work, though, for obvious reasons, we are precluded from regarding the gospel-narratives as his autobiography. Assuming, however, that he was the central figure whom the gospel-writers vied with each other in covering over with wreaths of beautiful allegory, the historical substratum of the facts of his life could not have been much different from what has been suggested in these pages, though it must be obvious to every thoughtful reader that even this reconstructed figure of the saviour *yogi* will not represent an individual but a type—a mystic adept trying to perfect himself—and will be devoid of all pretensions to personal characteristics and traits. For throughout the work of reconstruction, the question with us has been, not whether any particular event was supported by reliable testimony, but whether or not it was of a type that is known to occur in nature, so that we have been ever eager to assume a basis of fact where the evidence was the most discrepant, and at times have gone far enough to admit even that which bordered on the impossible. Moreover, the patched up figure that we are thus able to reconstruct will be found to be composed of parts which are incongruous with one another, and which will not hold together, as a whole. For it is not the life programme of a *yogi* to go about 'ministering' and working wonders. The adept is also not at liberty to change water into wine for the use of others, and may not use fish and intoxicating beverages himself. As for the crucifixion, the *yogi* seeks to perfect himself by destroying his lustful animal nature, but he is not allowed to make a public

demonstration, mock or real, of the doctrines of faith and of the powers of the soul. Even the notion of resurrection breaks down almost before it is brought within the pale of possibility, because Jesus did not appear before the public to convince them of the fact. The resurrection saviour, on the other hand, is a type, of which there are to be found many instances in different countries and Cults. Osiris, Tammuz and Mithra, amongst others, were all "resurrection gods," that were worshipped by men long before the birth of Christianity. The argument from the indications of reality, in the shape of brothers and disciples, completely breaks down when we wish to ascertain further particulars of their lives and of the historical traces left by them. On the other hand, long and elaborate pedigrees* even count for nothing in allegorical documents, as must be evident to any thoughtful mind.

Peter, indeed, might very well have been a representation of 'faith' which, in its inception, is subject to backsliding, especially in the moment of distress and strain, a fact that will seem to adequately explain Peter's disowning his master three times 'before the cock's crowing,' that itself may not improbably signify the stage of vigilant asceticism. Peter was nicknamed Cephias, meaning a stone (John. i. 42), and Jesus is recorded to have said to him :—

"I say also unto thee, That thou art Peter and upon this rock I will build my church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it,

"And I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven."—(Matt. xvi. 18-19.)

Surely, this is but the description of Faith, which is like a rock, in supporting those that flock to it, and which loosens evil, and binds what is good, and which opens the gates of heaven to the true believers! Thus, there is nothing surprising if the disciple turns out to be as mythical as the master himself. Lastly, the argument from the simple narrative of the suppositional "Q" is met by the counter-argument that it might be the simple framework provided

* Cf. "Neither give heed to fables and endless genealogies which minister questions, rather than godly edifying which is in faith."—(1 Timothy, i. 4.)

for the gospel-writers as a common basis for their elaboration, so as to prevent them from differing in every particular from one another. It is obvious that if the narratives had differed in respect of all items and particulars, there could never have been a creed, nor the question of a creed-founder. The case for the historical view, therefore, completely breaks down; and we are left with no alternative but to regard the whole thing as a huge allegory and not an actuality or fact.

To sum up, the doctrine of resurrection has revealed to us some of the most important secrets of life. It has shown us that immortality, which every soul hankers after, can be attained by following the true teaching of religion. It has also shown us that true progress always depends on individual exertion, never on the favour of another. Nothing short of the sacrifice of the lower nature, the greedy, lustful, appropriating self, can ever be the means of entering into Life. Arrived at the status of manhood, the soul has the power to claim its divine heritage of immortality and bliss, and to become the God which it already is in potency. If this opportunity is not availed of, it again falls into the cycle of births and deaths, with varying intervals of life in heaven or hell, according to its deeds on earth. While it has life, it has the chance of turning back from the path of evil, to follow in the footsteps of the Masters; but once the vital spark departs from the frail, mortal frame of matter, the privilege attaching to the human birth is lost, and may not be had again for a long long time to come! Neither friends, nor relations, nor teachers, nor possessions, nor, yet, name, fame, and the like, can be of any use to the soul in its post-mortem existence. How true are the words of the Prophet of Islam when he says:—

“Dread the day wherein one soul shall not make satisfaction for another soul; neither shall any intercession be accepted from them, nor shall any compensation be received, neither shall they be helped.—(*Sura Bakr.*)

“No soul shall acquire any merits or demerits but for itself; and no burdened soul shall bear the burden of another.”—(*Sura A'nam.*)

CHAPTER IX

THE HOLY TRINITY

"Two must not be distributed. If it is, it will lose its unity. If it loses its unity, it will be uncertain; and so cause mental disturbance, from which there is no escape."
—(*Confucius*.)

A question which, strictly speaking, pertains to the last chapter, but which was not taken up there and has been left over is: what is the significance of the extraordinary phenomena—the darkening of the sun, the shaking of the rocks, the rending of the veil of the temple, and the opening out of the graves—which are said to have followed the crucifixion of Jesus? That they do not have the literal significance is clear from the very description of them in the gospels. John's Gospel does not refer to them at all, and it is not at all likely that he would have omitted such glorious events from his record, if they had really taken place as visible occurrences in the world of men. Luke only mentions the darkening of the sun and the tearing of the veil. Mark ignores three of the miraculous happenings, and mentions the rending of the veil in twain from the top to the bottom. Matthew, too, does not mention the darkening of the sun, but gives the other three in the following words:—

"And behold the veil of the temple was rent in twain from the top to the bottom; and the earth did quake, and the rocks rent,

"And the graves were opened; and many bodies of the saints which slept arose,

"And came out of the graves after his resurrection, and went into the holy city, and appeared unto many."—(*Matt. xxvii. 51-53.*)

As to their historical sense, the intelligent reader might well ask, why no one out of the millions of the men and women who must have witnessed these miracles embraced Christianity? On what

prop was the temple supported when its wall was rent from top to bottom? Was it ever repaired, and by whom? Why no one ever took the trouble of recording the name of the person who had it repaired, and the year in which the repairs were carried out? What, again, happened to the risen dead who were given up by the graves? Did any one interview them to unravel the mystery of death, if so with what result? Did they finally go back to their respective homes, and live for the rest of their fresh term of life among men, like good citizens, or were they devoured back by their gaping graves, or re-buried in fresh ones, by their astonished brethren of the world? If the reader will only insist on being satisfied on these and other similar points which will arise in this connection he will not be long in perceiving that these miraculous occurrences cannot be connected with the outer world; but must refer to the wonderful psychological changes that precede the manifestation of the divine faculties and functions of the soul, before it can be deemed to become perfect like the Father in Heaven. As a matter of fact, they are only descriptive of some of the great internal changes which occur as the result of the culmination of *yoga samādhi*, the one-pointed concentration of the mind.

To appreciate the true merit of these allegorical conceptions, it is necessary to attain to a deeper insight into the constitution of the mind than has been attained hitherto. We shall accordingly first of all complete our study of the nature of the mind before entering upon an explanation of these quaint expressions of poetical genius.

The subject pertains to what is known as psychology; but, unfortunately, that department of knowledge is yet far from being a science, psychologists being still bent on constructing a science of the soul (*psyche*) without the soul itself.

To any one who will take the trouble of looking into its nature it will be apparent that the mind comprises

- (1) consciousness,
- (2) ideas, and
- (3) the will or energy which operates on the ideas.

Let us turn to dreams for a moment. The question is, how is a dream created? Is it not the illumination of an idea, or of more

ideas comprised in one single psychosis or thought, just as the magic lantern display is an illumination of its slides? In the magic lantern the apparatus comprises three parts, namely, (1) a lamp, or illuminator, (2) a certain number of slides, or films, and (3) the energy supplied by the operator who pushes the slides before the lamp. Similarly, the apparatus of the living bioscope of the mind consists of the identical three parts. Consciousness is the illuminator, living ideas, that is, memory, furnish the 'films,' and will supplies the necessary energy. It is an apparatus perfect and complete in itself, and stands not in need of an outside operator.

Such, briefly, is the mechanism of the apparatus of dreams, which may be said to consist of consciousness, memory and will. But as the psychologists and philosophers are not quite agreed as to the nature and functions of the several components of the mind, we shall endeavour to ascertain the truth for ourselves.

To begin with, it is first of all necessary to understand the nature of will which is the subject of a keen controversy among different writers. According to some, that which really and truly exists is will, while according to others, will is but 'a product of the original Essence in the third or fourth degree of its descent into matter.' Notably amongst the latter class of persons stands Vivekananda, who expresses himself thus:—

"I will here remark that there is one difference between Schopenhauer and Vedanta. Schopenhauer says the desire, or Will is the cause of everything. It is the will to exist that makes us manifest, but the Advaitists deny this. They say it is the intelligence. There cannot be a single particle of Will which is not a reaction. So many things are beyond Will. It is only a manufactured something out of the ego, and the ego is the product of something still higher, the intelligence, and that is a modification of 'indiscrete' Nature, or prakriti."—(*Jñāna Yoga*, vol. II. pp. 53 and 54.)

But it seems to us that the whole confusion is due to an indiscriminate use of the word 'will' which has more than one significances. It would appear that the German philosopher mostly used this word in the sense of what has come to be known as the thing in itself in modern European philosophy, but not in the limited sense

of the human will.* However, the word itself indicates that will cannot be identical with what might be termed 'blind' force, so that it will be a misuse of language to use it otherwise than with reference to an intelligent being, though the sort of will with which we are familiar, in our experience of mankind, is undoubtedly a product of spirit and matter.

So far as the human will is concerned, it is clearly not a being or thing, but a process—the act of self-assertion. It is a pure abstraction which the word signifies when used as a noun, for in the sense of pleasure, determination or choice, it cannot but imply an attitude, condition or modification of the soul. But in this sense, clearly, it can never be regarded as the thing in itself.

Harald Höffding well brings out the difference between the two aspects of the will (*Outlines of Psychology*, pp. 99-100):—

"Activity is a fundamental property of conscious life, since always a force must be pre-supposed, which holds together the manifold elements of consciousness and unites them into the content of the one and the same consciousness. Independently of this, the most fundamental form of the will, the word will is used in two different senses, a narrower and a wider. In the narrower sense, as the power of choosing between different possibilities, the will is only the product of a mental development not an original factor. But if will is understood in the wider sense, as all activity determined by feeling and cognition, it may be said that the whole conscious life is gathered up in the will as its fullest expression. The development of the conscious individual proceeds from will (in the wider sense) to will in the narrower sense."

* A couple of extracts from 'The World as Will and Idea' will make this perfectly clear. It is said at page 142 of the 1st volume:—

"Phenomenal existence is idea and nothing more. All idea, of whatever kind it may be, all *object* is *phenomenal* existence, but the *will* alone is a *thing in itself*. As such, it is throughout not idea, but *totally* different from it; it is that of which all idea, all object, is the phenomenal appearance, the visibility, the objectification. It is the inmost nature, the kernel, of every particular thing, and also of the whole. It appears in every blind force of nature and also in the pre-considered action of man; and the great difference between these two is merely in the degree of the manifestation, not in the nature of what manifests itself."

Again, at page 145:—

"The will as a thing in itself is quite different from its phenomenal appearance, and entirely free from all the forms of the phenomenal into which it

That confusion of thought should result from the diversity of definition and sense is but natural; but if we reflect on the point we shall not fail to observe that the confusion of thought, in this respect, is due mainly to the wrong definition of consciousness with which we have allowed our minds to be obsessed. As a matter of fact, all mental activity, whether it assume the form of feeling, willing, or thinking, is always associated with consciousness. In common parlance, however, men generally ascribe consciousness to thinking alone, and so great is the force of habit that when we come across those manifestations of the mind which do not need the guidance of reason we promptly designate them unconscious. A close study of our mental operations, however, reveals the fact that each and every act of the will has always an idea for its motive, whether that idea be consciously present in the mind, or unconsciously lying at the bottom of some state of feeling.

There is always the idea of the end to be achieved which precedes the action of the will, so that wherever we encounter determination or choice, we must expect to find intelligence behind it. When a bird builds its nest it proceeds to do so with a determination, not haphazard. The difference between the act of the bird in building its nest and that of a man in making his house is not in respect of will, for the determination to build is present in each instance, nor in respect of the end to be served by the act, since this also is present in both instances,—in the one *felt* as a kind of sensation of necessity and in the other perceived as an idea—but in respect of the power of deliberation observable in man and presumably absent or but dimly present in the bird. The knowledge of the bird, then, consists in the feeling of necessity, while that of man further includes the idea of the house into which that feeling is translated by his superior intellect.

What is commonly understood by knowledge, however, does not include feelings and mental tendencies within its scope. We are accustomed to apply that word exclusively to ideas deliberately formed or to dry facts and formulas of logic and other sciences and arts; first passes when it manifests itself, and which therefore only concern its *objectivity*, and are foreign to the will itself."

though, strictly speaking, knowledge is preserved in the modifications of feelings and mental tendencies. Hence, we may say that knowledge exists in two different ways in the soul, namely, in the shape of mental tendencies, or feelings, and as ideas. In the former case, it determines our instincts, that is, disposition, and in the latter leads us to conscious deliberation in thought.

It will not be difficult to understand how knowledge can be preserved in the shape of tendencies and feelings if we study the effect of education on ourselves. A child is, by nature, of an explosive temperament, and devoid of scruples and consideration for others. But a grown-up man is generally a very different being, and has little of the savageness of the child about him. The difference between these two states is undoubtedly due to the education received by him as a member of the society. But the question is, what is that faculty, or organ, which is modified in consequence of education?

The materialist points to the brain as the repository of education; but that cannot be. For the brain is essentially perishable, while the effects of education linger in the soul, even when the intellect has fallen into decay. In order to be of any service to the soul, education must first modify disposition; for it is character and character alone which outlives the intellect. But disposition cannot be modified purely and simply by the dry formulas of knowledge; it yields only to experience, since we adopt what is pleasing and avoid the unpleasant. We thus get the clue to the nature of the faculty in which the results of education are retained. It is that which feels. Now, feelings are quite independent of reason and spring from will, appearing as life in an organism. Schopenhauer recognized this when he said:—

"The complete difference between the mental and moral qualities displays itself lastly in the fact that the intellect suffers very important changes through time, while the will and character remain untouched by it. . . . The advance of age, which gradually consumes the intellectual powers, leaves the moral qualities untouched. The goodness of the heart still makes the old man honoured and loved when his head already shows the weaknesses which are the commencement of second childhood. Gentleness, patience, honesty, veracity, disinterestedness, philanthropy, etc., remain through the whole life, and are not lost through the weaknesses of old age; in every

clear moment of the worn-out old man they come forth undiminished, like the sun from the winter clouds. And, on the other hand, malice, spite, avarice, hard-heartedness, infidelity, egoism, and baseness of every kind also remain undiminished to our latest years. . . . The only alterations that take place in our inclinations are those which result directly from the decrease of our physical strength, and with it of our capacities for enjoyment. Thus voluptuousness will make way for intemperance, the love of splendour for avarice, and vanity for ambition; just like the man who before he has a beard will wear a false one, and later, when his own beard has become grey, will dye it brown. Thus, while all organic forces, muscular power, the senses, the memory, wit, understanding, genius, wear themselves out, and in old age become dull, the will alone remains undecayed and unaltered: the strength and the tendency of willing remains the same. Indeed, in many points the will shows itself still more decided in age: thus, in the clinging to life, which, it is well-known, increases; also in the firmness and persistency with regard to what it has once embraced, in obstinacy; which is explicable from the fact that the susceptibility of the intellect for other impressions, and thereby the movement of the will by motives streaming in upon it, has diminished. . . . Great age, illness, injury of the brain, madness, may deprive us of memory altogether, but the identity of the person is not thereby lost. It rests upon the identical will and the unalterable character of the person. It is it also which makes the expression of the glance unchangeable. In the *Heart* is the man, not in the head. It is true that, in consequence of our relation to the external world, we are accustomed to regard as our real self the subject of knowledge, the knowing I, which varies in the evening, vanishes in sleep, and in the morning shines brighter with renewed strength. This is, however, the mere function of the brain, and not our own self. Our true self, the kernel of our nature, is what is behind that, and really knows nothing but willing and not willing, being content and not content, with all the modifications of this, which are called feelings, emotions and passions. This is that which produces the other, does not sleep with it when it sleeps, and in the same way when it sinks in death remains uninjured. Everything, on the contrary, that belongs to *knowledge* is exposed to oblivion; even actions of moral significance can sometimes, after years, be only imperfectly recalled, and we no longer know accurately and in detail how we acted on a critical occasion. But the *character itself*, to which the actions only testify, cannot be forgotten by us; it is now still quite the same as then."^{*}

Character, indeed, has little in common with the intellect, but depends on the will; for the former is the faculty of judgment and the latter of action. It is in willing that character discloses its qualities, not in deliberation; hence it is possible for a highly intellectual man to possess a bad heart, and for a man of excellent character to have a dull head.

^{*} *The World as Will and Idea*, vol. II, pp. 456, 457 and 460.

Character, then, is preserved in the will itself, and is the sum-total of all the different activities of life manifested in the form of feelings, emotions, passions and disposition; it is the product of experience. We may thus say that desires are modified by experiences of pleasure and pain, and, in their turn, determine the future attitude and tendencies of the soul. But the will can be considered unconscious only when regarded as force, not when taken to be the repository of character, which is nothing other than the sum-total of all the different tendencies of the soul. For, a tendency is an inclination towards an end, and points to a conscious or sub-conscious awareness of the object to be attained. Remove this end from the mental horizon, and you at once reduce will to pure energy, devoid of all those characteristics indicative of the presence of the mind which are the concomitants of desire. Will stands for determination in conscious life, and cannot be devoid of consciousness. Hence, unconscious will is a contradiction in terms. It is true that the ego does not proceed with the assistance of deliberation in the act of willing, but it is no less true that all acts of willing depend on 'character,' which is the outcome of past experience. Where the course of conduct is already determined, the act of willing is sub-conscious, but where it is to be worked out according to circumstances, which may or may not present themselves as obstacles in the path, consciousness appears in the shape of intellect to guide the footsteps of the will.

Besides, there can be no act of willing where there is no awareness of a desire of some sort or other, so that awareness is a condition precedent to willing. But awareness and consciousness are merely two different names for the same thing; hence, every true act of willing is a conscious act. Further, if the will is 'blind' in itself, how can it possibly be benefited by the 'lantern' (intellect) which it employs for the guidance of its steps? Either, then, the will itself becomes the 'lantern,' or there is some one else behind it who rides on the will and carries the 'lantern' in his hand. But when we posit the will as the thing in itself, we deny existence to everything else; hence, the will, on Schopenhauer's own theory, must itself perform the function of lighting its own path. And

because the will can be educated, that is, controlled by knowledge, there must be a latent capacity for education in its own nature, since we cannot educate stones by packing them together in one case with works on knowledge, say, the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Hence, the will, when looked at as a thing in itself, can be nothing other than consciousness which alone can be the repository of knowledge. When looked at as force, it is the rhythm of life, in different words, the energy of function of consciousness. The truth is that Schopenhauer allowed himself to be misled by his wrong nomenclature, and, in the confusion which resulted from it, forgot the sound conclusion which he had already arrived at. In his 'Essay on the Fourfold Root of Sufficient Reason' he had already held (p. 169) :—

"Now the identity of the willing with the knowing Subject, in virtue of which the word 'I' includes and designates both, is the *nodus* of the Universe, and therefore is inexplicable. For we can only comprehend relations between Objects; but two Objects never can be one, excepting as parts of a whole. Here, where the Subject is in question, the rules by which we know Objects are no longer applicable, and actual identity of the knower with what is known as willing—that is, of Subject and Object—is *immediately given*. Now, whoever has clearly realised the utter impossibility of explaining this identity, will surely concur with me in calling it the miracle, in the highest degree."

Reflection shows that even feelings are not unconscious states of existence though they are invariably free from the companionship of the intellect, and at times also tend to make it cloudy.

This will be evident on a little reflection. The question is : what is a feeling* in itself ? Is it merely another name for pure activity or energy ? Surely not, for analysis reveals the fact that feelings differ *inter se* as much as ideas, so that the emotion of hatred is radically different from that of love. And yet activity is common to both. If we were to express this idea in the form of a mathematical equation, we should have to say that the emotion of love = energy + the idea † of love, and the emotion of hatred = energy + the idea of hatred. Feelings,

* A feeling might be defined as that in our inward states which cannot by any possibility become an element of a percept or of an image.—(*Hüffding*.)

† The word 'idea' is here used in its most comprehensive sense, and signifies what is known as instinctive consciousness as well as intellectual thought.

then, differ from one another not in respect of energy, but solely and simply in respect of the ideas which tinge our mental activity by saturating the mind with their essence. Hence, an emotion is an idea converted into a feeling, just as action is an idea liquefied into a process and carried into effect by the ego. Emotions and feelings are thus sub-conscious tendencies of life, not because consciousness is not present at the time, but because it is neutralized in consequence of the feeling whose presence leaves no room for a conscious choice, or deliberation, so long as it remains in possession of the field.

"When we mechanically perform an habitual act," writes Bergson (*Creative Evolution*, pp. 151-2), "when the somnambulist automatically acts his dream, unconsciousness may be absolute; but this is merely due to the fact that the representation of the act is held in check by the performance of the act itself which resembles the idea so completely, and fits it so exactly, that consciousness is unable to find room between them. *Representation is stopped by action.* The proof of this is, that if the accomplishment of the act is arrested or thwarted by an obstacle, consciousness may reappear. It was there, but neutralized by the action which fulfilled and thereby filled the representation. The obstacle creates nothing positive; it simply makes a void, removes a stopper. The inadequacy of the act to representation is precisely what we here call consciousness. Where many equally possible actions are indicated without there being any real action (as in a deliberation that has not come to an end), consciousness is intense. Where the action performed is the only action possible (as in activity of the somnambulist or more generally of automatic kind), consciousness is reduced to nothing. Representation and knowledge exist none the less in the case if we find a whole series of systematized movements the last of which is already prefigured in the first, and if, besides, consciousness can flash out of them at the shock of an obstacle."

Confusion is apt to arise in the mind by the statement that knowledge is necessarily included in the will as a thing in itself, inasmuch as the human mind insists on the question, whence came this knowledge in the first instance? Strictly speaking, the question itself is illogical, since the will as such is pure consciousness and eternal, so that the idea of a time limitation cannot affect it in the least. And, so far as awareness is concerned, consciousness cannot be said to have been devoid of it at any time. In other words we cannot conceive of a point of time when consciousness may be said to have dawned in its own mind for the first time, just as we cannot conceive heat as entering into fire at a given moment for the first time. As a

matter of fact, knowledge merely consists in the states of consciousness itself, and in respect to these every soul has an infinite capacity, as has been demonstrated in an earlier chapter. We shall see later on that this infinite capacity for knowledge is obstructed by our individual *karmas*, and becomes actual as soon as the soul frees itself from their evil influence. The consciousness of pure spirit, then, can only be pictured as full and perfect; and, even if we think away the material universe, which we are capable of doing in thought, we must perforce accord the consciousness of his own states and being to an omniscient soul. The knowledge possessed by a Perfect Soul would, then, consist in the knowledge of all that its own nature is capable of revealing; it would, to a very large extent, not be knowledge of things actually existing, but of the forms of all things as lying in the womb of possibility. In the knowledge which a pure spirit has of itself is included, therefore, the knowledge of all that is, or ever can be; and if we remember the distinction between the necessary and contingent action, which Leibnitz clearly saw, it will be seen that even the freedom* of the human will can present no possible objection to the perfection of the knowledge of a pure soul, that is, God.

* The present opportunity may be availed of to look into the question of pre-determinism. We have seen that will is free by nature, and possesses the power of freeing itself from its bondage. Hence, every bound soul must become free if it exert itself for the destruction of its bonds. Here, at the very outset, is the destiny of the soul which by the force of its nature is predetermined for it. But this very freedom implies the power of electing for itself whether it will free itself from bondage, or continue in it. This amounts to saying that it is all a question of desire. When the soul is satiated with the fruits of sensual desires, its free nature leads it to self-knowledge, i.e., the knowledge of its natural freedom, which, dawning upon it, enables it to destroy its fetters; otherwise no one interferes with its choice. The knowledge of Self comes, we may say, by the force of destiny for sensual pleasures do not make up for bliss; and, as a person who is capable of or who knows himself to be capable of great deeds grumbles when thrown in unsuitable environment, so does the naturally blissful soul feel ill at ease even in the midst of worldly prosperity and joy. The soul is like a man who enters his family in the guise of a menial, and, in consequence of the excitement caused by acting the part of a servant in his own house, identifies himself with his disguise and work, and forgets that he is the master. Now, it is evident that the termination of his servitude is a simple question of his choice:

Such is the nature of will which has given rise to so much confusion of thought. The cause of error, as already pointed out, lies in

and that nobody can force him into it against his will. But whether he will ever recover the memory or knowledge of his true condition, depends on the nature of the forces which debar him from it. It is, however, to be inferred that, because the excitement of the new position is not bliss itself, his own inner nature will, sooner or later, make him dissatisfied with the monotony of servitude, rouse him to a sense of his destiny, and set him meditating on it. This is the commencement of *yoga*. Here is destiny, but a destiny which no one from outside imposes on him ; it is a part of himself. Those who range themselves in opposition to determinism forget that unless the future be capable, at least to some extent, of being encompassed by our intellect and of being presented to us in terms which are not vague or indefinite, vain would be the inner craving of the soul for freedom, and equally vain the teaching of religion and the exact calculations of science. Even when an artist sets himself to work to paint a picture, he has an idea which he tries to produce on the canvas. He is free, no doubt, to alter this idea as much as he likes, but, in practice, he is controlled by his artistic instincts, and would not, though he could, allow the picture before him to differ from that in his mind. Further analysis reveals the fact that the artistic instinct itself is composed of the elements of past impressions, preserved in the mind as notions, beliefs, tendencies and emotions. Will also, thus, harbours its enemy at home, i.e., has its limitations in its own nature. The true sense of freedom with reference to will, therefore, is that it cannot be imposed upon against its own choice.

In dealing with the question of freedom of the will, the thing which is generally ignored by philosophers is the element of desire which determines its sphere of activity and makes it exert itself. It is under the influence of this element that will becomes manageable by the intellect. Hence it becomes possible to calculate its operations even with mathematical precision, provided it be possible to know all its circumstances and motives. But this is impossible for ordinary humanity, though easy for those in whom omniscience or the true kind of clairvoyance has dawned.

We fear, we are differing from Bergson in laying down the above views on the question of individual freedom. But Bergson's fear of determinism, and his anxiety to keep the door closed against it, have carried him off his legs. He declines to define what his idea of freedom expresses, for the reason that that would ensure the victory of determinism against free will. The utmost that this acute thinker has committed himself to comes to no more than saying that 'freedom is the relation of the concrete self to the act which it performs.' But he is careful enough to add immediately that 'this relation is indefinable, just because we *are* free.' Thus, in spite of his fine analyses of the ideas of duration, extensity, multiplicity, and the like, one is entitled to dismiss him from the mind, simply because he does not enable us to understand his notion of freedom. But taking the word in its ordinary significance, i.e., as implying

the wrong nomenclature, for it is not permissible to talk of will except with reference to a conscious being, so that its employment as a

an absence of restraint or necessity, it is obvious that the notion of absolute freedom is a purely imaginary concept. Even the 'gods' are not free from all kinds of necessity whatsoever. Fire must burn, water must flow, activity must ever remain opposed to inaction, and so forth. On Bergson's own showing, even pure duration itself is doomed to experience any particular sensation only once, in all its eternal enduring. But freedom means the power to do anything at will, and would be robbed of all its fascination and value if there remains a single *must* to bend the will, for such a *must* will be clearly a symbol of necessity pure and simple. What, then, is the meaning of freedom of the will?

If we analyse the idea of necessity which attaches itself to things, we observe it falling into two categories. First comes the class in which it is only functional, as in the above instances. But the second includes all those cases of necessity where it is not functional, but a something, a check or restraint, imposed by environment and circumstances, external to the organism, or nature. It is in the second class of necessity that the idea of restraint is located, for that which is functional can hardly be called a restraint. Hence, the ego, conceived as pure flux, *i.e.*, *duration*, must be regarded as free. Pure *duration* is, however, determined by its very nature to *endure*, which amounts to saying that it cannot refuse to do so. Here is the triumph of determinism again which Bergson justly dreads.

The highest conception of freedom is conceivable only in connection with an emancipated soul, *i.e.*, God, and yet even He is predetermined to certain acts, *e.g.*, He must exist, because existence is His nature. Man can and may put an end to his life, but suicide does not appear to be a divine prerogative in any sense. But, since the performance of an act to which one is predetermined by nature is not the cause of pain, rather, on the contrary, is its free performance a source of ease and joy, we do not regard it as a restraint on freedom. Besides, volition always seeks pleasure as its motive, and the highest form of pleasure is compatible only with the performance of action which is most agreeable to one's nature. Freedom, then, may be said to remain unaffected by the performance of action in agreement with one's nature. In so far, then, as the ego acts, it may be said to be free, for all activity is the manifestation of will, and will is determined to activity by its very nature.

Again, inasmuch as all acts are performed by will, we may go further and say that every act is a free act on the part of will. We must, however, bear in mind the distinction between deliberation and acting. The resolve to act and the actual performance of the act, however strictly in accord with the resolve, are two different things, since in the former freedom is more illusory than real. If one is free to resolve in any way, why deliberate at all? Deliberation is mainly directed towards individual advantage, and, of all the possible methods, suggested to the deliberative

term expressive of pure force cannot but lead to confusion, sooner or later. It is curious that so simple a truth should have escaped the notice of men like Schopenhauer, whose conception of will as the thing in itself is formed regardless of the distinction between the conscious and the unconscious, as is evident from the following from "The World as Will and Idea" (*vol. I, pp. 141-142*):—

"Whoever has . . . gained . . . the knowledge that his will is the real inner nature of his phenomenal being, which manifests itself to him as idea . . . will find that of itself it affords him the Key to the Knowledge of the being of the whole nature; for he now transfers it to all those phenomena which are not given to him, like his own phenomenal existence, both in direct and indirect knowledge, but only in the latter, thus merely one-sidedly as *idea* alone. He will recognize this will of which we are speaking not only in those phenomenal existences which exactly resemble his own, in men and animals as their inmost nature, but the course of reflection will lead him to recognize the force which germinates and vegetates in the plant, and indeed the force through which the crystal is formed, that by which the magnet turns to the north pole, the force whose shock he experiences from the contact of two different kinds of metals, the force which appears in the elective affinities of matter as repulsion and attraction, decomposition and combination, and, lastly, even gravitation, which acts so powerfully throughout matter, draws the stone to the earth and the earth to the sun,—all these, I say, he will recognize as different only in their phenomenal existence, but in their inner nature as identical, as that which is directly known to him so intimately and so much better than anything else, and which in its most distinct manifestation is called will."

consciousness, the one chosen is that which seems to secure the utmost advantage, under given circumstances. Circumstances, then, determine the future activity of rational beings. But what can circumstances possibly mean unless ideas, desires, motives, interests and the like? Compulsion, whether moral or physical, stops short here, for the very fact of deliberation is an indication that in a great majority of cases the will enjoys something more than what is termed Hobson's choice. Besides, when once the mind is made up and the resolution formed, action itself is performed by the ego of its own volition, however much it might have been predetermined to it by the previous mental determination. The act, or rather the impulse which leads to activity, depends, for its initiation, on the volition of the ego itself, and cannot possibly be started by any external force. The utmost that outside force can achieve is to lead the ego to deliberate over the advantage, or disadvantage, of the move which it is desired to make, and thus secure its assent, by argument, or some other intellectual method of persuasion; but the performance of action depends exclusively on the volition of the ego itself. Thus, every act of the ego, as known to us in the process of *willing*, is free. But since, at the moment of vacillation, the choice of possible

But this surreptitious levelling of differences is possible only in the region of abstractism pure and simple; so far as concrete nature is concerned, she does not lend herself to Schopenhauer's scheme of reducing everything to one differenceless existence or force, the will-to-be, as he calls it. Whether it was the Kantian philosophy or the *Upanishads* which were responsible for his error, we do not know; but it is clear that chemical affinity, gravitation and will are not quite the same thing. It may be urged that as substances exist by themselves and independently of any outside cause, they should be deemed to be existing by virtue of their own will, which, for that reason, must be termed the will-to-be; but the argument completely breaks down in the case of the atoms of matter which cannot be supposed to be forming a mental resolve to continue to exist from moment to moment. In any other case also the supposition is not supported by valid argument.

We must now turn to memory, or rather to perception, in the first instance, on which memory rests.

Materialistic philosophers, ignorant of the nature of the soul, are apt to regard perception as a mirroring of the sensory *stimulus* in a central part of the brain or the nervous system. But this is too paths is determined by individual circumstances, and since action is merely a carrying out of the final resolve previously made, determinism may claim to have established the fact that only one path was possible for the ego, for it could not but be guided by its ruling passion and motive. The supporters of free will may, however, retort by saying that deliberation was the act of intellect, not of will. But even this does not advance their cause any further, inasmuch as will faithfully carries out the final resolutions of intellect, except in so far as they are modified by the intellect itself, at subsequent stages of activity. Moreover, intellect and will are merely two aspects of the same thing, being different functions of the soul.

It follows that true freedom belongs to him alone who is not concerned in calculating the advantages or disadvantages of his actions. Therefore, he alone can be free who cannot be affected by 'circumstances'; in other words, freedom is the essential attribute, hence the nature, of him alone of all beings, who is self-sufficient. The Emancipated Soul alone is free in this sense, therefore. The unredeemed ego, when looked at as will, is subject to the dominion of his ideas and motives, that is, desires, and cannot be said to be free. We thus come back, in this round-about fashion, to the old Indian doctrine of bondage, which can be overthrown only by sacrificing desires, as the Scriptures teach.

fanciful to be true. There are several reasons that lead us to reject the brain hypothesis of consciousness.

Firstly, the brain is a material, that is to say, an atomistic substance, and it is impossible that an atomistic substance can be the seat of perception; for it can never perceive the whole of an object by any possibility at a time. This is a matter of observation which can be verified at any moment in front of a mirror. For a mirror not being an unit, but an agglomeration of atoms or parts, different parts of its surface reflect different parts of the object, so that no one part of it is seized of the whole reflection at any time. Hence it is impossible for any part of the mirror, and, therefore, also for any other atomistic thing, to take cognizance of, in other words, to perceive, the whole of an object, at one and the same time. But perception means nothing if not the seizing on the part of the mind of the whole and every part of an object at one and the same time. Therefore, it is clearly not a case of a pure mirroring of the stimulus in a composite substance, like a looking-glass. The perceiving substance will have to be a non-composite, that is to say, a simple thing, if perception is to be a reality of experience. Should we now seek to get over the difficulty by saying that conscious communications are despatched to the centralmost part from the surrounding portions of the area involved in the reflection of an object? But who will be willing to undertake to account for the correct sorting, and re-adjustment of the infinity of messages that will be received by the central part in the operation? Will not there be a great danger of miscarriage of at least some of the multitudinous criss-cross currents and communications that will be speeding, in hot haste, to take their proper places in the central part? And what of the congestion, which is not unlikely to hold up the lines of communication when it occurs? Will it never occur? and how will it be relieved if it does? The image, too, which will be thus formed in the central part will have a double character: one part of it will consist of perception proper of that much portion of the reflection which has actually fallen on its surface, and the rest of it, say, ninety-nine per cent of the percept, will be nothing but a bundle of messages from the surrounding parts—in other words, a strange amalgam of what is termed direct testimony and hearsay, in legal phraseology!

Lastly, if the composition of the central part itself be conceived to be atomistic, it will give rise, over again, to the same difficulty, which the argument sought to avoid; but if it be a simple unit, then it will be much better to hold at once that such a simple unit as is endowed with the power to perceive cannot be an atom of matter, but must be a unit of the spirit substance, i.e., the soul.* It will be observed that nothing else but an atom is endowed with indivisibility, which is the mark of individuality, in the region of matter, so that if consciousness is not the property of its atoms it cannot be fixed on to or made to reside in matter in any other way. The case with the perceptions of the senses other than sight is still more striking. For it is possible to think of a visual image as a composite thing; but it is not possible to do so with reference to the other kinds of perceptions. Smell, for instance, is pleasant or unpleasant, and is wholly incapable of being conceived in any sense as endowed with parts. Even in the case of visual images it is fallacious to think that perceptions have length and breadth and thickness like things in the world outside. The pages of this book have length and breadth, and the book itself has so many inches of thickness; but the idea of it in the mind has neither length nor breadth nor thickness. For an idea is purely a state of consciousness, a kind of affection or awareness, not a material thing. The following from a materialistic thinker may be taken to be the death-knell of the brain hypothesis (Normal and Abnormal Psychology, by Boris Sidis, p. 24):—

"A fallacy prevalent among the medical profession and now also among the populace is the placing of the psychic life in the brain. The neurologist, the pathologist ridicule the old Greek belief that the place of the mind is in the heart. Modern science

* For if the atom be deemed to be only endowed with a primitive *nucleus* of pure tactile sensitivity, then it will be impossible for it to develop out vision, taste, smell, hearing, and the higher functions of the mind, since these are in no sense modifications of the sense of touch. But if it be regarded that all kinds of conscious functions lie dormant in the atomic constitution, and only need unfoldment on the removal of the causes of obstruction, then the atomic consciousness should be endowed with omniscience (see The Confluence of Opposites, Lecture III (A)), which should be actually manifested whenever an atom of matter is isolated and separated off from all other atoms. But this is opposed to observed facts, for nobody has ever found the least reason to associate full knowledge with an atom of matter.

has discovered that the heart is nothing but a hollow muscle, a blood pump at best, the place of mental processes is in the brain. This medical belief now circulating in the popular and semi-scientific literature of today differs but little from the ancient Greek belief, it is just as fallacious and superstitious. It is true that psychic life is a concomitant variable function of nervous processes and brain activity, but neurosis is not the cause of psychosis. The brain does not secrete thought as the liver secretes bile. The mind is not in the brain, nor in fact is the mind anywhere in the universe of space; for psychosis is not at all a physical spatial process. As fallacious and superstitious is the recent tendency of medical investigation to localize psychic processes, to place different psychic processes in different seats or localities of the brain, thus implying that each psychic process respectively is placed inside some cerebral centre or nerve cells. Psychic life is no doubt the concomitant of nervous brain activity, and certain psychic processes may depend on definite local brain processes, but the *given* psychic process is not situated in a definite brain centre, nor for that matter is it situated anywhere in space."

It is not possible to explain the conscious phenomena even on the basis of mechanical motion. A change of conscious states does not imply motion of parts or groups in the same sense as such motion will bear in the region of matter. Says Dr. Boris Sidis (*Normal and Abnormal Psychology*, p. 20) :—

"Change certainly is manifested in the mutations of states of consciousness, but this change is not the physical change of translocation. Change in the states of consciousness may, no doubt, be regarded as activity, and if it is, as energy, but this activity is not the energy of mechanics. Activity in mechanical or physical sciences means molar, molecular, or atomic movement of matter through space, while psychic activity is not a translation of matter through space, a thought is not a material mass having extension, weight and locomotion."

We have seen that an idea has neither length, nor breadth nor thickness. But has it got parts? Most certainly not; it has no parts and can have none. The idea of an assembly is not in itself an assemblage of ideas of individuals, nor that of a book, a volume of loose mental sheets bound together to resemble a book. There is no book-binding department in the mind where loose ideas could be glued or pasted together to form a book! It is possible to tear the book to pieces; but it will be ludicrous to say that its idea in the mind is also capable of being torn and mutilated, page by page! With what instrument will that be effected? The mind has no hands with which to tear the pages of the mental book, to make it correspond (and that always

and without a mistake) to the tearing process in the external world. The book that is torn becomes so much rubbish ; but the idea of the torn book in the mind is not rubbish ; it is an idea, as perfect and complete as that of the book itself. Only it now represents a torn mutilated book instead of an undamaged one. A torn up idea will be an absurdity ; and mutilated knowledge, nonsense !

Again, the picture in the looking-glass is formed by the *stimulus* itself, the glass contributing nothing to its formation. It consists only in the reflection of the rays of light that emanate from the object in front of the reflecting surface. But mental pictures are not formed that way. An idea has no parts of which it may be deemed to be composed. The material mirror is ignorant of the reflection ; if it could feel its contact, it would merely be aware of a kind of sketch or plan as a sensation of touch ; but would know nothing else. It would have no knowledge in the *qualitative* sense ; it would not perceive colour, nor sensations like sweet and sour relish, pleasant or unpleasant smells, nor sounds ; and it would never know any such thing as the import of words, and judgment.

The idea in the mind is not formed by the external *stimulus*, because the *stimulus* is only matter or motion in some form, not consciousness. It can give rise to a picture only in the mechanical way ; but such a picture will not be tantamount to perception, as we have just seen. If a feeling of awareness arises in the mind on the receipt of the excitation from the without, it is not due to the *stimulus* in reality. For being matter or motion in its nature it can only give rise to a material or mechanical phenomenon, heat, motion, etc., but not to a sense of awareness, which is possible only because the perceiving entity is itself an intelligent substance, and capable both of feeling its affections and of responding to external nature, with knowledge and innate thought. Take away consciousness from the perceiving mind, replace it with a piece of looking-glass and no power to evoke conscious manifestation will be left in the *stimulus*. Even when the mind is engaged elsewhere, the senses are found to be irresponsible. The eye may even reflect the picture of a thing mechanically, but if the mind is not attentive to it, there will be no cognition of the object.

This is sufficient to show that cognitions are not constituted by the excitations whose function is thus reduced to a mere invocation. They only call forth what is within ; they are incapable of creating or manufacturing knowledge, perception or ideas [in any other sense.

What is knowledge itself, then ? It is, certainly, not matter. It is something entirely different from matter. It has neither colour, nor taste, nor smell, nor touch, nor any other material quality. The perception of the material qualities and attributes does, no doubt, appertain to consciousness, but the perceptions themselves are devoid of them ; in other words, perceptions arise in a substance that is itself devoid of the material nature, that is to say, of the sensible qualities of matter. If any one finds it difficult to perceive the force of this observation, let him try to find out what is the colour of the idea of a red object, and what that of a yellow one ; what is the smell of an idea like, and what is its taste ? In this way he will soon perceive that sensible qualities do not appertain to the subject of knowledge, and the ideas are equally devoid of them. Hence knowledge is independent of matter, though material excitation is needed, in our case, to call it out of the recesses of the partless substance to which it pertains.

If ideas were composed of parts they would be made of some sort of a material, which would be either conscious or unconscious. But in the former case its units would be in reality only so many souls, every one of which would have its own separate consciousness, which would mean the multiplication of a percept exactly as many times as the number of conscious units in consciousness. But this is absurd, for our consciousness does not endorse the supposition. And in the latter case, unconscious matter will never be able to constitute a state of consciousness, as we have already seen.

The illusion that seems to underlie the notion of an idea being composed of parts will be dispelled readily if we recall the image of a house that is being dismantled, which must have come within every one's observation. We are liable to imagine that as the house is made of parts which may be pulled to pieces, brick by brick, so must its mental counterpart be composed of some sort of mental bricks,

to correspond so exactly to the progress of the work of demolition. The fallacy lies in the illusion of stability of the mental picture, which is treated like the object in the world. The truth is that the *stimulus* is changing every moment, and new ideas are being called forth by it. Even in the looking-glass the image is not stable. There is a continuous emanation of the *stimulus* from the object, so that the image in the glass itself is never the same for two successive moments. In the instance of the house that is being dismantled fresh stimulus is likewise being radiated from it in all directions continuously, and there is no wonder if a corresponding changing image is evoked every time by it in the perceiving consciousness.

In the region of consciousness we have not only ideas that are partless, but a whole thought or psychosis, as it is termed, is also partless. Two entirely separate ideas cannot coexist in the mind. The mere fact that they are present simultaneously in consciousness is sufficient to combine them into a unity. Difficult as this is to realize, it is nevertheless a fact that has not remained unnoticed by psychologists. Its explanation is to be found in what is termed mental synthesis. But we shall let Dr. Boris Sidis state the case for the mental synthesis in his own words (see *Normal and Abnormal Psychology*, pages 113—117 and 230—232) :—

"One of the fundamentals of psychology is mental synthesis. Objects that appear within the same consciousness are synthesized in a unity, if they are taken cognizance of. An object may be presented to consciousness, and another object may be similarly perceived. They remain two and separate as long as consciousness does not take cognizance of their duality, of their being two objects, but as soon as the two appear in consciousness together and are perceived as two, they are by this very fact synthesized into unity. This is a point which may not possibly be so clear, and is also hard to realize for those who have been used to work in concrete sciences. The reason is that the mind is accustomed to dwell on the object of thought, not on the function of thought itself, and is therefore used to take the object for the thought. The confusion between the thought that possesses the thought and the object of thought is a fallacy that is as a rule committed by the intelligence trained to busy itself only with external objects. Our reader sees, of course, through this fallacy, he knows that the thing of the idea and the idea of the thing are not identical. The paper on which I write is white and is five inches wide and eight inches long, but my idea of the paper is neither white nor has it so many inches in width and length.

"The same fallacy, however, is not so very obvious when it appears under a somewhat different guise. The object of thought has parts, therefore it is concluded that the thought of the object must also be made up of corresponding parts. Because the chain in the external world is made up of so many links, it is concluded that the idea of the chain is made up of so many ideas of links, and that the total sum of the ideas of the links forms the idea of the chain. The idea of the chain, however, is not a mere juxtaposition of so many ideas of links. The ideas of the links would have remained in the juxtaposed disconnected condition, had they not been connected and synthesized in one new idea, the idea of the chain. . . . One realizes the impossibility and absurdity of subdividing an idea. We can have an idea of a third of a pound, but it is absurd to talk of a third of an idea of a pound. A third of an idea is simply so much nonsense. But why is it absurd to subdivide an idea? Why is it nonsense to speak of having a half, a third, a quarter or any fraction or part of an idea? Evidently *because an idea is essentially a synthesis, a unity, and has no parts*. . . . We can have an idea of half a book, but it is certainly absurd to have half an idea of a book. It means nothing at all; the idea itself has not been formed, and as such, as an idea, it is totally absent. A separate synthesis in consciousness is requisite in order to have an aggregation, or association of ideas cognized as one. Ideas do not meet, associate and form a unity, mental synthesis is required. . . . Consciousness is not an association of independently existing ideas, images, feelings and sensations. Mental events must form a unity, a synthesis in the total psychic life of some psycho-biological organization. Disconnected words of a sentence thought by a series of thinkers do not give rise to that unified mental process which goes to form the psychic experience of the meaning of the sentence. The words must be cognized by the consciousness of *one* psycho-biological organism. Ideas, images, feelings, emotions, volitions do not meet on independent ground, associate, fuse and go to form a unity, a new idea or feeling. Experiences in different minds do not combine and associate to form a new synthesis. . . . In order to get some form of cognizance or some form of experience of sensations and ideas, there must be some one organic consciousness that experiences or lives through the psychic events. Thoughts, feelings, ideas, images and sensations are occurrences in some one psychic individuality, a psycho-biological or psycho-physiological organism, an organism which possesses the living synthetic unity of consciousness. From a purely physiological standpoint we may term this living organic unity of consciousness—a subject. . . . This holds true of all psychic life, from the very lowest representative of mental life to the very highest, such as the self-consciousness of man. . . . The subject, or the unity of the psycho-physiological individuality cannot be represented by a series, whether temporal or spatial, as a series ceases to be unity or a synthesis. For a series of independent events remains a series, while the synthesis or unity of the series is a superadded event. A series of psychic events must exist in and for some psychic unity or individuality which stands for the organic unity of consciousness, or for the synthesis of consciousness, no matter what the type of consciousness is, low or high, animal or human. . . . Psychic contents or

states of consciousness are always found in connection with some individuality The individuality may be of a high or of a very low type, it may be that of a man or it may be that of a fly, but it must be some *one* conscious being that synthesizes the psychic state. . . . For if self-consciousness be reduced to a series, it may be pertinently asked with John Stuart Mill, 'How can a series be aware of itself as a series?' "

Thus, perception may be said to represent the element of mental reaction on the receipt of the afferent *stimulus*, which but for the reaction, would only exhaust itself in the shape of movement. It might impart motion to the brain cells, but can never give rise to a knowledge of the object, that is, to a sense of awareness of its presence. Suppress mental reaction, and you reduce consciousness to a photo of the object on the retina and the movements in the brain and nervous centres, with no one to perceive or to cognize !

Further, the act of perception takes place only in the mind, not by the mind going over 'bodily' to the spot where the particular object seen is actually lying ; for no one has yet seen the mind moving out of the body on such a cognitive quest. Besides, if this were the case, we should never see the whole of a big object at a time, as attention could then be directed only to a small portion of its surface, since it is distance alone which widens the field of vision. Moreover, distant objects would appear very different from what they do, if the faculty of perceiving actually went over to them. Illusion would also be impossible then ; for it arises in consequence of a misapprehension of the nature of the stimulus. Furthermore, things would not appear large or small, as the distance varied.

When we look at the slides of the realistscope, through that ingenious little instrument, we feel convinced that perception cannot take place on the object ; for if it did so take place, there ought to be no difference between the double picture in the instrument and the object cognized by the mind. Not only is this not the case, but, on the contrary, there is hardly any resemblance between them. There is a double picture in the instrument, but the mind sees only one object ; and, in place of the small plane surface which the picture presents to the naked eye, a life-sized, life-like object is seen by the mind. If perception took place on the object, it is difficult to conceive

how this deception could be caused. Illusion may be due to a hasty glance at an object ; but here the more intently one looks at the picture, the clearer becomes the deceptive image in the mind. Neither the glasses of the realistscope, nor its pictures, are, at all, like the fused and magnified image which the mind actually perceives. Clearly, then, the act of perception does not take place on the pictures. Neither can it take place on the glasses, because there is no image on them. Besides, if visual perception were to take place on them, they, at least, ought to be visible.

The effect of the ingenious device employed in the realistscope is to modify the light rays transmitted by the pictures, so as to make them resemble those which emanate from the original object. Hence, when the image from such modified rays is formed on the retina, the mind, guided by the resemblance between the realistscopic excitation and that from the normal object, operates upon it in its usual way, thus calling up the mental image of a life-sized object capable of being the original cause of the sensation actually felt.

The fact that the illusion of the realistscope continues, in spite of the awareness of its nature, proves that reason has nothing to do with the perceptive work of the mind, for otherwise the mentally 'projected' image ought to resemble the slides on disillusionment. It is thus clear that nothing but the quality of the external vibrations determines the nature of the mental image.

When the sensory excitation reaches the percipient consciousness it encounters and challenges the will in the centres of perception. The shock, i.e., the sensation, caused by the disturbance, then rouses attention, which, summoning to its aid the ideas and concepts residing in the sub-conscious region of the will, proceeds to investigate the situation. Of the ideas which appear on the threshold of consciousness, those that have the same rhythm with those in the arrested sensation vibrate in sympathy with the external *stimulus*, as if welcoming their brethren from the outside, and thus give rise to perception.

These ideas and concepts exist in the mind not separately, like photos in an album, but as a heterogeneous mass of seething

active potentialities, i.e., knowledge unmanifest. They are not separable from one another like things juxtaposed in space, but interpenetrating. Hence, when one of them is thrown into vibration, the rest become, as it were, suppressed. The result is that the vibrating idea stands out in the field of consciousness as an illuminated object in an unilluminated field. Thus is formed the image which is perceived. Hence, the statement that the mind itself assumes the form of the object which it cognizes.

It will be seen that general, or detail-less, perception precedes the knowledge of particulars, for detailed cognition is an intellectual process and begins with the isolation of parts from the undivided unity of perception. With the aid of the innate forms of understanding, attention 'cuts up' the perceived mass into 'individuals,' and these into organs and parts. It then resolves them, in a similar manner, into the different elements of which they are composed, and thus learns their composition.

When the rays from a section of the external world impinge on the eye, they originate certain movements in the nerves of the brain. These movements, or vibrations, together with the then prevailing feeling of the organism, constitute the sensation which the ego feels and becomes aware of. If this sensation is a commonplace one, and does not interest the ego sufficiently to engage its attention, the movements are allowed to discharge themselves into motor reactions with which they are associated, through habit; otherwise the ego arrests them in the course of their progress and invites the intellect to determine their cause or causes. Attention* then comes into play,

*Some psychologists see in attention the consciousness of an attitude, rather than an attitude of consciousness, but they seem to lose sight of the important fact that both the body and the mind act and react on one another, so that it is possible to secure the attention of the ego, by throwing the body into some particular attitude, just as it is possible to make the body assume that very attitude by an act of volition. In the latter case, the visible attitude of the body is all that there is to indicate the state of the mind, and may give rise to the inference that attention is always preceded by the bodily attitude. In reality, however, will itself is capable of throwing the body into the attitude of attention. With Bergson, we may say that the elementary work of attention may be compared to that of a telegraph clerk who, on receipt of an important dispatch, sends it back word for word, in order to check its accuracy. The analytical

and lays itself bare to be operated upon by the object outside in the world. This results in the formation, in the already familiar way, of the mental image which is pushed into the lime-light, so to speak.

Perceptions, then, are determined by the quality of the excitation, which varies with the circumstances. Consequently, the mind, at times, perceives big objects as small, and *vice versa*. It is, however, not the object which becomes big or small, but only its mental counterpart, the nature of which is determined by that of the excitation, e.g., the moon we see is not the real moon at all, but its mental image formed by the mind. Since a small moon at a little distance would cause the same sensation as a bigger one at a proportionately greater distance, the perceiving faculty is satisfied the moment the coincidence between the inner vibrations and the external excitation is attained. Hence, the size and distance of the 'projected' mental image are determined by the nature of the excitation. This explains why little children imagine the moon to be near at hand, and babies in arms vainly try to seize it.

We can perhaps now understand the nature of the unlimited perception an Emancipated Soul will enjoy in *nirvana*. Considering that the entire sensible world is presented to the senses and the mind, from moment to moment, in all the richness and brilliancy of colour,

work of attention is only an endeavour to attain to a more perfect synthesis. It is impossible to explain the whole range of the phenomena of attention on the materialistic hypothesis, or the effect-theory, as William James has termed it; we can only satisfy our understanding by saying that the soul's interest, in the movements going on around it, causes it to turn its mind and attend attentively to any particular object or detail. The power of the soul to countermand and override the inclination of attention, which has not received due consideration at the hands of materialistic psychologists, is, in no sense, capable of explanation on their hypothesis. If attention is the effect of, and called up, by the afferent stimulation, or of ideas connected therewith, how is its inhibition by an act of willing, on the part of the ego, to be explained? Prof. William James is himself inclined against the effect-theory, as he distinctly says, on p. 448 n. of the first volume of his 'Principles of Psychology.' In its nature, attention signifies the convergence of the inner forces of life to a point, constantly moving in the present and forming the medium of sensation and cognition between the individual organism and the outside world. It is the point of mental concentration, and implies an attitude of will when it may be said to be *at tension*.

only as an affection of the ego, and that this affection is not an affection of the entire ego, but of only an infinitesimally small portion of its substance, it is easy to realize the infinite nature of the full perception that will result if the entire mass of the intelligent substance were set free to vibrate simultaneously and at once. The teaching of Religion that the soul is endowed with infinite perception by nature is thus perfectly true. We shall have an opportunity of studying the nature of the causes that interfere with the functioning of this faculty of infinite perception later on; it will suffice here to point out that the union of spirit and matter is the cause of the limitation of perception and knowledge both, so that the Perfect Ones who are free from the crippling companionship of matter enjoy infinite perception and knowledge, because in the absence of a limiting cause the natural function of Spirit is indicated in Their case, in the fullest degree.

Passing on to a consideration of memory, it will be seen that it differs from sense-perception only in so far that the stimulus which occasions it does not proceed from an object in the outside world, but arises within the mind itself. The self-same mental 'elements' that vibrate in perception are also thrown into vibration in recollection, the imperfections of which are due to the very nature of the will itself. For, in the will impressions blend and interpenetrate to such an extent that often it is impossible to isolate and recall any particular sensation whole and entire. Hence, the images which are constructed with the aid of these recalled sensations are generally mutilated, wrongly grouped, and full of false detail. This should not happen if there were a place where memory-images were stored separately, as pictures in a gallery, or photos in an album.

Besides, whenever there is inner excitation of the senses, as in intense concentration, mind forms and projects into the limelight of conscious thought such distinct and life-like images as deceive the individual. These are known as hallucination, although to the individual concerned they are quite real, the most striking cases being those in which the senses of sight and touch are excited at the same time. Whence could these hallucinatory images arise, unless they be the offspring of the mind itself? It will be remembered

that they are not composite, but partless states, and not separable from the mind, imagination or will in any sense. They must, therefore, exist in the mind fully dressed, and only stand in need of the invocatory message to which they seem to be ever eager to respond.

What, then, is memory? Is it a store-house of facts and figures, as such, or a register or record of past experiences and events? That the past is preserved in the mind, in some form, is beyond dispute, since glimpses of it are caught now and then even after a supposed obliteration. The wonderful memory of hypnotic subjects and men who have undergone the experience of drowning, suffices to prove the preservation of every event in the past. Now, memory means nothing if not the recollection of a past event, i.e., the recurrence, in consciousness, of an experience already undergone, or of a sensation already felt. Hence, the difference between perception and recollection lies only in this that while the excitation which occasions the former comes from without, that which brings the latter originates within the mind itself. The sense of familiarity, which is associated with recognition and wanting in cognition, would appear to be the psychological effect of the fact that matters of detail furnished by the mind are verified by observation in the object, whence the feeling 'I knew it!'

But this is observed at its best only in the presence of the object itself. For recognition proper takes place only in the presence of the object, when mental images hasten to overlie the sensation that is actual. Hence when the object is only mentally recalled, the effort of recollection gives rise to images that, finding no substantial sensation to slip into, remain evanescent and fleeting—the shadowy ghosts of events, rather than actualities of perception.

Observation will show that memory consists in (a) a set or system of mechanisms or devices that are helpful in recalling mental states, that is to say, ideas, images, sensations and the like, which are too shy to show themselves unless called, and (b) in the subjective states themselves. In addition to these the effect, hence the memory, of our experiences is preserved also in the shape of the modifications of character or disposition, as already noticed.

The system of mechanical devices, it will be seen, is necessary, because ideas do not put in an appearance without being called out, in the first instance, though they exist ready to rush out into the limelight at all times. As for the system of mnemonical mechanisms, two kinds of devices are comprised in it, namely, firstly, those that reproduce movements, bodily and vocal, and, secondly, those that call up images and other forms of subjective states.

We shall first of all turn to the motor mechanisms that are 'set in motion as a whole by an initial impulse, in a close system of automatic movements which succeed each other in the same order, and, together, take the same length of time' (*Matter and Memory* by H. Bergson). The learning of a lesson by heart is an instance of this kind. As Bergson observes, this memory is nothing but a set of intelligently constructed mechanisms which enable a living being to adapt itself or himself to a given situation in the present. It is very common among those lower forms of life which are solely guided by their instincts. Habit rather than memory, it acts our past, but does not call up its image.

As for the preservation of the effect of experience, it is obvious that will is principally concerned where the past is preserved in the form of modification of disposition or character, for it is directly affected by experience. And this will be found to hold good with respect to all kinds of mental impressions, in so far as such impressions imply experience and are a source of education to the will. For no mental impression is altogether devoid of effect, so that it is impossible for it not to affect or influence one's instincts or character in some way. This is sufficient to show that memory is intimately associated with the will.

In the will also lies the initial difficulty which is experienced when we try to learn anything new; for it is not easy to make it respond to particular ideas or to force it into particular attitudes against its inclinations and temperament. Hence, so long as attention is fixed elsewhere, no amount of repetition will make any lasting impression on the mind.

The process of learning also throws considerable light on the nature of memory. When one hears a complex phrase in an unknown

foreign tongue one is not able to repeat it there and then; but its repetition becomes easy if it be broken up into the simpler sounds composing it. The reason why we can repeat a word or phrase when its composition is known and not otherwise, lies in the fact that the will is not able to set up similar vibrations in the glottis and other organs of speech, that are concerned in the reproduction of sounds. It is quite true that mental impressions corresponding to sounds and sense of words are present in the soul, like all other impressions, and cannot be conceived as coming into being by or through a process of evolution, or manufacturing in some other way; but expressed sounds have to be reproduced by the organs of speech which need special nervous mechanisms to be set in motion in corresponding appropriate ways. In other words, the articulation of words is really the articulation of specific simple sounds in quick succession. Hence the moment the practical knowledge of the composition of words is acquired, pronunciation of them becomes easy. The difference between a new-born babe and an adult in regard to phonetic reproduction then, lies not in respect of the capacities of the soul, but solely and simply in respect of education, that is to say, in respect of the knowledge of the analytical and synthetical processes which govern sound-production. In this sense, memory is the capacity of combining the simpler elements of sounds into complex forms, the frequency of repetition enabling the will to perform the operation with astonishing ease, almost without effort.

When the sequence of the newly acquired process becomes firmly fixed in the mind it becomes automatic, and it is this automatism of habit which offers opposition to the admission of anything new. The case-loving nature of the will makes it averse to leave the beaten track and strike out into new paths. It loathes trouble of every kind, but delights in roaming over familiar ground. Hence, things with which it has not become sufficiently familiarized are liable to be forgotten. Knowledge acquired by pure cramming, therefore, is as good as the waste of valuable time. Hence, ideas which are associated with familiar ideas are more lasting than bits and fragments, or odds and ends, of knowledge forced on the will.

So far as the effect of education is concerned, its preservation being associated with the will itself that is a phase or aspect of the immortal soul, it is obvious that it will survive death, and accompany the soul into its new surroundings, in the shape of a *nucleus* or seed of habits, tendencies, feelings, emotions and inclinations—in a word, as character. These inclinations, emotions, tendencies, habits of thought and other subjective aspects of the will also constitute the motives of individual activity, and control one's movements. As Bergson has so well shown, the human body is a sensory-motor organism; by its activity it keeps the attention confined to the present, and thus inhibits reflection. But whenever action is undetermined, opportunity is afforded to the faculty of reflection of going over past experience in search of the principle of guidance in the present emergency. We then reflect, (*re*, back, and *flexio*, to bend, or turn), that is, we turn our will back on its own past experience, thus making it reveal its contents, till the required memory is secured.

The past, then, is preserved* in the mind as tendencies and character. All knowledge is stored up that way. Bergson is right

* Cf. "Memory, as we have tried to prove, is not a faculty of putting away recollections in a drawer, or of inscribing them in a register. There is no register, no drawer; there is not even, properly speaking, a faculty, for a faculty works intermittently, when it will or when it can, whilst the piling up of the past upon the past, goes on without relaxation. In reality, the past is preserved by itself, automatically. In its entirety, probably, it follows us at every instant; all that we have felt, thought or willed from our earliest infancy is there, leaning over the present which is about to join it, pressing against the portals of consciousness that would fain leave it outside. The cerebral mechanism is arranged just so as to drive back into the unconscious almost the whole of this past, and to admit beyond the threshold only that which can cast light on the present situation or further the action now being prepared—in short, only that which can give *useful* work. At the most, a few superfluous recollections may succeed in smuggling themselves through the half-open door. These memories, messengers from the unconscious, remind us of what we are dragging behind us unawares. But, even though we may have no distinct idea of it, we feel vaguely that our past remains present to us. What are we, in fact, what is our *character*, if not the condensation of the history that we have lived from our birth—nay, even before our birth since we bring with us prenatal dispositions? Doubtless, we think with only a small part of our past, but it is with our entire past,

in holding that we act with our entire past, for knowledge implies the training of the will by altering and modifying its impulses, which determine the automatic activity of the soul.

To turn now to the formation of memory mechanisms, the first thing to note is that they must be material in nature; for otherwise they too will enjoy consciousness, which cannot be allowed, without introducing a great deal of confusion in the mind. The fact that in certain diseases and also in old age memory is impaired, goes to show its dependence on the physical organism, though it does not necessarily lead us to the conclusion which materialistic writers generally like to draw from it, namely, that there is no possibility of the survival of memory after injury to the brain or the occurrence of death. For the brain is not the organ of preservation, but only of manifestation, for which reason its injury or destruction can affect manifestation, but not preservation, the final form of preservation being in the shape of tendencies, inclinations, passions, emotions, likes, dislikes and feelings. The bundle of these mental tendencies and the like is not wiped out with death, but constitutes the *nucleus* which passes from life to life, as will be shown more fully later on.

To understand the nature of memory mechanisms we must turn to perception once more. We have said that perception is the reaction of the mind on the incoming stimulus, and but for it it will be reduced to pure mechanical movements set up in the matter of the brain or the nervous centres or system. The *stimuli* that impinge on the eye, to confine ourselves to visual perception for the present, consist of a myriad currents of vibrations that pass through the retinae and are taken up by the sensory nerves which are attuned to specific sensory stimulation. These are set vibrating probably in the same way as a violin string is set in sympathetic resonance when its note is struck in its vicinity. The movement then travels towards the

including the original bent of our soul, that we desire, will and act. Our past, then, as a whole, is made manifest to us in its impulse; it is felt in the form of tendency, although a small part of it only is known in the form of ideas . . . We could not live over again a single moment, for we should have to begin by effacing the memory of all that had followed. Even could we erase this memory from our intellect, we could not from our will."—(*Creative Evolution*, pp. 5 and 6.)

central place, or the headquarters of the ego, where all kinds of *stimuli* are received and synthetized, and where, therefore, the greatest sensitivity must prevail. Now comes the mental reaction, without which there can be no perception of anything, as we have already seen. But the perceptions being simple, that is to say, partless and non-composite in their constitution, are not composed by the stimulus, in the sense in which clay things are said to be composed of clay, or in any other sense, except that they correspond to the incoming *stimuli*. On the mass of the *stimuli* that come from the 'without' the ego reacts with its own innate impressions or forms, to ascertain their quality and nature. What interests the ego most is naturally the subject of experiment in the first instance; hence objects are isolated and singled out from the mass of sensory excitation with the aid of the innate mental forms of the understanding, though the whole of the external picture is 'reflected' in a general way in its warp and woof, so to speak. This accounts for the perception of individuals, as distinguished from the general sense of awareness of things *en masse*. Now memory mechanisms are formed by the combination, at the inner terminals, of the nervous 'threads' which correspond to and fit into the mental form that is brought out in the limelight from the depths of the mind. These seem to adhere together to constitute contrivances which have the power to invite again, that is to say, to reinvoke, the original idea which is responsible for their existence as mechanisms.

The sensory system in the organism is not like a single chord, but a board, in which the external ends are well designed to catch up the vibrations of different qualities, intensities and pitch, that come from the objects outside. At the other end are formed groups or clusters of nerve-terminals, as stated. Perception is accomplished because the mind produces from its own depths ideas and impressions that are pre-existing and that resemble the external excitation in every way, and fit it completely.

Observation shows that the sensory system is attuned to respond to a limited range of excitations from the without, those of a higher or lower intensity remaining unperceived. Thus, only a limited range of ideas can be evoked in the mind through sense-

perception, though we know that treasures of knowledge reside in the regions of the subconscious, glimpses of which are to be caught through clairvoyance and other higher forms of mental functioning.


To come now to the process of recollection: the sensory system is fivefold in nature, and consists in the sensitivities of the five senses. But the senses, though different and diverse outwardly, are in reality rooted in the individual will, which responds to them all. Hence, we have diversity outside—the diversity of objects and things in the world, and of nerve currents in the sensory system—but unity within—the unity of the perceiving consciousness or will. The sensory system is to be divided, for the foregoing reason, into five sections, corresponding to the specific* sensations of the five senses. Their functioning is performed much in the same way as of the sense of vision, and similar clusters of nerve terminals are set up in consequence of the reaction of the perceiving mind on the incoming stimulus.

Each of these five sensory sections consists in, and is therefore to be subdivided into a number of chords which can reproduce the exact quality of vibrations as come from without. Now, suppose the eye falls on a group of men. The currents passing through the retinae would set a certain number of mental chords which are attuned to their pitch, in vibration. Suppose these chords happen to be $A_1, A_2, A_3, A_4, A_5, \dots$ to A_n of the visual section A. Obviously, the next time that the eye falls on any of the members of the group, it will set some of these very chords in vibration, and these, in their turn, will tend to evoke resonance from the rest which had vibrated with them, as a whole, at the time of the perception of the group of which the man subsequently seen was a member. Hence we may lay down

* Modern psychology, too, has demonstrated the fact that the same *stimulus* when applied to different sensory nerves produces specific sensations peculiar to them, e.g., when an electric current is applied to the auditory nerve, sound is heard, when applied to the gustatory nerve, a sensation of taste is felt, and so on. It has also been demonstrated that the application of different *stimuli* to the same nerve, invokes normally only sensations peculiar to that nerve, as for instance, the eye will only perceive light and colour, whatever be the nature of the *stimulus* that is employed. It is, therefore, safe to say that the sensory system represents a set of nerves that are qualified to take up and transmit specific movements or excitations to the mind.

that the memory, hence the association, of similarity arises from the sameness or similarity of the response, while that of contiguity depends on the connection which springs up from having vibrated together. As Bergson says, association is not the primary fact; dissociation is what we begin with, and the tendency of every memory to gather to itself others must be explained by the natural return of the mind to the undivided unity of perception (*Matter and Memory*). Each time that one opens one's eyes, they take in the whole of the visible panorama before them at a glance, mechanically; and it is reserved for attention to carve out individuals from this heterogeneous mass, simultaneously perceived as a whole, that is to say, from the unity of perception. Hence, contiguity is given already at the very outset; it is obscured by the attentive dissociation of an 'individual' from other contiguous individuals, so that one has only to relax the tension of attention to develop the entire picture.

The following diagram, taken from Bergson's *Matter and Memory* and modified to suit our requirements, may be studied with advantage to understand the mechanism of association by contiguity.



S is the point of sensory-motor activity, which travels unceasingly from P to F, i.e., from the past to the future, in the universe, represented by the plane U in the diagram. The cone ASB represents

sents the entire capacity of memory which fills up its 'records' at S, the point of sensory-motor activity, hence, of attention. Between the summit S and the base AB of the cone, then, there is room for all the modifications which the faculty of recollection receives unceasingly from the outer world. In this space may be ranged, layer upon layer, all the impressions which the soul has brought over with itself from the past, each layer or record consisting of all whole impressions formed at one time. A B and A " B " are two such records. Now, suppose that the activity at S is inhibited on the plane U, and attention, withdrawing itself from the field of action, travels inward, in the region of memory, in search of a past experience. It will then have to travel backwards and forwards among these layers, of past impressions, till it recover the memory it is searching for. If, however, there were nothing to guide it in its pursuit of the phantoms of the past, its labour would be enormous, and oftener than otherwise in vain; but, fortunately, the principle of similarity at once comes to its rescue, and, in the manner already pointed out, enables it speedily to get hold of a similar impression in one of the innumerable records, in the region of memory. Similarity having fixed the layer, attention no longer travels up and down between the summit and the base of the 'conical tower' of memory, but busies itself in exploring the storey which has been reached through similarity. Now, because all the impressions which had presented themselves together, in a single act of perception, are stored up in this particular storey, on account of contiguity in space, they all pass under the search-light of attention, yielding the required 'image.' In this manner is the process of recollection carried on, consciously, or unconsciously, in the mind. The recovered impression is an affection of the ego, like perception, and is termed a recollection for that reason. So far as the functioning of the faculty of recollection is concerned, the rule is that it is obstructed by action, inasmuch as activity is only memory lived out, and you can either live out your memory or have it before you in the form of images, not both. But whenever the mind vacillates between two or more alternatives, the knowledge which would have been acted out, becomes solidified into representations, there and then, by the mere

circumstance of reflection. Memory thus is set free to display its richness by the relaxation of the tension of activity, and arises by the turning of the current on itself, whereby the reflected part becomes illuminated, and stands out, as it were, against a background of the unilluminated portion of the current of life, that is to say, individual consciousness. Thus the more the attention is disengaged from action, the greater will be the reflection, and richer the memory. Hence thinking and acting lie in opposite directions, and inhibit each other. In other words, relaxation of tension spreads out the contents of the current of activity into memories, and the performance of action liquefies recollections into actuating tendencies. The exigencies of the physical life, however, seldom allow man to disengage his attention so completely from the present as to enable him to spread out his whole past before him; hence it is almost impossible for him who is deeply engrossed in the world, to attain to that degree of relaxation which will bring him perfect knowledge. But, whenever and wherever a Master has turned his back completely on the world and become merged in the contemplation of the self, memory has never been known to withhold any secrets from him. The statement in the Scriptures that the knowledge of the past lives is stored up in the soul is thus literally true. Ordinary man is ignorant of the vast store of knowledge entombed in his memory, because of the sensual tendencies of his soul, summed up in the lower mind, which, thinned and sharpened like the point of a pencil, leads him by the nose in the pursuit of worldly lusts. But the *rigis* turned their backs resolutely on the world, and acquired the memory of their past incarnations.

The difference between the capacious memory of an illumined saint and our faulty faculty of that name lies in the fact that in us it remains in a sub-conscious state, owing to our inability to set the attention free from slavery to the senses. Experimental hypnotism has, however, revealed the fact that even our stumbling memory is capable of performing wonderful feats, whenever attention is disengaged from one's worldly concerns and made to dive into the depths of the sub-conscious.

Even knowledge of the future is possible to the being who withdraws his attention from the body. It is known that advanced

saints not only perceived the past lives of men, but their future incarnations as well. The knowledge may even be acquired by a householder under exceptional circumstances.

The difficulties which seem to surround this kind of knowledge vanish the moment we recognize the fact that all changes of disposition or character, which is the sole cause of future births, are stored up in the form of modifications of the will, so that if one's vision were keen enough to penetrate through the veils of matter and perceive these changes, one could without difficulty discover the nature of the seeds of rebirth. Further, since Nirvana is only the establishing of the soul in its own nature, that is, in the purity of the Essence of Life, and since every action which modifies character, the seed of rebirth, leaves its characteristic mark behind, the whole range of future rebirths must be readable in the *karmic* ledger of the soul. Hence, he who is able to reach and to set into motion the currents of forces which connect him with his past and future can easily point out the previous and the future incarnations of his soul.

We have said that the current of the tendencies of life is, owing to the necessities of the physical environment and the ego's action therein, thinned and sharpened to a point which is constantly pressing against the future, and from which radiate motor impulses in all directions in the body, enabling it to act on the surrounding bodies in the world. But suppose this radiation is inhibited. The result of the inhibition will be the stoppage of the outgoing energy and the consequent expansion of the point. If the process were to stop short here, only a feeling of fulness and expansion would be experienced by the soul; neither action nor reflection would ensue. But if the pent-up force is allowed to escape outwards, bodily action will inevitably follow its discharge; and if reflected back on itself, attention will travel away further inwards and will be scattered over the triangle formed by the very act of reflection. This triangle whose apex is the sensory-motor point and whose base an imaginary line drawn across the current to mark the extent of reflection, is the form of thought. Through it is precipitated, in the form of memory and recollection, the experience of the past which was gathered up in the liquid dynamic stream. The process is like that of the breaking up of a ray

of light into the colours of the spectrum, but it is not automatic. It depends on the will, for when two or more directions are open to the activity of the ego, and it selects one of them, the element of choice is there to contradict the hypothesis of automatism and chance. Intellect, the faculty of reflection and analysis, thus arises simultaneously with the creation of 'differences.' But it is a genesis, or creation, only if we start from the point of view of action. The triangle, the differences, and also the perceiver thereof were all there already in the current, only in a latent, that is, unmanifested state; they only needed the turning away of attention from immediate action to come into the field of consciousness.

We must dwell a bit longer on the nature of the current of life's tendencies to be able to understand the psychology of what is called the lower mind. Obviously, these tendencies, being different in different individuals, cannot all be regarded as natural to the soul. This means that they are modifications of the natural impetus, impulse or feeling of pure spirit. But, since impulses cannot be modified by aught except force, and since force is inconceivable apart from some kind of matter, the tendencies of life must be the effect of the fusion of Spirit and matter, for there is no other substance to combine with souls. This amounts to saying that desire, memory and reflection, the three most important characteristics of the finite mind, are the product of the union of spirit and matter.

So far as the faculty of reflection is concerned, it is only possible where the outgoing current is susceptible of being thrown back on itself; hence, where uncontrolled passions or sensualism are the dominating trait of existence, reason, the faculty of reflection, must be conspicuous by its absence. Accordingly, all lower forms of life, which are constantly engrossed in action and sensation in their wakeful moments, are unreasoning beings, though their souls are in no way inferior to the most perfect form of pure Spirit in respect of its natural qualities. The current of tendencies in their case is so much loaded with material impurities that it cannot be reflected back on itself. As we rise higher in the scale of being some sort of crude and imperfect power of reflection becomes apparent in some of the five-sensed animals—monkeys, horses, elephants, and the like—indicating

that the load of impurities carried by their souls is considerably lessened, though not sufficiently so to enable reason to have full play. These are the two main types of life in the animal kingdom. Apart from them, there is a third type, the lowest—metals, plants, and the like, which are characterised by the purely vegetative function of life. They have only the sense of touch, and spend their whole life in a mechanical way, as if heavily drugged. They have neither memory nor reflection, nor much of instinctive consciousness.

According to Jainism, living beings are either *sangi* (having a mind, i.e., the organ of reflection or thought) or *asangi* (*a*=not+*sangi*, hence the mindless). The *sangi* enjoy the power of deliberation, and are able to learn if taught; they respond when they are called, and can also be trained.

The organ of the mind (*dravya mana*) is a body of fine matter which is the instrument of reflection or thought. As already stated, every living organism is not endowed with it, the *asangi* having neither true volition nor judgment, but only the power of sensation and of responding to the external stimulus in an instinctive mechanical way.

All living matter, it will be seen, is irritable and contractile, and capable of responding to the external excitation in a mechanical, instinctive way. The simplest organisms are of this description; as we rise higher in organic life, a division of labour is found to exist; nerve cells appear diversified and grouped together in a systematic way. Bergson observes:—

“When a foreign body touches one of the prolongations of the amoeba, that prolongation is retracted; every part of the protoplasmic mass is equally able to receive a stimulation and to react against it; perception and movement being here blended in a single property, contractility. But, as the organism grows more complex, there is a division of labour; functions become differentiated, and the anatomical elements thus determined forego their independence. In such an organism as our own, the nerve fibres, termed sensory, are exclusively empowered to transmit stimulation to a central region whence the vibration will be passed on to motor elements. It would seem then that they have abandoned individual action to take their share, as outposts, in the manoeuvres of the whole body. But none the less they remain exposed, singly, to the same causes of destruction which threaten the organism as a whole; and while this organism is able to move, and thereby to escape a danger or to repair a loss, the

sensitive element retains the relative immobility to which the division of labour condemns it."—(*Matter and Memory*.)

The *dravya mana* is composed of very fine material, and marks the limit of the specialization of the function of nervous matter and nerve cells. It is not conscious in its own right, since consciousness belongs not to matter of which it is composed. As a matter of fact, this mind is, in a way, the instrument of limitation of knowledge, because it narrows down the field of consciousness to what is actually the subject of attention at any particular moment of time.

To elucidate the point, full and unqualified omniscience is the nature of each and every soul; but this is so only potentially in the case of those that are still involved in transmigration; for in their case the purity of Spirit is vitiated, more or less, by the contact of matter, there being no transmigrating soul which may be said to be altogether free from the pollution. Just as the intimate union of hydrogen and oxygen deprives those gases of their aerial freedom, so to speak, reducing it to bare fluidity of liquids, in the same way is the fusion of spirit and matter responsible for the loss and limitation of the all-knowing faculty of the soul. Where the association with matter is of the worst type, as in the case of the lowest forms of life—metals and plants—knowledge is reduced to bare sensations of touch and a mechanical response to the external *stimulus*. In less unfortunate cases other sense organs also appear, but deliberation, i.e., reflection and memory (except what is known as habit memory), do not appear, unless the soul acquires the central organ of reflection and the power to check the headlong rush of the torrential current of animal passions and desires. The organ of reflection is the central telephone exchange of the nervous system where all the nerves—sensory and motor—have their terminal endings. The clerk in charge of the office is the soul, the self-conscious force, whose self-consciousness directly depends on and is affected by the nature of his tendencies, desires and passions. These desires and tendencies are all of them powerful forces originating in the constitution of the soul by virtue of its union with matter. They clog the mental stream with rubbish, and prevent reflection. The point of this current of tendencies, the head of the serpent *manas*, is attention, which tests the quality of

the incoming sensory stimulus by laying itself open to its vibratory impulse and which may set a motor nerve in motion by the augmentation of energy at its inner terminal. It is the application of attention, the connecting of the object without with the point of the mental stream, which is the twofold cause of the detailed knowledge of a thing as well as of the closing of the door against all other senses than the one which may be actually functioning.

The amount of consciousness which watches over the actions of life where the intellect is not shedding its illuminative lustre, consists in the sparks given out, from time to time, at the sensory-motor point, in consequence of friction with the incoming stimulus, or of resistance to action. But the glow produced by reflection is the intellectual gleam with which reason carries on the adjustment of the soul's inner relations with the outer.

The control of the mind is exercised through the brain and the nervous system which are interposed between it and the body. The centripetal impulses coming from the periphery pass through the brain, just as the motor impulses originating with the will find their way to the desired channel of activity through it. This is because the brain is superimposed, as a loop, over both the sensory and motor systems, through which the ego comes into touch with the physical world. Bergson thus describes the function of the brain :—

"In our opinion the brain is no more than a kind of central telephonic exchange ; its office is to allow communication, or to delay it. It adds nothing to what it receives ; but, as all the organs of preception send to it their ultimate prolongations, and as all the motor mechanisms of the spinal cord and of the medulla oblongata have in it their accredited representatives, it really constitutes a centre, where the peripheral excitation gets into relation with this or that motor mechanism, chosen and no longer prescribed."—(*Matter and Memory*, pp. 19-20.)

Nevertheless the brain is not the chooser, since choice belongs to the ego, and also since the brain is composed of matter which is unconscious by nature. What connects the ego with the brain is the central organ of mind, which is composed of too fine a material to be visible except to clairvoyant vision. The nature of the matter of which this central organ (the *dravya mana*) is composed, is evident from the fact that it is in touch at one end with the finest nervous

fibres of the brain, and, at the other, with the subtile and superfine substance of the soul which is absolutely beyond the reach of sense-perception. The *dravya mana* is distinguishable from the *manas* of the non-Jaina systems, which is but another name for the individual will as appearing in the form of desire. As already stated, the material mind is only an instrument in the hands of the ego for deliberation, training, voluntary motion and intelligent speech, but the desiring *manas* represents the dynamic energy of the ego itself inclined in a particular way or ways. In different language, the *manas* consists in the energy of life bent on seeking gratification in respect of the four principal instincts, or generic forms of desire, namely, *ahāra* (food), *bhaya* (fear), *maithuna* (sexual indulgence) and *pari-graha* (attachment to worldly goods), and is laden with the impurities deposited by the four kinds of passions—anger, pride, deceit and greed—which arise from and are rooted in desire. The *dravyā mana*, on the other hand, is intended, like a system of switches, to regulate the traffic between the ego and the outside world, and discharges its function by offering a choice of paths for the different kinds of movements. But it does not originate motion, for that is the function of the will. And the work of the will in producing motion is of the simplest description : it has merely to dwell upon an idea to produce motion in any desired manner. As William James* points out, every idea tends ultimately either to produce a movement or to check one which otherwise would be produced. Her† tells us :—

"The lower centres act from present sensations alone ; the hemispheres act from perceptions and considerations, the sensations which they may receive serving only as suggesters, of these. But what are perceptions but sensations grouped together ? and what are considerations but expectations, in the fancy, of sensations which will be felt one way or another according as action takes this course or that ? If I step aside on seeing a rattle snake, from considering how dangerous an animal he is, the mental materials which constitute my prudential reflection are images more or less vivid of the movement of his head, of a sudden pain in my leg, of a state of terror, a swelling of the limb, a chill, delirium, unconsciousness, etc., etc., and the ruin of my hopes. But all these images are constructed out of my past experiences. They are reproductions of what I have felt or witnessed. They are, in short, *remote* sensations, and the

* The Principles of Psychology, vol. I. p. 24.

† *ibid.* p. 20.

difference between the hemispherless animal and the whole one may be concisely expressed by saying that the one obeys absent, the other only present, objects."

Such is the process of deliberation: the reminiscences of the past are awakened and re-grouped in different ways, and these regroupings constitute what is known as a train of thought. Thus is the function of the central organ of the mind discharged by means of simple 'ideas.' The *dravya mana* is a kind of an operating board which is connected at one end with the brain, by means of levers and bars of nerves. Its operator, too, is connected with it at the other end, and cannot break away from it during life. It is because of this inseparable association between the levers of movement and the ego that every immediate act of the will is also an immediate act of the body, except when the motion is allowed to be dissipated by the brain. In the latter class of cases the motion is communicated to certain parts of the brain where it evokes only nascent or potential movements, and is probably ultimately absorbed by the serous fluid surrounding that organ. This is why deliberations produce no bodily movement, though every true act of the will is also an immediate act of the body, as already stated.

As to the origin of motion, reflection reveals it to be the result of a purely mechanical process on the part of the will. The ego is affected by its sensations, perceptions and considerations and thrown into a state of agitation in consequence. These affections or agitations of the will are communicated to the nerve terminals embedded in the *dravya mana*, producing characteristic movements of the body or brain cells. Where the element of selection comes in is in the choice which opens one track rather than another to the motor impulse. But this is the work of the ego, and cannot be performed by matter which is not endowed with judgment. Deliberation, similarly, cannot be a function of the brain, though it bears the full weight of the ego's activity when engaged in thinking; for no amount of the motion of that which is devoid of consciousness can ever become thought by any conceivable chemical or mechanical process. The train of thought is really a series of affections, that is to say, states of consciousness of the ego, which arise from reflection and are felt by the soul. It is true that a sensation of dulness is

experienced in the brain after hard mental work, but the brain is by no means the thinker. As a matter of fact, apart from the motion of certain of its cells, the brain is not concerned in deliberation and is not even the seat of the central organ of reflection, or of the ego, whose headquarters are undoubtedly located in the heart. This is evident from the fact that the heart and not the head is directly affected by one's passions and emotions, which remain quite unaffected by the degeneration and decay of the brain in old age. Moreover, since passions and emotions also interfere with the proper exercise of the function of deliberation, they must be connected with the *dravya mana* itself, which, for this very reason, must be located in the same place with will, that is, in the region of the heart. As Schopenhauer says, in the heart is the man, not in the head. The explanation of the feeling of dulness or heaviness experienced in the brain after hard mental work probably lies in the fact that the parts of the brain concerned in the process become heated and overworked after a time. Just as a feeling of fatigue arises in the fingers in consequence of excessive work, though the ego's headquarters are not located in the hands, in the same way certain portions of the brain show signs of fatigue when put to excessive strain.

Furthermore, the *dravya mana* is necessary as a central organ for the work of mental synthesis; for the senses are located separately outwardly; and their functions would be independent, unless they are brought in touch with a unitary consciousness in a central part. The perceptive centres in the brain would also be as valueless as the senses for the same reason, namely, their separate location. If the unity of conscious life is dissipated in the form of the diversity of independent sensation centres, it will be impossible for the ear to 'learn' what the eye sees, and for the taste to be brought in relation to touch and smell. All conscious functions have to be recognized as ultimately pertaining to a unitary consciousness, the living and active will.

Though not the thinker itself, the *dravya mana* is indispensable for deliberation, because thinking consists in a series of nascent movements, or 'sensations,' which are not possible in the absence of the

brain and the central nervous organ interposed between it and the will. Hence it is that all the lower forms of life which are not endowed with the brain and the central organ of choice and control, are also devoid of reflection. Incapable of controlling their activity, they are also incapable of deliberation. Their actions are all determined by their instincts; they live in the present and are incapable of judgment and choice. The advantages of deliberation are obvious, and are clearly brought out by William James in the following passage which occurs on pp. 21 and 22 of the 1st volume of his *Principles of Psychology* :—

"Take the prehension of food as an example, and suppose it to be a reflex performance of the lower centres. The animal will be condemned fatally and irresistibly to snap at it whenever presented, no matter what the circumstances may be; he can no more disobey this prompting than water can refuse to boil when a fire is kindled under the pot. His life will again and again pay the forfeit of his gluttony. Exposure to retaliation, to other enemies, to traps, to poisons, to the dangers of repletion, must be regular parts of his existence. His lack of all thought by which to weigh the danger against the attractiveness of the bait, and of all volition to remain hungry a little while longer, is the direct measure of his lowness in the mental scale. And those fishes which, like our cunners and sculpins, are no sooner thrown back from the hook into the water, than they automatically seize the hook again, would soon expiate the degradation of their intelligence by the extinction of their type, did not their exaggerated fecundity atone for their imprudence. Appetite and the acts it prompts have consequently become in all higher vertebrates functions of the cerebrum."

What is true of the advantage in respect of food, holds good with regard to all other functions in the exercise of which prudence is a virtue. The animal devoid of the brain and the *dravya mana* cannot pause, postpone, deliberate, compare or nicely balance one motive against another. But it is not the absence of these necessary organs that debars him from these advantages; on the contrary, their absence itself is to be laid at his door. For, whatever the moderns may say to the contrary, it is not the brain which manufactures the ego, but the ego who organizes the brain, so that the absence of the brain itself is to be accounted for by the grossness and lowness of the tendencies of the organizing will itself. It is not the brain or the central *mana* which makes us pause and deliberate, but the force of the purer instincts of life which were developed, undoubtedly, in some pre-natal state or states. When the body came to be organized in

consequence of the presence of those instincts the brain and the central organ were evolved out in due course of things. The physical brain is, no doubt, a necessary part of the machinery of rational life, and injury to its substance is invariably accompanied by a corresponding impairment or loss of the functions of the mind, but it is not characterized by individuality which is the most indispensable trait of our psychic being, and cannot, for that reason, be regarded as the seat of consciousness or soul. It is like a shunting yard at a railway junction, and altogether incapable of regulating the movements of the mental rolling-stock. The same observations apply to the *dravya mana* which stands to the brain in the same relation as a signal-box does to the railway lines in the shunting yard. It, too, is unconscious, and, therefore, incapable of regulating the mental impulses originating in the will.

The *mana*, *chitta*, *buddhi* and *ahankāra* of the Indian philosophy, for which it is not always easy to find suitable equivalents in different tongues, are the four different aspects of the mental 'outfit,' *mana* (the same as *manas*) being the point of the current of life's tendencies, i.e., attention, *chitta* the bed of the mental stream, so to speak, *buddhi*, the faculty of reflection, the same as is termed intellect, and *ahankāra*, the sense of "I-ness," that is to say, the 'clerk in charge of the central exchange.' The whole of this current is full of memory records preserved in the form of living, that is, active tendencies, called *samskāras* (impressions) in Sanskrit.

In mindless beings whose consciousness is too much vitiated by the influence of matter, conscious function never rises to the dignity of perception proper, and is confined to a feeling of sensations to which response is made in an automatic way. But the case with those who are endowed with a central mental equipment is very different. In their case we have first of all a vague detail-less sense of awareness. This is called *darśana** (pure excitation

* The distinction between a percept and a bare sensation has been recognized by modern psychologists. Says Arthur I. Gates in his "Elementary Psychology" (p. 373): "The percept is the awareness of an object, condition or complex event whereas the sensation is the awareness of a quality, such as red, sweet or pain. In the chain of conscious reactions, the sensation precedes the percept, and is dependent on different central neurones, although the neurones of the two are intimately connected and the time interval between sensation and perception consciously imperceptible."

or sensing) and is followed, if the soul so wishes, by *avagraha*, which means the singling out of an object with reference to its class, that is to say, the knowledge or awareness of its general properties, *e.g.*, to know an object as a man. Then comes *lā*, which signifies an attitude of enquiry. The soul now exerts itself to acquire detailed information concerning the object of perception, brings its memory to bear upon the stimulus, the nature and composition of which it proceeds to ascertain with the aid of its mental 'reagents.' This process, which is dependent on the soul's interest in any given object, may be prolonged as long as it is desirable to continue the investigation. The important thing to know about this state (*lā*) is that perception here ceases to be mechanical and becomes volitional with the soul. The formation of the percept, consisting in the appearance of the correctly determined idea in the lime-light, is the result of *lā*. This is known as *avaya*, which is tantamount to the filling in of the detail in the general presentation or outline of an object in consciousness. The material basis here also is the mental stream, consisting of all kinds of 'reagents,' which enable the intellect to test the properties of a sensation.

The last stage is *dhāra* (literally, grasping), which means retaining or constructing. By the process of isolation of individuals in the presentations are set up memory mechanisms in nervous fibres, as described before, and these tend to hold together more and more firmly with repetition. In other words, by dwelling upon a presentation or sensation repeatedly is set up a special grouping—a sort of button or key—of nerve-terminals in the region of the *dravya mana*, which, when pressed, will yield, that is to say, call up again, the appropriate corresponding impression. This is *dhāraṇā*.

Some people think that recollections share the nature of mental concepts which, they maintain, exist in the brain. What is precisely meant by this statement is not easy to comprehend, unless it be that concepts and ideas exist somewhere in the matter of the brain, with their definite outlines and 'individualities,' in other words, as ready-made images. It thus becomes necessary to see what a concept can possibly mean.

Proceeding from the material object perceived in the physical world, we get first of all the object itself whose representation in the mind is called percept. In the absence of the object, its recollection is a memory image which lacks the concreteness of the percept. This memory image is, however, not to be confounded with the concept, for it has, as an image, its clear-cut outline and contour, as they were seen in the original object at some particular moment of time. A concept, on the contrary, is what the understanding conceives from what it has perceived. It is an idea robbed of all else but that which appertains to its kind, so that it would hold true of the whole class, but not represent any individual in it, except in so far as it shares, with the other members of its fraternity, the features distinctive of the class itself. As a modern psychologist says, in a concept the identity is removed from its concrete setting and 'viewed by itself. For instance, the concept 'man' would be true of every man, whether tall or short, fat or lean, young or old, whether existing now, or having existed in the past, or yet to be born. In other words, a concept is the symbol of thought, defining an object by pointing out those features of it which are common to all the members of its species or class, but omitting those in respect of which it differs from others. It is clearly impossible for it to be an image of each and every individual, though they may all be said to exist in it rolled up in some way: for an image is nothing if not the likeness of a particular object as it appeared to us on some particular occasion.

Many of the concepts must, obviously, be without form, *e.g.*, time, for we can mentally endow with forms only such objects as have been perceived by us, but never those which are beyond perception itself. The only form, then, in which they can exist in consciousness is the one in which all other ideas exist, namely, as indivisible mental states. We have seen that the subjective state known as perception is always only a single state; but the same holds true of imagination. "The object of perception or imagination," says W. McDougal (*Physiological Psychology*, p. 102), "at any moment is a single object only in the psychological sense. It is true that several objects in the ordinary sense of the word, *e.g.*, the five fingers of

my hand, may be contained in a single percept or idea, but only by being thus combined as parts of one object. Therefore of all the many physical things simultaneously affecting my senses, one only, or one complex of things is the object of attention, and as one thing becomes the object of attention the thing perceived in the previous moment ceases to be the object of attention." This is sufficient to show that neither memories nor concepts are preserved in the matter of the brain in the form of photos or images. It is true that by dwelling upon a presentation or sensation, repeatedly, a kind of mechanism is set up in the nervous matter wherewith the original impression may be recalled; but that does not mean that recollection consists purely and simply in the movements or agitation of nervous matter, without the interposition of the soul. On the other hand, we cannot hold memory to be a purely spiritual function, because of its dependence on the nervous mechanisms that are needed to recall a past experience. For us memory is a faculty, which pertains neither to pure Spirit nor to pure matter, but to a soul vitiated by the absorption of matter. For pure Spirit is endowed with omniscience, which is inconsistent with limited knowledge like recollection; and matter is unconscious, hence devoid of memory.

It is necessary to emphasize the distinction between omniscience and the productions of the lower mind to which memory appertains, especially as it has been utilized by the ancients in the building up of their mythological Pantheons. The knowing faculty in both cases, it will be seen, is the same, whether it know things directly or through the medium or instrumentality of the material mind; for knowledge is the very nature of the soul,* and consists in the feeling of its own states, that is, the states of its own consciousness. These states of consciousness are also in their nature nothing but aspects or modifications of the soul-substance, since spirit is pure consciousness in essence. Thus, the being who knows is one and the same; in the one case, that is, when free from the defilement of matter, he knows directly all that his own states have to reveal, which is infinite and all-embracing knowledge, and in the other, he is aware of as much as his drugged and stupefied will is capable of evoking

* See 'The Science of Thought' by the present writer.

from him ; for every impression through the mind must produce an affection of the soul, in other words, must excite a state of consciousness, before knowledge can be said to have dawned.

As regards the nature and form of omniscience, the soul being an individual, i.e., an indivisible unit of consciousness, the idea of knowledge with reference to it is that of a state of consciousness which is neither the whole, nor a separated part of the substance of its being, but of an infinity of interpenetrating and inseparable phases or aspects, each of which is pervaded by the all-pervading consciousness of the self. In different words, every soul is, by nature, an individual Idea which is itself the summation of an infinity of different, but inseparable and interpenetrating ideas, or states of consciousness. But, since all these ideas or states are not simultaneously present in the consciousness of each and every soul, some of them must necessarily exist in a sub-conscious or dormant condition, whence they emerge above the level whenever conditions are favourable for their manifestation. Thus, knowledge is never acquired from without, but only actualized from within. This is so even when we perceive a new object or are impressed with a new idea for the first time : for the soul can never know anything except through the states of its own consciousness. Hence, unless the soul be endowed with the capacity to assume a state corresponding to the stimulus from without, it will never have the consciousness of the outside object. It will be now evident that an impression in or on consciousness differs from a statue in marble, in so far as it ~~does~~ not signify the chiselling off or removal of any part of its ~~base~~ but resembles it, inasmuch as it is brought into manifestation from within the soul's being itself. Thus, while all impressions may be said to lie dormant in the soul, in the same manner as all kinds of statues remain unmanifested in a slab of stone, they cannot be described as being created in the same way. There is no question of carving out anything in the case of an impression on the soul-substance, but only of a 'waking up' of a dormant state, or a setting free of that which was previously held in bonds.

Hence, all kinds of impressions, or states of consciousness lie latent in the soul, and only need the removal of the causes which prevent their coming into manifestation to emerge from the sub-conscious state.

For the foregoing reasons, sense-perception implies no more than the uncovering of a pre-existing state or thought, the resonance of an already existing impress, or idea-rhythm, set free to vibrate in response to the incoming stimulus. It is this responsive resonance of its own rhythm, hence, a state of its own consciousness, which is felt by the soul at the moment of cognition. It should be stated that the soul has no other means of knowing its own states than feeling them; though the word feeling is here used in its widest sense, and includes sensations of touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing.

The differences of knowledge among beings of different classes and kinds,—as well as among individuals belonging to the same class, are due to the operation of the Law of Karma, for the potentiality for infinite knowledge, that is omniscience, being the very nature of the soul, some outside influence is needed to prevent its becoming an actuality of experience. The nature of this external influence, that is, of the force of *karmas*, is fully explained in such works as the *Gommatasara*.†

It follows from this that knowledge really arises from within, and education is merely a drawing forth (from *e*, out, and *duco*, to lead) from the depths of consciousness. As the bondage of *karma* is loosened, new impressions are set free to manifest themselves, widening the field of perception and knowledge, by bringing the soul into touch with something to which it had remained irresponsive hitherto; and, finally, when all the perception- and knowledge-obstructing

* It will be seen that impressions arise not only from perception, but also from the activity of thought; since, whenever a new idea is formed as the result of perception or inference, a new impression is discovered to enrich the stock of one's knowledge.

† The *Gommatasara* is a Jaina work of great authority on the doctrine of *karma*. The subject has also been dealt with by the present writer in his *Practical Path* at some length.

bonds of *karma* are destroyed, omniscience is attained by the potential becoming the actual.*

* There can be no getting away from the fact that the soul can never know anything unless it be endowed with the knowing faculty. The senses only give us impressions, photos or images of objects, but not the knower, to cognize them; and it would be a miracle if they could create the knower, for they are unconscious themselves. There can be equally clearly no doubt but that the soul primarily only perceives its own conditions or states of consciousness in knowing anything else, for very often that which it knows is very different from what is actually perceived, and in many cases what is known is never really perceived with the senses, e.g., ether, which is invisible to the eye. The existence of a capacity to know, then, is a condition precedent to the consciousness of the soul; and it is evident that this capacity of knowing is not anything foreign to it, or to be acquired from without, but its very nature, for, as we shall see later, the separation of *jnana* (consciousness) from the *jñani* (knower) is fatal to both. It is also evident that there can be no limit to the knowing capacity of the soul, for neither reason nor imagination is liable to be limited by aught but the impossible; and though the senses of each and every living being do not embrace the whole range of phenomena, still there can be no doubt but that different beings take cognizance of different things, so that what is invisible to one soul does not necessarily remain unperceived by all. Owls, for instance, perceive objects in the dark; and it is obvious that the minute little insects which are quite invisible to us must be known at least to the members of their own fraternity, for they breed and multiply. The inference is that, while the soul is the knower in its own right, its knowing capacity is obstructed, more or less, in the case of different beings, though consciousness with its special properties—individuality and knowledge—being common to all, there can be no differences of quality or quantity in respect of the potentiality of knowledge among them. This conclusion is fully supported by the facts or phenomena of clairvoyance and telepathy, of the very existence of which men are almost wholly ignorant in this age, but which have been proved to be the natural functions of the soul.

The nature of the soul being pure intelligence, thought (knowledge) or consciousness, the differences in the degree of its manifestation among the different kinds of beings, as well as among members of the same species, must be due to the influence of some outside force, or agent, whose association or union with the conscious substance (soul) has the effect of depriving it of its pure clarity of knowledge. Unconscious matter is just such an agent, which, as described in 'The Practical Path,' enters into union with the soul-substance and thereby cripples its knowing powers, more or less, according to the type of the bondage (the state of fusion of matter and soul). Thus, the differing types of consciousness depend on the operation of the knowledge-obstructing energies of *karma*, so that, where they are actually in

The rhythm, that is to say, the energy of functioning, of the soul, is of a very complex type, for it knows itself in addition to the

full play, the manifestation of the knowing faculty of the soul may be reduced to the sense of touch, as in the case of one-sensed beings (metals and the like), while in the converse case, that is, where they are totally eliminated, the full blaze of omniscience must be the reward of the conquering *jiva* (ego). All the intermediate degrees of manifestation of consciousness between these two extremes, it can be seen in a general way, also owe their existence to the destruction or quiescence, or partial destruction and partial quiescence, of these energies of knowledge-obstructing *karmanas*; for knowledge being the very nature of the soul may be covered over by the veil of ignorance and 'uncovered' as often as it may, but it cannot be acquired or developed anew, or engrafted on an originally unconscious stem. If we ponder over this statement, we shall not be long in realizing that no originally unconscious substance can, by a process of centralization, that is, mirroring of the incoming stimulus in a central part, convert it into a sensation and itself into a knowing being. The gulf between the conscious and the unconscious is too wide to be bridged over in this manner, and no intellectual jump or acrobatic feat of imagination can even faintly suggest the method by which or the manner in which such a miracle might be effected.

The soul, then, is the knower in consequence of its nature, the purity of which is defiled by the absorption of the unconscious substance—matter. It follows from this that the tearing asunder of the veil of matter, by destroying or checking the energy of *karmanas*, which interfere with the knowing capacity of the soul is the real means of increase of knowledge. As for the nature of the knowledge-obstructing forces of *karmanas*, observation shows that passions and emotions considerably interfere with one's knowing capacity and clarity of the intellect; and the effect of bias and prejudice on the faculty of judgment is too well-known to need comment. Thus our personal likes and dislikes, as well as wrong beliefs and passions and emotions are the causes which interfere with the dawn of *jnāna*. They make the intellect cloudy, producing the mental fog that is highly inimical to the clarity of conscious thought. They are also the causes of the fusion of spirit and matter referred to above, as will be demonstrated in another place later on. Another cause of obstruction is the interest in the physical concerns of life which narrows down the zone of knowledge to what is regarded as the immediately useful for the requirements of the physical body. Attention here acts as a porter at the gate, and admits only the desirable, thus, shutting the door against all ideas other than those presenting themselves in response to the invitation of the desiring *manas* (lower mind, the seat of desires). We, therefore, conclude that the functioning of consciousness is obstructed by certain kinds of energies, springing into being from personal likes, dislikes, interests, passions, emotions and desires. These energies have been classified under four different heads by the Jain *achāryas*, and constitute what are known as *phātīya karmanas* (see chapter xiii post).

object of knowledge at one and the same time, and also because its capacity to know things embraces the whole range of possibility, that which it can never know having no manner of claim to existence. It follows from this that the natural energy of the soul, as pure spirit—a condition in which no interests or motives or other forms and causes of obstruction or limitation remain to shorten the range of consciousness—is of the most complex type in which the rhythm of self-awareness holds together, in an interpenetrating manner, all other possible rhythms of knowledge, none of which is denied freedom of functioning and operation. As such, the soul resembles a great melody in which the rhythm of the tune hovers over the rhythms of the notes that enter into its composition, and in which each of the notes, though a separate entity in itself, is nevertheless only an indivisible and inseparable part of the whole.

Now, since rhythm is but another word for an idea in connection with the soul, because knowledge consists in the states of one's own consciousness, by putting the above in the simple language of philosophy, we may say that each perfect, or fully-evolved Soul, being pure consciousness freed from the blinding influence of matter, is actually an all-comprehensive Idea which sums up, as it were, and includes all other possible ideas without a single exception. Hence, the fullest possible knowledge, unlimited by Time and Space, is always the state of consciousness of a deified Soul. In other words, the emancipated Soul is simply *jñānamayee* (embodiment of knowledge), being pure consciousness in essence.

We must now attend to the part played by memory in our dreams. Analysis shows that a dream differs from waking perception mainly in so far as it is not accompanied by full consciousness, that is to say, the will is more or less reluctant to rouse the intellect at the time, and is easily satisfied with the presentations which memory puts up before it.

As Bergson says :—

"When we are sleeping naturally, it is not necessary to believe, as has often been supposed, that our senses are closed to external sensations. Our senses continue to be active. They act, it is true, with less precision, but in compensation they embrace a host of 'subjective' impressions which pass unperceived when

we are awake—for then we live in a world of perceptions common to all men—and which reappear in sleep, when we live only for ourselves. Thus our faculty of sense-perception, far from being narrowed during sleep at all points, is on the contrary extended, at least in certain directions, in its field of operations. . . . To sleep is to become disinterested. A mother who sleeps by the side of her child will not stir at the sound of thunder, but the sigh of the child will wake her. Does she really sleep in regard to the child? We do not sleep in regard to what continues to interest us. . . . The formative power of the materials furnished to the dream by the different senses, the power which converts into precise, determined objects the vague and indistinct sensations that the dreamer receives from his eyes, his ears, and the whole surface of the interior of his body, is the memory. . . . These impressions are the materials of our dreams, but they are only the materials, they do not suffice to produce them. . . . because they are vague and indeterminate. . . . The birth of a dream is . . . no mystery. It resembles the birth of all our perceptions. The mechanism of the dream is the same, in general, as that of normal perception. When we perceive a real object, what we actually see—the sensible matter of perception—is very little in comparison with what our memory adds to it. When you read a book, when you look through your newspaper, do you suppose that all the printed letters really come into your consciousness? In that case, the whole day would hardly be long enough for you to read a paper. The truth is that you see in each word and even in each member of a phrase only some letters or even some characteristic marks, just enough to permit you to divine the rest. . . . Thus in the waking state and in the knowledge that we get of the real objects which surround us, an operation is continually going on which is of quite the same nature as that of the dream. We perceive merely a sketch of the whole object. This sketch appeals to the complete memory, and this complete memory, which by itself was either unconscious or simply in the thought state, profits by the occasion to come out. It is this kind of hallucination, inserted and fitted into a real frame, that we perceive. It is a shorter process: it is very much quicker done than to see the thing itself. Besides, there are many interesting observations to be made upon the conduct and attitude of the memory images during this operation. It is not necessary to suppose that they are in our memory in a state of inert impressions. They are like the steam in a boiler, under more or less tension. . . . I believe indeed that all our past life is there, preserved even to the infinitesimal details, and that we forget nothing, and that all that we have felt, perceived, thought, willed, from the first awakening of our consciousness, survives indestructibly. But the memories which are preserved in these obscure depths are there in the state of invisible phantoms. They aspire, perhaps, to the light, but they do not even try to rise to it; they know that it is impossible, and that I, as a living and active being, have something else to do than to occupy myself with them. But suppose that at a given moment, I become disinterested. . . . in other words, that I am asleep. Then these memories perceiving that I have taken away the obstacle, have raised the trap-door which has kept them beneath the floor of consciousness, arise from the depth."

It should be noted that the psychic force, the will, is not in an active state during sleep, and that the consciousness of the sleeper is then rid of the mental tumult arising from the din and bustle as well as the worries and anxieties which absorb attention during the waking hours of life, so that many of the movements which pass unnoticed during the day impinge on his mind with great force. Similarly, sensations originating in parts and changes of the body of which one is unconscious during the waking state, burst on the drowsy consciousness with great force. It is for this reason that a slight sensation of heat is felt as walking on fire, and so forth. If the stimulus continue, attention is finally roused from the lethargy of somnolence into activity to remove the cause or causes of irritation; otherwise the dream comes to an end, and the sleeper lapses once more into the deep-sleep state without actually waking up.

As regards the contents of dreams, the stimulus which sets the dream-machinery in motion either comes from (1) the outside world, or (2) consists of bodily sensations, i.e., of excitations originating in some bodily organ. It is then blended together with the prevailing, subjective states, which mean such of the thoughts as, centred round paramount wishes, have strongly agitated the individual and lent their colouring to the aggregate of feelings in the will. During sleep these psychic states consist in potential, that is to say, nascent movements, and only need suitable impulsion to be developed into perceptions. The arrival of the stimulus just furnishes the impulsion that was needed, and the sensation is woven into the framework of consciousness, just as an ordinary excitation in the waking hours. This results in dream-perception with which we are all familiar.

So far as the type of a dream is concerned, it would appear to be determined by the nature of the prevailing feeling at the moment of dreaming; for instance, if we remove a corner of the sheet covering him and allow cool air to play on a part of his body, the sleeper, if he does dream at all, would dream of scenes in the Alps, with falling snow, intense cold, and the like—all details tending to emphasize the fact that a feeling of cold is present in consciousness. Similarly, if the heart happens to be weighted down by the hand, the sensation

excited by pressure gives rise to a feeling of fear, and leads the creative imagination to picture scenes in which accent is laid on that feeling. Thus, it is the feeling which determines the type of our dreams, and the differences of scenery in dreams of the same type are probably due to the differences in the quality, or intensity, of the feeling itself, *e.g.*, when the pressure on the heart is slight, there will be but slight fear, and the resulting dream will also be only slightly frightful in its aspect.

Dreaming, it will be observed, takes place at a time which is marked by the withdrawal of attention from the physical world. In deep sleep, the ego withdraws itself away from the plane of action and sensation, although it still remains within call. Hence, when an antagonistic sensation opposes the state of tranquillity and repose, the will reacts on it and rouses the dormant consciousness into activity. This it accomplishes by forcing the excitation down on to the plane of understanding, which gathers it up in the moulds of its thought-forms, thus enabling the soul to perceive its feelings in a pictorial way.

Now, the function of intelligence in the body is to preside over its actions so as to preserve it from harm; but, generally, experience renders its vigilance unnecessary whenever and wherever the surroundings are familiar. When its vigilance is not needed for adjusting the relations of the body with other bodies in the universe, it turns away its attention from the outside world, and like the captain of a ship leaves the bridge when the danger is over. This happens more completely in deep-sleep when the management of affairs is left in the hands of the involuntary system, with the will watching over, noddingly. The mechanism of life is sufficient under such circumstances to carry on the routine work of the organism. The automatism of the will itself then acts as a sentinel and mounts guard over the system, so that when any discordant element tries to penetrate into the organism, or when danger appears to be imminent, it offers resistance, and thereby creates sufficient disturbance to attract the attention of intelligence, which again mounts the bridge to take the direction of events into its own hands.

The above is a somewhat metaphorical description of what actually takes place at the time. In reality, the will itself becomes

transformed into reason on being disturbed, like a person roused into activity from the torpor of sleep. There is no question even of the withdrawing of attention from the outside world on the part of the ego in dreaming, for dreams occur when the torpor of deep-sleep, caused by the benumbing influence of matter on the soul, is somewhat lessened. Deprived of its natural 'vigour,' the ego is also then deprived of deliberate choice and voluntary action.

So far as the blending of the inner psychic states with the physical stimulus is concerned, Freud points out that—

"the dream activity is under a compulsion to elaborate all the dream stimuli which are simultaneously present into a unified whole When two or more experiences capable of making an impression have been left over from the previous day, the wishes which result from them are united into one dream; similarly, an impression possessing psychic value and the indifferent experiences of the previous day are united in the dream material, provided there are available connecting ideas between the two. Thus the dream appears to be a reaction to everything which is simultaneously present as actual in the sleeping mind The stimuli which appear during sleep are worked over into the fulfilment of a wish, the other component parts of which are the remnants of daily experience with which we are familiar."

As regards the distortion in dreams of the idea associated with a wish, the explanation given is:—

"Wherever a wish fulfilment is unrecognisable and concealed, there must be present a feeling of repulsion towards this wish, and in consequence of this repulsion the wish is unable to gain expression except in a disguised state We should then assume in each human being, as the primary cause of dream formation, two psychic forces (streams, systems), of which one constitutes the wish expressed by the dream, while the other acts as a censor upon this dream wish, and by means of censoring forces a distortion of its expression."

These distorted wishes linger in the deeper strata of the mind, called the sub-conscious, and, in combination with some sensation which is too strong to be ignored, rush up in time to occupy the central position in the scene whose type is determined by the incoming stimulus. As Mr. Maurice Nicoll of Dr. Jung's school of thought, which does not accept the Freudian hypothesis in its entirety, observes in his 'Dream Psychology' (p. 176), the more this repressed material is charged with emotion, the more will it seek expression.

The drowsy, somnolent will which is really the author of these repressed wishes is neither able to hold them down, nor quite unwilling that they should have their way once in this quiet manner. Intellect, no doubt, objects to their appearance, but then the intellect is still unawakened, and the will, on whose effort its waking up depends, is both passive and by no means anxious to rouse it into activity. Intellect is fully aroused only when the will is unable to meet the situation, and turns on itself in its difficulty. It is in this sense that we like to understand Freud when he says:—

"The dream is the guardian of sleep, not the disturber of it . . . Either the mind does not concern itself at all with the causes of sensations, if it is able to do this in spite of their intensity or their significance, which is well understood by it; or it employs the dream to deny these stimuli, or, thirdly, if it is forced to recognise the stimulus, it seeks to find that interpretation of the stimulus which shall represent the actual sensation as a component part of a situation which is desired and which is compatible with sleep. The actual sensation is woven into the dream in order to deprive it of its reality . . . The correct interpretation, of which the sleeping mind is quite capable, would imply an active interest and would require that sleep be terminated; hence, of those interpretations which are possible at all, only those are admitted which are agreeable to the absolute censorship of the somatic wish. . . . It is, as it were, confronted by the task of seeking what wish may be represented and fulfilled by means of the situation which is now actual."

The two chief characteristics of dreams, namely (1) incoherence and (2) the abolition of the sense of duration, arise primarily from the same cause, the loss of interest in the world of action. They signify the mastery of time and space which cannot be conquered so long as the physical body is interposed between them and the mind to make it impossible for fancy to jump over the contiguous in duration and distance. Where attention is not linked to action that is actual, there the mind is left free to plunge into the past or even to make an excursion into the future, regardless of the presence of the contiguous. When this happens the form and flow of ideas are determined by the similar, except where the very exigencies of thought determine otherwise.

These are the laws of reverie; in dreaming, too, disinterestedness is almost complete, and the will is loth so to speak, to exert itself

in any way. Hence, an idea has only to rise above the threshold of consciousness to be woven into a dream-content.

As Bergson says, in perception we choose, with extreme precision and delicacy, among our memories, rejecting all that do not suit the present state. But in dreaming the selection of memories is made without any real interest, or, to be more precise, is left to be made, to a great extent, to the mechanism of memory itself, the interests of the ego disposed to sleep being opposed to fine work of precision and judgment.

Bergson further tells us :—

"The incoherence of the dream seems to me easy enough to explain. As it is characteristic of the dream not to demand a complete adjustment between the memory image and sensation, but, on the contrary, to allow some play between them, very different memories can suit the same sensation. For example, there may be in the field of vision a green spot with white points. This might be a lawn spangled with white flowers, it might be a billiard-table with its balls. It might be a host of other things besides. These different memory images, all capable of utilising the same sensation, chase after it. Sometimes they attain it, one after the other. And so the lawn becomes a billiard-table, and we watch these extraordinary transformations. Often it is at the same time, and altogether that these memory images join the sensation, and then the lawn will be a billiard-table. From this come those absurd dreams where an object remains as it is and at the same time becomes something else. As I have just said, the mind, confronted by these absurd visions, seeks an explanation and often thereby aggravates the incoherence."

As regards the abolition of the sense of time, Prof. Bergson points out :—

"When we are awake we live a life in common with our fellows. Our attention to this external and social life is the great regulator of the succession of our internal states. It is like the balance wheel of a watch, which moderates and cuts into regular sections the undivided, almost instantaneous tension of the spring. It is this balance wheel which is lacking in the dream."

To sum up the conclusions concerning the psychic apparatus of dreams, we may say that the same mental faculties are concerned in dreaming as in perception, provided we do not forget that of the three constituents of the mind, the intellect is drowsy and fatigued, the will is like the child that fain would play but is afraid to disturb the sleepers in its vicinity, and attention assumes the form of a night

light, burning low and dim and casting mysterious shadows all round. We should not further forget that this threefold division is not intended to represent three separate and independent entities or functions: the thing working throughout the mental operations is only one—the force or faculty of intelligence—though it is known by different names in different conditions and aspects. Whenever, therefore, we find ourselves in difficulties over the delimitation of boundaries between the different aspects of the mind, it will be worth while to enquire whether we are not actually endeavouring to effect, in thought, a partition, by metes and bounds, between things which are not intended by nature to be so divided off from one another.

We may now turn to the elucidation of the great miracles that are said to have occurred at the time of the crucifixion of Jesus according to the gospels. Their explanation consists in the changes that occur internally, in the constitution of the aspirant after immortality and perfection under the stress of arduous effort, to rid himself of the crippling companionship of matter. For the physical body is the prison in which the soul is confined: and it has got to break away from it to come into its birth-right. As Origen points out, "the mental acumen of those who are in the body seems to be blunted by the nature of the corporeal matter" (*Ante Nicene Christian Library, Origen's Writings, vol. I. 82*). St. Paul, too, shows how there is antagonism between spirit and flesh, and how the latter interferes with the freedom of the former (*Galatians v. 17*). The soul, it will be seen, is not held a captive in the body by means of metallic bars and bolts, but by the forces of cohesion and adhesive-ness and other forms of material magnetism. On account of its captivity it is unable to exercise its natural perfections, and in the vast majority of cases is even ignorant of its divine nature. The cross is the symbol, in Christian thought, of the process which enables it to separate itself from its fleshly prison, the body. The changes that occur in the constitution of the soul in the course of the process of crucifixion are, as already stated, those that have been described allegorically as great miracles—the darkening of the sun, the rending of the veil of the temple, the shaking of the rocks and the opening out of the graves. Of these the darkening of the

sun stands for the disruption of the equipment of the lower mind, the seat of perception, recollection, imagination, will, etc. Omniscience having dawned in the soul, as the result of the crucifixion of the lower self, the 'little gleam' of inner light, which is so much prized by the finite man, is not needed any longer and is extinguished. This is the darkening of the sun ! The rocks that are shaken stand for the shocks that will be occasioned in the course of the process of the destruction of *karmic* knots that is described in the following significant words :—

" Every valley shall be filled, and every mountain and hill shall be brought low ; and the crooked shall be made straight, and the rough ways shall be made smooth " — (Luke iii. 5.)

The veil of the temple that is rent is not the wall of a temple of brick or mortar but of the temple of Divinity. It is the veil that lies over the face of the soul and is responsible for the obstructing of the super-clairvoyant, that is to say, all-embracing vision. The obtainment of the super-sensuous vision is what is implied in the metaphor.

The opening out of the graves, similarly, symbolises the recovery of the memory of the past lives ; for memory is like a cemetery in the mind wherein lie buried impressions and recollections of the past, as the dead lie buried in a graveyard. What is meant by means of these ingenious metaphors is only this that as a result of the process of crucifying the individual desires and appetites and cravings, the soul gets rid of the causes of obstruction to its real nature, and attains to the light inaccessible of infinite knowledge and perception. The intellectual mind is then not needed any longer, and is darkened for ever.

We may now apply ourselves to the elucidation of the myth which has furnished us the title of our present chapter.

That the Biblical Trinity does not represent actual beings, but is a secret doctrine imparted in concealed metaphor, like the legend of the ' fall,' is clear from the very constitution of the Trinitarian Board, which comprises (1) a father, (2) a son, and (3) a ghost ; for there can be no partnership between living beings and a phantom, even though it be a holy one. But this is not the only objection to

the acceptance of the idea in the literal sense ; for each member of this puzzling body is further supposed to be diffused in the other two, and all the three are deemed to be compressed, or compressible, into one. But no amount of eloquence or ingenuity can ever hope to succeed in making the rational intellect grasp the manner in which, or the method by which, three individualities may exist separate and distinct and yet be reducible to one. Nor are we able to picture to ourselves the kind of relationship which is implied by the terms father and son when both are posited as co-eval in point of time. The more one reflects on these elements of confusion, the more does one become convinced of the fact that the description is not intended, and could never be intended, to convey to the human mind the knowledge of a family of gods or men, who outrival all the oddities of prolific nature and of the equally prolific imagination of man. On the contrary, the terms employed to define and the attributes enumerated distinctly point to a mental conception of a single faculty or thing which is capable of being looked at from three different standpoints, though not of being partitioned off into as many separate compartments.

There can be no doubt but that the primary conception of the Holy Trinity is that of three different aspects of Life, which is by nature endowed with potential Divinity. This potential Divinity being the ideal as well as the source, or substantive cause, of the subsequent actual Godhood of the soul is the first member—the Father—of the Holy Trinity. The Son naturally represents the Soul that has conquered Death and obtained 'that world and the resurrection from the dead' (Luke xx. 35 ; Romans viii. 14); for he then becomes an 'heir of God,' to use the significant language of St. Paul (Romans viii. 17). Now because the potential Divinity of the Soul is only realised by those who attain nirvana, in other words, since Godhood is brought into manifestation only by the Soul who becomes an 'heir of God,' the Son alone is the revealer of the Father (Matt. xi. 27). Accordingly, the Bible tells us :—

"No man hath seen God at any time ; the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared Him."—(John 1. 18.)

Now, because the actual is the successor to the potential in point of time, Divinity in manifestation stands to the Divine in potency in the relation of a successor or son, whence the Pauline metaphor—an heir of God. Yet, in so far as the manifested and the unmanifest represent merely the two different phases of what, in reality, is the same thing, that is to say, since the Son only comes out of the 'bosom' of the Father, like a statue from out of rough stone, the Son cannot be said to have been non-existent at any moment in the life of the Father. Hence is the son a full contemporary of the Father.

The third member of the Holy Trinity is the spirit that makes us holy. As already seen in an earlier chapter, rigid self-control and self-denial are necessary to make us *whole* in which consist our salvation and holiness. When the individual will is developed to perfection in renunciation and self-denial, then is the final emancipation obtained, enabling the Soul to enter *nirvana* as pure radiant Effulgence, perfect and *whole* and unencumbered with any kind of material bodies. This perfect, bodiless soul is also itself the Holy Ghost.* Being *whole* and perfect in renunciation It is holy and as a pure bodiless Spirit It is a ghost, whence the term—the Holy Ghost.

Such is the primary conception of the Biblical Trinity, which is not only beautiful as an ingenious mythological metaphor, but is also strictly in accordance with the truth. The reason why the real import of the doctrine has been lost sight of by men is to be found in the difficulties involved in the interpretation of such subtle conceptions as the Son and the Word.

The idea of the Word is really only that of Knowledge in a collective sense. Life and Knowledge are the two aspects of the soul which, when conceived separately, give us the 'Father' and the 'Son.' The idea of the 'Father,' thus extricated, must be distinguished from the 'Heavenly Father' who stands for the Perfected Soul residing in *nirvana*, termed the Most High. For the 'Father' as the source of the 'Son' only stands for the potential Divinity of the

* This is the view from the subjective point of view ; from the objective point of view the Holy Ghost signifies the spirit of *Vairagya* (renunciation) which makes men *whole* and holy.

Spirit substance to be manifested in the 'Son,' who Himself becomes the 'Heavenly Father,' as the Teacher of the Science of Life, and ultimately 'ascends to Heaven,' to reside there among Those who are termed the Most High, or, more simply, Gods. This is the reason why St. John says in the fourth gospel:—

"No man hath seen god at any time; the only begotten son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him."—(Chap. i. 18.)

The idea of the 'Word' as the creator is merely that of Brahmx, who stands for the creative Thought. For it is the Creative Thought which removes the confusion and chaos of ignorance and fills the mind with orderly spiritual thought, in other words, which peoples the mind with spiritual conceptions and thoughts. The 'Word' is also the Knowledge Divine promulgated by an Omniscient Teacher, as in the text:—

"If he called them gods, unto whom the word of God came, and the scripture cannot be broken. . . "(John x. 35.)

or in the statement:—

"... by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God doth man live," (Deuteronomy viii. 3; Luke iv. 4.)

In John, vi. 24, also there is the reference to the 'Word' in the following context:—

"... He that hearath my word and believeth on Him that sent me hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation; but is passed from death into life."

The power of faith it is that is referred to here, in these passages. The creative thought is endowed with the power to call up its congeners, and displaces those that are opposed to it and their satellites. And because the creation of the 'Word' (of Truth) is eternal, therefore it is described as 'good' in the allegorical narration thereof, in the opening chapter of the book of Genesis. As Origen explains (Writings of Origen, ii. 218), "God never made anything mortal."

The Word when accepted entitles one to be termed a God; for the fact of acceptance is the starting point of the unfolding process which is to transform the potentially divine into an actual God. The

Word also stands for the fulness of Knowledge, that is, Omniscience, as a subjective state, in which case it exists potentially in Life (poetically, in the bosom of the Father), and actually in the being of a Perfect Soul.

As the term 'son' was directly applied to the 'Word,' it also came to be recognized as a member of the Holy Trinity. We have it from Max Müller :—

"There is, according to the Alexandrian philosopher, the Divine Essence which is revealed by the Word, and the Word which alone reveals it. In its unrevealed state it is unknown and was by some Christian philosophers called the Father; in its revealed state it was the Divine Logos or the Son."—(*The Vedanta Philosophy*, p. 154.)

The uttered word of Instruction is Speech, which, in its wisdom aspect, is referred to in the eighth chapter of the book of Proverbs in the Old Testament (Verses 22—30).

The Platonic philosophers were also familiar with the conception and termed it Logos (*The Vedanta Philosophy* by Max Müller, p. 141). The idea probably had its origin in Indian allegory. In the Maitrayana Upaniṣad (vi. 22), quoted in the Vedanta Philosophy, two Brahmanas are pointed out as the object of meditation, one of whom is called the 'Word' and the other, the 'Non-Word.' The Upaniṣad further lays down that the 'Word' alone can reveal the Non-Word. Speech (*Vach*), too, was recognized in India as the divine manifestation of the Creator, long before the conception of the Word by St. John.

As regards the co-existence of Brahman and Vach the Hindu scriptures teach the same thing as is expressed in the book of Proverbs (see Chap. viii. 22—30), from which only the following need be quoted :—

"When he prepared the heavens, I was there; when he set a compass upon the face of the depth;

"Then I was by him, as one brought up with him, and I was his daily delight, rejoicing always before him."

The Hindu scriptures teach :—

Prajapati, the creator, was all this. He had speech (*Vach*) as his second, or, in the language of the Bible, as one brought up with him."—(*The Vedanta Philosophy*, p. 147).

We must now turn to the primary Hindu *Trimurti* of Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Mahēśa or Śiva, to understand the true idea of creation in Hinduism. According to the Hindu ideas, Brahmā, the first member of this divine triad, is the creator, Viṣṇu, the preserver, and Śiva, the destroyer of the world. But Mr. K. N. Iyer, a Hindu graduate-pandit, has taken pains to explain the true significations of the *trimurti* (trinity) in the esoteric sense. In his '*Permanent History of Bharatvarsha*,' a work of paramount importance on the elucidation of Hindu mythology, he explains Brahmā as the totality of *buddhi* or the determination to involve.

"As all the religious advancement has to start with this turn of mind, it is described as Brahmā's creation. The work of maintaining and developing this *buddhi* points to Viṣṇu and preservation; Rudra as destroyer has two functions here: He has to destroy the worldly desires of man before Brahmā could create the *buddhi* which turns back to the Brahman. He has also to destroy the good effects of Brahmā's and Viṣṇu's workings before final emancipation could be secured. Thus the three gods here specified are not virtually distinct and separate, and they cannot possibly continue to exist as such."

In summing up his conclusions on the nature of the Tri-Murti, Mr. K. Narayana Iyer points out ('*The Permanent History of Bharatavarsha*,' vol. I. p. 395):—

"In the conceptions of Brahma, Viṣṇu and Śiva, the following important points have therefore to be ever kept before our view to avoid doubt and confusion:

"(1) The region of the Triad is the sphere of Satwic Maya, and not of Avidya, which is exactly the jurisdiction of the modern interpreters.

"(2) The very nature of the functions of the Triad is involutionary. The creation of Brahma or evolution virtually means the destruction of all the worldly desires and the consequent rising of a devotional tendency in man.

"(3) Viṣṇu preserves and develops the *buddhi* created by Brahma and does not preserve any other absurdities.

"(4) Śiva is primarily the cause of Brahma's creation, by his destroying the worldly desires, and, lastly, he is the cause of final liberation by annihilating the good effects of religious devotion and practice.

"(5) Brahma, Viṣṇu and Śiva, as explained above, exhaust the religious requirements for the final emancipation of man."

It would thus appear that right discernment, *dharma** (religious observance), and renunciation (*vairāgya*) are the three primary conceptions on which the Pauranic Triad is founded, and that the idea of the creation of the world has nothing, in common with that of the creation of Brahma. According to the Śatapatha-Brahmana (i. 6. 3/38) :—

“ After Prajapati had created the living beings, his joints were relaxed. Now Prajapati, doubtless, is the year, and his joints are the two junctions of day and night, the full moon and the beginning of seasons.

“ He was unable to rise with his relaxed joints ; and the gods healed him by means of . . . *havis*-offerings, . . . He who, knowing this, enters upon the fast at the very time (of full moon), heals Prajapati's joints at the proper time, and Prajapati favours him.”

The year is thus explained in another passage in the work quoted :—

“ But the year, doubtless, means all ; hence the gods thereby appropriated all that belonged to the Asuras, they deprived their enemies, the Asuras, of all ”
—(*Śatapatha-Br.* i. 7. 2/4 ; *Sacred Books of the East* xii. 198/199.)

The year, then, is a process, the process of healing the relaxed joints of the inner Prajapati, i.e., Dharmic Thought, whereby the Asuras (fiends) are deprived of their principality and power. This unmistakably points to Right Conduct which is destructive of the forces of *karma*, and the liberator of the soul. The conception of a creator in Hinduism can only be a further coarsening of the unauthorized vulgar view of their mythology ; for we still have the Bhagavadgita teaching :—

“न कर्तृत्वं न कर्माणि लोकस्य सृजति प्रभुः ।

न कर्मफलसंयोगे स्वभावस्तु प्रवर्तते ॥

नादृशो कस्यचित्स्वार्थं न त्वैव सुकृतं विभुः ॥

अज्ञानेनावृतं ज्ञाने तेन मुह्यन्ति जन्तवः ।

उद्धरेदात्मनात्मानं नात्मानमवसादयेत् ।

आत्मैव ज्ञातमनो बंधुरात्मैव रिपुरात्मनः ॥

* Of these three, right discernment leads to the observance of *dharma*, resulting in the accrual of virtue and consequently also of prosperity to the soul ; but absolute renunciation, culminating in the cessation of vice as well as virtue, is the cause of *moksha*. Hence is Śiva the general destroyer.

This means that God is neither the creator of the world, nor an actor, nor the bestower of the fruit of action ; all this is caused by the nature of things. He punishes or rewards no one for his good or bad deeds. The truth is enshrouded in ignorance, and therefore are men misled. One should improve oneself by one's own effort ; no one should regard his soul as evil, for the soul is its own friend and foe !

It is interesting to note in this connection that the maintainers of the Egyptian Philosophy also held that " the Supreme Being, the infinitely perfect and happy, was not the creator of the world, nor the alone independent being " (*The Mysteries of Freemasonry* by John Fellows, p. 271). The Biblical account of creation, as given in the book of Genesis, too, was not intended to be taken literally, but, like other Biblical narratives, was only to be taken in a secret sense. With regard to its true esoteric significance Moses Maimonides, a learned Jewish thinker of the twelfth century, who relies upon earlier explanations, says :—

" The restoration of the kingdom of Israel, its stability and permanence, is described as a creation of heaven and earth."—(*The Guide to the Perplexed*, p. 297.)

Israel is itself a symbol of the soul, so that the account of creation is really a secret teaching about the process of the restoration of divinity to the individual soul. It is a creation, or rather re-creation, or reviving of the divine attributes of the ego that are now functionless and unmanifest. Hence it is a creation of immortal things. We can now easily understand why Origen (*Writings of Origen*, vol. II, 218) says :—

" God never made any thing mortal."

All this is certainly relevant to the subject-matter of Religion and fully in harmony with what is said in the ' *Minhat Kenaet* ' (see *Jewish Encyclopaedia*, vol. I, 153) :—

" From creation to revelation all is parable."

The early fathers of the Christian church, too, rejected the literal sense of the narrative—Origen (*Writings*, vol. II, 218 ; *Philocalia*, 16, 61 and 225), Clement (*Writings*, vol. II, 239, 339 and 476) and Hippolytus (vol. I, 399)—holding it to be a secret doctrine which was

not to be disclosed to the profane. The details of the process of creation or rather re-creation and renovation acquire fresh interest in the light of the above remarks, and we shall pause here to look into them somewhat closely.

Starting from the condition of false belief and mental confusion in which the soul is involved prior to the dawn of Right Discrimination, we are told that the earth was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep. This is literally true of every soul that is involved in ignorance and falsehood: it is devoid (void) of goodness and without form (that is definite ideas), hence involved in confusion of thought. In this state the pall of ignorance (darkness) lies thick on the face of the waters of the deep (mind). Then there is the change towards faith, the turning towards Light and Life. Hence, we are told: the Spirit of God, that is, the Light Divine internal, moved on the face of waters! The result is the birth of the Light of Discrimination, that distinguishes between right and wrong beliefs. Night (ignorance) and day (inner illumination) thus come to be established in the new world for the first time.

On the next stage there is the appearance of a firmament in the midst of the waters to "divide the waters from the waters." This is the Dharmic Understanding which fixes up definite landmarks in the midst of chaotic thought, seeking to approach the purity of Spiritual nature (heaven).

The next item is the gathering together of the waters under the heaven, when dry land appears and brings forth grass and herb and the fruit tree. The dry land is the *terra firma* of Right Faith, and its produce (the herb, grass and the fruit tree) such adorable properties as humility, curative virtue, fulfilment or culmination of pious resolutions.

The fourth stage is characterized by the specification of lights. The two greater ones would seem to refer to the faculty of full knowledge to rule the day (the state of spiritual purity) and the human intellect to rule the (state of the) night (of the soul). The stars are the different kinds of intuitions, or intuitive knowledge (clairvoyance and the like), or the numerous sciences and arts that are helpful to an unemancipated soul. According to another method of

interpretation, the sun, moon and stars are technical names for certain nerve currents, *Ida*, *Pingala*, etc. (*The Permanent History of Bharatvarsha*, vol. I, 286)* which are developed by inner contemplation.

The next two stages are characterized by the creation of different kinds of living beings, including man. The animals are the different tendencies of the soul, good and evil (*vide* "The Letter of Aristeas"). This very interpretation, it may be mentioned, is the foundation of the distinction between the clean and the unclean animals concerning which Tertullian wrote :—

"The literal prohibitions about the clean and unclean kinds of foods would be quite contemptible."—(Farrar's *History of Interpretation*, 178.)

This view was fully current amongst the leaders of Esoteric thought in the early Christian church (Ante Nicene Christian Library, vol. IX, 72—74; Origen's *Philocalia*, 131; Clement's Writings, vol. II, 251-252 and 438). St. Barnabas also advocated this interpretation (Farrar's *History of Interpretation*, 169 and *The Epistle of Barnabas*, 18—20). Amongst the Jewish authors who held this view may be mentioned Aristobulus whom Barnabas follows (Farrar's *History of Interpretation*, 169).

The righteous rational soul is man, who is made in the image of God; for God's form is only that of Perfect Man. He (man) is made male and female, which terms are explained by Moses Maimonides to mean form (male) and substance (female), in the *Guide to the Perplexed* (see page 207). Man is thus made in the image of God, both in substance and in form!

The work of creation is now finished; man himself has now got to subdue the earth (spirit substance) and bring it under subjection :—

"Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth."—(Genesis i. 28.)

The sixth day therefore sees the termination of the work; and the seventh is the Sabbath (attainment to Godhood) for rest and peace!

We shall now revert to the Hindu Trinity to study the character of its third member a little more closely than we have done thus far.

* The quotation will be given in a footnote in Chapter XI.

Śiva is the third member of this Trinity, and is represented as a *yogi* with matted hair, and with serpents entwined round his person. He takes swallow-wort and other intoxicating and poisonous things, and wears a garland of skulls. His consort is Parvati, the daughter of Himalayas, who also assumes various other forms, such as Durga, Kali, and the like. His most popular name is Bholaⁿath; he is easily pleased, and grants boons to his worshippers readily, and, at times, even foolishly.

Now, Śiva represents will inclined and dedicated to *Vairāgya* (renunciation), which, as such, is free from formal sophistry. On account of his freedom from worldly wisdom, he is called the Simple-minded—the Un-worldly, or Unsophisticated—and because he knows no trickery, he is the Bhola (innocent, guileless) Nath (Lord).

The intoxication of Śiva is due to Self-realization which is the emotion of pure Self-feeling. It is this emotion of Self-feeling that constitutes the mystic's joy, which no wine can produce, and for which those who have experienced it renounce the world and become Self-centred. This comes only from Self-contemplation, *i.e.*, the *śamādhi* of Yoga, in which Will, finding itself free from the thralldom of desire, feels its own inherent Joy. We feel truly free in this state of extreme Self-centredness in the course of whose attainment the energy of life, which was being dissipated all round, is wound up, as it were, into an indivisible impulse of feeling. The ancients described this elevated state of feeling by the mystic symbolism of a rod, with a knob at its top, and a serpent entwined round it, the knob representing the point into which the Self has withdrawn itself, the rod standing for discipline, and the serpent for the force of *Kundalini*, the all-conquering energy of Life, which now lies coiled up and functionless behind powerful muscular contractions in the spine. Somewhat similar is the sign of the caduceus of Mercury which contains a lot of hidden significance. Its figure represents the human trunk and the nervous centres, seven in number, the "book" which is sealed with seven seals, and written inside and at the back. The two interlacing serpents represent the *Idā* and the *Pīṅgala nādis* (nerves), and the

* Revelations v. 1.

central tube is the symbol of the *Susūmā* (the hollow canal in the spinal column). The triangle formed at the lower end is the nervous plexus *Mulādhāra*, while the knob, or the head, at the top, is the *Sahasrāra*, the plexus of the brain. The *mulādhāra* is the abode of the spiritual energy known as *Kundalīnī* (literally, the serpent power), which is roused into activity in the course of advancement on the path of Yoga. The plexus *mulādhāra* is also the seat of three spiritual currents, collectively called *Tribenī*, that is, the confluence of the three streams, the Ganges (*Ida*, whose colour is that of the sun), the Jumna (*Pingalā*, which is of the colour of the moon), and the Saraswati (Spirituality, which becomes visible only in the heaven, i.e., the plexus of the heart). Now, in order that the individual should derive any real benefit from the confluence of these potent forces, they must touch his whole being from the *mulādhāra* to the plexus in the head; but in order to do so, the Spiritual current must pass upwards through the hollow tube of the *Susūmā*, energizing all the nervous plexi on the way, thus enlivening him from within. When the current reaches the brain, the individual becomes perfect like Śiva. Man can achieve this much coveted consummation by mentally bathing at this internal confluence daily, if possible constantly. The supposed *Tribenī* at Allahabad, in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, is an ingenious symbolism for this confluence of the three spiritual currents, though its esoteric import being unknown to the generality of men, it is now resorted to by all classes of Hindus as a place of pilgrimage.*

The garland of skulls worn by Śiva is intended to suggest the destructive element in pure Self-contemplation, since all kinds of good and evil tendencies have to be destroyed for spiritual emancipation. It is worthy of note that virtue is as much a cause of bondage as vice, though the fruit of the former is pleasant and that of the latter bitter, and, at times, very painful.

* For the secret import of the names of the other sacred places of the Hindus and for a proper appreciation of Hindu Mythology in general the reader is referred to the comprehensive work, '*The Permanent History of Bharatavarsha*,' by K. Narayana Iyer, B.A.

The constant consort of the god is Parvati, who is the daughter of Himalayas. But it would be foolish to take the Himalayas as a mountain; the goddess represents that much-desired state of the soul which arises from steady, immutable *dhyāna* (concentration of mind).

According to the Permanent History of Bharatvarsha, Parvati stands for *buddhi* (intellect) which, in association with Śiva, who represents *śairūgya*, probably only means joyous intelligence.

We may now explain the mythological significance of Sarasvati, the goddess of Wisdom. She is noted for her love of music and carries a *vinā* (a kind of banjo) in her hand. Her word is inviolable; she rides on a *hamsa* (swan), and is the daughter of God. These are her chief characteristics. It would seem that the primary conception is that of *Jina-bāni*, the voice of God, from *Jina*, the Conqueror of *samsāra*, hence, God, and *bāni* voice. As such, she represents revelation, for which reason her word is absolutely inviolable. She is the daughter of God, because she directly springs from a Tirthamkara (God). The *hamsa* on which she rides is a symbol for breath, because *ham* and *sa* (*ham+sa=hamsa*) are the sounds actually heard in deep inhalation and exhalation, respectively.

The Hindu conception of Sarasvati is also that of ultimate knowledge. In a passage in the *Sarasvatīrahasyopaniṣad*, quoted by Mr. K. Narayana Iyer,* she is thus invoked :—

“May the goddess Sarasvati whose form is the very essence of Vedānta, protect me. She is the Śakti [=energy] of Brahman that is dealt with in the Vedas and Vedāngas as the only one. She directs the three Lokas internally by her involutionary work. She is the guiding principle in Rudra, Aditya, etc., and she is enjoyed by those who turn their eyes inwards in their involutionary process of work. She is the expanding knowledge divided into eight parts. She is Nirvikalpa and the form of Brahman, meditating on whom Yogis deliver themselves from bondage. May the pure and white Sarasvati residing in the face of Brahma take rest in my heart.”

“The goddess Sarasvati,” adds Mr. K. Narayana Iyer, “is here described as the ultimate knowledge and form of Brahman and particularly explained as enjoyed by those who turn their eyes inwards back to the Brahman.”

* The Permanent History of Bharatvarsha, vol. I, p. 415.

Sarasvati must, however, be distinguished from Ganeśa, who is also the God of Wisdom. He is a child, and has the trunk of an elephant with only one tusk, in place of the natural head of which he was deprived soon after his birth. His mount is a rat, and he eats sweets. The youngest of gods, he nevertheless insists on being the first to be invited, and gets angry and causes a lot of mischief if neglected, at the commencement of an undertaking. In regard to his bodily build he is ill-knit and awkward as if disjointed.

In interpreting this personification, we must begin with the mount—the rat—which is noted for the excellent use it makes of its teeth. Now, the only mental faculty which can be represented by an animal notorious all over the world for its cutting propensities is analysis, which enables us to ascertain the composition of things. The awkward, ill-knit body of Ganeśa with an elephant's trunk, on the other hand, is suggestive of synthesis, which being more useful than analysis, has precedence over it. Hence, the rat is described as the mount of the god.

The solitary tusk has reference to the true monistic view that the real God for every individual is only one, namely, his own Soul, to associate another with whom is the deadliest of sins. Obviously, two tusks would have been compatible with dualism* alone. Ganeśa is represented as a child, because the soul that has been wandering in transmigration throughout the past infinity of time acquires Wisdom Divine only when it is about to enter *nirvana*. He eats sweets, because *ananda* (happiness) is the fruit of Wisdom. His insistence on being invited before other gods, and the trouble arising from his being neglected, only go to emphasize the nature of Wisdom.

The reason why the Messiah is described as the son of a carpenter in the Bible is also to be found in allegorical thought. For the carpenter is a good symbol for Wisdom, inasmuch as his work consists only in cutting up (analysis) and piecing together (synthesis).

These instances, in our opinion, suffice to prove that the nature of the divinities constituting the different pantheons is very different from what it is generally taken to be. The key that unlocks the

* The idea is traceable in the impersonation of Odin of the Teutonic mythology, who sacrificed one of his eyes 'so that he might be dowered with greater wisdom.'

door leading to the adytum is that of KNOWLEDGE DIVINE as is fully evident from the unravelment of the personifications actually accomplished thus far. The same line of investigation, if pursued, will, it is believed, reveal the secrets of most other myths and mythologies ; for they would all seem to be centred round the attributes, properties and nature of the soul. Every country in the past, it would seem, vied with every other country in regard to the composition of myths and legends, and composed the most fascinating and at the same time deceptive allegories and tales. All sorts of devices were employed to give expression to human thought bent on disguising its real purport under poetic masks. The Indians would seem to have been the pioneers in the field, and the large number of the Hindu gods testifies to the mania for poetic personification which characterized the Hindu mind in the past. Unfortunately its followers have ceased to take interest in the truths embodied in their mythology, and what was intended only for imparting the highest knowledge is now looked upon, by one section of the Hindu community, on account of their excessive conceit, as a collection of silly, childish tales, and is regarded by another engrossed in deep ignorance as the sole object of religious worship. If the truth is to be told, it was never intended that any worship beyond meditation on the different aspects of Life, which manifests itself in all the 330,000,000 forms spoken of in the Puranas was to be performed. The Vedas could not very well teach "That thou art," and yet enjoin the worship of mythological deities at the same time. It is the meditation on the nature of Life which is worship in the true sense of the word ; begging for favours from another can never be the means of salvation. Far from thinning the delusion, begging only goes to deepen it. The same is the case with all other rituals and ceremonies, whether they be performed for the special benefit of the souls of the departed, or for those of the living. They all tend to give prominence to the lower personality, and prevent us from grasping the sense of the *mahāvākyas* (great sayings, or truisms), such as " I am Brahman."

So far as the forms of these spiritual conceptions, Brahma and others, are concerned, they have been conceived with the greatest precision in the different mythologies ; but as they personify powers

and faculties of an exceedingly complex nature, it is not always easy to comprehend them fully. These mythological deities, however, are not to be confounded with actual beings, Indras, demons, and the like, who are living beings like ourselves. There is absolutely no reason why the *bhuta*, the *preta*, the goblin, the elf and the like, should not exist at all. They have been seen by men in all countries and in all times. They are not disembodied spirits, but possess bodies made of the same material as ourselves, although of a finer quality. The remark made by us in connection with the worship of Brahma and other mythological gods, applies with even greater force to demonology and the worship of angels and ghosts and the powers of darkness generally : it only goes to strengthen delusion. On this point we need only give the emphatic declaration of Vedānta, in the language of S. Abhedananda, who says (*Spiritualism and Vedānta*, p. 17) :—

“No amount of good thoughts and good deeds can produce as their effect that which is beyond thought and mind, and consequently beyond the reach of their efforts, because divine realization is not within the realm of psychic phenomena, nor can it be reached by mind, intellect or sense powers. And the path which leads the individual soul to the realization of the Absolute is neither through religious works, nor through the belief in departed spirits, nor by the worship of the spirits of the ancestors, but through self-knowledge and the knowledge of the relation which the individual soul bears to the Universal Spirit. That path is called in Vedānta ‘Devayana,’ the divine path, or the path which leads to divinity. The travellers on this path are those who are the most sincere and earnest seekers after the Absolute, who do not care for phenomena, whether physical or psychic, whose souls soar high above the clouds of desires that cover the light of the spiritual sun in the ordinary mortals ; but whose highest aim, loftiest aspiration, and deepest longing of the soul are to realize that unchangeable Truth which is beyond mind, beyond intellect, which the Father in Heaven of the spiritualists cannot reach.”

We shall now conclude this chapter : but, before inviting the reader to accompany us to the next one, wherein we give the views of what, to our thinking, is the only true philosophy of religion, it will not be quite amiss to cast a cursory glance at the result of our enquiry thus far. We have seen how the natural but mostly fear-smothered craving of every soul is to attain to that degree of happiness which knows nothing of imperfection or desire ; and we

have also seen how that state of happiness is not only possible to be attained, but also not far to seek. Step by step, have we been led to consider two of the most important religions in the world, that is, Christianity and Vedanta, and by the comparative study of their doctrines have been enabled to draw certain highly important conclusions as to the nature of the *samsara* and the God which we have aspired to become. But we have not yet found a true definition of God or *nirvana*, or even of the nature and causes of the soul's bondage, anywhere in either of the two creeds we have so thoroughly examined, not destructively, but constructively. Vedanta even considers it beneath its dignity to give a thought to the individual, and ascribes its very idea to illusion, pure and simple, while Christianity is altogether silent on the point. It is true that there is a close resemblance between the scenes in dreams and the waking world but simply because of this resemblance philosophy cannot jump to the conclusion that the universe must actually be the dream of a super-human dreamer. There is a very important difference between the dream and the world of our waking consciousness, and it lies in the fact that, while the dreamer whose subconscious mental activity is the cause of the dream was at one time a conscious being in the world of men, prior to his lapsing into the state of dreaming, and would wake up again into that world of waking consciousness, the dreamer of the universe has not been shown to be a being who was ever awake, or who would ever wake up from his eternal, beginningless and apparently unending sleep. The difference is not one of mere words, but of vital import to the soul which aspires to become "That." Are we drifting towards the state which Lord Byron describes as a

"Strange state of being ! (for 'tis still to be)
Senseless to feel, and with seal'd Eyes to see." —?

The "Perchance to dream!" of Hamlet is a silent commentary on the *summum bonum*, if dreaming be the be-all and end-all of religion. To be a dreamer—an eternal, never-waking dreamer—is more than any one cares to become. Have we, then, misunderstood Vedanta? Perhaps we have. But we have endeavoured to follow and work out its conclusions from its own point of view as far as it was possible to do so. The idea of Brahman as the Enjoyer of Bliss is magnificent,

but there also remains the other aspect, namely, that of a dreamer, to be considered, so that the query—'who am I?'—of the soul can hardly be said to find an answer in the sublime formula, 'That thou art,' since it also wants to know, 'What is the "That," the Enjoyer, or Dreamer, or both?' This last idea, i.e., the rolling of the Enjoyer and the Dreamer into one, is the most unsatisfactory of all, since no one can combine two incompatibilities in himself at one and the same time.

Christianity, when we turn to seek an answer from it, fares even worse, since it has nothing of its own, and itself stands in need of a foreign light to be deciphered into intelligible thought.

The diverse metaphysical theories also that have been examined by us thus far are found inadequate to explain the nature of the world process and incapable of leading to the realization of the aim in view—Happiness.

Mythology and mysticism might, no doubt, possess the truth but it seems safer to keep them at a respectable distance than to run the risk of being lost in their labyrinthine mazes.

We thus see that it is only an inkling of the truth that we have been able to get thus far, and that if we wish to satisfy our understanding on all those important problems which constitute true *jñāna*—and *jñāna* is the pre-requisite of *moksha*—we must turn to some other source able to satisfy the enquiring soul.

The foregoing treatment of the subject in hand and the explanation of the various mythological doctrines of different religions, from the standpoint of philosophy and metaphysics, have, it is to be hoped, prepared the ground for the reception of the doctrines of Truth which will be dealt with in the next and the succeeding chapters.

CHAPTER X

THE SIDDHANTA*

A number of blind persons, once upon a time, went out to 'see' an elephant which had come to their village. They were all taken to it, and allowed to touch it with their hands, one touching its trunk, another its ear, a third its leg, and so forth. After the departure of the animal, they all began to talk of their knowledge concerning its form. Each described it according to his own personal observation; but it was soon found that their descriptions did not tally. Upon this, a quarrel arose as to who was the truthful witness among them, and from words they speedily came to blows. At this juncture, there appeared on the scene a man who was not blind like them, and who had actually seen an elephant; and he was with great difficulty able to reconcile them by explaining to them that what each one of them had felt with his hand was not the whole animal, but only a part of its body. — *The parable of the blindmen and the elephant.*

Moral: — 'Men of this world are like the blindmen of the parable; they insist on their partial knowledge being accepted for the whole truth.'

The causes of misunderstanding in religion can be classified under two distinct heads, namely, those which arise from partial knowledge, which men try to pass off for exact truth, and those that are due to a failure to understand the teaching embodied in myths and legends. Of these the latter is the most fruitful source of trouble.

It is not to be supposed that mythology is a science to be encouraged. Its value is apparent from the fact that during the last two thousand years, at least, it has only led to wrangling, disputes and bloodshed among men, and has created greater differences among them than all other things put together. This is quite a natural result of the spirit of mysticism which mythology directly fosters, since it gives rise to ignorance, which never fails to give birth to the unholy twins, bigotry and fanaticism.

* Established Truth, the last word, or final conclusion.

Stories and myths, no doubt, are very fascinating, and do not entail much hard mental work, but we ought not to underrate the difficulties which they create for men. No one will seriously deny that they throw a veil of obscurity over the ideal, which it is the aim of philosophy to set free from the nebulousness of indistinct, chaotic thought, and of religion to bring into realization. Clear thought, not mythology, is needed for salvation.

Some people imagine that real charm lies in the mystic unintelligibility of thought. But they cannot be said to have any idea of the practical value of religion. How can that which is not understood by any one be a means of liberation by any possibility? Suppose a scientific work contained formulas which were beyond the comprehension of men, could anyone urge their unintelligibility as an argument in favour of its merit? It is no answer to say that those formulas would disclose important secrets of nature when understood, since cash-value depends on practical good, not on theoretical speculation as to the charm of unintelligibility. Would a pauper who claimed credit on the ground that he owned and possessed untold wealth, but was only ignorant of its whereabouts, derive any benefit from his millions? The same is the case with mythology, which, as stated above, has given rise to the worst forms of ill-feeling amongst men.


As regards the first kind of the causes of misunderstanding, it is sufficient to point out that none of the religions that we have examined hitherto is characterised by perfection. Vedanta, for instance, leaves us with Brahman and Maya, and gives little or no help in constructing a world of matter and force with their aid. Of Time, Space and Causality it has no explanation to offer. Nor are we given an insight into the mechanism of Maya, which is supposed to be responsible for the world-process in some mysterious way.

The final causes of the world must, then, be sought for and described in terms which make further thought possible. The theory that the universe is a bundle of names and forms is very useful in so far as it goes, and we hope we have accorded it the fullest latitude which it is entitled to; but the problem of the nature of the material and the operative cause or causes, which stamp on it the variety of names and forms, still remains to be solved.

Bearing in mind the fact that the world-process is eternal, and that concrete things must have some sort of material basis for their being, we may lay down that the existing material of the universe consists of two different kinds of substances, the living, *i.e.*, self-conscious, and the *jara*, that is, unconscious, or *Jiva* and *Ajiva*, as they are called in the philosophy of Jainism.

We must also make due allowance for their interplay. This necessitates a common ground for action, as well as the determination of the accompanying causes which bring about and render that interplay possible. We thus get Space, Time, the continuous ether, *i.e.*, the medium of motion, and another kind of ether as the medium of rest. Of these, Time is the principle of continuity and is recognized as a separate substance in the Jaina philosophy.

The medium of motion and that of rest are called *Dharma* and *Adharma* respectively; and matter is known as *Pudgala*. These are all the substances necessary for the world-process which may be enumerated in the following tabulated form:



Jainism posits these six substances as eternal,* and claims that no world-process is possible without them. Even when portions of the universe are destroyed, these realities do not disappear

* It is impossible to accept the theologian's dictum that everything that exists must have a maker, so that nothing can be self-subsisting. For if that were so, that maker would himself stand in need of a maker of his being, and that one, of still another, and so forth. But this is too absurd to be acceptable to theology itself, according to which there is a self-subsisting maker who is the author of everything else. Here also theology has no leg to stand upon, for if it is possible for one being or thing to be self-subsisting and eternal, it is also possible for more things and beings to be uncreate. Hence, the real issue again is what is more rational, whether the notion that a god made the substances of nature, or whether they are self-subsisting and eternal? And as to this the answer can be only one, namely, that which has been given in these pages.

or become merged in one another ; for there can be no such thing as an absolute *pralaya*. Even Vivekananda maintains (*Jñāna Yoga*, Part II. p. 26) :—

“ I should rather follow the . . . opinion that this quieting down is not simultaneous over the whole universe, but that in different parts different things are going on.”

It is not to be supposed that the word ‘ substance ’ used in reference to the six realities of Jainism, means only physical substances, such as stones. Matter is naturally included in these six realities, but the remaining five are very different in their nature and bear no resemblance to it. The best way to understand their nature is to consider them as different kinds of forces, since they all perform certain functions.

These six realities are thus defined in the Uttaradhyayana Sutra (*Sacred Books of the East*, vol. XLV. pp. 153-4) :—

“ Dharma, Adharma, space, time, matter, and souls are the six kinds of substances ; they make up this world. Dharma, Adharma, and space are each one substance only ; but time, matter and souls are an infinite number of substances. The characteristic of Dharma is motion, that of Adharma immobility, and that of space, which contains all other substances, is to make room for everything. The characteristic of time is duration, that of soul, the realisation of knowledge, faith, happiness, and misery. The characteristic of matter is sound, darkness, lustre, light, shade, sunshine, colour, taste, smell and touch. Substance is the substrata of qualities ; the qualities are inherent in one substance ; but the characteristic of developments is that they inhere in either (*viz.*, substances or qualities). The characteristic of development is singleness, separateness, number, form, conjunction and disjunction.”

It will be interesting at this stage to compare the six substances of the Jaina *Siddhanta* with the nine realities of the Vaisesikas. As pointed out on p. 55 *ante*, these nine realities comprise

- (i) the ultimate units of odour
- (ii) do. do. of flavour
- (iii) do. do. of luminescence
- (iv) do. do. of temperature
- (v) *ākāśa*, i.e., a kind of ether
- (vi) *kāla*
- (vii) *dik*
- (viii) *manas* and
- (ix) souls.

These are the nine realities in the system of Kanada : but only a glance is needed to show that the enumeration is purely arbitrary and devoid of scientific or philosophical merit. The first four classes, the ultimate units of odour, flavour, luminosity and temperature, do not represent four different things or substances, but only the four common attributes of one and the same substance, namely, matter. For there is no warrant for holding that temperature can be altogether eliminated from flavour, flavour from odour, odour from colour and so forth. The fact is that matter is endowed with the properties of touch, taste, smell and colour, though of the five senses, each responds to only one of these properties. For instance, we cannot perceive colour with the nose, odour with the eye and so on. It is true that water is not perceived with the nose, fire with the nose and tongue, or air with the nose, tongue and eye ; but it is also true that earth is known by all the senses excepting the ear, water by three (touch, taste and sight), fire by two (sight and temperature), and air by one (temperature) alone. We cannot, therefore, hold that earth is only endowed with odour, water with flavour, fire with colour, and air with temperature. Modern science has fully demonstrated the transmutability of elements, but no laboratory experiments are required to show that solid matter (*e.g.*, wood) is convertible into fire, or that water is but another form of vapour, a kind of gaseous matter. The so-called elements are the different forms of the one and the same substance, matter, called *pudgala* in the *Jaina Siddhanta*, because of the liability of its particles to become fused (from *galana*, to melt) among themselves as well as with souls. Owing to such fusion, different combinations arise in which certain qualities predominate, while certain others are more or less suppressed.

It is thus evident that the *Vaiśeṣikas* have no true conception of matter, which they unwarrantably split up under four different heads, as noted.

The *Vaiśeṣika* conception of ether as the source of sound is also unscientific, inasmuch as sound arises from the agitation of material bodies as may be fully demonstrated by experiment. Any elementary work on physics will furnish conclusive proof of this statement. Even apart from scientific experiments, the phenomenon of echo

suffices to demolish all such theories ; for an echo arises from the reflection of a sound-wave when its path is obstructed by some material body ; but ether cannot be obstructed by matter, being a finer and subtler element than matter.

The argument that because atoms of matter can be conceived as absolutely silent therefore sound must be the property of Ether, is unscientific, since Ether can also be conceived that way, and since no argument which ignores matters of observation and daily experience can be regarded as good. The fact is that having laid down four ultimate elements to correspond to four of the five senses, Kanada found his imagination exercised to find a correspondence for the sense of hearing, and, in his perplexity, immediately hit upon Ether as the source of sound.

The Vaisesikas have no idea of Ether as a medium of motion without which things cannot move about in space ; but their fifth category is a fanciful stuff conceived to be essential as the source of sound, as already noticed, and as an element necessary to impart magnitude to the ultimate units of matter or atoms. Their conceptions of Time and Space are also involved and unintelligible.

They regard time as only the principle of change, which, as such, cannot be held to be a reality or substance ; and space is said to be the " Reality, Power or Force, holding things in their relative positions even while they are being driven on " (*The Hindu Realism*, p. 29). We shall have more to say about the nature of Time and Space later on ; meanwhile it is clear that no true element of reality or ultimate substance is to be found in the description given.

The eighth reality of the system of Kanada is *manas*, the cause of succession in sensation and thought. It is, however, acknowledged by learned Hindus themselves that it is not a reality by itself but only a material organ, the instrument of experience (*Hindu Realism*, p. 93). Its classification under a separate head, as a reality, is illogical, under the circumstances.

All this suffices to show that the Vaisesika system is neither scientific nor logical in its analysis.

We may now turn to the school of the Sankhyan metaphysics, which posits only two permanent realities, the *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*

and which accounts for the world-process by alternate enfolding and unfolding of attributes and functions.

The insufficiency of the Sankhyan thought has been commented upon by more writers than one, and even Hindu commentators have not always been able to suppress their sense of disappointment, or to withhold blame. The following free comment from a friendly Hindu source on the doctrines of the six worldfamous schools of Hindu metaphysics, including Kapila's, may be read with interest in this connection :—


" He [Vijñāna Bhāṣya, a commentator on Sankhya] was fully aware of the fact that none of the six Darśanas, for example, was, as we have hinted more than once, a complete system of philosophy in the Western sense, but merely a catechism explaining, and giving a reasoned account of some of the truths revealed in the Vedas and Upaniṣads, to a particular class of students, confining the scope of its enquiry within the province of creation, without attempting to solve to them the transcendental riddles of the Universe, which, in their particular stage of mental and spiritual development, it would have been impossible for them to grasp."—*The Sacred Books of the Hindus*, vol. IX. Preface, p. xii.

The excuse found by Mr. Nandlal Sinha for the shortcomings of the founders of the six *darśanas*, including the Sankhya, in the passage cited, is rather lame and inadmissible, especially in the absence of anything showing perfection of knowledge in the authors concerned; but as it will be conducive to a better understanding of the causes of its failure to pursue the line of thought on which the doctrine under consideration is founded, we must endeavour to catch its author's mind actually at work in devising his system.

It will be seen that Kapila is not a believer in miracles, and does not recognize a creator who might create the world by a word of command. He discards monism for this reason. His system is a kind of dualism, consisting of a spectacle and its spectator, an unconscious show perceived by a conscious being or beings. To the spectacle belongs all that is changing, variable and shifting,—all that evolves and all that 'involves.' To the spectator is to be attributed nothing that is shifting and moving. He is a witness, and only a witness, though liable to be overpowered by ignorance. Even the intellect which disappears in deep-sleep cannot be said to appertain to the spectator for this reason.

Starting from this duality of the seer and the seen, Kapila conceives the world to be characterised by an alternation of manifestation and non-manifestation or dissolution, on the analogy of the alternation of waking and sleeping consciousness.

In the condition of dissolution the spectacle is reduced to a balanced state of the three attributes, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* (see p. 15 *ante*). Then there sets in a counter-movement: with the disturbance of the equilibrium, the process of manifestation begins, resulting in successive transformations of the evolvent, i.e., *prakṛti* (the balanced condition of the attributes), which accounts for the evolution of the spectacle as well as for the organs of sensation. But the most important part of this scheme of evolution, as it might be called, is the order of unfoldment of the *tanūas* (essentials or elements) which constitute the bulwark of the Sankhyan philosophy, and which may be arranged in the following way in a tabulated form:—



It is this order which is also interesting for us, since it proves that the system is based on nothing more solid or reliable than a series of imagined analogies between a somewhat distorted idea of the manner in which concrete nature bursts on an awakening consciousness and the world-process.

In a general way it will be seen that the following transformations occur before a sleeping consciousness may be said to have perception of the world on waking up:

- (1) the manifestation of the intellect ;
- (2) the dawning of the notion of individuality, the idea of " I, " in the intellect ;
- (3) the awakening of the faculties and functions of the ego, that is, of the *manas* and the organs of action and sensation ;
- (4) the stimulation of the senses, i.e., sensation, and
- (5) the formation of the percept, i.e., the perception of the world.

If the reader will bear in mind the notion entertained by certain Hindu Idealists that the sensible world is only held in the mind of its percipient and has no existence apart from it, he will have no difficulty in comprehending the position of Kapila, whose doctrine we shall now compare, side by side, with the manner in which an awakening consciousness becomes cognizant of the world of phenomena.

Human consciousness.

(1) Alternation of waking and sleeping.

(2) In deep-sleep the ego is not destroyed, but the spectacle is not perceived.

(3) In awakening the intellect is roused first of all.

(4) From intellect arises the thought of " I, " i.e., *ahamkāra* (egoity or individuality).

(5) From egoity flow the functions of certain organs or constituents of individuality, attention (*manas*), the senses and motor faculties.

(6) The " I " being awakened sensations, which signify affections of the ego, are perceived.

(7) The data of sensations are then projected and constitute the perceptible world.

The world-process.

(1) Alternation of creation and destruction.

(2) In world-destruction (*pralaya*) the perceiver (*puruṣa*) is not destroyed but nature is not perceived.

(3) In the world-process, *mahat* (Intellect) is produced first.

(4) *Mahat* is then transformed into *ahamkāra* (the 'author' of *aham* or "I-ness").

(5) From *ahamkāra* the *manas*, the five senses, and the fivefold functions of the five organs of action, the hands, feet, and the like, are formed.

(6) The *ahamkāra* is transformed into (1) smell, (2) flavour, (3) form, (4) touch, and (5) sound, i.e., the five kinds of sensations.

(7) The data of sensations, i.e., the subtle elements (*tanmātrās*) of smell, and the like, are transformed into the five gross elements, ether, air, fire, water and earth, of which the perceptible, that is to say, the phenomenal world is composed.

No need to go into further details; the whole doctrine is based on certain crude notions about what takes place in the mind when consciousness awakens from sleep. It is certain that Kapila's inspiration consisted solely and simply in an imaginary analogy which he sought to establish between nature and the human consciousness, and which he simply assumed to avoid further trouble. Kapila's system, however, marks an advance on the rigid Idealism of Advaitism, which denies reality to all except consciousness. Kapila in effect agrees with Advaitism as to the unreality of the objects of the senses, holding that their existence consists in their being perceived, that is, in the states of the perceiving mind; but he maintains that the changes of states themselves require the presence of an independent cause which must be co-existent with consciousness. To this cause, conceived as the source or substratum of change, is transferred all that is changing in consciousness. Having found a basis for the states of individual consciousness, Kapila devoted himself to develop perception in it, which he finally achieved by transforming the data of sensations into sensible qualities of which objects are composed. It will be now evident that Kapila knows nothing of an outside world, apart from the projections of his own mind, *i.e.*, the transformations of his sensations; for the sensations—flavour and the like—are described as transformations of the *ahamkāra*, and conceived to consist of subtle elements which are transformed into the grosser material of concrete things. Unfortunately for this line of thought, it never seems to have occurred to Kapila that a sensation does not originate entirely in the mind and that it consists in the prevailing psychic state *plus* the 'effect' produced by the excitation from without. If he had noticed this important feature of a sensation, he would not have described the gross elements, fire, water and the like, as transformations of the subtle *tanmātrās* of sensations in a hurry.

The correspondence between particular sensations and gross elements is equally irrational. It is said :

“The *tanmātrā* of sound, possessing the attribute of sound, is produced from *ahamkāra*; then from the *tanmātrā*s of sound, accompanied by *ahamkāra*, is produced the *tanmātrā* of touch possessing the attributes of Sound and Touch.

In a similar manner, the other *tan-mātrās* are produced, in the order of their mention by the addition of one more attribute at each successive stage. "(Preface to vol. IX of the *Sacred Books of the Hindus*, p. viii.)

That being so, sound is the first and smell the last evolute among the sensations. But this is not borne out by observation which shows that 'sound' is not enjoyed by all living beings in the animal kingdom. If sound were a necessary ingredient in the composition of the remaining sensations, then those animals which are not endowed with the sense of hearing should be devoid of the senses altogether; but this is not the case. The same is the case with the mind, the central organ of action and sensation; for it is not possessed by all living beings, being absent in all cases of life below the five-sensed organisms and in some cases even among them. It is needless to criticise the Sankhyan view any further; for, as its very inception shows, it is a substitution of surmise and speculation for science and scientific thought.

According to certain Hindu metaphysicians, Brahman's awareness of itself is the cause of the world-process. To understand the exact significance of the idea underlying this statement, we must take imagination separately from the ideas. As such, it is conceived as pure consciousness, aware of itself. Hence, assuming a starting point for the world-process, Brahman has to be pictured in the beginning as a being aware of his existence, or as thinking or saying 'I am' to himself. This impression, or thought, implies at once the ideas of unity and being (existence), and, by the force of deduction, which is inseparable from the understanding, further involves the denial of not-one, that is, 'manyness,' as opposed to unity, and of not-being (non-existence) as opposed to being (existence). Thus, the sense of 'I am' is 'I am one, not many,' and 'I am not non-existent.' But in this ideation of I-am-ness is involved the whole mischief; for no sooner does the idea come than the understanding becomes conscious of the many non-existent, and thus the multifarious not-Self is conceived in its womb, as an idea, or illusion, albeit only to be contradicted. The thought now becomes 'I am, not this,' which is equivalent to the Sanskrit '*aham etat na*' (I this not). The 'this' of 'I this not' refers to the totality of the illusory existences, that is, the entire universe of illusion.

A succession of alternate quiescence and activity is naturally to be ascribed to consciousness, that is to say, to conscious ideation. Hence when Consciousness awoke from the sleep of quiescence and the thought of being arose in it, the balanced state of rhythm into which energy had subsided and merged, during the *pralaya*, broke out into vibrations, and life began to manifest itself all round. Simultaneously with the 'birth' of the living energy, came the thought of 'I' which can be understood only after a negation of its antithesis, the 'not-I.' Now, because you cannot deny a thing without, in some way, giving it a local habitation and a name, however suppositional, or imaginary, the act of doing so might be, imagination had to create the not-I, to enable the understanding to grasp the significance of 'I.' In this manner was the diversity of illusory forms created in the totality of the not-self.

When consciousness becomes merged or lost, so to speak, in the rhythm of Self-awareness, it loses the consciousness of the "not-I," and a state resembling the trance of ecstasy, or sleep, ensues in which the Self knows nothing, that is to say, that in that condition it positively knows what is meant by Nothing, i.e., the Not-Self as a whole, without the distinction of name and form; for the potency and necessity of the Being of the Self maintains constantly, in one unbroken act, or fact, of Consciousness, this Nothing; a pure Not-Self, before that Self (*The Science of Peace*, p. 110).

This constant making and destroying of the worlds is called the *lila*, i.e., sport of Brahman; however, he does not indulge in it for the sake of play, but because it is his nature to do so. When it is said that he creates the world by the thought, 'I am one, let me become many,' what is really meant is that creation is a matter of necessity with Brahman, which arises out of the thought of his own one-ness in his mind.

With the awakening of the consciousness of 'I am' or Self, the Understanding, spider-like, spins out its world-web, producing the material and all from within itself. With the creation of the 'This,' the antithesis of 'I,' the Will rushes, as it were, towards the imaginary multitudinous 'This,' and the Understanding, fixing itself upon the two, pronounces the dictum 'I (am) This not.'

The view presented is not unlike that of a cinematographical show, and would reduce the world to a pure mental phenomenon, existing only in thought, or as thought-forms of the Understanding. We cannot, however, suppose that there is any real resemblance between the concrete world and cinematographical films. The most important difference between the living world and the moving images on the screen lies in respect of self-consciousness. In the cinematographical show the spectators form no part of the spectacle ; but in the world the spectacle is only constituted by the spectators. In concrete nature, again, both living beings and lifeless things are composed of certain kinds of 'material,' but the cinematographical view altogether loses sight of this fact. The human will, too, cannot be ignored, as a conditioner of things, within certain limits, in nature ; but there is no room whatsoever for the exercise of volition in the shadows that dance on the screen ! No doubt, the outer world is presented to the gaze in the form of pictures from moment to moment ; but the pictures are not kept stored in the drawers of a conscious or semi-conscious apparatus. There are, in fact, no rolls or reels of world-films ; but every picture is a living moving panorama that is perpetually transforming itself into a new spectacle, from moment to moment.

For these reasons we must reject the conjecture that would reduce the living moving and concrete nature to a mere puppet show, or transform it into a bundle of ideas or films in the consciousness or understanding of a solitary Mind. The world must be composed of a number of real substances, to be able to perpetuate itself eternally, as it does.

To proceed with our subject, the reduction of the world-process to the six primary or ultimate substances brings the old conflict between Advaita and Dualism once more to the front. Let us see what Jainism has to say on the point, and how it meets the arguments of its adversaries, in its turn.

Notwithstanding that its own doctrine implies a multiplicity of souls, Jainism finds fault, to begin with, with the systems which preach absolute 'Dualism' and maintain that the individuals have nothing in common between them. It points out that, while the

individuals are independent in respect of their individuality, they possess many qualities in common with one another, which goes to indicate that they have a common nature. This seems, at first sight, to lead to the tenet of Vedanta, but when the argument advanced against that system itself is taken into consideration a very different result is reached. The argument proceeds in the following manner :—

“The self cannot create the self. That means that Advaitism cannot explain, without some duality to help, how the all-in-all gave rise to itself, or to the other-than-itself. Again, has the Advaita doctrine any evidence to prove its truth? It may have it, or it may be its own justification. In the former case, the evidence brings in a duality; in the latter, Advaitism is condemned as unproved, as nothing can be its own proof.”*

If Vedanta calls in the aid of *Maya*, Jainism declares it to be out of court, on the ground that that which does not exist has no right to be heard, or introduced. Nor does it allow Vedanta to open its mouth to formulate an argument in reply, since that would be the recognition of the objector whose argument is to be met. Further, as two or more irreconcilable attributes cannot inhere in one substance, and since the attributes of consciousness and life are inconsistent with the nature of *Maya*, which is *jaya*, it follows that there are more substances than one in existence.

Vedanta, on the other hand, might retort that two or more substances possessing any attributes in common cannot be granted. The six substances must possess existence in common, in order to exist. They must, therefore, owe their origin to one and the same source, which alone is the *real* substance that exists.

To this Jainism might again object on the ground that if we grant a single substance of an unchanging nature as pure, qualityless existence, it is inconceivable how attributes and modifications can possibly arise from or in it. In reply to this, Vedanta points out that the attributes and qualities exist for perception alone and inhere in the intellect, not in things or substances. This, however, brings us back only to the point from which we started; because the intellect and the attributes which appertain to or inhere in it must both possess some kind of substantiveness in order to exist; and the

* *An Introduction to Jainism* by N. Rangaḷi.

moment this is conceded, there is no escape from the dictum of the Jaina philosophy and its six realities.

Vedanta now takes refuge behind the nature of *Māyā* which it describes as inconceivable and for ever beyond the reach of the intellect. But this is really tantamount to throwing up the brief, for no one has a right to preach what is inconceivable to him. Now, if the Vedantist maintain that he understands what he is talking about, *Māyā* ceases to be incomprehensible; but if he say that he has not been able to comprehend it, then he is talking of things which he does not understand, and has no right to be heard.

For similar reasons, Jainism is not prepared to accept the doctrine of those who say that consciousness arises from moment to moment. If this were true, it would follow that the mind is formed from successive sensations received from external objects, or is generated from time to time, i.e., in each moment, afresh.

" This is met by pointing out that on this theory, the mind that determines upon killing an animal is not the mind that kills it the next moment; hence this latter commits the act without any motive and responsibility. And, further, the mind that has to suffer the consequences of this sin is neither the mind that planned the act nor the one that executed the plan If knowledge consists of passing sensations without the 'unity of apperception' to connect them, there can be no recognition. " *

We next come to Buddhism, whose philosophy lays all the stress it can on the notion of a perpetual "becoming." This system is also one-sided. Its conception of becoming is magnificent, but in the absence of true being, must ever remain incomplete. Bergson's philosophy, which has stirred modern thought so much, for the most part follows the Buddhistic notion of "becoming." It maintains that the whole universe is a *flux* or system of different activities or processes from whose operation arise all kinds of forms. The latter are also activities, though of a less intense type. These activities are further inconceivable in themselves, for they are processes, and therefore, inaccessible to the intellect. Their nature is only *felt* in intuition, not conceived in thought. The view presented is that of an universe which is the resultant of certain eternal processes—a perpetual becoming, with nothing permanent, fixed or stable about it.

* *An Introduction to Jainism* by N. Rangaji.

As for the merit of the doctrine, it is unquestionably true, in so far as it points out the fact that all material phenomena are constantly undergoing change; but how can a system whose very foundation is beyond the reach of thought ever yield satisfaction to the rational intellect? If the right intuition ^{is} wanting, how is its lack to be made up? Mr. Hugh S. R. Elliot, the author of "Modern Science and the Illusions of Professor Bergson," denies that every one possesses that kind of intuition which enables one to realize the truth of this philosophy; and he is probably not the only one who holds that opinion. The question is, how is he to be met? That the philosophy is true is no answer, since it has to be proved, before assent can be given to its accuracy. This is not the only difficulty with the advocates of the philosophy of Change. How is a universe to be constructed, in Time and Space, from pure becoming? In what way, again, do the different processes differ from one another? Have they no fixed types of their own? What, again, is recollection, and who exercises it, and how? Further, how comes it that the flux happens to have selected a direction which is fraught with pain and misery to the untold millions of individuals who appear on its surface in the course of its unceasing, unending, and apparently aimless journey? What is the goal which it is marching towards?

Such are the difficulties which arise in the path of the philosophers of change, who have nothing else but pure becoming at the root of the world-process. If they will only reflect sufficiently on the nature of the problem, they will not fail to perceive that it is clearly impossible to construct a material world without

* It is, indeed, too bold a claim to attempt to found philosophy on intuition. The fact is that except where it is taken to mean omniscience, or other higher kinds of knowledge, such as pure or super-clairvoyance, the claim to the possession of which can be easily tested, intuition is no argument nor a guarantee against self-deception. In ordinary cases it is merely synonymous with a sense of inner conviction, all the more vague, unreasoning and unreliable because not proceeding from intellectual determination. If such random flashes of native wit could be accepted as furnishing accurate data for human guidance, every lunatic would have a right to fill the chair of philosophy or to rank as a patron of science. There must be a guarantee against self-deception in the declarant, and no guarantee is good enough from a man who is not able to remove the element of vagueness from his own convictions.

positing, in the first instance, certain kinds of constant units, particles or atoms, from whose combination bodies could be made. For a process by itself is nothing—a movement without anything that moves! Becoming and change are equally impossible in the absence of a material substratum, or basis, in which they might inhere. Thus, where there is nothing to proceed or pass from one state to another, there can be no process, becoming or changing there, and the only harvest one can hope to gather from this kind of sowing is a whirlwind of wordy abstractions. The beautiful simile of the flame of a lamp which the Enlightened One, as Buddha was called by his followers, employed to illustrate his philosophy, is only valuable in relation to forms; it is utterly misleading in the department of substance the absence of which would be fatal to the very existence of things. For while it is true that the universe is a changing, shifting panorama like the flame of a lamp, in which luminous particles are being constantly replaced by others of their kind, it is also true that no change whatsoever is ever known to or can possibly occur in respect of the ultimate basis of all changes themselves. As Jainism points out, every substance is characterised by the threefold phenomenon of origination, destruction and continuation at one and the same time. Of these, the first two appertain to form without which no substance can ever be found to exist in nature, and the last is the characteristic of the substantial aspect of things. For instance, in a gold ring there is origination of ringness and destruction of the previous form—bar-ness, lump-ness, and the like—accompanied by the continuation of gold as gold throughout, that is both when existing in the form of a bar, or lump, as well as in that of the ring. We must, therefore, concede that pure becoming, or change, is utterly inadequate and insufficient as a cause of the world-process.

The Jaina view of the nature of reality (substance) is well described by Mr. V. R. Gandhi, who, speaking at a meeting of the East India Association (London), on May the 21st, 1900, observed :—

“Noumenon and phenomenon are not two separate existences, but only two modes of our looking upon the full contents of a thing, part of which is known and part unknown to us now. The fallacy in the popular mind in reference to these terms

is that of confounding logical distinction with an actual separation. In the Buddhist view nothing is permanent. Transitoriness is the only reality. As Professor Oldenberg says: 'The speculation of the Brahmins apprehended being in all being, that of the Buddhists becoming in all apparent being.'

"The Jains, on the contrary, consider being and becoming as two different and complementary ways of our viewing the same thing. Reality in the Jain view is a permanent subject of changing states. To be, to stand in relation, to be active, to act upon other things, to obey law, to be a cause, to be a permanent subject of states, to be the same today as yesterday, to be identical in spite of varying activities, these are the Jain conceptions of reality. Mere becoming is as much an abstraction as mere being. In short, being and becoming are complements of the full notion of a reality."^{*}

This is also the reply which Jainism gives to Vedanta concerning the nature of existence. Pure 'existence' is a logical abstraction, and can exist by itself only in thought. In actual life, existence means to subsist with reference to material, place, time and qualities; but that only means to co-exist with other things.

In this manner does Jainism pull down the structure of different philosophies with its ruthless logic. But has it anything to offer us itself in return for the damage it does to our beliefs? Yes, it has; and that which it offers us is not only free from the faults which it points out in other systems, but is also the only satisfactory explanation of things and facts of experience which rational thought can accept.

Jainism points out that all the above schools of thought have fallen into error on account of their one-sidedness. They only look at things from one particular point of view, and ignore all others. This is not the way to deal with the living Reality, which overflows speculation on all sides. Hence, if any one wishes to get hold of the whole truth, he must first put himself in different attitudes to study things from all possible points of view. This particular method of study, called *anekānta*, is the one which Jainism itself adopts. With its aid it not only points out the element of truth in all other religions, but also rectifies their errors. It gives us a many-sided, and, therefore, the necessarily true, view of things. It says:—

"The idea is not true; also the individual is not true. But they are both true from different points of view. When the speaker lays stress on the one, he is speak-

^{*} See *The Jain Philosophy*, App., pp. 20 and 21.

ing of the many with only an implication. If the many are to the front, the one is not ignored but referred to only as secondary. The truth is neither in the one, nor in the many; but it lies in the *one in the many*, or *the many in the one*. Every individual implies an idea, and every idea presupposes the individuals. Existence as well as knowledge are governed by this relativity. Being possessed of the qualities of existence, all things are one. So again looking at the modifications, or considering the differences due to material, place, time, and quality, it is manifest that everything is different from everything else. Transferring the same idea to modern philosophy, the subject is the origin of all knowledge, because he is the one in the many, and thus he it is that makes the many possible. Exactly the same consideration applies to the objects that give the subject all its *contents*. 'The subject differs from the objects by the rationality, and the objects are different from the subject by their *Satsvaroop*, or the quality of being,'—this is not tenable, since the subject also is characterised by the *Satsvaroop*. The difference would deprive both the knower and the known of their reality. If the knower is without *Satta* the known would be non-existent. If the known is *Asat*, the knower, who is constituted by the known, would also become *Asat*. So in reality or *Satta*, there is no disparity between the subject and the object. The difference is only *kathanchit*, i.e., here, from the standpoint of rationality residing in the one and materiality residing in the many.'*

It is this view which we have been elaborating in the preceding pages, and there can be no doubt but that this is also the view which accounts for the element of incompatibility and discord in different religions. For instance, we can see that the final truth of the Advaita Vedanta is the same as that of the Jaina Siddhanta, notwithstanding that they are opposed to each other in many other things. This is due to the fact that Advaitism confines itself to the point of view of abstraction, totally ignoring all others, while Jainism is comprehensive and all-embracing. They both teach that the Atman and Paramatman are one; both maintain that the essence is only one; but Jainism, more scientific and exact as it is in giving expression to the culminating thought, rightly adds, 'when looked at from the standpoint of abstraction.' The addition of these eight words would make the teaching of Vedanta acceptable to the world at large which at present derides it. For as a concrete thing, spirit is not an unit, but a sum, the infinite. Vedanta would be wrong if it adhered to the popular import of the word 'one'; Dualism would be false if it professed to teach a multiplicity of 'sums.'

* *An Introduction to Jainism* by N. Rongaji.

Applying these observations to the question of the unity or multiplicity of souls, we may say that both Dualism and Advaitism are right from their respective standpoints, but they only express partial truth. Life when conceived as Existence is one; but many when thought of in reference to the individuals through which it manifests itself. A recent work on Jainism puts the case fairly when it says :—

“Here some one might choose to ridicule this theory, by observing that if Atman can become Paramatman, then it means that the Jainas believe, not in one God, but in many. . In answer to this, it must be borne in mind that the Jainas are the followers not of *Aikanta*, but of *Anukanta*. Their belief is not that God is absolutely one or many. According to Jaina principles, from one point of view, God is one; but from another, he is not only many, but infinite. With reference to His Svabhava or Svarupa (Omniscient and Perfect status), He is one, but as regards the Atmans in which that perfect status has been manifested, He is infinite. In reality, Jainism does not worship any particular individuality, but that Perfect, Pure and Good status in which Atman exists as All-knowing, All-seeing, All-powerful, All-happy and Vitraga. In Jainism prominence is given not to individuality, but to the status in which Atman becomes Paramatman, and that status, whatever may be the number of souls individually, is identically the one and the same.”*

Jainism, thus, starts from the reality of the essence as well as the individual, and leads us to the highest heights of truth, without destroying either. From the point of view of the one (abstraction), the many are transitory, hence, in a sense, illusory; but from that of the latter, the one is only seated distributively among them. How would a redeemed Soul feel?—is a question which can be answered by combining the two points of view, since a Saved One would possess perfect knowledge. He would, then, know Himself to be the enjoyer of a status which, as such, is only one and indivisible, but which is all the same enjoyed by all those who have been redeemed. This, then, is the true definition of Brahman or the Absolute, as some people insist on calling It.

The word Brahman is usually employed to indicate existence or consciousness; but reflection shows that existence and consciousness

* See “*An Insight into Jainism*.”

are pure abstractions of thought, like fluidity, manhood, or any other abstract quality. We are in the habit of abstracting away the qualities found in common among a number of individuals or things, forgetting that, apart from thought, they are not capable of existing by themselves. Just as fluidity is inconceivable as existing by itself and independently of a liquid or fluid material, so are not existence and consciousness capable of existing apart from beings, and things. The fact is that qualities can only inhere in substances, and substances are only bundles of qualities. It is not permissible to make a separation between them in thought. Hence, the moment we make a division between *jñāna* (the quality of consciousness) and the *jñāni* (a conscious being, or knower), we deprive the two terms of existence, and render them incapable of entering into relations with each other.

Suppose we start from the proposition that *jñāna* is a separate thing from the *jñāni*. Then either the *jñāni* was ignorant prior to his 'picking up' the quality of *jñāna*, or was a 'knowing being.' But if the latter, *jñāna* adds nothing to his being, and may be ignored. If the former, he was ignorant either by nature, or in consequence of being permeated with the quality of ignorance. If we now say that he was ignorant because of his nature, he can never subsequently become illumined; but if we say that his ignorance was the result of the assimilation of the quality of ignorance, he must be considered to be a *jñāni*, in the first instance.

Moreover, *jñāna*, when separated from the *jñāni*, can only exist either as a knower or as an object of knowledge. But in the former case, its separation from the *jñāni* is imaginary; and in the latter, it loses its characteristics and becomes objectified into bodies and relations which constitute knowledge only when they are cognized by a knowing being. Hence, the actual separation of *jñāna* and *jñāni* can only result in the destruction of both.

We must, therefore, say that *jīvas* are many, though they all manifest the one and the same essence. When we look at the number of individuals, attention is directed to the many, but to the one when we look at the Essence.

This is precisely the view which is taken of Godhood in the book of Genesis. In the 26th verse of the first chapter of that book it is said :—

"And God said, Let *us* make man in *our* image, after *our* likeness."

The italicized words are quite significant. As if to remove all possibility of mistake and misunderstanding, the author again refers to the subject in the 22nd verse of the third chapter, where the Lord God is made to say :

"Behold the man is become *as one of us*."

The words 'as one of us' are too significant to be ignored, and unerringly point to the idea of God being pluralistic in nature. If we were to put it in the figurative speech of mysticism we should have to say that Godhood is like a great Mountain of Light consisting of an infinity of smaller Lights, all interpenetrating one another, and, thus, presenting manyness in the one and oneness in the many. Even the serpent tempts Adam and Eve by promising them the status of Gods (Genesis, iii. 5).

So far as Islam is concerned, we have already shown, in our third chapter, that the concept of Allah is that of unity in multiplicity, whether we trace the word to Al-lah, or regard it as a contraction of Al-ilah; for the former signifies a hidden Flame, i.e., Consciousness, which is pluralistic in form, though singular in essence; and the latter is, on the face of it, a plurality of Knowing Lights. The same is the case with the word God, which, as the Imperial Dictionary shows, originally conveyed a pluralistic idea of Divinity.

Turning to Zoroastrianism, we find the same idea of a pluralistic Godhead. The Ahuras are many as well as one, according to the Holy Scriptures of the Parsis. Commenting upon the idea of God, Mr. E. Edward writes in the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* (vol. vi. pp. 291 and 292) :—

"The *ahuras* . . . seem to have gradually gained in prestige, and, apparently at a very early epoch, one of them had become the *Ahura par excellence*."

Mr. Edward's idea of a progressive monotheism is naturally based on the notion of evolution from a state of savageness to one of

civilization ; but this is hardly tenable in the light of our knowledge, especially as there is a complete explanation of the idea of plurality inseparable from the nature of Divinity. We not only find the pluralistic conception of God in almost all the religions of the world, but also the significant number 24 expressly mentioned in several of them. Even Zoroastrianism, which undoubtedly inspired many a prophet of the Old Testament fame, gives the precise number of Gods as *four and twenty*. These are not to be confounded with purely mythological gods, which are mere personifications of the aspects of the soul, as we saw in the analysis of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, but are to be taken as explained in Jainism.

Modern writers generally fall into error in understanding the doctrines of religion, because they have little or no idea of its basic principles. Hence, they only see the personifications of constellations and stars everywhere in all gods. Prof. Cumont takes these 24 Gods to be the 24 stars, outside the Zodiac, ' twelve in the northern and twelve in the southern hemisphere, which being sometimes visible, sometimes invisible become the judges of the living and the dead.' According to Zimmern, they are the twenty-four constellations which are set in circles round the polar stars, as the 24 Spiritual Kings of the book of Revelation are set round the Throne. To this Moulton objects as follows (*Early Zoroastrianism*, p. 402) :—

" This may or may not convince us. But what does he mean when he goes on to remark that these 24 signs are ' of course ' 24 divisions of the Zodiac ? . . . Diodorus expressly says these were outside the Zodiac, and Zimmern's remark implies that they are not far from the poles. "

To our thinking, the word Ahura Mazdah, when used in the singular number, denotes either the Supreme Status or the Siddha Atmans, the ' Blessed Ones,' taken collectively ; and in the plural form, the 24 glorious Tirthamkaras. This is evident from Yasna xxviii. 9 which reads:

" With these bounties, O Ahura, may we never provoke your wrath, O Mazdah and Right and Best thought, . . . Ye are they that are mightiest to advance desires and Dominion of Blessings. "—(*Early Zoroastrianism*, p. 346.)

The same idea underlies the teaching in *Yasna li. 20* :—

"Your blessings shall ye give us, all ye that are one in will, with whom Right, Good-Thought, Piety and Mazdah (are one), according to promise, giving your aid when worshipped with reverence."

The idea of God, thus, is that of perfection, which any number of souls may attain to, though no particular individual has an exclusive right to that high and sublime status. The popular fallacy in this respect lies in the personification of a status as a being, and in confounding the ideal with the individuals who bring it into realization.

The above is well expressed in the Bible, in the memorable words of John, the divine, as one seated on the throne from which proceed thunder and lightnings,* and which is surrounded by four and twenty seats on which sit the twenty-four Elders; all robed in white and wearing crowns of gold. This represents the sublime status of the twenty-four Tirthamkaras in whom the one Living Essence is most fully and perfectly manifested. It is the idea of the 'One in the Twenty-four.' Then follows that of the 'Twenty-four in the One,' which is described as follows :—

"When these beasts give glory and honour and thanks to him who is seated on the throne, who liveth for ever and ever, the four and twenty elders fall down before him that sat on the throne, and worship him that liveth for ever and ever, and cast their crowns before the throne saying, Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory and honour and power, for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created."

The four beasts† with eyes‡ in both directions are the four classes of living beings, that is, those whose bodies are made of the four

* Thunder and lightnings signify the explosive nature of life.

† Of the four beasts alluded to here, the lion and the eagle point at once to their respective types, since the lion walks on earth, and, therefore, represents the earth-bodied *jivas*, while the eagle flies in the air and thus points to the air-bodied. Of the remaining two the one with the face of a man is typical of the element of fire because the sun may be regarded as the symbol and source of this element, and it is always painted to represent the face of a man. This leaves the calf to be explained. Now, the calf is not only the young of the cow, but also of the marine mammalia, e.g., the whale (*Imperial Dictionary*); hence, it is typical of the water-bodied creatures.

‡ The metaphor of 'eyes' is also to be found in Hindu Mythology. Indra, the god of the thunder-bell, is said to have committed adultery with Ahalya, the wife of

different kinds of matter, namely, the air-bodied, the fire-bodied, the water-bodied, and the earth-bodied. The six wings of each of these beasts have a reference to the descending and ascending arcs of Time, called *Avasarpini* and *Utsarpini*, respectively. The *aras* (spokes) of which there are six on each arc, constitute the divisions of time in which the four kinds of *jivas* undergo different kinds of experiences, on account of the changes of Time.

After this brief prelude, we may proceed to consider the nature of the part assigned to the twenty-four Elders in the Apocalyptic drama. The worshipping of the one, that is, the Essence of Being or Life, is the symbol of the recognition of its divinity and of its oneness in all the twenty-four Perfected Souls. Hence the idea conveyed is that of the One-ness of Life, as distinguished from the twenty-four Perfect Beings in whom it is manifested. Lest some pious but unthinking Christian be inclined to think that the one on the throne is the Jesus of the Gospels, we desire to add that an historical Jesus is nowhere to be found in this drama, but the Redeemed Soul may be said to be the Lamb whose conquest is described in the subsequent chapters of the Apocalypse. Hence, Jesus* and, in general, every aspir-

his spiritual preceptor, Gautama, for which he was punished with a thousand disgraceful marks all over his body. These marks were, however, subsequently changed into eyes, which, according to Mr. W. J. Wilkins, the author of 'Hindu Mythology,' 'came to be regarded, by the ignorant, as marks of his omniscience.' The interpretation of this myth gives us, in a few words, the nature of Life and the effect of its manifestation in matter. Indra is Life, the god who holds in his hands thunder and lightning. He is ever-joyous and fond of Soma, the intoxicating nectar of bliss. Ahalya is the wife of Gautama, the sage, who is an impersonation of wisdom, i.e., intellect. The wife of the intellect is matter, since the intellect primarily only deals with matter and form. The word Ahalya means night, i.e., darkness, as well as unploughed soil, and is thus suggestive of matter. Therefore, the mythological adultery of Indra with Ahalya only signifies the entry of Life into matter, in consequence of which *jivas* appear as ugly spots on the body of Indra. These *jivas* subsequently evolve out self-consciousness in the course of spiritual evolution; hence the disgraceful marks are changed into 'eyes' on the body of the god. Mr. Wilkins' observation about the ignorance of those who regard these 'eyes' as marks of Indra's Omniscience needs no further comment.

* As a matter of fact, John employs the word 'Jesus' in the Book of Revelation in the sense of the Conquering Soul.

ing Soul may be said to be represented by the Lamb, who unseals the Book of Life, written inside and at the back, i.e., in the matter of the spinal marrow, and sealed with the seven *chakras* (psychic centres) of *yoga*.

In the state of *moksha*, then, the Soul is rid of the material body* and robed in its natural garment of bliss, which enables it to recognize its one-ness with Life, and yet retain its individuality as that of the Conquering *Jiva*. As such, it rises up to the topmost part of the universe, called the Siddha Śila, and resides there for ever, free from transmigration, i.e., the liability to repeated births and deaths.

The storehouse of unevolved *jivas* is the region called *nigoda* where an infinite number of them exist from all eternity. The *nigoda*-souls are also found in other parts of the universe.

The *nigoda* is the portion of the universe situated below the hells. Here evolution is almost at a stand-still, and is proceeding so slowly as to be almost imperceptible. From this condition *jivas* are constantly passing into the higher states of evolution. A *jiva* in this state is almost unconscious of himself.

Jivas in *nigoda* exist in two forms : either as group-souls, which have a common mouth, or as separate individuals. Some of these after entering into higher forms of evolution again fall back into the condition of *nigoda* and are called *itara nigoda*. These are the souls who are said to go to the 'outer darkness,' in the language of the Bible.

*Cf. "I Esdras saw upon the mount Sion a great multitude whom I could not number, and they all praised the lord with songs. And in the midst of them there was a young man of a high stature, taller than all the rest and upon every one of their heads he set crowns, and was more exalted; whereat I marvelled greatly. So I asked the angel, and said, What are these, my lord? He answered and said unto me, These be they that have put off the mortal clothing, and put on the immortal, and have confessed the name of God: now are they crowned, and receive palms. Then said I unto the angel, What young man is he that setteth crowns upon them, and giveth them palms in their hands? So he answered and said unto me, It is the Son of God, whom they have confessed in the world."—Jewish Apocrypha: II Esdras, Chap ii.

In the diagram on page 498 is given the map of the universe, showing the *nigoda* and the *siddha sila*. The following description of the latter place is given in the Scripture* :

"Twelve *yojanas* above the *Vimana Sarvartha* is the place called *Iśatpragbhara*, which has the form of an umbrella : where the perfected souls go. It is 45,00,000 *yojanas* long, and as many broad, and it is somewhat more than three times as many in circumference. Its thickness is eight *yojanas*, it is greatest in the middle, and decreases towards the margin, till it is thinner than the wing of a fly.


"This place, by nature pure, consisting of white gold, resembles in form an open umbrella, as has been said by the best of Jinas. Above it is a pure blessed place called *Sita* which is white like a conch-shell, the *naka*-stone, and *Kunda* flowers ; a *yojana* thence is the end of the world. There, at the top of the world, reside the blessed perfected souls, rid of all transmigration, and arrived at the excellent state of perfection. They have no visible form, they consist of life throughout, and they are developed into knowledge and faith, they have crossed the boundary of the *Samsāra* and reached the excellent state of perfection."

It is to be observed that the form of the *Lokakasha*, as described in the diagram, is necessarily given on the high and unimpeachable authority of the all-knowing Perfect Ones themselves. Those who have no faith in Their Word need not accept it as correct ; but it is essentially a matter of geography which depends more on testimony than logic. For the theologian, the matter is not only not open to dispute, but concluded by authority, since almost all religions regard the Microcosm (the body of man) as a copy of the Macrocosm (the universe).

The central region, called the *madhyaloka*, is not to be taken as confined to our world alone. It includes a large number of vast 'continents' and 'seas,' such as the *Jambu-Dvīpa*, the *Lavana Samudra*, and the like, lying one after another in an unbroken succession. Modern thinkers have found it difficult to identify these 'continents' and 'seas,' and failing to understand the text, have jumped to the conclusion that the Jainas were hopelessly ignorant of geography. The fact, however, is that the text refers to the principal divisions of the universe, and is not confined to our little globe, though the latter is also included in the central division called the *Jambu-Dvīpa*.

* The Sacred Books of the East, vol. xlv. pp. 211-212.

MAP OF THE LOKA.—(The Universe.)



Explanation of figures in the diagram :—

1. Five Anuttaras, 2. Nine Anudishas, 3. Nine Graiveyakas,

16 { 1. Saudharma, 2. Eshana, 3. Sanata, 4. Mahendra, 5. Brahma, 6. Brahmetra,
Celestial { 7. Lantava, 8. Kapishta, 9. Shukra, 10. Mahashukra, 11. Shatara,
Regions. { 12. Sahasrara, 13. Anata, 14. Pranata, 15. Arana, 16. Achyuta,

1. Kharabbaga, 2. Pankabbaga,

7 Nether { 1. Dhamina, 2. Vansha, 3. Mogha, 4. Anjana, 5. Ariatha, 6. Maghvi,
Regions. { 7. Maghvi. For a different set of names of the seven Hells, see ante, p.
192, footnote.

Below the *madhyaloka* are the hells, seven in number, which are situated above the *nigoda*, one on the top of another; and above it, sixteen heavens, on eight storeys, where pain and misery are the least known. Above these are higher celestial regions—*grāhavyākas*, *anudīśhas* and *anuttaras*—where all but perfect happiness prevails; and above these is the holy *Siddha Śīla* which is the abode of Those who have reached the other shore. The whole of the region below this Abode of Gods is the region of transmigration, known as *samsāra*, which is to be crossed with the aid of the Teacher's Word.

To revert to the nature of the soul, *jīva* or spirit is a substance whose function is to know; and, as shown in an earlier chapter, every soul is endowed by nature with a capacity for infinite knowledge and bliss. As such, every unredeemed soul is like a contracted aspect of knowledge and joy—an idea-rhythm, or globule of wisdom, charged with bliss. It is not made of matter, though being a substance it cannot be altogether 'immaterial.'

As regards its dimensions, the soul is an expanding and contracting substance, and has no fixed size of its own prior to the attainment of salvation. It is obvious that the soul cannot be smaller than its physical body, for in that case it will not be able to feel the bodily affections as its own. This will be readily agreed to if we take into consideration the proposition that pleasure and pain being affections of the ego it is impossible to feel either in a place which is not pervaded by the soul. If it be said that a mental message is received by the soul from the seat of the trouble, then the reply is that there will be no feeling of pleasure or pain on such an assumption; for just as it is impossible for a man to experience the actual sensation of burning and physical pain on the receipt of a message that his house is on fire, however much he might be distressed by the piece of information mentally, in the same way and precisely for the same reasons it is not possible for the soul to experience pleasure or pain in a place where it is not. And, lastly, even if it be assumed that physical pain could be caused by the message, then the feeling would be confined to the substance of the soul itself, and thus to the cavity of the heart or wherever else the soul might be located, but not at the seat of the trouble. Actual experience, however, demon-

strates only too clearly that the feeling of pain is not confined to any particular locality in the organism, but may be experienced all over the body. This unmistakably proves the pervasion of the whole body by the soul.

A possible objection to this view is that because our sensations are felt successively and not simultaneously, therefore, the soul cannot be present in every part of the body. But there is no force in it; for the succession of sensations arises from and is due to the fact that exclusive attention to any particular part of the system affects the sensitivity of the soul in other parts, rendering it insensitive to other *stimuli* for the time being. If it be said now that the sensitivity of the soul is not affected by exclusive attention being paid to any particular sensation, but that the succession is due to the barrier of the mind which can only be crossed by the centripetal impulses one by one, then there ought to be no limit to the number of 'interviewers' with the soul on the other side of the mental bar, for the barrier being once crossed, there is no further obstacle to prevent these 'visitors' from the without from joining one another and presenting themselves, hand in hand, to the will. Unless, therefore, the will itself become impervious to all except the sensory stimulus to which it may be attending at the time, it should take conscious notice of all those affections which arise together simultaneously, that is, at one and the same time. But since this is never known to take place in actual experience, the argument conclusively proves our proposition.

It will be further observed that the function of the mind in the economy of life, is not of making the soul feel the sensory stimulus in a place where it is not, as some persons maintain, for that would be tantamount to a mental fiction pure and simple, but of summoning any particular excitation, at will, into the centre of the most intensely conscious part of the field, diverting it from its normal path where it would have invariably exhausted itself in the shape of a motor discharge.

When a sensory impulse is called up by the mind, it travels along a nervous loop—if we may so call the arrangement which connects the system of what are technically known as direct reflexes

with the mechanism of the mind—and is then subjected to a deliberative analysis, more or less elaborate according to the development of the individual. This happens only in those beings who are endowed with a mind ; in the lower animals which are not so endowed, and which cannot, therefore, pause, postpone, deliberate, compare, or nicely weigh one motive against another, the movement at once passes through the predetermined channels of reflexes into a motor discharge, resulting in the contraction of a muscle. Such animals cannot exercise any choice, and are fatally condemned to perform the prescribed action, except that their reflex movements are subject to the feelings of pleasure and pain which accompany sensation, unpleasant sensations setting the organs of flight into motion and pleasant ones inclining the organism to seek a repetition of the experience. This shows that the mind is an instrument of selection in regard to the movement to be executed, and of analysis with regard to the movement received, permitting or checking its natural reflexes or substituting others for them, at will, at the same time. The objection therefore fails in its entirety, and we must, accordingly, conclude that the soul is not confined to any particular locality in the body, but pervades every part of it within its periphery.

Now, since the body is not constant, but a thing which grows from small dimensions, it follows that the soul cannot have a permanent size of its own so long as it is involved in transmigration. This amounts to saying that the soul is an expanding and contracting substance ; it begins from a microscopical size in the female womb and goes on expanding with its body till it attain its full proportions. Finally, that is, at the end of each earthly life, it is contracted again into the seed of the next incarnation to undergo the expanding process once more. Thus does the *jīva* continue to expand and contract in its different bodies, in the course of transmigration, till *nirvāṇa* be reached.

The Hindu philosopher, Ramanuja, possibly takes the same view when he says :—

“ The souls and matter are *uśatya* or unreal, which again means, that they are subject to modification which is necessarily an element of impurity. In the case of souls, this modification takes the form of expansion or contraction of intelligence.”—
Sri Ramanujacharya by T. R. Charlar, p. 53.

It is not uninteresting to note that the ancient Greeks and Romans held the soul to be an expanding and contracting entity. It is said in "The Conflict between Religion and Science" by J. W. Draper (chap. v) :—

"The Pagan Greeks and Romans believed that the spirit of man resembles his bodily form, varying its appearance with her variations, and growing with its growth."

This view was accepted by the primitive Christianity :—

"The primitive Christians whose conceptions of a future life and of heaven and hell, the abodes of the blessed and the sinful, were far more vivid than those of their pagan predecessors, accepted and intensified these ancient ideas."—*Ibid.*, chap. v.

Concerning the locus of the soul, the following passage which occurs in Maher's Psychology is full of interest for us :

"There has been much discussion among philosophers, Ancient and Modern, regarding the precise part of the body to be assigned as the 'seat' of the soul. Some have located it in the heart, others in the head, others in various portions of the brain. . . The hopelessly conflicting state of opinion on the question would seem to be due to the erroneous but widely prevalent view, that the simplicity of essence or substance possessed by the soul is a spatial simplicity akin to that of a mathematical point. As a consequence, fruitless efforts have continually been made to discover some general nerve centre, some focus from which lines of communication radiate to all districts of the body! The indivisibility, however, of the soul, just as that of intelligence and volition, does not consist in the minuteness of a point. The soul is an immaterial energy which, though not constituted of separate principles or parts alongside of parts, is yet capable of exercising its virtue throughout an extended subject. Such a reality does not, like a material entity, occupy different parts of space by different parts of its own mass. In scholastic phraseology it was described as present throughout the body, which it enlivens, not *circumscriptive*, but *definitive*; not *per contactum quantitatis* but *per contactum virtutis*. Its presence is not that of an extended object the different parts of which fill and are *circumscribed* by corresponding areas of space, but of an immaterial energy exerting its proper activities ubiquitously throughout the living body.

"The soul is present though in a non-quantitative manner, throughout the whole body; moreover, it is so present everywhere in the entirety of its essence, although it may not be capable of ubiquitously therein exercising all its faculties. Those activities which require a special organ are limited to the district occupied by the bodily instrument. In so far as the material subject by the limits of which vital activity in general is defined and conditioned increases or diminishes, the soul may be said in figurative language to experience *virtual* increase or

diminution—an expansion or contraction in the sphere and range of its forces; but there is no real *quantitative* increase in the substance of the soul itself."

The soul's 'diffusion' in the body cannot be compared with any other case of diffusion in nature, for the soul is a simple substance and altogether devoid of parts. The difficulty that is felt in connection with the notion of expansion and contraction of such a simple entity lies in the fact that the human mind is almost exclusively adapted to deal with quantitative phenomena, and comes to grief when endeavouring to picture to itself the extension of that which is not composed of different elements and parts. But, as Michael Maher, S.J., urges, imagination is no test of possibility.

The analogy of light may be employed to illustrate the point to a certain extent: for as the sphere of light increases or diminishes, according as it is placed in a small room or a big hall, or by the employment of different kinds of covers, though they do not in any sense affect its diffusion quantitatively, so does the soul expand and contract to fill up different bodies.

That the conception of the living Force or Rhythm should be somewhat puzzling to the unphilosophical mind, is but only natural. For consciousness is not a thing like a piece of stone or metal, but a living and intelligent substance. The question—why should a substance perform all these functions?—is inadmissible. Philosophy is only concerned with finding out things as they exist, not with creating them to suit the whims of its interlocutors. One might just as well ask: why should matter be inert, space extended, timefleeting, and so forth? The point is not whether the mind can picture a simple substance as an extended entity, but whether the soul does or does not perform the functions which have been ascribed to it, and as to this there can be no doubt but that its 'diffusion' in the body is absolutely essential for the reasons given.

The size of the *jiva* in *Nirvana* is just a little less than that of its last earthly body which "falls off" the soul as the result of severe *tapas*, leaving the simple essence of life as pure radiant effulgence. This resplendent effulgence of Pure Spirit is what has been termed the Solar Body by certain mystics, and it retains its size and form

permanently, because its complete separation from matter and the total elimination of its desires and passions ensure its freedom from the liability to expansion and contraction which nature imposes on all those that are involved in the 'wheel of samsara.'

The idea that the *jiva* is the *pratibimba* of Brahman, which certain Vedantists entertain, can be true only in so far as it has the potentiality of becoming Brahman, not otherwise. But in so far as the *jiva* is a centre of thought, or idea-rhythm, it is the builder of its own form, which it makes according to the paramount tendencies of its character, or disposition. Hence the body which it builds for itself, is the reflection of its mind. Every creature, in this sense, is the *pratibimba* (reflection) of its own character; but it is impossible to carry this principle any further, except in the sense that every *jiva* enfolds, within its own form, the germ of the divine status which will be attained on reaching Nirvana. For, if the *jiva* be only a *pratibimba* of consciousness, how comes it to be endowed with consciousness? Observation certainly does not support the supposition of understanding, will and memory in pure reflections.

Passing on to a consideration of the question, whether motion be a property of pure spirit, reflection shows that the soul is unmoving* by nature; it can only move from place to place with the aid of matter. If the soul were to move about, it would do so either because it is its nature to do so, or because it is subject to the forces of attraction and repulsion of matter; but so far as the former alternative is concerned, there is absolutely nothing to suggest that motion is a characteristic of pure spirit, and in regard to the latter, its subjection to the material forces of nature is exactly of the same sort as that of the insect which is drawn to a magnet because

* Hindu metaphysicians have recognized the fact that motion is not a characteristic of the soul. They have likened the association of Spirit and Matter to the companionship of the halt and the blind, the latter representing unconscious matter. In Judaism, too, the belief prevails that "... motion is no part of the definition of life, but an accident connected with it" (*Guide to the Perplexed* by Moses Maimonides, p. 60). Muslim tradition also taught the same thing when it depicted the unmoving, unchanging condition of the immortal whose sight turned away the explorer (Alexander) from the Fountain of Immortal Waters in Zalmit, the continent that is enshrouded in darkness.

it would not give up its hold on a piece of iron filing besmeared with honey. There is absolutely nothing to show that the soul, in its natural purity, is liable to be influenced by the operation of the physical forces of attraction and repulsion to which matter is undoubtedly subject. As a matter of fact the soul can override gravitation itself in the twinkling of an eye if it be self-conscious. A partial confirmation of this is to be found in the fact that while lifeless, unconscious things cannot break away from this powerful force, we jump, dance and walk about in defiance of it, at our merest will. If the soul were characterised by motion, the body would never know rest, for it cannot separate itself from its occupant whose slightest wish suffices to put it in motion.

It is true that the soul continues in time, but the idea of continuity implies motion of a very different kind from that which we perform when moving from one place to another. "To be" and "to continue to be" not being the same thing, the difference between them is precisely what underlies the idea of continuity; and consists in the discharge of functional activity, which is not taken into account in the one case and is mentioned as being repeatedly performed in the other. But so far as the nature of the motion implied in the idea of continuity is concerned, it is obvious that it cannot be one of translation from one place to another, since a function may be discharged without necessitating any one's moving away from any particular place. Motion in Time, as a matter of fact, is not to be measured in terms of distance in space; it is a qualitative alternation of 'moments,' or states—intense, less intense, and again intense—which is certainly not motion in the spatial sense. But we shall have to say more on the subject a little later.

We may make a little halt here to rectify a common error into which people unconsciously fall when they try to define certain terms. Since the only purpose which definitions serve is to enable us to understand things as they exist, it is clearly of the utmost importance to realize the necessity of being very precise with them. Where this necessity has been ignored, and inexact definitions accepted in place of true description, nothing but confusion—ofttimes of the worst possible type—has resulted from the

error. Buddha's inability to define Nirvana, of which mention will be made again later on, and Shankaracharya's concept of Brahman as the Absolute, to become which is the chief desideratum in Vedanta, may be cited in illustration of the point. The modern theological conception of God is the outcome of a similar lapse from precision of thought. Definitions fail to serve their purpose when they cease to be true to nature, and philosophers only prattle when they talk of pure abstractions, as if they could exist by themselves. If philosophically inclined dabblers in theology will only bear this in mind, they will very soon discover the true light of wisdom dawning upon them, and will then speedily realize that shouting oneself hoarse in praise, or condemnation, of misconceived ideas is, in no sense, the path of salvation.

It is high time that those who take pride in belonging to a missionary religion did understand the nature of the evil which results from the spreading of the ideas and traditions of men, in place of the doctrines of religion. It is nothing short of downright wickedness to implant the seed of ignorance and vague mysticism in the minds of men; and yet this cannot be avoided so long as the teacher, or the preacher, as the case may be, only dabbles in high-sounding but otherwise empty words. Of the thousands of preachers who preach in public, and of the equally large number of those who write their doctrines in books, hardly one in a thousand has any idea of what the words employed by him signify; yet, they all, unblushingly and shame-facedly, go on discharging a ceaseless torrent of rhetoric in the supposed interests of their presumably defenceless god whose cause, they seem to imagine, requires such a vast army of champions to defend! Most of them, when asked to define their concept of God, lose their footing on the *terra firma* of relevant sense, and begin to flounder in the quagmire of metaphysical nonsense. If this is the case with the teachers themselves, what must be the plight of their 'victims'? The notion of the Absolute which Vedanta and certain other systems of thought persist in positing as the sole existent reality is a fair instance of the confusion resulting from want of discrimination between a mental abstraction and concrete things. Regarded as pure existence, it is merely a quality of substance, and not a substance or thing itself. As such, it is impossible that it can exist by

itself, for qualities only inhere in substances and substances are but bundles of qualities. If it were otherwise, we should have existence existing apart from all other qualities. But this is absurd ; for existence would not then pertain to anything but itself, which would make all other qualities and things nonest. Existence itself would also then become a featureless quality of nothing whatsoever, and, in the absence of different substances and qualities, the universe would cease to be.

Thus, the conception of the Absolute as pure existence is quite unsound logically. There remains the notion of the Absolute as a summation of all to be considered. But as such it will resemble any collective concept, *e.g.*, the British Empire or the French Republic, which are pure mental conceptions. Suppose we set out to discover the latter, and proceed to France in search of it. It is obvious that we shall see only the country, the people, the institutions, and so forth in France, but not the French Republic itself. For the latter is only an idea which works through the numerous things French, and holds them together as a compact whole. Now, suppose we take away the tie of relationship between the idea of the French Republic and the things, or institutions, actually existing in France, and make a complete severance between them, in thought. We should then have the country, the people, the institutions, and the like as so many parcels, on the one hand, and an absolutely non-existent abstraction on the other. The former would become independent entities in the absence of a uniting bond, and the latter, an idea without anything to control, because we have denied it all relationship with the very things which it could control ; and inasmuch as its *raison d'être* is only the bond of oneness of aims and aspirations among the French, which is denied it by actual separation, its very existence becomes self-contradictory and ends in death at the very moment of birth ! An actual French Republic requires a living force, or idea, actually influencing the minds of the people in France, and holding them together as a nation. Separate the two terms by impassable barriers, and you destroy the Republican spirit in the hearts of men, and the power to exist in the idea of the Republic at a stroke

The Absolute, when conceived as a collective concept, is an idea of the same type as that of the French Republic, and is subject to all the limitations of the class to which it belongs. It is not a being, but a bond, and cannot exist apart from the terms which it unites and controls.* It will now be seen that the idea of Brahman in the early Upanishads is a pure mental abstraction. The early Hindu theorists of the Vedānta School, ignorant* of the state of super-consciousness, which was later recognised as *turya*, the fourth, seem to have revelled in the idea of becoming "That," conceived as a mental abstraction. As a matter of fact, their description of Brahman itself suffices to refute any argument to the contrary, since it ('it' is the pronoun which is invariably employed for Brahman) is not the Being-Knower-Blissful, but only Sat, Chit and Anand, that is, Existence-Knowledge-Bliss, in other words, pure abstractions. Accordingly, Hindu philosophers invariably described Brahman by maintaining unbroken silence—a method which Gautam Buddha also employed on certain occasions. The reason for this lay in the fact that their conception of Brahman, not being that of a being, but of a pure mental abstraction, which is un-analyzable and therefore almost beyond words, left them with no choice but to keep quiet.

The Hindus, however, made no secret of their inability to describe Brahman, and openly said so invariably in the end. At times this silence was preserved most tantalisingly, and finally employed as an argument to baffle the exasperated opponent with some such retort as the following, uttered with all the boldness of accusation: "I have been answering you all the time, but it is no fault of mine if you do not understand: Brahman, dear sir, cannot be described by words, but by silence!"

The later teaching quite correctly acknowledges the fourth phase of consciousness, which is the true Ideal for mankind; though even here the conception of Brahman as an abstraction is responsible for a lot of confusion. If the Vedantists will seriously reflect over the matter, they will not fail to observe that it is neither desirable nor possible to become a pure mental abstraction.

* Deussen's 'Philosophy of the Upanishads,' p. 399.

If we revert to our illustration for the moment, we can see at a glance the absurdity involved in the conception of becoming the Absolute. Suppose we asked a candidate for the dignity of the post of honour of the French President as to the ideal he had in view, and he replied that he was trying to become the French Republic, would he be right in saying so? Most certainly, not; for nobody can become the French Republic. Similarly, nobody can become the Absolute of abstract thought, which stands to the whole world in the same relation as the French Republic does to the people and institutions of France. Neither is it possible to imagine the pleasure which one can possibly derive by becoming Force, or Power, or even Existence or Mind, in a generic sense. To become God, surely, does not mean to become the Absolute as a metaphysical abstraction, but the Knower as distinguished from thinker, the Enjoyer, as distinguished from the seeker, in a word, the *Paramatman*, — not the republic of be-ness and becoming, but its Omniscient President. Surely, when one joins the Inns of Court to study Law, one does not aspire to become Law, but a Lawyer. To become Law is neither a possibility nor the ideal in view.

Buddha's ideal is also too obscure to afford satisfaction. *Moksha* is *Nirvana*, we are told; but what is *Nirvana*? There is nothing definite said as to this, and we are left to draw our own conclusions from a number of stray observations of the 'Enlightened One,' as Buddha was styled by his followers. 'The source of pain is life, and the source of life is will (desire, *ichchha*), therefore, destruction of desire, i.e., will, is Nirvana.' This is true in so far as it goes, if taken in a qualified sense, but it does not go far enough to enable us to form a clear conception of *Nirvana*. 'What is the nature of life in Nirvana?' — is a question which the early Buddhists declined to answer.

It is no use speculating about Buddha's idea of Nirvana, for no one has yet been able to discover any positive content of knowledge in the word as used in the Buddhistic literature. Even the staunchest champions of Buddhism have found it difficult to avoid associating it with extinction out and out. The destruction of the will to live—this is what Dahlmann understands *nirvana*

to imply—has already been shown to be an erroneous view of *moksha*.

A glance at the philosophy of Buddha suffices to show that the confusion of thought in his system has arisen from the laying of too much stress on what is termed 'becoming' as distinguished from 'being.' The followers of the Buddha had to resort to all sorts of evasions to meet the disturbing questions about the condition of the *jiva* in Nirvana. An instance of the inability of his disciples to explain the nature of life in Nirvana is to be found in the dialogue between King Pasenadi and Khema, the nun, who was noted for her wisdom. "Does the Perfect One [the Buddha] exist after death, O venerable lady?" asked the king. "The Sublime One, O great king, has not revealed to us the existence of a paradise beyond the grave," replied Khema. "Then the Perfect One," repeated the king, "exists no longer now that he is dead, O reverend lady?" "Neither, O king," replied Khema, "has the Sublime One revealed that he who is perfect does not exist now that he is dead." "Am I to believe, then," continued the king, "that the Perfect One being dead, neither exists nor does not exist?" But the king might have put this to a statue of stone, for it remains unanswered to this day.

We have not to deal with a case where the disciples' low intelligence is to be blamed for errors in expounding the doctrine of their master; Buddha himself had nothing definite to say on the point. A wandering monk once asked him: "How is it, Gotama? Is there an I?" No reply was vouchsafed by Buddha. The monk continued: "How is it, Gotama? Is there not an I?" But the Enlightened One simply preserved silence, till, at last, the monk grew impatient and went away.

Another monk asked him, "Who has contact? who has sensation?" Buddha replied: "The question is not admissible. I do not say, 'He has contact.' Did I say, 'He has contact,' the question, 'Who has contact, Reverend Sir?' would be admissible. Since, however, I do not say so, then of me that do not speak thus, it is only admissible to ask, 'From what, Reverend Sir, does contact proceed?'"

"Buddhism," says Paul Dahlke, in 'Buddhism and Science' at page 240, "is the doctrine of actuality, and its value as a view of the world from the standpoint of epistemology, lies in the fact that it teaches us to accept actuality as actuality. To this idea it is itself a martyr, inasmuch as its own teaching here is nothing ideally fixed and fast, but only an incitation to experience it in one's own self; it is 'a raft, designed for escape; not designed for retention.'"

But we must give Buddhism an opportunity of being fairly heard. Let us see how the founder of this system justifies himself, in this particular. He says, "'I am,' monks, is a believing. 'Such am I,' is a believing. 'I shall be,' is a believing. 'I shall not be,' is a believing. 'I shall have a form,' is a believing. 'I shall be formless,' is a believing. 'I shall have perception,' is a believing. 'I shall be devoid of perception,' is a believing. To entertain believings is to be ill. To entertain believings is to be infirm. To entertain believings is to be sick. When, however, all entertaining of believings is overcome, then is one called a right thinker."

Wisdom, then, consists in refusing to believe! Very good, we too refuse to believe what Buddha said, on Buddha's own authority! Thus, believing in him, we are ill, infirm and sick; not believing in him, we are, at least, wise!

The beautiful simile of the flame of a lamp, employed by Buddha to illustrate the impermanence of all nature, would hardly bear criticism. To compare Living Actuality, or Rhythm, as we have called it, to a manifestation of matter, is scarcely permissible in philosophy. A flame does not and cannot exist by itself; but Spirit, Actuality, or Rhythm, is a self-subsisting principle, and, therefore, free from death and decay.

Moreover, as an emancipated Spirit can never be without some sort of knowledge or belief, being *pure* consciousness in essence, the question is: 'what will be the belief of the perfected Soul, in Nirvana?' According to Buddhism, it can only be that believing is to be avoided, which, as we have pointed out before, is itself a false belief. Buddha seems to have aimed at the wiping out of consciousness and knowledge from the soul, forgetting that omniscience does not consist in having no knowledge, or belief, but in having full know-

ledge and right belief. Vain is our endeavour to reduce the mind to a *tabula rasa*, since it is its nature to know. Hence, the philosophy which aspires to attain this unattainable end is, from its very nature, foredoomed to failure. It is beside the point to speculate about the opinion of the millions that follow it, since only a very few persons care to know the truth in its naked majesty.

In his masterly treatise on the philosophy of the famous Master, entitled "Buddhism and Science," Paul Dahlke makes the Buddha say :—

"I not only am aware that I am no true I, as a unity in itself, but I also know what it is that I am. And that this has really been comprehended by me,—this I prove in my own person. For, from the moment that I comprehended myself as a process sustaining itself from beginninglessness down to the present hour by its own volitional activities, all volitional activities have ceased in me. A new upwelling of *in-force*, any further self-charging of the I-process, has no more place in me. I know; this is my last existence. When it breaks up, there is no more Karma there to take fresh hold in any new location, be it in heavenly, be it in earthly, worlds. The beginningless process of combustion is expiring, is coming to an end of itself, like a flame that is fed by no more oil."

On page 93 of the same book it is said : "When I say, 'That is green,' the statement conveys no definite positive contents of Knowledge; in making it I only say, 'That is not red, yellow, blue, and so forth.'" That may or may not be so, but we are sure that Mr. Dahlke will be the last person to adhere to this view, if on going to a restaurant he orders, say, a cup of tea, and the waiter begins to move about cakes, biscuits, coffee, etc., etc., thinking to himself that the guest's cup of tea is only a negation of all these and of everything else, except tea, which he is, however, precluded from knowing, since it has no positive contents of knowledge in itself. This, we fear, is too good to be true.

Thus, it is beyond doubt that the Jaina conception of Nirvana, with the persistence, for all eternity, of the Emancipated Soul, as the Paramatman, is a truth of philosophy. The identity of the Saved One in *moksha* is determined by the Living Rhythm retaining the form of the last physical incarnation and by the knowledge of the past. Hence, the statement that the form of God is the form of

man," which finds recognition both in the O. T. and the N. T. of the Holy Bible :

" And created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him."—(Genesis I. 27.)

" . . . who being in the image of God, thought it no robbery to be equal with God."—(Philippians ii. 5-6.)

As for the distinguishing features of the *Siddhatman* Right Belief, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct are the permanent attributes of Their souls. Of these, Their beliefs cannot be destroyed, for wisdom is the guarantee of their permanence; Their knowledge is eternal, being only the condition of being, i.e., the states of Consciousness of Their pure Souls; and Right Conduct remains because the total destruction of desires ensures its freedom from all forms of shortcomings, failings and fluctuations.

The nature of the personality of the *Siddhatman*, it must be borne in mind, is not the same as that of an unredeemed soul. It is not a personality of private loves and hatreds, or likes and dislikes, of a calculating, appropriating ego; it is a personality associated with Omniscience and consisting in the awareness of all the innumerable bodies in which the Perfected Soul had incarnated before the attainment of Nirvana, including the knowledge of, but not the feeling of warmth in, the last earthly form which it had assumed in the world of men.

The result of the investigation into the nature of the *Siddhatman* justifies us in saying that apart from the Perfected Souls, the Paramatmans, there can be no such thing as a separate and distinct kind of god. Not only does this appear to be so from the fact that the world-process is capable of being carried on without any one's interference, but also from the additional fact that nothing but the worst kind of confusion can result on the hypothesis of such a mythical being.

It would seem that the misunderstanding which has arisen in connection with the idea of God, amongst different religions, is

* Cf. " Because God created man for incorruption, and made him in the image of his own proper being; but by the envy of the devil death entered into the world and they that are of his portion make trial thereof."—Jewish Apocrypha: the Wisdom of Solomon, chap. II.

due, as is usual with all kinds of misunderstandings, to lack of precision in thought. Much confusion has also resulted from the personifying impulse of theology and from the failure of men to make any sense out of the quaint and queer descriptions of the crowds of gods and goddesses to be found in the different pantheons of the world. Those of an easy-going, non-discriminating turn of mind, naturally imagined that the presence of such vast crowds of gods and goddesses—their number in Hinduism alone rose to over three hundred million—could not but lead to holy wars of supremacy in the heavenly world, and, becoming disgusted with the unmanageable crew, elected to pay homage to the most powerful of them, whoever he might be. We thus have a god who not only cannot be found in the region of reality, but who is also responsible for a lot of mischief in the world. As knowledge dwindled still further amongst men, misunderstandings ripened into hot disputes, and strifes, warfare, and bitter feuds became rife in the world. At the present day, matters have come to such a pass that the true explanation is unceremoniously condemned as an atheistic heresy! Nevertheless, no one actually tries to give a proper definition of him whom they all talk about. If they had ever attempted to do so, they would not have failed to discover that the attributes they ascribe to their god can only go to contradict him out of existence. For instance, the qualities of omniscience and bliss, which are the necessary attributes of divinity, are in no sense compatible with the notions underlying such statements as the following from the Holy Bible :

“ And it repented the Lord that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart.”—(Genesis vi. 6.)

A god who makes things and beings only to repent of having done so afterwards has no right to be called omniscient or blissful. Desirelessness must be a feature of Divinity, in whatever form it may be posited, but that it is not one of the characteristics of the god postulated by modern theologies is only too apparent to need proof. The true Godhead is the Ideal of Perfection, the status of the Siddhatman, which is already within each and every soul ; and it is this ideal, manifested, in the most perfect degree, in the lives of the four and twenty Perfect Ones, the Tirthamkaras, who correspond to the

twenty-four Spiritual Elders in Christianity, which the Jainas go to receive their daily inspiration from in their Temples. Let us not forget that it is the devotion to the Ideal, not a fanatical doting on a false and chimerical idol, which can ever be the means of spiritual progress. Even in worldly matters, he who wishes to excel in a profession must take some great, living leader of that profession as his ideal, and should walk in his footsteps, to attain to his eminence. Can a law student ever hope to become an eminent lawyer by worshipping an idol of mystic fancy, *e.g.*, Alladin of the wonderful lamp? He must make up his mind to attend on the man who has already risen to eminence in the profession, not indeed to worship him, nor even to beg him to throw a slice of his greatness towards him, but to keep him in mind as the ideal to be attained, and to follow him on the path which leads to its realization. Then alone can good come out of devotion. It is high time that mankind understood the true sense of worship: it is not the devotion to a person, but to an ideal which is enjoined by religion. The great Ideal of the divine status, which must be idolized to be realized, is the original of the devotee's God; and it is time misspent to bow before any other gods and goddesses, who, like a blind alley, lead to nowhere, but keep their devotees entangled in the same place with themselves—the region of darkness and untruth.

We must now proceed to enquire into the nature of *ajiva*, the second of the two main divisions into which substance is divided in the Jaina *Siddhanta*. This class comprises Space, Time, the two kinds of ether and matter, and is called *ajiva* (*a* = not + *jiva* = life or soul) to distinguish it from *jiva*, the conscious substance, *i.e.*, spirit. We shall take up the five *ajiva* substances one by one to ascertain their nature.

To begin with space. Bergson's account of the origin of space is so highly interesting that we cannot refrain from giving the following abridged passage from his 'Creative Evolution':—

"When a poet reads me his verses, I can interest myself enough in him to enter into his thought, put myself into his feelings, live over again the simple state he has broken into phrases and words. I sympathize then with his inspiration, I follow it with a continuous movement which is, like the inspiration itself, an undivided act. Now, I need only relax my attention, let go the tension that there is in me, for the

sounds, hitherto swallowed up in the sense to appear to me distinctly, one by one, in their materiality. For this I have not to do anything ; it is enough to withdraw something. In proportion as I let myself go, the successive sounds will become the more individualized ; as the phrases were broken into words, so the words will scan in syllables which I shall perceive one after another. Let me go further still in the direction of dream : the letters themselves will become loose and will be seen to dance along, hand in hand, on some fantastic sheet of paper. I shall then admire the precision of the interweavings, the marvellous order of the procession, the exact insertion of the letters into the syllables, of the syllables into the words and of the words into the sentences. The further I pursue this quite negative direction of relaxation, the more extension and complexity I shall create ; and the more the complexity in its turn increases, the more admirable will seem to be the order which continues to reign, undisturbed among the elements. Yet this complexity and extension represent nothing positive ; they express a deficiency of will. And, on the other hand, the order must grow with the complexity, since it is only an aspect of it. The more we perceive, symbolically, parts in an indivisible whole, the more the number of the relations that the parts have between themselves necessarily increases, since the same undividedness of the real whole continues to hover over the growing multiplicity of the symbolic elements into which the scattering of the attention has decomposed it. A comparison of this kind will enable us to understand, in some measure, how the same separation of positive reality, the same inversion of a certain original movement, can create at once extension in space and the admirable order which mathematics finds there. There is, of course, this difference between the two cases, that words and letters have been invented by a positive effort of humanity, while space arises automatically, as the remainder of a subtraction arises once the numbers are posited. But, in the one case as in the other, the infinite complexity of the parts and their perfect co-ordination among themselves are created at one and the same time by an inversion which is, at bottom, an interruption, that is to say, a diminution of positive reality."

Again, at page 218 of the work quoted it is said :—

" As regards space, we must, by an effort of mind *sui generis*, follow the progression or rather the regression of the extra-spatial; degrading itself into spatiality. When we make ourselves self-conscious in the highest possible degree and then let ourselves fall back little by little, we get the feeling of extension : we have an extension of the self into recollections that are fixed and external to one another, in place of the tension it possessed as an indivisible active will. But this is only a beginning. Our consciousness, sketching the movement, shows us its direction and reveals to us the possibility of continuing it to the end ; but consciousness itself does not go so far. Now, on the other hand, if we consider matter, which seems to us at first coincident with space, we find that the more our attention is fixed on it, the more the parts which we said were laid side by side enter into each other, each of them undergoing the action

of the whole, which is consequently somehow present in it. Thus, although matter stretches itself out in the direction of space, it does not completely attain it; whence we may conclude that it only carries very much further the movement that consciousness is able to sketch within us in its nascent state."

All this is very graphic and interesting; but we must not allow it to escape our attention that physical expansion and mental regression and progression are not the phases of the same thing, but of different things. The simple state of entering into the poet's idea does not mean the disappearance of the poet himself from the field of extension. Unless we roll up the poet along with his poem, in the state of intension, it is useless to endeavour to show that he too spreads himself out in the movement of regression. Expansion and contraction, thus, are the two phases of *living* consciousness, but not of other things in nature. And, inasmuch as, apart from the states of consciousness of living beings, actual things outside those states remain where they are, it follows that extension and intension are both in existence at one and the same time. Bergson's error, it seems, has arisen, like so many other errors of Monism, from a monistic aspiration of thought to which, as we have already seen in these pages, so many philosophers have fallen victim, both in the East and the West. Thus, the statement that space is already possessed by the mind as an implicit idea in its own *detension*, that is to say, of the possible *extension* of its own mental operations, is only a kind of half-truth.

Even the field of the possible extension of *life* must be taken to be a permanent one, for there is no warrant for maintaining that it is created along with the movement of regression. If *life* exist prior to the commencement of the said movement, it must exist in space, which must be conceived as an infinitely extended substance, leaving no emptiness anywhere, otherwise we shall have emptiness also existing by itself as space, which would be absurd. The truth is that the will possesses the power of extension and intension, but the power only affects its own states and the awareness of the contents of its consciousness. The objects outside in the world are not affected by the change of rhythm in the will, and remain where they are. Bodies and compounds, indeed, may, and do perish, from time to time; but

mind refuses to believe that space, matter, ether, etc., should ever disappear altogether out of existence, though, owing to the intensity of certain types of feelings, their consciousness may be reduced to a zero-point.

The reality of Space is borne out by the fact that in order to reach things it is necessary to traverse the distance which separates them from ourselves. Further, the removal of Space can only result either in the throwing of all things into 'nowhere,' or in the complete isolation of each individual atom from all the rest of its kind, and in its being doomed to an eternal, solitary confinement. The one is, however, as inconceivable as the other, for 'nowhere' is as great an absurdity as absolute vacuity, and isolation is only possible in Space, never in spacelessness. As Deussen says, it is impossible to be nowhere, or in two different places at one and the same time.

That Space is a substance and not an absolute vacuum, is evident from the fact that our notion of absolute vacuity, or void, is, at bottom, only what Bergson calls a self-destructive idea (Creative Evolution, pp. 296—299). The fact is that an absolute void is an impossibility in Nature, and is altogether inconceivable by the mind, the true conception of vacuity, or what it really and logically implies, being only founded upon the idea of "room." Starting from the notion of emptiness arising from the perception of a room or place devoid of all sensible things, the man in the street expands his conception of vacuity till the boundaries of finitude melt away in the limitlessness of the infinite. He now imagines himself to have acquired an absolutely accurate image of pure vacuum, and insists upon positing it in place of Space. But it is obvious that what he has got hold of is not absolute nothing, but the pure concept of an *infinite expanse, containing nothing*, which is a very different thing; for pure expansion is not thinkable in the absence of a substance in which it might inhere, so that, at bottom, our friend's conception of emptiness actually and truly only represents our idea of Space. If we deny substantiveness to Space and replace it by absolute vacuity, the conception of the latter will have to imply unlimited expansion, our idea of spatiality being only that of a boundless expanse.

But such a concept will be as self-destructive as the notion of a square circle, or a circular square, for it will then imply the presence of the attribute of infinite extension in that which has no existence itself. Furthermore, if there be not one infinite vacuum but a large number of finite ones, then will arise the question as to the size of each of them; for if their dimensions be no bigger or greater than the point of Geometry, then it will be impossible to construct such a concept as that of the one infinitely extended space or 'room' with the aid of mere geometrical points. But if it be said that each of the units or 'atoms' of vacuity is endowed with actual dimensions, though of a finite type, then the old difficulty reappears with increased force since that which has no existence is as incapable of a finite size as of an infinite one. There is a further difficulty which arises on the supposition of a multitude of vacuities, for a multitude of 'unreals' is a possible conception for unhealthy intellects alone.

The infinity of Space is evident from the fact that we cannot conceive it as finite. If it were a finite substance, it would be limited by something else, and would have a 'beyond' to it which must be either another piece of Space or pure emptiness. But not the latter, for the reasons already given. It would then be the former. But two finite spaces would themselves require an inter-space to fill in their interstices. We should then have to enquire whether this inter-space be infinite or not, and, if it turn out to be finite, to posit a second inter-space, and so forth, *ad infinitum*. But this is absurd, for one infinite Space is sufficient for the purpose of finding room for all things.

Space, then, is a substance which is infinite and non-atomistic, that is, partless. Its function is to find room for all things, though being of the nature of "place," it does not stand in need of it itself.

The claim of space to rank as a reality is based upon its partless, non-atomistic nature, which preserves it in one condition always. Not being an effect, but only a simple substance in itself, it cannot be conceived to have been produced from other substances; and as such must be an ultimate reality, that is, a thing in itself.

The infinity of Space, called *ākāśa* in Sanskrit, is divided by the Jaina *siddhānta* into two parts, namely, the *lokākāśa* (*loka* + *ākāśa*),

that is, the space occupied by the universe, and the *alokākāśa*, (a not, and *lokākāśa*), the portion beyond the universe. The *lokākāśa* is the portion in which are to be found the remaining five substances, i.e., *Jivas*, Matter, Time, Dharma and Adharma; but the *alokākāśa* is the region of pure space containing no other substance and lying stretched on all sides beyond the bounds of the three worlds (the entire universe), as shown in the map on p. 498 *ante*.

Space, thus, is a self-subsisting entity: it cannot be created, or destroyed, by any process of regression, or progression. In its infinity of extension, it includes the universe of matter and form as well as that which lies beyond. As a simple substance it is uncreate and eternal, hence, a self-subsisting reality, since there is neither a being to create it, nor any possible source for its creation.

The next substance to demand our attention is Time, the thread of continuity on which are strung the successive moments of sequence. That Time is a reality, is evident from the fact that neither the continuation of substances and things, nor the sequence of events can be possibly conceived without it.

The primary conception involved in the idea of time is that of continuity, since the power to continue in Time is enjoyed by all substances, and, to a limited extent, also by all bodies and forms. Continuity itself is not a summation of a series of discontinuous events, changes, or moments, but a process of persistence, i.e., an enduring from the past into the ever-renewing present—a survival, or carrying over, of individuality, from moment to moment. If we analyse our feeling of self-continuance, we shall observe that our consciousness feels itself *enduring* in time, that is to say, that it knows itself to be constantly surviving the past, and emerging, whole and entire, in the present, together with an awareness of having performed some sort of a movement or 'journey' from moment to moment. This consciousness of the progress made is not the consciousness of a journey performed in space, but of one made in an entirely different manner. It is a journey which leaves the traveller exactly where he was before in space, but implies his progress in *duration*. Now, since we cannot have a consciousness of travelling, or change, except

when some kind of movement is actually executed, the progress of consciousness in Time must be a real motion in some way. Analysis discloses the fact that the movement of continuity is not a process of translation from place to place, but a sort of internal revolving, so that each revolution gives us a new 'now,' while, at the same time, leaving us where we were before, in all other respects. Introspection confirms this conclusion fully : for, while the consciousness of continuity implies a constant movement from the past towards the present, it involves neither an idea of locomotion in space, nor a notion of the change of identity. The consciousness of Time, then, is the consciousness of a movement of internal rotation of some kind. Any one who withdraws himself into his inner being, and concentrates his attention on the awareness of continuity, will feel himself emerging into each 'now' as the same individual, and will also know the present moment to consist in the feeling of self-awareness which life has of its own existence, independently of the sense-organs. This feeling of progress is precisely the one from which springs our consciousness of Time, and that which enables this progress to be made is the substance of Time.

The Jainas define Time as a substance which assists other substances in their continuity. Just as the central iron pin of a potter's wheel is necessary for its revolving, so is Time, i.e., the substance of Time, necessary for the 'revolving' of substances in nature. These revolutions, however, are not to be taken as an actual whirling round of elements and things, since consciousness does not testify to any such physical movement : they concern the qualities of substances, and to some extent resemble the process of breathing, if we may employ such a metaphor in respect of simple substances.

Still greater light is thrown on the nature of motion involved in 'temporal' gyrations by a study of the phenomenon of the consciousness of the 'present,' which all living beings are familiar with. Reflection reveals the fact that our awareness of the present moment is the feeling of a certain type of intensity, or rhythm, of being, which fades away as we endeavour to arrest it, but only to reappear immediately as the next 'now' of duration. There is a diffusion of attention or of its intensity in one moment, and a gathering up or

re-charging of it in the next. Life stoops, as it were, to conquer duration every moment, and rises conscious of its triumph each time. Awareness of the progress in Time, then, is the awareness of an alternating, yet continuous, rhythm of Life,—intense, less intense, *i.e.*, vanishing, and again intense. Now if we bear in mind the fact that Life is itself a kind of force or rhythm, we must say that its alternating intensities are only its own qualitative movements, in the course of which it constantly gathers fresh momentum for its future gyrations in Time.

As a substance which assists other things in performing their 'temporal' gyrations, Time can be conceived only in the form of whirling posts. That these whirling posts, as we have called the units of Time, cannot, in any manner, be conceived as parts of the substances that revolve round them, is obvious from the fact that they are necessary for the continuance of all other substances, including souls and atoms of matter which are simple ultimate units, and cannot be imagined as carrying a pin each to revolve upon. Time must, therefore, be conceived as a separate substance which assists* other substances and things in their movements of continuity.

Now, since things continue in all parts of the *Lokakasa*, it further follows that Time must be present at every conceivable point of space in that region. Time, then, may be said to be a substance consisting of a countless number of points or pins, each of which

* The question, 'on what does Time itself revolve?' does not arise, for its units revolve on themselves. If Time were to depend on another substance for its continuance, and that substance on another, and so forth, the series would be interminable, and we would ultimately have to acknowledge that among the substances in existence there must be a particular one which revolves on itself and also assists in the revolution of others. Suppose we posit $t_1, t_2, t_3 \dots$ as the series of substances of which t_1 is the cause of the revolution of the particles of matter and the other known substances, t_2 of t_1 , and so forth. Then, in the light of the above observations, T is a substance the units of which exist in the form of whirling posts and depend on themselves for their own revolution. Now, since T furnishes us with whirling posts, and is also endowed with self-continuity, the rest of the series, t_1, t_2, t_3 , etc., have absolutely no purpose to serve in existence. Hence, T alone is to be recognised; and since it is endowed with all the qualities necessary in the substance of Time, it follows that it is Time itself.

occupies but one point of the region of space known as the *Lokākāśa*. As such, its particles cannot be conceived as forming compounds with one another, or with other substances. For this reason it is called a non-*astikaya*, that is, as not extending beyond a solitary *pradeśa* (an imaginary point in space of the size of the smallest particle or atom).

The distinction between pure 'be-ness' and continuity of 'being,' it may be pointed out here, is not purely imaginary, or a mere matter of words; there is a real difference between the two terms and it lies in the fact that the suggestion of functioning present in the latter state is altogether wanting in the former. This is, however, so only so far as words are concerned. In nature 'to be' and 'to continue to be' must mean the same thing so far as simple substances are concerned, since to be in concrete existence is in reality only to function. In other words, pure functionless 'be-ness' is absolutely unthinkable by the mind, so that existence cannot be ascribed to what is devoid of all function. *Continuity* of function, then, holds good in respect of all things; and the continuity itself signifies nothing more or less than repeated functioning which must needs have a real cause. It is from this continuity of functioning that motion and change arise. The *Vyavahara* Time, which is nothing but the measure of the interval of regularly recurring events, also springs from the functioning of substances.

The substance of Time is called *nischaya* Time by the Jaina philosophers, to distinguish it from the *Vyavahara* (practical) time which, as said before, is not a substance, but only a measure of duration—hours, days and the like.

It is this *vyavahāra* aspect of Time which is said to be given *a priori* to the knowing consciousness, as Kant and Schopenhauer* maintain. But this only means that Time is not an object of perception, being essentially a form of innate thought.

Struck with the similarity between regularly recurring events and a wheel, the ancients described Time as a *chakra* (wheel), and called it *Kāla*, the mover. And, because all bodies are liable to dissolution of form in due course of time, and because decrease only

* See 'Kant's Philosophy as Rectified by Schopenhauer.' by M. Kelly.

signifies the dissolution of form which results from the operation of energy, *i.e.*, motion, Time (*Kāla*) also came to be regarded as the Destroyer.

From the foregoing explanation of the nature of Time, it is obvious that no philosophy which ignores the elements of continuity and succession can ever succeed in solving its mystery. Most of the philosophies of the world have taken it to be synonymous with succession, and, consequently, failed to understand its true nature. Some have even gone the length of eliminating it from the list of existing substances, forgetting that things continue and undergo changes of form only in Time, not otherwise. In one of its aspects, then, Time is the source of continuity, and in the other the force which makes it impossible for things to leap over succession and orderliness, by making them travel, point by point, or step by step, on the path of evolution. Take away Time as an all-pervading force from the universe, replace it in the form of capsules of energy in the individuals, and you destroy the possibility of succession, *i.e.*, orderly causation, at a stroke, since in a world, without Time things might well occur and vanish like the beautiful palace of Alladin of the Wonderful Lamp. Remove Time altogether from the world, and you stop its evolution instantaneously, since no world-process is conceivable where continuity and succession are both conspicuous by their absence. Thus, from one point of view, Time serves as the mainspring of the *perpetuum mobile*, and, from another, keeps back the impish chance from playing its uncanny pranks with men and things in the world.

We must now turn to see what relationship, if any, there may be existing between Time and Space. For some time past the modern mathematical genius has been finding the world of three dimensions rather inadequate to represent its conception of what gives room to all that it imagines to exist in nature. The notion was started at first by certain mystically inclined speculators, who went so far as to imagine that a diagram of a four-dimensional Space could be actually constructed. But there was little or no recognition of their thesis from outside the limited circle in which it was propounded. However,

in quite recent times the theory of relativity is regarded by some to have established a fourth dimension of Space, which it is said is of the nature of Time. This compounding of Space and Time has, in the opinion of certain admirers of the relativity theory, swept away the older notions of men regarding their nature, and the questions, What is Time? Is it real? What is Space? What is the number of its dimensions? What is the relation between the three dimensional Space and Time? etc., etc., have begun to agitate the thoughtful mind seriously. According to the admirers of the theory of relativity there exists a closer relationship between Time and Space than has appeared hitherto, so that the two taken together constitute but one Time-Space reality, which is, consequently, possessed of not three but four dimensions.

The necessity of the fourth dimension may be imagined to lie in the fact that events in nature do not take place at one and the same time for all spectators witnessing them from different parts of the universe. For instance, a fact which is witnessed by an observer stationed on our little globe today might have actually occurred a thousand years back in a distant planet or sun, because light, which is the solitary source of our knowledge of external happenings, takes time to travel through Space. Yet a person who is able to perceive the original happening and, later on, also its subsequent perception by different spectators stationed at different parts of the world, will see both with his mind's eye. For him the past and the future will have a different significance from what they have for ourselves. The past and the future may, therefore, be deemed to co-exist for the Absolute Mind. This gives us our fourth dimension, which, not being spatial, represents Time. To understand the Absolute Consciousness is thus to realize how Time can occupy Space, or, at least, how it can be spatialised. Such is the idea of Time in mathematics, and it differs from anything conceived by the mind hitherto. It is the picture of a Time that occupies Space, displaying the past and the future together! And naturally enough Space itself, that is linked up with this sort of Time, cannot be the Space which humanity has regarded as independent of all notions of Time. This is tantamount to saying that we have to revise our old conceptions of Time and

Space, and, ceasing to look upon them as different, have to recognise them as parts or aspects of but one Time-Space reality.

Such is the trend of the modern speculation about the nature of Time and Space.

The Jaina conception of the world-process and its teaching about existing things makes it, however, clear that Time and Space are two entirely different kinds of realities, each of which performs its own separate and specific function, and neither of which fulfils, wholly, or in part, the function of the other. The function of Space, according to Jainism, is simply to give room to concrete nature, that is to say, to all existing things, and the function of Time is to furnish a measure of duration through the regular recurrence of certain changes and events. This is the *vyavahāra* (practical) Time. The other aspect of Time, which is termed *viśchaya*, is not in point here, and need not be referred to in this connection.

Now, philosophically, it is simply impossible that the past can ever co-exist with the future; for the characteristic of the past is that it has ceased to be in the present, while the future is still to come for the present, that is to say, it is only a possibility in the present. It follows, therefore, that their co-existence can only be imaginary, not real. Even the spectator who witnessed the destruction of a planet a thousand years ago on the spot, and who is again witnessing the same spectacle today from elsewhere, does not really perceive the past and the future laid out side by side, but only the undated evidence of a catastrophe which was not itself devoid of a date. This amounts to saying that it is not permissible in estimating the age of events to attribute them all to the present indiscriminately, so that a wise man will always make an allowance for the time spent by the 'informing' agent in its journey through Space in fixing the dates of the phenomena he witnesses. We can certainly say with respect to the all-embracing consciousness of the Omniscient Soul that the past and the future lie mapped out in His Knowledge in their entirety; but it is not possible to regard even the infinite Knowledge of the Omniscient Siddhatman as a dimension in, or of, Space, or of Time, or of the Time-Space amalgam. For knowledge, whether limited or infinite, is only a kind of feeling—the feeling

of awareness—or affection, hence a state of the perceiving or knowing consciousness, and cannot be imagined as existing outside the being of the knower. Of course in mathematics it is permissible to postulate and lay down a proposition in any form, so long as the concept is not self-contradictory, and also so long as you do not insist positively on an absolute equation between concrete nature and the way you have set out to determine the values of the diverse world-processes mathematically. But it is characteristic of the modern mind that it is apt to sacrifice lucidity of thought to the desire to say something new and big, whereby it is led to the employment of high-sounding terms and sensational catch-phrases, representing things more or less in a topsy-turvy way, so as to be able to arrest the attention of the gaping world.

We now come to the two substances known as Dharma and Adharma. These are the two kinds of Ether which are necessary as a help to *jivas* and matter in their motion and rest respectively. Without Dharma, as an accompanying cause, motion from place to place will be an impossibility in nature, and without Adharma it will not be possible for things in motion to come to rest. It is obvious that things in nature require some kind of a medium for their motion, for, as Haeckel points out (*The Riddle of the Universe*, chap. xii), the idea of action at a distance is quite untenable in philosophy, and is possible only on the supposition that things cross over empty spaces by taking a leap, which is a highly absurd proposition. As regards its structure,

"Ether is not composed of atoms. If it be supposed that it consists of minute homogeneous atoms (for instance, indivisible ethereal particles of a uniform size), it must be further supposed that there is something else between these atoms, either 'empty space' or a third, completely unknown medium, a purely hypothetical 'inter ether'; the question as to the nature of this brings us back to the original difficulty, and so on *ad infinitum*. As the idea of an empty space and an action at a distance is scarcely possible in the present condition of our knowledge. . . . I postulate for Ether a special structure which is not atomistic, like that of ponderable matter, and which may provisionally be called (without further determination) *etheric* or *dynamic* structure."—(*The Riddle of the Universe*.)

This is obviously true; and it is further easy to see that motion being a characteristic of things in all parts of the universe,

its medium should be a substance which fills the entire field of activity. Up to this point Jainism is in full agreement with modern science, its conception of Dharma being purely that of a universal medium of motion—a substance co-extensive with the *Loka* and devoid of parts and interspaces. But when scientists go further, and, in obedience to their monistic aspiration, try to invest their ether with all kinds of attributes, making it out to be even the source of atoms of matter, the Jaina Siddhanta does not endorse their views.

When the confusion which prevails in certain quarters gives way to clarity of thought, it will be recognized that no single substance can perform all the functions which we ascribe to ether at one and the same time. At present, people imagine it to be an all-pervading, non-atomistic medium, circulating internally as a perfect fluid, and possessing a tremendous velocity comparable to that of light. We confess that to us the concept appears to be anything but clear. An infinite substance, very naturally, cannot move 'externally,' but can it move internally? If there is motion in ether, it can be only motion of parts; but then ether is non-atomistic (Haeckel). Thus we have motion of parts of a substance which is, by its very definition, devoid of parts!

It seems to us that the error lies not in the analysis of the functions of things in nature, but in their attribution to one substance. Rather than take up an attitude which throws us into conflict with the laws of clear thought, we ought to recognize that the different functions are performed by different substances, all of which exist, in an interpenetrating manner, in one and the same space. Space would then represent the partless, non-atomistic, extended substance which provides room for all things, Time, the reality or force underlying continuity and succession, *jivas*, the self-conscious beings, and matter,* the atomistic substance, moving about in ether, in consequence of the operation of different kinds of energy.

* Taken in its entirety, the *padgala dravya* of the Jaina Siddhanta might well be described as a 'perfect fluid, circulating internally, and possessing a velocity comparable to that of light.' Now, if we can recall to mind what Dr. Alfred Russell Wallace said on the point—that matter was ultimately traceable to force ('Natural Selection and Tropical Nature')—we can easily see that the ultimate atom would not be unlike a vortex or bubble in such an ocean of dynamic force.

According to the Jaina Siddhanta, *Dharma* possesses none of the specific properties of matter, and is not matter, though essentially a substance; i.e., a self-subsisting reality. It is devoid of all sensible qualities, and cannot be perceived with the senses. *Dharma* is not the cause of motion, but only its medium. As water is helpful in the movements of aquatic animals, but does not set them in motion, so is *Dharma* only a vehicle of motion, but not its originator or cause.

Adharma, like *Dharma*, is also a substance which pervades the whole *lokākāśa*; it, too, is non-atomistic in its structure and devoid of sensible qualities. It is the accompanying cause in the state of rest.

The necessity of *Adharma* as the accompanying cause of rest, that is, of cessation of motion will be clearly perceived by any one who will put to himself the question, how *jīvas* and bodies of matter support themselves when coming to rest from a state of motion. Obviously gravitation will not do, for that is concerned with the determination of the direction which a moving body may take. As a matter of fact we do not even know properly what gravitation is though Sir Isaac Newton* seems to have had a true inkling into the nature of *Adharma* when he ventured a surmise about gravitation being dependent on an ethereal medium pervading space.

Gravitation, however, will not explain the difficulty in the case of pure spirits. This is because that force has really no hold on the *jīva*, whose nature is freedom itself. The *jīva* is, however, rendered vulnerable on account of its association with its body which is subject to gravitation. But even here observation shows that the individual will is endowed with the power to partially annul the operation of gravitation, as in walking, jumping and moving about; and the case with a trained ascetic will is simply astonishing, inasmuch as it brings about the phenomenon of levitation† and enables one to walk through the air, as the ancient records testify. When the soul is completely rid of its load of the impurities of matter, it immediately rises up and goes to the *Siddha Śīla* to take its place among Gods.

* See 'Matter and Motion,' by J. C. Maxwell.

† To some extent the phenomena of levitation have also been recognised by modern research (see the *Law of Psychic Phenomena* and other works dealing with the subject).

It is thus clear that pure spirit is not subject to the operation of gravitation, so that even if that force be regarded as the medium of rest, it will not be available to assist a Redeemed Soul, when it is resting in *nirvana*. That such a medium is necessary may be seen by considering what is involved in its denial; for the Deified Soul who ascends up to *nirvana* at the top of the Universe will then be constantly sliding and rolling about in a state of perpetual un-repose. But this is absurd, and also opposed to the teaching of Religion.

It is now coming to be recognised slowly that when a body is resting alongside of another body it is not resting on that body at all, but on Ether. Sir Oliver Lodge states (in *Ether and Reality*, p. 73):

" a book resting on a table is really reposing on a cushion of Ether."

This is really significant, and most nearly approaches the Jaina conception of the medium of stationariness.

Adharma, then, is a necessary element in the order of nature. Its function, however, is not to bring things to rest, or to interfere with their motion in any way; but only to enable them to become stationary when their motion ceases, from whatsoever cause or causes that might happen.

This finishes our survey of the two substances known as *Dharma* and *Adharma*.

We now pass on to a consideration of the last of the six substances of Jainism known as *pudgala*, or matter, which is illusory according to Vedanta, but a reality according to Jainism. However illusory the matter, it certainly does not come into existence from nowhere. No matter by what name we may ultimately decide to call it, it is something which cannot be ignored. Even if it be regarded as illusory, its reality is not open to dispute, since an illusion is not an absolute non-entity. Look upon it in any way we might, we have to recognize its existence, in some form or other, since there is and can be no creation in the sense of a miracle, i.e., a making of something out of nothing, except that of forms. Matter, however, is not form, but the material basis of all forms.

Jainism points out that matter exists in six different forms, that is, as (1) *suṭṣhṃa-suṭṣhṃa*, or exceedingly fine, (2) *suḷaṣṭhṃa*, that is,

fine, (3) *sthūla-sūkṣma* which is invisible to the eye, but capable of being perceived with some other sense or senses, (4) *sūkṣma-sthūla*, that is, visible to the eye, (5) *sthūla*, i.e., gross, as water, and (6) *sthūla-sthūla*, i.e., exceedingly gross.

There is another aspect of matter known to Jainism as *karma-pudgala*; but we shall refer to it later on when we come to deal with the theory of *karma*. It suffices here to point out that as our thoughts and deeds affect our character, and create, or modify, the tendencies of our souls, *karma* must be recognized to be a force of some kind; for it would be ridiculous to maintain that a thing could be affected by that which had no substantiveness whatsoever.

The next question in connection with matter is, whether it is a single substance or composed of parts. The cinematographical view of the universe tends to suggest, at first sight, that matter might be one substance only, but if we probe a little deeper into its nature we at once find that that view is confined to the faculty of simple perception with which intellect does not concur in this instance, on the ground that the pictures themselves, as distinguished from our perceptions of them, must be composed of parts, hence of atomistic matter, or particles. Besides, it is a self-evident truth that since material things can be cut into pieces, they must be made of parts. The difficulty arises only when we take our stand at the beginning of a supposed world-process, and, assuming the existence of matter as a given unit, try to find out how that unit could be cut up into atoms. Hence Sāṅkhya which posits indiscrete *prakṛiti* at the beginning of a world-process or evolution, and all those other schools which have substituted fanciful terms—e.g., *ākāśa* of the Yoga system—for *pudgala* (matter) have had to explain it as indescribable. We seem to get a great insight into the nature of things by working out the genesis of matter from a supposed source; but the moment we ask how it could come out of a place where it did not exist before, the whole edifice falls to the ground, leaving us with the infinity of particles, as constant reals. It is immaterial what the nature of these particles is; they may be pure vibrations, or vortices in some kind of force, or anything else; they certainly are not parts of an

indivisible whole. We must, therefore, make up our minds to regard matter as consisting of an infinite number of particles.

According to Jainism, matter, like other substances, is only a bundle of qualities. Qualities, or *gunas*, are those which inhere in substances, as materiality exists in all atoms and bodies of matter. It is not correct to say that qualities can exist by themselves. There are many qualities, but six are the more important. These are: (1) existence, (2) enjoyability or utility, (3) substantiveness, (4) knowability, (5) specific or identity-rhythm, i.e., the force which prevents a substance from becoming transformed into another, and (6) the quality of possessing some kind of form.

These are some of the general qualities; besides them, there are special or individual qualities which exist only in special forms, combinations, or individuals, such as snow-whiteness, lily-whiteness, and the like.

A little reflection will show that the six general qualities enumerated above exist not only in matter, but in all the six substances. In addition to the above, each of the six substances also possesses its special quality, e.g., space has the quality of finding room for and containing all things. The general qualities, therefore, are to be conceived as if constituting the substratum of matter and other substances which exist in nature. Hence, matter ought to be defined as that which has a certain number of general qualities in common with other substances, and also as that which is composed of an infinity of particles, each of which is pervaded by the general qualities, as mentioned above.

Further light is thrown on the nature of matter with reference to the quality of enjoyability, or utility. *Jīva* is the perceiver and enjoyer, and matter, the object of perception and enjoyment. Hence the relation between them is that of subject and object.

The common element between the subject and the object of perception consists of special qualities, as for instance, the common element between the eye, which is the perceiver of form, and its object is colour. For the eye is adapted to respond to colour which is a property of matter. Now, since the sense-organs are only the exteriorized faculties, or functions of the *jīva*, the

elements which render perception of all objects possible must exist in the constitution of the soul itself. But these can exist in the soul only as subjective capacities not as sensible qualities, as they do outside.

Here, also, it is apparent that the special qualities of matter, that is, sound, colour,* taste, smell, and *sparsa* (tactile properties, i.e., heat, cold, and the like) correspond to the pleasure-extracting qualities of the *jiva*. For this reason, the disparity between the subjective qualities of the soul and the objective elements outside in the world is not absolute; in other words, the power to vibrate of the *jiva* stands in about the same relation to the vibrations of matter as does the subject of perception to the object to be perceived. This tallies remarkably with the view from the standpoint of Idealism, according to which matter is nothing but a bundle of sensible qualities, projected outwardly. Jainism, thus, fully explains away the causes of the old enmity existing between Realism and Idealism, and brings them together on a common platform by its *anekānta* method of investigation.

The eternity of souls as well as matter being established, it now becomes necessary to analyse the nature of their interaction. To understand this fully, we must turn our attention to the quality known as *agurulaghutva*, which is defined as that property of substances which maintains them as they are, and prevents their being converted into other things. This is nothing other than the special rhythm of each substance which is maintained in its own nature by the intensity of its vibrations, though allowed considerable scope for fluctuations of *intension* within certain limits. In virtue of this property of things, the union of different substances results neither in the destruction of an old nor in the creation of a new substance, for

* According to Jainism the colours are black, blue, red, yellow, and white. Of these the first and the last were generally not recognized as primary colours by European scientists. But Prof. Hering of Leipzig has recently shown that white is as much a simple quality (colour) as yellow, both being unanalyzable. As for black, Prof. Hering points out that when we look at a black surface surrounded by white we experience a positive sensation of blackness, not a mere gap in the field of visual sensation (*Physiological Psychology* by W. McDougall, p. 70). It may be added that Prof. Hering's hypothesis has already been accepted by many physiologists in Europe.

that would be a miracle, but in the fusion of their elements into a new form.

It is also worthy of note that the interaction between the different substances is possible only on the hypothesis that they should stand to each other in certain relationship which would draw them towards each other, and the modifications of form and function require that two or more substances should become interlocked in each other's embrace, giving rise to a new set of qualities as the resultant of their compounding.

We may now enquire into the nature of the force which brings about the interlocking between the soul and matter. Obviously, knowledge is not that force, because one may know a thing without actually being compelled to be locked up in its embrace, though knowledge, too, needs a material stimulus in the case of unemancipated souls, to arise in consciousness. And, so far as the power of omniscience of the *Siddhātman* is concerned, the whole universe is reflected in His consciousness, as in a mirror, without involving Him in bondage, in the least degree. Thus, the force which brings about the close association between *jīva* and matter can only be that which springs from their relationship in respect of enjoyment alone. But this depends entirely on the desires of the *jīva*, because matter can have no longing for enjoyment. Furthermore, the *jīva*, too, is impervious to this force by nature, since every *jīva* does not run after every kind of enjoyment, and also since one may give up particular forms of enjoyments and even sense-indulgence altogether. Thus, the union between *jīva* and matter only takes place when the former is actuated by a desire for the enjoyment of sense-objects, and, conversely, matter can affect the soul only when it is rendered vulnerable by its desires.

It follows from this that the soul remains liable to be influenced by matter only so long as it exists in a state of weakness. It is owing to the influence of material impurities that it wanders about in the *samsāra*, seeking pleasure and joy. Itself the subject of knowledge, it wanders about like a query—'?'—trying to define itself, and, under the blinding influence of matter, again and again, identifies itself with its body. Its natural rhythm of freedom is consequently unable to assert itself, and undergoes all kinds of changes—the number of

their types has been estimated at 84,00,000—in the course of transmigration. When the *jivic* consciousness vibrates in harmony with the rhythm of its physical personality, it can only extract such pleasures from life as are possible to a *jiva* vibrating at that low level. The joy of life increases as it raises the tone of its rhythm to higher potencies, the most perfect of which may be called the Tirthamkara, or God-rhythm.

In connection with the subject of the inflow of matter into souls, it is to be borne in mind that they are involved in bondage from beginningless time. If it were otherwise, we should have either a creation of souls, or the descending of a perfect *jiva*, i.e., God, to enter into crippling relations with matter, to His own detriment. But both these propositions are untenable in philosophy. A third alternative which may be put forward is that the *jivas* are locked up in some air-tight compartment, and that a certain number of them is sent out into the world, from time to time, to undergo evolution. Here again the question arises: is this air-tight compartment full of pure souls, or of those involved in impurity? But the former alternative is untenable, because the soul in its natural purity is a God, and cannot be kept locked up anywhere; and the latter directly supports our case, and points to Nigoda as the store-house of unevolved *jivas*. It is thus clear that no beginning can be ascribed to the bondage, i.e., the condition of negativity of souls. The effect of negativity is that souls remain liable to be influenced by matter, from which they constantly try to extract joy according to their capacities. This leads to the fusion of spirit with subtle molecules of matter (*karma pudgala*), resulting in a continuance of the bondage. For just as gaseous matter is robbed of its gaseous nature in consequence of becoming converted into water, so does the soul feel helpless in the clutches of matter.

The Arya-Samajist's conception of *moksha* as an impermanent state, it must be now evident, is unentertainable philosophically; for there is no force capable of overpowering the Redeemed *Jiva* in *nirvana* and of dragging Him down from that High and Holy Seat. As for desire, the Omniscient Siddhāntmans not only know it to be the arch-enemy of souls, but can also have no longing for the 'good' things

of the world being placed too high above the temptations of the 'flesh,' by the conscious enjoyment of the state of bliss which is the natural property of Their pure and purified Souls. Thus, there is no possibility of a 'fall' in Their case. The important thing to note in this connection is the principle or law that the bondage of *hormas* is really the bondage of desires, so that where there is no desire on the part of the soul itself there can be no entering into bondage for it. In different language, no one can force a soul into bondage, just as no one can set it free from it. Our conclusion, then, is that the notion of *nirvana* as a temporary state is altogether untenable in philosophy, and must be rejected as devoid of merit.

It might be urged that all that exists in Time and Space is subject to causality and therefore liable to change: but the argument is an instance of that perversity of metaphysical thought which delights in making sweeping generalizations regardless of facts. For it is the purest assumption to say that all that exists in Time and Space is liable to change, at least till so long as one does not prove that the Siddhatmans are also liable to experience a 'fall' from Their high status. As for causality, its idea has been so much confounded by the use of technicalities in modern times that one finds it a relief to rely upon the voice of common sense in preference to the learned discourses of metaphysicians. Introspection here reveals the fact that the mind has a tendency, born of practical observation and nourished by actual experience, to look out for the cause or causes of events, and declines to believe that the relationship of cause and effect does not govern the whole range of occurrences in the world. This is one of the senses in which the word causality is employed. Besides this, causality also implies the action of energy upon a body, as in the melting of snow by the heat of the Sun. In this instance the heat of the Sun is called the operative and snow the material cause of the resulting stream of water. There is another significance of the word which implies the idea of an agent, as a potter is said to be the cause of the pot which he makes from clay. The principle of causality, however, depends upon the nature and properties of substances, and on their coming together in one place and at one time under certain specified conditions. Beyond this there is nothing

in the conception of causality to authorize its interference with rational thought.

Applying the true principles of causation to the problem about the eternity of *moksha*, it may be seen at a glance that so far as the idea of agency is concerned, there is no one to force an Emancipated Soul into the state of bondage and transmigration afresh, for there are no higher beings than Gods, and They cannot be imagined as engaged in forcing one another into captivity, being living embodiments of Renunciation. With reference to the instrumental or operative cause, also there is no force capable of operating on a pure Spirit; and matter cannot approach and overpower a soul whose consciousness is unsullied and unimpregnated with desire. In short, causality has no hold on the Redeemed Soul, who must be deemed to exist as such for all eternity. We may now say that with respect to the high and sublime status of the Saved One there is a beginning but no end, but as regards the bondage of the unemancipated soul there is no beginning but an end, except where the possibility of the attainment of *nirvana* is excluded by the malignity of individual *karmas*, in which case there is neither a beginning nor an end to its thralldom.

In respect of the world-process it is to be further observed that the evolution of *jivas* proceeds from the lowest to the highest types of rhythm, or states, not in the precise order which a careless perusal of the story of the 'fall' would seem to suggest. That legend is useful only in so far as it points to the latent divinity of the soul, but not any farther. It is true that there is a great deal of rise and fall in the status of the *jiva* in the course of its transmigration, but the two ends of the line, the one marked by the condition of *nigoda* and the other by the Perfection of Gods, are unalterably fixed. As a matter of fact, the author of the legend of the 'fall' did not intend to suggest that a perfect God had fallen into the state of wretchedness and sin, but that the story was to be taken as a reminder of the latency of godly virtues and power within the soul. Hence, the *jiva* who, having attained to the human status, does not try to realise his divinity, but becomes absorbed in the pursuit of sensual gratification, may truly be said to experience a fall. It is

the employment of the intellect to pander to the animal passions and carnal appetites which constitutes the fall. Man is a thinking being and has the Ideal of greatness put before him, but when he discards it in favour of a brute's existence and falls from the position of the thinker to that of the sensualist, he experiences a fall from a higher to a lower status. It is with difficulty that one obtains birth as a man in the course of transmigration; but having obtained it, if one again live the life of a brute, there is no other word for it than 'Fall.'

According to Kapila, the founder of the Sankhyan philosophy, evolution is really an involution, in the first instance, so that the Puruṣa, i.e., pure Spirit, first of all descends into matter, and becomes ensouled in it, evolving out the intellect, *ahaṁkāra*, and the like one after another. But this is quite untenable; since absolutely no reason can be found for the descent of an Omniscient Being into matter, to undergo the pain and suffering of an unimaginably prolonged bondage. Besides, the Sankhyan philosophy, though based on the hypothesis of an alternation of cycles of manifestation and destruction of the universe, nowhere accounts for the souls which remain unevolved at the end of a world cycle, nor for those who obtain eternal emancipation. The latter cannot become involved in transmigration afresh, and must exist somewhere freed from the trammels of *samsāra*; and the former cannot disappear from existence altogether. Their impure nature will prevent them from rising to the *Siddha Śilā*, so that they must remain somewhere in the *samsāra* itself.

Moreover, it is permissible to ask, what might be the significance of Puruṣa? Is it a quality, or a being? If the former, it cannot exist by itself, since qualities require a substratum of substance to inhere in. If the latter, that is, a being, how is the multiplicity of souls to be explained? They surely are neither non-existent, nor reflections of any particular being. If it be now conceded that there is a multiplicity of *puruṣas*, then arises the great difficulty about their becoming all involved in alternate involution and evolution at one and the same time. But Sankhya has nothing to say to this in reply.

We thus conclude that the notion of an alternation of involution and evolution is as untenable as that of the creation of the universe at the fiat of a world-making god.

To sum up, the elucidation of the mystery of Existence has led us into the profoundest secrets of Metaphysics and Religion. Looking into the nature of the world-process, we have seen how each theory set up by the leading Schools of Thought is but a partial view of the whole subject, which is dealt with in its entirety in Jainism alone. Thus, Vedanta, while endeavouring to furnish the *raison d'être* of the process, fails to describe the mechanism of Maya and the nature of the material necessary for the manufacturing of the visible universe. Its definition of Reality is also somewhat involved, and not definite enough to enable one to escape from the intellectual pitfalls which abound in the region of Metaphysics. Buddhism, too, commits the same blunder. It lays all the stress it can on the principle of becoming, but denies that there can be any such thing as 'being.' When we turn to the scriptures of the mystic creeds we encounter the same difficulty: these sacred books have nothing more to offer than mysticism and dogma of which reason is heartily sick by this time. As regards the speculations of European philosophers, they avowedly do not go to the root of the matter, and wherever they pretend to do so, they are easily seen to be incomplete and one-sided. Materialism, on its very face, has no leg to stand upon at the bar of philosophy, and we pass it by accordingly.

We thus turn away from every door, with disappointment, and enquire of Jainism whether it has any satisfactory solution to offer of the riddle which has baffled every one without exception. It at once introduces us to its six Realities without whose aid nothing but confusion can be created. Their nature, properties, and modes of working have already been sufficiently discussed; and it is surmised that the explanation will suffice to satisfy the natural human thirst for a perfect understanding of the world-process, in conformity with the strictest demands of reason.

With the aid of its most exact metaphysics, Jainism enables us to comprehend, in the fullest possible measure, how the universe is eternal and composed of six substances, and how their interaction

is the cause of the world-process. It gives us a true insight into the idea of God, and explains how the individual soul may aspire to the high and sublime status of the Holy Ones. Jainism also enables us to unravel the meaning of myths and other sacred traditions, and, on account of the many-sidedness of its philosophy, is the sole means of establishing the truth underlying all creeds, each of which has fallen into error on account of the one-sided absolutism of its philosophical outlook. In short, Jaina philosophy may be said to furnish a common platform where all other creeds may meet, and grasp each other's hands in the sincere grip of friendship.

The value of philosophy as the only means of salvation cannot be exaggerated. Myths only make us superstitious, and mysticism produces intellectual fog and mist. It is clear thinking alone which can lead us into the region of Light and Life for which every soul is athirst. History shows how truth entombed in the sepulchre of myth and legend is soon lost to view and replaced by unholy superstition and purblind bigotry, so often mistaken for faith. The purpose these myths serve is great, but, when all is said and done, they are useful to him alone who can understand their significance. The soul is hankering after the realization of the great Ideal of Perfection, that is, Godhood, but the theologians have nothing better than mystic and misty dogmas to console it with. They have nothing but stones to give in place of the bread that we want. The realization of Goodhood requires the conception of Truth, i.e., the Ideal to be attained, and the knowledge of the means to attain it with, in the clearest possible way. That mythology, which is nothing if not the labyrinthine maze of obscurity, can ever help the unphilosophical in the elucidation of Truth and clarity of thought, is beyond conjecture. It follows from this that religion can only benefit where it is conducive to precise and clear thinking. The attempt to educate the masses by means of myths and legends has been given a sufficient trial, but it has only gone to make men irreligious at heart. It is high time now that Truth was imparted to them in its pure undisguised form. The fault with us, is that we are always ready to set up ourselves as teachers without ever having been students ourselves. When we approach Religion as humble seekers

after the truth, and not in the spirit of bigotry or conceit, it will be seen that Jainism stands unrivalled among the systems which claim to impart the truth.

CHAPTER XI

THE COMING OF THE MESSIAH

”دیکھو اگر دیکھنا ہے فرق کہ وہ پردہ نشیں - دیدہٴ ورژن دل سے ہے دکھائی دیتا

“The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God : and if children, then heirs : heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ ; if so be that we suffer with *him*, that we may be also glorified together.”—*Romans, viii.* 16-17.

The advent of the coming Messiah, the Redeemer divine, is an event for the signs of which almost every mystic's eye is constantly turned heavenward. The belief is to be found in almost every system of mythology, no apocalyptic religion being altogether free from its influence, though different names are given by different creeds to the Saviour who is to come. Thus, Hinduism has its Kalki, Islam its Mehdi, Theosophy its Maitrai and Christianity its Christ. This difference of nomenclature, however, does not affect the function of the coming Messiah who is expected in each and every instance to establish a new order of things by redeeming the faithful and by destroying the foe. Many and varied are the prophecies which foretell the coming of the 'Lord,' and history records the names of some of the men who have claimed to be the coming Messiah themselves. Even today a full-fledged Messiah is being chaperoned, and proclaimed from housetops by his well-wishers. It would thus appear that the belief in the coming of the Messiah is not confined to any particular sect or section of men, but prevails among all classes of mystics ; and the ridicule which men have drawn upon themselves in connection with the coming of the looked-for Saviour goes to show that even this little matter has not been properly understood by them. The truth is that the coming Messiah is as much a myth as any other tenet of mysti-

* “ If thou wouldst, O Zauk, behold that glorious one behind the Veil,

“ Than peep through the hole in thy heart ! ”

cism ; it certainly bears no reference to any particular human or super-human being whose descent on earth might be expected to put an end to the prevailing evil. The tenet represents a pure doctrinal allegory, depicting, in metaphorical garb, the fact of the attainment of divine perfection by the individual soul. There being no source of true happiness in the external world, it is simply impossible for any one to establish an order of things of the kind that will bring lasting good to the soul or be permanently satisfactory to all. Certainly, bliss is not to be culled from one's environment and surroundings, being nothing other than the natural emotion of pure joy which arises in the soul when it is no longer obsessed with the thought of the other than itself. As already pointed out more than once, there can be no happiness for the soul if it happen to be barren in itself. The coming Messiah must, therefore, spring up from within, if he is to confer happiness on the soul. The soul that is freed from the taint of its wrong beliefs is its own Saviour, and the Liberator that is to come. The advent of the Messiah which so many pious people are looking forward to, thus, means neither more nor less than a vision of their own Soul. In this sense alone is it possible to put any sensible construction on the statement of Jesus: "Verily I say unto you, There be some standing here, which shall not taste of death, till they see the Son of man coming in his kingdom" (Matt. xvi. 28). Any other interpretation would make it a piece of falsehood. The use of the word 'some' indicates that the sight was one not open to all alike, and, therefore, was not an historical event in the physical world. Nor was the spectacle timed to happen on or about the 'Judgment Day'; for it was to be witnessed during the lifetime of some of those who stood by at the time.

What Jesus meant was the consciousness of one's own soul as the great and glorious Self and the enjoyer of bliss. For it is the 'vision' of one's true Self which is the immediate cause of redemption, not that of another of however exalted a position.

It was pointed out in the seventh chapter of this book that yoga aimed at securing the vision of the Self for the *yogi*. We did not then enter into the intricacies of the process, but the time has now come to describe it in detail.

When the aspirant has perfected himself in the preliminary training, and has no longings left in his mind for sensual enjoyments, he is qualified for the vision of the Self.

Now, the seer is not the eye, but the soul; for the eye is an obstruction to its unlimited vision, being attuned to a certain type of vibrations alone. This seer is the dweller immortal in the body, and not the body or the organs of the senses. Hence the Upaniṣad teaches: "Here within the heart is a cavity; therein he resides who is the Lord of the universe" ('The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads,' p. 169). It is the vision of this Dweller in the Cavity of the Heart which is to be secured for emancipation. But this is impossible till the veils of matter covering the Atman and obscuring its vision are not torn to pieces. Self-perception, therefore, consists in the withdrawal of attention from the outside world and the throwing back of the will on itself. This is a process in which the organs of sight also play an important part. In the normal condition, the eyes are turned outwards, and enable us to perceive external objects alone, but at times, they also converge slightly upward and inward, as in the attitude of prayer; and when they do so we are enabled to see visions. How this happens is not difficult to understand. The peculiar upward, inward convergence of the eyes disengages the attention from the physical plane, and makes it penetrate the veils of finer matter, the astral, the mental, and the like, as they are called by certain modern mystics.

The Yogi aims at throwing his gaze inwardly with the full force of concentration till it is fixed on the plexus in the brain, within which is situated the pineal gland, which, according to some, is an incipient eye. This 'third eye,' when developed, enables the Yogis to look into the cavity of the heart, which is the abode of the Lord. Remembering that vision is not in the eye but in the soul, the version of the Yogis, when put into simple language, means that when by controlling the mind one prevents its outward flow, and throws it back on itself, it sees the Ātman face to face in the cavity of the heart. By the time the Yogi has acquired the power of fixing his attention on the point of concentration, his eye-balls have become accustomed to turn the

angle and remain steady in the attitude of introspection, without feeling strained.

Exactly in the proportion in which the Yogi's power of concentration gains in intensity, does his feeling of warmth and intimacy in his physical body decrease, so that when the intensity of concentration is able to destroy the veils of matter from the face of the Eternal Light Divine in the heart, the small remnant of interest in the external world, which might be still lingering in the mind, is completely destroyed for ever, and the glory of the soul now deified by the elimination of the karmic filth, is immediately perceived. This is the delight of God-vision of the earnest devotee, and the joy of seeing the Lord of the mystic. The Shiva Samhita thus describes an earlier stage of this process :—

“ When the yogi thinks of the great Soul, after rolling back his eyes and concentrates his mind to the forehead, then he can perceive the lustre from the great Soul. That great yogi, who even for a moment has seen the beauty of the Omniscient and all-pervading Soul, frees himself from sin and attains salvation.”

Thus, when by the supreme effort of his will the Yogi throws his concentrated gaze to penetrate beyond the veil of 'illusion,' so as to be able to contemplate his Soul, in its naked effulgence, his evil *karmas* are destroyed, resulting in the acquisition of omniscience and other kinds of divine attributes. This means liberation full and complete in all respects, except, that *nirvana* is not reached so long as the physical body is not dissolved, setting the soul free to ascend to the Abode of Gods.

We are now ready to enquire into the significance of the Biblical statement about the coming of the Son of man. The 'prophecy' is one of those mystic doctrines that could not be propounded in plainer terms, and which was liable to be misunderstood for that reason. Its literal reading was calculated to engender the belief that the Kingdom of God that was being preached should immediately appear (Luke xix. 11). To remove this impression, Jesus propounded the parable of the nobleman who gave some money to each of his ten servants and left for a far-off country. He returned home from his journey after a long time, and called for the accounts of

their investments. Now, nine of the servants had employed the moneys entrusted to them profitably, but one had not. The master was pleased with the good servants who were suitably rewarded; but the wicked one was made to refund what he had received. This parable was spoken to illustrate the principle that 'unto every one which hath shall be given; and from him that hath not, even that he hath shall be taken' (Luke xix. 12-26). This, then, is the fate in reserve for those who do not avail themselves of the present opportunity to control their destiny; they are in great danger of losing even what they enjoy today; in other words, of falling into the lower grades of life in the future.

On another occasion Jesus declared: "If a man love me, he will keep my words: and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him" (John xiv. 23). Here is the key to the situation: Christ will come to each and every one who keeps his word, and will take his abode with him, and because the Father 'loves whomsoever the Son loves,' the Father will also take up his abode with him. Jesus could not have meant that he would come back bodily into the world from heaven. How could he bring the Father with him? Again, how could the abode be taken, regardless of time and place with each and every devotee all the world over? The truth is that the kingdom of God "cometh not with observation, . . . for behold, it is within you" (Luke, xvii. 20-21).

When sending out his disciples to preach the gospel to the 'lost sheep,' Jesus prophesied: "Verily I say unto you, ye shall not have gone over the cities of Israel till the Son of man be come" (Matt. x. 23). Now, this prophecy is just as important as the one which is under consideration. The question is, has it been fulfilled? That it did not refer to Jesus does not admit of doubt, for Jesus was already there with them, and had not to come from anywhere. Therefore, if we are to interpret the expression, the Son of man, as referring to Jesus, this prophecy did not and could not come off; in other words, it was a piece of information of a past event gratuitously furnished in the future tense. But if we read the expression in the sense of the quickening of the germ of Godhood within men, its

sense not only becomes clear but most appropriate also. For, as St. Paul says, as many as are led by the spirit of God, are the sons of God (Romans viii. 14). What can be more appropriate for the Master when sending out his disciples to preach the gospel to the people than to encourage and inspire them with the hope that they would see the signs of the unfoldment of the germ of Divinity among men, before they got half through their work?

In determining the nature of the prophecy about the coming Messiah, the first question which naturally arises relates to its authenticity, since impartial Biblical scholars are agreed upon its being a subsequent interpolation. Perhaps the endeavour to make the statement as much repugnant to history as possible by the introduction of the symbolism of the holy city in the midst of the original observations, on the subject, is, more than anything else, responsible for the doubt that has prevailed amongst the unprejudiced section of the Biblical scholars about its authenticity. This circumstance, however, only tends to fix the date of the gospel, and leaves the question of the cash-value of the teaching untouched. The words used by Luke (xxi. 20): "And when ye shall see Jerusalem compassed with armies, then know that the desolation thereof is nigh," inserted in the middle of the chapter, are the most significant, and furnish a strong argument against the authenticity and genuineness of the passage under consideration. In our opinion, however, the siege of Jerusalem has nothing to do with the genuineness of the prophecy, inasmuch as Jerusalem would appear to be a time-honoured symbolism, as in the Epistle to Galatians (see chap. iv. 25-26). Besides, most of its verses are so full of the true spirit of allegory that they carry the stamp of genuineness with them. And, if we add to this the fact that true philosophy furnishes a complete explanation of the subject and explains away the absurdity which is met with in its orthodox interpretation, the conclusion is irresistible that the idea of 'forgery' cannot be entertained for a moment in connection with it.

The statement made by teacher can be very easily understood. He was asked as to the signs of the coming of the Son of man, i.e., of the kingdom of heaven. That these two expres-

sions, 'the Son of man,' and the 'kingdom of heaven,' were used interchangeably, in the same sense, is rendered clear by a comparison of such verses as Mark ix. 1, Matthew x. 23 and xvi. 28, and Luke ix. 27. In reply, Jesus warned his followers not to listen to the false prophets and Christs who would arise in the external world, from time to time. This, as a matter of fact, shuts out the hypothesis of his own return in a literal sense. As to the signs of the coming of the Son of man, they were told to wait patiently for them. They would see wars, famines, persecution of the righteous, and all sorts of other calamities on the earth, but they must patiently possess their souls (Luke xxi. 19), for the end is not yet (Mark xiii. 7). They must wait and watch like the good servant for the coming of the master, for no one knoweth when he would come (Matt. xxiv. 46 and 47). It is a wicked servant who turns away from the path of rectitude and ill-treats his fellow-servants, because of the delay in the coming of the Lord (Matt. xxiv. 49). One who desires to enter into the kingdom of heaven must, therefore, constantly remain on the alert, for no one knows of the day or the hour when his opportunity will come, 'not even the angels of heaven, but the Father only' (Matt. xxiv. 36). When there be signs in the sun* and the moon and the stars, and the very powers of heaven seem shaken, then will appear the sign † of the Lord, like a flash of lightning, which, while shining in one part, illumines the whole heaven; then shall be seen the "Son of man coming in a cloud with power and great glory" (Luke xxi. 27).

* The precise significance of such things as the Sun and the Moon in the mystery-language of symbolism would appear from the following brief extract from the Permanent History of Bharatvarsha (vol. I. p. 286):—

"The Ida or current of breath through the left nostril is technically called the Moon, and Pingala on the right is known as the Sun. The passing of the breath from the right to the left is also technically known among philosophers as Uttarayana. The reverse is Dakshinayana. The junction of Ida and Pingala is Amavasya or new moon. When the life-breath reaches Moladharà, it is Vishuva, or the New Year's day. When the life breath passes to Kundalini through Ida, it is Lunar Eclipse, and through Pingala it is Solar Eclipse."

† The sign of the Son of man (the state of Perfection) is omniscience, which reveals the entirety of the field of knowledge.

'Thus shall it be in the day when the Son of man is *revealed*' (Luke xvii. 30). Then one may lift up his head, for his redemption is near (Luke xxi. 28). Thus 'he that shall endure unto the end, the same shall be saved' (Matt. xxiv. 13). The whole statement is intended to be a great secret, and its significance is made to depend on the warning: "*whoso readeth, let him understand*" (Matt. xxiv. 15).

Now, we saw in connection with yoga that it is only when the mind is disgusted with fleshly lusts that the Yogi can hope to attain salvation, and it was pointed out, in the chapter on Yoga, that a tremendous amount of action takes place, as a result of spiritual training, in the nervous system, displacing many important nerve currents of the face and the head, in particular, those of the spinal column. It is due to these changes that the roots of bondage and *samsāra* are loosened and destroyed. The change brought about by the alteration of the pole or centre of being is so great that many misguided persons have come to grief through it. This change of polarity has the effect of arranging the mind particles in a manner akin to the process of magnetisation of a bar of steel. The old percepts are all upset; the sun seems to lose its light, the moon its brightness; the stars are seen to fall, making the very heavens shake and tremble; and visions of all sorts float before the eyes. When these signs appear, the point of concentration should be placed in the heart, or, as Jesus put it, one should 'stand in the holy place,' with the injunction: '*whoso readeth, let him understand*' (Matt. xxiv. 15). This state of affairs is the prelude to the vision divine, but Nirvana is not yet, inasmuch as it is a step beyond this stage. Every Yogi knows what this change of polarity in the nervous system means. The sceptic need only strain the nerves connected with his organs of sight, for a little while, to see the *stars*! We can now understand why Jesus said: "Verily I say unto you: This generation shall not pass, till all these things be fulfilled. Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away" (Matt. xxiv. 34 and 35).

His last declaration that not a hair of the head of those who possessed their souls in patience, in spite of calamities, tribula-

tions and disasters, should perish (Luke xxi. 18), if anything emphasizes his doctrine. Believe in your immortality and the power of the soul, and no harm can befall you, till, conquering death, you ascend to your true abode—the blissful Heaven of the *Jinas* (Conquerors, hence, Gods).

The injunction,

“ In that day, he which shall be upon the housetop, and his staff in the house, let him not come down to take it away : and he that is in the field, let him not likewise return back.”—(Luke xvii. 31)—

simply means that the desire for all worldly concerns must be given up at that supreme moment when the urge of the Holy Ghost (*Pairagya*) is felt by the soul ; for “ wheresoever the carcass [the bundle of the objects of desire] is, there will the eagles [desiring *manas*] be gathered together [attracted].” “ Remember Lot’s wife” (Luke xvii. 32), for as she was turned into a column of salt, in consequence of her looking back on the world, so shall all those who ‘ look back ’ be accounted unworthy to obtain salvation.

There is no question in all this of a public or official redeemer of souls, or of the establishment of a new order of things on a general resurrection of the dead.

There is no trace of an universal resurrection, on a particular day, even in the following mystic passages which were uttered in connection with the coming of the son of man :—

“ In that night there shall be two men in one bed ; the one shall be taken and the other shall be left.

“ Two women shall be grinding together ; the one shall be taken, and the other left.

“ Two men shall be in the field ; the one shall be taken, and the other left.”—(Luke xvii. 34—36.)

The urge of *pairagya* (renunciation) it is that is indicated in these verses.

The text of Matthew v. 5—“ Blessed are the meek for they shall inherit the earth.”—is fatal to the notion of a general resurrection at the end of the world ; for, if rewards and punishments are to remain in the mind of a Divine Judge till the Judgment Day, and

are only to be adjudged when the world shall have ceased to exist, how shall the meek inherit the earth? The true interpretation of this passage lies in the doctrine of transmigration of souls, which points out that rewards and punishments are meted out to each and every soul in this very world, and that the most coveted boons of all, namely, perfection, bliss and immortality, are to be had only on reaching 'the other shore,' i.e., Nirvana.

The expressions 'all the tribes of the earth [material tendencies] shall mourn' (Matt xxiv. 30), and the like, are mystic allegories, some of which have been explained by Mr. Pryse in his valuable work on the book of Revelation, entitled 'The Apocalypse Unsealed,' to which the reader is referred for their interpretation.

The coming of the Son of man, thus, was an expression employed to denote the dawning of God-consciousness in the soul, not the appearance of an 'historical' saviour in the world of men. Walter De Voë well expresses the idea, when he says:—

"The essential attributes of Jehovah-God are organized into your individual soul. The Father has organized His omniscient love into a glowing sun of light and power, and this divine ego is your soul, your true self, the Lord of your mind and body. This living Pearl of Divinity is the presence of God within your nature; you can well afford to sell all your accumulations of earthly thought, even though it seems a great sacrifice, in order to attain to conscious possession of this Pearl of great price. Your personality is from below, your individuality is from above. Your personality is the image and likeness of mortal parents, your soul individuality is the image and likeness of God. 'The first man is of the earth earthy; the second man is the Lord from heaven.' Each soul is a son of God, a Christ. Your soul is God manifesting—your Lord and redeemer. 'The Lord said unto my Lord: Sit thou at my right hand, until I make thine enemies thy footstool' Psalms 110: 1. This Scriptural passage mentions the Father speaking to the individual soul, or lord of the body, telling it to sit on the right side, and it will realize the power to overcome all things. Surrender to your souls, O mortals, and then you will see the mighty conqueror come. Then the soul will say, 'I am come that ye might have life, and have it more abundantly. I am the way, the truth and the life' (John xiv. 6). I and my Father are one (John x. 30). He that hath seen me hath seen the Father' (John xiv. 9)."

As for the question whether the teaching could be said to be an original Christian doctrine, comparative research reveals the fact that

it was not. The Jewish Apocrypha has a similar prophecy about the *end of the world* :

"For behold, the time shall come, and it shall be, when these tokens, of which I told thee before, shall come to pass, and the bride shall appear, even the city coming forth, and she shall be seen, that now is withdrawn from the earth,"—(II Esdas chap. vii.)

The symbolism employed makes it quite clear that the reference is to the attainment of the Divinity of the Soul, not to the re-coming of an outer saviour.

The true Redeemer can come only from within, and to whomsoever He has come, He has come from within. He is then described as Christos, or Krishna, seated at the right hand of power. It will be seen that quite a large number of the Biblical sayings which are meaningless and irrelevant with reference to Jesus acquire significant and lucid sense when applied to the Christ within. "I am the resurrection and the life: he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live," "whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die" (John xi. 25 and 26) and other such expressions cannot be applied to an outside 'saviour,' without divesting them of their true sense. Similarly, the passage: "There be some standing here, which shall not taste of death, till they see the Son of man coming in his kingdom" (Matt. xvi. 28), is robbed of its true merit if we take it to refer to Jesus, but is full of meaning when taken as alluding to the individual soul. Some one has well said:—

"Though Christ a thousand times and more
In Bethlehem's stall be born,
If He's not born *within thyself*
Thy soul is still forlorn."

To have a perfect grasp of the subject, we must look a little more deeply into the idea of redemption from the point of view of Jainism. In the purity of its essence, the soul is blissful and omniscient, but its vision is obstructed by the association of matter which it has absorbed. In this condition it is incapable of penetrating the veil of impurity with which it is enshrouded on all sides. Hence, if

its vision be clarified by the removal of the material filth that obstructs it, it can regain its pristine glory at once, since its real nature has in nowise changed. So long, however, as it is engrossed in the pursuit of fleshly lusts, its attention remains turned away from itself, and only directed to the perception of the outside world. Religion aims at turning its attention on itself, informs it of its omniscient nature, and advises it to actually behold its own glorious vision to realise its divinity. But in order to see itself the soul must, first of all, purge itself of the material filth which it has absorbed; and the only method of being rid of the harmful stuff is to scatter it about by the force of will. Hence, the withdrawal of the outgoing energy of the will, and its inner concentration are required to enable the soul to behold its own glory.

Concentration on the inner centres in the body has a twofold effect on the soul. Firstly, it checks the incoming stream of the molecules of *karmic* matter through the doorways of the senses; and, secondly, it disposes of the molecules already present, by scattering them about and destroying their *bandhas* (bonds). When this is accomplished, the self-luminous soul, freed from the taint of matter, sees and realizes its true nature, and feels the utmost joy. It is then called *jīna* (conqueror).

It is here that the precision of Jaina thought asserts itself against the one-sided Idealism of Vedānta, and it is here also that we see the insufficiency of the system of the Buddha brought into full view. King Pasenadi's question to the nun Khema, and the latter's confusion as to the existence or non-existence of the Perfect One after death, fully illustrate our point. Vedānta also finds difficulty in meeting the awkward question: the world being my illusion, will it come to an end on my redemption? It is certain that there is such a thing as release from the bondage of *samsāra*, which few have understood better than the great founder of Buddhism, and it is also certain that the world would not come to an end on the attainment of Nirvana by an individual. The weakness of these systems lies in the narrow horizon of thought which renders them one-sided, hence imperfect. Truth is not exhausted, without remainder, when looked at from any particular point

of view ; its full grasp can be had only when the student looks at it from all sides. It is here that the philosophy of Jainism comes to the rescue of the student mystified by the reticence of the Buddha and the vacillation of Vedanta. It shows that the soul enters Nirvana in a 'Solar body' which is pure divine Will, and, therefore, undecaying. It is separate from all other Emancipated Souls, and yet not so in respect of the nature of its pure Essence. In respect of the status of Divinity and the quality of Consciousness, it is one with all the Perfect Ones, but in respect of its 'Solar body' which signifies Pure Spirit, it has its own 'impersonal' personality, like that of the drop in the sea !

The continuity of the world is not affected by the attainment of Nirvana on the part of individuals. The world is truly enough, like an illusion, in many respects, but it is not an actual dream. Hence the emancipation of the individual is only consistent with his own disillusionment, not with the breaking of the 'spell' altogether. The illusion will persist, if only to accentuate the sense of freedom and to give a meaning to the joy of the Saved Ones.

Early Christianity seems to have followed the teaching of Jainism with remarkable fidelity. The similarity of thought between the two creeds is too striking to be ignored. We have the same rule of confession* in the primitive Church as in Jainism (see 'The Sacred Books of the East,' Vol. xlv. p. 168), the same notions of Redemption and Nirvana, the same basic principles of austerities, the same conception of Divinity having the form of man, and last but not the least, a marvellous concurrence of thought about the number of the Spiritual Leaders, called Tirthankaras by the Jainas, and Spiritual Elders, or Kings, by the author of the Apocalypse. Perhaps some day when the tenets of mysticism are better understood than

* Confession is the surest means of self-improvement. When the impulse to lay bare one's evil thoughts originates in the heart, it cannot but elevate the soul. At all other times, however, it is idle to talk of its utility. The abuses which it gave rise to in the Christian Church only show that Christians failed to understand its application. Here, also, clear thinking reveals that where the priest and the parishioner are moved, not from true religious motives, but from social compulsion and ignorant superstition, nothing but abuse is to be expected.

today there will be a full recognition of the affinity between the scientific and the mythological creeds all over the world. *

It will be seen that true religion aspires to make men *jivan-muktas* in this life, and has little in common with the idea of salvation subsequent to a general resurrection of the dead, on a suppositional Judgment Day. The idea of such a *post mortem* salvation is incompatible with the instinct of life, which causes a thrill of horror and impotent rage to pass through the human frame at the very idea of death. True salvation comes through a conquest of death, not by an unwilling submission to it.

A resurrection of the dead on a future day is like the draught of a physician which is to restore everlasting health after the patient is dead and buried; and it must be confessed that beyond the misinterpretation of certain difficult passages in the sayings of some of the founders of religions there is not the slightest evidence in support of it. The ancients only invented myths and legends to embellish their thought or to conceal their philosophy from all but the thoughtful; but the moderns take them literally!

The legend of the emancipation of Israel from the rule of Pharaoh, the king of Egypt, is an instance in point. An historical interpretation of it is well calculated to lead the scholar and the historian to pronounce against its genuineness, on the one hand, and an unintelligent reading is enough, on the other, to strike the pious devotee with awe and disgust with divine goodness itself. Far from respecting age, sex, or innocence, the Lord God sends Moses, armed with supernatural signs, to Pharaoh to intercede in the cause of the chosen people, and then himself hardens the heart of the tyrant, as if he was purposely manœuvring to bring about the bloodshed and carnage wrought among men and beasts in the land! The truth is that these accounts were written in this manner purposely to set the mind on an enquiry as to their hidden sense, so that if any one could understand that in what assumed the garb of history the substratum of truth was not made to

* In Appendix A we have arranged important Biblical texts, together with extracts from the writings of the early Christian Fathers, under appropriate headings, which represent the Jaina doctrines, to show how complete was the agreement between the Jaina creed and the teachings of early Christianity.

lie on the surface, but lay hidden beneath, he would not be long in finding it out for himself.

The story is a beautiful illustration of the emancipation of the Self from the clutches of the self. Through ignorance, the real Self is in the bondage of the false, 'illusory,' bodily self, and is suffering in captivity. This little bodily self is the tyrant, Pharaoh, who is the ruler of Egypt (that is, the world). Israel represents the real, effulgent Self, who is to be rescued and taken out from the land of captivity to that of bliss, where streams of milk and honey flow, and a vision of which was seen by the early patriarchs by the power of the Self. The stubbornness of Pharaoh illustrates the resistance which the lower self offers to the aspirant, in the early stages of spiritual unfoldment. The pith of the story now becomes clear, and may be described in a few words. When the disciple is firm in his determination for spiritual emancipation, he is opposed by his personal self, which throws all sorts of obstacles in his way. The early part of discipleship is, indeed, a hard struggle between the higher and the lower natures, and Maya (delusion) holds out all sorts of temptations and threats to the aspirant. But no emancipation is possible till the power of Maya is not totally destroyed once for all and for ever. The little, illusory self of Maya, therefore, is represented as having hardened his heart over and over again. At last, frightened by the devastating desolation of calamity, the despot half-heartedly agrees to set the 'Chosen One' free. However, he soon repents of his weakness, and makes one more effort to recapture the Emancipated Soul, but, God having manifested Himself, miracles are performed to baffle the enemy; the sea parts dry, letting the favoured one pass, but entombing the tyrant and completely destroying all traces of him.

The story of the rescue of Prahlada, which is celebrated annually in many places by the Hindus, is the Puranic counterpart of the legend of the emancipation of Israel. Hiranya-Kasipu, the *asura* king and the bitterest enemy of Viṣṇu, had a son named Prahlada, who took to worshipping the god, in defiance of the wishes of his august father. The distressed parent resorted to various devices to wean the unruly child from the love of the deity, but in vain. At

last he resolved to destroy the boy, but failed in the various attempts he made on his life. He then sought the help of his sister who was supposed to enjoy immortality, as a divine gift, and prevailed upon her to enter a burning pyre, taking the lad with her. The roaring pile was, however, turned into a garden at the touch of Prahlada, but the sister of Hiranya-Kasipu was destroyed by the flames. This exasperated Kasipu so much that he resolved to destroy the boy with his own hand. Tying him securely with a rope to one of the solid masonry columns in his palace, he addressed him somewhat as follows : 'Thou hast defied me thus far, but I am now going to destroy thee. Thou knowest well that I cannot be killed by man or beast; neither the weapons that have been manufactured by *devas* or men, nor metals, nor elements have power over me; and day and night cannot witness my destruction. Therefore, there is none to release thee from my power. Hasten thou now to call upon thine god to come to thy rescue, for thou shalt not live to utter his name again.'

Having thus spoken, Hiranya-Kasipu raised his arm to strike down his son; but just as the glittering blade flashed out of its sheath, the massive column burst with a loud report and a fearful creature, half lion and half man in appearance, sprang from its middle. The next moment it had ripped Hiranya-Kasipu's bowels with its powerful claws. Thus was Prahlada saved from death, and Hiranya-Kasipu destroyed.

As for the interpretation of this legend, Hiranya-Kasipu represents greed, the source and support of all other evil tendencies described as *asuras*. According to Mr. K. Narayana Iyer (see the Permanent History of Bharatavarsha, Vol. II. p. 152). "Hiranyom means gold or riches and Kasipu, a pillow or bed. Hiranya-Kasipu therefore naturally applies to a person who having acquired wealth is unwilling to spend, but clings to it with great attachment." Prahlada, on the other hand, signifies "great delight and contentment," which are the antithesis of greed. Greed being the most difficult mental trait to destroy, the development of contentment already marks an advanced stage of spiritualism. Hence is Prahlada a devotee to be saved. The sister of Hiranya-Kasipu is the

calculating intellect impressed in the service of greed, and fire represents a state of confusion, which is, however, changed into orderliness at the touch of Prahlada. The monster represents the combined virtues of intelligence and fearlessness (man=intellectualism + lion=courage), hence the combination of wisdom and will; and the column of masonry is a good symbol for the column of the spine which is the seat of many psychic *plexi*. Being the last enemy on the path, greed is destroyed as the soul turns away its attention from the world of strife and lust, that is to say, at the moment of the darkening of the sun of *ahamkāra*, hence neither in the day (the condition of spiritual purity) nor at night (when the light has not yet dawned), but at the juncture of day and night. The rest of the story is lucid enough and needs no further comment.

To sum up: every religion recognizes, more or less definitely, the possibility of a state of existence of surpassing joy which would have no ending. The coming Messiah is an ingenious symbolism with reference to that beatific existence, and conveys no idea of the return of a real or mythical personage of the name of Jesus, or of any other saviour or saint, who might or might not have lived in the world of men in the past. The soul that destroys its evil *karmas* becomes its own Saviour, and needs no Liberator from outside itself!

CHAPTER XII

RE-INCARNATION

مفتقد مقام قلب پیدا ام * هفتاد و هفت بار بارها روئیده ام

[Tr.—Seventy times seven hundred bodies have I passed through; seed-like have I sprouted forth again and again !]

The eternity of the soul being established in the preceding chapters, re-incarnation follows as a necessary logical corollary. For it is inconceivable that throughout the unimaginably vast eternity of time which is implied in our notion of the past the present incarnation of the soul should be altogether a novel and unprecedented event in its experience. The present appearance of the *jiva* can, then, in no sense be its first incarnation in the world. This is tantamount to saying that it must have appeared in many other forms or incarnations in the past. To deny this will be to introduce the element of chance, or the *doux ex machina* of a divine will, concerning which Mr. J. C. Chatterji makes the following highly pertinent observations in his Hindu Realism (pages 116-117):—

“ It cannot be said that the Atman suddenly makes a resolve to be born and is born. For, in that case, we have first to show the antecedents which can lead to such a resolve ; because we know of no resolves which are made without antecedents, consisting of thoughts, ideas and perceptions. Secondly, if an Atman came to be born out of its own choice, by making a sudden resolve, it would be born only under conditions which would make it happy. But there are millions of men that are anything but happy in regard to their situations or bodies ; and it is unlikely that the Atmans in them would have come to be born out of anything like choice.

“ Nor can it be said that it is born, once and all of a sudden, entirely by chance. For there is a rigid law which guides and governs the body in which the Atman is born (that is to say, with which it is related), and the surroundings in which the body is found. This body and surroundings form one term of the relation, while the Atman forms the other. In these circumstances it is hardly reasonable to assume that, of the two terms of a relation, while one is guided by law, the other is merely a thing of chance.

" Finally, if it be held that it is God who associates the Atman with a body, and he does so only once, then such a God would be open to the charge of injustice and involved in contradictions. He would be unjust and malicious, inasmuch as he associates one Atman, without any reason, with a body where a man cannot but be happy and have pleasant surroundings, while He associates another with a body which can be only a source of misery, and surroundings which can only foster vice. But nobody thinks of God as being unjust or whimsical, and therefore the theory that God associates an Atman with a body, only once, without any reason, must be abandoned."

It is only necessary to look at the souls of men to be convinced of the fact that they are neither at the top nor the bottom of the scale of evolution, since none is fully developed in knowledge, and none absolutely devoid of intelligence. Whence this middling status, and the differences* of temperament, knowledge, and the like, if they have come for the first time into the world? Reincarnation, and re-incarnation alone, explains these facts, and also accounts for the differences

* However eloquently one might advocate the cause of a man-like architect of the world, it is impossible to defend him on the count of favouritism. No amount of subtle hair-splitting, no manner of ingenious juggling with vague and contradictory epithets, no power of stirring oratory, can ever defend such a being from the simple charge of malicious differentiation in the exercise of his creative function. Why should he create one man happy and another very wretched; one the favourite of gods, another the companion of evil; one intelligent, another stupid; one capable of imbibing the right faith, another hopelessly perverse and incorrigible? Even great nations show differences of circumstances,—one is born to rule, another to serve in slavery, and so forth. Why does God, the Just, the Merciful, the Omnipotent, discriminate between his creatures in this manner? Theology has no sensible reply to give; but Vedanta, with its doctrine of Maya, tries to explain the situation as follows:—

" Here is a master who goes into the garden at one time, and goes into the mansion at another time and goes into the dingy dungeon at one time, and goes into the toilet at some other time, goes into the kitchen himself, and lives also under a burden himself. What will you call him? Is he unjust? No, No. He were unjust if the people whom he kept in the dungeon, or in the garden, or in the mansion, or in the toilet were different from him, but it is he himself who resorts to the toilet, and he himself who goes into the other places; if it is he himself who does all these things, then he is not unjust. Then all the blame is taken off him" (In the Woods of God Realization, Vol. III, 36-37).

And Sufism chimes in:

خود کوزه و خود کوزه کرد خود گل کوزه - خود پر سر آں کوزه خورشید پر آمد

between the animal, the vegetable and the human souls. Reject re-incarnation, put the soul, for all the past eternity of time, in a region of stagnation and inaction, and you will find that you cannot bring it into the world at all except on the hypothesis of chance, or, what is even worse, the miracle of a divine command.

When we look at the unimaginable infinity of the *jivas* now ensouled in the bodies of beasts, birds and insects, to say nothing of plants, and other lower forms of life, each of which is possessed of the potentiality of Godhood, we are irresistibly led to the conclusion that to deny re-incarnation is to foredoom them all to eternal damnation and misery: for none of them is possessed of that type of intellectualism which can discriminate between the Self and the not-Self, so as to be able to evolve out into perfection in their present incarnations. *Moksha* being dependent on self-exertion, and not on the favour of another, by far the vast majority of mankind, too, will find themselves unable to attain it in the course of one earth-life. What, we ask, will be their plight, on the hypothesis of one earth-life *per* soul? To deny re-incarnation is to condemn them all to an eternal and unending life of damnation, torture and torment in hell, or to a stagnation of inaction in some other place, without giving them any chance for developing their potential perfection, which is the end in view.

The case with those whose souls have felt the thrill of inspiration arising from a consciousness of their divine goal is still more striking: for if we ponder over the problem, we shall observe that the consciousness of the Ideal in a Self-conscious soul must itself lead it to perfection willy-nilly, in due course of time, since it is the nature of the Ideal to be active. How powerful must be the force of this living ideal, can be seen at a glance by comparing it with the false ones which men pursue in the World. Money, for instance, though

[Tr. Himself the pot, himself the potter, himself the material of the pot; himself appears also as the purchaser of the pot.]

Vedanta itself does not go quite so far as Sufism, since it is not its doctrine that Brahman becomes the material of the pot. As for the merit of the explanation, it is sufficient to say, with Schopenhauer, that a God, who, from the beginningless eternity, has been acting in this manner must have been tormented by the Devil!

unmoving in itself, is the cause of all the wild hustle and 'life' in the world, and what has it not led men and nations to in the past? One need only think of the horrible scenes which generally take place on the discovery of a "Klondike,"—scenes of starvation, suffering and villainy of men—to realize its power.

The metaphysics of the subconscious, which is engaging the attention of European psychologists at the present day, has gone a long way to show that the subconscious is not the same thing as the unconscious or inactive. It has been observed that the idea of the action ordered in hypnosis not only becomes an object of consciousness at a certain moment, but the more striking aspect of the fact is that the idea grows *active*; it is translated into action as soon as consciousness becomes aware of its presence. As to this, Prof. Sig. Freud of Vienna observes:—

"The real stimulus to the action being the order of the physician, it is hard not to concede that the idea of the physician's order becomes active too. Yet this last idea did not reveal itself to consciousness, as did its outcome, the idea of action; it remained unconscious, and so it was *active* and *unconscious* at the same time." *

This is quite sufficient to show that the true Ideal of Divine Perfection cannot but be active, and with a greater degree of intensity than the false ones whose association with consciousness is not of a permanent sort.

Thus, the activity of the Ideal is put beyond dispute; its effect can only be to lead to the realization of individual perfection, however much we might retard it by our wrong actions and failings. Now, since one earth-life does not suffice for the attainment of perfection in the case of every one, it follows that there must be repeated births, or, rather rebirths, to enable souls to obtain full development.

On the strictly scientific side of the question, the soul must have existed in the past in some form or other, since it is immortal and eternal by nature.

But it could have existed in the past only in one of the two ways, namely, either as a pure spirit or an impure ego. There is no third

* See the article entitled 'Some Types of Multiple Personality' in the Special Medical Part of 'The Proceedings of The Society for Psychical Research,' for November 1921.

way in which it could exist. But it could not have existed in the past as a pure spirit, for in that case it would be a God, and there is no power in nature to drag a perfect God into bondage and *samsara*. Nor can such a Perfect Being be deemed to be throwing himself down from His high seat. Hence, in the past the soul now involved in transmigration could have existed only in the condition of impurity, that is to say, in association with matter. Thus, however far back we may travel in the past, the unredeemed soul will be always found to exist in an impure state, that is to say, with its divine attributes and virtues crippled and curtailed by the association of matter. But matter is quite powerless to affect the soul merely from without; it is necessary that there should be an intimate degree of fusion between it and the soul, if the powers and functions of the latter are to be curtailed. For internal states are not affected by mere external juxtaposition in space. Even the taste of ~~amar~~ *amar* actually on the tongue requires a closer contact than mere juxtaposition between the *stimulus* produced by it and the soul to be felt. It is actually counter-indicated when owing to attention being exclusively engaged elsewhere there is not the necessary intimacy of contact (though juxtaposition there is) between the gustatory *stimulus*, that is to say, the article of food in the mouth, and the perceiving soul. It follows from this that actual fusion between spirit and matter, that is to say, the ensoulment of spirit in matter is necessary before the soul can be affected in respect of its attributes and powers. The soul, must, therefore, have existed in an embodied condition prior to its present incarnation. It must have consequently experienced death elsewhere to be reborn here in the present form.

The above arguments conclusively establish the truth of transmigration and *karma*.

Two counter-theses have been advanced against this theory, namely, (1) heredity, and (2) creation. These have already been sufficiently refuted, but we shall deal with them further, as we proceed with our general observations on the law of *Karma*.

Karma is said to be the cause of bondage and ignorance, pleasure and pain, and birth and death, in short, of every 'complexion' which the soul puts on. The law which regulates the action of *Karma* is

based upon the principle of cause and effect, so that the saying 'as one sows, so must one reap,' presents the whole doctrine in a nutshell. Every action, whether mental or physical, is a sowing of the 'seed,' or, in the technical language of Indian philosophy, an engendering of *karma*. In the act of sowing the 'seed,' or engendering the *karma*, the soul has the choice of acting or refraining from action; but when once the 'seed' is sown, i.e., *karma* engendered, its freedom is replaced by an inevitable liability to bear its consequences. The harvest which is sown must be reaped, gathered, and assimilated in its unabated fulness.* This is what constitutes the bondage of the soul. *Karma*, therefore, is a kind of force which compels the soul to bear the consequences of its good or bad actions; and this force originates in the very action itself and at the very moment of its performance.

Every action affects the doer as much as it does another, though the effects of it may differ in the two cases. The other may, in some cases, be not affected at all, but the doer is always affected by his acts. The effect of the expenditure of energy on another is generally visible, but not so its effect on one's own self. In the latter case, the invisible *kārmāṇa* body (a sort of inner vestment of the soul) is directly affected, for good or evil, by the energy spent in the performance of the act. The effect of action on the *kārmāṇa śarīra* is a change of the 'complexion' of the soul, which determines its future liability to particular actions and experiences. In plain language, the effect of action is the creation of new tendencies and inclinations, or the confirmation or modification of some old and deep-rooted habits. *Karma*, thus, is a force which binds the soul to the consequences of its good and bad actions.

True to nature as the Jaina philosophy throughout is, it recognizes the different kinds of *karmas* as so many forces (*karma-prakṛitis*), which, operating on the soul, tie it down hand and foot, and constitute its destiny. They are material in their nature, inasmuch as there can be no such thing as an immaterial force.

* This is the general rule, and it admits of one exception, since the effect of *karmas* can be modified and even destroyed, before fruition, by the acknowledgment, acquisition and practising of *dharma*.

In subjection to its *karmas* the soul is like a balloon held captive by means of heavy sandbags tied to its strings. As the balloon cannot ascend up in the air as long as the sandbags are attached to its ropes, so is the soul unable to enjoy its natural freedom and divinity so long as its *karmas* are not severed from it.

If the soul were an insentient principle, like the balloon, it could never free itself from its captivity, but being an active, conscious being, it has the power, hence the choice, to cut the cords with which it is tied down. Hence, its bondage continues just so long as it does not exert itself to break its bonds. It must, however, be remembered that the power of exertion depends on self-knowledge which arises only when the bondage itself is somewhat loosened, as in the case of man. Therefore, man alone of all creatures is gifted with the power to free himself from the cycle of births and deaths; hence he alone needs the warning against the eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Hence, also, the emphasis on the privilege and importance of human birth in the Scriptures.

Thus recognised, *karma* is no imaginary creature of the Jaina metaphysician, but a real binding force, the coils of which can only be unwound by certain prescribed means.

The effect of the actions of the soul is not to create a liability to suffer identically the same experience that an individual subjects another to, in all cases, e.g., he who has killed a man would not be necessarily murdered by his victim, in some future re-birth; for if that were so it should leave the natural functions of the soul-substance unaffected, or affected only very slightly. The fruit of evil *karma* may take any form, and subject the individual to ignorance, loss of vision, and the like. Evil *karmas* lead to ignorance, because perfect knowledge depends on the purity of the Self which is all-knowing, so that when it is covered over with impurities, like a candle put under a bushel, the light of its wisdom is necessarily obstructed. Moreover, the impetuous activity of will in the pursuit of desires, acts as an obstruction to knowledge, just as the disturbed state of the water of a lake prevents the things lying at its bottom from being clearly perceived. Swayed by passion, we become unreasonable, and often do things of which we repent in calmer moments.

But, since passions only arise from desires, which are, in their final analysis, reducible to love and hate, i.e., attachment (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*), attachment and aversion are the true causes of ignorance. Hence, the nourishing of these two arch-enemies of the soul is the cause of its bondage. The Jaina *Siddhanta*, therefore, points out that he who would attain liberation must not only give up sense-gratification, but also the very desire for it. The evil lies to a much greater extent in the entertainment of desire than in the actual indulgence of the senses. Hence, he who looks after a woman with lust is not less 'guilty' than he who has carnal knowledge of her.

It is to be remembered that the soul, as the enjoyer, is the subject, and matter, the object of enjoyment. Hence, the relation between the pleasure-extracting capacities of the soul and the qualities of matter, that is, colour, taste, smell, and the like, is that of subject and object, i.e., the male and female principles. As the male opens his arms to embrace the female, so does the soul give up its rhythm of *intension* and expand out, as it were, to embrace the slower rhythms of the qualities of matter. This results in the loss of its free rhythm of *intension*, and in the acquisition of the slower types of rhythm corresponding to the qualities of matter. In some cases, the quality of the pure rhythm of freedom becomes so much defiled and vitiated that the *jīva* can find solace only in the 'embrace' of matter. Smoking and drinking furnish fairly good illustrations of the polluting influence of matter on the soul, whose purer instincts, at first, revolt at the very sight of the things named, but later, when habituated to their use, become debased into a longing, and, in the worst cases, into an insatiable craving for them.

It can also be seen without much difficulty that all evil passions and emotions, and the foul deeds, also, which they lead men to commit, arise from the free indulgence of the senses. For instance, a person in whom the craving for liquor has passed the limit of control will readily do anything to obtain the means for procuring it, passing, by imperceptible degrees of moral degradation, from the self-abasing begging of money as a favour, to theft, and also, in the end, to robbery and murder. That the unconquerable longing for the gratification of the senses also deprives one of the power of judgment, the sense of

morality, and the capacity to act in the right way, follows as a necessary corollary. The associations, too, are determined by the same cause, since a drunkard can only find pleasure in the company of men of his own type, and so forth. The duration of life also depends, to a considerable extent, on the nature of the active tendencies of the soul, since the pursuit of sensual pleasure constantly acts as a strain on the body, by dragging it into all kinds of unhealthy surroundings and uncongenial environment. Besides, desires invariably bring us into conflict with men also bent on gratifying their lusts, and often lead to quarrels, duels and wars. As a matter of fact, the physical body also can be made to defy death and decay, to a considerable extent, as will be shown more fully later on, but that requires an active attitude of the soul, whose desires and actions in the state of bondage are only calculated to jeopardize and imperil its 'life' every moment.

The bondage of *karmas* is got rid of in two different ways, either naturally, or by the active exertion of the will. The difference between the two modes lies in the fact that, while in the former case the release is always partial and brought about by the exhaustion of the force of one or more *karma-prakṛitis*, in the latter it results from the knowledge of the real nature of the Self, and the consequent exertion of the will to remove the obstacles from its path. The result is that in the former case the soul is freed from one kind of bondage only to fall into some other, but in the latter all kinds of bonds are broken, one after another, by the conscious exertion of the will. It is, however, evident from the nature of the process and the causes of bondage that the will alone can bring about the freedom of the soul. No outside agency can, therefore, do anything for him who is not prepared to save himself. The function of the *Siddhātmanas* in Jainism is, therefore, confined to the imparting of instruction,* which they have left behind in the shape of Scriptures.

*Anxious as we are to acknowledge merit wherever it might exist, it would not have pained us at all to recognize the founders of other creeds also as true teachers of mankind. But when after giving the fullest possible credit to the accounts of their lives as contained in their own books, we find that not one of them attained *moksha* in its true sense, the very idea of which was unknown to many of them, there

How the karma of one life affects the soul in a subsequent incarnation is not difficult to understand, if we reflect over the principle of the objectification of will, as Schopenhauer calls it. Says the great philosopher :—*

" The body is given in two entirely different ways to the subject of knowledge. It is given as an idea in intelligent perception, as an object among objects and subject to the laws of the objects. And it is also given in a quite different way as that which is immediately known to every one, and is signified by the word *will*.

" Every true act of will is also at once and without exception a movement of the body. The act of the will and the movement of the body are not two different things objectively known; which the bond of causality unites; they do not stand in the relation of cause and effect; they are one and the same, but they are given in entirely different ways, immediately, and again in perception for the understanding. The action of the body is nothing but the act of will objectified, *i.e.*, passed into perception. This is true of every movement of the body, not merely those which follow upon motives, but also involuntary movements which follow upon mere stimuli, and, indeed, the whole body is nothing but objectified will, *i.e.*, will become idea. Thus in a certain sense we may also say that will is the knowledge *a priori* of the body and the body is the knowledge *a posteriori* of the will. Resolutions of the will which relate to the future are merely deliberations of the reason about what we shall will at a particular time, not real acts of will. Only the carrying out of the resolve stamps it as will, for till then it is never more than an intention that may be changed, and that exists only in the reason *in abstracto*. It is only in reflection that to will and to act are different; in reality they are one. Every true, genuine, immediate act of will is also, at once and immediately, a visible act of the

is no alternative but to say that the true Teachers are only the Tirthankaras, since he alone can be a teacher who combines in himself perfect knowledge, resulting from omniscience, and practical experience as the Conqueror. The founders of the other religions, in so far as they teach the elementary principles of religion, are at best like the staff of a modern high school, who are not intended to impart instruction in the more advanced course of education, necessary for those determined to pursue their studies in a higher sphere of thought. Muhammad was a 'seer,' or prophet, 'Jesus' a great *yogi*, Buddha, the world-famous head of an order of monks, Kabir a mystic *bhakta*, Śaṅkaracharya a great *paṇḍit*, and so forth. None of them crossed the *samsāra* or attained to omniscience. Their writings are good and useful, as an elementary course of training, but not free from confusion of thought, nor from misdirection, which none can afford to follow with closed eyes. He who wishes to avoid the pain of births and deaths in the world and the torments of hell, after death, must, therefore, turn to the only true source, and sit at the feet of the perfect Teachers, the Tirthankaras.

* See 'The World as Will and Idea,' vol. i. pp. 129—141.

body. And, corresponding to this, every impression upon the body is also, on the other hand, at once and immediately, an impression upon the will. As such, it is called pain when it is opposed to the will; gratification or pleasure when it is in accordance with it. It is quite wrong, however, to call pain and pleasure ideas, for they are by no means ideas, but immediate affections of the will in its manifestation, the body; compulsory, instantaneous willing or not-willing of the impression which the body sustains. Lastly, the knowledge which I have of my will, though it is immediate, cannot be separated from that which I have of my body. I know my will, not as a whole, not as a unity, not completely, according to its nature, but I know it only in its particular acts, and therefore in time, which is the form of the phenomenal aspect of my body, as of every object. Therefore the body is a condition of the knowledge of my will. Thus, I cannot really imagine this will apart from my body. So far as I know my will specially as object, I know it as body. The will as a thing in itself is quite different from its phenomenal appearance, and entirely free from all the forms of the phenomenal, into which it first passes when it manifests itself, and which therefore only concern its *objectivity*, and are foreign to the will itself.

" If now every action of my body is the manifestation of an act of will in which my will itself in general, and as a whole, thus my character, expresses itself under given motives, manifestations of the will must be the inevitable condition and pre-supposition of every action. For the fact of its manifestation cannot depend upon something which does not exist directly and only through it, which consequently is for it merely accidental, and through which its manifestation itself would be merely accidental. Now that condition is just the whole body itself. Thus the body itself must be manifestation of the will, and it must be related to my will as a whole, that is, to my intelligible character, whose phenomenal appearance in time is my empirical character, as the particular action of the body is related to the particular act of the will. The whole body, then, must be simply my will become visible, must be my will itself, so far as this is object of perception. It has already been advanced in confirmation of this that every impression upon my body also affects my will at once and immediately; and in this respect is called pain or pleasure, or, in its lower degrees, agreeable or disagreeable sensation; and also, conversely, that every violent movement of the will, every emotion or passion, convulses the body and disturbs the course of its functions.

" Thus, although every particular action, under the pre-supposition of the definite character, necessarily follows from the given motive, and although growth, the process of nourishment, and all the changes of the animal body take place according to necessarily acting causes (stimuli), yet the whole series of actions and consequently every individual act, and also its condition, the whole body itself which accomplishes it, and therefore also the process through which and in which it exists, are nothing but the manifestation of the will, the becoming visible, the *objectification of the will*. Upon this rests the perfect suitability of the human and animal body to the human and animal will in general, resembling, though far surpassing, the correspondence between

an instrument made for a purpose and the will of the maker, and on this account appearing as design, i.e., the teleological explanation of the body. The parts of the body must, therefore, completely correspond to the principal desires through which the will manifests itself; they must be the visible expression of these desires. Teeth, throat, and bowels are objectified hunger; the organs of generation are objectified sexual desire; the grasping hand, the hurrying feet, correspond to the more indirect desires of the will which they express. As the human form generally corresponds to the human will generally, so the individual bodily structure corresponds to the individually modified will, the character of the individual, and therefore it is throughout and in all its parts characteristic and full of expression."

This somewhat lengthy, though highly abridged, account of Will as the Thing-in-itself and of its objectification was necessary to show that the body is only an expression of the mind, that is to say, is made in the likeness of the soul, as Muslim philosophers point out. If we bear in mind the distinction between the process of organization and manufacturing, as pointed out by H. Bergson in his "Creative Evolution," namely, that the former proceeds from the centre to the periphery, while the latter in a reverse manner, i.e., from the periphery to the centre, there appears to be nothing surprising in the fact that the body should be built up according to the character which is to be expressed in it and through it. Thus, the present body is necessarily the result of the pre-natal character, formed in a previous life.

So far as instincts are concerned, their variations cannot be explained by environmental conditions and influences, for we see children in the same family—even twins—differing radically from each other in respect of their temperaments, instincts, emotions and the like.

The whole of the past experience, ante-natal and that acquired since the physical birth, is stored up in the constitution of the soul in the shape of tendencies, emotions, feelings and inclinations—in short, as character.

"What are we," writes Bergson, "in fact, what is our *character* if not the condensation of the history that we have lived from our birth—nay, even before our birth, since we bring with us pre-natal dispositions? Doubtless we think with only a small part of our past, but it is with our entire past, including the original bent of our soul, that we desire, will and act. Our past, then, as a whole, is made manifest to us in its impulse; it is felt in the form of tendency, although a small part of it only is known in the form of idea . . . We could not live over again a single moment, for we should

have to begin by effacing the memory of all that had followed. Even could we erase this memory from our intellect, we could not from our will."—(*Creative Evolution*, pp. 5 and 6.)

The parents are merely a channel for the passage of the soul from one condition into another; they do not manufacture it or its character in their own bodies. There must be a substratum of individuality, at the very outset, to be acted upon and affected by variations of surroundings and environment. But this is what is generally lost sight of by theological writers, whose preconceived notions of their misunderstood creeds have prejudiced their minds against the only theory which can offer a satisfactory explanation of all the discrepancies, disharmonies and enigmas in the world. The effect of this unconscious bias in the mind of the investigator is fateful for the unwelcome theory, for the moment the hypothesis suggests itself, it is apt to be dismissed with little ceremony and without investigation. So far as Christians are concerned, we have already sufficiently shown that their own religion preaches identically the same doctrine as is taught by Hindus and Jainas in respect of the eternity, evolution, and final emancipation of the soul, and with regard to Islam, also, we hope, ere long, to satisfy the world that the Holy Qur'an itself cannot but lead to the same conclusion when properly understood. Meanwhile, let us dispose of the subject of heredity with a single quotation from a modern psychologist of note:

"Even though the individual organism," says Harald Härding (*Outlines of Psychology*, pp. 353-354), "which, in spite of its completeness and relative independence, is still a republic of cells, were to be explained as compounded out of elements, and its origin made intelligible through the laws of persistence of energy, this would not explain the individual consciousness, the formation of a special centre of memory, of action, and of suffering. That it is possible for such a centre to come into being is the fundamental problem of all our knowledge. Each individual trait, each individual property, might perhaps be explained by the power of heredity and the influence of experience; but the inner unity, to which all elements refer, and by virtue of which the individuality is a *psychical* individuality, remains for us an eternal riddle . . . Psychical individuality is one of the practical limits of science.

"In recent times the attempt has been made to explain by heredity, not only the properties of the individuals and of the family and race, but also the forms and characteristics which apply to all consciousness. Even before Darwin's hypothesis

of the origin of species, Herbert Spencer (in the first edition of the *Principles of Psychology*, 1855) propounded the theory, that the fundamental forms and powers of consciousness had been developed through the adaptation of the ancestral races to their conditions of life. The forms of thought and feeling which are typical of the human race, would therefore be *a priori* in respect of the individual, that is to say, they could not be fully explained by the individual experiences, but these experiences would, on the contrary, be conditioned by an original substratum. However far back we go, the individuals still start always with a certain organization, with certain forms and powers which they have not themselves acquired, consequently with something *a priori*. At every stage of the great process of evolution there is a given basis, by which the effect of all experiences is determined. It must therefore be true of the race as of the individual, that the external always pre-supposes the internal, that which is acquired is conditioned by what is originally innate. This is a fundamental relation that constantly repeats itself."

Heredity, in truth, explains nothing about disposition ; at best it only accounts for the modifications of the innate substratum of individuality. We see a few striking resemblances between individuals in a family, or race, and shutting our eyes to a vast majority of equally striking differences, and leaving out of account the part played by common associations, surroundings and education in developing similar characteristics, jump to the conclusion that heredity sufficiently accounts for them all. It may well be that the resemblances are due to the fact that the soul is attracted towards parents and families whose predominant mental propensities accord with its own, in which case there will be an agreement in respect of the predominant traits between the individual and the family, but not in respect of other characteristics.

According to the theory of heredity, every individual owes its existence to a germ-plasm, which is a tiny speck of protoplasm. That this germ-plasm is the seed of all the peculiarities of the individual's character, disposition and tendencies is disputed neither by the propounders of the thesis of heredity nor by the supporters of re-incarnation. There being a hopeful agreement between them on this important point, the issue to be determined may be framed as follows : Whether the *nucleus* of the character residing in the germ-plasm is formed for the first time in the body of either parent, or does it possess any existence of its own.

But the first alternative is untenable, since character is inseparable from will and cannot possibly be described as the resultant, or product, of a process of compounding molecules or particles of matter ! Furthermore, if the germ-plasm be the source of individuality, as it must be on the materialistic hypothesis, it would follow that character is the maker of will rather than will, the maker of its character—which is by no means in harmony with the dictates of reason and commonsense.

We may now push this enquiry still further and transfer the store of tendencies, disposition, and the like, from the germ-plasm to some specific or central part within it ; but the operation cannot result in greater satisfaction by any means, unless we accord to this part the power of having existed from all eternity, and, also, credit it with a will of its own to be the substratum of its mental equipment and choice. The only other way to get out of the difficulty is to say that this specific part, or the fundamental atom, as it has been called by certain writers, is *manufactured* in the parents' body, by a number of particles or electrons of matter becoming fused or blended together in a particular form : but that would not give us an *organism*, but only a centre-less, will-less product of matter, and would again bring us face to face with the old problem, *viz.*, how came this part itself to be endowed with *individuality* ? It is thus evident that the theory of heredity is utterly insufficient to meet the situation, and it is certain that the power which builds the physical organism is a pre-existing *nucleus* of force independent of the ovum and the spermatozoon both. This *nucleus* of creative, that is to say, form-making, energy is bound up in a subtle and invisible body of matter, called the *kūrmāṇa śarīra* (the body of *karmas*), because of its being the repository of the effects of the past *karmas* of the soul, and is the root-cause of the differences of form and conditions amongst all kinds of living beings in the universe. Thus the 'seed' of life, *i.e.*, the soul, does not originate in the body of its male or female parent, but utilises its mother's womb as a portal of ingress into the world. As regards the selection of the 'womb,' that also depends on the past *karmas* of the individual, since it is determined by the magnetic properties or chemical affinity

residing in the inner bodies of the soul. It is, therefore, correct to say that the soul is the maker of its body itself.

That these are not purely oriental speculations, but truths based on sound reason, may be shown by a single quotation from Schopenhauer" ("The World as Will and Idea," vol. ii. page 485):—

"Who makes the chicken in the egg? Some power and skill coming from without, and penetrating through the shell? Oh no! The chicken makes itself, and the force which carries out and perfects this work, which is complicated, well calculated, and designed beyond all expression, breaks through the shell as soon as it is ready, and now performs the outward actions of the chicken, under the name of will. It cannot do both at once; previously occupied with the perfecting of the organism, it had no care for without. But after it has completed the former, the latter appears, under the guidance of the brain and its feelers, the senses, as a tool prepared beforehand for this end, the service of which only begins when it grows up in self-consciousness as intellect, which is the lantern to the steps of the will, . . . and also the supporter of the objective external world, however limited the horizon of this may be in the consciousness of a hen. But what the hen is now able to do in the external world, through the medium of this organ, is, as accomplished by means of something secondary, infinitely less important than what it did in its original form, for it made itself."

The transmigrating ego carries with it the entire load of its past *karmas*, which account for the circumstances and conditions of its present incarnation, or 'life.' The material basis of these *karmas*, as already hinted at, is the subtle inner body called the *kārmāṇa śarīra*, which, along with the one known as the *taijasa*, is a constant companion of the soul in all its transmigratory wanderings. Both these bodies are destroyed at the moment of final emancipation, when the soul immediately rises up to the holy *Siddha Śīla* as pure Spirit, and attains *nirvāṇa*. The *Kārmāṇa śarīra* is the compound arising from the union, or fusion, of spirit and matter, and is subject to modifications of form and type from time to time. The *taijasa śarīra* is composed of electric, or magnetic matter, and is a necessary link† between the outermost body and the *kārmāṇa śarīra*.

* See also pp. 252—280 of "The Fourfold Root and Will in Nature."

† The necessity for a link of this kind lies in the fact that its absence would render the gulf between spirit (soul) and gross matter unbridgeable, making it impossible for the ego to come in contact with or to use his bodily limbs. As to this the following observations of Dr. J. Bovee Dods (*Mesmerism and Electrical Psychology*, pp. 13 and 14) may be read with advantage:—

So far as the *kārmāna śarīra* is concerned, its existence is proved by the fact that a body of subtle matter is an absolute necessity for the sojourn of the soul in the regions of *devas*, demons and men, since a bodiless spirit at once rises up to the top of the world, to take its place among Gods. Hence the existence of a force which prevents its rising to the Holy *Siddha Śīla* is a *sine qua non* to its remaining entangled in the *samsara*. Now, since force cannot be conceived apart from matter of some kind or other, it is obvious that the bondage of the soul is due to its being imprisoned in some kind of an encasement, or body, of matter. It is this encasement, or body, of fine matter which is called the *karmāna śarīra* in the Jaina Scripture. That this body cannot be the body of gross matter itself, is evident from the fact that its existence is a condition precedent to the making of the outer visible body. For the soul which is perfectly divine when devoid of all bodies, would have absolutely no reason to descend to our world, to enter into crippling relations with matter, shutting itself out from all its divine powers, attributes and qualities. Furthermore, the attainment of *moksha* would also necessarily and immediately follow the dissolution of form, and could be obtained, with the greatest ease, by the simple process of committing suicide. Nay, even an act of murder would, on the supposition of the gross body being the only vestment of the soul, become invested with all the meritorious qualities of a virtuous deed, since it would signify the immediate emancipation of the soul of the murdered man. The absurdity of the supposition might be further emphasized by the fact that the separation of the soul from its physical body would place men and animals on the same level, doing away with the differ-

"It is evident that there is no direct contact between mind and gross matter. There is no direct contact between the length of a thought and the breadth of that door; nor is there any more contact between my mind and hand than there is between my mind and the stage upon which I stand. Thought cannot touch my hand; yet it must be true that mind can come in contact with matter; otherwise I could not raise my hand at all by the energies of my will. Hence, it must be true that the highest and most ethereal inert matter in the universe, being the next step to spirit, can come in contact with mind. And electricity, changed into nerve-vital fluid (which is living galvanism) is certainly the highest and the most ethereal inert substance of which we can form any conception."

ences of development in respect of intellect, knowledge, and character, at a single stroke. It is thus clear that the force which prevents the soul from attaining the perfection of Gods is not the outer body of gross matter, but an inner vestment of a finer sort of clay, to use the language of Al Qur'an. It also follows from this that so long as this body of finer clay, the *Karmāna śarīra*, is not totally destroyed by the soul, it is not possible for it to acquire its natural purity, i.e., the perfection of Gods.

The *karmāna śarīra*, thus, is the seed of all the soul's mental and physical activities to be exhibited in a future incarnation, and is the momentum in which are gathered up the effects of all the desires, passions, virtue and vice, evolved out in the course of its career as an incarnating ego. In this state it resembles a seed which readily germinates as soon as it finds itself in suitable congenial soil. It is attracted into surroundings suitable for its development by the operation of subtle magnetic forces operating upon its material, and becomes the starting point of a new phase or complexion of life. Now, since descent, lineage and other circumstances relating to status are dependent on the family in which one is born, and since the incident of birth is governed by the nature of the forces residing in the *karmāna śarīra*, the sum-total of the effects of the past activities of the soul, it is clear that worldly status is ultimately traceable to one's own *karmas* in the past. The same is the case with the bodily form, the duration or term of life, and all other incidents pertaining to and connected with the physical life. Thus, the determining factor of the genus, and in the genus of the particular species to which an individual belongs, as also of the longevity of the body, of the development of intellectual faculties and of all other individual peculiarities and traits is nothing other than the force of *harma*, persisting in the form of the *kārmāya śarīra*.

The *aijasa śarīra* is a coat of luminous matter thrown over the *karmāna śarīra*, and forms an atmosphere, or *aura*, of light round it. It is to the *karmāna śarīra* what a body is to the bony skeleton beneath. Taken together, the *aijasa* and the *karmāna śarīras* form only one organism, and accompany the soul throughout its career as a migrating ego.

The *kārmāṇa* and the *taijasa* bodies, taken together, are the equivalent of what are described as the *kāraṇa* and the *sukshma sariras* in Vedānta, though taken separately, there is but little correspondence between them. Practically, no information is forthcoming about the *kāraṇa sarira*, but the *sukshma* is said to consist of five 'seed-organs' of knowledge, five similar organs of action, the root-cause of mind, and the elements of the five kinds of activities of *prāṇa*, i.e., the functions of exhaling, inhaling, digestion, evacuation and circulation generally. No doubt, these functions cannot belong to the *sthūla sarira* (the gross body), for that body is not the starting point of life; nevertheless they cannot likewise be rooted in the *sukshma sarira*, but in the very first vestment or sheath, whatever it be called, the *karmāṇa* or *kāraṇa* or anything else. Furthermore, as every living being does not possess all the five senses and the organ of mind (*dravya mana*), the *sukshma sariras* of different beings cannot be said to be identically the same in all cases. But Vedānta makes no distinction between the *sukshma sariras* of different beings, and knows of no difference with respect to them.

There are three bodies of the soul in Vedānta, but five according to Jainism. The former recognizes the *kāraṇa*, the *sukshma* and the *sthūla sariras* alone; but the latter adds two more to them. These two additional bodies, however, do not always accompany the soul. To explain this difference of opinion, we give the description of these five bodies below.

(1) The *karmāṇa*, which, as already described, is made up of the different kinds of energies known as *karma-prakṛitis* engendered by the operation of the force or forces of different kinds of *raja* and *duṣa*, i.e., attraction and repulsion :

(2) the *taijasa* (lit. brilliant) which is composed of electric matter, as already defined ;

(3) the *audāraka*, i.e., the ordinary body of gross matter ;

(4) the *vaikṛiyaka*, or the body which the residents of heavens and hells possess, and which is ordinarily invisible to our normal vision ; and

(5) the *aḥaraka*, which is developed by advanced *munis*, and may be projected by them to visit the Tirthamkara, if there be one living in a distant land.

Of these, the first two never leave the ego till it enters Nirvana, and the third is also an almost constant companion of the soul in the world of men, though it undergoes modification on account of birth, growth, death and transmigration, from time to time. The fourth takes the place of the *audaraka śarīra* when the soul is born in heaven or hell, and the last is evolved out only by some of the pious saints.

The first four of these bodies do not require any further proof, but the fifth one, the *ākāraka*, rests on the authority of the very saints and *munis* who have seen it issue forth.

To familiarise the mind with the operation of the Law of Karma, it should be remembered that the *karmāṇa śarīra*, which is a constant companion of the soul in all its migratory wanderings in the *samsāra*, including the heavens and hells, is liable to undergo changes of form from time to time, so that no condition of life short of *nirvāṇa* can be a permanent state of existence. Hence, the soul which goes to heaven or hell returns to the human or animal kingdom on the termination of its life in those regions.

Here we may incidentally remark that the confusion of thought prevailing among the numerous sects of reincarnationists themselves, as to whether a human soul can be born again in an animal body, finds an easy solution in the nature of the *karmāṇa śarīra*. People do not take the trouble to work out the process of re-incarnation, and merely wrangle in empty words and concepts, the sense of which they do not themselves grasp; therefore, their disputations seldom lead to any substantial truths. In the light of the above remarks, it is clear that being born in a human or an animal body is just the question which depends on the human or animal tendencies lying latent in the 'creative momentum,' i.e., the *karmāṇa śarīra*. We have no doubt whatever on the point that whenever the animal propensities preponderate over and outweigh the nobler human tendencies of the ego, it cannot help being born in an animal body, the species being determined by the degree of brutal instincts evolved out by the soul. Those who ill-treat their fellow-beings, who show no mercy to the weaker in their dealings with men, who slaughter helpless dumb creatures for the sake of food, or trade, who rob

poor widows and defenceless orphans, and all those who persist in the path of villainy and vice, subject themselves to future incarnations as beasts and brutes. On the other hand, many of our dumb friends who have evolved out humane tendencies are on the high road to get a human form. Let man take a lesson from animals ; they are at least honest.

Terrible as the law of *karma* is in its effect as the instrument of punishment, it can nevertheless be made to remove the evil, not only of the present life, but, also, of all the past lives, and that in the course of a single earth-life, if one only applies oneself to attain emancipation with one's whole heart. But this is possible only by giving up all kinds of worldly activities and by becoming *absolutely* desireless.

The subject, strictly speaking, belongs to the next chapter, but it may be said here that *ahimsā* is the first great requisite without which no real progress whatsoever can be made on the spiritual path.

Obviously, the means employed to achieve an end must be commensurate with the aim in view. Here the aim is to manifest the hidden condition of bliss, which includes freedom from pain and a prevention of its recurrence. Our want of happiness is due to our desires which when unsatisfied create worry, and, when satisfied, a deeper and stronger longing for the objects of enjoyment. Desire, therefore, is the root of all evil. The principal form of austerity, therefore, should consist in a firm determination to be desireless ; one should take what is called a vow to that effect, and exert one's will persistently to adhere to it. There should be no desire for the enjoyment of the palate, the eye, the ear, and the like. One should practise *ahimsa* every day of one's life. *Ahimsa* means not injuring others. Since we injure others only to satisfy our desires, desirelessness must necessarily lead to *ahimsa*. Many people think that the killing of animals is necessary for their living, and on that account harden their tender nature. There is absolutely no justification for this act of wanton cruelty. Nuts, vegetables and cereals contain all the nourishment necessary to maintain life, and, in their purity, constitute more joy-giving food than the dead entrails and carcasses of innocent animals

butchered relentlessly and in utter disregard of their mute appeals for mercy. Life is dear and joyful to all, and we should remember that the disregard of their appeals for mercy, and the sight of the pain and writhings of their bleeding and dying carcasses must recoil on our own souls, furnishing us with brutal and butcher-like tendencies, thus, engendering *karmas* which cannot be easily destroyed, and which form an ever-hardening shell round the soul. He who is desirous of taking the vow which leads to Brahman must resolutely set his heart against such evil deeds, and must give up all desires, which, in any way, whether directly or indirectly, lead to the causing of injury to other living beings. The desire for animal food is one of the worst forms of desire and so long as it is not got rid of bliss cannot be had, even if all the powers under the sun decree otherwise. If the foregoing argument is sound, the meat-eaters must face the question : is it worthy of man—a thinking being—to please the palate and deny happiness to the soul ? In other words, should we allow our tongue to devour our chances of salvation ? The soul is thirsting for knowledge and bliss and for freedom from such undesirable conditions as death, disease, old age, suffering, pain and sorrow : should we allow our perverse desires and inclinations to condemn it to a life which it heartily abhors ? Should we not rather pluck out the tongue if it stand in the way of the realization of our glorious, Godly nature ? Let us think and reflect well before we condemn our souls to a life of anguish and torment.

Muhammad, the prophet of Islam, said* :—

“ The creation is as God's family ; for its sustenance is from Him ; therefore the most beloved unto God is the person who doeth good unto God's family.

* * * * *

“ An adulteress was forgiven who passed by a dog at a well ; and when the dog was holding out his tongue from thirst, which was near killing him, the woman drew off her boot, and tied it to the end of her garment, and drew water for the dog, and gave him to drink ; and she was forgiven for that act.

* * * * *

“ A woman was punished for a cat, which she tied, till it died with hunger ; and the woman gave the cat nothing to eat, nor did she set it at liberty, so that it might have eaten the reptiles of the ground.

* * * * *

* See ‘ The Sayings of Muhammad. ’

"There are rewards for benefiting every animal having a moist liver (*i.e.*, every one alive)."

This last was in answer to the question put to the Prophet by some one : " Verily are there rewards for our doing good to quadrupeds, and giving them water to drink ? "

Mr. Abdullah Suhrawardy adds the following as an explanatory note to the above passages :—

" In the Kur'an animal life stands on the same footing as human life in the sight of God. ' There is no beast on earth,' says the Kur'an, ' nor bird which flieth with wings, but the same is a people like unto you (mankind)—unto the Lord they shall return.' "


If it is true that there are rewards for those who give quadrupeds and other dumb animals water to drink or otherwise show them kindness, and punishment for those who ill-treat them, like the woman who killed the cat, can we say that our slaughter of cattle for the sake of filling our stomachs, which can be filled just as well, even if not better, with non-animal dainties, is a proper and becoming act for the soul that aspires for freedom and bliss ?

If we would but ponder a little over the matter, we should find that the slaughter of animals is not only sinful, but quite unnecessary as well. Taste, of which we make so much in insisting upon an animal diet, is not at all in the things which we take in or absorb. The æsthetic pleasure which simple, wholesome, non-animal food affords to the soul on account of its natural purity, cannot be equalled by the most sumptuous and expensive preparations from dead entrails and carcasses of birds and beasts, however much we might endeavour to conceal their sickening stench by condiments and spices. Besides, taste for flesh, is only an acquired something like all other tastes. When a man takes to smoking his instincts revolt from the fumes of nicotine, but with each repetition they become more and more blunted, till they lose their natural delicacy altogether, and actually long for that which they had abhorred before. The same is the case with all other evil things ; they not only vitiate the natural instincts of the soul, but also tend to harden one's heart.

*Ahimsā** is the only means of removing the impurities arising from evil tastes and inclinations. He who wishes to enjoy immortality and everlasting bliss must first subdue his senses. The conqueror is he who conquers his own lower nature; to destroy another is no criterion of heroism. He who cannot control his desires has no chance in the coming struggle with Death. The weapon which slays this arch-enemy of mankind is not to be found in the armoury of kings and potentates of the world, but is the evil-consuming glance of the *ahimsā*-freed will.

Does it seem strange that Death should be terror-stricken in the presence of an ascetic will? There is nothing surprising in the statement. The power to defy death is the natural result, or culmination, of a course of life characterised by the severest forms of asceticism. We have had occasion to refer to this power ere this, but we shall now go into the matter more deeply.

* We give below the 'lineage' of *ahimsā* to show its evil nature. It is taken from the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (see Eng. Trans. by P. N. Sīṃha, p. 52). The names in italics denote the feminine gender.



To begin with, we must ascertain the true significance of death. Now, since souls are not liable to disintegration or destruction, death must be a process fully compatible with the survival of the *jīva*. But we have already seen it is not as a pure disembodied spirit that the soul outlives the disintegration of its physical body, for the *kārmāṇa* and the *taijasa śarīra*s do not leave it till destroyed by *tapa*, preparatory to the attainment of *mokṣa*. It follows from this that death signifies the departure of the soul with its two inner bodies, the *kārmāṇa* and the *taijasa*, from the body of gross matter. Now, since the law of transmigration, to which all living beings involved in the *samsāra* are subject, implies an alternating succession of births and deaths, death necessarily becomes the first step towards rebirth.

There would be little to dread death for in this sense, since it is like an obliging friend ever ready to change the old, the useless and the worn out with that which is fresh and young and healthy, were it not for the fact that it is also the most strictly just and incorruptible judge, giving to every one neither a tittle more nor less than what is deserved and merited by him. Thus, those who have earned merit and laid by store of virtue find in death a kind friend whose agency enables them to rise higher and higher in the scale of being, while those who have wasted their opportunity and gambled away their prospects dread it as an unrelenting foe.

Death, then, is the gateway to re-birth, though full of pain and suffering both in the closing moments of life as well as in the circumstances surrounding the re-appearance of the soul in another form. The conquest of death, therefore, can only mean an escape from this liability to re-birth, i.e., the cycle of transmigration. This amounts to saying that immortality is the nature of pure spirit and is enjoyed by those alone who rid themselves of all traces of material impurity. It follows from this that the idea of physical immortality is a fallacy of reason pure and simple.

Himsā, according to the above genealogy of evil tendencies, is the great-granddaughter of irreligiousness and falsehood, and the mother of contention and abuse. Her grand-children are death and terror, who are the progenitors of hell and its sister, the unauferable anguish. *Himsā*, thus, arises from falsehood, passions and the like, and leads to death and the torments of hell hereafter.

The same conclusion is to be reached from the physical side of the problem, where death means not the separation of spirit and matter—for that would end in the immediate deification of the soul—but a re-adjustment of form or type, of their union, consequent on the changes incessantly taking place in the *karmāṇa śarīra*.

Death may be said to occur either in the fulness of time, or prematurely, as the result of an accident, or from certain forms of disease. In the former case it is due to internal causation, and arises from the exhaustion of the force of longevity (*ayuh karma*), while the latter is the result of the separation of the outer from the two inner bodies as the effect of causes external to them. So far as the force of longevity, i.e., the *ayuh karma*, is concerned, it is the term, or duration, of a particular form of the *karmāṇa śarīra*, and, therefore, must come to an end, sooner or later, since that body is a compound of spirit and matter, and since all compounds are liable to change. Hence, time, which 'revolves' all substances round and thereby forces all combinations and compounds to undergo changes of form, must, sooner or later, destroy the force necessary to maintain any given frame or form of the *karmāṇa śarīra*, throwing it automatically into a new form. The result of the operation is that the association of the soul with its outermost body is rendered impossible any longer, and what is known as death immediately supervenes.

It is to be observed further that the *ayuh karma* is a force which cannot be augmented by any means, inasmuch as it is engendered not in a *varṭamāna* (current or present) incarnation or life, but in the one that is past. Just as it is not possible to prevent the collapsing of a house built on a sliding hill-top, when he who would put up a prop happens to be imprisoned in the edifice itself, in the same way is it beyond the pale of possibility to staunch the running out of the *ayuh karma*; that is to say, to augment the force of longevity generated under circumstances and surroundings which have ceased to be actual and accessible since. Like the effervescence of an opened bottle of aerated water, which nothing can reinforce, the store of *ayuh* is bound to be exhausted in due course of things, sooner or later. For, just as the duration of

the process of bubbling up in aerated water is determined by the quantity of the gaseous matter in combination with water and by the nature of its fusion with the liquid, so is the longevity of living beings dependent on the type of the *bandha* (bonds) forged by the union of spirit and matter in the *karmaga sarira*. To put it in the simple language of philosophy, the *ayuh karma* is the force which determines the duration of the continuance of a particular form or type of the *karmaga sarira*, upon which depends the association of the soul with its outermost body of matter. Hence, the exhaustion of *ayuh* is immediately accompanied by the last gasp of life, and the migration of the soul into a new 'womb.'*

Thus, a perpetuation of the physical life, that is to say, of the outer body of matter as a living organism, is a matter of impossibility; it has to be deserted by its immortal occupant on the determination of his lease of life in each and every case. Hence, while the inevitability of death holds true of all forms of life in the *Samsara*, he who passes out of the cycle of transmigration necessarily rises above death and enjoys immortality. For death holds no sway over simple, that is to say, indestructible things, so that whoever attains to the purity of the nature of his spirit—a simple substance—may hurl defiance in its teeth.

When certain kinds of its malignant *karmas*, to be described in the next following chapter, are destroyed, the soul becomes freed of its liability to re-birth, and cannot die any more, though it still continues to live in the world of men so long as its *ayuh karma* remains to be worked off. When this is exhausted, it is left as pure spirit, and immediately ascends to the *Siddha Sila* at the top of the universe, to reside there for ever, as a fully Perfected Soul, the *Siddhātman*, enjoying immortality and bliss and all other divine qualities of which as a *samsari jiva* it was deprived, owing to the evil influence of matter.

This is the only way of conquering death—to acquire immortality. But while the soul is debarred from the enjoyment of true

* The word 'womb' is here used in a general sense, and refers to all kinds of births, i.e., modes of being born.

immortality so long as it is unable to escape from the wheel of transmigration, it is undoubtedly endowed with practically unlimited power to triumph over sickness and disease. Old age, too, is not a calamity which cannot be made to fly away to a great distance, even if not altogether avoided; nor are accidents which so often have a fatal ending necessarily included in the class of things which the soul must put up with. We shall deal with each of these causes of premature death separately to be able to understand their nature better.

To begin with disease, it will be observed that it is neither a function of the organism nor a state consistent with the natural condition of the body, inasmuch as the organism itself tries to throw it off even when unaided by medical skill and medicaments. The natural normal condition of a living organism is health which is regained the moment disease is eliminated from it. The question, then, is: what is disease, and how and why does it appear in the organism? The reply is that it is a run-down state of health, and its cause, in each and every instance, is to be found in the low vitality of the system. Whether it be an ordinary malady, such as common fever or the most virulent form of an epidemic, health cannot be affected where the vitality is strong enough to resist the onslaught of disease-bearing elements and germs. This just proves the fact that where the vitality is not impaired germs of malignant disease are powerless to destroy the organism. The question which now arises in this connection is: to what cause or causes is the lowness of vitality itself due?

Before attempting to find a reply to this question we must consider the cause of old age first, so as to be able to deal with the whole subject at once.

Observation will show that there is no fixed time at which old age may be said to set in in each and every case; on the contrary, it appears sometimes at a comparatively early age, while in other cases its symptoms are not observable till a very advanced period of life. The most essential difference between youth and the state of senility lies in respect of the vitiated state of bodily organs and the presence of certain microbes that eat up the finer material of

nerves, replacing it with a coarse and inferior stuff. It is well-known that increasing muscular debility, friability of bones, atrophy of vital organs and general degeneration of the system are the usual accompaniments of old age. According to Prof. Elie Metchnikoff,* "a conflict takes place in old age between the higher elements and the simpler or primitive elements of the organism, and the conflict ends in the victory of the latter. This victory is signalled by a weakening of the intellect, by digestive troubles, and by lack of sufficient oxygen in the blood. The word conflict is not used metaphorically in this case. It is a veritable battle that rages in the innermost recesses of our beings."

Hardened arteries, abnormal liver, vitiated kidneys and a general atrophy and degeneration of the vital organs are some of the effects of a victory of the forces inimical to youth and health. Gradually the muscles shrink, making the skin loose and wrinkled; the memory and intellect are enfeebled, the back becomes bent and the senses are impaired. Extreme decay is characterised by the dissolution of some of the lime in the skeleton and by its transference to the blood vessels. In consequence of this the bones become lighter and brittle, the cartilages bony, and the intervertebrate discs impregnated with salts producing the well-known senile malformation of the backbone.†

Such are the consequences of a victory of the enemies of health and youth on a living organism, and it is evident that the commencement of decay is accelerated or retarded in different individuals according to the degree of resistance which they are capable of offering to the force inimical to the well-being of the body. Here also we are entitled to infer that the run-down condition of the system, implied in the inability to resist the encroachment of the forces inimical to its own well-being, is produced by the lowness of its vitality.

Thus, the problem presented by disease and senile decay resolves itself into the simple question: what is vitality, and to what cause, or causes, is its impairment due?

* See 'The Nature of Man,' p. 239.

† See 'The Prolongation of Life' by E. Metchnikoff, p. 30.

In order to understand the nature of vitality, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that health is affected both by mental and material causes, so that harmful passions and emotions, such as peevishness, envy and the like, as well as unhealthy suggestions produce as much harm as unwholesome foods and poisonous surroundings. Vitality, it may be stated, signifies the healthful energy of a living organism, which is characterised by the presence of the soul, and is a term utterly inapplicable to a purely material compound. Hence, it is only natural that it should be liable to be affected by both the mental and physical *stimuli*. Accordingly, we find many of the ordinary ailments of life amenable to control by suggestion as well as by proper medicament. That vitality is not a pure secretion or product of matter, may be seen by trying to infuse it into a body from which the soul has already taken its departure, when the whole of the contents of all the different pharmacopœias may be emptied into the belly of the corpse without making it move as much as a muscle.

The modern mind whose outlook is limited by its ignorance of the nature of the law of *karma*, no doubt, seeks to discover the cause of the lowness of vitality exclusively in the element of matter present in a living organism, but religion points, in the first instance, to the operation of the forces engendered in the previous incarnation of the soul as furnishing the key to the solution of the problem. As already stated, the effect of the different kinds of activities of the individual is preserved in the *karmaya sarira*, the seed as well as the vehicle of re-birth, and constitutes the *nucleus* of potential energy or force for the life to come. At the moment of death the soul enwrapped in its two inner vestments is separated from the physical body of gross matter, and immediately enters a new womb. This operation, which takes much less time than is required for its description, is performed mechanically by the soul, in obedience to the action of the chemical and magnetic forces residing in the two inner bodies, the *karmana* and *taijasa sariras*. The transference of the soul from a dying organism to the selected base of fresh activities being complete, the process of organising an outer body immediately

begins, resulting, in due course of time, in a new re-birth in fresh environments and surroundings.

If we now bear in mind the fact that the physical body is the objectification of will, as already shown, we shall have no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that the power of the organism to resist the onslaught of the microbes and elements of disease and old age, in other words, the vitality of the system, is primarily dependent on the nature of the forces stored up in the *kārmāṇa-kavira*. Whether it be regarded as a chemical property of the physical matter of the organism, the effect of the conjunction of the body and soul stored up in the structure of nerves, muscles and bones or in any other way, it is certain that vitality is dependent, in the first instance, on the operation of forces responsible for the making of the body itself; for the differences in the degree of resistance offered by different systems to the harmful influences from without must, obviously, arise out of the differences in the quality, or quantity, or both, of the material of bodies and the structure of bodily organs and limbs, and must, therefore, be attributable to the organising agency or power in each and every case. Thus, every organism enters into the struggle for existence with a certain amount of the vital force which represents the amount of investment of the soul in its last incarnation. It is the balance which is placed to the credit of the individual in the Bank of Life, and which may be preserved by careful economy, or squandered speedily by reckless and riotous living.

But while the soul brings with itself the *nucleus* of the vital force from its past life, it is also forced, in a certain sense, to carry with it the causes that may constitute a heavy drain on it. These are the seeds of desires which may be said to be the harbingers of vital poverty and decrepitude. The body, which is at once the objectification as well as the instrument of the will, for the gratification of its appetites, is liable to deteriorate and is subjected to abnormal strains, by reckless living. It is easy to desire, but not so easy to gratify the senses; for their objects often lie beyond reach. Besides, every desire once gratified, becomes a still stronger longing for further gratification. Hence, worry puts in its appearance and becomes an additional tax on the body for which it was never designed.

It is this additional burden on the body which is the cause of much trouble in the case of thinking beings. An animal suffers but little or no mental pain on account of worry, for it does not think of the future. Man is, however, mostly given to relying upon his intellect, and, thus, suffers most acutely from both real and imaginary pains, for he not only thinks of the immediate future, but also of that which is the most remote and might never happen. The amount of energy which is consumed in the operations of the intellect, in calculating and determining the future course of events, is enormous, and directly tells on one's health. This is not all, for man at times evolves out emotions which are not only unnecessary, but positively harmful as well.

Now, the human body is a delicate organism, and not intended to bear, with impunity, the constant pressure of hard work to which it is subjected in many instances. Exposure to inclement weather, harmful uncongenial surroundings, and want of suitable healthy food, all combine to accelerate the approach of old age, and often lead to untimely death. One of the most fruitful causes of disease and premature decay, in the case of thinking beings, is the force of unhealthy suggestion, which, as pointed out by M. Jean Finot, is responsible to a great extent in shortening life. The same is the case with excessive eating, unhealthy foods and riotous, Bacchanalian living which also make heavy drains on one's store of vitality.

Now, if vitality were a fixed quantity which could not be augmented or reinforced, health and youth would very soon come to grief. Fortunately, however, it is not a fixed quantity, but a fluctuating balance, generally on the credit side of the account. The rallying power of the organism is no less remarkable than its capacity to resist disease, though this power appears to diminish or dwindle away with each trial of strength between the forces of health and the elements inimical to physical well-being. In conditions characteristic of prostration and disease, the 'microbes of health'—if we may coin such a phrase—resemble the men who are unable and disinclined to work on account of mental listlessness, overfeeding or the paralysing effect of intoxicants and drugs. In some cases—generally the worst—all these three aspects are found together with symptoms charac-

teristic of exhaustion and fatigue due to over-work for a long period of time. These are the cases that are past all hope of cure, and the question they suggest is not how much relief can any particular system of treatment afford to the patient, but how soon will death put an end to the misery of an existence which has nought but suffering and pain in store ?

Leaving these and some other similarly hopeless cases of extreme lowness of vitality out of consideration, there is every reason to believe that where no heavy inroads are allowed to be made on the resources of the organism, and where the healthful energy of the system is properly husbanded by its 'occupant,' there is no cause to fear the coming into being of the conditions which usher ill-health, premature senescence and untimely death. Adepts, indeed, aspire for absolute control over these undesirable conditions, and by means of persistent healthy auto-suggestion and *tapas*—fasting, observance of the vow of celibacy and the like—acquire full mastery over them.

We now come to cases of accidents. It would seem a great presumption to the vast majority of mankind to say that no accidents can possibly happen to a *fully* spiritualized soul; nevertheless the fact is that no *jivana mukta* or *kevali* (the saint who has acquired omniscience) can ever die of an accident. It is, no doubt, hard for materialism to endorse our statement, especially as science is supposed to deny the miraculous: but if we ponder over the matter we shall perceive that there is nothing strange or incredible in it. We could quote several great men of science to show that the materialist's views are not conclusive on spiritual matters; but in these days of rapid progress a single quotation from an address, delivered by Sir Oliver Lodge, at the Free Church Council Assembly at Portsmouth, will suffice to show that it is not necessary to deny miracles on scientific grounds.

"Why seek to deny either the spiritual or the material? Both are real, both true. In some higher mind, perhaps, they might be united. The bare possibility of the existence of the miraculous has been hastily denied. It is not necessary to object to miracles on scientific grounds. They need be no more impossible, no more lawless, than the interference of a human being would seem to a colony of ants or bees."*

* See 'The Leader' (Indian), dated 4th April, 1911.

There is, as a matter of fact, no miracle, nothing that is supernatural, nothing that is lawless. It is our ignorance which makes us look upon an occurrence as a miracle; for were we all-knowing, we should know the causes of the miraculous as well, and thus know them to be simply natural. The reasons given by us in proof of the power of the will are not pure speculations of a metaphysically inclined brain, but facts which are conformable to truth under the severest tests, namely,

- (1) as being in strict conformity to the rules of reason,
- (2) as being confirmed by ancient tradition, *i.e.*, the experience of mankind in the past, and
- (3) as being capable of yielding immediate and certain results when experimented with.

In the last instance, however, there is a little qualification to be attached to our statement, and it is that we do not try to make theoretical experiments with spiritual truths, but in all earnest sincerity put them to practical test. The powers of the human will seem incredible on account of their simple explanation, and superficial students are ever prone to raise their voice against what they have never properly exerted themselves to understand. When the construction of a steamship was in contemplation, some one, it is said, took it into his head to write a book on the impracticability of the idea, and sent some copies of it for sale to America. But, by a strange irony of fate, the boat which carried the books to the New World happened itself to be a steamship! The 'easy-chair' speculations of our men of science on spiritual matters are just like the views of the author of the book referred to, and possess little or no validity in the realm of true metaphysics. Many of them even deny the existence of phenomena which are only too well proved, on unimpeachable testimony.

The one most fatal effect of ignorance in us is that it makes us blind to our own inner forces and powers. By the impetuosity of will running wild in the pursuit of desire, the transparency of consciousness is beclouded to such an extent that we are rendered quite unconscious of its inner operations, and begin to prize the little gleam left to us with which to adjust our relations with the outer world. The

consequence of this is the most unfortunate one for our race, for it renders the will negative, exposes us to all sorts of evils, and prevents our acquiring a knowledge of such psychic faculties as clairvoyance, telepathy and the like, lying dormant within the soul. When one desires to have the homage of all mankind, to appropriate all the wealth of the world, to be admired and praised by every one, to secure all the titles and other marks of distinction which tickle the vanity of the foolish—in short, when one craves for all the things that abound in the world, he converts himself into a sort of pit which remains ever empty in spite of being filled from all directions unceasingly. When a man thus turns himself into what may, more appropriately, be called a dust-bin, his will becomes negative, and is forced to look upon itself as impotent. In such a state of mental degeneration it cannot perform its higher functions, and lies dormant, as if drugged and stupefied. If we are then exposed to danger we are powerless to combat it, and readily succumb to it, being stricken with terror at its very sensing.

The whole of mankind, except those who are aware of and have realised the true nature of their will pass their lives in a state of demoralizing terror, and so great is their sense of powerlessness that a slightly louder peal of thunder than what they are accustomed to is quite sufficient to make their hair stand on end, even when they are perfectly safe from it. This mental cowardice is a characteristic of the race, but, amongst the cowards, those who are a little more courageous are patted on the back and loudly praised for their courage !

How can man, who looks upon himself as the noblest creature on earth, justify such eternal mental degeneration in him ? Courage and cowardice furnish us with the key to the nature of the will. The former is the result of fearlessness, and springs from self-reliance, implying a belief in the invincibility of one's self ; but the latter is the outcome of dependence on reason, which, by relating one concept to another, gives rise to fear, thus paralyzing the system by terrifying the ego.

Will as the self-conscious force is invincible and recognizes no power to be greater than itself. But its chief limitation is that it

does not reason, and is, thus, amenable to suggestion. Hence, the great importance of right beliefs, *i.e.*, faith. Those men who give wrong suggestions to their will are necessarily the authors of their own undoing. This is the sin which cannot be forgiven, for it is one against the Holy Ghost, and death is the wages thereof.

Will is the executive side of life and capable of accomplishing the most wonderful feats, but in the state of impurity it is forgetful of its own nature and powers, and, therefore, liable to be influenced by the wrong suggestions from others as well as from its own intellect. Different kinds of *karmic* forces produce different kinds of impurities in its nature, some obstructing its knowledge, some its perception, some its capacity for faith and mental serenity, or sober-mindedness, and some its freedom of action. Deprived of its natural perfection and independence, the soul behaves in all sorts of ways, and has to break away from its *karman*s before it can attain to the status of Gods.

It is thus clear that the will remains weak and impotent only so long as it is involved in the delusion of ignorance, that is, wrong ideals and beliefs. According to our thoughts it is that the will in us appears as potent and powerful, or impotent and powerless. But for our individual ideals and beliefs, we all would be equally brave, or cowardly, since the egos are all alike in substance, and, also, since all organisms are made of the same material. Our thoughts may, therefore, be said to constitute the influence which renders the will negative in us.

To understand the power of thought on will, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that there are two systems in the human organism, the conscious, or intellectual, and the sub-conscious, also known as the subjective, which possesses full control over the bodily organs and functions. The ego, *i.e.*, the will, is the primary impetus which combines both these systems in itself. It is the king for whose preservation they both work in their different ways, the subconscious doing duty for the executive, and the intellectual discharging the functions of a prime minister, that determines and adjusts the relations of the individual with other individuals and bodies in the world. The affairs of the waking moments of life are

ordinarily conducted by the prime minister (the intellect), but when the latter is incapable of dealing with any particular situation, *e.g.*, when danger is imminent, the subjective mind takes the reins of control in its own hands. At other times, however, it does not dispute with the discriminative faculty the advisability of its orders, but obeys them all if they happen to bear the seal of the 'king,' that is to say, it faithfully carries out all such suggestions as are approved of by the will. Hence, suggestions which are strong enough to affect the will are alone recognised and obeyed by the subconscious, *i.e.*, the Executive.

The sub-conscious is there merely to do the will of the ego, so to speak, and, therefore, does not reason concerning the advisability of its orders; it seizes the reins of control only, when the prime minister is rendered powerless and the king turns to it for protection and help. In such extreme cases, the executive (incapable of induction) perceives and grasps the situation by direct intuition, and does the best thing possible, under the circumstances, to avert the threatening danger and to preserve the king. If, however, the mischief done by the terror-stricken minister is great and the situation untenable, as when the king instead of trusting the executive is still trying to rouse the minister from his terror-stricken and paralyzed condition, the executive can only succeed in rendering the ego immune from pain, but is powerless to avert the catastrophe. What is called death then takes place.

Now, when a man is attacked by a wild beast, say, a wolf, he is frightened by its approach, and his reason tells him to fly away from it. The moment this conclusion is arrived at, the will is rendered negative, leaving the man exposed to danger and death. But sometimes when danger appears suddenly, and there is little time for reason to look round and determine upon the best possible means of defence, we, without reasoning, avail ourselves of the readiest means at hand, whatever they may be, and then invariably escape from harm. We then call it the presence of mind, which, however, is nothing other than the presence of the will, as the result of reliance on the self, but not on the intellect. Now, if we could go a step farther, and, instead of unconsciously relying on the self,

were to consciously rely on and cling to the Self, our will would ever remain positive, that is, in a condition natural to it. We should then observe that taking place which would astonish everybody, and would be a miracle. The wolf, then, instead of coming and devouring us, would turn away and pass by harmlessly, or would come and lie down at our feet ! A majority of men in our day would, no doubt, consider this statement highly absurd, but it is no more absurd than the turning away of the positive point of a magnetized needle from the positive point of another similar one, or their coming together only at different and opposite poles, in a friendly spirit, if we may use a metaphor. It is the magnetism of the Will which is the miracle, not its manifestation in Self-conscious Souls. And this is the secret power which enabled the *yogis* and *mahatmas* of India to remain unmolested from wild beasts in the forests. Every day do we see the manifestations of will in various forms, but fail to observe their significance. The biggest stone cannot get away from the law of gravitation, and lies chained to the earth, till it is moved by some external force ; but man, an insignificant and frail being, so far as the matter of his body and its dimensions are concerned, at his sweet will and pleasure overrules that very law, and walks, runs, dances and jumps about in defiance of it. Is it not because his will lifts up his body and suspends the operation of one of the greatest of all the laws of nature, which is said to be keeping all the suns and planets, and even entire solar systems, in their proper positions, maintaining their equilibrium ? And, what enables his will to defy this great force of nature ? Just the slightest inclination in that direction ! Is this not an equally great miracle ? If we were to ascertain the cause of the exertion of the will, we should learn that it is none other than self-knowledge, in different language, self-consciousness. Hence, knowledge is power, as the proverb says. When the consciousness of the little appropriating ego has such a wonderful effect on one of the greatest of all the forces of nature, can we possibly measure the extent of power which a consciousness of one's true Self puts within the reach of the wondering soul ? What chance, then, does a poor beast of the forest stand against a Self-illuminated Soul ? Not only would the beasts of prey pass quite harmlessly by

in the presence of such a Self-conscious Soul, but also the forces and powers of nature would work only for his welfare—at his bidding, as it were. Accidents such as arise by the collision of ships and trains, the falling of roofs, and the like, also do not affect him, for the opening out of his consciousness enables him to discern the causes which bring them about, and he can then not only save himself but many others besides.

Another form of the wonderful manifestations of the will is the magnetic 'fluid,' which radiates in all directions from the persons of great *yogis* and saints. It is this subtle magnetic force which is responsible for the engendering of that atmosphere of peace and love which invariably surrounds holy personages. The arrival of a *Tirthankara* was heralded by the appearance of bloom on trees out of season, and the wolf and the sheep invariably sat by the side of each other in His presence. Even the mountains where Jaina ascetics performed their holy meditation are known to have offered resistance to the passage of *vimanas* (air-craft), coming from far off distant regions of space flying over them. All this was the effect of the *munis'* personal magnetism. Their magnetic radiations impinging on the surrounding matter created such an atmosphere of holiness, love and impregnability in their vicinity that all those who came in contact with it were overpowered by its powerful vibrations, forgot their personal animosities and unholy pursuits, and were unable to penetrate into it, except to show reverence to the Source whence emanated those radiations of virtue and power.

Those who come under the influence of such an atmosphere of human magnetism, as is described above, undergo two opposite kinds of experience, according to their own nature. Persons of a holy and pious temperament feel exalted, but those who are evilly inclined and vicious find themselves overpowered by the higher vibrations of the ascetic Will, and soon come to grief, if determined to oppose its rhythmic pulsation.

Investigation into the nature of the causes which dethrone reason in all cases of sleep, mesmerism, fascination and will-power, discloses the fact that it is the rhythm, or pulsation, of life which is first affected by them. They either increase or diminish the intensity of its pulsation. To the former class belong all cases of exaltation of

will, and to the latter all those which are characterised by symptoms of sleep, fatigue, fright, or death. Midway between the two (opposite types of rhythm) does reason occupy its throne. Hence, whenever the normal conditions which favour the functioning of calculating reason are disturbed, it at once vacates its throne, and a state of exaltation, or depression, of varying degree comes to take its place.

Thus the 'virtue' which flows from the persons of great *rigis* and sages creates in their vicinity an impregnable atmosphere of peace and love, which, by coming into contact with different temperaments, exalts or diminishes their life-pulsations, according to their own dispositions. It is not to be supposed that the radiation of 'virtue' is a loss of power, in any sense. On the contrary, it directly leads to greater power, since it rouses enthusiasm and makes the will vibrate more intensely than before, and also because the will has an inexhaustible supply of virtue in itself.

The training of the will, then, is the door to power. Many persons try to develop their wills nowadays, but derive little or no benefit from their exercises on account of their ignorance of its nature. Some undergo severe tortures to acquire will-power; and a class of literature has sprung up pretending to deal with the cultivation of occult and psychic forces, neither the authors nor the readers of which have the slightest idea of the mischief which is likely to result from the unnecessary and harmful exercises prescribed in the books. For in its purest form, the will is the holiest of forces in existence, and opposed to all moral failings. Hence, it cannot manifest itself, in its true character, till all taint of evil thoughts, passions and inclinations is not removed from the soul. Those who try to develop it from motives of worldly power and greatness, therefore, do the very thing which prevents its coming into manifestation. One may spend one's whole life in practising all conceivable kinds of breathing and other exercises, yet will not the will condescend to manifest itself, so long as the mind is not freed from all kinds of the taint of selfishness. The utmost that can be had from these exercises is the development of such powers as the superficial clairvoyance with which modern Psychical Research has made us familiar. These

powers, however, confer neither immortality nor bliss on the soul, but generally lead to mental and moral degeneration here, in this life, and to undesirable re-births hereafter. Besides, the temptation to turn them to one's material advantage is too great to be resisted by ordinary humanity, and their least use, for one's selfish ends, is sure to lead the soul on to the path of destruction.

Those who wish to develop their will for the conquest of Death must, therefore, give up the silly and senseless idea of training it by means of the physical exercises of the body, but should apply themselves to purify their moral nature. It is only the moral impurities which stand in the way of the soul; for the higher and truly joyous rhythms of Will are kept back only so long as passions and desire are allowed to sway one's conduct.

It is not the will seeking power and greatness in the world of men that will conquer death, but the will which is holy, passionless and Self-centred.

The powers of the Self-conscious Soul are truly wonderful, and life is only the effect of the conjunction of the body and the soul. Hence where the soul *wills*, not merely *wishes*, to maintain this connection, disease, old age and even untimely death, every one of which arises from avoidable causes, can be made to fly away to a great distance from the body. The recuperative powers of the will have never failed to manifest themselves wherever the unnatural strain, to which the body and mind are subjected, in the prime of youth, has been lessened in the more advanced, and therefore the less active, i.e., the more restful, period of life. Third dentition is known to have occurred in several cases after 80. M. Jean Finot reports* a number of cases where eye-sight, a new set of teeth, and even the natural colour of the hair have been regained and acquired at the remarkably advanced ages of 110 and 117.

"The forces of the mind," says the *Philosophy of Long Life*, "well utilized, may render us most important services from the point of view of the prolongation of life, as we have demonstrated elsewhere. . . . When we think of our manner of life, which seems only calculated to upset, from our earliest infancy, the thousand wheels of the human machine, we are filled with wonder at its resistance. And not content with disorganizing it, we endlessly calumniate it besides. After having used and abused

* See 'The Philosophy of Long Life.'

our body during a certain number of years, we are pleased thereupon to declare it old, decrepit, and worn out. We then neglect it with a carelessness which completes its ruin. After having suffered for long years from our excesses and our follies, it succumbs under the weight of our gratuitous contempt. And even if the insult did not come from its immediate proprietor, be sure that our neighbours, relations, or friends would not spare to throw it in its face. Poor human body! Source of so many joys which embellish, nourish, and sustain our life, it is nonetheless reduced to the post of simple whipping-boy. The reproach that our mind or conscience is senile or worn out rouses in us a sentiment of revolt. We allow no one to doubt their power or their youthfulness. And yet how many are there who would dare to rebut the accusation of senility unjustly addressed to them? Worse still, men who have reached a certain age bend themselves still lower under the imputation, and do all that they can to merit it."

The effect of evil suggestion about old age, senility and weakness is terrible on life. It paralyzes the will on whose activity alone depend the life and health of the organism. Men who assume the airs of age, weakness, and decrepitude to excite the sympathy of their fellow-beings, who pretend to be overwhelmed with grief to convince others of their love for the dead or sympathy with the living, and all those who stifle or in any way smother the natural buoyancy of their souls, are the authors of their own death. Wherever and whenever, on the contrary, the organism has been treated with the regard and respect which it is entitled to from its 'tenant,' and not made to bear the ceaseless strain of unnatural living, nor exposed to unhealthy, uncongenial or poisonous environment, it has never failed to prove the fact that premature death, disease and old age are merely accidents which nature has strewn in the path of reckless sensuous living. And death itself is conquered with the subjugation of passions and lusts, for it holds no sway over pure Will, so that he who attains to spiritual purity necessarily passes out of the whirling whirlpool of transmigration to which alone is confined the suzerainty of the King of Terrors. But much more than mere speculation from an easy armchair is needed to acquire the mastery over death. He who would aspire to soar so high—and none is debarred from it by nature—must follow the advice of the Buddha:—

"Look to no extraneous aid, make yourself an island, depend on none, depend on the strength of your own righteous exertions, and the supreme effort made with earnestness to control the low nature is sure to succeed. Strive earnestly, persevere strenuously, let no lethargy and irritability and scepticism prevent you from reaching

the goal. Ring out the old, ring in the new, avoid evil, store in good. Fight valiantly against sin and lust and selfishness."

It must be distinctly understood that the practising of what may be called purely negative virtue will not enable the soul to defy death.

Negative virtue merely amounts to not doing unto others what we should not like them to do unto us, but it takes no account of the first commandment, 'Thou shalt love thy God with all thy might,' which, in plain language, means: 'Thou shalt cling to thy Self with all the force of will thou art capable of exerting.' Moreover, since the Self is characterised by pure goodness, it follows that he alone who actively practises equanimity, in all his thoughts and deeds, can be said to practise virtue actively. He, then, not only tolerates, but actually becomes filled with affectionate sympathy for all those who are involved in transmigration, like himself. As the capacity for goodness increases in his breast, the power to defy death becomes more and more his possession. It follows from this that no one who is not prepared to renounce *himsā* (injuring others), in all its three forms, can ever hope for salvation or immortality. These three forms are, (1) the actual commission of the harmful act oneself, (2) its abetment when done by another, and (3) the encouraging of those who have already committed it independently of oneself. As we punish the man who abets a burglary, the thief who actually commits it, and the receiver of the property stolen at the burglary, so does Will detest the accessory after the fact as much as the abettor and the 'thief.' Hence, they who slaughter animals, they who get them slaughtered, and, also, they who purchase their dead limbs are travelling on the path which leads to suffering and pain. Mr. Herbert Warren points out (Jainism, p. 101):—

"If we analyse the state of mind of a person who is hunting for sport, we find three factors, (1) an absence of thought of the pain and harm he is inflicting on the innocent creatures; (2) he is entirely taken up with his own pleasure; and (3) he has no feeling for the pain and suffering of the animals. Thus we find thoughtlessness, selfishness and heartlessness."

Neither the heaven-world nor *Nirvana* is suitable for the residence of those who possess these three qualifications, and the only

other place for their after-death sojourn is too dreadful to contemplate.

Ahimsa, thus, is the path of salvation, which is open to each and every one who would but exert himself to reach the goal. Freedom and bliss lie only in this, not in the pursuit of the wisdom of the world.

After what has been said above, it is not necessary to dwell any longer upon the power of Will in preserving life and conquering death. As regards its healing powers, the testimony is overwhelming in its favour, for the art of mental healing is a birth-right of our race which has descended to us from the remotest antiquity. Even today scores of men, who had been led to regard themselves as incurable, bear grateful testimony to its efficacy. Whether it be the 'laying of hands,' or the making of magnetic passes, or a mere word of command, or any other process, its efficacy lies only in the omnipotence of Will; and its success depends, not so much on the powers of the operator, as on the mental buoyancy, courage and faith of the patient himself.

Thus, so long as one depends on the strength and virtue of another, there is little hope for him; for the necessary condition involved in a belief of this kind is that of emptiness within and of expectation of help from without, in other words, that of pure receptivity, hence weakness. Will is the maker of the organism, and always possesses the power to repair and renovate the old, the worn out and the useless. And, since the body is the objectification of the individual will, that is to say, of the desires, emotions, passions and beliefs of the individual, clearly, physical beauty also depends on the nature of our thoughts, so that, if we cease thinking evil and fill the mind with noble thoughts of 'virtue' and power, the body must necessarily become an expression of beauty, holiness and love, instead of sin and ugliness and fear, as it usually is. He who loves is never in a receptive or negative state. But it will be highly mischievous to confine the sphere of true love to such emotions as one feels for the opposite sex, or even to those less selfish manifestations of it which one observes in the relation of parents and guardians and their wards. It is a misnomer to call such low forms of emotions by the name of Love, for while the

human lover loves one particular individual, he hates the rest of the world—a remark which applies equally well to all the relations of love among men, whether those subsisting between parent and child, or amongst relations or friends. In its true sense, love is that noblest of emotions which, free from all kinds of leaning or bias towards any particular individual or community, expresses itself in the form of mental equanimity and compassion for *all* kinds of living beings. This is the only form of love which can save humanity from the clutches of Death. It is a libel to call the spasmodic, trickling streamlet of emotion which flows only at the sight of some particular person or persons, and dries up at that of the rest of our race, to say nothing of the other forms of life, by the name of Love. Love is not a thing which bubbles up and flows at intervals, or by fits and starts; it is one continuous, ever-flowing, ever-bubbling emotion which flows in all directions and towards all beings, human and animal. The former only makes the heart cold, but the latter opens out its lotus, and keeps it ever fresh and blooming, by constantly irrigating its roots with the living waters of Life. This lotus is not a myth invented by the *yogis*, as some biased missionaries, backed up by a knowledge of physiology, would have us believe. These gentlemen, ignorant of the true significance of *yoga* centres, only looked for it in the physical organ of the heart,—a place where *yoga* does not place it—and, needless to say, failed to find it there. The lotus of the heart is a psychic centre in the spinal column, and is known by its action. It is called the lotus of the heart, because it controls the function of the heart. This great lotus is the centre of radiation in the organism, from which life radiates its joyous vibrations all round. Its free activity leads to health, youth and immortality; but its obstruction at once converts the vibrations of love into the poison of hatred and worry, which soon destroys the organism.

The emotion of love ensures the free functioning of the lotus of the heart, whose rhythmic pulsation sends the fresh life-blood coursing through the arteries and veins, sweeping and carrying away all obstructions and accumulations of effete matter, so highly dangerous on account of its suitability, as a breeding ground, for disease-bearing germs. When the will is fully developed by the practising of universal

love, its powerful rhythm suffices to scare away death itself in the manner already explained. Thus, he who would aspire to attain immortality must proceed by practising universal love.

We thus see that death is not a thing which must come to every one ; on the contrary, it comes only to those who live in ignorance of their true Self which is perfectly godly and omnipotent, and at the assertion of which death itself flies away, like *Iblis* at the ejaculation of '*tahaul*,' as is the Muslim belief. The efficacy of this or any other formula, it will be observed, lies not in words, but in the power which faith in its efficiency invokes on the occasion, for that power is Will itself, and it is irresistible by men, brutes and demons alike. Ignorant humanity is, however, debarred from the conscious exercise of this power, since man seldom distinguishes between the acts of *wishing* and *willing*, which are totally different and antagonistic, the former signifying mere passive day-dreaming, but the latter nothing if not the iron-will to succeed. The difference between the man who *wills** to be well and him who merely *wishes* to be so, is just that between life and death. The latter spends all his time in pure wishing, and frets and fumes at the non-realization of his wish, thus accumulating a large amount of additional worry under the tear-

* 'Willing' should not be taken to imply vociferation or shouting or any other mode of violent effort. The purpose is served when the idea to be materialized is stably placed in possession of the mental field. What is needed is a minimum of effort on the part of the individual to stamp the idea or the picture of the desired state on the sub-conscious will, and the impress will be readily engraven if disinterestedness in the normal concerns of life has freed the attention to concentrate itself upon the image. Relaxation of the tension of the normal daily life will, then, suffice to bring the full powers of the Subjective Mind into manifestation, and it will itself do the rest ; for its powers are practically unlimited in the departments of life and health.

As *Monsieur Coué* points out, the secret of power lies in the faculty of imagination, and it is not at all necessary to resort to mental or physical effort of a violent type. Why *wishing* is fraught with evil is because it puts the Law of 'reversed effort' (see chapter vii *ante*) into operation, and thus ends by augmenting the existing trouble. For the idea underlying such a thought as 'I wish I were well' is that of helplessness, which is likely to materialize and cause harm, instead of good. The man who *wills* to be well, on the contrary, has confidence in himself, and speedily regains health and strength, by furnishing his mind with pictures of health and vigour.

ing strain of which the frail, human frame speedily collapses ; but the former uses his internal forces to throw out disease, is saved all the worries which arise from listless, inactive wishing, and is soon restored to health, to the wonderment and confusion of specialists and experts.

In vain shall we be told that religion is impracticable, and that philosophy and metaphysics are not intended for the man of the world. So far as philosophy is concerned, it is the only means of rendering life consistent in its actions, and of bringing the higher ideals of goodness and power within the reach of one and all. Even education, which raises men's ideals and imparts to them the urbanity of manners whereby we distinguish them from savages, is only the hand-maid of philosophy.

With respect to practicability, it can also be definitely shown that all the impracticability, that there is in the world, lies with the so-called man of the world, and in no sense with Religion, when properly understood. The question is, what is practical ? If we reflect on this unfortunate word at all, we cannot remain ignorant of the fact that it acquires significance only when we accord to it the capacity to bring our ideals or ideal into speedy realization. Hence, anything is practical if it lead us to the goal, by the shortest path. Now, since the ideal of our race is the attainment of happiness by the conquest of death, it follows that the only practical thing in the world is the ' path ' which leads us to the realization of our high ideal. There is no man who, in his heart of hearts, does not cherish this great ideal, though there be some who from a superficial analysis of their feelings or from fear of ridicule, might refuse to credit their souls with this noble and ennobling aspiration. Such being the high aspiration of the soul, it is evident that no means which do not bring it nearer to realization can be termed practical. Mankind, however, generally lavish all the praise they can on those who amass large fortunes, who move in high society, who are companions of kings and potentates, and who possess hereditary or personal titles conferred on them by their fellow-beings, but who, in spite of all their wealth, companions and distinctions, are not a bit nearer the attainment of the ideal of their souls. Can we call these men, or their admirers,

practical ? Which is more practical, the pursuit of ideals which must invariably lead to regions of pain and suffering after death, followed by subsequent incarnations in undesirable surroundings in this world, or of the Ideal which confers immortality and bliss on the soul ? There can be only one answer, and that in favour of the latter alternative. If any one still think that this world is going to afford him lasting joy, let him bestow a glance at the picture of human misery and woe so vividly drawn by a lady writer of our times (*The Use of Evil*):—

“ Look at the men and women around you, look at their faces ; see how they are full of anxiety and of desire, of trouble and of injustice ; and see how men's hearts are pierced by pain and laid desolate by catastrophes, by miseries, by hopes and by fears ; how they are tossed about and flung from side to side, and too often brought to ruin ! ”

Can a life so full of misery, so full of pain and trouble, so full of grim evil, where the spectre of death stalks about unchecked, with no certainty of anything even in the very next moment, be compared with the eternal peace, tranquillity and calmness of the blessed state of perfection, called *turiya* in Vedanta ? Think and reflect and

“ then realize that Brahman is bliss. Bliss, but how ? Bliss, because there is unity ; bliss, because there is absence of desires ; bliss, because there is knowledge of permanence, which nothing that is transient can disturb.”—(*The Use of Evil*, pp. 53 and 54.)

The definition of *turiya*, the highest state of consciousness, need not altogether depend on negative statements, but an idea may be formed of it in the mind by an internal sensing of the feeling—“ I am I ”—which persists after all forms of desires are quelled. It is the condition in which the joyousness of life is directly the object of internal perception, the state of consciousness or soul which is characterised by a feeling of growing freedom and bliss.

The following extract from Bergson's highly interesting work, the “ *Creative Evolution*,” will suffice to show that this beatific experience is not a pure hallucination of indolent asceticism:—

“ Let us seek, in depths of our experience, the point where we feel most intimately within our own life. It is into pure duration that we then plunge back, a duration in which the past, always moving on, is swelling unceasingly

with a present that is absolutely new. We must, by a strong recoil of our personality on itself, gather up our past which is slipping away, in order to thrust it, compact and undivided, into a present which it will create by entering. Rare, indeed, are the moments when we are self-possessed to this extent : it is then that our actions are truly free. Our feeling of duration, I should say the actual coinciding of ourself with itself admits of degrees. But the more the feeling is deep and the coincidence complete, the more the life in which it replaces us absorbs intellectuality by transcending it. The more we succeed in making ourselves conscious of our progress in pure duration, the more we feel the different parts of our being enter into each other, and our whole personality concentrate in a point, or rather a sharp edge, pressed against the future and cutting into it unceasingly. It is in this that life and action are free."

This is confirmed by Schopenhauer who observes (*The World as Will and Idea*) :—

"All willing arises from want, therefore from deficiency, and therefore from suffering. . . . Therefore so long as our consciousness is filled by our will, so long as we are given up to the throng of desires with their constant hopes and fears, so long as we are the subject of willing, we can never have lasting happiness nor peace. But when some external cause or inward disposition lifts us suddenly out of the endless stream of willing, delivers knowledge from the slavery of the will, the attention is no longer directed to the motives of willing, but comprehends things free from their relation to the will, and thus observes them without personal interest, without subjectivity, purely objectively, gives itself entirely up to them so far as they are ideas, but not in so far as they are motives. Then all at once the peace which we were always seeking, but which always fled from us on the former path of the desires, comes to us of its own accord, and it is well with us. It is the painless state which Epicurus prized as the highest good and as the state of the gods ; for we are for the moment set free from the miserable striving of the will ; we keep the Sabbath of the penal servitude of willing ; the wheel of Ixion stands still Whenever it discloses itself suddenly to our view, it almost always succeeds in delivering us, though it may be only for a moment, from subjectivity, from the slavery of the will, and in raising us to the state of pure knowing. This is why the man who is tormented by passion, or want, or care, is so suddenly revived, cheered, and restored by a single free glance into nature ; the storm of passion, the pressure of desire and fear, and all the miseries of willing are then at once, and in a marvellous manner, calmed and appeased. For at the moment at which, freed from will, we give ourselves up to pure will-less knowing, we pass into a world from which everything is absent that influenced our will and moved us so violently through it. This freeing of knowledge lifts us wholly and entirely away from all that, as do sleep and dreams ; happiness and unhappiness have disappeared ; we are no longer individual ; the individual is forgotten ; we are only pure subject of knowledge ; we are only that eye of the world which looks out from

all knowing creatures, but which can become perfectly free from the service of will in man alone. Thus all difference of individuality so entirely disappears, that it is all the same whether the perceiving eye belongs to a mighty king or to a wretched beggar; for neither joy nor complaining can pass that boundary with us."

We need mention only one more instance, though any number can be cited on the point. It is furnished by the famous English poet, Lord Tennyson, who, in a letter which he wrote to Mr. B. P. Blood, reports of himself as follows (see 'The Varieties of Religious Experience' by William James):—

"I have never had any revelations through anæsthetics, but a kind of waking trance—this for lack of a better word—I have frequently had, quite up from boyhood, when I have been all alone. This has come upon me through repeating my own name to myself silently, till all at once, as it were out of the intensity of the consciousness of individuality, individuality itself seemed to dissolve and fade away into boundless being, and this not a confused state but the clearest, the surest of the surest, utterly beyond words—where death was an almost laughable impossibility—the loss of personality (if so it were) seeming no extinction, but the only true life. I am ashamed of my feeble description. Have I not said the state is utterly beyond words?"

Professor Tyndall, in a letter, recalls Tennyson saying of this condition :—

"By God Almighty! there is no delusion in the matter! It is no nebulous ecstasy, but a state of transcendent wonder, associated with absolute clearness of mind."

Such are the expressions of opinion of those who were not perfect Yogis and whose contemplative labours in the region of Life allowed them but an occasional peep behind the veil, but the true bliss of the blessedness of being, which may be experienced in nirvana, has been declared to be beyond description; for no human language is designed to describe feelings, except by comparison, and bliss is absolutely incomparable.

Which, then, is more practical—the realization of happiness by following the great Tirthamkaras who have attained it themselves, or the pursuit of means which are, by their very nature, incapable of leading to the ideal in view? The practical wisdom of the worldly wise is clearly impracticable here, for it busies itself with the pursuit of means which lead in a direction opposite to that in which lies the

ideal dear to every heart. It is the stupid opinions of a handful of ignorant men which are leading us into error in ignorance of our true ideal. Let us determine to attain this ideal with half as much strength of will as we put into our business, and see if its realization is outside the pale of practicability or more practical than the realization of our worldly ideals, money, fame, and the like. When we sincerely apply ourselves to the realization of the true ideal, we shall discover that all the impracticability that seems to surround it lies only in the muddled heads of our counsellors, and, in no way, in the ideal itself.

The practical value of religion is to be judged not from the side of a theoretical speculation of what its adoption leads men to give up, but in terms of the actual increase of power, knowledge and bliss which it brings to the soul. As repeatedly pointed out ere this, the giving up is not of anything worth clinging to, but only of those things and ideals which actually play havoc with the higher aspirations of the soul. As soon as the vision is sufficiently clarified to perceive the true side of life, of which the majority of men are ignorant today, the idea of giving up will be recognized to be a process full of exhilaration and joy, since each act of giving up will only go to make the soul more and more positive, and thus bring it a step nearer the goal of perfect knowledge, unending bliss, and infinite power. Renunciation is a necessity with nature from which none can hope to escape. If we do not renounce our weakening tendencies and attachments ourselves, Nature will, sooner or later, compel us to do so perforce, in which case our anguish will be all the greater. Against the forces of life nature arrays her terrible dragon of death, whose very thought is enough to strike terror in the bravest heart. The clinging to the objects of the senses is, thus, the creature of delusion; they have to be given up, sooner or later. If we do not renounce them cheerfully, death will sure enough put an end to our enjoyment thereof. It is for us to decide whether we give them up ourselves, or let death tear us away from them. In the one case, power and blessedness result for the soul, but, in the other, there are only the lamentations and gnashing of the teeth, born of impotent rage.

Such being the case, it becomes necessary for every rational being to prepare himself for the final struggle with the dreaded foe—Death. The law of re-incarnation proves, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that if we neglect the present opportunity which the human birth has thrown in our way, we might not get another chance for a long long time to come. As the Scriptures teach, difficult it is to obtain the human form; having obtained it, difficult it is to be born in the best environment for speedy progress; having been born even in the most suitable environment, difficult it is to acquire the truth; and having acquired it, difficult it is to put it into practice! Nothing avails when death comes to claim its victim! Friends, relations, money, fame, authority, and the like, only go to make the parting all the more sorrowful. Fool, indeed, is he who having obtained the human birth squanders away his time in the pursuit of the pleasures of the world, which can never obtain for the soul the bliss which it is hankering after.

Our statement about the advantages of birth in a good family needs a little elucidation. There is a great deal of truth in it, since some men are so placed by the very circumstance of birth that they are saved most of the trouble involved in the practice of renunciation. This will become quite obvious on a comparison of the rules of conduct prevailing in different communities. For instance, he who is born in a family in which flesh and wine are generally taken is at a greater disadvantage than one born where only one of them is indulged in, and the latter is less fortunate than him who takes birth in a household from which both are rigidly excluded, as is the case with the Jainas. Similarly, a man born in a community which possesses the most exact knowledge has decidedly better facilities of speedily acquiring the truth than those of his brethren who are born elsewhere. But although it is not in our power to undo the effect of the past *karmas*, in so far as it has brought about the present birth, it is possible to destroy its remaining force by the acquisition of Right Faith, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct—the three priceless jewels of the Jaina philosophy.

Terrible is the fate of those who not only are in ignorance of the real truth themselves, but who, also, convert others to their

erroneous views. The value of religion does not depend on the numbers that acknowledge its supremacy. The whole world may be ignorant of truth, yet it is inconceivable that truth itself be any the worse for the ignorance of men. Numbers are only useful to him who has nothing better or higher to aim at than show. Religion loses all its potency in the hands of those who only go about converting others to their views, but who otherwise care little for *living* it themselves. The very nature of religion is opposed to such treatment. It is the system which undertakes to cure the soul of the spiritual breakdown, consequent on the absorption of the poison of ignorance and evil *karmas*, and it is inconceivable how, without the practising of rigid disciplinary austerities on the part of its followers, its case can differ from that of a quack whose sole interest lies in increasing the number of his patients, irrespective of the question whether they are cured of their ailments or not.

Jainism points out that the true Teacher must possess no less than eighteen divine qualifications, which are enumerated on pages 60 and 61 of Mr. Warren's "Jainism." The most prominent ones of these are :—

- (1) complete eradication of lust, or sexual passion ;
- (2) absolute freedom from ignorance, in different language, most perfect knowledge ;
- (3) total abstention from drinking, flesh-eating, killing, and other forms of *hiṃsā* (injuring others) ; and
- (4) freedom from sleep, since that would signify a gap in omniscience.

Bhagwan Mahavira, the last great Tirthamkara, had all these 18 qualifications in Him, and for that reason His great personality stands out, amongst the numerous company of pseudo saints and saviours, as that of the greatest Teacher the world has had during the last five and twenty centuries. We are not minimising the greatness of the other teachers by any means, since it is not our purpose to find fault with any religion, however backward, or insufficient. But after the fullest possible credit is given to their lives, as described in their own books,

it is impossible to shut one's eyes to the absence of most of the four prominent traits pointed out above. Jainism, indeed, goes still further and points out that its teaching does not include the worship of the Great Ones (the twenty-four Tirthankaras) in any way. These Saviours are not the objects of worship, in any sense; but only the living Models of Perfection which every soul must constantly keep before its mind. For, as stated before, it is not idolatry, but 'idolatry,' which Jainism inculcates, the realization of the fruit of which it assures, in the fullest possible measure, to each and every soul, that cares to follow the Masters on the path.

Every soul, does not matter in what sphere of life it might be born, has the capacity to come into the realization of its own godly nature, and may do so by following the right path. This right path, however, is not the 'practical' path of kings and millionaires and other potentates of the world, but the path of Those who have fought and conquered Death and destroyed the demon of Darkness.

It should be pointed out here that with reference to the rules of Right Conduct Jainism divides the aspirants after liberation into two distinct classes, namely, ascetics and laymen. The former are those noble-minded, high-souled beings who are determined to reach the goal by the shortest route of *tapas* (asceticism), but the latter are the ordinary men of the world, who, unable to keep pace with their more advanced brethren, the *sādhus* or *munis*, seek, first of all, to perfect themselves in the preliminary discipline of the householder's *dharma* (religion), which is really the training ground for the higher course. The rules of conduct laid down for the former class of souls are all characterised by the utmost severity of disciplinary austerity, which no one desirous of the attainment of Godhood can ignore; but those meant for the guidance of ordinary men and women in the world are tempered to the capacities of their less evolved souls. Hence, conduct becoming a *śravaṇa* is forbidden to the *muni*, though it is only compatible with the steady progress of the soul, through succeeding incarnations. Obviously, the rules of conduct, if they are to raise our status, must be consistent with the laws of progress, so as to bring out the best within us. This point is constantly kept in view in Jainism. Hence, the rigidity of moral

discipline in the case of less evolved souls, is made to yield only to the extent to which it is compatible with the idea of steady progress. For this reason, while strict celibacy is enjoined on the *muni*, the *śrāvaka* is required to restrict his sexual passion to his married spouse, and may not gratify his lust with other women and 'slaves.' As for slavery, Jainism has been its bitter opponent from the very beginning. It does not tolerate even the bondage of animals and birds, to say nothing of men and women.

To conclude, the proof of the theory of transmigration renders it necessary for man to readjust his existing notions of the important problems of life. The belief that all will end once for all and for ever, in the cold embrace of mother earth, in the grave, is seen to be an absolutely unjustifiable one. Man cannot now afford to take life indifferently. Something more than a mere life of 'harmless ease,' so fashionable in society, with all its well-meant chit-chat, picnics, tea parties and other forms of social intercourse, considered innocent fun, is needed to be saved the anguish which will be the lot of the soul imbued with the notion of its identity with the body. And much more than the eradication of that pernicious belief is necessary to escape from the cycle of births and deaths altogether. Strenuous effort is required to be made for the attainment of Godhood; vice and frivolity have to be given up one after another, and to be replaced by meditation and knowledge of the Self.

New light is thrown on the problem of ethics and morality by the doctrine of re-incarnation. In all the numerous departments of science and commerce, as well as in all other walks of life, the path to improvement is laid open along lines which are compatible with the highest and noblest aspirations of the soul. When we regulate our conduct on truly spiritual lines, we shall find an easy solution of all those problems of modern times which have hitherto proved insoluble. The contest between capital and labour, which has been growing keen for some time past, and for which no satisfactory remedy has been found as yet, is an instance in point.

So long as people leave out of consideration the fact that the tables might be turned, and their own future incarnation might take place in the very class which they are now trying to keep down,

there is little chance of arriving at a conclusion which would yield satisfaction to both the parties to the contest. At present, one side are eager to accumulate all the money they can, forgetting that it is neither the end nor the means for the realization of bliss, but only a means for the procuring of those luxuries and accoutrements of voluptuous 'disease' so often mistaken for 'ease.' The soul can neither carry with it its millions of gold and silver into the grave, nor avoid, with their aid, a tittle of the suffering which the path of mammon entails; nor, yet, can it claim its previous earthly wealth in a subsequent incarnation. The value of vast accumulations of money, in our own coffers, a very small portion of which will suffice to lessen the burden of some unfortunate creature, is, then, reduced to the satisfaction we feel in the idea of being considered rich by our neighbours and friends. When we set against it the harm its acquisition—not always strictly in accord with the rigorous code of morals—does to the future peace of the soul, and remember that we are just as much liable to be re-born in the very position which we put ourselves in opposition to in the present life, it ceases to possess even the feeble satisfaction which the notion of importance in the eyes of our friends and neighbours may be deemed to yield. Its proper use will, then, be confined to the providing of the necessities of life for the family and for such other purposes as will advance the cause of the soul. When the value of money is estimated in the light of the above observations, and full allowance is made for the consequences which must redound on the soul in case of a disregard of the true teaching of religion, it becomes perfectly clear that all our endeavours to keep down certain classes of men are decidedly harmful to our own interests. The same observations apply to politics. The idea of nationality is only on the surface of consciousness; for the transmigrating soul all nations are alike, and the man who in one incarnation is born in Europe, may, in the very next one, appear, in a Hindu body, in Hindustan. The tyrant may take birth in the nation or family of the victim of his tyranny, and the bomb-thrower, among those whom he now despises. Nay, the one may be now persecuting his own kinsmen—even parents—of a past birth, just as the other may be blowing up the reincarnated bodies of those who were near relations in some

previous life. Those who are now ruling the destinies of men, and who pay no heed to the distress their tyrannical acts cause, directly, or indirectly, among the weaker nations of the world, and all those who, in any way, tyrannize over their fellow-beings, may some day have to groan under the rigor of the very laws which they are now making, for keeping down those whom they regard as created solely for the purpose of being insulted and kicked by them !

The law of *karma* is no respecter of personality : it does not distinguish between the peer and the peasant, the cat and the king, or the rustic and the civilian. It only takes into account the quality of active goodness in the soul, and though its mills grind slowly, they grind exceedingly small.

To sum up : the doctrine of re-birth, by whatever name it might be known, whether metempsychosis, re-incarnation or any other, is an indisputable proposition of philosophy, and rests on the solid foundation of the indestructibility of souls, so that being eternal and, therefore, also, uncreated, they must have existed in some form or other in the past. Furthermore, miracles being inadmissible in science, the present incarnations of the souls now living in the world cannot all have been determined by anything in the nature of a lawless occurrence, but must be due to a law, or laws, which are concerned in the shaping of our destinies. The fact is that the souls are wrapped, so to speak, in two invisible inner sheaths which constitute the vehicle of transmigration, regulating their re-births and determining their circumstances, environments and conditions. All that a living being undergoes, all that he feels, and all that he experiences, is in consequence of his own actions in the past, even health and vitality depending, in the first instance, on the forces residing in the very constitution, which he has brought over from a previous life.

As for working off the effects of *karmas*, we may anticipate the next chapter to a certain extent and say that no one whose being is a continuing source of affliction and ill-luck to other living beings, especially to weaker souls, can ever hope to rise to that high and sublime status which is unattainable except by those who are the most merciful and compassionate. What misfortune can be too

great, what calamity too severe, for him who separates the flesh of poor confiding animals from their bones, so that he and his friends might emulate Epicure for one passing moment at their meal? We would cry out immediately if a pin pricked us; but we have no thought for the extreme agony which we inflict on another soul when tearing off its flesh from its limbs, as if it had no right even to its own body! Abject slaves to the senses, we should pause and consider where the love of flesh is dragging us to? *Ahimsā* is the first and the foremost qualification for progress on the path, that takes us out of this terrible region of births and deaths to the land of Everlasting Glory and Joy and Immortality. The path might, no doubt, appear to be thorny and uphill in the first instance, but he who perseveres shall discover, ere long, that it appears so only to keep off undesirable intruders, and that, in reality and truth, it is full of life and joy for the soul.

As regards the association of the soul with its outer body of gross matter, that is determined by what is known as *syuk karma*, on the exhaustion of which it must come to an end in due course of time, sooner or later. Short of this, the power of the soul to avoid sickness, old age and even premature death is practically unlimited, though even this is liable to be affected by the past *karmas* of an individual, appearing in the form of the proverbial slip between the cup and the lip!

CHAPTER XIII

IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF GODS

"The worshipping of the feet of the *Deva* of *dausa*, the bestower of the desired good and the consumer of Cupid's shafts, is the remover of all kinds of pain; for this reason it should be performed reverently every day."—The Ratna Karanda Śravakachara.

"Whoever turns himself into a jewel-case [*i.e.*, an abiding place] of faultless Wisdom, Faith and Conduct, to him comes success in all his undertakings in the three worlds, like a woman eager to join her lord."—*Ibid.*

There can be no denying the fact that no one who does not know the method of doing a thing is ever likely to be successful in his undertaking to accomplish its doing. The man who would bake his bread, for instance, must know precisely what bread is made of, as well as the exact method of making and baking it. And the knowledge that is useful is not of the metaphysical type—a general discourse on food, cookery, bread, buns and the like—but of the specific properties of the ingredients of which bread is made, and of the detail of the process, that is, of the steps to be taken and of the order in which they are to be taken. For the man who is ignorant of the specific properties of flour and water might proceed to make his bread with such things as gun-powder and picric acid, while he who is unaware of the exact order or process, pour down his flour and water into the oven, instead of mixing them together in the first instance. Now, it is obvious that the result would be nothing short of an unmitigated calamity in either case. The acquisition of scientific knowledge, connecting the individual effort with the goal in view, by a series of steps each of which carries one nearer the end than the one preceding it, is, therefore, an absolute necessity, if we are to succeed in our undertakings. There is no exception to this rule, even spiritual progress falling within its scope, as must be evident to the reader by this time.

The path of *Jinas* (Conquerors, *i.e.*, Gods) is the scientific path, and consists in the doing of the right thing at the right moment.

It is constituted by the confluence of the three streams—Right Faith, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct—which conjointly, but not separately, wash off the impurities of sin and carry the soul to the Temple of Divinity in Nirvana, installing it on the pedestal of everlasting glory among Gods.

Of the three constituents of the 'path,' Right Faith has its eye constantly fixed on the great Ideal of Perfection and Bliss, and never loses sight of it for a moment. Its function is to determine the direction of individual activity in the right way, preventing it from becoming self-destructive. Faith is, like the man at the helm, always directing and guiding the barge of life, in storm or in calm, to the looked for Haven of Freedom and Rest. He whose heart is not chastened by Right Faith is like the rudderless ship which is soon dashed to pieces against rocks, for want of proper guidance and control. The necessity for Right Faith is fully obvious from the fact that people only live up to their beliefs.

Right Knowledge is the detailed knowledge of the process of self-realization without which nothing but confusion can be expected as a result of action. It is the chart which is intended to furnish an accurate description of the path to be traversed, of the obstacles to be encountered on the way and of the means to be adopted to steer clear of them. As no one who has not provided himself with such a chart is ever expected to take his boat successfully across an ocean, so is not the soul that is not provided with Right Knowledge ever likely to land in safety at Nirvana.

Right Conduct is the third essential of success, since without the doing of the right thing at the right moment no desired results can ever be achieved by any one. If Right Faith is the properly directed rudder and Right Knowledge the chart of navigation in the Ocean of Transmigration, Right Conduct is the force which actually propels the barge of being Havenward.

The scientific validity of these three constituents of the 'Path,' called *ratna trai* (triple jewel) by the Jaina *acharyas*, may be further judged by the fact that it is simply inconceivable how success can possibly crown our endeavours where all or any one of them is wanting.

Taken singly, Right Faith only opens the outlook of life to embrace the highest good. Right Knowledge is merely the diagram of the action to be performed, while Right Conduct is simply inconceivable in the absence of Faith and Knowledge of the right sort. Just as he who would bake his bread must believe in his heart of hearts that it is capable of being baked, must learn the process of baking it, and must also actually exert himself for its baking, so must he who would have Dame Success fly to embrace him on the spiritual 'path' acquire the *ratna trai* of Right Faith, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct, in the first instance.

The faith to be acquired means belief in the infallibility and truth of the doctrine of Jinas, the teaching of the Holy Ones who attained to perfection with its aid. An unwavering mental assent is what is implied by the word. With respect to its quality, faith grounded on knowledge is by far the best form of faith, but even belief induced by will will do. This comes about by acting as if the state of belief, to be induced, were true irrespective of its verification by reason. In the fulness of time, the assumed attitude will become, as it were, a habit, or emotion, and will possess all the characteristics of belief based on knowledge, and knowledge itself will arise from it in due course. Prof. James maintains :—

" Nature sometimes, and indeed not very infrequently, produces instantaneous conversions for us. She suddenly puts us in an active connection with objects of which she had till then left us cold. ' I realize for the first time,' we then say, ' what that means ' ! This happens often with moral propositions. We have often heard them ; but now they shoot into our lives ; they move us ; we feel their living force. Such instantaneous beliefs are truly enough not to be achieved by will. But *gradually* our will can lead us to the same results by a very simple method : *we need only in cold blood act as if the thing in question were real, and keep acting as if it were real, and it will infallibly end by growing into such a connection with our life that it will become real.* It will become so knit with habit and emotion that our interests in it will be those which characterise belief. Those to whom ' God ' and ' Duty ' are now mere names can make them much more than that, if they make a little sacrifice to them every day.

The last sentence in the passage quoted leans towards *bhakti*, and furnishes sound argument in favour of ' idolatry ' within the limits laid down by us elsewhere. Right Faith being acquired, it should be

reinforced by Right Knowledge, to be derived from study and meditation in conjunction with the reading of *śāstras* (scriptures). Right Knowledge means knowledge which leads to and is indispensable for the attainment of *moksha*; it is the knowledge of subjects (*tattvas*) which have the most immediate bearing on the attainment of the object in view. The *tattvas* are seven in number, and naturally arise in a scientific treatment of the subject. The aim is to obtain freedom from the mancipation of sin, which must consist of real bonds if it can hold us down in captivity. How to break these bonds?—then, is the real problem, which is logically resolvable into the following seven points, namely,

(1) the nature of that which is to be freed—whether it is such as can be freed from its bonds?

(2) the nature of the substance of which the chains of bondage are composed;

(3) how does the second substance approach the first?

(4) how are the bonds forged, also what kind of bonds are they which are to be destroyed?

(5) in what way can we stop the forging of fresh bonds?

(6) how to destroy those actually existing now? and

(7) what will be the nature of the condition resulting from the destruction of the bonds?

Such are the ultimate principles of Right Knowledge; they are called *tattvas* because no soul desirous of its welfare can afford to remain ignorant of them. In different language, the *jīva* that does not know them knows nothing worth knowing, though he may have mastered all the worldly sciences and arts and other departments of knowledge. In the technical language of the Jainā Siddhanta, these seven essentials of Right Knowledge are known as (1) *jīva*, (2) *ajīva*, (3) *āsrava* (inflow of matter into the soul), (4) *bandha* (bondage), (5) *saṁvara* (cessation of *āsrava*), (6) *nirjarā* (destruction of existing bonds), and (7) *moksha* (liberation). The whole teaching of the Holy Siddhanta as to the nature of Right Knowledge may be tersely summed up in the following sentence, with the small numerals placed on appropriate words to emphasize the *tattvas*: the *jīva*¹ is held in the clutches of *ajīva*² which flows³ towards it, and assumes the form of

bonds' ; the stoppage' of the inflow and the destruction' of the existing bonds result in the attainment of salvation or liberation,' the highest conceivable form of good.

As to the nature of the *tattvas*, we are already sufficiently familiar with the first two and the last, but the others need explanation. To begin with *āśrava*, the first thing to grasp is that there can be no bondage of pure mental abstractions, or purely wordy concepts ; the word signifies some kind of real fetters, not, indeed, consisting in chains of iron, but of some very subtle and fine kind of matter. It is well to know that nothing but force, in some form or other, is capable of exercising restraint or of holding living beings in the condition of captivity, and that no kind of force is conceivable apart from a substance of some kind or other. The bondage of the soul must, therefore, be the bondage of matter, the only substance which is known to enter into interaction with souls, and the obtainment of freedom must consequently imply the removal of the particles of this foreign material from the constitution of the ego.

As for the principle of interaction between spirit and matter, observation shows that the soul is liable to be affected, agreeably or otherwise, by all kinds of actions, mental, physical and those concerned with speech. But before the soul can be affected by them it is necessary that they should produce a modification of its substance, that is, a characteristic change in the state of its feeling-consciousness. But, since no modification of the feeling-consciousness is possible or conceivable in the absence of a material agent reaching and making a deep impression on it, it is certain that matter must be flowing towards the soul with every thought, word and deed, modifying its condition and affecting its states. For it is obvious that apart from matter there is no other substance to enter into interaction with spirit, whence it follows that matter flows towards the soul with every action of the mind and body, including the articulation of sounds and words, i.e., speech.

The first great law of interaction between spirit and matter, accordingly, may be laid down as follows : all actions of embodied living beings, whether mental, or physical, including speech, are accompanied by an influx of matter towards the soul.

It should, however, be noted in this connection that our first law of interaction only concerns the process of influx which accompanies every action ; it has no concern with the further question whether an impression be made on the soul, since that depends on the question whether it be attentive to the incoming stimulus. It is common experience that we fail to notice even the taste of food in the mouth whenever attention is deeply engrossed elsewhere. The physiology of taste indicates that while the bulk of food passes into the stomach through the gullet, some fine particles of its relish reach the soul through the glands of taste and the nerves connected with them, enabling it to ' feel ' and enjoy the properties of each morsel. But these relish particles must be there all the same whether the soul attend to them or not. It would follow from this that the relish of taste is an affection of the ego which results from a more intimate contact with the particles of matter than mere co-existence, or coming together, in a place, and that attention acts as the hand-maid of the soul who ushers afferent *stimuli* into the presence of her mistress. Moreover, since attention always implies interest, whether it indicate the merest wish to know or the most passionate longing to embrace, it further follows that the union, or fusion, of spirit and matter cannot take place unless the soul be first thrown into an attitude of desire. Itself a dynamic force or substance by nature, the quality of soul's rhythm is affected by the entertainment of desire, and it is consequently exposed to the influx of the particles of matter which readily combine with it, limiting its functions in different ways. Our second law of interaction between spirit and matter may now be formulated as follows: the fusion of spirit and matter does not take place except where the soul is thrown into a condition of expectancy, or desire, i.e., weakness.

It is a corollary to this that the giving up of desires which produce the condition of weakness in the soul must necessarily bring about its liberation from the thralldom of matter, also called the bondage of *karma*, on account of *karmas* being the primary causes of the material influx and *bandha*.

As regards the quality of *bandha*, the rule appears to be that the stronger the desire the deeper the penetration of the particles of

matter and the closer the union between them and the soul, so that the worst forms of bondage result from the worst types of desires. Now, desire principally assumes four different intensities and appears as greed, deceit, pride and anger. Greed, it will be seen, is but another word for desire, to gratify which one resorts to deceit ; and pride arises from the possession of what is desirable, while anger blazes up in consequence of being foiled in an endeavour to secure an object of desire, or from wounded pride. These four kinds of passions, thus, are the main causes of bondage, so that the strength and 'thickness,' and, consequently, the duration of the *karmic* chains also actually depend on the degree of their intensity. Besides these powerful passions, desire also takes the form of joking, attachment, aversion, grief, fear and disgust, as well as of the three kinds of sex-passion peculiar to the three sexes, the male, the female and the neuter. These are called the nine *no-kashtyas*, and are all potent causes of bondage.

So much for the duration and strength, i.e., malignity or virulence of the forces of *karma*. As regards the quantity of matter which enters into union with the soul, that obviously depends on the actions performed by the individual, since material influx only follows upon the three kinds of activities, mental, physical and lingual or vocal. So far as the different kinds of *karmanas* are concerned, they all clearly result from the material influx, because they are, in their real nature, only so many different kinds of forces, which, as already observed, cannot be imagined to be altogether immaterial. We may now formulate the third great law of interaction between spirit and matter thus : the quantity of the material of our bondage and the variety of *karmic* bonds depend on the working of the three channels of activity, namely, the mind, speech, and body, but their duration and strength, or malignity, are determined by the intensity of passions and desires of the soul.

The next thing to understand in this connection is the effect of the action of matter on the soul. We have said that the fusion of spirit and matter results in the bondage of the soul. This is literally true ; for the union of substances always tends to limit their natural functions, though new properties and faculties arise in consequence of it. As

hydrogen and oxygen, which are gaseous by nature, are robbed of their natural 'freedom,' i.e., of their gaseous nature, by combining with each other in the form of water, so does the soul become crippled in respect of its natural functions in consequence of its union with matter. This is the bondage, meaning, as it does, the suspension and vitiation of the natural functions and properties of the soul-substance, which are held in check for the time being.

Observation shows that the soul involved in the cycle of transmigration is unable to enjoy its natural perfection in respect of knowledge, perception and happiness, which, therefore, must be held in abeyance by the forces arising from its fusion with matter. But since the fusion with matter is dependent on individual activity, they cannot but be the forces engendered by one's own actions. We thus get three kinds of *karmas*, namely, those which obstruct knowledge,* those that interfere with perception, and those that control the experiencing of pleasure and pain.

In addition to these, observation also proves the existence of a force which stands in the way of the acquisition of Right Faith. This comprises two distinct types of energies : those which interfere with the acquisition of Right Faith itself, and those that debar one from putting it into practice.

Separate places must also be allotted to the force which determines the duration of the association of the soul with its physical body, and to the energies responsible for the making of the different bodies and their limbs. The status—descent, lineage and the like—which really depends on the 'womb' into which the ego is attracted by the operation of the forces of chemical affinity and magnetism residing in its two inner bodies, the *kārmāṇa* and the *taijasa*, is also the outcome of a distinct type of energy, and must, for that reason, be treated as a class by itself. Lastly, souls are also observed to differ from one another in respect of physical prowess and the power to achieve what is desirable and desired. There are several kinds of

* Cf. "The supreme cause of lack of knowledge is the flesh and intimate association with the flesh." (Philo Judæus, quoted in Philo's Contribution to Religion, by H. A. A. Kennedy, p. 90.)

energy which limit the powers and effectiveness of the soul, and they form a class by themselves.


We thus have the eight principal kinds of *karmas* which, for facility of reference, are technically known as

- (1) *Jñānavarāṇiṇi* (from *jñāna*, knowledge, and *āvaraṇa*, a cover or obstruction);
- (2) *Darśanavarāṇiṇi* (perception-obstructing);
- (3) *Vedanīya*, which regulates the experiences of pleasure and pain;
- (4) *Mohaniya*, which is of two kinds :
 - i. *darśana-mohaniya* (*darśana*=faith, and *mohaniya*=infatuation, hence the infatuations ranged against Right Faith); and
 - ii. *charitra-mohaniya* (*charitra*=conduct), which prevents one's living up to one's faith;
- (5) *Āyuh* (age, longevity);
- (6) *Nama*, which is responsible for the work of organising different bodies and bodily limbs;
- (7) *Gotra*, which determines descent, lineage, and the like; and
- (8) *Antarāya* (from *āya*, to come or stand, and *antara*, between), which prevents effectiveness and interferes with energy in general.

These are the main kinds of forces engendered by individual actions. The Jaina Siddhanta subdivides them again into one hundred and forty-eight minor types which may be studied with the aid of the other works on the subject. It is, however, important to note here that the eight kinds of *karmas* are divisible into two main types, the *ghātiya*, and the *aghātiya*, of which the former comprises the first, second, fourth and eighth classes described above, and the latter, the remaining four.

The reason for the distinction lies in the fact that while the former actually affect and interfere with the natural attributes and properties of the soul, the latter are mainly concerned with its environments, surroundings and bodies. Hence are the former known as *ghātiya* which means inimical, and the latter, *aghātiya* (*a*=not + *ghātiya*).

The *ghātiya* may further be divided into (a) those that are directly controllable by the soul, and (b) those which are not so controllable, but which can be affected indirectly through those of the class (a). The different kinds of energies falling under the *Mohaniya* group all belong to the class (a), because they may be directly destroyed by self-restraint and exertion on the part of the soul. The following classification of *karmas* tends to facilitate the study of the subject and will be found useful by those who are not familiar with it :



We can now understand, to some extent, the ramifications of the diverse kinds of forces operating on the ego. Different kinds of energies, called *karma prakṛitis*, in the literature of Jainism, form

round him a veritable network of forces which have to be destroyed before salvation can be attained. The *jiva* is entangled in this network of his *karmas*, and wanders about under their influence in all sorts of conditions of life in the world experiencing pleasure and pain in the course of his wanderings. He is the pilgrim who has to free himself from the attachments of the world to reach the holy Shrine of his own Divinity. Till perfection is attained, he remains in the clutches of destiny, of which he is himself the author, and, consequently, liable to changes of forms and states, that is, births and deaths. Different kinds of *karmic* forces drag him about in the world, in different forms, giving rise to different experiences in the course of transmigration.

The *jiva* is the greatest living force in himself and not liable, by nature, to be influenced by any other force, or forces; but he becomes vulnerable by his own inclinations, longings and desires. Hence, it is his own longings for the things of the world which go to weaken his native vigour, and bind him down hand and foot with the chords of *karma*. His free nature is, however, constantly at war with his evil inclinations and pursuits. Thus, there rages a constant battle in the field of action, the physical body, between the natural qualities of the soul and the forces of *karma*, in which the scale sometimes turns in favour of the *jiva*, but mostly against him. The powers of the soul are diminished by the struggle raging in its own house. Thus arise the different kinds of disabilities which Jainism points out, and which constitute the bondage that is holding us down in captivity.

It is this bondage to which Jesus in the Bible referred when he said :—

“ And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.”—(John viii. 32.)

The fictitious discourse recorded in the verses that follow this dynamic truth was only designed to furnish a hint to the thoughtful as to the nature of the bondage referred to. The important verses bearing on the point are reproduced below :—

83. “ They answered him, we be Abraham’s seed, and were never in bondage to any man : how sayest thou, ye shall be made free ?

34. " Jesus answered them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin.

35. " And the servant abideth not in the house for ever : but the son abideth ever.

36. " If the Son therefore shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed."

If we are to construe these verses correctly, we must first endeavour to find out the truth each of them lays down. Careful reflection will show that the 34th is intended to settle the question raised in the 33rd—whether the bondage meant national or political subjugation? The answer is plain : it is the servitude of sin that is meant, not national captivity. In the 35th verse a distinction is made between the conditions of servitude and Sonship, the former of which is pronounced to be terminable, but the latter eternal. The 36th finally lays down that true freedom from all kinds of bonds—note the force of 'indeed' after 'free'—can only be conferred by the Son who is to abide for ever. Now, we already know what the word 'Son' signifies in the mouth of Jesus—the soul that has *inherited* the status and glory of God. Thus if we put down our conclusions categorically, we get,

1. that the word bondage in religion means the servitude or thralldom of sin ;

2. that this thralldom is not everlasting, but the condition of Sonship is eternal ; and

3. that the soul obtains true freedom only when it acquires the status of the Son.

These propositions are fully in harmony with the teaching of Jainism, and only reproduce three of the most fundamental truths of religion. They are not exhaustive of the *why* and the *wherefore* of the doctrine of transmigration, but were only intended as a hint to the wise. Let the reader ask himself as to what is meant by sin, and he will soon perceive that there can be no being or substance corresponding to the term. It is a mere word, and were we to search for it from now till the Judgment Day, it is certain that it will always remain what it is today—a pure wordy abstraction. The truth is that sin only conveys the idea of wrong-doing, there being no concrete being or thing to correspond to it in nature. The bondage of sin, thus, is

clearly the thralldom of actions, i.e., *karmas* (actions or deeds), which is to be shaken off to bring the state of "Sonship" into manifestation.

Now, if the reader will further pursue the theme, and enquire how the soul can be bound by its acts, he will not be long in coming to the conclusions which have been already established in this chapter regarding the nature of *āsrava* and *bandha*. For there can be no binding of real, subsisting beings or things with mere imaginary notions, or by pure ideas and words. A force is needed for the purpose, and no force is conceivable apart from a substance of some kind or other. It is here that the utter inadequacy of all the non-Jaina systems, without a single exception, may be clearly perceived; for while some have pure words, illusion, *maya* and the like, to bind the soul with, others vaguely talk of desire, and others again of such generalities as *karma*, action, sin, and *taqdīr* (destiny or fate). The importance of scientific knowledge has been pointed out by us in the beginning of the present chapter, and it is clear that vague generalities are wholly responsible for the amount of confusion which has prevailed in theological circles hitherto.

It is not likely that a man would now be found to insist on interpreting the word Son to mean Jesus of Nazareth in the 36th verse of the 8th chapter of John: but should one venture to entertain that supposition, it would be well to remember that no one can help another in the spiritual region, except to the extent of pointing out the way for obtaining release from the turmoils of the *samsara*. And the case is nowise altered by our individual beliefs: for the laws of nature are not dependent on the whims of men and other higher or lower beings, but work independently of them. Hence, when people say that it is more comforting to believe that some one else will, out of grace, do the needful for them, they lull themselves into false security and allow themselves to fall asleep on the verge of an innocent-looking volcano whose apparent quietness is soon to be changed into a sudden outburst of destructiveness. It is a corollary to be deduced from the spiritual laws already described that the bondage of the soul cannot possibly be terminated by any agency outside its own self. The reason for this is to be found in the fact that no one

can possibly control the desires of another, which being the causes of the fusion of spirit and matter, must continue to produce their effects so long as they exist.

Surely, it is but common sense to say that unless we ourselves desist from the doing of evil and banish it from our hearts no one else can do it for us from without; and it is legitimate to infer that the forces which are set in motion by our own actions must remain operative and produce their appropriate results unless their causation is stopped and destroyed. Not only is the natural law opposed to the idea of redemption by the favour of another, but also not one instance can be cited of a man who may be said to have reached *nirvana* that way.

The effect of desire on the constitution of the soul is to make it 'negative,' opening its pores, as it were, through which penetrates the poison of sin. It is this negative condition which is to be changed before redemption can be had, for in consequence of it the soul constantly draws the material of *karma* (termed *karma-pudgala*) unto itself, acting like a magnet. A change of intention, therefore, is the main thing to be effected, but this is not possible except where the soul exerts itself in the right way, since no one can change the evil intention of another. This is why Jesus is seen in the Bible to be constantly repeating, in one form or another, the old injunction imparted, expressly or by necessary implication, by every Saviour before him :

"And why call ye me Lord, Lord, and do not the things which I say."—
(Luke vi. 46.)

So far as the harmful consequences of evil intention are concerned, the Bible correctly points out the principle that every one who looks at a woman with lust is as guilty as if he had committed adultery with her. This is made perfectly clear by the principle of *asrava* (influx), which follows alike upon thought and word and deed.

With respect to *bandha*, it must be fully evident now that no outside agency is needed to fasten the coils of servitude on the soul. The fruit of action is secured to its author directly it is per-

formed, and the process is carried on all along throughout life. There is no room for the interference of a superhuman magistrate or judge in this, even if one could be found able to perform and willing to be bothered by such a bootless duty, or task, for all eternity. The argument that because our *karmas* are *jara*, that is, unintelligent, therefore, they cannot themselves determine the punishment or reward which is deserved by us, is altogether unscientific and devoid of force ; for in the realm of the natural law such determination is not dependent on an adjudication by a magistrate or judge, but on the properties of substances. The man who lies is punished by nature with as unerring a judgment as he who puts his hand on fire, or he who sitting on the trunk of a tree cuts down its root. If the award of punishment in the last two cases be the result of the decree of a god, sitting, with the scales of Justice in his hands, in some high heaven or other, and constantly engaged in determining the rewards and punishments for living beings, he must be deemed to be guided in the discharge of his judicial function by the scientist who can tell beforehand the precise consequences of these acts. And, if it be a fact that the reward and punishment in these cases are not meted out by any human or super-human agency, what is our authority for ascribing the fruition of other *karmas* to the decree of a calculating and judging divinity ? Not only is there no such judicial agency to be found anywhere in nature, but the necessity for its existence is also absolutely counter-indicated by the facts of observation. For the same natural law which determines that the hand which is placed on fire should be burnt, and that the hatchet that strikes at the root of the tree should be the instrument of punishment to its owner seated on the trunk, the same law which promulgates these decrees, we say, also declares that the man who denies what he has seen with his eyes should be deprived of his vision in the life to come. There is no dark mysticism implied in this ; on the contrary, the punishment indicated is directly traceable to natural causation, for the formation of all bodily limbs, including the organs of vision, being the effect of the operation of energies residing in the *kārmāṇa* body of the soul, it is but natural that the organs to be formed must undergo appropriate modification where the forces responsible for their manufacturing are themselves

modified by individual actions. Now, when a person denies the evidence of his senses, e.g., the existence of a thing which is lying before him, he is forced to keep his eyes turned away from it as far as possible, to avoid his gaze falling on it. The result is that his eyes are forced into an unnatural and strained attitude, in consequence of which the influx of matter is diverted from its natural course, its particles finding lodgment in places not intended for them in the normal course of things. This leads to a decrement or clogging of certain parts of the innermost vestment of the soul and to an excessive tumefaction of certain others, with the result that when the organizing energies of the system become active again to manufacture a new organism, the abnormalities prevailing in the constitution of the soul do not admit of the organs of vision being made in the natural way. This is why he who endeavours to deceive another ends, though quite unconsciously, by throwing dust into his own eyes. This one instance suffices to demonstrate the working of the principle of causality in the region of *karma*, and shows its independence of all human and divine interference.

We must now proceed to a consideration of the fifth *tattva*, namely, *samvara*, which means the stoppage of the influx. *Samvara* is necessary, because no progress is possible where the fresh influx of sin is not brought to a stop in the first instance. As an enemy that has taken possession of one's house cannot be destroyed till the doors and windows through which his reinforcements are pouring in be effectively barred against them, so can we not destroy the forces of our *karman* without first of all closing the inlets of *āsrava* against sin. The channels to be closed are the three passages of the mind, speech and the body, and the bolt with which they can be effectively fastened is that of desirelessness, that implies the changing of the attitude of negativity on the part of the soul. The course of conduct prescribed for effecting the desired change comprises sundry rules of conduct, falling under the seven heads detailed below.

I. Vows, namely,

1. abstinence from injuring living beings,
2. desisting from falsehood,
3. refraining from theft,

4. control of sex-passion, and
5. indifference to worldly goods.

II. *Samitis* (diligence in movement to avoid injuring insect* life) in respect of

1. walking,
2. speech,
3. food,
4. handling things, and
5. disposal of excretions.

III. Rules of *dharma* (piety), comprising,

1. forgiveness,
2. humility,
3. honesty,
4. truthfulness,
5. non-covetousness,
6. self-control,
7. asceticism,
8. renunciation,
9. self-denial and
10. chastity (celibacy).

} all qualified by the word
uttama, meaning saintly,
excellent, or commendable.

* It is not to be supposed that the Jains have nothing better to do than to spend their whole lives in studying the well-being of the insect community. The *samitis* are enjoined because they are the only means of bringing the automatic activity of life under control. A major portion of our actions, it will be seen, consists of those performed automatically, *i.e.*, without deliberation, and as they all lead to *āraṇa* and *bandha* they have to be brought under personal control and stopped. Now, the only means of checking uncontrolled, automatic activity is to cultivate the habit of carefulness and diligence with respect to all matters directly controllable by the will. Hence the *samitis*, which tend to check and ultimately destroy automatism of habit and action (*pramāda*). They are difficult to be observed by the householder, because of his worldly concerns leaving him little time to cultivate them, but the *muni*, who has withdrawn his attention from the world to apply himself exclusively to obtain mastery over his destiny, must exert himself to acquire the power of making his bodily movements only after due deliberation and care. Now since the *muni* has no other occupation in life, the *samitis* are the only means open to him of bringing his automatic activity or motor reflexes under control. Besides this, every *sādhu* has to perfect himself in respect of the qualities of mercy and love without which

IV. *Gupita*, or control of the

1. mind,
2. speech, and
3. body.

V. Meditation on

1. the transitoriness of the world,
2. the want of a protector of souls,
3. the pain and suffering implied in transmigration,
4. the inability of another to share one's suffering and sorrow,
5. the distinction between the body and the soul,
6. the filthiness of the body,
7. } the nature of *āsrava*, *samvara* and *nirjarā tattvas*.
8. }
9. }
10. the form and divisions of the universe and the nature of the conditions prevailing in the different regions—heavens, hells and the like,
11. the extreme difficulty of obtaining the human birth, and
12. the nature of *dharma* (religion).

VI. Endurance of hardships (suffering) consequent on

1. hunger,
2. thirst,
3. cold,
4. heat,
5. insect-bite,
6. nakedness,
7. disagreeable surroundings,
8. feminine attractiveness,
9. discomfort arising from constant moving about,
10. remaining immovable in the face of danger, and living away from the haunts of men,
11. sleeping on hard ground,
12. abuse, or insult,

nirvāṇa can never be attained by anyone; and the highest form of mercy and love is only consistent with an active solicitude to avoid injuring any living being.

13. ill-treatment or assault,
14. determination not to beg for favours,
15. disappointment in obtaining food,
16. disease,
17. thorn-pricks,
18. uncleanness of the body,
19. disrespect,
20. pride of learning,
21. failure to acquire knowledge, and
22. delay in the fruition of meritorious deeds.

VII. Right Conduct, comprising the following types :

1. *sāmāyika*, i.e., equanimity and refraining from sin,
2. *chhedopasthāpānā* (re-establishing or repairment after a breach), i.e., observance of penalties for faults committed through inadvertence or negligence,
3. *parihāra-viśuddhi*, refraining from *himsā*,
4. *sūśikṣasāmiparāya*, control of the lower nature, where greed is reduced to a bare unrecognisable trait and all other passions are fully under control, and
5. *yathakhyāta* (perfect) which characterises those who have destroyed all of their passions and lusts.

These are the diverse means prescribed for changing the negative condition of the soul and for ridding it of its desires. They aim at engendering the spirit of *vairāgya* (renunciation or desirelessness) in the soul, weaken and destroy the bonds of its *karmas* and enable it to acquire its divine attributes and powers.

With the doorways of sin closed and fastened with the bolt of renunciation, the effect of the evil deeds of the past can be burnt up and destroyed in no time. The process of destruction of *karmas* is called *nirjarā*, which is the sixth *tattva*. The main cause of success in *nirjarā* is the attitude of undisturbed mental tranquillity or equanimity which is developed by practising the rules of conduct laid down in connection with *saṁvara*. But as the rigidity of these rules makes it impossible for a beginner to observe them without faltering, the conduct prescribed for the house-holder, who has just entered on the 'path,' is characterised by a lesser degree of severity than that laid

down for a *muni* (an ascetic or 'homeless' saint). For instance, while the latter's vow relating to the control of the sexual passion signifies nothing less than absolute unqualified celibacy, the former's admits of his marrying a suitable spouse.

The rule as to the practising of these vows and injunctions is that one should exert oneself in their observance to the full extent of one's power; but not so as to do oneself harm by over-exertion. There is a close analogy between the development of the physical body for athletics and the training of the will. As insufficient exercise does not develop a bodily muscle, and one overdone is productive of harm by bringing on fatigue, so is not the will developed by aught that falls short of full exertion, or that is calculated to produce excessive strain. Within these limits, one should exert oneself, whole-heartedly, to maintain the spirit of imperturbable equanimity under all conditions. To this end *tapas* (asceticism) will be found to be a valuable and altogether indispensable ally. *Tapas* is of two kinds: the external and the internal. Of these, the external is necessary for the due sustentation of the internal, and consists in (i) fasting, (ii) avoidance of full meals, (iii) placing restrictions on the conditions under which food may be taken, (iv) abstaining from such things as impart relish to eatables—salt, sugar, milk, (clarified butter), curds and oil, (v) living in unfrequented places, and (vi) practising physical austerities to be rid of the longing for bodily comfort and ease. The internal *tapas* comprises such acts as the acquisition and strengthening of faith, the showing of respect to ascetics and to men learned in the doctrines of truth as well as to the Word of the *Tirthamkara*; attending upon and nursing holy saints when unwell, study, and meditation, including Self-contemplation in the highest sense. The house-holder begins by worshipping the trinity of the *Deva*, *Guru* and *Sastra* (scripture) which constitute the layman's *ratna trai* (triple jewel). The *Deva* (*Tirthamkara*) is worshipped because He is the true Guide, and because His word is the final authority in case of doubt and dispute: the *guru* (preceptor) is worshipped because he is the living example to guide one's footsteps in the right way, and because without his practical instruction and guidance it is almost impossible to cross the

thorny 'path'; and the Scripture is 'worshipped' because it is the infallible Word of God.

The layman is also expected to observe the vows and to gradually train himself for the arduous path of asceticism, so that his perfection in the house-holder's *dharma* should be his passport to *sannyasa* and the complete renunciation of the world. Having thus qualified himself in the preparatory course, he now observes the vows and rules of conduct prescribed for saints, and whole-heartedly devotes himself to the attainment of *moksha*. In due course of time his passions are eradicated, leaving his soul calm, placid and free from the tinge of all kinds of desire. The eradication of passions and lusts is the signal for the destruction of the remaining kinds of the *ghātiya karmas* of the soul, and is followed by the acquisition of Omniscience full and complete. The *jiva* is now styled a *jivanamukta* (from *jivana*=alive, and *mukta*=liberated), and enjoys the status of the Redeemed though still embodied in the flesh. Finally, when the force (*āyuh karma*) which holds the body and the soul together is exhausted, he throws off his three bodies, the *kārmāṇa*, and *taijasa* and the *audārika* (gross body), and immediately ascends to the *Siddha Śila* as a pure effulgent Spirit, i.e., God, to reside there for ever, free from the impurities of matter and *karmas*, and beyond the pain and suffering of *transmigration*. This is *moksha*! Completely rid of all those traits and faculties which spring from the association of matter, the Soul can now no longer perform the functions of an embodied being but everlastingly enjoys all those divine attributes and privileges which appertain to all pure undefiled Spirits, i.e., Gods.

Such is the general scheme of the *tattvas*, which constitute Right Knowledge, the second of the three gems that combine to form the *ratna trai* of salvation. So far as Right Conduct is concerned, it comprises two sets of rules, one consisting in directions and injunctions applicable to the untrained laity, and the other, in those the observance of which is enjoined on *munis* (ascetics or saints). The reason for this division of the 'path' into two sections is to be found, as already stated, in the fact that the austere life of a monk cannot be adopted by an untrained layman all at once, so that his

conduct cannot but be found wanting in respect of the vows of renunciation and self-control, as compared with that of a well-disciplined saint. The layman's training is, thus, the preliminary course of asceticism, and is as essential to steady progress in the more advanced stages of the 'journey' as is a good foundation to a lofty edifice. The point is to develop the spirit of self-denial and renunciation in such a way as to ensure its steady sustentation. In vain shall we search for a method that shall place us at the goal at once. To become a God it is first of all necessary to learn to behave as a God, and this can only be done by degrees. The *Ananias* in us cannot be killed in a moment; the *Sapphira* element requires time to be brought under control. The important thing, then, is to proceed scientifically, that is, step by step. Right Conduct aims at perfecting us in respect of action, so that we should also ultimately learn to behave as Gods. We must, therefore, make up our minds to give up all those actions and deeds which do not become Gods, and should strive to develop the traits of conduct that are characteristic of Divinity and Godhood. Enormous is the amount of work to be done before success may be expected to crown our efforts; the pinnacle to be reached is far off and precipitous, but cheerfulness and steadfastness of purpose have never been known to fail in any enterprise, and may be always relied upon to take us to the goal. If a member of the learned profession were told in his infancy the enormous amount of literature he would have to carry in his head as an eminent lawyer, it is more than probable that he would have died at the mere mention of the number of books he would be required to read. Yet it is a fact that there are many lawyers of note, and they are all men of flesh and blood. The eminence attained by them is simply the result of cheerful perseverance and study. The same principle holds good with respect to Right Conduct. A real beginning is to be made, and, if we are steadfast and firm in our resolution, success is sure to be attained sooner or later, in the course of one or more lives. There need be no fear of the fruit of labour being destroyed by death. The merit acquired by Faith, Knowledge and Conduct accompanies the soul from life to life and cannot be lost. It is carried in the shape of modifications in the constitution of the *kārmāṇa sarīra*, and becomes

an important factor in the building of the future career and personality of the individual.

The start in Right Conduct is to be made by the renunciation of the very worst habits and thoughts as soon as the Right Faith is acquired. Wanton cruelty, the worst form of *himsā*, for which there can be no justification, is the very first thing to be abandoned. It is no use our endeavouring to make any headway on the path without first renouncing animal flesh and sport. How shall he whose foot has never touched the very first rung of the ladder reach the top? The "worse" cannot be attacked so long as the "worst" remains unchecked, for the one is implied in the other. The Gods, in whose company we fain would sit, are the well-wishers of all; they neither devour nor destroy any living being. How, then, can he who causes pain to living beings to afford momentary pleasure to his palate or tongue ever aspire to become a God?

The aspirant after immortality and joy must, therefore, give up sport and animal food at the time of the adoption of the Right Faith. For similar reasons, he should also give up gambling, profligacy, and the habits of stealing, drinking and falsehood.

This is the first step in the House-holder's section or stage. There are eleven such steps (*pratimas*) in all before sainthood is reached, and it is necessary for the house-holder to perfect himself in them all, if he wishes to make steady progress all along.

The second *pratima* consists in the observance of a milder form of the vows enumerated on pages 632-633 *ante*. There are seven other vows, comprising three *gṛha* and four *śīla vratas*, which should also be observed regularly by the house-holder. The *gṛha vratas* are so called because they tend to increase virtue (from *gṛha*, virtue, and, *vratas*, vows); they consist in the placing of restrictions on the field of one's movements, refraining from purposeless activity, and cutting down the number of articles of daily use and enjoyment. The *śīkṣā* vows tend to increase piety and knowledge, and consist in restricting one's movements (for certain fixed periods, within still narrower limits than those fixed in the first *gṛha vrata*), the performance of daily meditation (*sāmayika*), fasting and the service of saints.

The full description of these *vratas*, the manner of their observance, and the faults arising in connection with them are all minutely described in the Jaina Books; they can only be briefly touched upon in a work like the present, which is mainly concerned with the comparative study of religion.

The reason for the observance of these vows is not that our enduring of hardships has a tendency to please some supernatural god or goddess, upon whose pleasure our destiny might be said to be dependent, but that self-denial is the only method of training the individual will, and of purging it of its weaknesses.

The third step on the house-holder's 'path' consists in the observance of the *samayika* meditation (see *ante*, p. 255) three times daily, that is, morning, noon and evening, every day. Its duration should also be increased from two to six *gharis* (a *ghari*=24 minutes) on each occasion.

The fourth step signifies the observance of the eleventh vow, relating to fasting, at least four times a month, on certain auspicious days.

The fifth step is characterised by abstaining from eating 'live' or uncooked roots, fruits, greens, tendrils, bulbous vegetables, flowers and seeds. The sixth is marked by the avoidance of food after sunset.

The seventh step implies sexual purity; the house-holder now takes the vow of absolute *brahmacharya* (abstinence).

On the eighth step still further progress is made by the individual, who now withdraws himself from all kinds of business, engagements and occupations. In the ninth, there is the distribution of property among the heirs. The tenth is reached by those who vow not to give advice on any worldly matter—not even if the family honour be at stake. The house-holder who has reached this step should only attend to the welfare of his soul, "leaving the dead to bury their dead" (*Matt.* viii. 22).

The eleventh and the last step in the house-holder's section consists in the renunciation of the world, that is, of all that the world calls its own, retaining from its goods only a small whisk of the softest peacock feathers, with which to remove insects from his person and books, without causing them injury, a small bowl

for water and a book or two on religion if necessary. This *pratimā* is called *uddiṣṭa tyāga* (*uddiṣṭa*=that which has been ordered beforehand, and *tyāga*=renouncing), because the aspirant now refrains from accepting anything in the shape of food if offered by special invitation or appointment. The course of training here is two-fold, the preliminary and the advanced. The house-holder in the preliminary stage of this *pratimā* is called *kṣhullaka*, and the one in the more advanced, *ellaka*. The *kṣhullaka* wears a *langoti* and a sheet of cloth, three cubits long and of a single width ; but the *ellaka* rejects the wrapper and keeps only the *langoti*. As regards food, a *kṣhullaka*, if he belong to any of the three higher castes, should eat only what he gets from one household ; but he may visit five houses one after another if he happens to be a *Śudra*. In no case should he call at another house after getting sufficient food for the day, but should sit down and eat it at the last house visited by him. While calling for food, he should not penetrate beyond the court-yard, hall or vestibule, nor ask or beckon for food, but should only wish the inmates *dharma-lābha* (may you obtain spiritual merit). If not observed or welcomed with due respect, he should immediately depart from that place and proceed to another. In no case should he call at that house a second time that day.

The *ellaka* also observes these rules, but he eats what is obtained from one kitchen alone. Both the *kṣhullaka* and the *ellaka* eat only once a day, and go out in search of food between the hours of ten and eleven in the morning.

The eleventh *pratimā* attained, the house-holder becomes a *muni*, and follows the rules of conduct prescribed for ascetics, which may be studied in other works. He has now no concern with the world and aspires to reach *nirvana* in the shortest time possible. On two points alone does he come in touch with the men and women of the world ; firstly he imparts instruction on *dharma* to all who seek it from him, and, secondly, he goes out to obtain his subsistence from such of the pious house-holders as welcome him with veneration and respect, considering it their good luck to have the opportunity of serving holy saints. He eats but only to keep his body and soul together, so that he might continue the work on which he

has embarked—the destruction of his *karmas*. He is not a beggar in any sense of the word, and will not touch a morsel if the food be not free from all kinds of impurities pointed out in the Scripture. As a house-holder, he himself used to long for the opportunity to serve the holy men, and would patiently wait at his door for their arrival before taking his meal. What he then did himself it is his turn now to expect from others. Neither is he looked upon as a burden, for every true house-holder longs for the opportunity to tread the same path, and actually worships the beings into whose footsteps he knows that he will himself have some day to walk, to reach the goal. With reference to the merit of giving food to homeless saints, it is said in the *Ratna Karanda Śrāvakaśāstra* :—

“As water for certain washes away blood, so does the giving of food to homeless saints, without doubt, destroy the sins incidental to a house-holder's life.”

The statement that the sins incidental to a house-holder's life are destroyed by the giving of food to a saint in the approved manner, is descriptive of the power of holy thoughts in washing away *karmic* impurities from the soul. The approved manner consists in (1) prostrating oneself at the feet of the saint, (2) offering him a seat, (3) washing his feet, and applying the washing to one's forehead in token of reverence, (4) worshipping him, (5) saluting him, (6—8) preserving one's own mind, speech and body in a state of purity in his presence, and (9) giving him pure suitable food to eat.

The life of a saint should be one continuous *sāmāyika*, from one end to the other, as far as possible. In practice, however, the development of his will depends on the destruction of his *ghātiya karmas*, the order of which will now be described briefly. There are four types of each of the four kinds of *kaṣāyas* (passions) comprised in the class of *dhāritra mohaniya* (see p. 625 *ante*), denoting four different degrees of intensity which may be described as

1. mild,
2. malignant,
3. highly malignant, and
4. the most malignant.

Of these, the most malignant are the worst, and prevent the acquisition of Right Faith itself; the highly malignant sort admit of

the acquisition of Faith, but obstruct Right Conduct ; the malignant enable the house-holder's vows to be observed, but stand in the way of the more rigorous vows of asceticism becoming a saint ; and the mild only debar the soul from pure self-contemplation (*sukla dhyāna*). The destruction of the fourth type leads to the acquisition of Right Faith, through the development of scientific discrimination ; of the fourth and the third, to the adoption of the house-holder's conduct ; of these two, and the second, to the observance of the vows of asceticism ; and of all the four to *sukla dhyāna*, which is the cause of omniscience and *nirvana*. There are in all fourteen stages by which the soul passes from the lowest state of bondage and ignorance to that of full illumination and Godhood. These are described in the following tabulated form, together with their characteristic features in the column of remarks.

Table showing the stages on the Path.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Serial number	Name of the stage.	Number of <i>phāṭiya karmas</i> of class (a).	Number of those out of column 3 which are destroyed in passing to the next stage.	Resulting gain.	class (a) still left to be destroyed.	Remarks.
1	<i>Mithyātva</i> ...	28 [16 <i>Kaṣāyas</i> , 9 <i>no-kaṣāyas</i> , and 3 kinds of <i>dāraṇa meha-</i> <i>niya</i>]	1 [<i>Mithyātva</i>]	Escape from liability to rebirth in hell, and among beings of a lower order than the five-sensed.	27 [28-1]	The escape from rebirth in hell,* and among beings of a lower order than the five-sensed is the effect of the acquisition of Right Faith which prevents the soul from 'sinking' so low. This stage is called <i>mithyātva</i> (falsehood) because it is characterised by false beliefs.
2	<i>Sāradāna</i> ...	27	4 [Anger, pride, deceit, and greed of the most malignant type]	...	23	This stage is characteristic of a soul that is falling down from the fourth stage into the first. The explanation of the fact that four energies are shown in column 4 although it marks a retrograde step lies in the fact that the

3	Mitra ...	23	1 [Samyag mithyātva]	22	The destruction of mixed beliefs (falseness and truth) purifies the faith.	<p>soul in passing into the fourth from the first stage destroys the <i>bandha</i> of 6 <i>karma prakritis</i>, four of which cannot be engendered even in the state of falling back.</p> <p>This stage is called <i>miśra</i> (literally mixed) because the <i>samyag mithyātva prakṛiti</i> of <i>Darsana Mahaniga Karma</i> becomes active in it.</p> <p>The destruction of <i>samyag mithyātva</i> causes the <i>samyak prakṛiti</i> to become active.</p> <p>The name of this stage indicates the progress of the soul, since <i>avirata</i> means non-observance of vows, and a <i>samyag dṛṣṭi</i> is he whose faith is of the right sort. The gain shown as accruing in the previous stages really results in the first instance in this stage, because the soul always passes from the first into the fourth stage when it acquires right faith for the first time.</p> <p><i>Darsa</i> is partial, and <i>virata</i> means vows. Hence this stage is characterised by</p>
4	Asvatthasamyak adṛṣṭi.	22	4 [Anger, pride, deceit and greed of the third type]	18	The house-holder's vows can be observed by the destruction of the highly malig- nant type of <i>kaṣāya</i> .	
5	Dadāivata ...	18	4 [Anger, pride, deceit and	14	The destruction of obstacles to the obser-	

* Cf. "The effect of baptism is illumination, perfection; hence sins before and after baptism, i.e., enlightenment, are different."—(The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages on the Christian Church, pp. 295-296.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Serial number.	Name of the stage.	Number of <i>ghātiya karmas</i> of class (a).	Number of those out of column 3 which are destroyed in passing to the next stage.	Resulting gain.		Remarks.
6	Permattoet-rata.	14	greed of the malignant type]	<p>vance of the vows of a saint.</p> <p>Three of the energies of the <i>ghātiya karmas</i> of class (b) are destroyed here, in consequence of the life of purity led by the saint.</p>	14	<p>the observance of the qualified vows of a householder. The <i>kāgyas</i> of the malignant type being destroyed, the aspirant steps into asceticism in the next stage. The liability to be re-born among animals is counter-indicated at this point.</p> <p>The name of this stage indicates "vows tinged with carelessness." This is the condition of monks whose souls have reached this stage. The energies of class (b) of <i>ghātiya karmas</i> destroyed here are only minor forces of the <i>darśanāvarīya</i> group, namely, heavy slumber, somnambulism and a kind of intense drowsiness.</p>

7	<i>Apramattā-</i>	14	1 [<i>Samyaktva- prakṛti</i>]	Purity of Right Faith results from the elimi- nation of <i>saṃ- skṛta</i> <i>prā- kṛti</i> .	13	The word <i>apramattā</i> means devoid of laziness. Hence the conduct of the saint on this stage is not cha- racterized by carelessness or laziness.
8	<i>Apraṇa ka- raṇa.</i>	13	6 [1. Joking, 2. attachment, 3. aversion, 4. grief, 5. fear, and 6. dis- gust]	...	7	The name of this stage in- dicates strange, i.e., new, thought-activity, resulting from the absolute purity of faith.
9	<i>Anivṛtti ka- raṇa.</i>	7	8 [Anger, pride and deceit of the mild type, and the three kinds of sex- ual passions]	The destruction of the energies mentioned in column 4 en- ables the con- duct to become almost perfect.	1	The words <i>anivṛtti karaṇa</i> indicate advanced thought- activity, showing that the mind of the saint in this stage is full of very bold thoughts.
10	<i>Śukṣh ma- sāmparāya.</i>	1	1 [Greed of the mild type]	Total destruction of the <i>ghātiya</i> <i>karma</i> of class (a) results in the condition of ab- solute desire- lessness.	NW	The name of this stage is suggestive of its chief characteristic, i.e., the slightest tinge of greed, with all other passions eradicated.
11	<i>Uparāśānta- mōha.</i>	24 [23-4]	The <i>uparāśāntamōha</i> is a sta- tion which does not lie on what may be termed the main line. As its name in- dicates, it is the stage of

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Serial number.	Name of the stage.	Number of <i>ghātiya karmas</i> of class (a).	Number of those out of column 3 which are destroyed in passing to the next stage.	Resulting gain.	<i>Ghātiya karmas</i> of class (a) still left to be destroyed.	Remarks.
						quiescence, as distinguished from destruction, of <i>karma</i> , and is the highest state attainable by the saint whose <i>mohaniya karmas</i> are only rendered quiescent, notwithstanding that he has succeeded in destroying the most malignant type of his <i>koṣayas</i> . Being a distinct psychological state, it cannot be left out of account from any systematic chart or scheme of progress to be made, but otherwise it has no concern with the main route on which the soul passes directly to the <i>kāśhinimokṣa</i> (the twelfth) stage from <i>śukshma sūptirāya</i> , the

tenth. The most virulent form of the four principal *kāśayas* are destroyed in the seventh stage on this route, the further details of which are omitted here as being outside the scope of the present work.

Kāśānanta (all infatuations destroyed) is characterised by absolute desirelessness, in consequence of which the remaining forces of class *b*) of *ghātiya karmas* are destroyed in less than 48 minutes.

Saṃyoga kevali is the condition of liberation while still embodied in the flesh. This is called *jīvana-mukti*, and signifies freedom in all essential respects though still in association with the physical body. Full unobstructed omniscience, freedom from sleep

Nil

Omniscience from the destruction of the *pāśavaśāyā*, infinite perception and infinite power from the elimination of the *dāśaśāyā* and the *antarāśāyā karmas*, respectively, accrue to the soul.

Nil

All the energies of the *jīvaśāyā*, all the remaining kinds of *dāśaśāyā* and all kinds of *antarāśāyā* in class *b*) of the *ghātiya karmas*.

Nil

Nil

Nil

Kāśānanta

Saṃyoga kevali

12

13

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Serial number.	Name of the stage.	Number of <i>ghāṭiya karmas</i> of class (a)	Number of those out of column 3 which are destroyed in passing to the next stage.	Resulting gain.	(a) still left to be destroyed. <i>Ghāṭiya karmas</i> of class	Remarks.
11	<i>Ayoga kevali</i>	Nil	...	<i>Nirvana</i>	Nil	and many other divine attributes are the reward of the ascetic who reaches this stage. Sense-perception <i>vanishe</i> here completely, along with the entire equipment of the objective mind. Most of the <i>agāṭiya karmas</i> , which have not been shown here for the sake of brevity, are also destroyed earlier in the course of the journey, and the remaining ones fall off the soul in this stage. <i>Ayoga kevali</i> (from a, not, <i>yoga</i> , channels of <i>varana</i> , and <i>kevali</i> , emollient) signifies complete liberation. On the termination of the <i>ayuh karma</i> , which

determines the association of the soul with its body, the spirit is freed from all kinds of fetters of matter and immediately ascends to the Holy Abode of Gods in the full glory of a Deified Soul, to reside there in the everlasting enjoyment of omniscience and bliss and all other divine attributes.

It is now necessary to work out the idea of meditation with reference to the different stages of the path of progress, as described above. Meditation (*dhyāna*) is of four kinds, namely :

1. *ārta dhyāna* which arises from the loss of an object of desire, the association with an undesirable person or thing, bodily suffering and envy ;

2. *raudra dhyāna* which implies the absorption of the mind in *himsā* and other forms of sin, and delighting in acts of cruelty, falsehood, theft and the hoarding of wealth ;

3. *dharma dhyāna* which means meditation on such subjects as have a bearing on the attainment of liberation from the bondage and *samsāra*; and

4. *śukla dhyāna*, which signifies pure self-contemplation in the highest sense.

Of these, the first two are characteristic of all deluded *jīvas*, and the last two of those who have acquired the Right Faith. The fourth form of meditation is, however, beyond the house-holder, who cannot, as such, aspire higher than devoting himself to *dharma dhyāna*, that is, meditation on the nature of *tattvas*, the means of the destruction of *karmas*, the consequences and effects of different kinds of actions, and on the nature of the conditions of existence prevailing in different parts of the universe—heavens, hells and the like—in which souls are born in transmigration. *Dharma dhyāna* leads to *vairāgya*, and enables the house-holder to renounce the world. But it is the *śukla dhyāna* which is the direct cause of *moksha*.

Śukla dhyāna is practised by holy *saints* well advanced in asceticism and self-control. It consists of four parts, limbs or steps as follows:—

1. that which is characterised by the changes of *yogas*,* that is, of the instruments or vehicles of meditation ;

* Self-contemplation is only possible in three ways, *viz*: (1) with the aid of the mind, *i.e.*, thought, (2) by means of words, and (3) with the help of the body, *e.g.*, the fixing of the mind on the nervous centre in the forehead. Being instrumental in self-contemplation, the mind, speech and body are technically called *yogas*.

2. that in which there is no changing of *yogas*, but which is steadily maintained, with only one *yoga* ;

3. that in which the bodily activity is the slightest ; and

4. that in which there is no bodily action whatsoever.

Of these, the first part is practised by excellent saints in the eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh stages on the path, and is the cause of the destruction of *mohaniya karmas*. The causes of distraction being destroyed, steadiness in meditation is attained in the twelfth stage, and there is no changing of *yogas* any more, that is to say, that the mind can then be fixed exclusively on one out of the three channels of self-contemplation. This speedily leads to the destruction of the other kinds of *ghātiya karmas*, and to the acquisition of omniscience and other divine attributes, which were held in check by those *karmas*. The saint now becomes a Deified Soul in consequence of the acquisition of the divine attributes, and lingers in the world of men only so long as His *āyuh-karma* is not exhausted to set Him free from all kinds of fetters of matter. With respect to the path of progress, He is on the thirteenth stage, which is characterised by *jivana-mukti*. He is now qualified for the third kind of *śukla dhyāna*, which would be pure self-contemplation but for the fact that it is accompanied by a slight tinge of bodily activity, that is itself due to the association with the physical body. As the *āyuh karma* which keeps the body and the soul together is exhausted, the *aghātiya karmas* which may still be existing are destroyed, the *yogas* come to an end, and the last form of *śukla dhyāna*, implying pure self-contemplation, undisturbed by any kind of bodily activity, is enjoyed. The soul is now on the fourteenth stage, and immediately rises up to the *Siddha Śilā* as a body of radiant Effulgence, to reside there for ever, in blissful contemplation of the unsurpassed glory of His own Divine Self.

The forms of meditation recommended for the destruction of *karmas* may also be noted in this connection. There are four such forms, namely, (1) the *Pinḍastha*, (2) the *Padastha*, (3) the *Rupastha* and (4) the *Rupatita*.

(1) *Pinḍastha dhyāna* is the contemplation of oneself, and comprises five special modes or forms, technically known as *dhāraṇās*, which may be described as follows :

(a) *Prithvi dhāraṇā*. The *yogi* should imagine a vast, boundless ocean of milk, motionless and noiseless, with a huge resplendent lotus of a thousand petals, having a bright yellow stem, like a mountain of gold, in its centre. On the top of this stem he should imagine a throne resembling the autumnal moon, and on this throne he should further imagine himself as seated, calm and tranquil and engaged in the destruction of his *karmas*.

(b) *Agneyi dhāraṇā*. The *yogi* should next imagine himself seated as in the first *dhāraṇā*, and should further imagine his whole body being burnt up by the fire of internal *dhyaṇa* and reduced to ashes.

(c) *Ākāśani dhāraṇā*. He should next imagine powerful winds blowing away the ashes of the body from his soul, and scattering them about in all directions.

(d) *Vāruṇi dhāraṇā*. The *yogi* should further imagine a great downpour of rain washing away the ashes of the body that might be still sticking to the soul, leaving it in the condition of its natural purity as a pure Effulgent Spirit.

(e) *Tattva-rupāvatī dhāraṇā*. The *yogi* now contemplates on his soul as possessed of all divine attributes, all-knowing, free from all kinds of bonds, the conqueror of death and the object of worship and adoration on the part of *devas* and men.

(2) *Padanṭha dhyaṇa* consists in contemplation with the aid of holy *mantras* (sacred formulas), such as *namo arhantanam*.

(3) *Rupāṇṭha dhyaṇa* is contemplation of the form of the *Tīrthamkara*, sitting in a celestial pavilion, attended by *Indras* (rulers of *devas*), of radiant effulgent glory, and expounding *dharma*.

(4) *Rupatīta dhyaṇa* consists in contemplation of the pure qualities of Perfect Souls in *nirvana*, accompanied by the belief that the contemplating soul is also like Them in all essential respects.

As to the *why* and the *wherefore* of the process of *dhyaṇa*, it is evident that Self-contemplation is possible only in three ways, viz : (1) with the aid of thought forms, (2) by means of words, and (3) by *feeling* the pulsation of Life in certain nervous centres in the body. These are the three *yogas* which have been already referred to ; and their changing is due to their instability in all stages prior to the thirteenth, where only one of them is operative. Even this remain-

ing *yoga* is destroyed in the fourteenth stage when there is complete separation between spirit and matter, so that the final form of pure Self-contemplation (*śuklā dhyāna*) is only the functioning of pure spirit, devoid of *yogas*—mind, speech and the body of matter.

The necessity for practising *śuklā dhyāna* arises because the contemplation of the soul, as separate and distinct from matter and endowed with all the divine qualities and attributes, is the only direct means of Self-realisation. In one sense, *śuklā dhyāna* occupies an intermediate position between *dharma dhyāna* and actual self-realisation, so that while *dharma dhyāna* is the instrument of developing the knowledge of the Self and of engendering the spirit of *vairāgya* in the soul, *śuklā dhyāna* is necessary to raise that knowledge to the degree of an actual affection, or feeling, before the divinity in *embryo* may be expected to be transformed into a fully evolved God. The old law—as you believe, so you become—is also in operation here, since belief reaches its culminating point only when characteristic feelings are evoked. The forms of the different *dhāraṇās* and *dhyānas* are also most helpful in this respect. They not only furnish material for Self-contemplation with the aid of the two principal *yogas*, that is, the mind and speech, but, being in full agreement with nature and in no way subversive of the natural functioning of substances, actually tend to expedite the realisation of the wished for end. There is nothing in common between these scientific and natural forms of Self-contemplation and the methods of mystics and others, who spend their whole lives fruitlessly in a vain endeavour to make their minds blank, by forcing upon them all sorts of fanciful suggestions about sleep, somnolence and the like. The difficulty with these unscientific methods lies in the fact that no means or device can really ever succeed in defiance of nature. Hence, where a given suggestion is opposed to the real nature of a substance, it will never take effect except in so far as to distort the vision of the individual to make him perceive that which has no foundation in truth. It is, therefore, actually fraught with great harm to put such ideals before one's soul as the Inconceivable, the Absolute and the like, or to lead it to imagine that salvation can be had by such suggestions as tend to produce mental blankness and fog.

It only remains to complete our comparative study of the different methods of self-realization before closing this chapter. Most of these methods have already been examined by us in the chapter on Yoga; but two deserve special mention here, on account of their mystic tendency, which has a great charm for the untrained imagination. The first of these methods aspires to obtain the highest good by separating the soul from certain specified envelopes or sheaths. The idea underlying the supposition is that the soul is wrapped in five successive *kośas* (envelopes or sheaths) and therefore unable to attain emancipation. The first of these sheaths, beginning with the outermost, is conceived to be the envelope of food (*anna-maya kośa*), the second, of *prāṇa* or breath (*prāṇa-maya kośa*), the third, of desire (*manomaya kośa*), the fourth, of knowledge (*vijñānamaya kośa*), and the last, of bliss (*ānanda-maya kośa*). The soul is conceived to be devoid of and distinct from all the attributes named in connection with the sheaths, and to be lying at the back of them all. It is this something lying behind all the sheaths that is to be freed. The means for its freedom consist in all those practices which, falling under the different heads—Hatha Yoga and the like—have already formed the subject of enquiry in the seventh chapter of this book, and found to be insufficient and vague. Thus, the only question before us now is: how far is the idea of the soul's envelopes or sheaths entertainable by rational thought?

The answer to this is really furnished by the nature of the things of which the sheaths are said to be composed. We have seen that knowledge and bliss appertain to the soul, not as a pillow-case may be said to appertain to a pillow, but as inalienable properties of pure Spirit as a substance. It is, therefore, wrong to say that they form two of the envelopes, or sheaths, which are to be destroyed before the soul can be set free. The case with the other sheaths stands no better, for mind is not an envelope, but only an instrument of discrimination and volition. We cannot even conceive *prāṇa* as forming a sheath on the soul, though the diaphragmatic and the thoracic cavities, taken together, might easily be mistaken for one, because of their liability to expand with breath. It is not even possible to regard the physical body in the light of an envelope, though with

regard to the soul its resemblance to a sheath, or cover, is more striking than that of the diaphragmatic cavity itself. The fact is that the outer body of matter, which is nourished and maintained by food, is, in no sense of the term, a sheath, or cover like a pillow case; it is an organism made by the soul itself, by the mechanical operation of the forces residing in its two inner bodies. Hence, the use of such terms and phrases as the physical encasement of matter, this mortal coil and the like, with reference to it is only permissible by way of a metaphor, but not in the literal sense. The idea of the association of the soul with its three bodies may be partially grasped by likening it to oxygen and the matter of the *kārmāṇa śarīra* to hydrogen which combine together to form water. If we now throw some colouring matter into the liquid formed by the fusion of these two kinds of gases, we shall have an idea of the form of the *taijasa śarīra*. The position occupied by these two inner bodies in relation to that of gross matter is something like that which would come into existence if we hold the coloured liquid in a sponge, so that it would saturate every portion of the sponge without becoming fused or united with it. We should not, however, lose sight of the important distinction between the sponge and the physical body, namely, that while the former is an independent article, the latter is only organized by the soul, which becomes ensouled in it.

It is thus not possible to lend assent to the theory which places the soul in a series of successive *pośas* one after another, on scientific or logical grounds. Nor is a conception of emancipation which leaves the soul devoid of knowledge and bliss both likely to appeal to a mind whose natural vigour has not been vitiated by overdoses of mystery and mystifying thought.

The misconception about the sheaths has probably arisen from the fact that the fusion of spirit and matter is not uniform throughout in the constitution of the soul, certain parts, e.g., the seats of the different senses and mind, being more sensitive than the rest. Even among the senses themselves the defilement of matter is not quite uniform, inasmuch as some of them respond to finer vibrations or *stimuli* than others, as, for instance, is the case with the olfactory nerve, which takes cognizance of the presence of particles of

matter that are invisible to the eye. If we may employ a metaphor, we may say that the soul is like a luminous substance covered all over with a thick pall, which is attenuated in certain parts, or centres, in varying degree of tenuity, corresponding to the senses which are five in number, and the material organ of the mind. These centres, however, do not resemble sheaths, and are not sheaths in the sense in which the word is used by the mystics.

We have commented upon the insufficiency of the methods suggested by mysticism for the obtainment of freedom from the bondage of *karma*, but we may add, while we are still on the subject, that no amount of breathing exercises or *prāṇāyāma* and other similar purely physical practices can ever take the place of the systematic scientific path; for the *karmic* chains are held together by the force of *desire*, which breathing and *prāṇāyāma* cannot by any possibility loosen. The same is the case with such practices as fixing the mind on the tip of the nose; they, too, are valueless except as preliminary aids, when properly employed.

So much for the method of emancipation through the destruction of sheaths. The other system which we propose to examine here is also advocated by a certain class of mystics, who profess to follow the doctrines laid down in the *Yoga Vasīṣṭa* and other similar works of mystic origin. They believe in hallucination and 'suggestion,' and propose to steal a march on nature by substituting a product of illusion for the genuine 'thing.' The idea underlying their teaching is that 'suggestion' is the all-important, all-powerful force in nature, and that the products of imagination are as desirable as the genuine things themselves, only we should not believe them to be unreal. Thus, whatever be the nature of the condition to be produced, all one need do is to dream of it, and then to believe the dream to be a reality. In course of time the mind will accept the mental hallucination as a fact, and the belief will be gratifying to the soul. So far as *moksha* is concerned, it is regarded as a state altogether beyond conception, and as devoid of knowledge and bliss both.

Such is the main doctrine of the hallucinationistic mystics as they might be called; they seek to create mental illusions and then to hypnotise themselves to believe the product of their imaginations

to be real. As for the element of merit in their teaching, there is little or nothing to be said in its favour; it is essentially a system* which can appeal only to a particular class of men—those who cannot or will not pursue clear, logical thought. It is true that suggestion is a potent and powerful ally on the spiritual path, but it is also true that it is not every suggestion that will land one in *nirvana*. As a matter of fact, salvation and hallucination are as wide apart from one another as the poles, the one implying the fullest degree of perfection in knowledge and bliss, and the other only seeking to hide its rotting imperfection under self-deluding falsehood. The suggestion that is likely to encompass the desired good is not the suggestion that the world is an illusion and that the ego is different and distinct from knowledge and happiness, which must be 'scraped' off it somehow, but the belief that the soul is fully able to attain to the status of Gods, the living embodiments of all-embracing knowledge and absolute, unqualified bliss. Neither *samvara* nor *nirjarā* is accomplished by the stimulation of the faculty of hallucination, nor is *desire* eradicated from the soul by aught but the right kind of actions and belief.

Another form of mental hallucination consists in the perception of the object of one's worship. Ignorance of the nature and effects of self-hypnosis has led many a good and pious soul to a belief in the existence of gods and men—saints or masters as they have been called—that are purely imaginary. Some have claimed to derive great satisfaction from the experiences of such hypnotic initiations, as Mr. Macdonald calls them (see the 'Religious Attitude and Life in Islam'). Here is an account of one of such initiations, being the record of the experiences

* The cash value of this system of philosophy—if indeed the term be applicable to a collection of mystic and mystifying, though elegant and well-chosen words and phrases, interspersed here and there with half-understood plagiarisms of others—may be judged from the somewhat lengthy review of one of the most recent publications on the subject, which is given in Appendix B at the end of the book. It originally appeared in the *Jaina Gazette* for 1917 (pp. 295—317), but as it lays bare the whole subject and goes to the very root of mysticism, it is reproduced here, to enable the reader to form a correct estimation of the teaching of the system under consideration.

of the sister of Prince Dara Shikoh, whose name was Fatima (Ibid., pp. 203—205) :—

"I seated myself, then, in a corner with my face turned toward Mecca, and concentrated all my mind on the image of the master, calling up, at the same time, in my imagination, the personal description of our most holy Prophet. Occupied with this contemplation, I arrived at a state of soul in which I neither slept nor waked, and then I saw the holy company of the Prophet and of his first adherents, with the other saints. The Prophet and his four friends [Abu Bakr, Umar, Usman and Ali] were seated together, and a certain number of the principal companions surrounded him. I perceived also Molla-Shah; he was seated near the Prophet upon whose foot his head lay, while the Prophet said to him, 'O Molla-Shah, for what reason did you illumine that Timurid?'"

"When my senses had returned to me, my heart, under the impression of this distinguished sign of the divine favour, bloomed like a bed of roses, and I prostrated myself, full of boundless gratitude, before the throne of the absolute Being. Filled with unutterable happiness, I did not know what to do to express all the joy of my heart. I vowed a blind obedience to the master, and I chose him, once for all, as my spiritual guide, saying, 'O how signal a happiness! What an unheard of felicity has been given to me—to me, a feeble and unworthy woman! I render thanks and praises for it without end, to the All-powerful, to the incomprehensible God, who, when it seemed that my life must pass uselessly, permitted me to give myself to the search for him, and accorded to me, thereafter, to attain the desired end of union with him, giving me thus to drink of the ocean of truth and the fountain of mystic knowledge. I nourish the hope that God will permit me to walk with a firm step and unshakable courage on this path which is comparable to the *sir-at* [the narrow bridge to paradise] and that my soul will always taste the supreme happiness of being able to think of him. God be praised, who, through the particular attention of the holy master, has accorded to me, a poor woman, the gift of conceiving, in the most complete manner, of the absolute being, as I have always ardently desired.' . . . Every man who has attained this supreme felicity becomes, through this fact itself, the most accomplished and the most noble of beings, and his individual existence is lost in the absolute existence; he becomes like a drop in the ocean, a mote in the sunshine, an atom over against totality. Arrived in this state, he is above death, future punishment, the Garden, and the Fire . . ."

Such is the beautiful description of her vision by the Moghul princess. She was a well-cultured girl and wrote with enthusiasm. The vision was sufficient to convert her to the tenets of the faith, and she was profoundly impressed with the power of the master under whose direction she had worked. Even today there are men and women living who cultivate the habit of calling up 'masters,' and who claim to have seen them.

Sometimes these visions come unexpected and uninvited. We have it from Ibn Khaldun (see 'Religious Attitude and Life in Islam,' p. 75) :—

"The most of this which occurs to mankind is apart from their intention and outside of their control . . . It is not that the soul wills the vision, and sees it. In the books of those who have written about ascetic and mystical exercises, certain names are given. If they are pronounced at the time of going to sleep, a vision of what is looked for will come from them. These are called *al halūmiyā* [apparently derived from the Hebrew *halom*, 'dream']."

One of such visions is called the vision of Perfect Nature. Ibn Khaldun says about this particular vision :—

"The author of a book of the kind has mentioned one of these, which he calls the '*halom* of the perfect nature.' It is that at the time of sleep, after the completion of religious exercises and with complete intention of mind, these foreign words should be pronounced [here follow certain unintelligible combinations of letters, which are unpronounceable as the vowels are not given . . .], and that the seeker should bear in mind his need; for he will see in slumber the unveiling of that concerning which he asks. It is related that a certain man did that after a preparation of some nights as to his food and religious exercises. Then a form appeared to him saying, 'I am thy perfect nature.' Then the man asked his question and was told what he had been looking for."—(Ibid. p. 75.)

Ibn Khaldun further adds :—

"To me, myself, have come, through these names, strange appearances, and I have learned by them details of my circumstances into which I was looking."—(Ibid. p. 75.)

As Mr. Macdonald points out (Ibid. p. 80) :—

"Dreams are on record, and the veracity of the narrators of them cannot be doubted, in which God himself was personally seen; the dream-books give sections to the interpretation of such appearances. This was too common to be an eccentricity; it was part of the normal possibility."

As to what is really seen in such visions we have Al-Ghazzali's version given us by Mr. Macdonald, in his valuable work from which already so much has been quoted :—

"He who does not know the true nature of vision (or dreaming) does not know the true natures of the different kinds of vision, and he who does not know the true nature of the vision of Muhammad and the other prophets, nay, even of the dead in general, does not know the vision of God in dream. So the ordinary man imagines that whoever

sees Muhammad in a dream has seen his actual person . . . How could there be a vision of the person of the Prophet in a dream, when that person has been committed to his grave at Al-Medina and has not left that to go to the place where the sleeper saw him. And even if we let that go, the Prophet is often seen by a thousand sleepers in one night in a thousand places and in different forms. And instinct supports reason in declaring that one person cannot be seen at one time in two places nor in two different forms. Whoever does not grasp that has contented himself, in the sphere of reason, with names and descriptions instead of realities and ideas. After that we need neither rebuke him nor speak to him."—(Ibid. pp. 80-81.)

Al-Ghazzali further tells us that what is seen is an "image" and not an "equivalent." The spiritual essence is not possessed of colour and (visible) form (Ibid. 81), and the form of a dead personage has no existence to be seen. It is a *symbol*. The distinction between an image and an equivalent is rather interesting, and may be given in Al-Ghazzali's own words:—

"The reason is something to which there is nothing like, yet we can use the sun as an image for it, because of their relationship in point. Sensuous percepts are shown by the light of the sun, and intellectual percepts by reason. This measure of relationship suffices in an image. Nay a Sultan may be represented . . . by the sun, and a Wazir by the moon. . . But these are images and not equivalents."—(p. 82.)

And he adds:—

"But it may be said, what you have mentioned does not lead to the conclusion that God is seen, nay, to the conclusion that Prophet even is not seen—for seeing a symbol is not seeing the thing itself. . . ? We reply that exactly the same thing is meant when any one says that he saw God in a dream. He does not mean that he saw him in his essence as he is. For it is generally admitted that the essence of God cannot be seen, but that an image which the sleeper believes to be the essence of God, or to be the essence of the Prophet can be seen. . . Only the image sometimes is truthful and sometimes is lying. . . ."—(pp. 82-83.)

Al-Ghazzali himself, however, seems to have thought that a "truthful" image (as distinguished from an equivalent) served as a medium for knowledge between the God, or the saint, and the devotee. But he merely clutched at the idea uncritically and did not examine its foundations.

The real explanation of these visions is to be found in the mysterious power of thought-force, which is the real magician, and capable of performing wonderful feats. The resort to mystic formulæ and names is justified by the need for impressing the mind with the

sense of the mysterious, so that it should be eagerly looking out for incalculable and strange things. Ibn Khaldun himself rejected the notion that real power could or did reside in any combinations of numbers and letters (*Religious Attitude*, etc., p. 106). It is, no doubt, a case of self-hypnosis. Touching the power of the mind to produce strange results, Mr. Macdonald, who seems to have devoted much time to the study of the problem, says (*Ibid.*, p. 257): "That a state of auto-hypnosis, with very curious consequences, could be produced by the abstraction, physical and mental, above described and by the mechanical repetition of a single phrase seems tolerably certain. There is the case on record of Tennyson who, by the repetition of his own name could bring himself into a similar dreamy state with resultant ideas which he regarded as veridical." The explanation of the feeling of happiness lies in the nature of the soul, which is blissful by nature. The feeling of satisfaction arises from within, like the happiness that is experienced on the receipt of the news of success in an examination. The vision is deemed to be a mark of divine favour, and its appearance, after nights of wakefulness and intense self-abstraction, brushes aside some of the worries and anxieties of the soul, leaving it free to manifest its real joyous nature, to some extent for the time being.

The knowledge and insight, too, that are deemed to be gained in these visions, prove, on examination, to be altogether illusory. They consist in bits and mystic fragments which are laconic and meaningless in themselves, and which for that reason, that is to say, in virtue of their laconicity and incoherence, are adaptable to any kind of a reading. It is, again, a well-known trick of the devout imagination that it will persistently ignore all the nine hundred and ninety-nine cases of failure of prophecy, but will lay all the stress it can on the one that seems to attain to some kind of veridical confirmation from the events in life. It is undoubtedly true that such supernormal powers as that of clairvoyance are inherent in the nature of the soul, but that will not justify the decreeing of all claims for their possession indiscriminately.

Similar criticism is to be made in the case of those unthinking devotees of *yoga* who seek and find satisfaction in the perception of

such internal phenomena as their own image, light, the solar orb, the moon, seven suns at a time, or the hearing of sounds or dulcet mysterious music. Many such phenomena are perceived in the course of *yogic* concentration, and are thoughtlessly attributed to some divine agency other than the soul itself. These are, however, no more real than the sight of gods and prophets, and are really only due to the excitation of the perceptive centres and of the sensory nerves connected with them, under the stress of intense mental concentration. Surely, the dignity of a god, or a saint, cannot be deemed to be enhanced by entertaining his devotees with such meaningless though bewitching sights and shows. As a matter of fact, any one who will practise inner mental concentration for a few weeks will soon begin to perceive distinctive luminous flashes and other mysterious forms of phenomena, even though he proceed by abusing the gods and the prophets that have been and shall ever be hereafter.

It is thus clear that hallucination is utterly incapable of taking the soul to *nirvana*, though suggestion, rightly employed, is a valuable ally on the 'path.'

To sum up: hypnotism and hallucination are two of the blind alleys of faith that lead to nought but suffering and pain. They are narcotic in their effect and deaden the finer instincts of life, keeping the soul entangled in the meshes of transmigration, so long as their effects continue. Suggestion, no doubt, is a powerful instrument for self-realisation, but by itself it is by no means powerful enough to remove the *karmic* filth from the soul; it is also capable of great harm, when employed carelessly and without proper safeguards. Emancipation is also not to be had by the destruction of the so-called sheaths of the soul, for the simple reason that there are no such sheaths on the soul. The path of progress consists in the *ratna trai* of Right Faith, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct, which means the doing of the right thing at the right moment. As Śrī Samantabhadra *acharya*, the author of the *Ratna Karandā Śrāvaka-chara*, points out, whoever turns himself into a casket, that is, an abiding place, of faultless Wisdom, Faith and Conduct, to him comes success in all his undertakings, like a woman eager to join her lord !

CHAPTER XIV

RECONCILIATION

"Remember that everywhere you will find some sort of faith and righteousness. See that you foster this, and do not destroy."—*Asoka*.

Only a very little study of comparative religion is needed to show that apart from matters of ceremony there are hardly any differences in the cardinal principles of the different creeds which are flourishing in our midst in the world. We have seen how the differences with respect to doctrinal matters and dogmatic belief disappear with the true interpretation of the sacred books, and we have also seen how a true and lasting reconciliation is possible amongst the followers of the apparently hostile sects. Even the differences in respect of ceremonies exist on the surface, and totally disappear when we look into the principles underlying their observance. The ignorant alone emphasize the difference between the places and forms of worship; in reality, the object of worship is always the same, whether it be understood by the devotee or not.

To the true worshipper in spirit all places are alike, their forms and designations being matters of secondary import. The Sufis maintain :—

"The true mosque in a pure and holy heart is builded : there let all men worship God ; for there He dwells, not in a mosque of stone."

The fact is that the earnest seeker after truth has eyes and ears only for the living Divinity enshrined within his own heart, and not for the style and structure of the places made by the human hand.

As regards image-worship, true worship being 'idealatry,' and not idolatry, as repeatedly pointed out before, anything which has the tendency to bring us nearer the ideal in view is a fit object for holy meditation. The images of those Great Ones who have attained to everlasting bliss, and whose lives, therefore, constitute beacons

for our guidance in the turbulent sea of *samsāra*, thus, are the fittest objects of worship. Those who regard the Jainas as idolators have no idea of the sense in which they worship their twenty-four Gods, nor of the object of devotion. The images of the Blessed Ones possess three great and priceless virtues which are not to be found in any non-Jaina image of God ; and these are :—

(1) They at once inspire the mind with the fire of self-less *vatrāgya* (renunciation), and exclude the idea of begging and bargaining with God ;

(2) They constitute the true Ideal and point to the certainty of its attainment, thus removing and destroying doubt each time that the worshipper's eye falls on Them ; and

(3) They teach us the correct posture for meditation and self-contemplation.

As to the first of these advantages, it is sufficient to say that philosophy can never tolerate the hypocritical form of worship which is in vogue amongst the generality of mankind. Ordinary worship is the worship of a God-King whose omnipotence man is led to dread, and whom he wants to propitiate by food, song and praise, so that he may not send him to regions of pain and suffering, and may give him choice things here and hereafter. But analysis reveals the elements of fear and begging to lie at the root of this form of devotion. It differs from the ancestor-worship of the savage only in this that the object of worship in its case happens to be an omnipotent power, instead of a dead and powerless ancestor. Hence, when we ridicule the ancestor-worshipper for his low form of faith, we ought, in justice, to find fault with him not for his emotion of devotion, i.e., fear *plus* begging, since that is also implied in the popular idea of worship, but for his ignorance in imagining that a dead ancestor can be of any use to him. But what does the so-called civilized worship mean if not devotion to an imaginary supreme power, personified and conceived after the manner of earthly kings ? Far from leading us to understand the nature of the great Ideal, which is beyond its reach, farther still from making us whole and holy, which is our real destiny, and farthest from enabling us to realize our own Godhood, it only tends towards demoralization, by exciting unholy dread of a mythological

monster* of unreasonableness, fury and power. There is, surely, not much to boast of in this form of worship.

As to the second great advantage which the images of the Blessed Ones possess, it suffices to say that they not only represent the great Ideal of wholeness and holiness which we are all anxious to attain, but also teach us that that is the only true and practical Ideal to be entertained. The *pratibimbās* (images) of the Holy Bhagwan† teach us the great lesson of Life that it is within our power to rise to the highest heights of power and glory. Their noble Lives

“ remind us we can make our lives sublime ;

And, departing, leave behind us footprints on the sands of time ;—

Footprints that perhaps another, sailing o’er Life’s solemn main,

A forlorn and shipwrecked brother, seeing, shall take heart again.”

* Cf. “In my opinion it is not the quantity, but the quality, of persons among whom the attributes of divinity are distributed, which is the serious matter. If the divine might is associated with no higher ethical attributes than those which obtain among ordinary men ; if the divine intelligence is supposed to be so imperfect that it cannot foresee the consequences of its own contrivances ; if the supernal powers can become furiously angry with the creatures of their omnipotence and, in their senseless wrath, destroy the innocent along with the guilty ; or if they can show themselves to be as easily placated by presents and gross flattery as any oriental or occidental despot ; if, in short, they are only stronger than mortal men and no better, then surely, it is time for us to look somewhat closely into their credentials, and to accept none but conclusive evidence of their existence.”—(‘Science and Hebrew Tradition,’ by T. Huxley, p. 258.)

† The following somewhat lengthy article, adapted and reproduced here from the “Digambar Jain” (Special number for October-November, 1918), will be found to throw further light on the worship of the Tirthankaras :—

It would undoubtedly be a great surprise to many of our non-Jaina friends to be told that Jainism is not an idolatrous creed and is as bitterly opposed to idol-worship as the most iconoclastic religion in the world, yet the fact is as stated. The attitude of Jainism towards idolatry is evident from the following from the *Ratna Karanda Śrāvakaśāstra*, a work of paramount authority, composed by Śrī Samantabhadraśāstra, who flourished about the commencement of the second century A.D. :—

“Bathing in [the so-called] rivers and oceans, setting up heaps of sand and stones [as objects of worship], immolating oneself by falling from a precipice or by being burnt up in fire [as in *śati*] are some of the common *marhaṭṭā* (foolies). The worshipping, with desire, to obtain favour of deities whose minds are full of per-

In respect of the third advantage, also, it is obvious that material aid can be had in fixing the true attitude of self-contemplation by

sonal likes and dislikes is called the folly of devotion to false divinity. Know that to be *guru markatā* which consists in the worshipping of false ascetics revolving in the wheel of *samsāra* [births and deaths, i.e., transmigration], who have neither renounced worldly goods, nor occupations nor *himsā* [causing injury to others]."

This is sufficient authority for the view that Jainism strongly condemns fetish-worship—the cult of rivers, stones and the like—as well as devotion to human or super-human beings who have not eradicated their lower nature, that is to say, who are liable to be swayed by passion and by personal likes and dislikes. What, then, is the significance of the image-worship which takes place daily in our temples and which is undoubtedly the cause of the false impression that has been formed by the non-Jainas concerning our faith?

To explain the nature of this worship, it is necessary first of all to summarise the Jainā creed which fully accounts for it. The Jainas believe that every soul is Godly by nature and endowed with all those attributes of perfection which are associated with our truest and best conceptions of divinity. These divine attributes—omniscience, blissfulness and the like—are, however, not actually manifest in the case of the soul that is involved in transmigration, but will become so when it attains *nirvāna*.

Nirvāna implies complete freedom from all those impurities of sin which limit and curtail the natural attributes and properties of the soul. Accordingly, the Jainas aspire to become Gods by crossing the sea of *samsāra* (births and deaths), and the creed they follow, to obtain that devoutly-wished-for consummation, is the method which was followed, by those who have already reached the goal in view—*nirvāna*. It is this method which is known as Jainism, and the images that are installed in our temples are the statues or 'photos' of the greatest among those who have already reached *nirvāna* and taught others the way to get there. They are called *Tirthamkaras*, literally the makers or founders of a *tirtha*, a fordable channel or passage (across the ocean of births and deaths).

How did they cross the sea of *samsāra* themselves? By curbing their fleshly lusts and by purifying and perfecting their souls. We, too, have got to tread the path They trod, if we would attain to the heights They have attained. In a word, the *Tirthamkaras* are models of perfection for our souls to copy and to walk in the foot-steps of. Their images are kept in the temples to constantly remind us of our high ideal and to inspire us with faith and confidence in our own souls. As for Their worship, They have no desire to be worshipped by us; Their perfection is immeasurably greater than we can praise; They are full and perfect in their *wholeness*. We offer Them the devotion of our hearts, because in the initial

the same being illustrated in the *pratibimbās* of the *Jīnas*. The weakness-conquering posture of Yoga is well described in the *Bhagavad-Gita*, vi. 13 and 14, which makes Krishna say :—

"Holding the body, head and neck erect, immovably steady, looking fixedly at the point of the nose, with unseeing gaze, the self-serene, fearless, firm in the vow of the Brahmachari, the mind controlled, thinking on Me, Harmonised, let him sit aspiring after Me."

stages of the 'journey' it is the most potent, if not the only, means of making steady progress.

It is not mere hero-worship, though worship of a hero is transcendent admiration. As Carlyle puts it, it is something more ; we admire what we ourselves aspire to attain to. The great English thinker, Thomas Carlyle, tells us :—

"I say great men are still admirable ; I say there is at bottom, nothing else admirable ! No nobler feeling than this of admiration for one higher than himself dwells in the breast of man. It is to this hour, and at all hours, *the vivifying influence in man's life*. Hero-worship endures for ever while man endures. Boswell venerates his Johnson, right truly, even in the eighteenth century. The unbelieving French believe in their Voltaire ; and burst out round him into very curious Hero-worship, in that last act of his life when they 'stifle him under roses.' At Paris his carriage is the 'nucleus of a comet, whose train fills whole streets.' The ladies pluck a hair or two from his fur to keep it as a sacred relic. There was nothing highest, beautifullest, noblest in all France, that did not feel this man to be higher, beautifuler, nobler . . . It will ever be so. We all love great men ; love, venerate and bow down submissive before great men : nay can we honestly bow down to anything else ? Ah, does not every true man feel that *he is himself made higher by doing reverence to what is really above him* ? No noble or more blessed feeling dwells in man's heart. And to me it is very cheering to consider that no sceptical logic, or general triviality, insincerity, and aridity of any time and its influences can destroy this noble inborn loyalty and worship that is in man. It is an eternal cornerstone, from which they can begin to build themselves up . . . That man in some sense or other, worships heroes ; that we all of us reverence and must ever reverence Great Men : this is, to me, the living rock amid all rushings-down whatsoever."

The italics are ours, and they speak for themselves. Even today men and women assemble, in thousands, in Trafalgar Square in London to do honour to a statue of stone that stands there ! They illuminate the whole neighbourhood ; they place garlands of flowers on the object of their adoration ! Is it idolatry they practise ? Are they idolators ? No, no, such a thing is simply impossible ; no one can accuse the English of idolatry ! It is not worshipping the block of stone ; they ask nothing from it ; they offer it no food, nor do they pray to it. If you look more closely into their 'Statue-worship' you will find it to be the adoration of a something of which the figure

Such is the posture for devotion, and material assistance in making it firm can be obtained by a contemplation of the serene, dispassionate Images of the Jaina Tirthamkaras.

Thus, the three advantages enumerated above which spring from the worship of the Jinas cannot be gainsaid. It is well to remember that the realization of the Ideal of Perfection and Bliss is possible only when the soul is impressed with its own divine nature,

in stone is a symbol. It is not the statue of Nelson they assemble to worship, but the spirit of the brave man, the fearless sailor who made England what she is today,—the acknowledged Queen of the Seas. The English are a nation of sailors : take away their sea-power, and they are gone. But for the glorious achievements of the British navy, England would have been overrun by Germany today. The English know it, and pour forth, spontaneously, almost unconsciously, the warmest devotion of their free hearts on the one being who saved them from utter ruin in the past. But if Nelson himself was able to save England from destruction only once, his inspiration has been her salvation not once, not twice, but repeatedly. The great sailor is now dead ; he may no longer command the fleet of England in the hour of danger ; he may win no more laurels for himself or victories for his country ; but his spirit and influence survive. For there is not a sailor lad in the whole of the United Kingdom who does not brighten up at the mention of Nelson's name, who does not reverently recognize him as a model of greatness for himself, who does not draw powerful inspiration from his life. The nation that placed the statue of this great man in a conspicuous part of the capital of their country knew that they were not merely erecting a statue to the memory of a dead man, but *laying the foundation-stone of their own greatness* for generations to come.

Such is the true significance of 'Nelson-worship' which takes place on the Trafalgar Day annually. It is not idolatry that we can charge against the English, but *idealatry*, which, if a fault, is one that has been the source of unparalleled greatness to the 'culprit'!

The Jaina form of worship is, similarly, an instance of *idealatry*, for devotion to God in Jainism only means devotion to the attributes of Divinity which the devotee wishes to develop in his own soul, and consists in the blending of the fullest measure of love and respect for those Great Ones who have evolved out those very attributes to perfection in Their own case. The Jainas ask for nothing from their *Tirthamkaras* ; no prayers are ever offered to Them ; nor are They supposed to be granting boons to Their devotees. They are not worshipped because worship is pleasing to Them, but because it is the source of the greatest good—the attainment of Godly perfection—to our own souls . . . The causal connection between the ideal of the soul and the worshipping of those who have already realised it, is to be found in the fact that the realisation of an ideal demands one's whole-hearted attention, and is only possible by following in the foot-steps of those who have actually reached the goal.

not when its supposed inferiority and helplessness are constantly dinned into its ears.* The place which does not lead to the elevation of the individual will, but falsely impresses on it the necessity of assuming an attitude of a captive and beggar, can, therefore, in no sense of the term, be described as the House of God.

Of the devotion to an unmanifest god it is sufficient to say that it is time wasted almost wholly, since the Unmanifest is only an abstraction, and as such devoid of existence, except in pure metaphysical thought. Hence, the worshippers of the Unmanifest are little better than those who personify thunder and lightning and other forces of nature as gods and goddesses, and then fall down at their feet in adoration.

The idea of an image as an aid to meditation stands on the same ground as the photograph of one's intended. Both are a means to put the soul *en rapport* with the object of Love, the ideal of spiritual

* The recitation of holy *mantras* and texts at death-bed is also calculated to remind the soul of its true nature, so that it might be filled with thoughts of its own divinity, and thereby escape the torments of hell and the lower forms of life. For if the soul is filled with the ideas of goodness and power even at the last moment of its earthly career, it cannot then descend into the regions of pain and suffering, or be reborn in unhappy circumstances any more. Accordingly, all religions enjoin the reading of holy texts, in some form or other, in the hearing of the departing soul. The recitation is at once calculated to divert the attention from bodily suffering and grief at the idea of being torn away from all it held dear and near in the physical world, in addition to imparting to it the consciousness of its own true and glorious Self, the one and the only Bestower of *Moksha*, so far as any individual soul is concerned. It must, however, be always kept in mind that merit is not in empty words, or in the recitation thereof, but solely and simply in their purport or import; and it must be evident now that weeping and crying in the presence of the departing soul can not only do no good to those whom it is leaving behind, in this Vale of Tears, but also actually go to deprive it of the last, and, therefore, the most momentous and valuable, opportunity for proper progress in the closing hours of its life on earth.

The recitation of the Sura Y. S. enjoined on the followers of the creed of the Crescent also seems to have been intended to assist the departing soul on the spiritual path. The very letters Y and S are suggestive of this purport; for the numerical value of ي is ten which, as a perfect or whole number, is the symbol of Perfection, and س is an abridgement of *saat*, or Life, whose divinity is the one and the only theme to be dwelt upon in the hearing of a departing soul.

or domestic felicity and joy. And just as it cannot be said that the lover intends to marry the photograph of his intended, though he kisses and places it next to his heart, so can it not be said that the true worshipper takes the piece of stone to be his God.

So far as the images of the non-Jaina gods and goddesses are concerned, obviously they do not possess sufficient merit to lead to the salvation of the soul, since they are mere symbols of the various aspects of Life. It is, however, true that the contemplation of the different aspects of Life is not without its usefulness, since meditation is the only means of *jnāna*, which, arising in the soul, enables it to turn to the true Divinity. But while it is true that meditation on symbolical gods and goddesses may ultimately lead to the true form of worship, it is not possible to minimise the value of time lost, in a fruitless pursuit, which has ultimately to be given up. As a matter of fact, mythology is only calculated to lead into error more often than otherwise; and no soul eager to attain emancipation can afford to enter its labyrinthian domain. Besides, superstition seldom fails to implant itself on the worship of mythological gods, and misunderstood devotion usually degrades itself into a begging of favours—'Lord do this, and Lord do that'—which is as far away from the spirit of renunciation as ignorance from Truth.

As for the element of discord with respect to ritual, what has been said about the differences in the form of devotional worship, applies with full force to the differences in all other ceremonies, since the true aim of all forms of ceremonial worship is to rouse the dormant divinity of the soul.

All rational religions, it may be seen at a glance, have the two following points in view, namely,

- (1) the ideal of happiness to be attained, and
- (2) the means to attain it with.

Now, it is obvious that so far as the attainment of happiness is concerned, there are no material differences in the principal religions of the world. They all prescribe

- (i) discrimination between the Self and the not-self,
- (ii) renunciation,

(iii) concentration, and

(iv) devotion

for the attainment of the great ideal of happiness. The Hindus classify these means as the different kinds of Yoga, Karma Yoga, Jnana Yoga, Raja Yoga, Bhakti Yoga, and the like; the Muhammadans describe them as belief, purification, resignation and devotion; in other systems they are known by other names. We have already discussed them all in the previous chapters of this book, from different points of view; and the subject of devotion has also been dealt with in this chapter.

The facts established and the inferences drawn only point to one conclusion, namely, that there are no great differences in respect of the means prescribed by the different teachers of humanity from time to time, though, owing to misunderstanding and ignorance of the real truth, and not a little to our personal and racial prejudices also, the gulf has always been widening between the followers of the numerous faiths prevailing in the world.

As regards the first point, in particular, namely, the ideal of happiness to be attained, it will be seen that most of the religions of the world fall under one or the other of the two classes, the philosophical and the mystical; and the difference between them lies in the fact that while the former insist on the true understanding of the nature of things, in the first instance, the latter lay all the stress they can on the element of devotion, leaving knowledge to arise from the depth of the soul in the course of concentration. The disadvantage of this latter course is, however, too great to be minimised, since, devotion being a kind of emotion, no genuine feeling of devotion can arise in the soul so long as it is not clearly convinced of its special relationship to the prescribed object of adoration and worship. Besides, the ultimate object of devotion being one's own Self, its being directed towards another, especially towards a mythological deity, in the first instance, is only a mischievous waste of time. Of the prevailing religions, Christianity, Islam and certain sects of the Hindus are all mostly devotional in their nature, while Jainism, Vedanta, Buddhism and the remaining five schools of Hindu philosophy are or aim at being philosophical. We have already dealt with most of these

religions, and propose to deal with Islam before closing this chapter. The ideal of happiness each lays down for its follower has also been subjected to investigation, and has been seen to be nothing short of becoming God, which every soul already is in essence. There is no creed which does not recognize and preach it directly or indirectly, though in the devotional types of religion the teaching is to be found with difficulty, and lies buried beneath myth and allegory. Even the religions of the philosophical type, with the exception of Jainism, are all more or less obscure on the point, as has already been seen. Thus, when purged of the elements of vagueness and error which have gathered round the nature of the Ideal, the Moksha of Yoga, the '*aham Brahman asmi*' of Vedanta, and the Father-like Perfection or the Kingdom of Heaven of Christianity convey identically the same idea as that set by Jainism before mankind. Even amongst Muhammadans, the Sufis and some others believe in becoming one with God. Mr. Amir Ali points out ('Islam,' p. 15) :—

"A large section of Muslims, especially those inclined to Sufi-ism, believe, however, that as the human soul is an emanation from God, the highest joy would consist in its fusion with the Universal Soul, whilst the greatest pain would be in a state of separation from the Divine Essence."

That the same idea underlies the true teaching of the Qur'an will be demonstrated presently.

There remains the question, whether it is possible to attain to the highest ideal of happiness? On this point, it is refreshing to note that there is no difference of opinion among the founders of the different religions who all declare, with one voice, that one has only to try for it to realize it. But while this is so, so far as the main conclusion is concerned, there is, nevertheless, a slight misunderstanding as regards the various arguments which philosophers have advanced, from time to time, in support of their views. The subject is divisible into three heads, namely,

- (1) God,
- (2) Nature, and
- (3) souls;

and covers the whole field of philosophy. In the West the object of philosophy has not been fully understood, for which reason people

indulge in it as a mere scholarly pastime. Shakespeare makes one of his characters say to the physician :—

“ If thy physics canst not cure me of such evils as the mind is heir to,
Then throw thy physic to the dogs;
I'll have none of it.”

This applies equally well to the philosopher in the West. But in the East the sole purpose of philosophy has been to relieve the suffering of humanity who are victims to those very evils alluded to by Shakespeare. Even in the West certain philosophers, especially the Greeks, imitated their brethren of the East, and tried to unravel the mystery of being. Some of them visited India and other countries and benefited by their learning and wisdom,—a fact which explains the remarkable similarity of thought between the Indian and the Greek systems, and also accounts for the minor differences existing between them. There are always more sides than one of looking at a thing; and when two persons look at the same thing from different points of view, their opinions must differ, until one of them is able to make direct observations from both sides. Besides, the medium we possess for expressing our ideas is so defective that it is impossible to avoid all chances of error. One man may use a word to express a certain idea, another may express the same sense by a different word, meaning not to differ from the first, and yet a casual reader may be puzzled by the variation, and may even find it difficult to reconcile the two versions. The confusion becomes most aggravating when words having a special significance in one language are translated into another having no word to represent them with.

If we would avoid the confusion of thought which has been a prolific source of trouble and has frequently led to bloodshed in the past, we must make up our minds to reject all but the most rigidly scientific method of study and investigation. We must avoid the pernicious habit of hasty generalization, and reject the deduction which seeks to triumph over opposition by the broadest of assumptions and the cheapest presumption. True metaphysics, it will be observed, is wedded to science; it takes its facts directly from nature, and does not allow an inference to be drawn till all the arguments for and against

a given proposition are sought out, investigated and duly weighed. It will not jump to a conclusion like the one we have had occasion to consider in connection with the permanency of the state of *moksha*—all things involved in Time and Space are evanescent, therefore *moksha*, too, must be a passing state of existence! As an argument it betrays the conscious advocacy of an indefensible cause; as a declaration of opinion, lack of sober judgment. If the propounders of the argument had taken the trouble to study the problem from the standpoint of physics, they would have observed that all things involved in Time and Space are not necessarily ephemeral; for all simple substances, *e.g.*, atoms of matter, are eternal; although they exist in Space and continue in Time.

Jainism takes its facts direct from nature, and employs the further safeguard of *naya-vāda* (the 'logic' of standpoints) to ensure the accuracy of its deductions. The result is a Science of Thought of unrivalled perfection,* the like of which has never yet been produced

* The charge of indefiniteness brought by the opponents of Jainism against the many-sidedness of the *Jaina Siddhānta* rests on hasty judgment, and is easily refuted; for if they had taken the trouble to study the subject before criticising the *Jaina* view, they would have perceived that though vagueness is hostile to precision and certainty of thought, it is not the same thing as the many-sidedness of aspects. There can be no indefiniteness in a synthesis or summing up of conclusions obtained from different standpoints, where the conclusions are definite and clear in themselves; nor is there room for the element of error in a system in which its very root—one-sidedness of outlook—is destroyed at the very outset. To illustrate the point, a man, *e.g.*, a governor, may be a master with reference to certain individuals, and a servant, with reference to his king; hence, there is neither error nor indefiniteness in describing him as a master from a particular point of view and a servant from another, but it will be a falsehood to regard him *absolutely* either as a master or as a servant. The man who says that the governor is a master in relation to certain individuals and a servant with reference to his king certainly knows more, and is in no way less definite, than he who knows him only as a master or he who is but aware of him as a servant. It is quite an error to read in the many-sidedness of the *Jaina Siddhānta*, a device to entangle the unwary opponent into an ingeniously elaborated out system of 'either—or's; on the contrary, this very many-sidedness of its *naya-vāda* is the true secret of its unrivalled perfection. This also disposes of the view that *naya-vāda* implies the attribution of mutually contradictory attributes to objects and things; for just as a governor is both a master and a servant at one and the same time, so are all things the abode of seemingly hostile qualities, which are irreconcilable only when thought of with reference to the same

by any other system, whether oriental or occidental. It is a matter of daily experience that a set of rules applicable to a bundle of facts established with reference to a certain point of view do not hold good indiscriminately, that is, with reference to every other standpoint; yet there is not one non-Jaina philosopher who has not fallen into a logical trap by mixing up his standpoints. Suppose we say, here is a jar of iron: if we remove its ironness, it will cease to exist. The statement is a metaphysical truth, for if the very substance of which a thing is made be conceived to be non-existent, it is evident that the thing can then have no manner of claim to existence by itself. But now suppose further that we generalise upon this one instance and apply it to the case of a jar of x . It is conceivable that in certain cases the result may be true, but obvious that in certain others it must be simply disastrous; for x might not only stand for iron, copper, glass and other substances of which a jar may be made, but also for such things as water or butter which it might contain, as well as for the name of a person to whom it might belong. As no jar containing butter would ever cease to exist by the removal of its contents, nor one belonging to a person, by changing hands, the result would be a logical calamity resulting from the application of a rule especially suited to a particular set of circumstances to one not falling within its scope. It will be observed that in common parlance it is as permissible to say a jar of iron as it is to say a jar of butter or a bowl of John, though the three state-

group of facts, that is to say, from the same point of view. Thus the true hall-mark of perfection of thought is the many-sided *naya-vada*, which, in the words of a great American thinker (see the *Nayakarnika*, pp. 24-25), is "competent to descend into the utmost minutiae of metaphysics and to settle all the vexed questions of abstruse speculation by a positive method. . . to settle at any rate the limits of what it is possible to determine by any method which the human mind may be rationally supposed to possess. It promises to reconcile all the conflicting schools, not by inducing any of them necessarily to abandon their favourite 'standpoints,' but by proving to them that the standpoints of all others are alike tenable, or at least, that they are representative of some aspect of truth which under some modification needs to be represented, and that the integrity of Truth consists in this very variety of its aspects, within the rational unity of an all-comprehensive and ramifying principle."

ments are made from different points of view. The first holds true from what is known as the *dravyārthīc naya*, the point of view which takes into consideration the nature of the substance of which a thing is made, while the other two are true only from what may be called the *vyavahāra*, that is the practical standpoint. This is sufficient to show that the inability to distinguish between different points of view must eventually lead to confusion.

It might be urged that confusion such as this seldom occurs in philosophy, and that we have needlessly magnified the possibility of error. It is true that the instance selected to illustrate our point is an easy one, and one hardly likely to be committed by a rational being; but its type has been repeated by all systems of thought which have not expressly adopted the principle of *nayavāda*; or which have deliberately sought to disprove its validity. Such, for instance, is the case with the Advaita Vedānta which deliberately challenges the Jaina method, and which is, consequently, plunged into the quagmire of confusion, resulting from the mixing up of what is known as the *parāyārthīc naya* (the standpoint of 'accident,' or form) with the *dravyārthīc* (the point of view of substance). The distinction between these two standpoints may be brought out clearly by the instance of water which is gaseous matter in its essence, that is from the *dravyārthīc* point of view, but a non-gaseous liquid in appearance or form (the *parāyārthīc* side of the question). Similarly, the individual soul is a pure divinity in so far as its essential nature is concerned, as has been established in these pages, but from the *parāyārthīc* point of view it is only an impure ego, involved in the cycle of transmigration. But this view is not open to Advaitism, which fights shy of *nayavāda*; and the result is that the Advaitists have had no other alternative but to deny the very existence of the soul, calling all else but one solitary principle, or abstraction, an illusion pure and simple! It is evident what an amount of ridicule one would draw on oneself should one persist in describing water as an illusion; but the mistake of Advaitism is exactly of the same type and form.

Buddhism, too, has fallen a victim to its antagonism to *nayavāda*; for it has only laid hold of the principle of change, and shut itself out from all other points of view. Its notion of *nirvāṇa*, consequently,

is a conception of extinction, out and out which is clearly opposed to the nature of the soul from the *dravyārthīc* point of view, that is, as a substance.

Coming to modern times, the metaphysicians of the materialistic school have also fallen into error like the Buddhists. They draw their inferences about the nature of the soul from the fact that our consciousness is liable to be affected by musk, coffee and other like material things; but refuse to study its nature any further. Their observation is thus confined to the *pariyāyārthīc* point of view, and consequently does not prove the existence of the soul as a self-subsisting reality. It is not that their observation is faulty, for the soul is actually affected by matter in the condition of bondage; but it is their metaphysical deduction which is to be rejected as a one-sided, and therefore necessarily inaccurate, conclusion. The truth is that from the *dravyārthīc* point of view, that is, considered as a thing in itself, the soul is a substance independent of matter; but from the *pariyāyārthīc* side of the problem, no unredeemed soul—and it is only an unredeemed soul that is open to be experimented with—can ever be found to be free from the companionship of matter. Hence the error of the materialist.

Jainism warns us not only against inexhaustive research, but also against being misled by the one-sided observations and statements of others. Itself a master of the Science of Thought, it knows the shortcomings of language—how it is incapable of expressing the results of investigation from different points of view at one and the same time, and how misleading its expression becomes unless attention be constantly directed to the particular standpoint from which a statement proceeds. To guard against this huge possibility of error, Jainism suggests the simple device of mentally placing the word *syāt* (lit., somehow, hence, from a particular point of view, or in a certain sense) before every statement. This would at once enable one to perceive that the statement is made from a particular point of view and holds good only so far as that standpoint is concerned. The mind would then be directed on the right lines of enquiry and the ascertainment of truth speedily attained.

As Jainism points out, perhaps no other cause of error in metaphysics is quite so fruitful as the failure to realize that all seemingly contradictory statements are not necessarily hostile. For instance, when it is said that the world is *nitya-anitya* (permanent-impermanent), the bewilderment of the untrained mind is great, and it is apt to reject the statement as a piece of buffoonery, if not the outcome of an unsound brain. Nevertheless, true metaphysics can only describe the world as *nitya-anitya*, for it is *nitya* (permanent or eternal) in so far as the substances of which it is composed are eternal and indestructible, and certainly it is also constituted by things that are seen one day and gone the next. In a word, the world is unperishing and eternal in so far as the substances composing it are concerned, but perishing and non-eternal with regard to the forms which those very substances put on from time to time. This simple truth, when put into the form of the pilule formulæ which metaphysicians delight to employ, is apt to cause a great deal of confusion, and has to be guarded against, by means of certain well-defined safeguards, that aim at ensuring the consistency of subtle abstract thought. The Jaina doctrine of the *Syadvada* is a system of scientific safeguards that aim at maintaining the proper consistency in metaphysical thought. It proceeds by examining the theory of contradiction, and points out that contradictory speech is resolvable, ultimately, into seven forms as follows :—

- (1) affirmance (of a proposition),
- (2) denial (of the proposition),
- (3) simultaneous affirmance and denial,
- (4) affirmance + denial,
- (5) affirmance + indescribability,
- (6) denial + indescribability,
- (7) affirmance + denial + indescribability.

The above are all the possible forms of contradiction that can occur in thought. They may be contradictory in reference to one another, or in regard to their own contents, as is the case with the compound forms, especially the seventh. It will be noticed that the first three of these forms are simple judgments or predica-

tions, and the remaining four, their compounds or combinations, combining them in different groups.

The first three of these combinations are also the three possible modes of predication in human speech. For when talking, we only talk about some object or thing, and in talking about an object or thing, we either affirm something about it or deny something with reference to it, or say that it is indescribable altogether, which means that it presents, at one and the same time, the two contradictory aspects of existence and non-existence, which makes it impossible absolutely either to affirm or deny its being. To illustrate, the world is *imperishing and eternal* with reference to its substances ; it is *perishing and non-eternal* with regard to the forms that are seen one day and gone the next ; and it is *indescribable* when thought of with reference to its dual constituents, namely, substance and form both. For when we think of both substance and form *at the same time* the world presents to the view both *perishability* as well as *imperishability* at once, and as there is no word in our languages except *indescribability* that can represent the existence-non-existence idea that arises *uppermost* in the mind at the time, we must say that it is *indescribable*. These three—affirmance, denial and indescribability—are, then, the three simple forms of predication in human speech. Their combinations give rise to four other forms which have been enumerated at numbers 4 to 7 in the list given above.

It may be pointed out that the distinction between *simultaneous* affirmance and denial and in what has been put down as *affirmance + denial* is rather important ; for in the former the view is held *simultaneously* from both the standpoints (e.g., with reference to substance and form in the example of the world), while in the latter there is a simple *summing up* only of the results obtained by viewing things successively from the two points of view.

A true metaphysician must warn himself against falling into error by the mere appearance of contradiction in form : for, as is evident from the example of the world, not all contradictions are real. In order to constitute a real contradiction, the affirmance and denial will both have to proceed from the same standpoint. For instance, of the statements "A is dead" and "A is not dead," when

they proceed from the same standpoint one at least is bound to be false, inasmuch as it cannot be that A is both alive and dead, when the question of his death is considered from the one and the same point of view. But when taken from different standpoints there is no necessary contradiction involved in them ; for A may be dead as A, and yet alive in so far as he is a soul, which is eternal and, therefore, above birth and death both. For this reason the student of metaphysics in Jainism is advised, as already noticed, to mentally insert the word *spāt* (literally, in some way) before every statement of fact that he comes across, to warn him that it has been made from one particular point of view, which he should engage himself to ascertain. In this way he is not likely to be frightened by the contradictions he might encounter in the course of his study, and will not be baffled by them. Hence, where an untrained novice is likely to lose his head in dumb-founding bewilderment produced by such seemingly irreconcilable statements as "the world is *nitya-anitya*," and to spurn or turn away from truth, the master of the *syadvada* is sure to acquire the true insight into the nature of things, and ultimately also mastery over the empire of nature, inasmuch as knowledge is power whereby men have subdued and are now subduing nature !

We may now revert from this necessary digression, and take up the three subjects, namely, God, Nature and Soul, with reference to which we proposed to study the differences amongst the principal religions of the world.

Of these the idea of

God

which, as we saw in the third chapter, has been understood in a variety of senses by mankind, is the first to claim our attention. The clear idea of God is naturally that of Jainism, which signifies the Supreme Status of the Liberated Soul.

The insistence on the number twenty-four as that of the most Glorious Souls, is due to the fact that these Great Ones became Teachers of humanity before the attainment of Nirvana, while the rest of the Liberated Souls only applied themselves to attain Their own salvation, although they also taught others to some extent.

We have seen that the teaching of Christianity, Buddhism and Zoroastrianism recognises these twenty-four Gods. The Hindu Scriptures also acknowledge some of the Holy Ones, and the first *Tirthankara* is even mentioned by name in the Bhagavata Purana and other works. Islam alone of the other more important creeds can be said to be silent about them, but the use of the plural form of the 1st person for Godhead can only indicate one of the two things, either that the word 'we' is employed with reference to a number of Gods, or in the sense in which it is used by earthly Kings, that is, as a mark of personal greatness. But except the word of the ignorant theologian of modern times, there is no authority for the latter interpretation, for the Qur'an is altogether silent on the point; and the former is supported by good reason and philosophy. It follows, therefore, that the former is the true interpretation.

We thus find that Al Qur'an also contains the same teaching as to the nature of Godhead as is to be found elsewhere. But for this Muhammad would never have said, "Man know thyself," nor 'God,' "I am nearer to you than your jugular vein."

As for the remaining ideas of God, we have had occasion to point out that the notion of the Absolute is quite untenable philosophically. It has, however, largely entered into modern thought, and some sects lay stress on positing it by itself, describing it as the Unmanifested. The views of the Vedanta and the Sankhya schools on this point have already been discussed in the earlier chapters of this book, but the fact that Muslim theology has taken the same view, will become clear on a perusal of the following abridged passage from the 'Philosophy of Islam':—

"In the beginning was God just as He now is—without any addition or participation . . . There is no addition to or subtraction from the Divine Essence—It is the same. In the first stage Unity is real and diversity is relational . . . It is a stage where imagination cannot be exercised. He is beyond all knowledge. In this stage the essence had overwhelmed the attributes. He was as it were engaged in Himself. Then there is the awakening of His love for Himself. He wanted to see Himself. 'I was a hidden treasure,' in a Hadis it is said, 'and loved to be known, and created the world to be known.' There is the awakening to His attributes. In the second stage (Wahdat), four relations are found, Vajud (essence), Ilm (knowledge of self), Nur (Light, i.e., dawning of the essence in the knowledge,—the Ego), and Shahud (observation of self). He becomes conscious—'I am that I am.' "

It is needless to comment upon the impurity of the notion of the Unmanifest Absolute, since it is a pure abstraction like fluidity, or republic.

The conception of God as *Īvara*, 'the Word,' and the like, is the next to demand our attention. But we have fully shown in the ninth and the tenth chapters that in actual life there is nothing to correspond to these conceptions which are pure personifications.

There remains the idea of God as a creator to be dealt with. On this point, also, it has been shown that the creation of the universe, of individual souls and of their bodies cannot be truthfully ascribed to any one. The God who creates all things, including evil, cannot possibly claim our reverence. Jainism, *Vaiśeṣika*, *Nyaya*, *Sankhya*, *Vedanta* and the school of thought known as the *Pārva Mimamsa* are at one in refusing to offer homage to any one who creates unhappy beings and then claims devotion from them. The freedom of Jaina thought appears at its best in the following argument (see 'An Introduction to Jainism,' by N. Rangaji, p. 61):—

"Why should I call you my God? Is it your entrance into this world accompanied by all the splendour of *Indras* and more, that entitles you to my homage? Is it your power to work through the sky? Do then the two classes of immunity from physical pain, etc., constitute your claim to our reverence? Are you then our God by being the founder of a religion?"

In this way a question is put about each and every attribute, till the list is exhausted, and the philosopher concludes that in a world, which is governed by the law of *karma*, or cause and effect, a creative divinity who declines to violate and is powerless to suspend that law, for the sake of his devotee, cannot be entitled to our reverence on any ground. Jainism also declines to believe that Divinity is the source of all actions, because that leads to an absurdity in relation to the doctrine of punishment. To say that a thief commits theft, because he was so moved by the will of a God, and, at the same time, to hold that that God will punish him for the theft, cannot be considered just by any means. The *ācārya* returns to the charge with the argument that if a god is entitled to take credit for sending the rains, for producing milk in the mother's breast, and for tempering the winds to the shorn lamb, he must be censured for creating famines,

for bringing on plagues, for causing devastation by earthquake, and the like. That there is considerable force in these 'daring speculations' has always been admitted by all rational theologians. The Sankhyas, the Mimamsakas and the Jainas have not been satisfied with the argument in support of the notion of an anthropomorphic Creator, demanding worship by virtue of his position as such. Why did he create at all? Obviously, a god who is desireless (and the true Godhead must be so, in consequence of His high position) cannot be credited with a desire to create anything. Nor can it be granted that he has some aim of his to be served by his creatures, since he must be self-sufficient. If he is benevolent and has created the world out of his grace, he would not have created misery as well as felicity. If the creation be regarded as a mere play of his will, the supposition renders him childish. If it be said that he creates merely as an agent, according to the *karmas* of souls, that makes him dependent upon others for his activity. And so far as the teleological argument from variety in the world is concerned, it is obviously caused by the variety of *karmas*, which are the actions of the soul. "The soul is therefore the cause of everything through its own actions. The soul is its own God" ('An Introduction to Jainism,' p. 88). Similarly, the philosopher asks about dissolution: Why should a god destroy that which he had created? If it is to stop the evil-doing of the wicked, why did he create the evil-doer at all? Again, why not destroy the wicked alone? Why destroy the good as well as the wicked both?

It is thus clear that not only is the idea of a beneficent creator a self-contradictory concept, but that in no sense can such a creator be considered entitled to our devotion or respect. The Jainas, therefore, do not offer worship to the *Siddhātmas* on any other ground than that of Omniscience. As a *guru* is entitled to reverence from his disciple, so are the *Holy Tīrthamkaras* entitled to worship on account of having shown the *mārga* (the path of liberation); and as of all kinds of teachers in the world They alone attained to perfection. They alone are entitled to the fullest measure of our reverence. A necessary corollary from this is that when the disciple becomes perfect

himself he ceases to worship the Holy Ones. This is actually the teaching of the great *Tirthankaras* Themselves.

Jainism does not recognize the claim of any god or goddess, nor even of the great *Tirthankaras*, to be worshipped on the ground of fear, or for obtaining boons from them. The Teacher (*guru*) alone is entitled to worship, and the true Teacher is he who imparts perfect knowledge in plain language, not he who has not sufficient knowledge himself, nor he who mystifies us with myths and legends. As regards the granting of boons, it is obvious that the soul is itself immortal, and possesses the capacity for perfect knowledge and bliss. Hence, no one can grant to it anything worth having, from outside. Neither can any external agency destroy the force of its *karmas*, called destiny in Islam. It follows that worshipping an outside agency for the things which are already ours and which cannot be had from the outside, is only calculated to lead to greater trouble, inasmuch as all expectations of help from without only go to make the will negative. The true God to worship and praise, therefore, is the individual soul itself, whose 'omnipotence' is kept back only so long as one insists on insulting it by regarding it as helpless, and by applying to wrong sources for its help. Besides one's own Self, only those who have set the example of self-evolution and attained perfection and everlasting joy, and whom we must follow if we would free ourselves from the cycle of births and deaths, are alone entitled to respect and reverence from us. Just as he who would become a lawyer cannot derive any benefit from the worship of mythical heroes and saints, so cannot the soul desirous of attaining nirvana be benefited by any but the Soul that has attained to liberation. A lawyer alone can help us in the study of law; similarly, it is only a Liberated Soul that can be of help to us in the attainment of perfection and bliss.

We now pass on to a consideration of

Nature,

that is to say, of the universe, which, as scientists maintain, does not require the interference of an outside agency. Science undoubtedly is right to the extent that there is no creator of the world, and that the universe, as a whole, discloses no teleological design in its evolution. But it is unable to explain the nature of the soul

which has only baffled it hitherto. Failing to understand the true sense of the teachings of the real Teachers of our race, it has unhesitatingly declared religion to be irrational and unscientific. And, since metaphysics only endeavours to ascertain the final causes of the word-process, and since its conclusions invariably agree with those of religion, wherever and whenever they are pushed to the final issue, it, too, has been dubbed unscientific indiscriminately. As a matter of fact, consistency of thought without which no department of knowledge can be perfect, however much it might be based on the observation of facts in nature—it is not the facts of observation themselves which constitute science, but their rational classification, and the ascertainment of their causes—is unthinkable without the aid of true metaphysics or philosophy. Hence, philosophy, which totally rejects the element of chance and its companion, arbitrariness, and which recognises only the sequence of Cause and Effect in its all-embracing sphere of activity, is the science of all sciences known to man.

The absence of the knowledge of the soul in the West became the starting point of the development and growth of a system of thought which soon managed to shake itself free from religious domination of every description whatsoever, and which, in consequence of the extraordinary abilities and forcible eloquence of some of the leading scientists, who took up its cause, evolved out, towards the end of the last century, into what has been termed Scientific Agnosticism. Carried away by the brilliancy of their researches in the realm of what must be described as dead matter, and encouraged by the semblance of worldly prosperity which their discoveries and inventions brought about, these scientific giants pushed on with their enquiries, and discovered newer and newer secrets of nature, till, emboldened by their successes, they invaded the domain of Religion, forgetting that in that territory all those whose equipment for study consisted solely of the spectrum, the microscope, the knife and measures and weights were not, by any means, welcomed as guests by mother Nature, and that the only persons who could successfully hope to explore that region were those who had been initiated into the mysteries of the soul or spirit, that is Life.

Enormous is the debt of gratitude the world, and particularly the so-called civilized world, owes these indefatigable workers for their discoveries of electricity and the like, but equally great is the mischief which their opinions on the subjects connected with religion have done. But thanks to the growth of the New Thought movement, already a great deal of the lost ground has been wrenched back for Religion from the clutches of Pyrrhonism; and men who had come to look upon life as the result of a mere juxtaposition of atoms of dead matter have begun once more to look upon it as a thing which continues to exist after the dissolution of the body in death.

In dealing with such subjects as Soul, Spirit and Time, it is not to be expected that the conclusions of religious philosophy would always find material corroboration from the researches of the modern scientific world. As a matter of fact, science is yet in its infancy, and still thinking of manufacturing life and consciousness from its lifeless matter and unconscious force.

Science would take a living animal and say that its carcass, when placed at a certain height, is capable of doing so many foot-pounds of work, but would not worry itself about the work it is capable of doing as a living being. It feels baffled in the presence of life, and, therefore, prudently confines its operations to the calculation of foot-pounds of work which it can extract out of carcasses. And, since its system of energetics only professes to deal with the actual and potential motion of lifeless bodies, it is not surprising that its conception of energy should altogether leave out of account the innumerable virtues of the soul.

Full of admiration and alarm as religion is for the wonderful vigour and daring of this strange child of its own declining years, it cannot be expected to lend its assent to its surmises about the production of life and consciousness from the motion of dead, unconscious matter, or about the end of existence being nothing more cheerful than the 'peaceful repose' underground.

Not a little of the confusion of thought which prevails in our midst today, is, however, due to the fact that Theology makes its man-like creator poke his nose everywhere, in and out of season; and no one can wonder if men are led to prefer a matter-and-force world

to its being a product, *ex nihilo*, at the command of a self-contradictory creator. Jainism shows that nothing alone comes out of nothing, and furnishes a complete explanation of the phenomenal world. The cause of the differences of opinion between the philosophical and the mystical schools of religion, on this point, is to be found in the personification of the different functions of the soul as *Ivara* or the Word. When theology lost sight of the fact of personification, and accepted the product of human imagination as an actual being, a creator was at once ushered into the world, to be the harbinger of atheism in his turn. The tendency to a monistic conception of the world reached its culmination in denying existence to everything else, and leaving this man-made creator in the sole possession of the field. Hence, matter had to be created out of nothing to enable this pet of theology to exercise his creative function. The moment theology would come round to acknowledge the nature of the personifications which different orders of mystics have set up for themselves, that very moment would mark the termination of differences among the different creeds, and, in all probability, between science and religion as well.

The cause of the theological error in maintaining the world to have been created from nothing might also be found to lie in the nature of matter with special reference to the phenomenon of dreaming. Since the material of the dream-world seems to come from nowhere, and since the dreamer's mind is not conscious of its presence in the waking state, an inexact philosophy might come to the conclusion that it is created from nought. Arrived at a conclusion so highly satisfactory to mystical thought, it is but natural that theology should have jumped to the further conclusion that the world was also formed of a matter which rushed into being from nought, at the creative fiat of its *Causa Causans* of things. The absurdity of the argument, however, is apparent to any one who knows the nature of the mechanism of dreams as explained in an earlier chapter. Besides, if a dreamer could be credited with creative function, every soul would have the power to create matter from nothing, which, however, is not the position of the theologian. Thus, the statement that the material of the world was created from nothing is not acceptable to common sense by any means.

We may now pass on to a consideration of the nature of differences about the

Soul.

It is generally accepted by religion that there is an immortal essence behind every form of life which is the centre and source of the activities of living beings. We have fully examined the nature of this immortal essence already in the earlier chapters of this book, and, therefore, need only concern ourselves here with the question, what is meant by it in the different schools of religious philosophy.

The reader is already familiar with the Advaitist's view according to which the one Brahman is the only reality and all else an illusion ; but Sankhya defines the soul as an ' Absolute, all-pervading, unlimited, immaterial, quality-less intelligence, free by nature, and a spectator.' By the use of the term immaterial Kapila does not mean that the soul is devoid of substantiveness altogether, but only that it is not a product of matter. Nyaya considers the soul to be the ruler of the senses and body, and an all-pervading, active agent.

Other systems of Hindu philosophy give more or less the same definition of the soul, and consider its nature to be 'immaterial,' blissful, eternal, unmanifest, without members, without modifications, and intelligent.

In Islam the soul is regarded as an emanation from its god, and is said to exist for ever ('Islam' by Amir Ali, p. 12). The Prophet himself was asked to explain the nature of the soul, and he declared : '*Ruh*' (spirit or soul) is by the command of God ('The Philosophy of Islam,' by Khaja Khan, p. 14).

So far as the evangelists are concerned, they did not define the soul in philosophical terms ; but they distinctly recognized that it could attain the perfection of Gods.

Moses taught : " And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life ; and man became a living soul."—(Genesis ii. 7.)

In Zoroastrianism the soul is said to be a spiritual entity which passes after death into the place of reward, or punishment, according to the deeds performed in this world.

According to one of the sects of Muslim mystics the soul is the reflection of God. Mr. Khaja Khan points out (*The Philosophy of Islam*, p. 9) :—

"The Shahudians consider that the *alam* (world) is a reflection of God. A man enters a glass-house and sees himself reflected in a hundred directions. These reflections virtually depend on the man and have no existence of their own. The attributes and the ego (*Animat*) of man are thus the reflection of the attributes and essence of God. The *alam* (the world) is the rupee of the juggler, which in reality is a piece of pottery (a nothing); but by the skill of the juggler shows itself like the silver of the rupee. Thus everything is 'with him.'"

These views have all been subjected to a searching criticism already in the earlier pages of this book, and need not be dwelt upon here any further. We shall accordingly pass on to a consideration of the further question : whether all living beings be endowed with a soul ?

Now, so far as the higher animals are concerned it is obvious that there is a difference in respect of the degree of intellectualism, but not of kind, between them and man. If any one doubt this, let him call his dog to himself, and find out which part of the animal *understood* his command, whether the matter of the physical body, or the thinking principle within ? That will convince him that the consciousness of the animal is of the same type as his own, although in his case it is manifesting itself through fewer limitations, while in the dog it is very much cramped and restricted in its activity. The experiments made on animals by trainers and others conclusively prove the presence of the Thinker* in their bodies. Surely the doing of simple addition and the expression of such thoughts as 'I am tired'† and the like are sufficient proof of the presence of intelligence†

* See the article entitled "Educated Horses at Elberfeld" in 'The Field,' dated April 19, 1913, vol. cxxi, No. 3147. See also in this connection pages 172-174 of E. M. Smith's 'Investigation of Mind in Animals.'

† Ancient Scriptures record many instances of animals comprehending human speech, and the Jaina *Tirthankaras* are said to have put some of them on the road

in the animals. Even if these accounts be not true, there are innumerable other indications of inborn sagacity in them. The plants are very little removed from the lowest grades of animals, so that there is hardly any perceptible difference between the highest strata of the vegetable and the lowest ones of the animal kingdom. Even in the mineral kingdom death is not unknown, which means that metals are also endowed with life. This is amply borne out by the experiments conducted by the great Indian Scientist, Prof. Sir J. C. Bose of Bengal. The fact is that there is no life without consciousness, and no consciousness without life. Hence, wherever there is life there is consciousness, whether it be fully manifested or not. Now, because the thinker or soul is nothing other than the conscious essence, it further follows that wherever there is life there is soul !

We now come to

Transmigration

which, as has been already shown, is a truth of philosophy. So far as its recognition by the generality of mankind is concerned, undoubtedly all the ancient religions of the world were based on it. The conflict of opinion among the followers of the different creeds about its truth only arose, when the basic principles of religion had become buried under the cobwebs of superstition and the dogmas of a vague and mystic theology. The worship of personified gods has, no doubt, been responsible, in a great measure, for the error of modern theology. The transference of the function of determining the consequences of individual actions from the 'fruit-bearing' property of *karma* to an imaginary godhead could not but end in positing a ruler divine on the one hand, and in robbing the individual deeds of their *karmic* force, on the other, with the result that transmigration had to give place to this man-made creator, wherever the absence of philosophical illumination gave him a chance of establishing himself.

to redemption. All these accounts have hitherto been treated by modern thinkers as human inventions seeking additional glory for religion, but truth has now, at last, begun to assert itself, and to show that animals can at least understand, and at times also make themselves understood by man.

It must, however, be said in defence of the founders of the two non-Indian religions, whose followers now deny the doctrine of transmigration, that they themselves never denied its truth. The doctrine is there, sure enough, in their teachings, only it is not directly preached. Their less enlightened followers have, however, taken that which is not openly preached in their Scriptures as frivolous and false. It is a dangerous and highly mischievous rule of interpretation to read silence into contradiction. Not only have their venerable leaders not denied the truth of the doctrine of re-incarnation, but there is, on the contrary, much in their sayings to show that they were well aware of it, and taught it in disguise. Why they did not preach it openly, might be due to two causes in the main. In the first place, they dared not openly say anything to excite the fury of the mobs, and, secondly, they did not profess to deal with religion exhaustively. That the authors of the Christian creed accepted the doctrine of transmigration has been sufficiently demonstrated in the earlier parts of this book, and is further supported by such texts as the following :—

“Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit [i.e., shall be born as kings and rulers of men in their next incarnation on] the earth.”—(Matt. v. 5.)

Even the doctrines of *Asrava* (influx of matter into the soul) and *bandha* (bondage) are to be found in the Bible and the early Christian teachings, as will be evident from the following quotations :—

Asrava :

(1) “Save me, O God ; for the waters are come in unto my soul. I sink in deep mire, where there is no standing ; where the floods overflow me.”—(Psalm lxxix. 1 and 2.)

(2) “And there shall in no wise enter into it [the Pure Perfect Spirit] anything that defileth, neither whatsoever worketh abomination, or maketh a lie. . . .”—(Revelations xxi. 27.)

Bandha (bondage) :

(1) “For bound in this earthly body we apprehend the objects of sense by means of the body.”—(Ante Nicene Ch. Lib. vol. xii. 224.)

* Cf. “I am bowed down with many iron bands, that I cannot lift up mine head by reason of my sins, neither have I any respite : for I have provoked thy wrath, and done that which is evil before thee : I did not thy will, neither kept I thy commandments :

(2) " His own inequities shall take the wicked himself, and he shall be holden with the cords of his own sin. "—(Proverbs v. 22.)

(3) " The mental acumen of those who are in the body seems to be blunted by the nature of corporeal matter. "—(Ante Nicene C. Lib.—Origen i. p. 92.)

(4) " Flesh separates and limits the knowledge of those that are spiritual. for souls themselves by themselves are equal. "—(A. N. C. Lib. xii. §62.)

(5) " For I know that in me dwelleth no good thing : . . . but I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members. "—(Romans vii. 18—24.)

(6) " For the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh ; and these are contrary the one to another : so that ye cannot do the things that ye would. "—(Galatians v. 17.)

(7) " Know ye not, that to whom ye yield yourselves servants to obey, his servants ye are to whom ye obey ; whether of sin unto death, or of obedience unto righteousness ? "—(Romans vi. 16.)

(8) " . . . the contest . . . is not against flesh and blood, but against the spiritual powers of the inordinate passions that work through the flesh. "—(A. N. C. Lib. xii. 419-420.)

(9) " Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free. "—(John viii. 32.)

(10) " . . . for of whom a man is overcome, of the same is he brought in bondage. "—(2 Peter ii. 19.)

These passages are capable of sound sense only on the hypothesis of transmigration. In John iii. 12 is given the reason why Jesus withheld certain higher teachings of religion from his congregations. He is said to have declared :

" If I have told you of earthly things, and ye believe not, how shall ye believe, if I tell you of heavenly things. "

This one quotation suffices to show that the New Testament was never intended to be a complete code of religion by itself, and the present work is a demonstration of the fact that neither the Holy Bible, nor the Qur'an, nor the scriptures of any other non-Indian religion can be treated as complete and exhaustive in themselves.

I have set up abominations, and have multiplied detestable things. "—The Prayer of Manasse (*Jewish Apocrypha*).

Even the Vedas are so much involved in mysticism and unintelligibility of devotional poetry that, taken by themselves, they can only mislead one in the first instance. The inference to be drawn from this circumstance is that, unless there be something to contradict the teaching of an earlier scientific school, either expressly or by necessary implication, the founder of an incomplete later system of theology cannot be said to have denied the truth of any true and philosophically sound doctrine of religion. Applying this test to the Holy Bible and the Qur'an we find that they do not anywhere contradict the truth of re-incarnation.*

Christianity and Islam will both have to reject a number of passages from their sacred scriptures, if they persist in denying the truth of re-incarnation. So far as Christianity is concerned, we hope we have said enough to convince the most obdurate Christian that his own religion teaches identically, and word for word, the same doctrine as is preached by the most ancient faith in the world, namely, Jainism. We shall, therefore, now turn to

Islam

to show that the same doctrine is contained in its sacred books.

Muhammad even believed in the existence of souls prior to their embodied life on earth. He said :—

"Souls before having dependence upon bodies, were like assembled armies : after that they were dispersed ; and sent into bodies. Therefore, those which were acquainted before the dependence attract each other, and those that were unacquainted, repel."—('The Sayings of Muhammad,' p. 81.)

The Qur'an and the tradition (Hadis) also contain carefully concealed allusions to the highest form of belief. A few quotations may be given :—

1. "We are nearer to him (man) than the vital vein."—(Al Qur'an, 1. 15.)

*The text, "whosoever slayeth Cain, vengeance shall be taken on him seven-fold" (Genesis iv. 15), directly supports the doctrine of transmigration of souls. For it is inconceivable how a person can be killed seven times in revenge for Cain except on the hypothesis of re-incarnation. The precise sense of this passage is not at all difficult to grasp if we recall to mind what was said about Cain in the chapter on the "Fall." It simply means that having arrived at the stage when he can form an opinion about the nature of intellect, whosoever is foolish enough to throttle its voice shall have to undergo many re-births, before he gets another opportunity of electing for himself whether he will be guided by it or not.

2. "And He to whom you pray is nearer to you than the neck of your camel. —('Sayings of Muhammad.')

3. "God hath not created anything better than Reason, or anything more perfect, or more beautiful than Reason; the benefits which God giveth are on its account, and understanding is by it, and God's wrath is caused by it, and by it are rewards and punishments."—('Sayings of Muhammad.')

People were not worthy to be told that He who is nearer than the camel's neck and the vital vein in one's body is none other than the Self, and so the highest truth was not imparted to them in plain, undisguised language.

This, we fancy, was the main consideration which led Muhammad to preserve silence on some of the most important problems of religion.

However, the error which the followers of Islam have fallen into is one which nullifies the little good that may be found in their interpretation of their faith. If we start with a belief in the eternal and unbridgeable duality between God and man, thus investing the latter with all conceivable kinds of negative powers and qualities, the whole faith becomes self-contradictory; for belief, being the builder of character, can only build according to what is believed, never in opposition to it. Hence, if the belief in the irremediable, ineradicable inferiority of the soul be deeply rooted in the mind, it is not possible for it to attain to higher spiritual unfoldment.

It is our wrong interpretation of scriptures which leads us into conflicting and mutually contradictory dogmas, and causes us to adhere to them with the full force of stupid bigotry that never fails to attend on prejudice. We thus not only become the causes of our own undoing, but also richly deserve the scathing condemnation of all unbiased minds, of which Schopenhauer's opinion of the Qur'an furnishes a fairly good instance. Says the great Philosopher:—

"Consider, for example, the Koran. This wretched book was sufficient to found a religion of the world, to satisfy the metaphysical need of innumerable millions of men for twelve hundred years, to become the foundation of their morality, and of no small contempt for death, and also to inspire them to bloody wars and most extended conquests. We find in it the saddest and the poorest form of theism. Much

may be lost through the translation ; but I have not been able to discover one single valuable thought in it.”*

If our Muhammadan brethren would escape criticism like that of Schopenhauer, they must endeavour to put a more sensible interpretation on their tenets than they have done hitherto, for in the modern days of advancing intellectualism it is the force of reason which commands respect, not that of the sword of *jehad*.

There is a great deal of truth in what Schopenhauer says about the Qur'an, but we are sure that that great book is not without its special merit. After a weary and tiresome plodding through its pages, which, for the most part, contain variants of the earlier traditions† of the Sabians, the Persians, the Egyptians, the Jews and others, the patient reader must acknowledge that the cardinal doctrine of the Qur'an is the great principle of absolute resignation to one's destiny. Most of us would regard a doctrine like this as fatalism pure and simple, but if we would reflect a little, we should see our error at once. Fatalism is essentially passive, and, for that reason, but another name for laziness, but religious life demands an active attitude of the soul, and would mean stagnation without it. Here we find the Bhagavad Gita-explaining the situation admirably:—

“ Thy business is with the action only, never with its fruits ; so let not the fruit of action be thy motive, nor be thou to inaction attached.

“ Perform action, dwelling in union with the Divine, renouncing attachments, and balanced evenly in success and failure : equilibrium is called yoga.

“ Man musing on the objects of sense, conceiveth an attachment to these ; from attachment ariseth desire ; from desire anger cometh forth.

“ From anger proceedeth delusion ; from delusion confused memory ; from confused memory the destruction of reason, from destruction of reason he perisheth.

“ There is no pure reason for the non-harmonised, nor for the non-harmonised is there concentration : for him without concentration there is no peace, and for the un-peaceful, how can there be happiness ?

“ Whoso forsaketh all desires and goeth onwards free from yearnings, selfish and without egoism—he goeth to peace.

* See “ The World as Will and Idea,” Vol. II. pp. 361-362.

† See ‘ The Sources of The Qur'an,’ by Dr. Tisdall.

"This is the eternal state, having attained thereto none is bewildered. Who even at the death hour is established therein, he goeth to the nirvana of the eternal."—*Discourses 11.*

The main thing is to cultivate the habit of equanimity which prevents new *karmino* bonds from being forged even though *Sarava* of matter still continue. The man who is resigned to his fate, who keeps his mind evenly balanced both in prosperity and adversity, who calmly and dispassionately employs himself exclusively in the performance of *right* action—such a man alone is said to practise resignation, none else.

Fatalism is altogether out of place here, for while fatalism proceeds on the supposition of an inexorable fate, resignation is practised only to take the shaping of one's destiny in one's own hand.

Active resignation, thus, is as different from physical laziness as is a living being from a corpse. It is this principle of resignation which is the pearl of great price in the Qur'an.

To any one who will critically look into the Qur'an, it will be obvious that so far as religion proper is concerned there are three remarkable features of that book, namely,

(1) variants of the myths and traditions of the Jewish and certain other forms of faith, interspersed here and there with the folk-lore of the Arabs themselves ;

(2) a total absence of all reference to the scriptures, traditions and myths of other countries, such as India, China, and the like ; and

(3) a paramount teaching as to the great merit of the principle of resignation to one's destiny.

Of these, the first tends to show that the traditions and myths are not to be taken as having an historical basis ; the second points to one of two things, that is, either Muhammad was ignorant of those scriptures, or that they did not need correction and reform in his opinion ; and the third is but the practising of renunciation under a different name.

As for the place of the Qur'an amongst the scriptures of the world, Non-Muslim writers, very naturally, were not expected to write much in favour of the book ; but much of their criticism only goes to show that they possess no true insight into the nature of religion.

The main defects pointed out in the great book by European writers may be classified under the following heads:—

(1) its errors, such as the denial of the death of Jesus on the cross, and the description of Isaac as the brother of Jacob, whereas, according to the Bible, Isaac was the father of Jacob (cf. Sura Hud with Genesis, xxv. 19—26) ;

(2) its childish fables ;

(3) its false geography ;

(4) its dishonouring representations, in some respects, of its god ;

(5) its fatalism ;

(6) its religious intolerance ;

(7) its perpetuation of slavery ;

(8) its harsh punishment of theft and other kinds of offences ;

(9) its sanctioning of polygamy and unbounded license with regard to female slaves, as well as the unlimited and unrestricted power of divorce ;

(10) its contradictions ; and

(11) its mythology.

To these may be added another and a more serious objection on account of the doctrine of animal sacrifice, which, as we have seen in an earlier chapter, is certainly opposed to the true spirit of religion.

Besides the above, the point which is most frequently and hotly debated with reference to the Qur'an is the nature of its source. Muslims, naturally, claim it to be a revealed scripture, and base their claim on the peculiar style of its composition. This claim really originated with the Prophet himself, and time after time was the challenge to compose anything like it thrown out in the Qur'an.

What this challenge actually means is not easy to understand ; for if it be a challenge to write something equally sensible, we fear the challenger has already had the worst of his challenge, for there are in existence works which are in no way inferior to the Qur'an, even if they do not surpass it in wisdom and philosophical merit. Is it, then, a challenge to compete with the Book in its argumentativeness ? Even here the contest can be decided in favour of Islam only

if constant repetition and the use of arguments which do not convince any, but those who have faith in their hearts, or those who are interested in advocating its cause, be regarded as being in good taste and in keeping with the sound principles of elegant diction. We fear there is little to be said in favour of the book in this respect either. Next comes its composition. Undoubtedly its jingling rhyme went a long way to please the Arab ear, but that is purely a question of taste. Several of the world's scriptures are metrical in their composition, and it is not easy to imitate their style. Besides, in every country there is always a book, which is confessedly the best piece of its literature. Suppose the author of such a work claimed divine inspiration for his work, and rested it on the inability of the people to produce one to equal it, would such a claim be recognized? Surely, it is the feeblest argument in support of revelation to say that because the style of the writing is inimitable, it must, therefore, be the work of a god. So long as Muslim writers do not take the trouble to put their religion on a sound philosophical basis, so long will the Qur'an continue to be a butt of ridicule and contempt for the philosopher. People, certainly, do not turn to religious works to study poetry or the art of elegant diction. Moreover, the Qur'an is not free from literary defects, even though its rhyming be unsurpassed. Carlyle thus expresses himself as to its literary merit:—

“A wearisome confused jumble, crude, ineondite; endless iterations, long-windedness, entanglement; most crude, ineondite;—insupportable stupidity, in short! Nothing but a sense of duty could carry any European through the Qur'an.”—(Hero and Hero Worship, Lecture II.)

The beauty of the jingling rhyme of Al Qur'an, thus, is more than sufficiently counterbalanced by its poor literary merit and lack of philosophical exposition. It seems to us that Muslim writers make a great mistake in laying too much stress on the literary merit of their Book, since that only goes to divert the attention from the question of practical worth, provokes the spirit of fault-finding in the reader, and ends by bringing into prominence matters which had best be left out of discussion. If our friends will seriously think over the matter, the challenge to compose anything like unto a single verse of the Qur'an, which, for reasons best known to the Prophet, was made,

later on, in respect of ten verses, and at times, also, with respect to a whole chapter, will be found to be not one made to the whole world and for all times, but one meant only for those to whom it was actually made. The Arabs were well-known for eloquence, and it was the way in which the Prophet delivered his discourses which went a long way to captivate their hearts. They cared little, or nothing, for the science of religion, and were easily swayed by arguments which appealed to the ear and the emotions.

The sudden nature of the wholesale conversions made by the Prophet, after he was firmly established at Medina, bears ample testimony to their causes being other than real conviction. The widespread apostasy which followed on the death of Muhammad among his followers also shows the superficial nature of these conversions ('The Preaching of Islam').

As Mr. T. W. Arnold points out, the acceptance of Islam was, in many instances, due to the fiery eloquence of the Prophet as well as to political expediency, and, more often than not, in the nature of a bargain struck under pressure of violence, or from motives of worldly prosperity. But eloquence is too feeble, as a means, for altering one's deep-rooted convictions, since it only appeals to the emotional side of life, and causes a temporary effervescence of the emotion appealed to. It is incapable of producing permanent results. Hence, when philosophers come to look into the nature of the discourses of the Prophet, as contained in the Qur'an, they seldom find aught but 'long-winded entanglement,' as Carlyle puts it in the Book. But while agreeing with Carlyle as to the monotonous and uninteresting nature of the perusal it affords, we are inclined to the opinion that the Qur'an is not to be so easily rejected from consideration as that great writer would like us to do.

To understand the merit of Al Qur'an properly, it is necessary to study the life of its author, and the circumstances in which he found himself placed.

Muhammad was born at Mecca in Arabia, which geographically belongs to the same group of countries in Western Asia as Persia, Syria and Palestine. Close upon six hundred years had elapsed since the advent of the New Testament religion, and Christianity had fallen

into decline. Jerusalem was sacked and the Jews had dispersed, many of whom had fled to Arabia. Judaism had already been undermined. Idolatry, that is, worship of symbolical gods, mammonism, and sensuality prevailed in the land. Sale makes the following observations about the state of Christianity at the time of Muhammad's appearance:—

"If we look into the ecclesiastical historians even from the third century, we shall find the Christian world to have then had a very different aspect from what some authors have represented; and so far from being endued with active graces, zeal, and devotion and established within itself with purity of doctrine, union, and firm profession of the faith, that on the contrary, what by the ambition of the clergy, and what by drawing the abstrusest niceties into controversy, and dividing and subdividing about them into endless schisms and contentions, they had so destroyed that peace, love, and charity from among them, which the Gospel was given to promote; and instead thereof continually provoked each other to that malice, rancour, and every evil work, that they had lost the whole substance of their religion, while they thus eagerly contended for their own imaginations concerning it; and in a manner quite drove Christianity out of the world by these very controversies in which they disputed with each other about it. In these dark ages it was that most of those superstitions and corruptions we now justly abhor in the church of Rome were not only broached, but established: which gave great advantages to the propagation of Mahomedism. The worship of saints and images, in particular, was then arrived at such a scandalous pitch that it even surpassed whatever is now practised among the Romans."^{*}

As regards the Arabs themselves,

"Arabia was of old famous for heresies; which might be in some measure attributed to the liberty and independency of the tribes. Some of the Christians of that nation believed that the soul died with the body, and was to be raised again with it at the last day: these Origen is said to have convinced. Among the Arabs it was that the heresies of Ebion, Beryllus, and the Nazareans and also that of the Collyridians, were broached, or at least propagated; the latter introduced the virgin Mary for God, or worshipped her as such, offering her a sort of twisted cake called *Collyris*, whence the sect had its name."[†]

It was in such surroundings that Muhammad was born at Mecca some five hundred years after the compilation of the last of the canonical gospels. His early life has nothing out of the common in

^{*} See 'The Koran' by Sale.

[†] *Ibid.*

it. His father Abd'allah left little or nothing to him by way of inheritance, and he was practically a dependent on his grandfather and uncle, who seem to have taken great interest in him. Through the latter's influence, Muhammad became the factor of Khadijah, a noble and rich widow, who soon perceived the excellent qualities of his disposition and accepted him for her lord and husband.

Muhammad had little or no education beyond what was customary in his day. He was, however, not deficient in the three accomplishments which the Arabs esteemed most, namely, eloquence, horsemanship—including the use of arms—and hospitality. The first two of these stood him in good stead in the propagation and protection of the new Faith which he founded, and the last made him famous throughout the land. He had seldom any money in his house, and kept no more than was just sufficient to maintain his family.

Muhammad had a contemplative mind; he was fond of seclusion. He often retired to a cave in Mount Hira, and there suffered himself to be lost in meditation. The state of religion prevailing in the country did not satisfy the inner longing of his soul for happiness. He wanted to think for himself, to get at the inner meaning of Life. Probably he came across some ancient Cabalist who imparted to him some of the true secrets of Judaism; perhaps he was also initiated into some sort of 'mysteries.'

What took place in Mount Hira is not known; perhaps some sort of *yogic* 'vision' was perceived by the 'seer.' This is suggested by the miracle of *Shaq-ul-qamar*, which is ascribed to the prophet. In addition to this Muhammad has been credited with two other miracles, the *Meraj* and the conversion of *jins*. But *meraj** is only suggestive

* There are at least two instances in which the experience of *meraj* is described by the prophets of Zoroastrianism in almost the same manner as Muhammad's. Upon the basis of these instances Rev. W. St. Clair Tisdall thinks (The Sources of The Qur'an) that Muhammad borrowed the idea of *Meraj* from Zoroastrianism. Mr. Mohammad Ali, M. A., whose book, 'The Divine Origin of the Qur'an,' is an attempt at the refutation of Mr. Tisdall's opinion, makes the following comment on the subject:—

"The description given by the Holy Prophet of his spiritual ascent to heaven was, according to Rev. Tisdall, borrowed from the following passage of *Arta Vîraf Namak*, a Pehlvi book written in the days of Ardashir, some 400 years before the Hejira: 'Our first advance upwards was to the Lower heaven . . . and there we saw the Angel of those

of some sort of higher introspective flight of thought, that is, the trance of Self-contemplation. For it is said in the 'Sayings of Muhammad, termed *Hadith*' (see "Extracts from the Holy Quran," by Abdullāh Allahdīn, 37) :-

"Prayer is the *miraj* (union with or annihilation in the divine essence by means of continual upward progress) of the faithful."

This is precisely what Mirza Abu'l Fazl, the author of the "Life of Muhammad," says (see p. 69) : "..... the 'Night Journey' is an allegory of easy explanation. The *Burak*—the white steed of wonderful form and qualities, unlike any animal ever seen, and, in truth different from any animal ever before described—which signifies lightning is *thought*, which moves more swiftly than the electric fluid; and the ladder of light by which Muhammad is said to have ascended up to heaven was contemplation, by which men pass through, all the heavens up to the Throne of God; and the wonderful cock, whose crowing God took delight in hearing, was the prayer of the just; and so on with all the rest."

As for the conversion of the *jinn*, we must remember that the term *jinn* stand for the 'suspicions of the mind' (Studies in Tasawwuf, p. 66), so that the conversion of the *jinn* would mean the settling of doubts, or removal of suspicions.

The life of Muhammad, thus, is the life of a man whose habits of meditation and retirement in seclusion had enlarged his consciousness to a certain extent. His greatness, as such, cannot be denied; and the greatest feature of that greatness is that he never claimed to be greater than what he actually was—a prophet, or seer.

There, in the seclusion of the caves of Mount Hira, he used to become absorbed in holy meditation. One day, all of a sudden and

Holy Ones, giving forth a flaming light, brilliant and lofty." We are then told that Arta extended similarly to the second and third heavens and to many others beyond. 'At the last,' says Arta, 'my Guide and the Fire-angel having shown me paradise took me down to hell. * * *

"The truth is that God has been raising prophets in all lands. They brought the same teachings and had similar experiences. Hence if certain passages of the Holy Qur'an correspond to certain contents of the ancient Zoroastrian scriptures, and if the Holy Prophet of Arabia had experiences similar to those of an ancient Prophet of Iran, this does not show that the Holy Prophet had found access to ancient Zoroastrian scriptures or had found means of communicating with men learned in Zoroastrian scriptures. On the other hand, such parallelisms and such analogies, in the absence of there being any means of communication, are a clear proof of the fact that all these books had originally come from a common source, and that all these teachers were the messengers of the same Being. These parallelisms are not confined to Islam and Zoroastrianism alone; they exist in all the great religions of the world."

We agree with Mr. Mohammad Ali as to the possibility of similar experiences being gained by different prophets independently, but not when he denies, in his book, the familiarity of Muhammad with the traditions, the mythological lore and the general tenets of Zoroastrianism and certain other creeds. We shall give reasons for our opinion later on, when we come to deal with the subject of revelation.

without warning, the scales fell off his eyes, and brought before his view things which are generally hidden from the gaze of the profane; he found himself in the presence of the arch-angel.* Muhammad was frightened, and ran home in great fear and excitement. Perspiration broke out in great beads on his forehead, and he covered himself up with the wrapper of Khadijah. She knew something of the meditation her husband was in the habit of practising, and comforted him with the idea that the vision was not a nightmare. For three years the husband and wife waited in patience for the recurrence of the vision, and at last were rewarded by the sight of the 'angel' once more. During this long interval of time, the mind of the Prophet was all the time filled with the noblest of expectations. Many a problem of religious philosophy must have occurred to him during this period. He had had no philosophical training in the strict sense of the term, but knowledge does not depend on study in schools; it is stored up in the soul. He must have come across teachers of different sects also, and must have discussed many of the problems with them. In the midst of the confusion which prevailed in the religious circles in his country, in the medley of theories and dogmas and doctrines which were

* The angel Gabriel is but another aspect of one's own soul. This is borne out not only from the meaning of the word 'Jesus,' which, in Arabic, signifies both the soul and the arch-angel (see *The Philosophy of Islam*, p. 30), but can be easily verified by any one who will seriously practise *yoga* for a few months. The concentration of mind on the nervous plexus known as *ajna*, situate in the brain, between the eye-brows, if sufficiently intense, will enable the soul to perceive its own lustre, reflected in the outer atmosphere. It is this lustre from the real Self which is described as the arch-angel Gabriel. The *Shiva Samhita* has it:

"When the yogi thinks of the great Soul, after rolling back his eyes, and concentrates his mind to the forehead, then he can perceive the lustre from the great Soul. That clever yogi who always meditates in the abovementioned way, evinces the great Soul within himself, and can even hold communion with Him."

It is interesting to note in connection with the Gabriel legend that Sir Syed Ahmad Khan who was a staunch Muhammadan, declined to believe in the existence of the arch-angel, holding that when the Prophet said that an angel had appeared unto him, he meant nothing more or less than the simple fact that an unknown person had met him.—(*The Philosophy of Islam*, p. 54.)

perplexing him, truth at last flashed on his mind, like a ray of sunshine in the midst of winter clouds. He clearly perceived that the truth of truths, the quintessence of philosophy, the kernel of religion, was the rock of the Unity of the Essence of God whom he describes as 'that which seeth and heareth.' Mystic, as he was in his tendencies, he personified this Essence as the Creator, after the manner of the 'school' of mysteries; and believed that salvation lay only in the doing of his will, not in obedience to the personal will. Meditation led him to penetrate to the core of many a mythological legend, and enabled him to understand that their interpretation lay not in an historical reading, but in the symbolical sense. He thus perceived that his countrymen had drifted away from the true teaching of religion; and he felt tenderness and pity for their lost souls. Those were, however, the days of intolerance; and people used to meet argument with sword. What was he to do under the circumstances? To preach the truth openly was out of the question. He had the example of other prophets and saints who had preceded him in the divine mission. They had been ill-treated, more or less. He recalled to mind what Hermes had said and 'Jesus' repeated about 'the lips of wisdom being sealed, except to the ears of understanding.' The masses had to be told that their interpretation of the earlier Scriptures of Judaism and Christianity was wrong, yet he dared not do so openly. That would have only gone to make everybody his enemy. Thus it was that the prophet of Islam, too, was led to speak in allegory and concealed metaphor.

His preaching at first had little or no effect on his hearers, who all seem to have resented him, more or less, with the exception of the faithful Khadijah. Gradually his influence extended to some members of his family, and even persons outside the family-circle often came to hear him. As is usually the case, the idea of a new religion excited animosity and resentment in the minds of the tribesmen, and the sincere protestations of Muhammad to the effect that he brought nothing new to them, had little power to check the tide of adverse criticism and hatred which was surging up against him. The small band of the followers of the creed of the Crescent were exposed to all kinds of dangers, and had to fly from place to place. Even Muhammad

had to flee for his life more than once. He, however, never abandoned his mission, and though the following increased slowly, he remained undaunted by the paucity of the number of 'true believers.'

A few years later Hamza, a powerful and influential chieftain, embraced Islam. Other important conversions soon followed, till in the thirteenth year of the mission, the little band had acquired sufficient importance in the eyes of its enemies to lead them to seriously think of its extermination. Several conspiracies were formed to encompass Muhammad's death; he was several times waylaid, and various other measures were resorted to for his destruction. The alternatives put before him were death or the renunciation of his mission. But the latter was out of the question; so the only point left to him to decide was: whether he would prefer to be butchered peacefully, or die fighting, sword in hand? His fiery nature, however, revolted at the former alternative; the idea of dying, like a rat in a trap, was not agreeable to his soul. The sword was, thus, the only alternative left, and he did not hesitate to draw it now. Hitherto he had preached toleration; persuasion rather than compulsion had been his method. But that was out of the question now. The times were changed; persuasion could no longer be relied upon. Accordingly, he made a departure from the policy of peace. Fortunately, the followers of Masab, who had embraced Islam in the meantime, undertook to defend him. With their aid, he established himself at Medina. Then followed a series of expeditions, skirmishes and assaults in which the little band gave a good account of themselves. These were followed by the famous battle of Bedr, which may be reckoned as the foundation of the temporal power of Islam. The Prophet now became a warrior chief, in addition to a religious preacher. Rather than suffer his enemies to persecute his followers, he himself now declared *jihad* against them. He had no political ambition in his earlier days, but now the element of power, engendered by constant persecution and suffering, came to occupy a prominent place in his mind. He now became the militant prophet in which capacity he became intimately associated with history.

In the Qur'an, which was admittedly compiled after the death of the Prophet, no distinction is observed between those of the sayings that emanated from the 'preacher' and those which originated from the 'statesman' in him. Possibly, a few of the sayings of others, erroneously ascribed to him, were also included in the manuscript.

The doctrine of the abrogation of the word of God, which is peculiar to Islam, obviously owes its origin to the exigencies of the political life the Prophet finally adopted. But, so far as we have been able to ascertain, from a perusal of the Qur'an, it is confined only to such of the sayings as are not the essential and eternal truths of religion, and only touches matters of secondary import, *e.g.*, the changing of Kibla from Jerusalem to Mecca. Different writers have estimated the number of the abrogated verses from five to five hundred, but many of them are presumably still incorporated in the Qur'an.

It is thus clear that in order to understand the true teaching of the creed of the Crescent, one has to reject a number of verses, on the ground that they form no part of religion proper. Add to this the fact that Muhammad was not only a preacher and a statesman, but a law-giver as well, and the number of passages to be rejected becomes still greater ; for the law which the Prophet gave was suitable only to the exigencies and requirements of his own time, and essentially applicable to his own people, not of general or universal applicability.

The salient features of the Qur'an may now be categorically stated. It consists of :

- (1) the essential and eternal truths of philosophy which are the true basis of religion,
- (2) the rules of law, essentially applicable to the circumstances of the country, at the time of the Prophet,
- (3) the verses which have been abrogated,
- (4) some stray observations of the Prophet, made from time to time, which are valuable only in so far as they emanate from a great person, but which possess little or no value otherwise, and

(5) a large number of allegories and myths of the Zoroastrians, the Assyrians, the Jews and others, adopted and varied to suit the requirements of the Prophet's teaching.

A glance at the above classification of the contents of the Qur'an will suffice to show that of the five main divisions into which we have divided them only the first is the true basis of religion. Thus, we need only consider the merit of the Qur'an under the following three heads, which are comprised in the first and the fifth divisions :

- (a) philosophical truths and definitions,
- (b) mythology, and
- (c) ritual.

To begin with the subdivision (a), it may be stated, without the least fear of contradiction, that the holy Qur'an contains identically the same teachings as are the basis of all ancient religions. It leaves no doubt as to the nature of the Essence of Life or God, which is described as that which seeth and beareth.* It is further

* That the true Muslim conception of unity in relation to God has little in common with the modern idea may be seen from the following from "The Mystics of Islam" (page 79) :—

"Both Moslems and Sufis declare that God is one, but the statement bears a different meaning in each instance. The Moslem means that God is unique in His essence, qualities, and acts; that He is absolutely unlike all other beings. The Sufi means that God is the One Real Being which underlies all phenomena."

The Sufi doctrine, as a matter of fact, is the exact copy of the 'heretical' Vedanta, which seems to have been the creed of at least some of the wandering Calendars of Muslim origin. To what extent these bold free-thinkers of Islam went is apparent from the following couplet of Abu Sa'id ibn Abi'l Khayr (see 'The Mystics of Islam,' p. 90) :—

"Not until every mosque beneath the sun
Lies ruined, will our holy work be done ;
And never will true Musalman appear
Till faith and infidelity are one."

The formula *La ilaha illa 'l-lahu*, which means, 'there is no God but God,' can, in the light of what has been said before, only mean a denial of mythological gods, not of the true living Gods, or of the divinity of the soul. The most secret and sacred name of God, according to Muslim Tradition is the Living, or the Self-subsistent, which is only understood and realized by Saints. The Prophet said that

conceived to be omnipresent, after the manner of the mystics, so that 'wherever thou turnest thy face, there is the *essence* of God' (Suratul Baqr). In Suratul Nisa, we are told :

" Really God surrounds everything."

Suratul Hadid records :

" God is with you wherever you are."

Finally, Suratul Rahman points out that He is the first and the last, the apparent and the real, and all-knowing.

With reference to the individual soul also it is easy to see that the teaching contained in the Qur'an is the same as has been found to be philosophically true. We may cite the following verses in support of our view :

- (1) " We are nearer to man than his jugular vein" (S. Zariyat).
- (2) " We are nearer to man than you, but you do not observe" (S. Wakiya).
- (3) " I am in your individuality, but you do not see" (S. Zariyat).
- (4) " He is the apparent and the real" (S. Rahman).
- (5) " The people who strike palm with thee, do not strike it with thee, but with God. The hand of God is on all hands " (S. Fatah).

These are some of the verses which are intelligible only in the light of the doctrines established in these pages. The reason why the highest truths of philosophy were imparted to men in disguise,*

whoever calls upon God by this name shall obtain all his desires (see 'A Dictionary of Islam'). Since the saints are only those who have become conscious of their own Divinity and since occult powers spring from Self-consciousness, this most secret and sacred name, not to be disclosed to the profane, is that which indicates the nature of the inner Divinity. The '*Ana 'i Haqq*' (I am God) of Al-Hallaq, commonly known as Mansur, is only the '*Aham Brahman asmi*' (I am Brahman) of Vedanta.

The ancient and true conception of the Divine unity is fully explained by Moses Maimonides who shows it to be grounded on the simplicity of spirit, devoid of all those attributes which appertain to embodied existence and which imply composition. Hence, he concludes : " We say with regard to this latter point [whether God be a composite being or not], that he is absolutely one " ('The Guide for the Perplexed,' pp. 69 and 71).

* The spirit of intolerance was not peculiar to the Arabs ; it was widespread. The following from St. Augustine (see 'The Mystics of Islam,' p. 118) is a fair sample of the dread which influenced the speech of saints :

is to be found in the attitude of the Arabs and the state of Society at the time of the Prophet. Their hidden sense is clear enough to any one who cares to think for himself, but otherwise might easily pass for poetical license or rhetorical flourish, without exciting comment. Muhammadan theologians found them difficult to understand even so soon after the Prophet as the second century of the Hijri era. Some of them, led by the spirit of enquiry, collected a large number of religious and philosophical books, including many Sanskrit Manuscripts, and a magnificent library was established at Baghdad in the second century after Muhammad. As already stated Muhammad's eloquence and personality, rather than the doctrines of the creed, seem to have been the cause of the spread of Islam even during the life of its founder. In many instances conversions were due to political expediency and motives of power and greatness.

"How superficial was the adherence of numbers of the Arab tribes, to the faith of Islam," writes Mr. Arnold ('The Preaching of Islam,' p. 41), "may be judged from the widespread apostasy that followed immediately the death of the Prophet. Their acceptance of Islam would seem to have been often dictated more by considerations of political expediency, and was more frequently a bargain struck under pressure of violence than the outcome of any enthusiasm or spiritual awakening."

This feature of weakness was, however, soon discovered by the leaders of the new faith, and steps were taken to establish the creed on a sound philosophical basis. Mr. Khaja Khan's interesting work, 'The Philosophy of Islam' (pp. 61 and 62), throws considerable light on the nature of these steps :—

"The presence of the Prophet and His companions had sufficient mesmerizing and spiritualizing power to purify the hearts of those who were brought under the influence of their magnetic personalities. After their days, people devised various ways and processes of keeping the torch burning. In the meanwhile, Islam came in contact with various phases of philosophical thought in its expansion on its Eastern and Western borders.

"If he (man) loves a stone, he is a stone : If he loves a man, he is a man : if he loves God—I dare not say more, for if I said that he would then be God, ye might stone me."

"During the time of Mamun-ul-Rashid¹ several Grecian and Sanskrit works were translated into Arabic. While the discursive, ethical philosophy of the Greeks was absorbed on one side, the austerities of the Eastern nations leavened Muslim thought on the other. The Nicomachian Ethics of Aristotle with the commentary of Porphyry was translated into Arabic by Ishag, and the other two works of the same philosopher, Eudemian Ethics and Magna Moralia, were translated by Abu Umar of Damascus. With the aid of these translations, the moralists of Islam began to write original works and to adapt the Islamic preaching to the ethical speculations of the Greeks and *vice versa*."

Knowledge thus acquired proved to be highly valuable, as a philosophical foundation, to the school of Muslim thought which has come to be known as Sufism.

The close affinity between the teachings of Islam and some of the Indian faiths may be seen from the following quotations from Muslim books :

(1) "The veriest truth of truths of Arabic is the speech of the poet Lubaid who said, 'Know, everything besides God is non-existent.'"²

(2) "Verily God saith : I became ill, why didst thou not enquire after me ; I became hungry, why didst thou not feed me ; I begged of thee, why didst thou not give me."³

(3) "If you let down a bucket by a rope into a well, it will, of a surety, descend on God."⁴

(4) "What God created in the beginning was my soul."⁵

(5) "I was a hidden treasure and loved to know myself, and so I created *Khalq* to know myself."⁶

The above are consistent with the Advaitist theory we have examined in the earlier chapters of this book. The passage : "I was a hidden treasure and loved to know myself, and so I created the *khalq* (universe) to know myself" is, almost word for word, the same doctrine as is contained in the Idealistic formula "I This

¹ 813—833 A.D.

² 'The Philosophy of Islam,' p. 87.

³ 'The Philosophy of Islam,' p. 87.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

Not." Some of the Muslim Saints who have attained to greater wisdom have even gone so far as to maintain their identity with God, as was the case with Shams Tabrez, the poet, whose famous couplet—

" *Ajab man Shams i Tabrezam, ki gashtam shaifta bar khud ;*

" *Chun khud ra khud nazar kardam, nadidam juz Khuda dar khud.*" —

breathes the purest Vedanta. Ba'izeed is another instance in point, and many more can be cited. The Maulana Rum says :

"O my soul, I searched from end to end, I saw in thee naught save the Beloved ;

Call me not infidel, O my soul, if I say that thou thyself art He.

Ye who in search of God, of God, pursue,

Ye need not search, for God is you, is you ! "

Mr. Khaja Khan points out that the Prophet himself said :—

1. "I am Arab without *ayn* . . . ; without the letter *ayn*, Arab becomes *rab*.

2. "He who has seen me has seen God.

3. "He who knows his *nafs* knows his *rab* . . . i.e., he who knows his own *nafs*, knows it as God."—(Studies in Tasawwuf, p. 28.)

The Sufi thought touches perfection in the following couplet ascribed to Farid-ud-din Attar, one of the most clear-headed thinkers Islam has ever produced :—

تا تو هستی خدائے در خواب است + تو نهانی چو او شود بیدار

[Tr.—So long as *thou* art in evidence a God is asleep ; when *thou* shalt cease to be, He shall wake up!]

This is nothing but pure Jainism, and expresses identically the same idea as underlies the Biblical text : " *He that findeth his life shall lose it : and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it* (Matt. x. 39).

As for the idea of plurality in unity which is the characteristic of Godhead, we have already shown that the very word Allah, the

* معجب من شمس تبریزم که گشتم شیفته بر خود

چو خود را خود زهر کردم ندیدم جز خدا در خود

Tr. ' What a unique being am I, Shams of Tabrez ;

' When I came to look into myself, I discovered none but God in the Self ! '

only *Ism-'z-zat* (the name indicative of the nature) of God, out of the 99 by which he is known in the Qur'an, indicates a plurality of knowing 'Lights,' the 'Illumined Ones.'

It is also interesting to note that Alifuddin al-Tilimsani, the author of the commentary on Niffari, described the Qur'an as a form of polytheism. ('The Mystics of Islam,' p. 92.)

So far as the theory of re-incarnation is concerned, it is admitted by Muslim writers that some of the passages of the Qur'an do favour that doctrine; but they do not like to acknowledge its truth, on the ground that the subject is uncongenial to the spirit of its followers ('The Philosophy of Islam,' p. 90). One can only express surprise at a philosopher rejecting a doctrine, without investigation, on a ground like this. As a matter of fact several Muslim philosophers have actually acknowledged the truth of the doctrine of transmigration, as Mr. Khaja Khan himself points out ('The Philosophy of Islam,' p. 37). Notable amongst these are Ahmad Ibni Sabit, his disciple Ahmad ibni Yabus, Abu-Moslem of Khorassan and Ahmad ibni Zakarah. According to the sect of Dervishes known as Baktashees, 'wicked people who have degraded humanity in this life will live again in the shape of animal existence' ('The Dervishes' by John P. Brown, p. 47). Jalaluddin Rumi, the poet-philosopher, too, openly taught re-incarnation. Some of his verses* bearing on the point are:

"I have grown like grass often;
Seventy times seven hundred bodies have I put on I
From the inorganic I entered the vegetable kingdom;
Dying from the vegetable I rose to the animal;
And leaving the animal, I became man.

* The original verses run as follows:

هفتاد و هفتاد قالب دیدم ام	* صد و سی و هفت بارها روئیده ام
وز نما مردم بهیوان هر زدم	* از جمادی مردم و قلمی شدم
پس چه ترسم که زمردهم کم شدم	* مردم از حیوانی و آدم شدم
تا برآرم از ملک بال و پر	* حاکم دیگر بهیوم از بشر
انچه اندر دهم ناپد ز آن مردم	* باز دیگر از ملک پیران شوم
گویدم کجا الیه راجعون	* پس عدم کردم عدم چون ارفعون

Then what fear that I shall be made less by death.

The next transition will see me rise as an angel,

With an angel's hair and wings !

Then shall I rise above the angels, and become even that which is beyond imagination !

Thus having annihilated non-existence, it was proclaimed to me, in a voice like that of an organ,

That all of us shall return unto Him."

Mr. Khaja Khan takes the idea to be that of 'circular movements.' "The seed germinates into a green sapling; this develops into a tree, blooms and blossoms; and the finale is the seed itself. So is *Suluk*, or the travelling of man towards God."

According to Muslim writers, Jalaluddin does not mean anything more than the idea of 'circular movements' in the above verses. Their idea of evolution takes the soul right up from the mineral kingdom to man, through the vegetable and the animal kingdoms, but there leaves it abruptly, either to enjoy an eternal life of pleasure in heaven, or to suffer eternal damnation in hell, forgetting the last line—

"That all of us shall return unto Him !"

Strange philosophy, indeed? Why stop the course of evolution in this abrupt fashion?

In reply, Mr. Khaja Khan relies on certain verses of the Qur'an which, he maintains, indicate that the suffering of the soul in hell shall never terminate. But it seems to us that he attaches too great an importance to the word 'never,' which, in the verses he relies upon, is clearly a form of rhetoric. The word "never" uttered in reply to the petition for mercy of the hypothetical sinner of Sura Moumin—"O preserver, send me back that I may do good works in the world which I am leaving"—does not necessarily signify eternity, but might mean "not till you have expiated your sins." In ordinary parlance also the word is not always intended to convey the idea of eternity. Its use in connection with the idea of life in heaven or hell, must, consequently, be taken to mean only a long period. The Jaina Scriptures point out that the length of life in heaven or hell varies according to individual deeds, the longest term consisting of untold millions of years, which is as good

as eternity, for all practical purposes of ordinary speech. The reason why *moksha* cannot be obtained from either the heaven or hell, is to be found in the fact that the soul is deprived of the opportunity for performing *tapas* in those regions. The continuous life of pleasure in heaven, and the unending experiences of pain in hell leave no time for the practising of *tapas* (austerities), without which *moksha* cannot be attained. For this reason, are these two regions described as *Bhoga Bhāmis* (the worlds of 'fruits'). "The place of just retribution," says the author of 'Al Bayan,' "is the next world, where nothing of actions is to be found. The place of actions is this world" (page 166). That being so, it is inconceivable how spiritual evolution can be completed in heaven or hell, so as to enable the soul to 'return unto Him,' which is the fulfilment of its destiny.

Does it not strike our brethren of Islam that unless the doctrine of transmigration be an integral part of the teaching of their Prophet, their creed renders it absolutely unnecessary that there should be such a thing as soul? The belief in the resurrection of the physical body on the Judgment Day is quite inconsistent with the survival of the soul on the death of the individual, as well as with its existence prior to his conception and birth in this world of ours. The former, because it has no function to perform during the period intervening between its death here and the resurrection at the place of Judgment, and the latter, because it will directly lead to an admission of our claim. In short, they must altogether deny the existence of such a thing as soul and take the body to be the man. But in doing so they will find that they not only contradict the sound conclusions of reason, which, in the passage quoted from the 'Sayings of Muhammad,' is so highly extolled by the Prophet himself, but also attribute injustice and want of dignity to the God-head, in addition to rendering a number of passages in their Scripture of no effect.

If the soul be by the command of God (Al Qur'an, chap. xvii), and created, for the first time, to inhabit the body of flesh, by an Almighty God, he must be the author of its existence. If so, he must be blamed for creating differences in the circumstances of different

souls, so that one is born ignorant, while another enjoys the light of wisdom, and so forth. If emphasis were needed on this last observation of ours, it is not wanting, for the Qur'an itself records :—

" And unto whomsoever God shall not grant *His* light he shall enjoy no light at all."—(Chapter xxiv.)

Also :—

" Whom God shall cause to err, he shall find no way to *the truth*."—(Chapter xlii.)

We have already commented upon the injustice of unequal creation, and need not reproduce the argument over again here. The conclusion is that if the creation of the world be ascribed to an almighty god, he must be found fault with for differences and inequalities ; but if, in agreement with the dictates of reason, we attribute the causation of differences to the working out of the past *karmas*, in obedience to the laws of nature, all the difficulties vanish from our path at once.

As regards the teaching of the Qur'an about the soul, it is certain that that sacred book itself promulgates the truth about the pre-existence of soul before the formation of the physical body. The author of ' Al Bayan ' (p. 144) tells us that the general Muslim belief on this point is that the souls were created by God ' thousands of years ' before the making of the body. Sufeism, too, is, on the whole, decidedly opposed to the idea of the creation of a soul there and then to inhabit a body.

In order to arrive at a perfect understanding of the symbolic teaching of the holy Qur'an with reference to the nature of the soul, it is necessary to analyze the idea underlying the statement, ' soul is by the command of God.' A little thinking will show that ' command ' differs as much from the uttered word, which gives it expression, as man differs from the body of matter in which he is ensouled. The spoken word is perishable, because it is a kind of sound, which is only a mode of motion ; but ' command ' is the injunction, or ' sense ' which the word ensouls, and is unperishing, as such. The distinction is time-honoured, and has been well

brought out in the Parva Mimansa Sutras of Jaimini, the founder of one of the six schools of Hindu philosophy.

Sounds originate in two different ways: either they arise from the vibrations of material bodies, or are uttered by living beings. In the former case, they convey no 'idea' to the mind beyond that of noise of a pleasant, or unpleasant type, but in the latter, the mind is made aware of an 'idea,' in addition to the auditory sensation. Now, because the speech of a living being is deliberate and determined, and is intended to convey the speaker's thought to the mind of the hearer, it is expressive of a sense or purport. It is this 'sense,' 'meaning,' or 'word-purport,' collectively knowledge, which is eternal.

If we now take a step in the direction of mythology and personify knowledge as God, we shall see the Prophet's description of the soul acquiring significance. For, the soul being in the nature of an idea, all the souls, taken collectively, must be represented in the entirety of knowledge personified as a being. It is interesting to note in this connection that the Sufis hold everything to be an 'ism' (name) of their god, and the Bible points out that the Lord brought all living creatures unto Adam, and 'whatsoever Adam called any living creature, that was the name thereof.'*

The Qur'an, thus, rightly propounds the nature of the soul: it is intelligence or knowledge of the Intelligent Essence of Life, personified as a god. Where the followers of Islam go wrong is in respect of the origin which they ascribe to it.

For even from a purely speculative point of view, which mostly constitutes the logic of modern theology, the eternity of souls can be easily proved. That the soul is the uttered word of God, is the proposition agreed upon. Now, the question is: did God utter the 'word' haphazard, or intelligently? If the former, God is not all-wise, but a thoughtless, chaotic being, who has neither control nor understanding of his speech, but who raves like one in *delirium tremens*—in short, a thoughtless monstrosity. If the latter, the sense of the word must be known to him prior to its utterance.

* Genesis, ii. 19.

Further reflection will show that the 'sense,' i.e., the idea, must be eternal. For, if it is not eternal, it must come into existence in time, in which case it will have both a beginning and an end. Hence arises the question: did God know the particular idea before it came into existence, or not? If he did not, his knowledge was not perfect, since he was ignorant in respect of that particular idea; and, as all ideas, on the hypothesis of theology, must be said to have had an origin, there must have been a time when God had absolutely no idea in his mind, that is to say, when he was totally ignorant. But this contradicts the wisdom attribute of God, and is, for that reason, absurd. Besides, how could that which has no existence whatsoever ever come into existence? Again, if we say that God made the idea, the question again arises as to the volitional or thoughtless nature of the process of making, which has already formed the subject of discussion. The last loop-hole of escape may be sought in the statement that the idea did not exist, but that God knew it somehow. This is but another way of throwing up the brief, as the sense of the expression itself indicates the absurdity of the proposition; for it means neither more nor less than this that the idea had no existence, and yet it existed in the consciousness of a specified being—which is ridiculous. The denial of the past existence of the soul only aims at the root of the theory of transmigration, but it is evident that only confusion of thought results from such a course.

The true sense of the teaching, 'soul is by the command of God,' thus, is not that God created the soul at a particular point of time, in the history of duration, but that the differentiating principle of the *jiv* essence, i.e., pure Consciousness, is the 'sense,' or purport, or 'idea-ness.' That this is the true sense is further borne out by the text itself which is not, 'soul is the command of God,' but 'soul is *by* the command of God,' which clearly means nothing if not that the Essence of Existence is seated distributively among the 'ideas,' i.e., souls. In this sense the doctrine is not only sound philosophically, but is also in perfect agreement with the teaching of all other rational religions of the world. The literal interpretation of the text is naturally out of the question, since the soul is a simple

substance and cannot be thought as coming into being by or with any one's fiat or command.

From the practical side of the question also the doctrine of transmigration furnishes an explanation of all those hard problems of philosophy which have proved insoluble from the standpoint of theology, and which involve it in endless contradictions. It is more satisfactory to accept the blame for one's present condition oneself than to throw it on a being who creates imperfect creatures and then expects them to be perfect. It is also more reasonable to believe that the sojourn of the wicked in hell, in spite of the enormity of their sins, shall have an end, sooner or later, on the termination of the *ayuh karma* of the *narak gati* (hell-life), when one or more human incarnations will furnish them with the opportunity to manifest their hidden divinity, in the fullest degree of perfection.

When setting themselves in opposition to the theory of transmigration, modern exponents of Muslim theology generally forget that their noble Prophet has acknowledged the fact that no origin can be ascribed to the soul. The following note of Sale, based on 'Al Beidawi,' is highly relevant to the point in issue:—

"It is said that the Jews bid the Koraish ask Mahomed to relate the history of those who slept in the cave and of Dhu'l Karnein, and to give them an account of the soul of man, adding, that if he pretended to answer all the three questions, or could answer none of them, they might be sure he was no prophet; but if he gave an answer to one or two of the questions and was silent as to the other, he was really a prophet. Accordingly, when they propounded the questions to him, he told them the two histories, but acknowledged his ignorance as to the origin of the human soul."*

Mr. Khaja Khan tries to explain away Muhammad's acknowledgment of ignorance by saying that 'the Prophet, accepting the omission as the gauge of their (i.e., the Jew's) mental fitness, determined not to burden them with a definition beyond the grasp of their capacity';† but in the absence of anything showing that the knowledge of the soul would have been a 'burden,' too heavy for them to bear, the statement is hardly of any value. What should we think of a scientist who, in answer to a question as to the origin of matter,

* 'The Koran' by Sale, p. 214 (note a).

† 'The Philosophy of Islam,' p. 31.

propounded with a view to test his claim to learning, were to reply that he was not aware of it? Some would see in the reply only a confession of ignorance, and some only a compassionate regard for the 'feeble' intellect of the interlocutor; but the truth is neither in the one nor the other of these views. It is given out in the reply, though expressed facetiously.

The above is quite sufficient to show the true nature of the soul; but there are other passages in the Qur'an which fully support our view. In the 33rd chapter it is said:—

"We formerly created man of a finer sort of clay; and afterwards we placed him in the form of seed in a sure receptacle: afterwards we made the seed coagulated blood; and we formed the coagulated blood into a piece of flesh: then we formed the piece of flesh into bones; and we clothed those with flesh: then we produced the same by another creation."

The pious commentator would read the words "a sure receptacle" to mean the womb, but no one can seriously maintain that it is so sure as not to miscarry in any case. Surely the Prophet could have used the word himself if that was the sense intended, for there is apparently no reason for not using the right word here. And, if any one maintain that it was not used out of decency, the reply is that religion is generally disregarding of any pretensions on that score. In almost all religions matters relating to sex are spoken of without the least reserve, and the Qur'an is no exception to the rule. What is the precise sense of the expression "sure receptacle" will become clear if we realize the nature of the finer sort of clay of which, it is stated, man was formerly made. This passage is susceptible of sense only on the supposition that there is a subtle body inside the gross encasement of physical matter, and that this body of finer clay, in some way, corresponds to the *kārmāna* body, as described before. When this subtle body was made is not given in the Holy Qur'an, but the reader is left to find it out for himself, from the only clue which is furnished by the use of the word "formerly." The body of finer clay, thus, corresponds to the *kārāna śarīra* of the Hindu Scriptures, and the sure receptacle, which does not miscarry, like the female womb, is the *śukshma śarīra*, which contains the essence, or gist of individuality, hence, character, in the form of

seed, i.e., as a potency, and which by entering the mother's womb, manufactures coagulated blood, etc., etc., as briefly described in the passage under consideration. The last sentence in the text, viz.—

"Then we produced the same by another creation."—

is too significant to be overlooked. The commentators understand it to mean "the production of perfect man composed of soul and body," but that cannot be the meaning of the passage. The author had not before his mind the idea of *completion*, but of *another creation* while the commentators ignore the notion of another creation, and talk of completion. The fact seems to be that in his ardour and zeal to differ from the creed of the 'idolatrous infidels,' and, thus, unable to make sense out of a passage which is capable of intelligible sense only on lines of reincarnationistic philosophy, some pious commentator grabbed at the first idea which entered his head; and since the generality of the followers of Islam are not given to the study of philosophy, the opinion thus ventured acquired currency, and prevails to this day. The Prophet of Arabia had to contend against deep-rooted prejudices among the men of his time, and it might be that the use of guarded language the sense of which is obvious to the wise but mystifying and obscure to the uninitiated, was necessitated by the exigencies of a life constantly imperilled by the turbulent circumstances of the time.

In the sixth chapter it is recorded :—

"It is he who hath produced you from one soul; and hath provided for you a sure receptacle and a repository."—('Al Koran,' Eng. Trans. by Sale, p. 98.)

Here we have a repository in addition to the sure receptacle, and the commentator is not slow to interpret it according to his fixed principle. He would have it that the repository is the loins of the male parent. But the true sense cannot be that. This will become clear if we look into the doctrine contained in the first half of the sentence. The question is, what is meant by the sentence: "It is he who hath produced you from one soul?" Now, the soul, being itself a self-subsisting substance or reality, cannot be created by any one. Hence, if we are to interpret the above text in the sense that a god is the creator of souls, the interpretation does not coincide with the con-

clusions of rational thought ; but, if we take the 'one soul' to mean the abstraction soul, the repugnancy vanishes at once, leaving the scriptural text in complete agreement with the conclusions of sound philosophy. Therefore, the one soul from which all other souls were *produced* is none other than the genus spirit, for, as has been already demonstrated, 'sense,' metaphorically speaking, is the principle whereby the Essence of Life is differentiated into an infinity of souls, from beginningless eternity. This warrants our interpretation of the two terms, 'the sure receptacle and the safe repository,' to mean the two subtler bodies of the soul.

Here we may again refer to the saying of Muhammad already quoted :

"Souls before having dependence upon bodies, were like assembled armies ; after that they were dispersed ; and sent into bodies. Therefore, those which were acquainted before the dependence attract each other, and those that were unacquainted, repel."—('Sayings of Muhammad,' p. 81.)

Since this is not contradicted anywhere by the text of the Qur'an, but, on the contrary, is strictly in agreement with it, we may lay down the following propositions, as established from the scanty material of the Prophet's word :

- (1) every soul is a living 'idea,'
- (2) souls existed prior to their being born in the world, and
- (3) all souls contain the Essence of God, and are comprised in one genus.

Our first proposition compares well with :

"And the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us,"—(St. John, i. 14.)

The following passages from the text of the Qur'an itself quoted in "Reincarnation and Islam," which marks a valiant and praiseworthy attempt on the part of a thoughtful Muslim writer (Mr. Naderbeg K. Mirza) leave no doubt in the mind as to their being grounded on the philosophy of re-incarnation :—

"How do you deny Allah, you were dead and He gave you life ? Again He will cause you to die and again bring you to life, then shall you be brought back to Him"—(Al Qur'an ii. 28.)

"As for those who are disbelievers . . . so often as their skins are thoroughly burned, we will change them for other skins that they may taste of chastisement . . ."—(Al Qur'an iv. 56).

"I call to witness the sunset, and that which it drives on ; and the moon when it grows full . . . that you shall most certainly enter one state after another . . ."—(Al Qur'an lxxxiv. 18-19.)

The Muslim idea of predestination, which has brought upon Islam the stigma of fatalism, itself suffices to prove the theory of transmigration, if investigated philosophically.

"*Taqdir*, or the absolute decree of good and evil," says T. P. Hughes in 'A Dictionary of Islam,' "is the sixth article of the Mahomedan creed, and the orthodox believe that whatever has, or shall come to pass in this world, whether it be good or bad, proceeds entirely from the Divine Will, and has been irrevocably fixed and recorded on a preserved tablet by the pen of fate."

This preserved tablet is the Book of God's decrees, called *laub-i-mahfuz* (لوح محفوظ) in Arabic, and is said to contain all that has happened in the past and all that is to happen in the future.

"Nor is anything added unto the age of him whose life is prolonged, neither is anything diminished from his age, but *the same is written in the book of God's decrees*."—(Sura xxxv.)

It is pointed out in Sura Y. S. :—

"Verily, it is We who will quicken the dead and write down the works which they have sent on before them, and the traces which they shall have left behind them : and everything have we set down in the clear book of our decrees."

Thus, predestination is an established belief in Islam. The actions of men are determined according to what is written in the Book of Decrees, so that

"all things have been created after fixed decrees.—" (Sura li. 49.)

To the same effect are the following :

"No one can die except by God's permission according to the book that fixeth the term of life."—(Sura iii. 139.)

"The Lord hath created and balanced all things and hath fixed their destinies and guideth them."—(Sura lxxxvii. 2.)

"By no means can aught befall us but what God has destined for us."—(Sura ix. 51.)

The question which now arises is : how are the decrees contained in the Book of Fate enforced in the world of men ? There may be a book, or even a whole library, in the Cosmic archives, but unless there is a force which connects every individual soul with the actions it is destined to perform, it is inconceivable how the decrees can be worth anything more than the cash-value of the tablet on which they are inscribed. If our Muslim friends will take the trouble to work out the problem of the connection between the decrees of fate and the actions of men and other beings in the three worlds, they will not fail to perceive that the force which compels obedience to the decrees of fate is none other than the force of *karma*, and that the کتاب مقدر the Perspicuous Book, whose decrees can never be challenged, is the 'Cosmic Memory,' the self-registering Ledger of *karma*, wherein are recorded all things that have happened in the past and also those that are to happen in the future, or, in the language of the Qur'an, all actions of men, including 'the words which they have sent on before them, and the traces * which they shall have left behind them.' The reader has only to turn to the doctrine of *karma* as propounded in the Jaina *Siddhānta* to understand the nature of the Perspicuous Book and of the process which automatically records † and registers the actions of men and their future, hence predetermined, fruits. The whole doctrine, thus, is a highly abridged and condensed version of the theory of *karma*.

Hindu philosophers divide *karman*s into two main classes, *prārab-dha* and *adṛiṣṭa*, the former of which signifies the *karmic* force, or forces, which have begun to be active, and the latter, the latent, and, therefore, the potential residue. They are called *adṛiṣṭa* (from *a*, not, and *ṛiṣṭa*, visible), because they signify *karman*s whose effect is not yet visible, hence, the potentiality of future action. The other class of *karman*s, that is *prārab-dha*, corresponds to the Muslim *taqdir*, and is the destiny which is beginning to shape the circumstances and environment of an individual. This is the true doctrine of *taqdir* ;

* Cf. " Verily god will not change his grace which is in men, until they change the disposition in their souls by sin. "—(Sale's Koran, p. 182.)

† In the Suratul Jathiyā it is said : " Whatever acts you do we cause them to be recorded (entered in your register). "—(" Studies in Tasawwuf," p. 115.)

to deny it will be to sever the connection between the *نفس* and the individual soul, and, consequently, fatal to both, and, also, to the doctrine itself.

As Mr. N. K. Mirza has shown, there is much in the teaching of the Qur'an itself that makes it impossible to disregard the tenet of re-incarnation. The following may be cited as directly relevant to the point :—

"This is a people that have passed away ; they shall have what they earned and you shall have what you earned, and you shall not be called upon to answer for what they did . . . "—(Al Qur'an ii. 134.)

" . . . for upon it [the soul] is the benefit of what it has earned, and upon it the evil of what it has wrought . . . "—(Al Qur'an ii. 286.)

"Whatever misfortune befalls you (O man), it is from yourself . . . "—(Al Qur'an iv. 79.)

"Whatever affliction befalls you, it is on account of what your hands have wrought . . . "—(*Ibid.* xlii. 30—32.)

"Allah does not do any injustice to men, but men are unjust to themselves . . . "—(Al Qur'an x. 44.)

It would seem surely futile to deny the principle of *karma* after these authentic statements from the accredited scripture of Islam itself.

Of all the objections which have been raised against the theory of transmigration by all sorts of intruders in the field of metaphysics, the one that need be noticed here is the one which is based on the assumption of a beginning of the world-process. Unable to meet the thesis on the purely scientific or philosophical ground, the objector does not hesitate to mix up his own idea of a first beginning of things with what he sets out to refute, and then suddenly turns round to demand the origin of the *karmic* force, prior to the first beginning of things. His objection, thus, is not an argument of sound reason, but only an example of the sleight of hand the intellect is capable of, when bent on finding a pretext to reject a doctrine against which it has been prejudiced by fanatical faith, insufficient research or any other like cause. The theory of transmigration of souls, in its original purity, as taught by the Tirthankaras, has nothing in common with the

idea of a beginning of the world-process ; hence it is bastardising its concept to introduce the element of a first beginning into it. The objection is thus beneath the notice of both a serious philosopher and an earnest seeker after truth.

As pointed out in the chapter entitled the *Siddhanta*, an infinity of souls have always been found existing in the condition of impurity—in *Nigoda*, poetically described as the loins of Adam in the Holy Qur'an. Think of Adam's loins in the literal sense, and you will be searching from now till eternity for them in vain ; but take the expression as a symbolic representation of *Nigoda*, the lowest part of the man-shaped *Lotakūṣa* and you not only avoid the error committed by the commentators, but also understand the true merit of the beautiful metaphor employed by the Prophet.

With reference to the nature of consciousness, Islam recognises that the power of perception and understanding is not in the organs of sensation or the material body, but in the soul, whose association with the organs of sensation is the cause of their functioning. It is said in 'Al Bayan,' at page 15 :—

" Which of the senses in man can feel and what is it that it feels ? Is it the eye that sees ? or something else that sees through the eye ? Is it the ear that hears, or is it something else that hears, by means of the ear, through the hole of the ear ? A shallow-minded person, not looking into the truth, might unhesitatingly say that it is the eye itself that sees and the ear itself that hears. But inquiring minds who look into and know the truth will say that they are not the senses that do it, because they do not feel at all, neither the eyes see nor the ears hear, though they may be safe and sound, even when the original thinker is engaged in something else or intoxicated or made insensible by means of chloroform, etc. So far as careful examination and observation show, it is manifest that understanding or knowledge is the part of *mujarradat* or spiritual things only."

Again, at page 16 :—

" What we want to prove is simply this, that matter or material things, by themselves, are unable to have feelings or understanding. Now think what is it in man which, through the aforesaid holes or windows, gains knowledge of the external world ? The philosophers make a distinction between the natural functions and the actions of the will. If a fool may not make a distinction between the two, and know not black from white, it will be a deficiency of his own understanding. Find out, then, what is it that gains knowledge of the external world and grasps the ideas relating to moral truths ? Now I tell you, it is *nafs-i-natīqa*, which in the theological language is called soul."

As regards the question whether animals are also endowed with souls, Al Bayan does not distinctly say, in so many words, that they have one ; but the argument is there to show that they are not soul-less. At page 9 we are told:—

“ These senses are not confined to men only. God's common gift reaches generally not only to all the animal kingdoms, but also some vegetables . . . The circumstances surrounding the animal kingdom; their instincts, their nature, the methods of nursing their young, the skill with which they collect their food for future use, union among their kind, the sympathy they show towards their species, and apathy towards their enemies, the love of their males towards their females, their sensibility towards their benefits and injuries, and the treatment of their sick, all create wonder, from which we are certain that they have senses and other means of knowledge.”

Now, since the material organs of sensation are regarded by the author of Al Bayan as incapable of perception and of performing the functions of understanding, and are looked upon as the door-ways, or windows, of the soul, and since the animals are possessed of the power of feeling and knowing, so accurately described by him, it is certain that he regards the animals also as endowed with souls. The Qur'an* itself puts the matter more emphatically than the author of Al Bayan, for it says :—

“ Dost thou not perceive that all creatures both in heaven and earth praise God ; and the birds also, extending their wings ? ”

What is to happen to this vast army of ‘ creatures ’ and birds, who praise Life (God) with extended wings ? According to the author of ‘ A Dictionary of Islam,’

“ It is believed that at the resurrection the irrational animals will be restored to life, that they may be brought to judgment, and then annihilated.”

But the Qur'an itself does not support the statement, and points out,

“ There is no kind of beast on earth, nor fowl which flieth with its wings, but the same is a people-like unto you ; we have not omitted anything in the book of our decrees : then unto their Lord shall they return.” †

* See chapter xxiv.

† See chapter vi.

The *italics* are ours. Commenting upon the popular Muslim belief about the fate of brutes and beasts, Sale observes : *

" Not only mankind, but the genii and irrational animals also, shall be judged on this great day, when the unarmed cattle shall take vengeance on the horned till entire satisfaction shall be given to the injured. "

This seems to contradict what Hughes thinks about the popular belief as to the fate of beasts, but we are not concerned with the opinions of either Sale or Hughes. The true sense of the text is simple enough, if we read it in the light of what has been established in the previous pages of this book. There is no reference to resurrection in the text, but even if there were, that would not make any material difference, since that expression merely signifies the liberation of the soul from bondage, not an universal rising of the dead on a particular day. The statement that animals also are a people like unto men, is an authority for the conclusion that their souls do not differ from those of men in respect of their essential nature, and the fact that their deeds are also recorded in the Book of Decrees clearly shows that they are not exempt from the operation of *prarabdha*, the force of *karmic* destiny. Lastly, there is the text—'*then unto their Lord shall they return*'—to show that the animals† also are not debarred from the attainment of the great Ideal in Nirvana.

We must now refer to the legend of the cow sacrifice which in itself sums up the entirety of the matter of belief, and is one of the most fascinating and elusive of myths that have ever been composed

* See 'The Koran,' by Sale, Preliminary Dis. Sect. iv.

† The return of the animals 'unto their Lord' clearly means the attainment of perfection by their souls, in the course of transmigration, not their resurrection in their present unevolved condition. The idea that the beasts shall appear unto the Lord, kicking and butting and making a mess everywhere, and only to be destroyed by the order of their maker, is too absurd to be entertained for a moment. The true significance of the doctrine is sufficiently clearly hinted at in the following passage in the Qur'an itself :—

" O man, surely you must strive to your Lord, a hard striving until you meet Him. "— (Chap. lxxxiv. 6.)

by men. Its elucidation will suffice by itself to convince the most obdurate opponent of transmigration that not only was full assent accorded to that doctrine by the founder of Islam, but that he also actually taught it in disguise.

The tradition of the sacrifice is thus given in Sale's edition of the Qur'an :—

"A certain man at his death left his son, then a child, a cow-calf, which wandered in the desert till he came of age ; at which time his mother told him the heifer was his, and bid him fetch her, and sell her for three pieces of gold. When the young man came to the market with his heifer, an angel in the shape of a man accosted him, and bid him six pieces of gold for her, but he would not take the money till he had asked his mother's consent ; which when he had obtained, he returned to the market place, and met the angel, who now offered him twice as much for the heifer, provided he would say nothing of it to his mother, but the young man refusing went and acquainted her with the additional offer. The woman perceiving it was an angel, bid her son go back and ask him what must be done with the heifer, whereupon the angel told the young man that in a little time the children of Israel would buy that heifer of him at any price. And soon after it happened that an Israelite, named Hammel, was killed by a relation of his, who, to prevent discovery, conveyed the body to a place considerably distant from that where the fact was committed. The friends of the slain man accused some other persons of the murder before Moses, but they denying the fact, and there being no evidence to convict them, God commanded a cow, of such and such particular marks to be killed, but there being no other which answered the description except the orphan's heifer, they were obliged to buy her for as much gold as her hide would hold ; according to some for her full weight in gold, and, as others say, for ten times as much. This heifer they sacrificed and the dead body being, by divine direction, struck with a part of it, revived, and standing up, named the person who had killed him, after which it immediately fell down dead again."

Such is the legend of the red heifer whose sacrifice is enjoined in the Qur'an. Its true interpretation which was published in the year 1922* for the first time in this age shows that it has nothing in common with the idea of sacrifice, which is, unfortunately, still practised in many religions under the grossest of misapprehensions, concerning the teaching of *dharma*. It is not necessary to dwell at length upon

* See the Confluence of Opposites by the present writer (Lecture viii).

the details of the story in this place : the following correspondences will be found sufficient to elucidate its hidden purport. The man who died is the purity of Spirit which is lost in consequence of the association with matter. The child is the soul, whose orphanage represents the condition of its having no protector.

The heifer is the *نفس* (*nafs*, the desiring *manas*), and the desert is the joyless state of the lower grades of life, the one-sensed, two-sensed, and the like, which the soul passes through in the course of transmigration before it obtains the human birth, when the orphan may be said to attain to discretion. The counselling mother is the Intellect which is developed in the human form, and the market is the world where the heifer is to be sold. The three pieces of gold signify ample provision for the three needs of human life, that is, the necessities, comforts and luxuries, which all seek to obtain for themselves. These are to be obtained in exchange for the *nafs*, since the curbing of desire is implied in all kinds of trades, occupations and also in manual labour. The angel is the effect of meritorious deeds of the previous life, appearing in the form of the good counsel, and enlightening the soul as to the nature of the *nafs*, by curbing which, in a lesser degree, men obtain the means for the joys and pleasures of the world, by subjecting which to a regular course of ascetic self-denial heavenly pleasures are obtained, in the life to come, and by the total destruction of which Omniscience, Godhood and Divinity are secured on the spot. Thus is the 'cow' of *nafs* which is worth its full weight in gold !

As for the function of the heifer in the economy of life, the theme is developed in the second half of the story, which is equally fascinating. The Israelite that is killed by a relation of his is the soul which is 'killed' by the *bāhiratma*, the ego of flesh. Accusation is preferred before Moses, but the accused persons deny that they have killed any one, and there is not sufficient evidence to charge them with the crime. A miracle is resolved upon under the circumstances. A cow with certain marks is to be sacrificed ; but there is no other cow than the orphan's that answers the description. This cow is sacrificed at last, when lo ! the dead is brought back to life to reveal the truth !

Here we have the old dispute between materialism and religion once more before us. The materialists deny the existence of the soul, but it is no good trying to convince an unwilling materialist of what is so obvious to the faithful! He will not be convinced by mere argument. A miracle is needed to extort his assent, to overcome the obstinacy of irresponsible thought! Religion, however, is quite capable of meeting the emergency. It is not to be defeated so easily even by materialism! The *acharya*, accordingly, orders the sacrifice of the greedy lustful *nafs*, when behold! immediately there springs into life a Divinity, to belie the materialist's creed! The falling dead of the body after the miracle is intended to signify the final release of the soul, when the body is left behind and the soul enters *nirvana* as a full, perfect God!

Such is the beautiful legend of the cow sacrifice, which contains, within the small dimensions of a single allegory, the entire philosophy of Spirit and Life, including transmigration and *karma*!

We might pause here to dwell on the allegorical nature of the composition of the Qur'an. Certain of the early Muhammadans, especially Sufis, there can be no doubt, were fully aware of the fact that the language of the sacred text of the Qur'an was hidden allegory. The Batinites were amongst those who had applied the allegorical method to the interpretation and the elucidation of the Quranic text. As is shown in the Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics (Vol. ix, 881), "extreme mystics, rationalists, and free-thinkers, all came in this way to the same results." Mr. Khaja Khan has brought together much valuable testimony in his informing book, entitled 'Studies in Tasawwuf,' which goes to show that the sacred book of Islam is really couched in the allegorical style. The views of Muslim Dervishes, collected by Mr. J. P. Brown in his interesting brochure "The Dervishes," directly support the case for the allegorical view. We shall quote from the "Dervishes":—

"Paradise and hell and all the dogmas of positive religion are only so many allegories, the spirit of which is only known to the Sufee."—(The Dervishes, p. 11.)

"Most parts of the Koran have a hidden, inner or spiritual significance, called by them *ma'anae Batinee*."—(Ibid., 106.)

"The Koran without the interpretation was only an assembly of words void of sense"—(Ibid., 336.)

But the reason for the employment of the allegorical language was not always apparent to the Sufis.

"Why parts of it (the sacred text) were veiled in allegory we scarcely dare to ask, and may only suppose that the knowledge was withheld from a good and wise cause."—(Ibid., 21.)

It would nevertheless seem that the Sufis followed the old practice of visiting the divulging of the true secrets of their beliefs to unworthy people with condign chastisement. Mr. Brown tells us as to this "The Dervishes," page 183) :—

"They must not divulge the secrets to their family (wives and children) nor to any one who is not the seeker of the truth (Talib Sadik), and ask for assistance in attaining to the path of God (Hakk). In that case violence must not be used towards him who does divulge them to another in view of engaging him to join the order . . ."

The reason, obviously, was the same as that which prevented open discourse in the case of the New Testament—the fear of the 'swine'! Muslims themselves treated those who held the soul to be a God as infidels and put them to death. The case of Mansur, al Hallaj, is an instance in point. He was surely impaled because he said he was God! The prophet was beset by enemies all round and had no alternative left except to speak in concealed allegory. He nevertheless referred to Ali for the true purport of his speech. This is undoubtedly what he meant when he said that he was the *madinat ul ilm* (مدینة العلم = city of knowledge) and Ali was its gate! Ali would naturally not impart the truth to whomsoever he might not deem worthy of it.

The Qur'an itself does not leave the matter of its composition in doubt. We are told :—

"O Lord, thou hast given me the kingdom and hast taught me the interpretation of sayings" (chap. xii. 102, and Extracts from the Holy Qur'an and Sayings of the Holy Prophet Muhammad).

In the third chapter (see the 5th verse) we are again told :—

"He it is who has sent down to thee the Book of which are some verses clear—they are the mother of the book, and others are figurative . . . but none knows the interpretation thereof except Allah . . ."

Again in chapter xxxii (verses 26-27) it is said :—

“ [Allah alone is the] Knower of the secrets ; He throws not open His secrets to any, except with whom He is pleased among the Apostles.”

In the Tradition Muhammad says more clearly :—

“ Speak to men according to their mental capacities, for if you speak all things to all men some cannot understand you and so fall into errors.”—(Extracts from the Quran, p. 170.)

Muhammad found himself surrounded on all sides by men of violent nature and of low understanding, before whom it would have been the height of folly to expose himself. He said (Al Qur'an viii. 22) :—

“ Verily the worst moving things with Allah are the (spiritually) deaf, the dumb who do not understand.”

In chapter lxxxiii of the Qur'an itself (verses 13—16) there is a reference to the men of the times :—

“ When signs are recited to him, he says, Tales of old. Ay ! but what they have acquired has cast a veil on their hearts. . . .”

The next quotation is charged with chagrin and the spirit of irritation :—

“ Dost thou reckon that most of them do hear or have sense ; they are only as brutes ; nay, they err more from the way.”—(Chap. xxv. 46.)

It is the same tale over again—a horrible tale of stupidity of men and of the spirit of persecution that prevailed all over the world. Fanatical mobs ruled the world, and men trembled to open their lips in plain speech: Hippolytus distinctly speaks of the fear that made men withhold the open truth, when he says :—

“ These things, beloved, we impart to you with fear, and yet readily, on account of the love of Christ, which surpasseth all. For if the blessed prophets who preceded us did not choose to proclaim these things, though they knew them, openly and boldly, lest they should disquiet the souls of men, but recounted them mystically in parables and dark sayings, . . . how much greater risk shall we run in venturing to declare openly things spoken by them in obscure terms ! ”—(Ante Nicene Christian Library, vol. ix, 2nd part, p. 18.)

This spirit of persecution persisted unabated throughout whole centuries. The grossest cruelties were practised by religious bigots in the name of religion itself. The following from St. Augustine (‘*The Mystics of Islam*,’ p. 118) which has already been quoted ere this is a fair sample of the dread which influenced the speech of saints :—

“ If he [man] loves a stone, he is a stone : if he loves a man, he is a man ; if he loves God—I dare not say more, for if I said that he would then be God, ye might stone me.”

In India itself there was the bitterest exterminating persecution of the Jainas for several centuries (see ‘*Studies in South India Jainism*’ part ii. pp. 34-35), and this notwithstanding that India has ever been probably the most tolerant country in the world in regard to religious freedom.

Under these circumstances there is nothing surprising in the fact that Muhammad found himself forced to adopt the allegorical style, as those who had gone before had done, to preserve themselves and their followers from harm. To interpret his thought in the literal sense of the words can, under the circumstances, but create confusion and add to the prevailing misapprehension amongst men. It will be observed that the true allegorical interpretation of the text of the Qur’an at once brings Islam in a line with the other creeds and shows its tenets to be identically the same as of the older ones.

Thus, there can be no doubt whatsoever that the true interpretation of the Qur’an not only does not conflict with the doctrine of re-incarnation, but actually supports and upholds it. Indeed, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that no consistent philosophy of Islam is possible which does not include a belief in the transmigration of souls, as an article of faith.

This finishes our survey of the philosophy of Islam.

There remains the question of the ritualism of Islam, which is of a very simple type, consisting, as it does, in prayer, fasting, almsgiving and pilgrimage. These, no doubt, aim at the purification of the mind ; and, as such, are steps in the right direction, though taken by themselves they are quite insufficient to enable the soul to attain

nirvana. The Sufis, however, did recognize the inadequacy of the Quranic teaching in this regard, and tried to live to a higher level than that of the ordinary Musalman. The Ehl el Hakk (those endowed with true insight) consider that "every one may, by superior piety and love of God . . . even become God" (The Dervishes, p. 294). These men, the Ehl el Hakk, seem to resemble and correspond to Gnostics in Christianity, and they did their best to place their religion on a sound philosophical basis. They developed the germ of truth they could discover in the Qur'an, and proceeded to elaborate it out into systematic thought, though their grasp over the scientific aspect of the question does not appear to have been perfect, by any means. We shall quote from their teachings to show the real tenets of the Sufi-dervishes of Islam.

As to the function of Religion :—

"Deen (Religion) . . . (is) the only true and correct faith, the right path leading to eternal happiness."—(The Dervishes, p. 65.)

As to the divinity of the soul :—

" . . . The seeds of Sufecism were sown in the time of Adam, germed in that of Noah, budded in that of Abraham, and the fruit commenced to be developed in that of Moses. They reached their maturity in that of Christ, and in that of Mahommed produced pure wine. Those of its sectarians who loved this wine have so drunk of it as to lose all knowledge of themselves and to exclaim 'Praise be to me ! Is there any greater than me?' . . . I am the truth (that is to say, God) ! There is no other God than me.' . . . "—(The Dervishes, p. 9.)

"For this reason, religious man, intoxicated with the cup of Divine Communion, exclaims, 'I am God.' In fact man's attributes are of a divine character—what do I say ?—His substance is that even of God."—(Ibid, 10.)

As to the simplicity of this divine substance :—

"The God . . . who should be adored by all is an unique deity, simple in His essence," . . . —(Ibid, 61.)

The soul's existence is independent of the body, which is only like a prison :

"The soul existed before the body and is confined within the latter as in a cage."—(Ibid. 12.)

"The soul is a divine emanation incorporated in human form. It exists in five conditions, viz : it is awake, it dreams, it is plunged in slumber, it fills a state of half-death, and, finally, even perfectly separated from the body . . ."—(Ibid., 46.)

Transmigration naturally follows :—

"After death it [the soul] must pass through several new existences. Virtuous souls occupy spheres superior to that of this soul and enjoy the fruits of their good works, whilst the guilty ones are condemned to fill conditions inferior to that of humanity. Wicked people who have degraded humanity in this life will live again in the shape of animal existence. . . ."—(Ibid., 46-47.)

Salvation must, therefore, imply the separation between Spirit and matter :

"Death, therefore, should be the object of the wishes of the Soofee."—(Ibid., p. 12.)

The Saved Ones do not have to die, but they go up to the Abode of the Gods :

"The . . . Hadees says, The faithful do not die : perhaps they become translated from the perishable world to the world of eternal existences."—(Ibid., 186; see also Extracts from the Holy Quran by Abdulla Allahdin, p. 84.)

Such are the main principles of the Sufi teaching, the seeds of which are sown in the Quran itself. But when we come to the Right Conduct we find them to be characterized by a kind of nebulosity which interferes with the clearest perception of what is the practical thing to do at the different stages of the journey. This is due, no doubt, to the lack of precise knowledge as to the nature and operation of the force, or forces, which are responsible for the union and association of spirit and matter, and for the different kinds of bonds resulting therefrom. The utmost that appears in the tradition (Hadis) on the point is only :—

"Verily these your deeds will be brought back to you, as if you yourself were the creator of your own punishment."—(Extracts from the Holy Quran, by A. Allahdin, p. 52.)

Perhaps it was not expedient, and, in view of the general exhortation to acquire philosophical understanding* of the teachings of

* Cf. "The ink of the scholar is more holy than the blood of the martyr."—(Hadis, quoted from the Extracts from the Holy Quran, p. 158.)

the faith, not necessary, to be further explicit on the point. Be that as it may, we have only the most general kind of practical injunctions in the department of practical life, though stress is rightly laid on world flight.

"The love of the world is the root of all evil."

"The world is as a prison and as a famine to Muslims; and when they leave it you may say they leave famine and a prison."

"Be in the world like a traveller, or like a passer-on, and reckon yourself as of the dead."—(Sayings of Muhammad, quoted in the Extracts from the Holy Quran, pp. 76-77.)

The *terk* (path of renunciation) is thus explained :—

"To abandon the world, its comforts and dress,—all things now and to come,—conformably with the Hadees of the Prophet, *i.e.*, 'The world is forbidden to those of the life to come; the life to come is forbidden to those of this world; and both are forbidden to the true servants of God,' which is thus explained :—The true Dervish in the heart not only willingly abandons all the joys and pleasures of the world, but he is willing also to give up all hope of the pleasures of Paradise, and to be satisfied with the enjoyment derived from a submissive and devout contemplation of the beauty of God, and the hope of attaining to that private Paradise, occupied only by the pious, the holy and the prophets."—(The Dervishes.)

Stress is rightly laid on putting into practice the matter of belief :—

"O man, surely you must strive a hard striving to your Lord, until you meet Him!"—(Al Quran lxxxiv. 6.)

"Who are the learned? Those who practise what they know."—(Hadis, quoted from the Extracts from the Holy Quran, p. 103.)

"The man must die, so to say, before the saint can be born."—(The Dervishes, p. 300.)

For,

"Hell is veiled in delights, and Heaven in hardships and miseries."—(Hadis, quoted in the Extracts from the H. Quran, p. 70.)

The principal things to be avoided are : anger and fleshly lust, envy, cupidity, fulness of food, even though it be lawful and pure, love

of adornment in furniture and clothing and house, importuning men for aught, haste and the abandoning of steadiness in affairs, levity, miserliness, partisanship for schools and leaders in theology and law, faithlessness, and thinking evil of co-religionists. "Let the seeker sever all the ties of this world and empty it from his heart. Let him cut away all anxiety for family, wealth, children, home; for knowledge, rule, ambition. Let him reduce his heart to a state in which the existence of anything and its non-existence are the same to him" (*Religious Attitude and Life in Islam*, p. 255). The distractions are constituted not by big things and concerns alone, but also by very ordinary and trifling things. "The Prophet himself was distracted from prayer by the border of his own robe and by a gold ring on his finger" (*Ibid.*, 298). Abu-l-Kasim of Geelani discarded even the loin-strip, going completely naked (*Ibid.*, 206). We know that strict nudity is observed by the Jaina Saints. Certain of the Hindu *yogis*, too, remain naked.

The chief ambition of a Muslim should be the acquisition of scientific knowledge of things. Al Ghazzali says :—

"... what I want is knowledge of the real natures only of things. I must ask, therefore, what is the essence of knowledge. It seemed to me then that certain knowledge is that which uncovers the thing known in such a way that there does not remain with it a doubt, nor accompany it the possibility of error, or illusion, nor can the mind conceive such Knowledge with which no trust goes is no certain knowledge."—(*Religious Attitude and Life in Islam*, p. 176.)

Like the Jains, Muslim philosophers recognized that knowledge appertained to the nature of the soul and arose from within. Ibn Khaldun maintained, for instance :—

"The rational soul, by its nature, has an absolute power of perception in the spiritual world."—(*Religious Attitude and Life in Islam*, p. 77.)

As regards soothsaying also Ibn Khaldun tells us :—

"That [soothsaying], also, belongs to the characteristics of the human soul The human soul has an equipment for passing over from its humanity to the spiritual nature which is above it. A flash comes to mankind of the class of the prophets through the nature of their constitution, which plainly comes to them not through any acquisition, nor by seeking the aid of any of the channels of apprehension, nor through

conceptions, nor through bodily actions in speech or movement, nor through anything at all. It is simply a transition from the human nature, to the angelic nature through innate constitution, in a flash, in less than a glance of the eye."—(Ibid., pp. 62-63.)

We again have it from Ibn Khaldun :—

"The essential nature of Vision is that the rational soul through its spiritual essence gains for a moment information as to the forms of events. Inasmuch as the soul is spiritual, the forms of events exist in it actually, as is the case with all spiritual essences, and it becomes spiritual through being stripped of all material substance and of the channels of bodily apprehension. This happens to the rational soul from time to time, for a moment, because of sleep, as we shall mention. So it acquires thereby knowledge of the future events for which it looks, and returns with that knowledge to its channels of apprehension. Then if that acquisition is weak and lacking in clearness, through the use of metaphor and imagery in the imagination in order to state it, it has need of interpretation on account of these metaphors. And sometimes the acquisition is strong and can do without metaphors; then it has no need of interpretation to clarify it from the imagery of the imagination. The cause of the occurrence of this flash of perception in *the soul* is that the soul is potentially a spiritual essence, seeking to fulfil itself through the body and the bodily channels of apprehension, until its essence may become pure rationally, and it may become perfect actually, and so be a spiritual essence *apprehending without any bodily instruments*. So its class, as to the spiritualities, is under the class of the angels, the People of the Upper Region, who need not seek to fulfil their essential nature through any channel of apprehension, bodily or otherwise. . . . As to that which belongs to the prophets, it is a capability of passing over from the human nature to the pure angelic nature, which is the loftiest of spiritual things."—(pp. 70-71.)

The obstruction to the knowing nature of the soul is constituted by the organs of sensation and the material brain. We have it again from Ibn Khaldun :—

"We have already said that apprehension by the rational soul is of two kinds—an apprehension by means of what is external, namely, the five senses, and apprehension by means of what is internal, namely, the powers of the brain, and that all this tends to hinder the rational soul from apprehending the spiritual essences above it; yet to apprehend these it is equipped by its constitution. And since the external senses are physical, they are exposed to sleep and indolence through weariness, and the soul faints by the multitude of business."—(Ibid., p. 72.)

We may now turn to the objections raised against the Qur'an by non-Muslim writers, which have been specified on page 699 *ante*.

(1) The first category refers to the errors of the Qur'an. But, as we have pointed out more than once in the course of the preceding pages, the contradictions in the description of persons and the accounts of their doings are due either to a desire to guard against an historical interpretation of the traditions, or arise naturally in the employment of mystic thought from different standpoints. They might, no doubt, be due to the Prophet's ignorance of these traditions, as Tisdall and other European writers maintain, but we prefer to believe that the mythological hypothesis furnishes the better explanation of the two. We explained one of such contradictions in reference to the crucifixion of Jesus in the chapter on Resurrection, and probably the same method would yield satisfaction in respect of most of the remaining contradictions between the Bible and the Qur'an. St. Paul gave the death blow to the historical exegesis when he showed (Galatians iv. 21—31) that the family of Abraham consisted of allegorical conceptions. In 1 Timothy (chap. i. 4) the old genealogies are similarly brushed aside with scant ceremony :

"Neither give heed to fables and endless genealogies which minister questions rather than godly edifying which is in faith . . ."

There is therefore nothing surprising if differences have arisen between two religions in the course of personifying spiritual states as historical beings.

(2) The above observations also apply to the fables of the Qur'an. As a matter of fact, fables form no part of any religion; they are either statements of facts which occurred at some time, in the past, or mythologies intended to train the minds of the people in religious doctrines. When Christian missionaries object* to such accounts as show that the wind 'ran' gently at the command of Solomon, they forget that according to the Bible the wind also obeyed Jesus Christ (Luke viii. 23 and 24).

(3) The geography of the Qur'an is, if anything, incomplete, as we had occasion to point out ere this. In its most complete form, the geography of the universe exists only in Jainism. European

* See Murdoch's 'Selections from the Qur'an,' p. 134.

writers go wrong when they think it is the geography of our little planet, the Earth. As a matter of fact, it embraces the whole of the universe, visible and invisible both. It is possible, nay even probable, that a good deal of false accretions have gathered round the original teaching in this regard ; but so far as adverse criticism is concerned, one can only smile at the following statement in the ' Selections from the Qur'an' :

" With regard to geography, Muhammadan writers acted like the Hindus. They sat in their houses and framed seas and continents out of their heads."

(4) In respect of the fourth category also, the Qur'an cannot be found fault with any more than any other mystic Scripture. Mr. Murdoch objects to the following passages, on the ground that they are incompatible with the dignity of God, who cannot be said to lead men astray :

(i) " Whomsoever God shall direct, he will be rightly directed ; and whomsoever he shall lead astray, they shall perish."

(ii) " He whom God shall cause to err shall have no direction."

(iii) " Verily, I will fill hell with jinns and men altogether."

But Mr. Murdoch forgets that these passages are directly supported by the Holy Bible itself. The following from the book of Isaiah (xlv. 6 and 7) is admissible on the point :—

" That they may know from the rising of the sun, and from the west, that there is none besides me. I am the Lord, and there is none else. I form the light, and create darkness : I make peace, and create evil : I, the Lord, do all these things."

The *Italics* are ours. The conception of God in these passages is that of a mere personification of life, as we have repeatedly pointed out in these pages.

Many a time is the nature of the essence of God described in the Qur'an, but nearly always in the same words—" that which heareth and seeth." There are no qualifying words, or phrases, and their

* Cf. the following from the Bhagavad Gita (Disc. xv. 15) :—

सर्वस्य चाहं हृदि सन्निविष्टो

मत्तःस्मृतिर्ज्ञानमथोद्भवम्

sense is plain to anyone who cares to think for himself. This is sufficient to show that Muhammad held the soul to be divine in its real Essence. The current Muslim interpretation to the contrary cannot be arrived at without the addition of certain words to the text ; but this is opposed to the rules of interpretation according to which the plain sense must be ascribed to the words in all cases, so far as possible. Besides, there is no reason why the author of these passages should not have used the correct expression himself, in this regard, if his sense was different. Their true interpretation not only removes the repugnance in the theologian's view, but also renders the text in accord with sound philosophy, and reconciles it with other texts in the Qur'an itself.

(5) So far as the fifth objection is concerned, we have already pointed out that the principle of resignation to one's destiny implies an active attitude of the soul which is not compatible with fatalism. Even here the objection is futile. But in saying this we wish to guard against being misunderstood by our brethren of Islam. There is such a thing as destiny, which is sure to lead some *jinnas* and men into hell, as one of the verses in the Qur'an correctly points out ; but this destiny is not the mandate of a super-human being, who arbitrarily and capriciously determines and seals the fate of his creatures, and foredooms some to eternal damnation in hell, and decrees to others the enjoyment of Olympian bliss. Destiny is nothing other than *prārabdha*, and means the potential *karma* of the past life, or lives, of the soul which is

वेदैश्च सर्वैरहमेवबोध्यो

वेदान्तकृद्वेदविदेव चाहम् ॥ १२ ॥

Tr.—" And I am seated in the hearts of all :

From me are memory, knowledge (perception) as well as their loss ;

It is I who am to be known by all the Scriptures (Vedas)—

I am indeed the author of Vedanta and the knower of Vedas."

beginning to be actualized. It is hardly necessary to enlarge upon the theory of *karma* now, since the whole subject has been dealt with in the preceding chapter.

(6) In reference to the religious intoleration of the Qur'an, there is little doubt that *jehād* is not an essential feature of Islam, as a religion, since Muhammad was led to proclaim it only after years of the bitterest persecution. The doctrine has been incorporated in the Book only on account of the inability of its compiler to distinguish between the different aspects of the personality of the Prophet, who was, at least in the later years of his life, a public preacher, a statesman, a *pater familias* and a law-giver, at one and the same time. Our friends, the Muhammadaans, should by this time understand that true *jehād* is waged against *kufr*, i.e., those tendencies and inclinations which prevent the soul from turning towards the Self; but not against the *kāfir* (an infidel); because the destruction of the former leads to bliss, and that of the latter, only to hell. Mr. Abdullah Allahdin has quoted the following saying (*hadis*) of the prophet, in his "Extracts from the Holy Quran," which clearly shows what *jehād* really meant:—

"The most excellent *Jehād* (Religious War) is that for the conquest of self."
—(p. 94.)

True *jehād*, thus, is always against one's own lower nature, never against another. It will profit us to bear in mind what the Bible says as to the power of the sword:

"All they that take the sword shall perish with the sword."—(Matthew, xxvi. 52.)

(7) The perpetuation of slavery is certainly opposed to the true principles of Religion, and the authorship of the passages countenancing and legalising it must be ascribed to Muhammad, the law-giver, not to Muhammad, the Seer.

(8) The punishment of theft and other offences provided for in the Qur'an is also against the dictates of conscience.

(9) The same is the case with regard to the laws of marriage and the libertinism allowed by the Qur'an. Possibly, the rules laid

down by Muhammad with respect to these matters were intended only to control the greater laxity and wholesale libertinism which might have prevailed in Arabia in his time. It might also be that political considerations did not admit of the imposition of greater restrictions on the people. Muhammad's fault, however, is that he openly countenanced evil. He should not have compromised matters. The excuse that the exigencies of a life constantly imperilled by circumstances beyond his control justified this kind of legislation, might be open to a politician, but it is no defence for a prophet. The fact is that Islam has always looked upon marriage as a civil contract, never as a sacred relation formed for life. Disregardful of the opinion of the outside world, which it defied with the sword, it framed its laws only to prevent internal friction and lawlessness. Hence the following in the Sura Maarij :

"And who abstain from the carnal knowledge of women other than their wives, or the slaves which their right hands possess (for as to them they shall be blameless); but whoever coveteth any woman besidea these, they are transgressors."

The unrestricted power of divorce which the husband enjoys under the Muhammadan Law is also the outcome of the notion that marriage is merely a civil contract. Religion has, as a matter of fact, been always hostile to the very idea of divorce, not on the ground, as some might suppose, of its being a violation of the commandment of a super-human god, but for the reason that all relaxations of restrictions on libertinism and sensuality and desire interfere with the spiritual advancement of the soul, retarding its progress and leading it to regions of suffering and pain after death. Even the re-marrriage of widows is not recommended by religion, on this ground. Hard as this rule may seem in certain cases, it is nevertheless one framed in the interests of all concerned, for those who aspire to the attainment of Nirvana have to practise much severer types of self-denial than abstention from marrying a second time. Sexual passion is a powerful foe of the soul, and has to be overpowered before any real progress can be made or expected.

Our observations against the re-marrriage of widows have, however, no application to the cases of those unfortunate victims of social

tyranny who are known as virgin-widows. In the eye of Religion they are still unmarried though forced to drape themselves in a widow's weeds. Religion would be a nuisance if it ever countenanced the perpetuation of the cruel injustice of forcing little children into matrimony, by enjoining a life-long mourning on an unfortunate child, whom an unholy, inhuman custom declared a widow ! In her case, certainly, there is no question of breaking the nuptial vow, of sullyng the virgin purity of the heart, or of prostituting the body to the embraces of another than the man deliberately accepted, in the name of *Dharma* itself, as the sole companion, in weal or woe, and the solitary exception to the absolute impregnability of feminine modesty.

Thus, it cannot be seriously denied that the considerations, which apply to the case of an ordinary widow, have no application to that of a little child, forcibly thrust into the unholy bonds of mock matrimony by parental tyranny ; and it is really high time now that people made up their minds to give up, once for all and for ever, a custom of such evil repute and consequence as child-marriage has proved to be.

So far as female slaves are concerned, happily the question of their rights and privileges does not arise under the present conditions of society ; but the passage from the Qur'an (Sura Nisa) which 'legalises' an unlimited number of slaves to every true believer is there to show that Muslim legislation concerning domestic matters is grounded upon a purely materialistic conception of life, and, consequently, falls short of the spiritual ideal of self-denial, which religion insists upon.

(10) Under the tenth head fall the contradictions in the Qur'an. Some of these might, no doubt, be difficult to reconcile ; but their explanation is to be found in the different capacities which their author filled at different times of his life.

(11) The eleventh objection bears reference to Muslim mythology. But we need merely state as to this that mythology appears ridiculous only when read from the standpoint of history.

The additional objection raised against Islam is with reference to the doctrine of sacrifice. The observations we made in reference to the principle underlying the doctrine, in the eighth chapter of

this book, and the elucidation of the mystery of the cow-sacrifice, are sufficient to show that Muhammadans have not understood the true sense of the teaching in this respect. Junayd once asked a man who had returned from the pilgrimage to Mecca: "When you reached the slaughter place and offered sacrifice, did you sacrifice the objects of worldly desire?" The man replied that he had not. "Then you have not sacrificed at all!"

Our survey of the tenets of Islam is now complete and justifies the statement that the Holy Qur'an, when purged of the element of allegory and mysticism, and of the tendency to personify elements and essences, that is characteristic of all religions of the mystical type, contains the seeds of the true philosophy of the Science of Salvation, though, owing to the spirit of compromise, which Muhammad was led to adopt, on political and social considerations, truth is not to be found in his sayings, in its naked grandeur and majesty.

We may now conclude the subject of transmigration, and say that not only is the doctrine a perfect truth of philosophy, but has also been recognized by the founders of the principal religions now prevailing in the world, including Christianity and Islam. Even Sikhism is no exception to this, as its teachings show (see 'A Dictionary of Islam,' p. 590).

We now come to the differences of opinion about the personality of

The Evil One.

Those who believe in his existence regard him as an angel of evil. According to the myths which have gathered round his personality, he is said to have been ordered to prostrate himself before Adam, but he refused to obey the command, and the "Lord God," in consequence of his refusal, bestowed the kingdom of hell and evil upon him. Since then the sole aim of the Evil One has been to throw temptation in the way of the pious devotees of God, and to lead them astray, for which reason he is called the Tempter. Muhammadans, Christians and Zoroastrians believe in this traditional devil, in one form or another. In the Old Testament, Satan appears on the scene very early, and is shown as one of the principal *dramatis personae* in the tragedy of the Fall. Innumerable are the accounts of his deceiving

mankind, and many of them appear, at first sight, to be exceedingly conflicting. According to the Book of Job, he used to attend upon the Lord along with the Sons of God. Job, it seems, owed his misfortunes more to the decrees of the Lord than to the evil nature of Satan (Job i. 6—12). The Lord himself gave power to Satan over the family and possessions of Job, and the Evil One, be it said to his credit, did not exceed his instructions! In the book of Exodus, the Lord sends Moses to intercede with the Pharaoh for the freedom of Israel, brings plagues and pestilence on the Egyptians, and yet himself hardens the heart of the tyrant time after time; in other words, plays the part of the Devil himself! The Bible is silent as to the origin of this evil power; but in Zoroastrianism it is recognized as one of a pair of twins which exist from all eternity. It is said in Yasna (xxx. 3):—

"In the beginning there was a pair of twins, two spirits, each of a peculiar activity, and these two spirits united created, one the reality, the other, the non-reality."

In Yasna xlv. 2 further light is thrown on the nature of the eternal twins:—

"I will speak of the Spirits twain at the first beginning of the world, of whom the holier thus spake to the enemy: 'Neither thoughts, nor teachings, nor wills, nor beliefs, nor words, nor deeds, nor selves, nor souls of us twain agree.'"

The explanation of this conflict of tradition and tenet is to be found in the complexity of the personification itself, Satan representing sometimes the desiring *manas* and sometimes matter, the second of the eternal twins of Zoroastrianism. As the cause of bondage, suffering and hell is the pursuit of good and evil of things, the kingdom of hell and evil is said to have been conferred on the Devil. And since the tendency of matter is altogether *anti-spiritual*, the Evil One is necessarily the enemy of the faithful.

Besides matter and the desiring *manas*, intellect, too, would appear to have been personified at times as Satan. Dhu'l-karnein, the mythical person about whom Muhammadan commentators have ventured all sorts of fanciful speculations, simply appears to be the Intellect personified as an incarnated embodiment of Evil and Power.

He is a *wanderer*, belongs to the class of horned beings, and *reaches the confines of the East and the West*. He is also said to have reached the place where the sun sets, and to have found it to set in a spring of black mud. Here, the horns are indicative of the evil tendency, 'the confines of the East and the West' refer to the entirety of the field of knowledge of good and evil, and 'wandering' suggests a search for experience. The end of intellectualism is the discovery of the fact that 'the sun sets in a pool of black mud.' As the Sun is the symbol of Spirit and the pool of black mud of matter, the discovery of Dhu'l-karnein is indicative of the nature of the two kinds of substance, the *jiva* and *ajiva*, which are the final causes of the universe.

In comprehending the true nature of the Intellect, however, we ought not to hastily jump to the conclusion that its sole function is to mislead mankind. As stated in the chapter on the fall, it is not the Intellect that is bad in itself, but only its employment solely to determine the good and evil of things for our worldly ends. It is the tutor of Will, it is true, but its pupil is by no means a docile, submissive child, as many would like to believe. It is quite helpless before the freedom and explosiveness of its pupil, and can only impart him knowledge which is agreeable to his disposition, and though it never fails to give the necessary warning when he takes a wrong step, it is powerless to prevent him from pursuing his own inclinations.

The description of Satan according to another text of the Qur'an would appear to fit in with the nature of matter as well as with the desiring nature (chap. xiv) :—

"And Satan shall say after judgment shall have been given, Verily God promised you a promise of truth ; but I deceived you. Yet I had not any power over you to compel you ; but I called you only, and ye answered me ; wherefore accuse me not but accuse yourselves. I cannot assist you ; neither can ye assist me. Verily I now renounce your having associated me with God heretofore."

As the soul is impervious to both matter and desire in its pure condition, Satan is naturally describing himself as possessed of no power to seduce it against its will. The description is thus both clear and exact, though couched in mythological thought.

As stated already the Evil One in Zoroastrianism is a representation of matter.

The effect of the influence of matter on the soul has been described in many allegories in different lands, but in none so charmingly as in the Assyrian story of the descent of Ishtar, the Queen of Heavens, into Hades. Hades nowadays means a place of torment, the kingdom of Satan, or hell. But the original idea was only that of matter in a state of invisibility (The Mysteries of Freemasonry, by John Fellows, page 146 footnote). Mr. F. F. Hulme also points out (The History, Principles and Practice of Symbolism in Christian Art, page 108) :—

"The Greek Hades, the Scandinavian Hella, originally the unseen world, has gradually become, in popular idea, the place of torment, the kingdom of Satan Hell is generally, with the mediæval painters and sculptors, the yawning mouth of a huge monster, breathing smoke and flames, or a large caldron set on flames, into either of which attendant spirits hurl their victims."

In the Assyrian myth, Ishtar represents the individual spirit whose enchainment in matter is the central theme. Ishtar is depicted as descending into Hades, "to the house of darkness, the house out of which there is no exit, to the road from which there is no return, to the house from whose entrance the light is taken, the place where dust is nourishment and mud, food."

"The light is never seen, in darkness they dwell Over the doors and bolts is scattered dust."—(Myths of Babylonia, etc., by D. A. Mackenzie, page 95.)

The journey is undertaken by Ishtar in search of her lover, Tammuz, which is a clever personification of happiness, or *ānanda* (bliss). Arrived at the gates of Hades, Ishtar demands admission of the porter in charge. The latter asks for orders from the Queen of the Underworld. He is told :

"Go, keeper, open the gate to her, bewitch her according to the ancient rules."

As Ishtar passes in through the several gates, she is stripped of her ornaments and clothing. First her crown is taken from her, then her ear-rings, her necklace of precious stones, the ornaments at her breast, her jewelled girdle, and her bracelets and anklets are removed

from her person, one after another ; and finally she is stripped of the covering robe from her body ! She is then struck with disease in all parts of her body, by the plague demon at the command of her dreaded rival.

Hades is called the kingdom of the dead, which itself has a special significance, as in the famous text :

" Leave the dead to bury their dead ; come thou and follow me."—(Luke ix. 60) which has already been explained.

The allegory thus employs the terrible imagery of hells to portray the frightful influence of matter on the soul. The subtle invisible matter which Hades originally signified, is what is technically known as *karma vargaṇā* in the Jaina *Siddhānta*. This subtle material combines with the soul, reaching it through the three channels of *āgrava*, namely, the mind, speech and the body, as already described in the thirteenth chapter. The effect of the fusion of spirit and matter is the loss of the divine attributes of the soul which is symbolized by the loss of the vestments of glory in the legend. These divine raiments are donned by Ishtar again when she is led out of the successive gates, on being purified and strengthened by the messenger of gods, with the water of Life (cf. *Studies in Biblical and Semitic Symbolism*, by Maurice H. Farbridge, p. 165).

As already stated, Zarathushtra's twins are Spirit and Matter whose interaction is the cause of evil and misery in life. Of these, Matter has the tendency to lead men astray and to make them worship itself in place of the true God, that is, Life. According to a Muslim myth, the Evil One was required to prostrate himself before Adam, but he declined to do so. The explanation of the incident is to be sought for in the nature of the hostility between Spirit and Matter, and in the superiority of the former over the latter.

The seducements of the Temptress consist in the fascinating forms which it eternally displays, and with which it lures its admirers. Hence, Satan is said to be constantly engaged in seducing mankind in different forms. Those whose ideals are confined to material happiness may, thus, be said to worship the Devil. Now, inasmuch as the ' worship ' of matter is fraught with harm and spiritual degeneration,

and leads to hell, the devil is said to lead men into hell, which, for that reason, is called his kingdom. However, evil lies in the pursuit of matter, not in matter itself. Forms must exist, because matter exists ; but if we allow ourselves to be tempted by them, it is our own fault, not that of matter. Man, in his shallow conceit, is only too anxious to throw the blame for his own misdeeds on some one else, and since his unwholesome dread of supernatural agencies does not permit him to accuse the being whom he places at the head of the affairs of the world, there is no one else to be made a scape-goat of but intellect or matter. Evil, however, is a relative term, and lies only in our inclinations and pursuits, not in intellect or matter. As a matter of fact, evil is not altogether devoid of utility, and may be used for our uplifting and betterment. The account of Job's trial and suffering is a beautiful illustration of this principle. Will is the essence of life, and is developed by fighting against evil. Self-denial, i.e., the curbing of desires, the stamping out of evil passions and inclinations, has to be practised, so that the power divine might be freed from its bondage ; and nothing enables the Will to manifest its true Divinity so much as a fierce struggle against adversity. The function of evil in nature is not to cause us suffering and pain exclusively, but also to furnish us with an opportunity for building up our moral character, to become perfect like ' the Father which is in heaven.' We ought to remember that

" the Gods in bounty work up Storms about us,
That give Mankind occasion to exert
Their hidden Strength, and throw out into practice
Virtues that shun the day, and lie conceal'd
In the smooth seasons and the calm of Life "—*Adelphon*.

Virtue is Life, and, *as such*, is truly its own reward ; it is no authority for putting on an air of injured innocence, or for a display of hypocritical martyrdom. The righteous are ever tranquil in adversity ; they care not for the mock, impotent sympathy of their kind ; nor do they deviate, in the least, from the strict path of truth and rectitude. Cheerfully do they welcome adversity when it comes, believing that

" the good are better made by ill ;
As odours crushed are sweeter still ! "

And, when the trial of their moral character has proved their worth, the Voice of Love sweetly whispers in their ears,

" Ye good distress'd !
Ye noble few ! who here unbending stand
Beneath Life's pressure, yet bear up a while,
And what your bounded view, which only saw
A little part, deem'd evil, is no more ;
The storms of wintry Time will quickly pass,
And one unbounded Spring encircle all."—*Thomson*.

So long as man identifies himself with his material body, there is evil for him. Good and evil have no existence for the *Siddhatman* ; they exist only in the imagination of the sinful man. Where the spirit is impervious to adversity, bodily suffering cannot retard the progress of the soul.

The arrows of adversity do not penetrate the man of renunciation, for he has nothing to grieve for ; but they pierce to the core the man of the world, because of his selfishness. We have seen how evil is caused by our own actions, and how it may be converted into good by the emotions of equanimity and love. In the following beautiful passage a lady writer gives us her idea of the life which is worth having :—

" No life is worth the having which is filled only by selfish thought and cold indifference to the wants of the world around. That life is only fit to grow in the heavenly places which is a life of sharing, of giving of everything that one has gathered. And there is this joyous thing about all the real goods of life : the goods of intelligence, of emotion, of art, of love—all the things which are really worth the having—that they do not waste in the giving ; they grow the more, the more we give. These physical things get smaller as we take away from them, leaving so much less for future use ; and so, when it is a question of sharing the physical things, men calculate and say : ' I have only enough for myself, for my wife, for my child. How can I give any away ? ' All that is matter is consumed in the using ; but that is not true of the higher things, the things of the intelligence, of the heart, and of the spirit. If I know something, I do not lose it when I teach it. Nay ! it becomes more truly mine because I have shared it with one more ignorant than myself ; so that you have two people enriched by knowledge, by the sharing of a store that increases, instead

of diminishing, as it is shared. And so with all that is worth having. You need not fear to lessen your own possessions by throwing them broadcast to your hungry fellow-men. Give your knowledge, your strength, your love; empty yourself utterly, and when for a moment you think you are empty, then from the inexhaustible fount of love, and beauty, and power more flows down to fill the empty vessel, making it fuller, and not emptier than it was before."—('When a Man Dies Shall He Live Again' by Dr. A. Besant, page 17.)

The lives of all great men illustrate this principle. According to the Bible, Jesus also taught his disciples :—

"Heal the sick, cleanse the lepers, raise the dead, cast out devils; freely ye have received, freely give."—(Matthew x. 8.)

It is the one function of will to radiate peace, power and harmony all round. Saints and sages never check, but always increase its radiations, and, thus, acquire inexhaustible powers themselves. The selfish, worldly man, not knowing the peculiar virtues of the Essence of Life, grudges its outgoing radiations, and regards the operation in the light of a loss.

The one true function of Life is to radiate 'virtue' all round unceasingly. Health, bodily and mental, peace and joy are the result of this free radiation of Life. This silent, steady work, in a spirit of Goodwill and Love, transmutes enemies into friends, evil into good, disease and sickness into health, and poverty into wealth. The man who is selfish, who loves himself more than his neighbour, who is cruel, vicious or intemperate, interferes with the free activity of his life, and obstructs the free radiation of 'virtue' from his being. When such evil thoughts are persisted in for a number of years, the mind and body lose their virility in consequence of the poison of evil, and a process similar to that of the winding up of a going concern takes place. Life, instead of expressing itself, begins to shut up shop, till gradually the premises are vacated and shutters put up. A story may be told to illustrate the working of this principle. There was a money-lender's firm which did excellent business, and was flourishing most promisingly. The director of the firm one day thought that it would be a grand idea if he could so arrange matters that money always came in but none went out, and so he promptly issued orders to his chief manager to stop the going out of money. The manager

was stunned by the orders of the director, and sent him several messages informing him that no money could possibly come in unless the capital of the firm was allowed to circulate, but they remained unheeded by the director. Faithful to his position, the manager had to yield at last, and so he put all the money of the firm in an iron safe and locked it up. The result was that the income stopped, but not the expenses; and as the capital in the safe dwindled, servants and creditors of the firm began to press for immediate payment of their claims. Matters went on like this for some time, till one morning the director went to take some money out of the safe to pay off some of the most pressing employees and creditors, when, lo! and behold! the safe was only full of emptiness, with all its money already spent and gone. In vain did he try to beg and pray the manager to save him somehow, but so confused were his ideas that he could only curse his hard fate and abuse that faithful servant, calling him the devil, the evil one, and so forth. At last he began to march up and down the room in a state of mental frenzy; when accidentally he knocked against the iron safe, fell heavily upon its open door, and burst an artery!

The lesson to be learnt from the story will become obvious when we remember that the director of the firm is the illusory bodily self of man, the concern, the life of the body, and the good manager, the Divinity of Life, also called Providence, who carries out the wishes of the apparent physical ego. The director wished to shut up what he foolishly considered to be his possessions, in the iron safe of selfish greed, heeded not the warnings from the Providence, and, finally abused the same Providence for the evil which he had brought on himself, calling him the Evil One and the like. Thus it is that man creates the devil for himself; in reality the devil has no existence apart from one's thoughts.

Let us now enquire into the Christian notion of evil and sin. As early as I Kings viii. 46 it was said:

“For there is no man that sinneth not.”

In Romans (iii. 23) we are told:—

“For all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God.”

In Ecclesiastes (chap. vii. 20) we have :—

“ For there is not a just man upon earth, that doeth good, and sinneth not. ”

No explanation is, however, furnished of man's shortcomings in this respect, in any of these books. But we are told by Isaiah (see chapter xlv. 6 and 7) :—

“ I am the Lord, and there is none else. I form the light and create darkness ; I make peace, and create evil ; I, the Lord, do all these things. ”

Job too declared (chap. v. 7) :

“ Yet man is born unto trouble, as the sparks fly upward. ”

This, no doubt, gives us a sort of explanation of the matter : but the question is, why is man born into trouble ? Why, to use the words of Isaiah, does the Lord create evil ? If he creates evil* there is an end of the matter, and man's responsibility ought no longer to be preached. What does this mean ? Is the Lord to be blamed for a wanton creation of evil ? Can we ascribe to him a design for creating that which we abhor even in the lowest and most degraded being amongst us ? And, yet, this is what it comes to ! The creator creates evil himself, is good enough to tell us that he has done so, and then turns on us, because we are evil ! How absurd ! But there is no escape from the dilemma. Either he did not create evil, or he did. If he did not, whence came evil into the world, since, according to theology, he is the creator of all things ? But the matter is set at rest by the direct testimony in Isaiah, in the passage already quoted. There remains the difficulty arising out of the mysterious conduct of this alleged creator. He creates evil himself, and then does his level best to remove its harmful effect ! Why this change of attitude ? Was he at first actuated by the impulse which makes the cat play with the mouse ? If so, why so great a solicitude for the welfare of humanity afterwards ? If we call him Father, because he sent down his only begotten son as a propitiation unto himself, what shall we call him for his cat-like spirit of playing with us ? Would it not have

* The Qur'an also has it (chap. xlii) : “ Whatever misfortune befalleth you, is sent you by God. ”

been infinitely better if he had left us uncreated? The confusion of thought with reference to the creation of evil, it seems, has arisen from the ignorance of the nature of the power that has been personified as the creator, and it is further aggravated by our introducing into the composer's picture our own private conceptions about the nature of divinity, which can never be deemed to be deliberately engaged in the creation of such a thing as evil. Hence, the moment the question is asked, 'does god create evil' we say, no, no, thinking that we ought not to ascribe its creation to a god, but forgetting that in doing so we make him out to be a liar; for he says quite distinctly that he is the creator of evil. We then make matters worse by adding that he means something else when he says, "I create evil," for in that case our statement comes to this that he either purposely misleads us, or is unable to express himself in plain, comprehensible language. The fact is that divinity can have no possible interest in misleading or deceiving us, but it is we who failing to understand the nature of the mythological personification which is represented as speaking, and of the language of the seer, deceive ourselves by perverting its sense. The fault lies in us, because we will not allow our pursuits in life to leave us time to meditate on these vital problems, and are, therefore, forced to accept conclusions which are based on a defective research.

Let us, therefore, believe in the testimony of the 'lord' when he says "I create evil."

But what are we to think of a being who creates evil, and is then good enough to tell us that he has done so? Should we worship him, because he is the author of evil, and, therefore, a being to be dreaded, or because he says:

"Whatever misfortune befallerh you is sent you by God."—Al Qur'an, chap. xlii.

He is repeatedly said to lead men astray, as will appear from the following passages from the Holy Qur'an:—

1. "Whomsoever God shall direct, he will be rightly directed; and whomsoever he shall lead astray, they shall perish."—Chap. xlii. 179.
2. "For he whom God shall cause to err shall have no direction."—Chap. xlii. 83.

3. "He will lead into error whom he pleaseth, and he will direct whom he pleaseth."—Chap. xvi. 96.

4. "We have created for hell many of the jins and men."—Chap. xvi. 180.

If emphasis were needed on the creation of men for hell, it is supplied by the Sura Sijda, which affirms:

"The word which hath proceeded from me must necessarily be fulfilled when I said, Verily, I will fill hell with jins and men altogether."

Since the punishment in hell is ordinarily understood to be eternal, and since there can be no worse fate for those who are sent, or are to be sent there, the question arises as to the obligation of the unfortunate wretches who are to people that place of insufferable torment to worship the creator of their undeserved suffering and pain. Does Islam expect to convince mankind of the advisability of licking the hand that relentlessly inflicts the blows? Can those who are created to fill the hell with their shrieks and yells be expected to find love in their aching hearts for the author of their everlasting misery? Surely the idea is too much even for mysticism!

The root of the error into which mysticism has fallen on this point lies in the very personification of *karma* as an anthropomorphic creator. As a matter of fact, all actions which lead to good or bad results spring from souls themselves, so that they are truly the authors of their own miseries and woes. This is the truth which was fully known to the ancients, as is evident from our investigation. In course of time this simple truth was distorted into a doctrine of creation, which reached its natural culmination in the 'inspired' utterances of Isaiah and the Prophet of Islam.

The rise of mysticism itself is due to the poetical genius which delights in puzzling the minds of men, by the mythical creations of imaginative fancy. The luxuriant growth of myth and legend and their widespread employment are suggestive of mythology having become, at some time in the long forgotten past, the *Lingua Franca* of all creeds excepting Jainism, which has always adhered to the simple matter-of-fact expression of scientific thought. When the true interpretation of the myths and legends was lost sight of by the efflux of time and the vicissitudes of human destiny, the mystically inclined

mind had nothing left but the outer husk to cling to. Then arose the differences which have given rise to bitter feuds and wholesale butchery of men.

Mythology seems to have found its staunchest ally in the *yoga* of devotion which professes to lead the soul to the goal by the shortest and cheapest of routes. For this reason people were delighted with it and flocked to it in large numbers. But they failed to see the far-reaching consequences which were sure to flow from concentration of mind on a false and inadequate object. For devotion creates the worst form of prejudice in the mind, being nothing other than the constant strengthening of belief, in every possible way, in the existence and power of its object. The replacing of the true Ideal with a false and inadequate idol being thus a necessary element of the mystic's devotion, it is not surprising that his mind should stick to it with all the tenacity of prejudiced bigotry it is capable of, and shut itself out from the truth. Moreover, concentration can be of use only when it is on a subject, as distinguished from a purely imaginary personification, since the former presents an unlimited field for investigation while the latter has but a few details to offer which can be mastered in no time.

Having installed the mythological impersonation in their hearts as a being, the devotees had no other alternative left but to invest it with the power to shape the destinies of all beings, now left, by the force of logic, as mere puppets in the hands of their supposed creator. Hence, the god of the devotee became the author of both good and evil. This is why Isaiah did not hesitate to attribute the creation of evil to his god. Muhammad, likewise, adhered to the personification, and declared :

"God misleadeth whom he will, and whom he will he guideth."—Al Qur'an, chap. xlv. 4.

So far as the idea of sin is concerned, it is obvious that there can be no such thing as sin in the theological sense of the word. No one can sin against an imaginary mythological being ; and since the soul is its own God, it follows that sin only signifies a wrong done to one's own self.

According to Philo Judæus, sin is "innate in every one born even if he be virtuous, by reason of his coming to birth" (Philo's Contribution to Religion, by Kennedy, p. 72). This is undoubtedly true; for those who are sinless are rid of matter altogether, and cannot, therefore, be born any more. Philo further tells us that "pleasure is the serpent, an abominable thing in itself which beguiles and leads astray the reason . . . Passion is the fountain of sins" (Ibid. p. 100).

Philo's description of the evil nature of matter in association with the soul is remarkably accurate and precise :—

"God alone is most true and genuine peace, but all matter, as having come into being and perishable, is constant warfare. For God is free activity . . . Whoever, therefore, is able to leave behind warfare and necessity and becoming and decay, and to take refuge with that which has no becoming or decay . . . might rightly be called the dwelling place and city of God."—(Ibid. 73.)

What, then, is Philo's advice to the true seeker ?

"Away, my friend, from that earthly vesture of yours, escape from that accursed prison, the body, and from its pleasures and lusts which are your jailors."—(Ibid. 89.)

In the gospel according to St. John, a further distinction seems to have been drawn between ignorance and sin. Accordingly, the Messiah is made to say of his congregations :—

"If I had not come and not spoken unto them, they had not had sin; but now they have no cloak for their sin."—(John xv. 22.)

According to this view, sin is a wilful disregard of truth when it is known—a stubborn and perverse refusal to better one's condition after the way to do so is pointed out. Even the Qur'an declares :—

"If ye do well, ye will do well to your own souls; and if ye do evil, ye will do it unto the same."—(Chapter xvii.)

"Whoso committeth wickedness committeth it against his own soul."—(Chapter iv.)

God is the ideal of absolute perfection for the imagination of man and the Christ within is the emblem of freedom and salvation.

and is ever ready to manifest himself, if we would but give him a chance to do so. So long, however, as we search for him in the outer world, we display a disbelief in his presence within us, and, thus, prevent him from revealing himself. It is this state of disbelief which is all the sin, and its punishment consists in the non-manifestation of the Godhood of the soul, with all the ills of the flesh and the worries of the mind which are the necessary concomitants of such an ungodly condition. The lives of the Jaina Tirthamkaras show us the heights of glory to which man can rise by living the life enjoined by Religion proper, and we have to thank ourselves for being debarred from them now. In short, man will find that all the sin he commits in the course of his career, as an incarnating ego, consists in his insulting his soul by regarding another as his creator, and by paying his homage to a creature or creatures of poetical fantasies. Sinlessness, consequently, consists in a belief in the Divinity of the soul itself.

We may now conclude the subject with a word of explanation of the differences of opinion between the religions of India and the Semitic group, as to the duration of existence in heaven and hell, the former holding that the soul's sojourn in these regions is for a time and not unending, and the latter, that it is eternal. This difference of opinion is due, as must be obvious to the reader by this time, mainly to the difference of significances of the terms heaven and hell in the two sets of religions. In the Indian religions both heaven and hell are geographical regions in space, but in the Jewish, the Christian and the Muslim creeds they generally bear a mystic import, hell implying the state of existence when spirit is dominated by matter, and heaven, the opposite condition of release from such domination. As the condition of release is unending and eternal for all times to come in the future, and as matter's domination is without a beginning in the past eternity of time and it is not likely to be ever terminated in the case of a very large number of souls even in the future, the duration of heaven and hell is said to be eternal in the delusive language of Mysticism. It is not often that the words heaven and hell are employed in *their* plain sense in the mystic scripts.

We may now enquire into the nature of

REVELATION

to which almost every religion attributes its Scriptures. Jainism, so far as we know, is the only important creed which claims for its Scripture the authority of omniscient men.

Many and bitter have been the quarrels which this unfortunate word—'revelation'—is responsible for; for the disputants always take care to assert that their own books alone, to the exclusion of all other Scriptures in the world, are the repository of revealed truth, thus giving rise to a painful feeling of anger and resentment against, rather than to a sense of veneration for, the creed whose supremacy they would like to assert and establish. But nobody, it seems, understands the nature of the thing which they all unblushingly invoke in their aid.

The misunderstood or half-understood Word of Law in the hands of fools and dunces, thus, becomes a prolific source of hatred and strife, rather than the harbinger of blessing and peace which it ought to be. If this is the immediate effect of the power of the Revealed Word, we are glad that this book has so little to do with revelation.

But let us proceed to meet the argument strictly logically. Taking the case of the Bible as a concrete instance, we can say of it that it is either a revealed Scripture, or not. In the former case, the truths contained in it could not be known otherwise than on revelation; and since the revelation itself took place only about two thousand years ago (in the case of the teaching of Jesus, at least), it follows, that before that auspicious time, in the history of religion, they could not have been known. For, if the matters revealed were, or could be, known independently of a divine revealer, revelation would lose all its special charm and the almighty Revealer of nature's profound secrets would stand unmasked as a false pretender, who infringed the copyright of others, and passed off their plagiarized knowledge with a label of his own, calling it revealed truth. This alone must be the test of the type of revelation with which we are concerned for the present, so that if knowledge already existed, there could be no revelation of it at all, however much that knowledge might have remained unknown to any particular people in the world.

But not only the New Testament, but, also, the older portion of the Holy Bible pales at the very idea of this test. For the Bible, as a whole, and apart from the admixture of the myths woven round some stray historical events of the Jewish nation, contains nothing that did not exist, prior to its compilation, in the Zend Avesta, the Scriptures of the Hindus, or those of the most ancient faith of all, namely, Jainism. And the case with Al Qur'an stands no better, for it is principally based on the Old Testament of the Holy Bible and other older teachings. Which, then, can be the properly revealed Word of God, that which is the source, or that which is derived from the source? We might consider a concrete instance to illustrate our point. Jesus said, 'do unto others as you would be done by'; but long before him Confucius had made identically the same statement, which is also to be found in other older religions, such as Buddhism and Hinduism. Assuming that Confucius was not inspired, and that the Buddhist canon and the Vedas are not revealed books, but were compiled by men, as they surely must have been, Jesus can only be said to have imposed on the credulity of his disciples, if he gave out the passage in question as a revelation. The question really is: how came those religions which are older than Christianity to know that which was only revealed to Jesus in the Holy Land? Did they discover the truth for themselves, or was it revealed to them also? But in the former case revelation becomes a pure farce; and in the latter, the claim about the Holy Bible being the only revealed Book falls to the ground.*

* In the midst of all this clamour for a monopoly of revelation, it is refreshing to find such utterances as the following in the Holy Qur'an itself:—

"Every age hath its book of revelation.¹ . . . The Koran is not a new invented fiction; but a confirmation of those scriptures which have been revealed before it."² . . . There hath been no nation, but a preacher hath in past times been conversant among them.³ . . . I swear by the instructive Koran, that thou art one of the messengers of God, sent to show the right way."⁴ . . . Say, I believe in all the scriptures which God hath sent down⁵ . . . We have heretofore raised up in every nation an apostle to admonish them, saying, Worship God, and avoid Taghut.⁶ . . . Mankind was of one faith, and God sent prophets bearing good tidings, and denouncing threats, and sent down with them the scripture in truth."⁷

1 Chap. 10.

2 Chap. 12.

3 Chap. 10.

4 Chap. 10.

5 Chap. 42.

6 Chap. 16.

7 Chap. 2.

In its true nature revelation is the instruction in truth imparted by an omniscient *Tirthamkara*. It is called *śruti* (that which is heard), because of its having been originally heard by the ear. When reduced to writing it is called scripture. The reason why so much veneration is attached to it is to be found in its absolute freedom from doubt, ignorance and error, which are the three constituent elements of falsehood. For its accuracy is guaranteed by the infinite all-embracing knowledge of the *Tirthamkara*, who imparts it to men, not because it will serve some end of His own, but because He is moved by mercy at the sight of the suffering of living beings. Hence, the chief characteristics of a true revelation are that (1) it should proceed from an omniscient Teacher; (2) it should be free from falsehood of any kind whatsoever; and (3) it should be the gospel of mercy, which means that it should not mislead men by dubious, cryptic expression, nor promulgate false and cruel doctrines, such as that of animal sacrifice.

The reason why there is no revelation today *when it is most needed* is to be found in the simple fact that we have no *Tirthamkara* in our midst nowadays, the last * of the Holy Ones having entered *nirvana* in 527 B.C. What this means is that revelation is possible only while the *Tirthamkaras* are still embodied in the flesh, not after They have discarded the physical body to enter *nirvana*.

This will become clear if we bear in mind the nature of *Śruti* (revelation) which means that which is originally heard from an omniscient Teacher. Now, since all that is heard is sound in some form or other, and since sound consists only in a certain kind of movement—the vibratory motion of material bodies—it follows that there can be no revelation where the circumstances are not favourable for the propagation of sound waves. Hence, * the *Siddhatmans* in *nirvana*, whose being consists of pure Effulgence of Spirit, and who have neither a material body nor any other kind of connection

* According to the Jaina Scripture; the present cycle of time will end 39,546 years hence, giving place to the next, the first *Tirthamkara* of which will be born after 42,000 years of its commencement. There will be a fresh revelation then in our part of the world.

with matter, cannot communicate with men. Neither do the Holy Ones entertain a desire for such communication ; for the attainment of *nirvana*, the ideal of Perfection and Bliss, is possible only on the destruction of all kinds of desire, and is, consequently, indicative of and consistent with the state of absolute desirelessness on Their part.

Applying these observations to the different scriptures now extant in the world, it can be seen at a glance that none of the non-Jaina books can lay any claim to being the Word of God. They do not proceed from an omniscient *Pirthamkara*, and none of them is free from mythology, the source of misunderstanding and strife. They are also not helpful to *all* souls alike, most of them being even directly the cause of the slaughter of innocent animals, in the name of religion itself.

In this connection let it be further added that the utmost confusion has resulted in the non-Jaina religions from an indiscriminate incorporation in their sacred books of all sorts of contradictory and discordant utterances of half-illuminated men, believed to be possessed of prophetic inspiration. Their knowledge is not even derived from true clairvoyance ; though some of them might have developed what is known as *ku-avadhi* (false or imperfect clairvoyance) to the Jaina writers.

Many of the prophets of the Old Testament epoch, for instance, were men not particularly noted for their renunciation or wisdom, and were, consequently, subject to all or most of the faults and frailties of common humanity.

It is about such men that Isaiah says :—

“ But they also have erred through wine, and through strong drink are out of the way ; the priest and the prophet have erred through strong drink, they are swallowed up of wine, they are out of the way through strong drink ; they err in vision, they stumble in judgment. For all tables are full of vomit and filthiness, so that there is no place clean.”—(Chap. xxviii. 7 and 8.)

And, Joel exhorts :—

“ Awake, ye drunkards, and weep ; and howl, all ye drinkers of wine, because of the new wine, for it is cut off from your mouth.”—(Chap. i. 5.)

The 'new wine' referred to is the wine which exhilarates, but does not inebriate; it is the ecstasy of Self-contemplation, the *masti* (intoxication) of *ananda*, that *enlivens* the soul, but does not rob it of consciousness. He who would aspire for spiritual unfoldment must first break his connection with this curse of 'civilisation,' which, as Isaiah declares, is the cause of error in vision and judgment. This is why wine is strongly condemned by Jainism. The Muhammadans also forbid its use.

The case with meat is not a whit different; it does not make one unconscious, but by hardening the finer instincts and merciful nature of the soul, stands in the way of the full development of spiritual power. Prophetic vision, thus, cannot become perfect so long as the impurities deposited by animal flesh and intoxicating liquor are not removed from the system.

In order, therefore, to understand the discrepant writings of the different prophets, one must, first of all, find out the degree of purity of life attained by them. Thus warned, the reader is not likely to become confused by the bewildering mixture of truth and falsehood which he will come across in the records of prophetic inspiration, and will not lose his balance of mind in the presence of such utterances as:

"My words are not contrary to the word of God, but the word of God can contradict mine and some of the words of God abrogate others (Jabir). Muhammad said, 'some of my words rescind others, like the Kur'an' (Ibn Qimar)." *

It is not the word of a God which is ever abrogated, but the word of man erroneously ascribed to God.

So far as mythology is concerned, there being no question of revelation concerning it, it is clear that when the myths and legends of two creeds are found to be the same, in principle and form, the younger of the two will be deemed to have borrowed its stock, directly or indirectly, from its elder sister.

It is for this reason that we find it impossible to agree with Mr. Muhommad Ali † when he denies that Zoroastrianism and other religions had anything to do with the teaching of Islam. When he insists

* 'Sayings of Muhammad,' p. 10.

† See 'The Divine Origin of the Holy Qur'an.'

on direct proof of Muhammad having derived his wisdom from the Zoroastrians, the Jews and others, he forgets that most of the legends and aphorisms of religion were the common property of the people at large, having been related, times out of number, at halting places of caravans, by beggars at the roadside, and by hermits and monks of different faiths, who had their monasteries in the neighbouring countries, to say nothing of those who used to travel abroad in the cause or search of truth. Unless we believe that the Prophet's mind was an air-tight compartment in which nothing from the outside had been allowed to enter, till the completion of the Qur'an, it is not possible to think that he had not become acquainted with the things which were the common property of all alike. Rather than take up a position untenable on the face of it, it might be more profitable to lay stress on the wisdom of Muhammad, which enabled him to get to the kernel of truth in those very legends which many repeated but few understood.

The position and antiquity of Jainism can now be seen to assert themselves. It does not claim to derive its authority from any mystic or unintelligible source, but bases it on the authority of the *Tirthankaras*, who saw, by their power of Omniscience, the things as they actually exist in the universe, and whose statements are verified by the most searching conclusions of reason. Add to this the fact that Their knowledge enabled them to attain the *summum bonum*, the great Ideal of Perfection and Bliss, which is the aim and aspiration of all, and the argument in support of the claim of Jainism is conclusive. It will be seen that no amount of revelation from one who has not himself undergone the experiences and trials which the *jiva* has to pass through, on the Path of Liberation, can possibly be helpful to the soul, since he will lack the merit of practicalness which only a *guru* with actual experience can possess. Just as he who is a pure quack, or has only read about surgery in books, cannot be employed to perform a surgical operation, which must be left in the skilled hands of a qualified surgeon, so cannot he who has not had the necessary practical experience, be entrusted with the spiritual welfare of the soul.

In respect of the antiquity of Jainism, it is sufficient to say that if it be true that the ideal of perfection and bliss is realizable by mankind, there must be a number of men who have already attained to it. The very first * of these Holy Ones, must, therefore, be recognized to be the founder of the true religion which his teachings constitute. This Holy Lord, the first *Tirthamkara*, is Shri Rishabha Deva, who was the first to establish Religion in this cycle. His teaching has been confirmed by twenty-three subsequent *Tirthamkaras*, whose Holy Feet have graced our little earth, from time to time. Jainism, thus, differs from the remaining creeds in the following essential particulars :—

(1) it is founded by those who have actually attained Liberation, not by mystics vaguely impressed with truth, whose writings cannot lay claim to precision and lucidity of thought, however much we may admire them for their cryptic unintelligibility, or poetic excellence ;

(2) it is a self-sufficient and complete explanation of all the departments of religion, neither fragmentary nor disjointed, like those other creeds which depend on extraneous light for their interpretation ;

(3) it is the only scientific Path of Salvation which in other religions is hopelessly involved in obscurity ;

(4) it is the oldest religion, being founded by the first ' Conqueror ' in the present cycle ;

(5) it is free from the entanglements, pitfalls and snares of mythology, which only lead to wrangling and feuds ; and

(6) it is helpful to *all* living beings alike.

It is not necessary to comment any further upon these features of distinction after what has been established in the previous pages : suffice it to say that they are the true marks of perfection of knowledge and method.

* This statement is to be understood with respect to the Jaina divisions of time, for otherwise in a world which is eternal the question of the first man to attain *nirvana* can hardly arise. The Jaina teaching is that in each cycle of time there are 24 *Tirthamkaras*, the first of whom re-establishes religion among men. The others also re-establish it if it disappears subsequently, or only confirm and reconfirm it, periodically.

So far as the age of Jainism is concerned, it is now admitted on all hands that it is at least about 2,800 years old (the Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics, vol. vii. pp. 465-466). This implies the historicity of the twenty-third *Tirthamkara*, *Bhagwan* Parasva Nath. But modern speculation is still exercised over the historicity of the earlier *Tirthamkaras* whom it is inclined to regard as a fiction invented with a view to claim the lustre of antiquity for a new creed. This is, however, absurd, for, as has been demonstrated in this work, not only Jainism but even some of those very creeds which today range themselves in opposition to it fix the number of the Holy Ones as four and twenty. Several works of authority on Hinduism, as for instance, the *Bhagwat Purana*, go even farther, and bear out the Jaina tradition, mentioning the first *Tirthamkara*, *Bhagwan* Rishabha Deva, expressly by name, and describing Him as a great Teacher and *muni*, the Conqueror of *samsara*, and the obtainer of *moksha*. His parents and descendants are also expressly named, and He is described as the founder of Jainism. Such important testimony, coming, as it does, from the hostile camps, is of the greatest value, and conclusively establishes the fact that the great *Tirthamkaras* are not pure inventions of the Jaina writers. The important thing to note is that the Hindus know of no one else but Sri Rishabha Devaji as the founder of Jainism.* If Jainism had been established by Parasva Nathji or some other *Tirthamkara* they would be sure to know of it, and, instead of confirming the Jaina tradition, would have flatly contradicted it as untrue. As Stevenson says in his "Kalpa Sutra and Nava Tattva," the Hindus and the Jainas agree so seldom that we cannot afford to refuse credence to their agreement, when it is actually reached on any particular point. The age of *Bhagwan* Rishabha Devaji may be judged from the fact that His son Bharat was the first Chakravarti (great Emperor) after whom India came to be known as Bharata Varsha, a name which she is found to bear in the oldest known reference extant.

* For the greater comparative antiquity of Jainism with reference to Hinduism see Appendix C, which has been adapted and removed from the Practical Path where it was not needed.

So far as the theory that would make out the Holy Ones to be an invention of imagination is concerned, it is to be observed that the ancients were noted for sincerity and love of truth, and their records breathe the purest fragrance of ingenuousness and unsophisticated candour. It is plain that no true teacher of religion can afford to indulge in what is known as fabrication of evidence, since that can only go to retard his own spiritual progress, which he must be presumed to be anxious not to mar in any possible way. It is simply absurd to impute fraud and forgery to men whose lives of piety and renunciation are models for our own, and who have never been excelled in righteousness.

Moreover, the ancients whose wonderful insight into the nature of things has thrown the lispings 'wisdom' of the moderns into shade, must be presumed to know that they could not hope to dupe the whole of mankind into false beliefs for ever. They must, therefore, be fixed with the knowledge that the moment the fraud was discovered their whole teaching was liable to be discarded as the word of swindlers and rogues. We refuse to believe that they would incur this risk for no purpose. Besides, it is the nature of man to claim credit for a new discovery; hence, where we find not one's own, but another's claim advanced, the case assumes an aspect of sincerity which no amount of highflown rhetoric can displace. The study of human nature is as necessary for a historian as it is for a philosopher, and so long as our historians ignore that element, they can never hope to command the respect of philosophy, however much they might applaud one another.

The question of antiquity, it may be pointed out further, is of little or no importance with reference to truth, because scientific facts are not valued by the number of centuries that may have elapsed since their discovery. It does not, similarly, matter whether religion be the most ancient system or only of recent growth; if it is true and helpful, its utility will ever remain unimpaired by all considerations of age.

The comparative antiquity of Jainism, that is to say, its priority in point of time over all other creeds is apparent from the fact that it furnishes a complete explanation of the entire subject, in a scien-

tific way. The teaching of all other religions is mythological, not scientific even in a single instance; and wherever they tend to approach scientific thought, they make it amply evident that they have no true conception of the subject. It is evident that religion is a science as exact as any other that we can think of, so that whoever be its discoverer, he could not have been a primitive savage on the eve of his emergence from monkey ancestry, as modern research would have us believe.* The question now is :

* The assumption that the Vedic and other mythologies are the work of primitive humanity because they were composed in an age which is known, by the relics that have been since unearthed and discovered, to have been characterised by the existence of men who know nothing of the potter's, the carpenter's or the blacksmith's art, is, in the light of what has been stated in the preceding pages of this book, as much devoid of merit as the one which insists on taking these different mythologies as the expression of the savage admiration for wind, cloud and rain, though it might well be that certain parts of the world were steeped in deep ignorance, at the time of their composition. We are not to be taken as denying the existence of any well attested and duly established fact, tending to show that at a certain period of time, in the past history of our globe, certain parts of the world were inhabited by human beings who cannot but be classed as savages. Our thesis does not clash with any such well-established fact : nor are we interested in disputing the existence of the cave-man who made his implements at first from stone, and then resorted to metal. What we do dispute is the sweeping inference which has been drawn—all too hastily as it would seem—by the modern investigator that all men who lived contemporaneously with or prior to the time of the cave-man in Northern Europe or elsewhere must be as uncultured as he. For the different mythologies that have been examined by us in this book prove—as eloquently and unerringly as the implements left behind by the cave-dwellers of the past—that their authors were familiar with and have bequeathed to us truths which are almost wholly beyond the comprehension of the modern man. This is sufficient to show that the prevalence of gross ignorance in certain communities, or parts of the world, is not necessarily incompatible with full enlightenment in other places, at one and the same time. In India everything points to the existence, for a very very long time in the past, of full enlightenment and high culture, as in the case of Jainas, side by side with extreme ignorance and savage barbarism, characteristic of certain nomadic tribes, who led a wandering life in the forests, shunning civilisation, and some of whom even lived by such inhuman practices as *thugae*. This co-existence of high science with extreme barbarism, it would seem, is not peculiar to any particular country or age, for we find even today unmitigated cannibalism and savagery prevailing simultaneously, and, in some places almost side by side, with what has been claimed to be great enlightenment and culture. Suppose our descendants, some

whether Jainism borrowed from others and perfected their teachings, or whether the fragmentary, incomplete and mythological scriptures of the others are grounded upon the scientific explanation of Jainism. The answer to this is easily furnished by the fact that the literature of mythological sects could not be grounded on the principles of truth unless those principles were known* to some one already.

five or ten thousand years hence, were to discover the relics of cannibalistic barbarism in certain caves, among the rocks of the Dark Continent, and in some way to determine their precise age; would they be entitled to conclude that the whole world in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries of the Christian era was inhabited by men who knew no culture and ate their fellowmen? Our laboured conclusions about the primitive man are exactly of the same type, and are no more valid than the one of our descendants under the abovementioned circumstances will be.

* Cf. "Pagan Religion is indeed an Allegory, a Symbol of what men felt and knew about the Universe; and all Religions are symbols of that, altering always, as that alters; but it seems to me a radical perversion, and even inversion of the business to put that forward as the origin and moving cause, when it was rather the result and termination. To get beautiful allegories, a perfect poetic symbol, was not the want of men; but to know what they were to believe about this Universe, what course they were to steer in it; what, in this mysterious life of theirs, they had to hope and to fear, to do and to forbear doing. The *Pilgrim's Progress* is an Allegory, and a beautiful, just and serious one; but consider whether Bunyan's Allegory could have preceded the Faith it symbolizes? The Faith has to be already there, standing believed by everybody;—of which the Allegory could then become a shadow; and with all its seriousness, we may say, a *sportful* shadow, a mere play of the Fancy, in comparison with that awful fact and scientific certainty which it poetically strives to emblem. The Allegory is the product of the certainty, not the producer of it; not in Bunyan's nor in any other case. For Paganism, therefore, we have still to enquire whence came that scientific certainty, the parent of such a bewildered heap of allegories, errors and confusions? How was it, what was it?"

"Surely it were a foolish attempt to pretend 'explaining,' in this place, or in any place, such a phenomenon as that far-distant distracted cloudy Imbroglio of Paganism,—more like a cloud field than a distant continent of firm land and facts! It is no longer a reality, yet it was one. We ought to understand that this seeming cloud field was once a reality; that not poetic allegory, least of all that dupery and deception was the origin of it. Men, I say, never did believe idle songs, never risked their soul's life on allegories: men in all times, especially in early earnest times, have had an instinct for detecting quacks, for detesting quacks. Let us try if, leaving out both the quack theory and the allegory one, and listening with affectionate attention to that far-off

Moreover, scientific religion is like a chain no single link of which can be removed or displaced without destroying it as a whole. This is exactly the case with Jainism whose doctrines are presupposed and implied in one another, so that it is impossible to treat them as isolated fragments or bits of knowledge. It follows from this that the knowledge of truth must have existed in a scientific way before the coming into vogue of the mystery-language of mythology. The field of enquiry is thus narrowed down to the question : where did this scientific knowledge exist—whether in Jainism or among the non-Jaina creeds ? But the latter have nothing to show that might indicate that they were the discoverers of truth ; on the contrary, we cannot imagine them to have thrown away the kernel and retained only some bruised and mutilated fragments of the outermost shell. It is clear, therefore, that they builded their pantheons on foundations not their own. Further, where we look out for a scientific source we do not find it anywhere else but in Jainism, because it is the only scientific religion in the world. Jainism, it will be seen, fully meets the situation, furnishing a complete explanation not only of the Science of Salvation, as religion might be termed, but also of the doubts and difficulties of men which have arisen from a wholesale personification of the psychic and spiritual faculties of the soul. It follows from this that the fragmentary, incomplete and mystical doctrines of the non-Jaina creeds belong to a later period in the history of religion, and that the plain statements of the Jaina *Siddhānta*, free from blood-stained symbolism, confounding myths and meaningless, degrading ritual, depicting truth in its naked majesty, are those of the earliest and, therefore, of the purest religion. That truth should have been known to man in ancient times is not surprising, since knowledge is the very nature of the soul, and only requires to be drawn out by simple living and high thinking, so that the ancients

confused rumour of the Pagan ages, we cannot ascertain so much as this at least, that there was a kind of fact at the heart of them ; that they too were not mendacious and distracted, but in their own poor way true and sane."—'Heroes and Hero-Worship' by Thomas Carlyle.

who certainly lived much simpler lives than ourselves were better qualified of the two for the acquisition of wisdom divine.

It will be convenient to notice here an objection which has been raised in certain quarters against our thesis on the score of language. It is said that the language of the Vedas is centuries older than that of the Jaina Books, and upon the strength of this it is contended that Hinduism must be deemed to be older than Jainism. The contention is, however, devoid of force, and in no way fatal to the conclusions we have arrived at here. It will be seen, first of all, that the language of the Vedas is not the language of the Jaina Books, the former being couched in Sanskrit, 'the polished' tongue, and the latter mostly in Prakrit, i.e., the language of the masses. That being so, it is not easy to arrive at a definite basis of comparison likely to yield conclusive results. Secondly, the Jaina *Siddhānta* was preserved, like the Vedas, in the memory of men, and was not reduced to writing till several centuries after the *nirvāṇa* of the last Tirthamkara, *Bhagwan Mahāvira*. As Max Müller points out, the whole literature of India in the ancient days was preserved by oral tradition. According to Tiele, writing was known in India before the third century B.C., but was applied only rarely, if at all, to literature. "But all this," observes Mr. J. M. Robertson (*Christianity and Mythology*, p. 143), "is perfectly compatible with the oral transmission of a great body of ancient utterance. All early compositions, poetic, religious, and historical, were transmissible in no other way; and the lack of letters did not at all necessarily involve loss. In all probability ancient unwritten compositions were often as accurately transmitted as early written ones, just because in the former case there was a severe discipline of memory, whereas in the other the facility of transcription permitted of many errors, omissions, and accidental interpolations. And the practice of oral transmission has survived." Even at the present day young Brahmans are taught Vedic hymns from oral tradition, and learn them by heart.

"They spend year after year under the guidance of their teacher, learning a little day after day, repeating what they have learnt as part of their daily devotion. . . . In the *Mahabharata* we read, 'Those who sell the Vedas, and even those who write them, those also who defile them, shall go to hell.' Kumārila says: 'That

knowledge of the truth is worthless which has been acquired from the Vedas if it has been learnt from writing or been received from a Sudra? How then was the Veda learnt? It was learnt by every Brahman during twelve years of his studentship or Brahmacharya."*

As pointed out in a footnote to p. 143 of Mr. J. M. Robertson's highly interesting work already cited, this description corresponds remarkably with Cæsar's account of the educational practices of Druids. He tells us that many entered the Druid discipline, learning orally a great number of verses; some remaining in pupilage as long as twenty years; and this though writing was freely used for secular purposes.

This, then, was a common practice with mankind, and the Jainas were no exception to the rule, as every scholar of note admits. According to Mr. Barth (see the *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, vol. iii. p. 90, quoted in the *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. xxii. Intro. p. xxxv), the Jaina Canon existed for nearly a thousand years before it was reduced to writing. Jaina tradition, too, is quite explicit on the point, and itself fixes the date of the redaction of the Books, adding that before that time teachers made no use of books when teaching the *Siddhānta* to novices, but after that time they did.

Thus, both Hinduism and Jainism had their literature preserved in the same way, and it is evident that priority in point of time with reference to the date of redaction can be no test of greater antiquity between them, since it is conceivable that a more recent creed might resort to writing at an earlier date than the one that is more ancient. Besides this, it is possible for an earlier system when reduced to writing to exhibit strong linguistic traits that are suggestive of later development. This is bound to happen where the rivalry is between an earlier scientific system and a later poetical one; for while the very expression and wording of the latter is fixed rigidly and unalterably once for all at the moment of its composition, the former cannot but be reduced to writing in the language of the day, i.e., the date of its redaction. This is precisely what has happened in the case of the Jaina *Siddhānta* which had a definite system of thought but

* Max Müller's 'History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature,' pp. 601—2.

no fixed expression, except as regards the numerous technicalities occurring in it—*jiva*, *ajiva* and the like. The Vedas, on the other hand, have a fixed expression in the idiom of the date of their composition, so that whatever be the time of their appearance in writing in a manuscript form, their language will naturally and necessarily point to the period of their authors. The issue, however, is not whether the expression of Vedic hymnology was fixed prior to the redaction of the Jaina *Siddhānta*, but whether that *Siddhānta* did or did not exist on the date of the composition of the Vedic hymns? But the determination of this point is not possible by the supposition—whether assumed or real—of the greater antiquity of the language of the Vedic poetry, for the reasons given. It must, therefore, be left to be determined by those other considerations which we have relied upon in reaching the conclusion we have arrived at.

It only remains now to look into the philosophy of the much despised school of thought whose followers were termed *Charvāka*. These were men who followed no religion, who denied the existence of the soul, who considered it useless to waste the short time at one's disposal in this world in the study of metaphysics or philosophy, and who fully gave themselves up to the enjoyment of the pleasures which the world afforded. They had little or no philosophy, and the practical side of their life—shall we say their religion?—may be summed up in the formula, 'eat, drink and be merry.' That this palpably wretched creed at one time acquired the dignity of a school of philosophy is not surprising, when we remember that the masses love anything which allows them the free indulgence of the senses, and care not to plunge into the study of any complicated system of metaphysics, or to practise *yoga* austerities. Possibly Epicure was a follower of *Chārvaṅkism*, and the same might have been the case with the author of the book of Ecclesiastes in the Holy Bible. Much of its literature, if it ever boasted of one, is now lost, because of the hostility and opposition which it encountered everywhere in the world of thought; and, beyond a very little more than what has been stated here, practically nothing is known about its founder, literature and philosophy. So great was the opposition which prevailed against this sort of philosophy that anyone who had at all dabbled in metaphysics and who

could anathematize a bit never felt any hesitation in emptying his broadside against it. But, notwithstanding all these disadvantages, it seems to have made a considerable impression and to have secured a fairly large number of followers for itself, at least, in the early part of its history.

So far as its merit is concerned, it might be that it was not intended to be a license for libertinism and sensuality. It is not impossible to interpret its tenet—*eat, drink and be merry*—in a highly technical sense; for it might be argued that its insistence on remaining merry under all circumstances rendered its practical side as hard as that of any system of severe *tapas* or *yoga*, since cheerfulness is for all intents and purposes synonymous with equanimity which is the aim of religion to develop in the soul. But if that was the real doctrine of this school, it is a pity that it should have allowed itself to become an agency for the spreading of ignorance, falsehood and sensualism which alone seem to have been included in its purview.

To conclude, our enquiry has brought us to the highly satisfactory conclusion that there are no real differences of principles amongst the rational religions of the world which we have examined here. Much has been said here, in this book, which throws light on the respective merits and demerits of each system of philosophical thought, and it has been seen that all the differences that prevail amongst us are due to inexhaustive research and hasty, hence defective, generalisation. The spirit of personification is also responsible for a great deal of mischief. It might be that the differences of opinion on philosophical matters must prevail amongst us, for all of us cannot become wise at once; but that is assuredly no ground for there being any differences, much less bitter differences, of feelings, on matters religious, when the whole humanity is at one on the essentials of religion and spiritual salvation. How much nearer the attainment of our goal would we be if, instead of dissipating our energies in bigoted refutation of one another's principles, which, in very truth, are not different but identically the same in every religion, we were to settle down to understand the truth, to work out our salvation, to realize the Ideal. It is well to bear in mind that we should impart knowledge, but only in the spirit of sincerity, sympathy and love,

never in any other mood. The object is not to convict, but to convince; and harsh words, offensive arguments, and unsympathetic tone do more damage on such occasions than perhaps even the sword-drawn in the cause of *jehad*. Even when one comes across a stone-worshipper, one should not spit on the piece of stone before him; for that stone is as dear to him as his life, perhaps even dearer; but should gently raise his ideals, so that he might be qualified to worship the true God from within. Our mission, as the messenger of peace, fails if we only make the stone-worshipper an enemy of ourselves and of the faith which we preach. It is well to understand that it is reason, and reason alone, which alters the convictions of men, and leads them to give up their unreasonable beliefs. Our chief fault is that we are ever ready to set up ourselves as teachers, without ever having *learnt* the subject of our discourses ourselves. One should remove the beam from one's own eye, before rushing off to remove the mote from that of one's neighbour. The world has had enough of dogmas and myths already, and has no more time to waste over them. It is now time to preach the Gospel of Truth which will carry

PEACE AND JOY TO ALL BEINGS.

CHAPTER XV

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

"Religion is the vital principle of the world, since it is the first cause of all felicity. It proceeds from man, and it is by it also that man attains the chief good. From religion, birth in a good family is obtained, bodily health, good fortune, long life, and prowess. From religion also spring pure renown, a thirst for knowledge, and increase of wealth. From the darkest gloom, and every dreaded ill, religion will ever prove a saviour. Religion when duly practised bestows heaven, and final emancipation."—*The Kalpa Sutra*.

The motor spring of all volitional activity, the secret of all kinds of passions and emotions, the cause of all thinking and acting is solely and simply happiness. There is no being, human, angelic or animal, to say nothing of the other forms of life, who does not strive to obtain as much joy as he can extract from his surroundings. There is equally truly no man, *deva*, demon, or animal, who does not fear death. "That all men fear to die," said J. J. Rousseau,* "is the great law dominating the thinking world, and without which all living things would soon cease to exist. This fear is the natural impulse, and is not merely an accident, but an important factor in the whole order of things. *He who pretends to face death without fear is a liar.*" Death is terrible; it terrifies all, and few, indeed, are the souls who have courage enough left even to think on the point. A captive slave of death, and mostly its victim, too, man nevertheless aspires to attain happiness, to avoid all those accidents and incidents which might directly or indirectly tend to embitter life. Alas! how often has not this dream of everlasting joy, almost beyond the conception of the majority of terror-stricken men and women, been nipped in the bud, by the physical body being taken to be the man? Many think: death is the dissolution of form, and man (body) only a compound; therefore, is it not futile to think of eternal life? And, since

* Quoted from 'The Nature of Man.'

eternal life is taken to be a hallucination of the deceitful fantasy, unalloyed joy also becomes a delusion of the intellect.

Such is the conflict of false conceptions and high aspirations of the human soul. Dogmatism, which fears rational intellect, and, therefore, prudently reserves its insinuating eloquence for those whose minds are either too immature or too much paralyzed for consistent thought, offers to help the soul over the stile by its promises of eternal life in the hereafter. Islam, the youngest of creeds, with the exception of Sikhism and one or two other minor faiths, such as the Brahmo-Samaj, may be assumed to be the first to open fire. Asked to prove its doctrine, it declares: 'Did not the Prophet say so; is not his word sufficient? who ever dared to deny his authority? Christianity, finding the opportunity favourable, now puts in its appearance to ask: whom would you be guided by, the servant, or the Son? The master, no doubt, is the Son, never the servant, or messenger. Here is the chance which Puranic Hinduism has been seeking, and it quickly silences both with the statement that the Father, and neither the Son nor the servant, is alone entitled to be heard! Bewildered by the confusing statements of the exponents of three of the leading religions of the world, the despairing soul is ill able to determine for itself which of them it should believe. In this state of mind it is that it comes across Buddhism, the so-called religion of light, which forthwith assures it: 'Believing is the source of weakness; believing is the source of pain; believing is the source of misery; therefore, avoid believing.' What kind of consolation does the soul derive from this argument is beyond conception, since that would be a believing too! Imagining it, however, to be foolish enough to believe that it derives little or no satisfaction from this kind of argument, we now introduce it to Vedanta which promptly whispers in its ear the vivifying formula, the 'That Thou art, O Beloved.' The soul now leaps up with joy, but only to fall back into the trough of despond the next moment. 'If I *am* That,' it thinks to itself, 'surely the That can mean nothing more than a despairing soul, since I, the despairing soul, *am* That.' Forlorn, troubled and disappointed, it is now more than ever in need of a Teacher and Guide to lead it to Life and Light. This guide it discovers in its own

Intellect, in the first instance, since without its aid discrimination between a false and a true teacher is out of the question.

Therefore, taking the intellect as our sole guide, we set out on an enquiry into the nature of happiness which is the motor-spring of human activity. Investigation reveals the fact that pure joy does not exist outside the seeker thereof. None of the objects from which we may expect to extract it contains it within its body or magnitude, nor can any outside agency bestow it on the soul; for the very idea of dependence on another will itself furnish sufficient cause for unhappiness. Analysis discloses the important fact that he alone of all beings who can be said to be free from all kinds of restraint, obligation and desire, who, in other words, is full and perfect in himself, and whose consciousness of supremacy places him beyond the temptations of the senses, can be happy in the true sense of the word. But such a condition is conceivable only in connection with Gods; hence, man must become God if he would enjoy perfect bliss. Logically, the position is clear enough, but the important question which it gives rise to is: is it possible to become God? For the human mind, imbued, as it is, with the notion of practicability, cares little or nothing at all for its logical deductions, unless it be also made clear to it that what logic points to is capable of being realized by him. We, therefore, proceed to investigate the nature of Godhood and to ascertain if the difference between God and man be such as may be said to be bridgeable.

The subject plunges us at once into the very thick of the battle that has been raging, from time immemorial, between religion and materialism, by which term we mean the philosophy that denies the existence of spirit or soul. The problem presents itself under three heads, namely,

- (1) God,
- (2) Soul, and
- (3) Nature (the world).

As regards the first of these points, we must reject the idea of a creator altogether, since there are no sufficient reasons to prove that a supreme being is responsible for the world-process, and because no one who sets himself up as a creator can possibly have happiness in

himself, and also because the idea of a creator is a self-contradictory notion. The removal of a man-like creator from the field, however, does not mean the removal of Godhood from the universe, since that is the Ideal of fulness and perfection for the soul to aspire to.

In respect of the soul, it will be apparent to any one who cares to think for himself that the knowing subject cannot possibly be regarded as a product of matter. You cannot have blood out of stones; neither can you have consciousness out of the concourse of dead atoms. The psychological functions of perception, memory, judgment and the like, as also the higher faculties of the Subjective Mind, unmistakably point to mind being no secretion of matter. The dependence of the discriminative intellect on the convolutions and development of the brain is not inconsistent with this hypothesis, and merely points to the functions of the physical brain being 'transmissive,' but not productive. The consciousness of man, and for the matter of that of all beings in the world, is, therefore, quite independent of the groupings of atoms and molecules of matter, which some of us hold to be the things which give it birth. Soul, then, is a conscious substance the nature of which is to know. Analysis further reveals the fact that it cannot be subject to death, since it is not a compound but a simple substance. The soul is, therefore, immortal by nature. It is also easy to see that true happiness only signifies perfect freedom, and that we are truly happy only when freed from the weight, or burden, of all extraneous relations and worries and desires. Hence the soul is also blissful by nature. Thus, the three characteristics of the soul are (1) knowledge, (2) immortality, and (3) bliss. Now, since no God can have any greater or more fascinating attributes in Him, it follows that every soul is a God in potency. The difference between God and man, therefore, only lies in respect of perfection, not in that of anything else.

Hence, God is the great ideal of Perfection which has already been attained by a number of Perfected Souls, the Holy Ones, as Religion points out. In respect of power, also, it can be seen that the soul, as a substance, must be endowed with the same attributes as appertain to Divinity, for they both have spirit as the substance of their being. Hence, even in respect of power there is no differ-

ence between man and God, except that between a fettered and a free being.

The capacity for infinite knowledge, infinite bliss and infinite power, which is inherent in the soul, renders it necessary that some at least, if not all the souls, should perfect themselves sooner or later ; and since one earth-life does not suffice for the purpose, it logically follows that there should be as many re-incarnations as are necessary to enable one to attain perfection. In each earth-life certain experiences are undergone by the soul, and the sum-total of them is carried over in the form of character, i.e., disposition, tendencies, and the like. This quintessence of character is carried over by the ego in two inner bodies, the *kārmāna* and the *aijasa*, which, taken together, have been termed 'soul' by St. Paul (1 Thes. v. 23).

That there should be some such thing as transmigration of souls, is put beyond the possibility of doubt by the differences of individual character, which the thesis of heredity is unable to explain. As Hoffding says, there must be a substratum to be acted upon by variations. Immortal by nature, the soul must have had a past, just as surely as it will have a future. When we look at the formation of the child in the parent's body, we are led to the same conclusion ; for there is no one to make it unless it make itself. *Karma* is discovered to be the determining factor of the differences of form, understanding and circumstances, and furnishes a much more satisfactory explanation of the misery and unhappiness of which there is so much in the world than the hypothesis of the creation of each soul there and then at the time of conception.

So far as the world, the third subject of the metaphysical problem, is concerned, we need only say here that investigation into its nature leads us to the conclusion that it is without a beginning and without an end in time, though certain portions of it may undergo periodical destruction and reformation from natural causes.

What, then, becomes of the position taken by Idealism which reduces the world to an illusion, pure and simple, and the infinity of souls to one Brahman ? The reply is that that which persists in time and is eternal, cannot be dismissed from the mind, even though it be the purest form of illusion. The thinking and willing 'I' is eternal,

and the substitution of one 'I' for all the multitude of the concrete "I's" in the universe, is the outcome of pure logical abstraction and personification. When it is said that the outer world is devoid of reality, being merely a state of consciousness spun out from the raw material of sensations, the fact that a sensation is only the resultant of interaction between the outer and inner realities is generally lost sight of. It is true that without consciousness nothing whatever could be known of the world, but it is no less true that the data of sensations only come from without. Hence, the objects outside in the world are exactly of the same description as they are perceived by the knowing faculty, notwithstanding the fact that errors are committed, at times, in their perception.

We may now unhesitatingly answer the question which necessitated the above enquiry by saying that it is not only possible for man to become God, but that he is already none other than God, in potency. The amelioration of his condition is, therefore, a matter which exclusively rests with him; and the power which enables him to attain this end is his own indomitable will. This leads us to a consideration of the means which speedily enable the soul to come into the realization of its great ideal. Investigation shows that the soul is in the bondage of its *karmas*, the chains of which are composed of a very subtle kind of matter. Hence, the tearing asunder of the veils of matter which go to obscure the inner spiritual illumination, is clearly the means for the realization of the Self as a being all-knowing, all-powerful and *naturally* blissful. Now, since these veils of matter are inaccessible to human hands, and may not be destroyed by hand-made weapons of destruction, the only power which can tear them asunder is will. But the very first requisite for self-exertion is faith, since people only live up to their beliefs and seldom act in opposition to them. Hence, Right Faith, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct, that is, the doing of the right thing at the right moment, are the true means of liberation.

Different religions have pointed out, more or less, the same methods of realization, though some lay stress on *jñāna*, some on *bhakti*, and so forth. But the difference is only a seeming one:

in reality, they all lead to one and the same result. For knowledge, *i.e.*, wisdom necessitates meditation and concentration, and cannot be had without them: and conversely, meditation and concentration lead to wisdom, without anything further being necessary, so that wherever there develops the habit of deep concentrated meditation, or thoughtfulness, there wisdom must, sooner or later, come into manifestation. Thus, all the different branches of Yoga, Jnana Yoga, Karma Yoga, Bhakti Yoga, Hatha Yoga, and Raja Yoga, are so many means for developing the habit of concentration and meditation. When the mind is steadied and gives up the habit of wandering in the pursuit of the objects of desire, it becomes quiescent, setting the soul free to study itself, which, in consequence of the quieting down of the mind, now presents the appearance of the placid surface of a lake unruffled by storm or waves, and sees itself as the source of all knowledge and power and bliss. Right Discernment, or Belief, having arisen, it immediately sets knowledge free from the subjection to doubt and dubiousness, transforming it at once into Right Knowledge, without which the observance of the rules of Right Conduct is a matter of impossibility. The Path of Emancipation, thus, consists in Right Discernment, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct, which also constitute the three priceless jewels in the crown of glory of the Emancipated Soul, that is, God.

The body of *karmas* (the *kārmāṇa śarīra*), which accompanies the soul in all its incarnations, is made of very subtle matter, with consciousness 'embedded' in it; and so long as this body does not break up, the soul cannot attain liberation by any means. This subtle body carries with it the seed of the individual character, in the shape of modifications of its 'structure,' from life to life. So long as ignorance prevails, individual desires hold it together; but with the advent of wisdom, and its concomitant state of desirelessness, the pole of magnetism changes, and the particles of matter, instead of being attracted and held together, are repelled and dispersed, thus destroying the body and leaving the pure Sachchidananda in place of the limited ego which ignorance may be said to have planted on Truth.

The main thing, then, is to acquire wisdom, that is, the knowledge of the Self. Knowledge is power, and, sooner or later, is bound to lead the soul to the highest heights of bliss.

The above are truly the underlying principles of every rational religion in the world; but the one creed that teaches them fully and clearly is Jainism, which, as our enquiry reveals, is also the most ancient of all. The difference between Jainism and other creeds, then, comes to this that while in the other religions a handful of 'corn' lies, mixed up with an enormous quantity of chaff, in such a manner that it is almost impossible to pick out the useful grain, in Jainism the Holy *Tirthamkars* and *acharyas* have taken the utmost care to allow only the purest truths to be incorporated. Hence, while the other religions dread the search-light of intellect, Jainism insists on its full blaze being turned on the problems of Life. Hence, also, where the others demand faith in the pupil, Jainism only requires the employment of intellect to understand and appreciate its teaching. It is not that where the intellect is not fully developed, its teaching may not be of help to the soul, if sincerely put into practice, but that exact and scientific knowledge is necessary for speedy progress, since religious truths are at once converted into beliefs the moment they are verified by the intellect. Jainism, then, is the Path of Liberation *par excellence*.

There remains the point of practicability of the high ideal set by Religion before mankind. Some of us might be inclined to think that if all men were to devote their lives to religion, civilization would come to an end, and a state of general confusion and chaos would be the result. Certainly, the kind of civilization which produces abnormal men and institutions would come to an end, for when it is realized that the soul has neither nationality, nor class, nor sex, of its own, and that it may incarnate in any body, in any country, and in any sex, in its next incarnation, people would pay more attention to the welfare of their souls than to such matters as give rise to evil *karman*. Wars and strikes would then become things of the past, and peace and prosperity would be the lot of mankind on earth. As for the individual, it has been seen that the ideal set by

Religion before mankind is the only practical ideal to cherish ; for what shall a man profit if he gain the whole world but lose his own soul ? None of our worldly acquisitions can possibly prevent the force of evil *karmas* from harmfully affecting the soul. Therefore, only such thoughts and actions are permissible as actually facilitate its progress on the path of Perfection and Bliss. The doing of the proper *dharma*, that is, duty, or conduct enjoined by religion, is the only means of progress for the soul. In whatever stage of evolution an individual might be, the observance of the principle of *dharma* would, without fail, facilitate his onward progress on the path : because *dharma* is the force which enables the soul to realize its own glorious nature ! *Dharma* is also the highest form of morality, without which peace and prosperity cannot be thought of. The lives of the great *Tirthankaras* furnish ample proof of the practicability of Religion, and show the heights of greatness and glory to which a soul, conscious of its own nature, may aspire. Every detail of Their noble lives illustrates the supremacy of Religion over materialism, and invites us to follow the path They trod, to reach the heights which They attained. The path may be steep and thorny, but it has to be trodden, if not now, then, in some future incarnation ; and each backward step, or fall from our present position, only goes to make the journey to be performed, more tedious and tiresome. Let us, then, gird up our loins to tread the path of the *Tirthankaras*, the path which takes us out of this dreadful valley of suffering and sorrow and death, we call our World. Let us not be daunted or discouraged by its steep and thorny nature, but, providing ourselves with the three invincible weapons of Right Faith, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct, fearlessly march on to the conquest of Ignorance and Death. The 'fall' has to be reversed, and Death is a mighty warrior who overcomes all weapons except those tempered with *vairagya*, that is, Renunciation. The Fountain-spring of Eternal Life, from whose *enlivening* waters we all would like to quench our thirst for immortality and joy, lies in the Kingdom of Death, guarded over by the King of Terrors ; and the sword of *vairāgya* is held by the Self in pledge for the knowledge of good and evil, which is but another name for body-consciousness.

Come up, then, to the Adytum of the great and glorious Divinity, your own Blissful Self, to claim your birth-right, the *Ananda*, by fulfilling the conditions of the pledge, so that by its addition to the *Sat* and the *Chit* which you already enjoy, you may yourself become the perfect *Sat-Chit-Ananda*, which you, in very truth, already are in essence.

OM ! PEACE ! PEACE !! PEACE !!!

APPENDIX A

GLIMPSES OF A HIDDEN SCIENCE IN THE ORIGINAL CHRISTIAN TEACHINGS.

I. IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

THE BIBLE.

- a. "Neither can they die anymore."—Luke, xx. 36.
- b. "The last enemy *that* shall be destroyed is death..." 1 Cor., xv. 26.
- c. "So when.....this mortal shall have put on immortality, then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory..." 1 Cor., xv. 54.
- d. "I *am* he that liveth, and was dead; and, behold, I am alive for ever more, Amen; and have the keys of hell and of death."—Rev., i. 18.

CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA.

- i. "Nor is there at all any composite thing, and creature endowed with sensation, of the sort in heaven."—Ante Nicene Christian Library, vol. xii. 242.
- ii. "And to be incorruptible is to participate in divinity." A. N. Lib. vol. xii. p. 239.
- iii. "...The Gnostic will avail himself of dialectics, fixing on the distinction of genera into species, and will master the distinction of existences, till he come to what are primary and *simple*." A. N. Lib. vol. xii. 350.
- iv. "...The more *subtle substance*, the soul, could never receive any injury from the gross element of water, its subtle and *simple nature* rendering it insensible, called as it is incorporeal." A. N. Lib. vol. xii. p. 334.

v. "...and man, when deified purely into a passionless state becomes a unit." A. N. Lib. vol. xii. p. 210.

OTHERS.

"And these (objects formed) of one (substance) were immortal, for (in their case) dissolution does not follow, for what is one will never be dissolved. These (objects) on the other hand, which are formed out of two, or three, or four (substances) are dissoluble; wherefore also are they named mortal. For this has been denominated Death, namely, the dissolution of connected (bodies)." A. N. Library vol. 6. (Hippolytus, vol. i.) p. 394.

"...And with respect to this 'How could the dead man be immortal?' Let him who wishes to understand know that it is not the dead man who is immortal but he who rose from the dead. *So far, indeed, was the dead man from being immortal, that even the Jesus before His Decease—the compound being, who was to suffer death—was not immortal.* For no one is immortal who is destined to die, but he is immortal when he shall no longer be subject to death. But, 'Christ, being raised from the dead, death has no more dominion over Him'..."—A. N. Library vol. xxiii. (Origen, vol. 2) p. 23.

"...*That the Soul is a substance is proved in the following manner.* In the first place the definition given to the term substance suits it very well. And that definition is to the effect, that substance is that which, being ever identical, and ever one in point of numeration with itself is yet capable of taking on contraries in succession. And that this soul without passing the limits of its own proper nature takes on contraries in succession, is, I fancy, clear to everybody...And in the second place, because *if the body is a substance, the soul must also be a substance.* For it cannot be that what only has life imparted should be a substance, and that what imparts the life should be no substance..." A. N. Library vol. xx. (Gregory Thaumaturgus) p. 115.

".....The Soul...being incorporeal is simple; since thus it is both uncompound and indivisible into parts. It follows in my opinion, as a necessary consequence that what is simple is immortal...and what is subject to dissolution is compound; consequently the soul being simple and not being made up of diverse parts, but being uncompound and

indissoluble, must be, in virtue of that, incorruptible and immortal."—Gregory Thaumaturgus. A. N. Lib. xx. 115.

II. SOUL IS NOT A PART OF ANOTHER BEING, *E.G.*, A GOD.

i. "But it is not as a portion of God that the spirit is in each of us..."—Clement (A. N. C. Lib. xii. p. 273).

ii. "But God has no natural relation to us,...neither on the supposition of His having made us of nothing, nor on that of having formed us from matter;...*neither portions of himself nor...his children*...But the mercy of God is rich towards us who are in no respect related to Him."—(Clement vol. 2.) A. N. Lib. vol. xii. p. 45.

iii. "They were misled by what is said in the book of Wisdom; 'He pervades and passes to all by reason of his purity'; since they did not understand that this was said of Wisdom, which was the first of the creations of God."—(Clem. 2.) A. N. Lib. xii. p. 274.

iv. "...the cause of all error and false opinion is the inability to distinguish in what respects things are common and in what respects they differ..." A. N. Lib. xii (Clement vol. 2.) p. 351.

III. SOUL IS ALL-KNOWING BY NATURE.

THE BIBLE.

a. "In whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge."—Ephesians, iii. 4.

b. "Ye are the light of the world." Matt., v. 14.

c. "...the Holy Ghost...shall teach you all things."—John, xiv. 26.

d. "For there is nothing covered, that shall not be revealed; neither hid, that shall not be known." Luke, xii. 2.

e. "Is a candle brought to be put under a bushel, or under a bed? and not to be set on a candle-stick? For there is nothing hid which shall not be manifested; neither was anything kept secret, but that it should come abroad. If any man have ears to hear, let him hear."—Mark, iv. 21—23.

OTHERS.

"And knowledge is essentially a contemplation of existences on the part of the soul, either of a certain thing or of certain things, and *when perfected of all together*...The Gnostic...himself comprehends what seems to be incomprehensible to others believing that *nothing is incomprehensible to the Son of God*, whence nothing incapable of being taught." A. N. Lib. vol. xii. (Clem. vol. 2) pp. 343-344.

"...For its (the Soul's) knowledge of these things does not come to it from without but it rather sets out these things, as it were, with the adornment of its own thoughts."—Gregory Thaumaturgus. A. N. Lib. vol. xx. p. 117.

IV. SOUL IS BLISSFUL BY NATURE.

THE BIBLE.

a. "...who for the joy that was set before him endured the cross."—Hebrews, xii. 2.

b. "And the ransomed of the Lord shall return, and come to Zion with songs and everlasting joy upon their heads; they shall obtain joy and gladness, and sorrow and sighing shall flee away."—Isaiah, xxxv. 10.

c. "But the fruit of the spirit is...joy, peace."—Gal., v. 22.

CLEMENT.

"And exultation is said to be gladness, being a reflection of the virtue which is according to truth through a kind of exhilaration and relaxation of the soul." A. N. Lib. vol. xii. p. 361.

ORIGEN.

1. "...For in the trinity alone...does goodness exist in virtue of essential being, while others possess it as an accidental and perishable quality, and only then *enjoy blessedness* when they participate in holiness and wisdom and in divinity itself."—A. N. Lib. vol. x. p. 56 (Origen vol. 1).

2. "...Laws which ensure happiness to those who live according to them and who do not flatter the demons by means of sacrifices, but altogether despise them..."—A. N. Library vol. xxiii (Origen vol. 2) p. 194.

V. THE DIVINITY OF THE SOUL.

THE BIBLE.

a. "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect."—Matt., v. 48.

b. "And know ye not that ye are the temple of God and *that* the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?"—1 Cor., iii. 16.

c. "I said, Ye are gods."—John, x. 34.

d. "Beloved, now are we the sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be: but we know that, when he shall appear, we shall be like him; for we shall see him as he is." 1 John, iii. 2.

e. "Whereby are given unto us exceeding great and precious promises: that by these ye might be partakers of the divine nature, having escaped the corruption that is in the world through lust." 2 Peter, i. 14.

f. "Till we all come...unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ." Ephesians, iv. 13.

g. "...that ye may be perfect and entire, wanting nothing."—James, i. 4.

h. "For I reckon that the sufferings of this present time *are* not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us."—Romans, viii. 18.

i. "...for behold, the kingdom of God is within you."—Luke, xvii. 21.

j. "Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus: Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God."—Philippians, ii. 5-6.

k. "And no man hath ascended up to heaven, but he that came down from heaven, even the son of man which is in heaven."—John, iii. 12.

l. "...greater is he that is in you, than he that is in the world."—1 John, iv. 4.

m. "For in him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily. And ye are complete in him, which is the head of all principality and power."—Colossians, ii. 9-10.

n. "And to know the love of Christ, which passeth knowledge, that ye might be filled with all the fulness of God."—Ephesians, iii. 19.

IRENÆUS.

"...The creature should...ascend to Him, passing beyond the angels, and be made after the image and likeness of God..."—A. N. Lib. ix. 167.

HIPPOLYTUS.

"...If therefore man has become immortal he will also be God... Wherefore I preach to this effect: Come, all ye kindreds of the nations to the immortality of the baptism."—A. N. Lib. ix. part ii. page 86.

"For once the crown of righteousness encircles thy brow, thou hast become God... Thou hast been deified and begotten unto immortality... This constitutes 'know thyself,' or, in other words, Learn to discover God within thyself."—A. N. Lib. vi. p. 402.

VI. ALL SOULS OF LIKE NATURE.

THE BIBLE.

a. "Ye are the light of the world" Matt., v. 14.

b. "...Ye are the sons of the living God." Hosea, i. 10.

c. "...because as he is, so are we in this world."—1 John, iv. 17.

ORIGEN.

1. "Every one who participates in anything is unquestionably of one essence and nature with him who is the partaker of the same thing.... Every mind which partakes of intellectual light ought undoubtedly to be of one nature with every mind which partakes in a similar manner of intellectual light. If the heavenly virtues, then,

partake of intellectual light, i.e., of divine nature because they partake in wisdom and holiness, and if human souls have partaken of the same light and wisdom, and thus are mutually of one nature and of one essence...then, since the heavenly virtues are incorruptible and immortal, the essence of the human soul will also be immortal and incorruptible." A. N. Lib. vol. x. p. 353.

2. "...And we also believe him (Jesus) when referring to his having a human body he says 'but now you seek to kill me, a man that has told you the truth' we maintain that he was something compound." Origen, *Philocalia* p. 97.

CLEMENT.

"...for souls themselves, by themselves are equal. *Souls are neither male nor female*, when they no longer marry nor are given in marriage." Clem. vol. 2. (A. N. Lib. vol. xii) p. 362.

HIPPOLYTUS.

1. "...And she brought forth a man-child who is to rule all the nations.' By this it is meant that the church always bringing forth Christ, the perfect man-child of God, who is declared to be God and Man, becomes the instructor of all nations. And the words 'Her child was caught up unto God and to His Throne' signify that he who is always born of her is a heavenly King and not an earthly..." A. N. Lib. vol. ix 2nd part. p. 36.

2. "...For if he were not of the same (nature with ourselves) in vain does he ordain that we should imitate the teacher. And if that man happened to be of a different substance (from us) why does he lay injunctions similar (to those He has received) on myself, who am born weak?...He did not protest against His passion but became obedient unto death and manifested His resurrection. Now in all these (acts) He offered up as the first-fruits His own manhood in order that thou when thou art in tribulation, mayest not be disheartened, but confessing thyself to be a man with nature like the Redeemer, mayest dwell in expectation of also receiving what the father has granted unto his son."—A. N. Library vol. xi. (Hippolytus. vol. 1) page 400.

3. "And it is written 'These things are all that He behoved to suffer, and *what should be after Him* '..." A. N. Library vol. xii. (Clement, vol. 2) page 380.

4. "...This (Logos) we know to have...remodelled the old man by a new creation. (And we believe the Logos) to have passed through every period in (this) life in order that He Himself might serve as a Law for every age.....and might exhibit his own manhood as an aim for all men...For if he were not of the same (nature with ourselves) in vain does he ordain that we should imitate the teacher." A. N. Lib. vol. vi. (Hippolytus, vol. 1.) pages 399-400.

VII. THOUGH DIVINE BY NATURE SOUL'S PRESENT CONDITION ANYTHING BUT DIVINE?

THE BIBLE.

a. "For all have sinned and come short of the glory of God."—Romans, iii. 23.

b. "Save me, O God; *for the waters are come in unto my soul.*" I sink in deep mire, where *there is no standing*: I am come unto deep waters, where the floods overflow me."—Psalm. lxxix. 1 and 2.

OTHERS.

i. "No one is clean from filthiness, not even if his life lasted but a single day."—A. N. Lib. x. (Origen i) p. 347.

ii. "...His first advent in the flesh, which took place without honour by reason of His being set at naught, as Isaiah spake of Him aforetime saying 'We saw Him, and He had no form nor comeliness, but His form was despised, and rejected (lit. deficient) above all men; a man smitten and familiar with bearing infirmity (for his face was turned away); He was despised and esteemed not.' But his second advent is announced as glorious, when He shall come from Heaven with the host of angels.....as the prophet saith, 'Ye shall see the King in glory' and 'I saw one like the Son of Man coming with the clouds of heaven.'"—A. N. Library, vol. ix Part ii. p. 25.

*.....*Cf.* "The individual man is stamped according to the impression produced in the soul by the objects of his choice." A. N. Lib. vol. xii (Clement vol. 2) 214.

VIII. PHYSICAL BODY (EMBODIMENT IN MATTER) THE CAUSE OF TROUBLE.*

a. "...flesh...separates and limits the knowledge of those that are spiritual.....for souls themselves by themselves are equal."—A. N. Lib. vol. xii (Clement, vol. ii) p. 362.

b. "For bound in this earthly body we apprehend the objects of sense by means of the body."—A. N. Lib. vol. xii. (Clement ii) p. 224.

c. "His own inequities shall take the wicked himself, and he shall be holden with the cords of his own sins."—Proverbs, v. 22.

d. "The mental acumen of those who are in the body seems to be blunted by the nature of corporeal matter."—A. N. Lib. (Origen i) p. 82.

IX. THE BODY HAS TO BE SEPARATED FROM THE SOUL FOR SALVATION.

THE BIBLE.

a. "...he that hath suffered in the flesh hath ceased from sin."—1 Peter, iv. 1.

b. "...whosoever shall lose his life shall preserve it."—Luke, 17. 33.

c. "Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption. Behold, I shew you a mystery: we shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed,.....For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality so when this corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal shall have put on immortality, then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory."—1 Cor., xv. 50—54.

d. "For I know that in me (that is, in my flesh,) dwelleth no good thing:...For the good that I would I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do...I find then a law, that, when I would do good,

* Cf. "For a corruptible body weigheth down the soul, and the earthy lieth heavy on a mind that is full of cares."—Jewish Apocrypha: II. Ecdrae, chap. ix.

evil is present with me. For I delight in the law of God after the inward man: but I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members. O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"—Romans, vii. 18—24.

e. "I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the mercies of God, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, *which is your reasonable service.*"—Romans, xii. 1.

f. "For the word of God *is* quick, and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of the soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow."—Heb., iv. 12.

g. "Knowing that our old man is crucified with him, that the body of sin might be destroyed..."—(Romans vi. 6).

h. "In whom also ye are circumcised with the circumcision made without hands, in putting off the body of the sins of the flesh by the circumcision of Christ."—Colossians ii. 11.

OTHERS.

".....The mental acumen of those who are in the body seems to be blunted by the nature of corporeal matter. If, however, *they are out of the body* then they will altogether escape the annoyance arising from a disturbance of that kind...*at last by the gradual disappearance of the material nature, death is both swallowed up and even at the end exterminated*, and all its sting completely blunted by the divine grace which the soul has been rendered capable of receiving, and has thus deserved to obtain incorruptibility and immortality...It follows that we must believe our condition at some future time to be incorporeal..... and thus it appears that then also the need of bodies will cease.....*The*

* St. Paul's idea of the divisions of the constitution of a living being into spirit, soul and body (1 Thessalonians v. 23) can be easily grasped if we liken the living organism to a piece of sponge that is saturated with water. The sponge is, of course, the outer physical body, and the liquid compound of oxygen and hydrogen, the other two, namely, the spirit and soul. The element of pure Spirit in this inner residue of being is the life-giving oxygen that is existing in the closest chemical union with hydrogen, the symbol of matter. Taken together, they constitute the soul, which is subject to birth and death; separated from the soul, the element of life is pure Spirit, deathless, all-knowing and blissful. Hence, it is said of such purified Spirits "neither can they die any more" (Luke, xx. 36).

whole nature of bodily things will be dissolved into nothing."—A. N. Lib. vol. x. (Origen, vol. i), pp. 82-83.

CLEMENT.

(a) "...Now the sacrifice that is acceptable to God is *unswerving abstraction from the body and its passions.*"—Clement, vol. 2. p. 261.

(b) "The Saviour himself enjoins, 'watch' as much as to say 'Study how to live and *endeavour to separate the soul from the body* '..." p. 284 (vol. 2).

(c) "...the more subtle substance. The soul, could never receive any injury from the gross element of water, its subtle and simple nature rendering it impalpable, called as it is incorporeal. But *whatever is gross, made so in consequence of sin, this is cast away along with the carnal spirit which lusts against the soul.*"—A. N. Lib. vol. xii. p. 334.

X. DESIRE FOR WORLDLY PLEASURES THE CAUSE OF TROUBLE.

THE BIBLE.

a. "For if ye live after the flesh, ye shall die: but if ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live."—Romans, viii. 13.

b. "But to be carnally minded is death."—Romans, viii. 6.

c. "But she that liveth in pleasure is dead while she liveth."—1 Timothy, v. 6.

d. "For the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh: and these are contrary the one to another: so that ye cannot do the things that ye would."—Galatians, v. 17.

e. "Know ye not, that to whom ye yield yourselves servants to obey, his servants ye are to whom ye obey; whether of sin unto death, or of obedience unto righteousness?"—Romans, vi. 16.

f. "...for he that had suffered in the flesh hath ceased from sin."—1 Peter, iv. 1.

g. "Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world."—1 John, ii. 15.

h. "And every one that hath forsaken houses, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands, for my name's sake, shall receive an hundredfold, and shall inherit everlasting life."—Matt., xix. 29.

i. "And if after they have escaped the pollutions of the world . . . they are again entangled therein, and overcome, the latter end is worse with them than the beginning."—2 Peter, ii. 20.

j. "...For he that soweth to his flesh *shall of the flesh reap corruption*; but he that soweth to the Spirit shall of the Spirit reap *life everlasting*."—Galatians, vi. 8.

k. "Mortify therefore your members which are upon the earth."—Col., iii. 5.

l. "Enter ye in at the strait gate: for wide *is* the gate, and broad *is* the way, that leadeth to destruction, and many there be which go in thereat, because strait *is* the gate, and narrow *is* the way, which leadeth into life, and few there be that find it."—Matt., vii. 13-14.

m. "Woe unto you that are full! for ye shall hunger."—Luke, vi. 25. "Blessed *are ye* that hunger now; for ye shall be filled."—Luke, vi. 21.

n. "...if any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me."—Matt., xvi. 24.

o. "If any *man* come to me and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple."—Luke, xiv. 26.

p. "The foxes have holes, and the birds of the air have nests; but the Son of man hath not where to lay *his head*."—Matt., viii. 20.

q. "In weariness and painfulness, in watchings often, in hunger and thirst, in fastings often, in cold and nakedness."—2 Cor., xi. 27.

r. "...there be eunuchs, which have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven's sake."—Matt., xix. 12.

s. "But I keep under my body, and bring it into subjection."—1 Cor., ix. 27.

t. "And they that are Christ's have *crucified the flesh with the affections and lusts*."—Gal., v. 24.

u. "Ye adulterers and adulteresses, know ye not that the friendship of the world is enmity with God? whosoever therefore will be a friend of the world is the enemy of God."—James, iv. 4.

v. "Love not the world, neither the things *that are* in the world. If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him. For all that *is* in the world, the lust of flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father, but is of the world. And the world passeth away, and the lust thereof: but he that doeth the will of God abideth for ever."—1 John, ii. 15—17.

w. ".....it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God."—Matt., xix. 24.

x. "For we which live are always delivered unto death for Jesus' sake, that the life also of Jesus might be made manifest in our body."—2 Cor., iv. 10.

CLEMENT.

a. "But God is impassible, free of anger, destitute of desire."—A. N. Lib. vol. xii. p. 210.

b. "We must therefore rescue the Gnostic and perfect man *from all passions of the soul*. For *Knowledge* produces practice and practice habit or disposition; and such a state as this produces *impassibility, not moderation of passion*. And the *complete eradication of desire* reaps as its fruits impassibility. But the Gnostic does not share.....in those affections that are commonly celebrated as good, that is the good things of the affection that are alike to the passions;..." A. N. Lib. vol. xii. (Clement 2) 346.

c. "...the true athlete—he who in the great stadium, the fair world, is crowned for true victory *over all the passions*.....Angels and Gods are spectators; and the contest, embracing all the varied exercises, is, 'not against flesh and blood,' but against the spiritual powers of inordinate passions that work through the flesh. He who obtains the mastery in these struggles and overthrows the tempter, menacing as it were, with certain contests wins immortality. The spectators are summoned to the contest, the athletes contend in the stadium; the one

who has obeyed the directions of the trainer wins the day."—A. N. Lib. vol. xii (Clement 2) pp. 419-420.

d. "...the good man...is without passion, having through the habit or disposition of his soul endued with virtue transcended the whole life of passion. He has every thing dependent on himself for the attainment of the end."—A. N. Lib. vol. xii. p. 453.

e. "But self-control...perfected through knowledge abiding ever, makes a man Lord and Master of himself; so that the Gnostic is temperate and passionless, incapable of being dissolved by pleasures and pains, as they say adamant is by fire."—A. N. Lib. xii. p. 455.

f. "For he who has not formed the wish to extirpate the passion of the soul kills himself."—Ibid. p. 458.

g. "And to bear the sign of the cross is to bear about death, by taking farewell of all things whilst still in the flesh alive."—Ibid. xii. p. 464.

XI. THE PATH OF PROGRESS IS THREEFOLD.

THE BIBLE.

a. "Be ye doers of the word, and not hearers only, deceiving your own selves."—James, i. 22.

b. "What *doth* it profit, my brethren, though a man say he hath faith, and have not works? Can faith save him? If a brother or sister be naked, and destitute of daily food, and one of you say unto him, Depart in peace, be ye warmed and filled; notwithstanding ye give him not these things which are needful to the body; what *doth* it profit? Even so faith, if it hath not works; is dead, being alone."—James, ii. 14—17.

c. "And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free."—John, viii. 32.

d. "I am the way, the truth, and the life."—John, xiv. 6.

[The correspondences are as follows:—

the way = the path, *the* Faith, hence the Right Faith;

the truth = *the* knowledge, the Right Knowledge;

the life = *the* proper mode of living, the Right Conduct.]

e. "But let every man prove his own work, and then shall he have rejoicing in himself alone, and not in another. For every man shall bear his own burden."—Gal., vi. 4-5.

f. "If by any means I might attain unto the resurrection of the dead."—Phil., iii. 11.

g. "Awake thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead."—Eph., v. 14.

h. "But they which shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry: nor are given in marriage, neither can they die any more: for they are equal unto the angels; and are the children of God, *being the children of the resurrection.*"—Luke, xx. 35-36.

CLEMENT.

a. "For works follow knowledge, as the shadow the body."—A. N. Lib. xii. 467.

b. "Right Faith is...a comprehensive knowledge of the essentials; and knowledge is the strong and sure demonstration of what is received by faith, built upon faith.....conveying the soul on to infallibility, *science*, and comprehension.....the first saving change is that from heathenism to faith.....and the second that from faith to knowledge. And the latter terminating in love, thereafter gives the loving to the loved."—A. N. Lib. xii. (Clement, ii) pp. 447-448.

c. "*Love** is the keeping of commandments which leads to knowledge. And the keeping of them is the establishment of commandments from which immortality results."—A. N. Lib. vol. xii. (Clement, ii) p. 375.

d. "If ye love me keep my commandments."—John xiv. 15.

e. "...it is our aim to discover what doing and in what manner of living we shall reap the knowledge of the sovereign God, and how, honouring the divinity, we may become authors of our own salvationnow it is well pleasing to Him that we should be saved and

* Cf. "For her (Wisdom's) true beginning is desire of discipline; and the care for discipline is love of her; and love of her is observance of her laws; and to give heed to her laws confirmeth incorruption; and incorruption bringeth near unto God; so then desire of wisdom promoteth to a kingdom."—Jewish Apocrypha: II. Ecdras, chap. vi.

salvation is effected through both well doing and knowledge, of both of which the Lord is the teacher."—A. N. Lib. vol. xii. (Clement, vol. ii) p. 376.

f. It is not simply doing well but doing actions with a certain aim, and acting according to reason, that the scripture exhibits as requisite."—A. N. Lib. vol. xii. (Clement, ii) p. 369.

g. ".....all actions of the Gnostic may be called *right action*... that of the simple believer *intermediate action*; but that of every heathen...are *sinful*."—Ibid. p. 369.

h. ".....but we must be above both good and bad, trampling the latter under foot, and passing on the former to those who need them."—Ibid. p. 645.

i. "Such are they who are restrained by law and fear. For on finding a favourable opportunity they defraud [rise above] the law, by giving what is good the slip. But self-control.....perfected through knowledge...makes the man Lord and Master of himself."—A. N. Lib. vol. xii. (Clement, vol. ii) p. 455.

XII. DEIFICATION THE RESULT OF RIGHT ACTION.

THE BIBLE.

1. ".....that ye might be filled with all the fulness of God."—Ephesians, iñ. 19.

2. "I have said, Ye are gods."—Psalm, lxxxii. 6.

3. ".....he called them gods, unto whom the word of God came, and the scripture cannot be broken....."—John, x. 35.

CLEMENT.

a. "Knowledge is...followed by practical wisdom, and practical wisdom by self-control; for it may be said that practical wisdom is divine knowledge, and exists in those who are deified."—A. N. Lib. xii. 378.

b. "On this wise it is possible for the Gnostic already to have become God. 'I said, Ye are Gods, and sons of the Highest.' And Empedocles says that the souls of the wise become Gods."—Ibid. p. 209.

c. "And David expressly (or rather the Lord in the person of the saint and the same from the foundation of the world is *each one who at different periods* is saved, and shall be saved by faith) says....."
—Ibid. p. 332.

d. "...and man, when deified purely into a passionless state, becomes a unit."—Ibid. p. 210.

e. ".....the word of God became man, that thou mayest learn from man *how man may become God.*"—A. N. Lib. vol. iv. p. 24.

XIII. THE EFFECT OF DEIFICATION.

THE BIBLE.

1. "Neither can they die any more: for they are...the children of God, being the children of the resurrection."—Luke, xx. 36.

2. "Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin. And the servant abideth not in the house for ever: but the Son abideth ever. If the Son therefore shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed."—John, viii. 34—36.

3. "...there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain: for the former things are passed away."—Revelation, xxi. 4.

4. "He that overcometh shall inherit all things..."—Revelation, xxi. 7.

CLEMENT.

a. "In the soul the *pain is gone, but the good remains; and the sweet is left, but the base wiped away.* For these are two qualities characteristic of each soul, by which is known that which is glorified, and that which is condemned."—A. N. Lib. vol. xii. p. 364.

b. ".....restoration to the everlasting contemplation and they are called by the appellation of Gods."—Ibid. p. 447.

c. ".....capable of reaching his own mansions." Ibid. p. 367.

d. "Knowledge is therefore quick in purifying...Thence also with ease it removes the soul to what is akin to the soul, divine and holy, and by its own light conveys man through the mystic stages of

advancement, till it restores the pure in heart to the *crowning place of rest.*"—A. N. Lib. vol. xii. (Clement, vol. ii.) p. 447.

e. "Accordingly after the highest excellence in flesh, changing always duly to the better, he urges his flight to the ancestral hall, through the holy septenniad to the Lord's own mansions; to be a light, steady, and continuing eternally, *entirely and in every part immutable.*"—Ibid. (Clement, vol. ii) p. 448.

f. "For having become wholly spiritual, and having in the spiritual Church *gone to what is of kindred nature*, it abides in the rest of God."—Ibid. (Clement vol. ii) p. 455.

XIV. THE EXCELLENCE OF THE CONDITION OF THE SAVED ONES (GODS).*

THE BIBLE.

a. "There shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain."—Rev., xxi. 4.

b. "Knowing that Christ being raised from the dead dieth no more; death hath no more dominion over him."—Romans, vi. 9.

OTHERS.

a. "...in which there is neither sleep, nor pain nor corruption, nor care, nor night, nor day measured by time...eye has not seen nor

* Cf. "But the day of judgment shall be the end of this time, and the beginning of the immortality for to come, wherein corruption is passed away, intemperance is at an end, infidelity is cut off, but righteousness is grown, and truth is sprung up. Then shall no man be able to have mercy on him that is cast in judgment, nor to thrust down him that hath gotten the victory."—Jewish Apocrypha: II. Ecdras, chap. vii.

"He shall inherit joy, and a crown of gladness, and an everlasting name."—Ecclesiasticon (Jewish Apocrypha), chap. xv.

"For unto you is paradise opened, the tree of life is planted, time to come is prepared, plentiousness is made ready, a city is builded, and rest is established, goodness is perfected, wisdom being perfect aforehand. The root of evil is sealed up from you, weakness is done away from you, and (death) is hidden; hell and corruption are fled into forgetfulness: sorrows are passed away, and in the end is shewed the pleasure of immortality."—Jewish Apocrypha: II. Ecdras, chap. viii.

".....They shall have the tree of life for an oliment of sweet savour; they shall neither labour nor be weary."—Jewish Apocrypha: II. Ecdras chap. ii.

ear heard, neither has entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love him."—A. N. Lib. vol. ix. part 2 (Hippolytus, vol. ii) p. 50.

b. "For the incorruptible nature is not the subject of generation; it grows not, sleeps not, hungers not, thirsts not, is not wearied, suffereth not, dies not, is not pierced by nails and spears, sweats not, drops not with blood. Of such kind are the natures of the angels and of souls *released from the body*. For...these are of another kind, and different from these creatures of our world, which are visible and perishing."—Ibid. (Hippolytus, vol. ii) p. 88.*

c. "...No longer having the qualities of fleshly weakness and pollutions."—Origen, *Philocalia*, pp. 112-113.

XV. THE ETERNITY OF THE CONDITION OF LIBERATION.

THE BIBLE.

a. "And the servant abideth not in the house for ever: but the Son abideth ever."—John, viii. 35.

b. "And there shall in no wise enter into it anything that defileth, neither *whatsoever* worketh abomination, or *maketh a lie*..."—Rev., xxi. 27.

c. "...and they shall reign for ever and ever."—Rev., xii. 5.

d. "...his dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his kingdom *that* which shall not be destroyed."—Daniel, vii. 14.

OTHERS.

a. "For it is impossible that he who has once been made perfect by love, and feasts eternally and insatiably on the boundless joy of contemplation, should delight in small and grovelling things. For what rational cause remains any more to the man who has gained

* The following eighteen faults are enumerated in the *Jaina Works* from which the Perfect Souls are free: anger, thirst, senility, disease, birth, death, fear, pride, attachment, aversion, infatuation, worry, conceit, hatred, uneasiness, sweat, sleep and surprise (The *Ratna Karanda Śrāvakācāra*, śloka 6).

the 'light inaccessible.' for reverting to the good things of the world."—A. N. Lib. xii (Clement, vol. ii) pp. 346-347.

XVI. NOT ALL SHALL BE SAVED:

THE BIBLE.

a. "...many be called but few chosen."—Matt., xx. 16.

b. "...for wide is the gate, and broad is the way, that leadeth to destruction, and many there be which go in thereat: because strait is the gate, and narrow is the way, which leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it."—Matt., vii. 13-14.

c. "Though the number of the children of Israel be as the sand of the sea, a remnant shall be saved."—Romans, ix. 27.

d. "...there is a remnant according to the election of grace:"—Romans, xi. 5.

e. "...for many will seek to enter in, and shall not be able."—Luke, xiii. 24.

f. "For the preaching of the cross is to them that perish foolishness; but unto us which are saved it is the power of God."—1 Cor., i. 18.

g. "For we are unto God a sweet savour of Christ, in them that are saved, and in them that perish: To the one *we are* the savour of death unto death; and to the other the savour of life unto life."—2 Cor., ii. 15.

APPENDIX B

DAY-DREAMING TO ORDER.*

In these days of cheap printing and of cheaper opinion we do not find it in our heart to blame "the dreamer" for his rushing into print with his 'Dream Problem.' Some might, indeed, go further and thank him, not for the discovery of anything grand, or useful, or new, nor for the promulgation of anything genuine, but for his preaching, in a quaint and not quite uninteresting way, a certain cheap and worn out method of satisfying the natural craving for happiness which arises in every heart. One is almost tempted to congratulate "the dreamer"—whoever he be, whether the brilliant editor and compiler of the book or only some shy and backward friend of his, hiding himself behind the pseudonym, to escape from the inevitable and naturally unpleasant cross-examination by friend and foe—on the unique distinction of being initiated, and that in a dream, by his own mental-creature of whom it is said that he was also previously "required to act as the guru of Ram Chandra, who, born of worldly parents had utterly forgotten his Godhood" (p. 333).

That our friend's method is cheap does not admit of doubt, for one has only to turn oneself into a day-dreamer to realise the promised reward, the only other condition being that one should not pry too closely into the nature of the stuff to be supplied to him. We are sure to find the whole thing simple and fascinating, if we only agree to accept it on trust, on the word of its propounders. We are assured by the compiler, his phantom preceptor, Vasishtha, and several of the contributors to the book, that the matter is essentially one for experience, not for intellectual analysis or controversy. The procedure prescribed is the simplest imaginable: deny the reality of the world, get into bed and dream as hard as you can of the condition which you want for yourself. Tinged with the colour of thought, as they necessarily are, one's dreams cannot but accord with one's most predominant wish, so that you can always make them what you wish them to be. Thus if you want to be a millionaire, you need only think of your millions somewhat forcibly before going to sleep, and even if you be a veritable pauper in actual life, there is not the least doubt but that you will have all the wealth you are intent on acquiring the moment your eyes close in repose. There is the case of the convict whom Prof. Macran of the Dublin University encountered in one of the prisons at Rome.

"With determined effort he succeeded in having a continuous dream having an ideal life, rich possessions, beautiful wife, virtuous children and all happiness. He turned his mind to such a belief that his working as a convict was a dream and the other a reality. He was so happy in his prison cell and used to be so anxious to go into it for sleep to meet his beautiful family" (p. 42).

* A review of the "Dream Problem" by Dr. Ram Narain, L.N.S.

Dr. Khedkar (p. 42) would have it that if a person were to control his mind and remain with non-attachment in this world, he may in course of time believe this to be a dream. That is what a yogi strives to earn." Hence, the reality of the phenomena depends on personal habits, expectations and interests for the same. The "dreamer," too, fully endorses this view when, in describing his experiments with his dream-creation, he says :

"The method proved so satisfactory that the dreamer was actually worshipped by every one of the dream-creatures and was pronounced to be the only true spiritual guide. He now considered himself in no way less fortunate than so many leaders of the various faiths, in the waking world, who enjoy the pleasure of being devoutly worshipped by their disciples. They enjoy it during the twelve hours of the day, while the dreamer enjoyed it during so many hours of night, and there seemed to be no variable difference between the two" (the compiler's own italics).

No need to dilate any further on the point ; the strangest thing about it is that it does not strike "the dreamer" to improve his condition here in this waking world, which he also regards as a dream, instead of drowning his senses in the false and artificial intoxication of some agreeable form of hallucination in dream. Our "dreamer," however, insists that he enjoys the waking state of consciousness throughout his dream, and says with reference to a dialogue between himself and his shadowy guru (preceptor) which is reported on pp. 308-369 of the book :—

"The reader will thoroughly appreciate it if he only bears in mind, first that the scene of the dreamer's interview with the sage is laid in the world of dream and secondly that the dreamer's waking consciousness is intact throughout the discourse."

This is, however, obviously, another charming instance of hallucination, if it be meant that the dreamer is awake in the same sense in which a man consciously cognizant of the waking world is said to be awake. The "dreamer" would be able to understand his psychological condition better if he would try to discriminate between two different states of consciousness, one characterised by the conditions of normal wakefulness and the other by a dreaming state in which one dreams that one is dreaming. However much the continuity of the latter condition of consciousness might remain intact—and it is bound to do so if the dream is not to be a summation of several dreams—it can never be described as waking consciousness. The dreamer gives himself away when he says (p. 370) at the end of the interview :—

"It appears that the dreamer pressed and pressed the last question on to the sage who answered it in complete *silence* by tightening his lips, closing his ears and shutting his eyes and gradually all appearances vanished, resulting in the dissolution of the dream-world. Thus ended the dream of the dreamer, who, when awakened into the waking world, was sorry for asking the last question, but he had the consolation of acquiring the power of summoning the sage at will in his dream."

On page 305 is given the ending of one such 'waking consciousness' dream in the following words : "with these words he [a dream *sādhū*] struck the dreamer on his head with his heavy staff, who, in consequence woke up and found himself lying in his bed with his mind extremely puzzled."

* According to B. Shrivastav Lal, a staunch follower of the Radha-wansi Faith and the contributor of solution No. II printed on pp. 97-101 of the book :—

"A dreamer is not a bad being . . . The sects, the holy men and the prophets were all dreamers."

The following question and answer also tend the same way, and would be meaningless in any other sense :—

Q. " Dreamer.—You are right in saying that I do not want my dream-body to be injured or killed, and have indeed a strong love with this personality in spite of my knowledge that it is a dream, but if I do commit suicide here, will I be awakened? "

A. " Sage.—No, you will not be awakened, but will have another dream where you will lose even so much knowledge that it is a dream " (p. 817).

As regards the possibilities of hallucination, there is practically no limit to one's mental creation; one may create for one's satisfaction any kind of worlds—even heavens of all or any of the famous or infamous divinities—or the company of saints and saviours, if one be inclined that way, or even a happy home & id the Roman Convict of Prof. Macran. Babu Shivararat Lal Warman, the contributor of solution No. II, writes of the dream state :

" Heaven and hell a man brings into manifestation, in this plane, just in proportion to his wickedness and good deeds. What a man sows he reaps his full harvest, even in this condition. Whatever he witnesses with his mental senses here, is his own thought creation and nothing else. Friends or foes, angels or evil spirits are all thought forms, and they deal with him as he was wont to deal with others when living on the earth " (p. 72).

The phantom sage also corroborates this and says :—

" A sinner will see a scene of hell and a pious or good man will find himself in heaven, very much like the one depicted in religious books that he has read and followed. An atheist or materialist who believes in no existence after death, will see *nothingness* or darkness. A devotee of any deity will find himself in the dream world of his god and enjoy the beautiful scenery of that place " (p. 325).

Touching the return of the dead, the following words of wisdom flow from the shadowy lips :—

" But remember that the dead do not return in their original personalities. What people see is *help* or a mere phantom of their own creation and it is why a large number of devotees can see the same guru or deity at one and the same time. Such occurrences or seances do not differ from dream creation " (p. 326).

This unfortunately knocks the bottom out of the lovely visions of the Goddess Kati, of *pagis* in trance in the caves of Mount Girnar, and of others including that of a beloved parent, which Dr. Khedkar saw and which he has been at considerable pains to describe (pp. 46—58).

The next question is how to control the type of our dreams? But as to this neither the compiler nor any of the other contributors who share his views has anything definite to say, all contenting themselves with pure wordy abstractions and the broadest generalities of expression. No endeavour is made to establish the causal connection between the means suggested and the end in view, but we are told that there are three different methods of reaching the goal, namely :

1. by impressing ourselves with the unreality of the world, and contemplative meditation,
2. by ascetic renancee, coupled with contemplation, and

3. by devotion to a particular god or goddess or even to a human guru, the culmination of which is reached when the devotee can "project" a perfect physical image of his deity, in whose company he continues to enjoy his full measure of ecstatic pleasure" (p. 344).

As regards contemplation, the greatest stress is laid on the power of suggestion, which is described as the influence responsible for the creation of anything that is created, under the sun. It is said :—

"There is no limit to the power of suggestion. It is indeed the Key-stone or basis to the whole edifice of creation of this and the waking world, as well as of all other worlds" (p. 350).

The greatest obstacle to the first path is said to consist in the recognition of truth by the intellect alone. The most advanced soul on this path "sees no duality in any of his three *avasthas*—*jagrat* [waking] *svapna* [dreaming] and *sushupti* [deep-sleep]." His point of view is changed and he "sees himself and all others as one."

The obstacle on the second path consists in the exhibition of 'extraordinary powers' acquired by the *yogi* which enable him to perform miracles, "altering the course of creation and stopping, changing, and even creating dreams just as he wishes." This results in pride which encompasses his fall. A *yogi* enjoys *ananda* (bliss) as long as he is in *samādhi* (self-induced trance), while a *śāśi* (the follower of the first path) enjoys it in all the three conditions.

The danger on the third path lies in that "the devotee is apt to labour under a sort of self-deception. He comes to look upon this feat of conjuring up his deity as the ultimate goal, and the sensation of ecstatic pleasure which he feels in the presence of his god inclines him to remain in his service. This keeps him from *kaivalya moksha* or final liberation. If, however, he goes beyond this stage, his power of concentration increases, and he succeeds in carrying his consciousness to the *sushupti avastha* [the state of deep-sleep], where he becomes one with his beloved, and realises that the object of his devotion was in reality his own self." We are, however, not instructed as to the method of disposing of the phantom god invoked by the devotee.

As to the state of final liberation which is the *summum bonum*, we are told (p. 339) :—

"*Kaivalya moksha* consists in complete dissolution of personality or separateness into one Absolute, *Advaita* [non-dual]. It is inconceivable and beyond the reach of mind, and that is the reason why even the great *rishis* and *urachins* of Jain religion refuse to believe in a final liberation. None of the ancient or modern sages, of whom the name and form are known to you, has acquired *Kaivalya moksha*. Neither I [the phantom Vasishtha], nor even the well-known Rama, Krishna, Buddha, Christ, etc., have attained it. They are yet a long way from the goal."

* Some of our readers might be interested in recalling the statement of one of the leaders of Mystical thought who said of himself in one of his devotional paroxysms :—

من ايسر نر دل بهر چيست گنگو نهر پاچه پاچه هر پيرى كه كبر كبر

(Tr.—The mind has become clear as the Ganges' stream : [and] I (God) follows persistently, calling Kabir, Kabir !)

No wonder rationalism refuses to believe in a mythical state which can neither be conceived by the mind nor be pointed out as having been experienced by any known being! On p. 330 we are given the last word on the subject. It is said in answer to "the dreamer's" question: "Who, then, can go beyond the spheres of creation and attain what you call *kevalya moksha*?" :—

"Those only who reach the highest stage . . . in this life, have no disciples or adherents and leave no name and form after them . . . Some of these . . . you will find confined in 'your lunatic' asylums . . . They obtain *Kevalya moksha* the moment their earthly sojourn . . . comes to an end."

There are said to be sixteen stages of advancement called *bhūmikas*. Put in a tabulated form, they are as follows :—

Serial number.	Name of the stage.	Characteristics.
1	<i>Jagrat-jagrat</i>	First dawn of consciousness marked by inability to discriminate between any two states of existence. To be found in newly-born babes and lower animals.
2	<i>Jagrat-svapna</i>	Knowledge, during the waking state, of the existence of dream state, but not of deep-sleep or <i>turya</i> .
3	<i>Jagrat-mahupiti</i>	Retention of the memory of deep-sleep. Here people remember the minutest details of their dreams on waking up. Almost all human beings reach up to this stage.
4	<i>Jagrat-turya</i>	Remembrance of the <i>turya</i> state also. Exclusive students of religion and philosophy who possess highly developed intellectual power reach this stage. Devotees and yogis also attain to it. <i>Turya</i> is called super-consciousness, or cosmic consciousness. Not only do people who reach this stage "know that they had dream and dreamless sleep states, but over and above this, when they wake up, they remember the experiences of their <i>turya</i> state and say that immediately before awakening they felt an ecstatic pleasure which they are unable to explain in ordinary language."

Serial number.	Name of the stage.	Characteristics.
6	<i>Swapna-jagrat</i>	Recognition, while dreaming, of a dream as a state of consciousness different from waking consciousness.
8	<i>Swapna-swapna</i>	Awareness of the additional fact that the dream will disappear on waking up. In this stage a person "still believes it to be a creation of another creator and himself a created personality, separate from all other creatures of the dream world."
7	<i>Swapna-sushupti</i>	Mastery over one's dream creation and the power to stop or alter it at will. In this stage one fully recognises "that he is dreaming, that the dream world is his own mental creation and that he will next pass into a dreamless sleep state; but he does not know his fourth <i>avastha</i> , the <i>turya</i> ."
8	<i>Swapna-turya</i>	Awareness of the fourth <i>avastha</i> (state of consciousness), that is <i>turya</i> , while still dreaming.
9	<i>Sushupti-jagrat</i>	Awareness during deep-sleep of the bare fact of one's existence. In this stage one "still believes that, though not seen by him, the waking world as well as other personalities like himself also exist."
10	<i>Sushupti-swapna</i>	Recognition during deep-sleep of the fact that one's previous states of waking and dreaming consciousness "were both merely the results of one's own mental activities."
11	<i>Sushupti-sushupti</i>	Full awareness during deep-sleep of the "mindless" condition of one's mind, that is to say, full consciousness of one's own unconsciousness, i.e., of the unconscious condition of deep-sleep. This is but a temporary condition and either merges into the next higher stage, that is, <i>turya</i> , or lapses into the dreaming state, or is followed by waking up, due to a sensation similar to that of throttling. If the aspirant has no love for his personality left in him he will pass beyond this stage; otherwise he will return to dreaming or wake up altogether.

Serial number.	Name of the stage.	Characteristics.
12	<i>Sushupti-turpa</i>	Expansion of the ego or self into the all-pervading ocean of life and joy, ever conscious, ever existent, ever blissful. Here one "sees the whole universe in him and himself in the whole universe, and actually feels that both the waking and the dream worlds are his own mental creation. This is called the state of <i>samadhi</i> by the yogis." He who reaches this stage is called a <i>Jivan-mukta</i> . This is the description of <i>turpa</i> . Beyond this is <i>turpa atit</i> which will be described after three other stages that intervene on the path of knowledge unaccompanied by perfection in renunciation.
13	<i>Turpa-jagrat</i>	Persistence of desire for doing good, and liability for "assuming a personality and appearing in the world as an ascetic or prophet."
14	<i>Turpa-svapna</i>	The desire for doing good now extends to <i>devatas</i> (gods or the residents of the celestial world). The 'dreamer' might now "come down as Brahma, Vishnu or Mahesh in creation."
15	<i>Turpa-sushupti</i>	Persistence of the "desire of <i>karan</i> (seed) world." One might now become the Lord <i>Hiranyagarbha</i> (the golden egg). "He has practically achieved the goal, but the last obstacle is not yet removed, and he still remains the seed or the egg from which creation may spring at any time."
16	<i>Turpa-turpa</i>	Elimination of the desire for creation. <i>Māyā</i> , however, still exists in this stage potentially. In this condition, "the <i>Ishwara</i> identifies himself with the world as its creator or source. He is an impartial spectator and rejoices in witnessing the play of <i>maya</i> , his consort, as a magician rejoices in the performance of tricks which he himself knows to be sham and baseless in nature."

The goal beyond the sixteenth stage is the *turya atit* or final awakening, where *maṣṣā* and the trinity of the 'knower,' 'knowledge' and the 'known' merge into the non-dual Absolute. It is beyond mind and speech both; "and," says the guru *Vasiṣṭha*, "there are no means in my power nor in that of anybody else to give you even an idea of a mental picture of this ultimate Reality."

Such is the path of progress and such the goal depicted by the venerable *Vasiṣṭha* of the Land of Dreams. A glance at the tabulated description of the stages is sufficient to show that they are not the natural rung of a ladder of causes and effects leading up to perfection in knowledge or happiness or anything else, but truly and essentially landings on an erratic flight of steps to the empty attic of hallucination; for the artificial happiness induced by auto-suggestion is no more real than a juggler's rupee, which cannot pass current as a genuine coin. The force of suggestion is apparent at each stage beginning with the fifth, which is the first above the normal. The analysis of the mental condition of "the dreamer" himself, who claims to have reached the sixth stage has already shown us that his claim to a possession of his waking consciousness is utterly baseless and false, and that, on the contrary, he has fallen a victim to his own unbridled fancy, taking a complex phase of dreaming consciousness to be an unbroken continuity of waking existence. The seventh stage is characterised by the power to stop or alter one's dreams, to be acquired by the further suggestion for mastery over them. The eighth is the outcome of suggestion for the dreaming of a condition of *turya* in addition to the preceding one. The ninth step is the result of a still more complex mental condition in which one fancies oneself to be sound asleep with but an awareness of one's existence. But it is no more deep-sleep than the sixth was a normal waking consciousness; for what is known as deep-sleep is, by the very sense of the words used to express its significance, a condition devoid of wakefulness. This stage, therefore, is marked by the curious illusion of a 'wakeful-sleeping,' or 'sleeping-wakeful' dream in which one actually dreams of oneself as sound asleep. The tenth is characterised by a fuller sense of awareness; and the eleventh is a still further elaboration of the same. Here one may be said to dream of one's own unconscious condition in deep-sleep with the awareness of the suspension of all mental operations. This cannot naturally last long, since the element of inconsistency between the condition suggested—the suspension of all mental operations—and the actual working of the mind (whence the awareness of the condition of deep-sleep) is a source of disturbance to the ego. The sensation of throttling which one is said to be liable to experience here is probably due to this disturbance, *i.e.*, conflict between imagination and will, the former trying to force the latter into silence (suspension) and the latter refusing to be annihilated. Hence it is that those who neglect their egoity are regarded as qualified to pass on to the next stage, as they train their will to submit to the suggestion of 'suspension' of itself without offering opposition. All others must return to less violent forms of dreaming consciousness or wake up at once. Here again it is clear that the whole thing is pure and simple dreaming or hallucination.

The twelfth stage is reached when the ego surrenders its personal likes and dislikes, and visualises, in its mind, the notion of its being devoid of *me* and *mine*. The soul now has a vision of itself as a pure subject of knowledge and as devoid of

all tings of private loves and hatreds. It is wrong to say that one becomes a *jīvan-mukta* at the time; for as one cannot become a king by robing oneself in purple in one's imagination, so cannot one become a *jīvan-mukta* by imagining oneself to be one in one's dreams. This stage is the last for the *śrova-tyāgi*, that is for him who has perfected himself in renunciation, but for the follower on the path of *jñāna* (knowledge) there are four others to be traversed. The follower on the path of devotion, if he come up so far, is apparently not qualified to pass any farther, unless he get rid of the divine apparition which bars his further progress, as pointed out ere this. We are not told us to what would happen if he did get rid of his "god," but presumably he would somewhere fall in a line with the follower of knowledge or asceticism, and reach the 'goal' by twelve or sixteen stages.

To proceed with the *jñāni* (follower on the path of knowledge) the remaining four stages on his path are characterised by a refinement of desire which is for doing good generally in the thirteenth, for doing good to "gods" in the fourteenth, and for continuity of creation in the fifteenth. In the sixteenth the attainment of desire apparently raises the "dreamer" to the dignity of Ishwara, as he is actually called by that name by our author. He now plays with his consort, *māyā*, and magician-like rejoices in the performance of tricks which "he knows to be sham and baseless in nature!" Finally he passes into the "dissolution of separateness," and ceases to be in the Absolute. This is a condition so hopelessly beyond mind and words that it will not pay the reader to dwell upon it. If he wishes to understand it, he must borrow some of the abundant intuition which the compiler and some of his contributors claim to enjoy.

So far, however, as these additional stages are concerned, it is clear that they are intended to bring the traveller by the first path to the same point which the follower of the second reaches in the twelfth stage; for it is presumed that the love of personality can be destroyed by the ascetic in that stage, but not by him who is unable to control his passions fully. The latter, who reaches the topmost point with regard to dream-making, but lags behind in respect of indifference to his own personality, must, therefore, qualify himself even in that particular before he can reach the goal. This is all the difference between the two paths. It is said distinctly (p. 343) that "the difference between the two paths *yoga* and *jñāna* is that while in the former the aspirant carries his waking-state consciousness to the deep-sleep (*sushupti*) state, in the latter the *sushupti* is brought into the waking state. It is called *asahyga* (easy) *samadhi* as distinguished from the *samadhi* (trance) of a *yogi*." The idea seems to be that while the *jñāni* is to advance by practising auto-suggestion in his dreams, gradually reaching a point when he might dream of himself as involved in deep-sleep, the *yogi*, should begin by approaching the state of deep-sleep in his waking mood, till he reaches the breaking point in the twelfth stage, so that if the former be the method of dreaming *par excellence*, the latter is nothing but day-dreaming pure and simple. In different language, the one tries to create, by auto-suggestion, a dream in which he dreams of himself as sound asleep, and the other to obtain, by the same means, the riddance of the waking consciousness till it become reduced to the barest hallucination of awareness, with the suspension of all other forms of mental functioning. The final hallucination to be produced now is conceived to consist in the dream or vision of a mental world from which the dreamer's representation

is eliminated,—when he sees his dream-creatures, but is invisible to himself and them both. In other words, his personality is to be suppressed in his own consciousness, so that he should be conscious of himself only as if he were a pair of eyes. This is to be merged in the cessation of duality which is the last representation minus the dual throng. If the reader will abstract away everything from the last vision, he will then have the invisible pair of eyes staring at—Nothing. This is the final liberation, which, as the compiler tells us, "is to be attained by some of the inmates of our lunatic asylums." Does the reader still persist in asking, how will the dual throng disappear? Well, our author's reply comes to this: beloved! you only know the world through your ideas or thought-forms; you suppress these, as it were, and, e-r-r—well, and nothing will be left but the INCONCEIVABLE!

Such is the doctrine that is preached in the Dream Problem. But although many a philosophical term and expression find a place in its elaboration, it is actually supported by nothing more solid and substantial than bare assertions and asseverations, interspersed here and there with a handful of insinuating similes, analogies and paralogisms. Some of these assertions are too amazing even for the abnormal mental faculties of the irresponsible inmates of certain public institutions some of whom, we are assured, are on the point of obtaining Final Liberation. We have, for instance, the statement, on p. 259:

"The sun is present as a whole in the minutest ray of light."

Let us hope it only means that the qualities of the sun and not the sun itself are present, etc.

On p. 274 we are told in reference to *māyā* that "being itself a non-existence, it possesses a wonderful *shakti* (power) of making an unreality look as real."

It will serve no useful purpose to criticise the book any further; suffice it to say that it is as much remarkable for its hasty assumptions as it is for its inconceivable ideas and illogical deductions. Perhaps the law of polarity which is the keynote of the philosophy underlying the author's thesis might some fine morning succeed in demonstrating that good reason and fallacy are but two poles of one and the same thing, and are identical on the principle of "opposites being the same" (p. 260); but till that is done we are not called upon to take it seriously.

It only remains to disabuse the mind of our author of the notion that all views are equally true, and lead to the same goal. We shall compare the system which he himself advocates side by side with Jainism, to enable him to perceive that there is little if anything at all in common between them.

Our Author.*	Jainism.
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The world is a created world. 2. The world is not real, being an imaginary creation in the mind of its Creator. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Nobody ever created the world. 2. The world is neither unreal nor imaginary. It is nobody's mental creation.

*The dialogic form will be found to be best suited for the occasion, though, of course, it does not represent an actual conversation.

Our Author.	Jainism.
3. The Absolute is the only reality.	3. There is no such thing as the Absolute. There are six substances, viz., Jiva (spirit, or souls), matter, etc.
4. Jivas (souls) are illusory.	4. No, the souls are real.
5. The goal is to bring about a dissolution of one's personality, i.e., separateness into the non-dual Absolute.	5. The goal is to attain to godhood. There can be no merger of two or more real existences into one.
6. When the goal is reached there will be no ideas of duality left in one's consciousness.	6. On reaching the goal every soul becomes omniscient, all-perceiving, and perfectly happy, and possesses inexhaustible energy.
7. The condition of final liberation is beyond mind, speech and words. It is altogether inconceivable.	7. Not so; all things are knowable.
8. The 'path' lies along the line of suggestion and contemplation as described in the bhūmikas.	8. The 'path' does not lie through hallucination or dream, but consists in the destruction of karmas, as taught by the Tirthankaras.
9. I also preach complete renunciation.	9. No doubt; but it can never be perfect; because of—pardon the observation—your hallucinations you are not in a position to judge of what is perfection in renunciation.
10. It is not possible for me to point to a single soul who might be said to have attained to final liberation.	10. We can give the biographies of a large number of souls who are now living in nirvana and enjoying the beatitude of final liberation.
11. We create our mental worlds as we proceed on the path, thus filling our creations with whatever kind of population we please, and destroying the undesirable ones.	11. The happiest dreams have an ending. Suppression of ideas is no proof of their destruction. When suppressed ideas break loose and become turbulent, they displace the mental equipages. Many people go mad then, and wander about in <i>samsāra</i> .

Our Author.	Jainism.
	<p>through different forms of life. Meditation and contemplation do not certainly mean day-dreaming. Contemplate, if you can, in agreement with truth; but if you cannot, then don't contemplate at all. Nature can never actually and permanently accept a false suggestion, however forcibly given. One cannot make oneself a stone actually and permanently by auto- or hetero-suggestion; neither can one render that unconscious whose very nature is consciousness!</p>
<p>12. Contemplation is necessary for progress on the path.</p>	<p>12. Yes, but not day-dreaming. Our idea of contemplation has nothing in common with the dreaming state of consciousness you try to force on yourself. Contemplation for us means a process which augments the purity of consciousness, finally making it omniscient.</p>
<p>13. What is the difference between your process and mine when we both try to avoid <i>rāga</i> (attachment) and <i>dveṣa</i> (aversion)?</p>	<p>13. You should know that the effect can never be the same where the causes are different. You avoid <i>rāga</i> and <i>dveṣa</i> for things of this world to be free to enjoy your own mental creations, but we give them up to remove the impurities of our soul. Your case resembles that of Prof. Macran's Roman convict whose indifference to his convict's life only arose from his greater attachment for the beautiful wife and family of his dreams whom he was "so anxious to meet."</p> <p>This is clearly <i>rāga</i> which is a cause of bondage. In our case there are no dreams and visions to be attached to. We do not give up one thing to fall in love with another. The difference between the results, yours and our own, is great for this reason. If you were asked to separate the gold from the dross in a lump of ore,</p>

Our Author.	Jainism.
	<p>you would simply daub the thing yellow and then hypnotize yourself to regard it as gold; but we should not be content till we brought out the precious metal by separating every particle of impurity from it!</p>
<p>14. Contemplation as I practise it gives me pleasure. How, then, can you object to it?</p>	<p>14. Only artificial happiness can result from artificial means; your pleasure is manufactured in the Land of Dreams and can never be real. Real happiness is the very nature of the soul, and cannot possibly be had by a contemplation of natural or artificial dreams. The sensualist's pleasure has been condemned by all. Your happiness from your own creations can only be due to your perception or enjoyment thereof, and; therefore, must be sensual in nature. It makes no difference that your 'creations' are mental; for their enjoyment is no less sensual for that reason.</p>
<p>15. In deep-sleep we "dive, as it were, into the fountain which is the source of our being and energy, and enjoy the bliss of the everlasting glory in the lap of our Father."</p>	<p>15. Your language is meaningless to us. Do your words represent actual things and processes in nature or are you only using a metaphor? What is the significance of the word 'dive,' which you qualify by the phrase 'as it were?' What, again, is the idea underlying the expression 'the source of our being and energy.' A living being is a <i>jīva</i> ensouled in a body; but surely you do not mean that the atoms of matter composing the body fall apart in deep-sleep, and fly back to their places at the first dawn of returning consciousness? Perhaps your idea only is that the operation of "diving" is performed by spirit alone? But then spirit has no source whatsoever, being a simple substance! The writer of edition No. II understands this clearly (see p. 70).</p>

Our Author.	Jainism.
<p>16. I had better give you my idea of bliss: if you read the following passage at the top of p. 361 of the Dream Problem you would understand what I mean by bliss:</p> <p>"A new-born infant and a <i>param gnanî</i> [he whose knowledge is perfect] are apparently the same, but in the one ignorance and in the other knowledge predominates. Both are in the state of bliss (<i>ananda</i>), fearless (<i>virbha</i>), desireless (<i>nirraśnî</i>) and so forth; but in the case of the infant, the instinct has to undergo a change or evolution into higher states, while the <i>param gnanî</i> ever remains the same. The infant knows not that he is happy and blissful, while the <i>gnanî</i> knows that he is absolute bliss incarnate."</p> <p>17. But <i>sushupti</i> (deep-sleep) is not a myth.</p>	<p>Probably what you mean is that every soul becomes what you call the all-pervading Absolute during the hours of deep-sleep every night? But that would be tantamount to saying that every soul obtains Final Liberation every night and after some six hours re-enters the body, which is in too violent a conflict with the doctrine of <i>karma</i> and transmigration of souls to be true.</p> <p>Lastly, it is difficult to understand what you mean by the expression 'the bliss of the everlasting glory'. In your conception of Final Liberation, which, in your own words, means only "a complete dissolution of personality and separateness into one Absolute, <i>Advaita</i>" (p. 929), there is no room for such a thing as bliss.</p> <p>16. We can only hope that it is a case of misprint, and not a deliberate statement on your part, when you say that a child is in the state of bliss (<i>ananda</i>) and desireless (<i>nirraśnî</i>), though it is difficult to see how misprinting could have occurred on such an extensive scale. In case our suggestion about a misprint be not acceptable to you, it will be interesting to know in which particular state of the infantine existence may an infant be regarded as blissful and desireless—whether when it is "cross" and peevish, or when crying for milk, a toy, or anything else?</p> <p>17. Deep-sleep is your stumbling block. You seem to think that because there is</p>

Our Author.

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cessation of pain in that condition therefore, it is the end in view. This was the Hindu conception at one time; but it was soon realized that there could be no happiness unless it was consciously felt. Accordingly, a fourth state, the *turpa*, was conceived as possible over and above the three familiar ones, *jyoti*, *śruti* and *śukṛti* (Deussen's *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, p. 300). This accounts for your conception of happiness consisting in the condition of deep-sleep *plus* its awareness. But as this is impossible in the natural way—for you cannot be asleep and awake at the same time—you try to create a state resembling it in your dreams with the help of auto-suggestion. Having thus created a dream in which you perceive yourself as sound asleep, you have next to console yourself for the loss of the waking reality. This you achieve by arguing that the waking world is itself a dream with a solitary "dreamer," the Absolute, which you are forced to regard as not a being, but an indefinable existence, to avoid some of the most glaring contradictions. Having arrived at this result, you naturally conceive your aim in life to consist in "waking up," in other words, to cease to dream, that is to say, to become the Absolute, without name and form and figure. This additional notion you now engraft on your earlier conception of the fourth state, removing from your hallucination of the mental blankness of deep-sleep the mark of personality and "separateness," and leaving it a dream about pure and simple nothing by an invisible dreamer. This accounts for the wild enthusiasm about the state of deep-sleep which is apparent in your otherwise beautiful metaphor. The

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	<p>statement of Sister Deomata, which you accept, to the effect that the deep-sleep state is a withdrawing from the many to the one, from the manifested to the power that manifests (p. 238) is a pure assumption. It is no argument to say that because we feel refreshed after sound sleep, therefore deep-sleep must signify the merger of the soul in the Absolute. Sleep is refreshing because during the hours of rest the physical system is enabled to absorb and dispose of the poisonous secretions in certain sensitive parts of the nervous system caused by the pressure of the activities of waking life.</p>

No need to dwell any longer on the point; there is so little in common between the two systems that if one of them be the path to nirvāṇa, the other must necessarily lead to bondage and pain.

To conclude, the Dream Problem would have been better written if its talented author had kept his mind in touch with the concrete reality, and taken the trouble to test the logical value of every statement he was going to make. Above all, it is incumbent on all writers to remember that theory questions cannot be disposed of by making sweeping assertions, like the one on p. 273, to the effect that Vedānta is the basis of all religions. A clear issue should be framed as to each and every such point, and no opinion should be hazarded without a full and careful examination of all the available evidence and of the arguments both for and against each side's view.

APPENDIX C

The origin of the creed of *Tirthankaras*, that is Jainism, has been a fruitful source of speculation and error for the moderns who have advanced all sorts of hypotheses concerning its rise. It was at one time thought that it originated, as an offshoot of Buddhism, in the sixth century A.D. Recent research has, however, fully demonstrated the fact that it has existed at least from 300 years before Buddha, and modern Orientalists are now agreed on the point that Bhagwan Parasva Nath, the twenty-third *Tirthankara*, is not a mythical figure, but a real historical being. It is not necessary to cite much authority in proof of this, the following quotations being quite sufficient to demonstrate the fact that Buddhism cannot possibly be regarded as the source of Jainism.

"We cannot," said Dr. T. K. Laddu,* "trace any reliable history of Jainism beyond Vardhamana Mahavira. This much, however, is certain that Jainism is older than Buddhism and was founded probably by some one, either Parasvanatha or some other *Tirthankara* who had lived before the time of Mahavira."

Mahamahopadhyaya Dr. S. C. Vidyabhusan is equally clear on the point and writes † :—

"It may be held that Indrabhuti Gautama, a direct disciple of Mahavira whose teachings he collected together, was a contemporary of Buddha Gautama the reputed founder of Buddhism and of Akshapada Gautama the Brahman author of the *Nyaya Sutra*."

Turning to European writers on the subject, the following from the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. VII, p. 465, may be taken to be the last word on the subject :—

"Notwithstanding the radical difference in their philosophical notions, Jainism and Buddhism, being originally both orders of monks outside the pale of Brahmanism, present some resemblance in outward appearance, so that even Indian writers occasionally have confounded them. It is, therefore, not to be wondered at that some European scholars who became acquainted with Jainism through inadequate samples of Jain literature easily persuaded themselves that it was an offshoot of Buddhism. But it

* See the 'Full Text of the Address by Dr. T. K. Laddu,' published by the Hon. Secy., Syadrasa Mahavidyalaya, Benares.

See The *Jaina Gazette*, Vol. X, No. 1.

has since been proved beyond doubt that their theory is wrong, and that Jainism is at least as old as Buddhism. For the canonical books of the Buddhists frequently mention the Jains as a rival sect, under their old name Nigantha.....and their leader in Buddha's time, Natasputta (Nata- or Natiputta being an epithet of the last prophet of the Jains, Vardhamana Mahavira), and they name the place of the latter's death Pava, in agreement with Jain tradition. On the other hand, the canonical books of the Jains mention as contemporaries of Mahavira the same kings as reigned during Buddha's career, and one of the latter's rivals. Thus it is established that Mahavira was a contemporary of Buddha, and probably somewhat older than the latter, who outlived his rival's decease at Pava. Mahavira, however unlike Buddha, was most probably not the founder of the sect which reveres him as their prophet, nor the author of their religion.....His predecessor, Parsva, the last *Tirthankara* but one, seems to have better claims to the title of the founder of Jainism.....but in the absence of historical documents we cannot venture to go beyond a conjecture."

We may also quote the authority of Dr. Johann George Buhler, C.I.E., LL.D., Ph.D., who writes (see 'The Jainas,' pages 22 and 23) :—

".....the Buddhists themselves confirm the statements of the Jainas about their prophet. Old historical traditions and inscriptions prove the independent existence of the sect of the Jainas even during the first five centuries after Buddha's death, and among the inscriptions are some which clear the Jain tradition not only from the suspicion of fraud but bear powerful witness to its honesty."

In his Essay on Jaina Bibliography, Dr. A. Guerinot maintains :
" There can no longer be any doubt that Parashvanath was a historical personage."—(Quoted from the Jaina Gazette for 1927, p. 103.)

We need only refer further to the authority of Major-General J. G. R. Forlong, F.R.S.E., F.R.A.S., M.A.I., etc., a learned scholar and writer, who points out, as the result of over seventeen years' study and research (see Short Studies in the Science of Comparative Religions, pages 243-4) :—

" All Upper, Western, North Central India was then—say 1600 to 800 B.C. and, indeed, from unknown times—ruled by Turanians, conveniently called Dravids, and given to tree, serpent, and phallic worship.....but there also then existed throughout upper India an ancient and highly organized religion, philosophical, ethical and severely ascetical, viz., *Jainism*, out of which clearly developed the early ascetical features of Brahmanism and Buddhism.

" Long before Aryans reached the Ganges, or even the Sarasvati, Jainas had been taught by some twenty-two prominent Bodhis, saints or Tirthankaras, prior to the historical 23rd Bodhi Parsva of the 8th or 9th century B.C., and he knew of all his predecessors—pious Rishis living at long intervals of time; and of several scriptures even then known as Purvas or Puranas, that is, ' ancient,' which had been

handed down for ages in the memory of recognised anchorites, *Vanaprasthas* or 'forest recluses.' This was more especially a Jain Order, severely enforced by all their 'Bodhis' and particularly in the 6th century B.C. by the 24th and last, Maha Vira of 598—526 B.C. This ascetik Order continued in Brahmanism and Buddhism throughout distant Baktria and Dacia, as seen in our *Study I.* and *S. Books E., Vols. XXII. and XLV.*"

The above expressions of opinion of non-Jaina writers, while not always recognising the historicity of the first twenty-two Tirthamkaras of Jainism, fully establish the fact that it has prevailed in the world for at least 2,800 years, that is to say, from a period of three hundred years before Buddha. It follows, therefore, that Jainism cannot possibly be described as an offshoot of Buddhism.

The important question which now arises on these established facts is, whether Jainism is an offshoot of Hinduism?

Certain modern writers* now imagine it to be a daughter of the Brahmanical religion, risen, as a protest, against the birth (caste) exclusiveness of the parent creed. This opinion is based on the notion that the Rig Veda being the record of the thoughts of a period when humanity was in a sort of intellectual childhood, must be considered to be prior in time to the more intellectually developed forms of religion. Starting from this assumption, it is argued that Jainism is a protest against the old religion, and must be presumed to be a rebellious daughter of the parent creed to which it bears a close resemblance.

Unfortunately, there is no independent testimony available on this important point, since neither monuments nor any other kind of historical data† are forthcoming to throw any light on the situation. The question has to be decided, solely and simply, by the intrinsic testimony furnished by the scriptures of the two creeds independently of all external help. We shall, therefore, study the teachings of the two religions, side by side, to be able to test the claim of each to greater antiquity.

* See 'The Heart of Jainism,' p. 5.

† The Jaina Records do, indeed, prove the great antiquity of Jainism, but as the modern Historian is apt to distrust all documents that are not strictly historical, we may leave them out of consideration at present.

To begin with Hinduism, its writings consist of Vedas, Brahmanas, Upanishads and Puranas. Of these the Vedas are the oldest; the Brahmanas come next in the order of time; the Upanishads follow still later and the Puranas last of all. All the Vedas also do not belong to the same period; that known by the name of Rig being the oldest. Thus, Hinduism is one of those creeds which are characterised by periodic evolution and growth.

This fact speaks for itself, and gives rise to the inference that Hinduism has not always been what it is today; and it is clear that important additions have been made to it, from time to time, to impart to it that look of perfection which it undoubtedly lacked in the Vedas, notwithstanding the highly mystic tone of their sacred hymns.

When we turn to find out what was the teaching of the early Hinduism of the Vedic or pre-Vedic period, we are met with the difficulty which even the Upanishad-writers failed to solve satisfactorily, for we have nothing in the nature of a systematic or scientific exposition of religion in the Vedas, but only a collection of hymns addressed to a host of deities almost all of whom are now regarded as pure personifications of the various forces of nature. The Brahmanas admittedly lay no claim to a scientific treatment of the subject, and consist mostly in sacrificial ritual, while the Upanishads, in spite of their philosophical tendency, need elaborate commentaries to be understood, and are also full of such mythical matters as the creation of living beings by Brahmā as the result of repeated acts of rape on his own unmarried daughter, Śatarupa.* Even the six schools of philosophy or *darshanas*, which endeavoured to give a systematic presentation of the subject of Religion, end in contradicting one another. The result is that nobody seems to know even today what is the true teaching of Hinduism, though the follower of the Ishvaraless Sankhya is dubbed a Hindu as much as the devotee of Vishnu, or the worshipper at the shrine of Sita, the controlling deity of small-pox. So far as sacrificial rites are concerned, there can be little doubt that animal sacrifices are opposed to the purity of the spirit of the Rig-Veda, and that such ceremonies as the *ajā-medha* (goat-sacrifice), the *asva-medha* (horse-sacrifice), the *go-medha* (cow-

* See The Brihad Aranyaka Upanishad, I. 4. 4.

sacrifice) and the *purusa-medha* (human-sacrifice) were adopted afterwards in some evil moment of time. This is evident from the general nature of the personifications made, especially from that of Agni which represents *tapas* (asceticism), the direct antithesis of the principle underlying human or animal sacrifice. Such of the Vedic texts as, "Childless be the devouring ones,"* and those which contain strong imprecations against *valabhasus* and flesh-eaters† also furnish strong evidence in support of this view. The tremendous endeavours Hindus have themselves made subsequently to put a symbolical interpretation on the sacrificial text only go to show how bitterly the Hindu heart was opposed to animal-sacrifice. How these sacrificial texts came to be incorporated in the Vedas, is involved in obscurity, the only thing certain about them being that they were opposed to the true spirit of Hinduism, and, therefore, must have been added later on, under some evil influence, since it is not likely that a purity-loving religion would indulge in this kind of cruel and misleading symbolism.

This finishes our survey of Hinduism which entitles us to hold that precision of thought and language has never been a distinguishing feature of that creed at any stage of its activities. This amounts to saying that Hinduism has never been free from the nebosity and confusion of thought which are the distinguishing marks of mystic poetry, and that its foundation consists solely in a collection of emblematical hymns, addressed to personified powers and forces, hence, imaginary deities, springing up in the mystery-loving fancy of the poet-sages of the past.

When we turn to Jainism we find a very different state of affairs. It is a purely scientific system of religion and insists on a thorough understanding of the problem of life, or soul. Far from having received periodic additions, it has descended to us in its original form, and although a few schisms have taken place in its constitution during the last 1,800 years or so, nothing of importance has been added to or subtracted from its teaching.

* The Rig Veda, I. 91. 5.

† See Wilkins' Hindu Mythology, p. 27.

It is necessary to refer briefly to the teaching of Jainism to understand the marvellous perfection of thought exhibited by it. It points out that the attainment of the supreme bliss, the condition of Godhood, is the real ideal of the soul, though it is not always conscious thereof. The realisation of the supreme status, it is further pointed out, is possible with one's own exertion, never by the favour or grace of another. The reason for this is that the supreme status of the *Siddhātman* (God) is the essential nature of the soul, which, in the condition of impurity, or imperfection, is not manifested by it owing to the bondage of different kinds of *karmanas*. These *karmanas* are forces of different sorts which arise from the union of soul with matter, and which can only be destroyed by self-exertion. So long as a soul remains ignorant of its own true nature, it cannot exert itself to realise its natural perfection and joy. Hence, knowledge of the nature of spirit and other substances and of the forces which cripple the natural powers of the soul, is essential to the attainment of final emancipation from the bondage of *karmanas*.

It is the accurate, or right knowledge, springing from true discernment, of the seven principles called *tattvas* which is absolutely essential to the attainment of the goal of spiritual evolution. This must be accompanied by right conduct, that is, exertion in the right direction for the destruction of *karmic* bonds and the obtaining of release from the cycle of transmigration, *i.e.*, repeated births and deaths.

Such, briefly, is the teaching of Jainism, and it is obvious that the whole thing is a chain of links based on the Law of Cause and Effect, in other words, a perfectly scientific school of philosophy; and the one most remarkable feature of the system is that it is not possible to remove, or alter, a single link from it without destroying the whole chain at once. It follows from this that Jainism is not a religion which may be said to stand in need of periodic additions and improvements, or to advance with times, for only that can be enriched by experience which is not perfect at its inception.

To revert to early Hinduism of the *Vedic* period, we find nothing approaching the systematic perfection of Jainism either in the *Rig* or the remaining three *Vedas* whose authors merely content themselves by singing the praises of mythical gods—*Agni*, *Indra* and the like. Even

the doctrine of transmigration which is an essential part of religion, in the true sense of the word, has to be spelt out laboriously from the mythological contents of the *Vedas*, and, as European scholars have pointed out, is only directly hinted at in one place, which describes the soul as 'departing to the waters and the plants.'

We have thus no alternative left but to hold that early Hinduism, if taken in its exoteric sense, differs from the creed of the *Purthasokaras* as much as any two dissimilar and disconnected things can differ from one another.

As said in the introduction to the *Jaina Law*, the *Jainas* cannot be Hindu dissenters. Whenever there is a division in a religious community the bulk of the creed remains the same. The differences arise only in respect of a few matters. Here if we regard Hinduism as non-allegorical and then compare it with Jainism, the differences are very great; their agreement is only in respect of a few particulars, excepting those matters which concern the ordinary mode of living (civilization). Even the ceremonies which appear to be similar are, in reality, different in respect of their purport, if carefully studied. The *Jainas* regard the world as eternal; the *Hindus* hold it to have been made by a creator. In Jainism worship is not offered to an eternal and eternally pure god; but to those Great Ones who have realized their high ideal and attained to Godhood themselves; in Hinduism worship is performed of one Lord who is the creator and ruler of the world. The significance of worship in Hinduism is also not the same as that in Jainism. In Jainism it is a kind of idealatry that is practised; there is no offering of food and the like; nor is a prayer made to the deity for boons. In Hinduism the attainment of the object is by the will of certain divine beings who are to be propitiated. In respect of their scriptures, too, there are great differences between Hinduism and Jainism. Not one of the Books of the *Hindus* is accepted by the *Jainas*, nor do the *Hindus* accept a single *śāstra* of the latter. The contents, too, of the Scriptures of the two religions differ. Not one part of the four *Vedas* and the 18 *Puranas* recognised in Hinduism is included in the *Jaina* Scriptures. Nor is any part of the Sacred Books of the *Jainas* included clearly or expressly in the Hindu Books. The matters in respect of which there seems to be an agreement between the *Jainas* and the

Hindus are merely social ; their significance wherever they have a religious bearing is divergent. Ordinary agreement in respect of social matters is to be expected among communities that have been living together for a long time, especially when intermarriages take place between them, as amongst the Jains and the Hindus. There are several social customs which are common to the Jains, the Hindus and the Muhammadans, but they have no special significance with reference to religion. Many customs are adopted, especially in imitation of kings and potentates, in one community from another. In times of calamity changes are sometimes effected in the religious practices to preserve religion and life. In the past the Hindus committed many acts of oppression against the Jains. Jaina saints and householders were ill-treated and some of them were even put to death. Under these circumstances the Jains took the shelter of Brahmanical greed and began to employ the Brahmanas for the performance of their social ceremonies, so as to preserve themselves in that way. The practice has continued and even today Brahmanas are employed by them to assist in the performance of marriage and other ceremonies at various stages. But religious matters are quite different ; they are not touched. There are great differences between the Hindus and the Jains in the department of law also which have been described in "The Jaina Law."

It is thus impossible to regard the Vedas as the mother of the Jaina canon. Indeed, the truth would seem to lie the other way, for if we once disabuse our minds of the idea of revelation being the source of the Vedas, and can manage to understand the true teaching underlying its emblematic hymns, we can easily perceive the growth of Hindu mysticism from a scientific source outside its own domain.

It has already been observed that neither the conception of the great ideal of Nirvana, that is, perfection and bliss, nor the doctrine of transmigration of souls, with the underlying principle of *karma*, is to be found in the scripture of early Hinduism if taken in its popular sense, and it may also be stated that even when these doctrines are disentangled from the mythical skein of the *Vedic* lore, they lack the scientific basis which they enjoy in Jainism. In this respect, early Hinduism resembles Buddhism which also acknowledges the truth of the doctrine of transmigration and

the principle of *karma*, but does not explain the nature of bondage or transmigration in the scientific way they are dealt with in the Jaina *Siddhānta*. The inference these facts give rise to is plain, and, plainly put, amounts to this that the doctrines of *karma*, transmigration and final release were never discovered by Hindu or Buddhist philosophers, nor were they ever revealed to them by an Omniscient or all-knowing Teacher (God).

To appreciate the merit of the argument, it is necessary to remember that the doctrine of *karma* is a highly rational and scientific treatment of the subject of spiritual unfoldment, and that it is based on the principle and causes of interaction between soul and matter, the absence of either of which will be absolutely fatal to its validity, since a non-existent being cannot possibly be bound, and since there can be no binding with imaginary non-existent chains. Buddhism denies the existence of the soul, and does not hold the *karmic* bondage to be material in its nature, while early Hinduism has little or nothing to say on the science of spiritual evolution. These facts speak for themselves, and negative the idea of the Jains having borrowed their elaborate system from either of them. Nor is it possible to hold that the Jains perfected the system of Hindus or any other creed. The following from the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* (Vol. VII. p. 472) contains a sufficient refutation of all such notions :—

" A question must now be answered which will present itself to every critical reader, viz., Is the Karma theory as explained above an original and integral part of the Jaina system? It seems so abstruse and highly artificial that one would readily believe it a later developed metaphysical doctrine which was grafted on an originally religious system based on animistic notions and intent on sparing all living beings. But such a hypothesis would be in conflict with the fact that this karma-theory, if not in all details, certainly in the main outlines, is acknowledged in the oldest parts of the canon and presupposed by many expressions and technical terms occurring in them. Nor can we assume that in this regard the canonical books represent a later dogmatic development for the following reason: the terms *desava*, *samvara*, *nirjara*, etc., can be understood only on the supposition that *karma* is a kind of subtle matter flowing or pouring into the soul (*desava*), that this influx can be stopped or its inlets covered (*samvara*), and that the *karma*-matter received into the soul is consumed or digested, as it were, by it (*nirjara*). The Jains understood these terms in their literal meaning, and use them in explaining the way of salvation (the *samvara* of the *desavas* and the *nirjara* lead to *moksha*). Now these terms are as old as Jainism. For the Buddhists have borrowed from it the most significant term *desava*: they use

it in very much the same sense as the Jains, but not in its literal meaning, since they do not regard the *karma* as subtle matter, and deny the existence of a soul into which the *karma* could have an 'influx.' Instead of *samvara* they say *darakkhaya* (*darasakaya*), 'destruction of the *darasas*,' and identify it with *magga* (*marga*, 'path'). It is obvious that with them *Asrava* has lost its literal meaning, and that, therefore, they must have borrowed this term from a sect where it had retained its original significance, or, in other words, from the Jains. The Buddhists also use the term *samvara*, e.g., *sīlāsamvara*, 'restraint under the moral law,' and the participle *samvārita* 'controlled,' words which are not used in this sense by Brahmanical writers, and therefore are most probably adopted from Jainism, where in their literal sense they adequately express the idea that they denote. Thus the same argument serves to prove at the same time that the *karma*-theory of the Jains is an original and integral part of their system, and that Jainism is considerably older than the origin of Buddhism."

When we turn to Hinduism to enquire if the *karma*-theory be the result of the researches of the Hindu *ṛishis*, we find only a vague and incomplete conception of it in the early scripture of Hinduism. The conclusion here also is the same, namely, the *karma*-theory has been adopted by the Hindus from some other creed, for if it were the product of the labour of Hindu *ṛishis*, it would have retained that scientific aspect in the hands of its authors which it undoubtedly wears in Jainism. What is the nature of *karma*, bondage, emancipation and *nirvana*, is a subject on which the Hindus seem to entertain the most conflicting and unscientific notions; indeed, the terms *āsrava*, *samvara*, and *nirjarā* are some of those which are almost wholly unknown to the Brahmanical creed, in spite of the elaborate intellectualism of the *Upaniṣad*-writers, who tried to put their ancestral faith on a sound metaphysical basis. The conclusion we are entitled to draw, then, is that Hinduism has itself borrowed that from some other source which is now regarded by some as its own discovery.

The next question is, from whom could the Hindus have borrowed their *karma*-theory? Not from the Buddhists, because Buddhism came into existence subsequently; nor from any other creed than Jainism which undoubtedly is the oldest of all other religions which preach the doctrine of transmigration, and the only one which explains it in the scientific way.

This practically disposes of the wrong notion that Jainism is a daughter of Hinduism; but as the origin of the Vedas is likely to throw

considerable light on the point, we shall now endeavour to trace out their source from the point of view of rational thought.

Modern research conceives the Vedas as a collection of the outpourings of the human mind in its infancy when mankind feared the elements, and were ready to fall on their knees to propitiate all kinds of physical forces, personified as gods and goddesses. The state of civilization attained by the Hindus, as is evident from the intrinsic evidence furnished by the Vedas themselves, however, sufficiently disproves this notion. For the authors of the sacred hymns were not primitive men or savages, in any sense of the term, and cannot be said to have fallen down before fire (Agni) and other forces of nature in wonder and awe. According to one European writer:—

"The country occupied by the Aryans was peopled by various tribes, and divided into numerous principalities. Many names of kings occur in the Vedas . . . Mention is made of *purpati*, lords of cities, and *gramani*, heads of villages. . . . References are made to well-dressed females and to well-made garments. From these passages and others relating to jewels, it may be gathered that considerable attention was already paid to personal decoration. The materials of clothing were probably cotton and wool. The form of the garments was much about the same as among the modern Hindus. A turban is mentioned. References to needle and sewing suggest that made dresses were not unknown. . . . Iron cities and fortifications are mentioned. . . . Intoxicating liquors are mentioned in the hymns. Nearly a whole mandala of the Rig Veda is devoted to the praise of Soma Juice. Wine or spirit, *sura*, was also in use.

"The chief occupations of the Aryans were fighting and cultivating the soil. Those who fought gradually acquired influence and rank, and their leaders appear as Rajas. Those who did not share in the fighting were called *Vis*, *Vairagas*, or householders."

Describing the state of the Hindu society of the Vedic period, Dr. Wilson observes:—

"That the Aryans were not merely a nomadic people is very evident. As well as their enemies they had their villages and towns as well cattle-pens; and many of the appliances, conveniences, luxuries and vices found in congregated masses of human family. They knew the processes of spinning and weaving, on which they were doubtless principally dependent for their clothing. They were not strangers to the use of iron and to the crafts of the blacksmith, copper-smith, carpenter, and other artisans. They used hatchets in felling the trees of their forests, and they had planes for polishing the wood of their carts. They fabricated coats of mail, clubs, bows, arrows, javelins, swords or cleavers, and discs to carry on their warfare, to which they were sometimes called by the sound of the conch-shell. They made cups, pitchers, and long and short ladles, for use, in their domestic economy and the worship of the gods. They employed professional barbers to cut off their hair. They knew how to turn

the precious metals and stones to account; for they had their golden earrings, golden bowls, and jewel necklaces. They had chariots of war from which they fought, and ordinary conveyances drawn by horses and bullocks; they had rider-bearing steeds and grooms to attend them. They had eunuchs in their community. . . . They constructed skiffs, boats, rafts and ships; they engaged in traffic and merchandise in parts somewhat remote from their usual dwellings. Occasional mention is made in their hymns of the ocean which they had probably reached by following the course of the Indus. Parties among them covetous of gain are represented as crowding the ocean in vessels on a voyage. A naval expedition to a foreign country is alluded to as frustrated by a shipwreck."

Amongst amusements, the Aryans were familiar with singing, dancing and acting. Drums are mentioned in the Vedas, and in the Atharva Veda one hymn is especially addressed to a drum.

Such were the Aryans of the period during which the Vedas were composed. We can call them savages only if we shut our eyes to their achievements of which a sufficiently long list is given in the two preceding quotations. What, then, is the explanation of the almost childish worship of Agni, Indra and the like to whom the hymns of the Rig Veda are addressed? It seems inconsistent with good reason to hold that men of such brilliant attainments as the Hindus have been shown to be, from the intrinsic evidence furnished by the Vedas themselves, could be so backward in respect of reason as to be struck with wonder and awe at the sight of fire (Agni), and to compose a series of hymns to propitiate a force which they could themselves produce with the greatest ease. The fact is that the Vedic gods are not the personifications of the physical forces of nature, but of the spiritual powers of the soul. As the singing of the praises of the soul is the direct means of 'waking' it up from the lethargy of *karmic* somnolence, the poet-rishis of the Rig Veda addressed a number of hymns to the most important ones of the spiritual faculties, so that they should come into manifestation in the consciousness of him who chants them with intelligence and understanding of their purport. They also personified many of the minor functions of life—perception, etc.,—as will be shown later on. All this, however, presupposes a profound knowledge of certain spiritual truths on the part of the *rishis*, and is fully in keeping with the highly advanced civilisation of the Aryans of the Vedic period.

But while a presupposition of the knowledge of spiritual truths is a condition precedent in the composers of the hymns of the Rig Veda,

the existence of such knowledge, in a clear scientific way, is also an unavoidable necessity. But where shall we look for this knowledge of truth if not in Jainism, which is the only other ancient religion in India? It follows from this that the Jaina system is really the basis of the sacred poetry of the Rig Veda, whose authors personified different functions of life as well as certain latent spiritual forces of the soul as gods and goddesses.

The force of the observation that the superstructure of Vedic mythology is based on a foundation of fragmentary truth taken from the Jaina Siddhānta, will be evident to any one who will seriously reflect on the origin of the doctrine of transmigration and its underlying principle of Karma. That this doctrine was known to the author or authors of the Vedas is apparent from the passage in the Rig Veda which speaks of the soul as 'departing to the waters or the plants' (see 'Indian Myth and Legend' by Donald A. Mackenzie, p. 116), as well as from the general tenor of the philosophy underlying the Vedic mythology.

If it be conceded in agreement with Yaska, a commentator of the Vedas, that there are three important deities in the Vedas, Agni whose place is on the earth, Vayu or Indra whose place is in the air, and Surya whose place is in the sky, it becomes easy to perceive that these deities receive severally many appellations in consequence of the diversity of their functions (see 'The Hindu Mythology' by W. J. Wilkins, p. 9.) We have explained the nature of Indra to a certain extent already, and shall also describe it here later on; but Surya is the symbol of omniscience (*kevala jñāna*), and Agni of the 'fire' of asceticism. Thus, the three principal deities of the Vedic *ṛṣis* are symbolical of the three different aspects of spirit, Surya representing it in its natural effulgence, Indra depicting it as the lord and enjoyer of matter, and Agni standing for its sin-destroying characteristics to be developed under the influence of asceticism. The three legs of Agni indicate the threefold nature of *tapas* (asceticism), relating to the mind, speech and the body, while his seven arms indicate the seven occult forces conceived to be lying dormant in the seven *chakras* (plexuses) of the body. The ram, the favourite mount of the god, is a symbol of lower personality (see ante chapter VIII) which is to be sacrificed for the glorification of the higher Self. The 'pieces of wood' which give

birth to Agni represent the physical body and the material organ of mind which are both consumed before the final emancipation. As the pure divine qualities of the soul are brought into manifestation through the fire of *tapas*, Agni is described as the priest of gods who appear at his invocation. Finally, Agni (*tapas*) is also to take the soul to the region of the ancestors (Nirvana) where it shall dwell for ever in the enjoyment of peace and wisdom and happiness.

Such is the nature of Agni, the youthful priest of the gods. He is not a being but an impersonation; and the impersonation is not of the physical fire, as the European translators of the Vedas have imagined it to be, but of the *karma*-consuming fire of the soul itself, as manifested in the practising of *tapas*. This one impersonation is sufficient to show that the brain which conceived it must have been familiar with the doctrine of transmigration and the theory of *karma*; and the fact that the doctrine is preached in allegorical garb indicates that the author of the mystic impersonation did not realize the unfortunate effect of imparting religious instruction in emblematic form. He could not, then, have been truly illumined himself, and must, therefore, have borrowed the teaching from some other source, which, outside Jainism, is not to be found elsewhere in the world.

It may also be pointed out here that Hinduism itself has always admitted and never disputed the great antiquity of Jainism and of its founder, Bhagwan Rishabha Deva, whom the Hindus regard as an incarnation of Viṣṇu. He is mentioned in the Varāṇḍ and Agni *Purāṇas*, which place his historicity beyond question, giving the name of his mother—Marudevi—and of his son, Bharata, after whom India came to be called Bharatavarsha in the past. The Bhagavata *Purāṇa* likewise makes a mention of the holy Tirthamkara, and acknowledges him as the founder of Jainism.

According to the last named *Purāṇa*, Rishabha Deva was the ninth *avatāra* (incarnation) of Viṣṇu, and preceded the Vāmana or Dwarf, Rama, Kṛṣṇa and Buddha who are also regarded as *avatāras*. Now, since the Vāmana *avatāra*, the fifteenth in the order of enumeration, is expressly referred to in the Rig Vēda, it follows that it must have priority in point of time to the composition of the hymn that refers to it; and inasmuch as Bhagwan Rishabha Deva even preceded the

Vāmana avatāra, he must have flourished still earlier.* Thus, there can be no doubt but that the composition of the Vedas took place a considerable time after the establishment of Jainism in the present cycle of time.

It is also interesting to note that the name Rishabha in Hinduism has been treated as a symbol of Dharma; and the same is the case with the bull which is the distinguishing mark of the Holy Tirthankara, and engraved on His consecrated statues. Mr. K. N. Iyer says as to this in his *Permanent History of Bharata Varsha*, vol. i. p. 213:—

"The name Rishabh constantly mentioned as referring to the father of Bharata, signifies Dharma usually described as a bull in the Puranas."

This is quite sufficient to show that in personifying Dharma for the requirement of their mythological teachings, the minds of the *ṛṣi* composers of these ingenious symbols naturally went back to Rishabha Deva, as the first *Tirthankara* and founder of *Dharma* (religion). Under the circumstances it is not surprising that the bull which is the mark of the Holy *Tirthankara*, should also be associated with *Dharma* in the symbolical language of Hindu mythology.

The Hindus naturally claim divine authorship for their Vedas, but the nature of the hymns shows that the claim is unfounded. Revelation, in its true sense, means either (a) the discovery of truth by one's own soul by means of direct perception, called *kevala jñāna* (omniscience), or (b) the statement of pure truth by an omniscient Teacher (*Tirthankara*) prior to His leaving the world to enter *nīrvāṇa*. The Vedas are said to belong to the latter type, since they are described as *śruti*, i.e., that which is heard. It is, therefore, necessary to ascertain the nature of the propounding source of true *śruti* or scripture.

* The fact that the Vedic text is couched in mythological language does not impair the accuracy of this inference, since the Vedic mythology, like that of the epics and puranas, has, in many instances, drawn the raw material of its personifications, metaphors and allegories from well-known facts and events of history. The Jaina puranas prove the historicity of both Śri Rishabha Deva Bhagwan and Viṣṇu ṛṣi, who came to be known as the *Vāmana Avatāra*, because of his relieving, on one occasion, the suffering of certain ascetic saints, by contracting his body to a dwarfish size and then expanding it to incredible dimensions, with the aid of an occult power acquired by the performance of austere asceticism.

The main thing to be borne in mind in this connection is that speech—whatever be its form and whether it be voluntary or not—is a kind of material movement, and arises by the agitation of material 'bodies.' The disturbance is then communicated to the matter of the atmosphere which carries it to the ear of the hearer. The impulses of the mind, which are responsible for the production of voluntary speech, consist in subtle movements, which, originating in a matter-ridden will, are communicated, through the nervous mechanisms, to the organs of speech in the throat. But a pure spirit is not connected through nervous mechanisms with a body or with the material organs of speech. Hence, where there is no taint of matter left in the soul, speech necessarily becomes impossible for it. It follows from this that a bodiless soul, or, in general terms, pure spirit, is incapable of communicating with men by means of speech. Further, since perfect freedom from the bondage of matter is possible only by Self-contemplation in the highest degree, no pure spirit can possibly be interested in the affairs of others. It is, therefore, certain that there can be no revelation by a pure Spirit, such as a revealing god is conceived to be, to men.

It is also worth noting that there can be no true revelation except in plain terms, since the *Tirthankara* is devoid of motives for concealment of truth, and cannot, therefore, be credited with a desire to use language which is liable to misinterpretation, hence likely to mislead. There can be no revelation through high or special priests, or mystic poets and saints. On this point it is only sufficient to read the scriptures of the different creeds now prevailing in the world to be convinced of the fact that the message, or command, whose authorship is ascribed to God is at times contradicted by another such message, or command, in the same book, and, generally, by some passage in the scripture of another creed. The secret of this kind of inspiration—it is really nothing but being possessed by an idea—lies in the fact that the priest, or the inspired seer, as the case may be, trains himself, by a long course of fasting, sacrificial worship, and the like, to enter into a sort of abnormal state in which the powers of his soul are manifested in a more or less marked degree. These are generally mistaken by men for a manifestation of divine favour, and all kinds of absurd and fanciful notions are founded upon them. The fact, however, is that the suspension of the functioning of the discriminative

faculty puts the most predominant idea for the moment in possession of the mental field of the seer, so that his conversation is tinged with his personal prejudices and beliefs, notwithstanding the fact that he believes himself to be inspired by his deity. The following account of a Polynesian priest's inspiration may be read with advantage in this connection. (see *Science and Hebrew Tradition* by T. H. Huxley, p. 324):—

" a hog was killed and cooked over night, and, together with plantains, yams, and the materials for making the peculiar drink *kava* (of which the Tongans were very fond), was carried the next day to the priest. A circle, as for an ordinary *kava*-drinking entertainment was then formed; but the priest, as the representative of the god, took the highest place, while the chief sat outside the circle, as an expression of humility calculated to please the god. As soon as they are all seated the priest is considered as inspired, the god being supposed to exist within him from that moment. He remains for a considerable time in silence with his hands clasped before him, his eyes are cast down and he rests perfectly still. During the time the victuals are being shared out and the *kava* preparing, the *Mataboos* sometimes begin to consult him; sometimes he answers, and at other times not; in either case he remains with his eyes cast down. Frequently he will not utter a word till the repast is finished and the *kava* too. When he speaks he generally begins in a low and very altered tone of voice, which gradually rises to nearly its natural pitch, though sometimes a little above it. All that he says is supposed to be the declaration of the god, and he accordingly speaks in the first person, as if he were the god. All this is done generally without any apparent inward emotion or outward agitation; but, on some occasions, his countenance becomes fierce, and as it were inflamed, and his whole frame agitated with inward feeling; he is seized with an universal trembling, the perspiration breaks out on his forehead, and his lips turning black are convulsed; at length tears start in floods from his eyes, his breast heaves with great emotion, and his utterance is choked. These symptoms gradually subside. Before this paroxysm comes on, and after it is over, he often eats as much as four hungry men under other circumstances could devour."

Commenting upon this instance, Prof. T. H. Huxley observes:—

" The phenomena thus described, in language which, to any one who is familiar with the manifestations of abnormal mental states among ourselves, bears the stamp of fidelity, furnish a most instructive commentary upon the story of the wise woman of Endor. As in the latter, we have the possession by the spirit or soul, . . . the strange voice, the speaking in the first person. Unfortunately nothing (beyond the loud cry) is mentioned as to the state of the wise woman of Endor. But what we learn from other sources (e.g., 1 Sam. x. 30—34) respecting the physical concomitants of inspiration among the old Israelites has its exact equivalent in this and other accounts of Polynesian Prophecy."

Similar sights can be witnessed by any one at the tombs of certain dead 'saints' in India, and even an ordinary *syānā* (medium) can manage to 'dish up' something in this line without much trouble. As stated above, this is not an instance of revelation, but of 'possession' by an idea.

The true characteristics of revelation are mentioned in the *Ratna Karandā Śrāvakāchāra*, and may be briefly described as follows:—

- (i) it should proceed from an omniscient *Tirthamkara*;
- (ii) it should be absolutely irrefutable, i.e., incapable of being disproved by logic;
- (iii) it should be in agreement with perception (or observation), inference and reliable testimony;
- (iv) it should be helpful to all *jīvas*, that is, it should not directly or indirectly become a source of suffering and pain to any one—not even the animals;
- (v) it should describe things as they exist in nature; and
- (vi) it should be competent to destroy doubt and uncertainty in respect of spiritual matters.

Bearing the above characteristics of a true scripture in mind, it can be seen at a glance that the claim of the Vedas to a Divine authorship, through the medium of revelation, cannot be entertained by a rational mind. Unpalatable as this statement may seem at first sight, there is nevertheless no escape from it; for the Hindus have themselves 'outgrown' their Vedas in many respects. For instance, they no longer worship Indra, Mitra, Varuna, and most of the remaining Vedic deities nowadays. What else can this change indicate, if not that the true character of the Vedic gods was discovered to consist in pure personifications, and their worship consequently, suffered in public estimation?

The same conclusion is to be reached from the fact that modern Hinduism considers the sacrifices of animals and men enjoined in the Vedas as inhuman and degrading. Indeed, so far as sacrificial ritual is concerned, later writers have endeavoured to interpret the text relating to sacrifices in an esoteric sense, but it is obvious from the ancient traditions and customs that have survived to the present day

that it was not originally intended to be so read. That its authorship must be ascribed to 'devouring' seers is only too obvious, for no truly vegetarian *ṛishi* could have ever dreamt of defiling his composition by employing a type of sanguinary symbolism which is not only open to misinterpretation, but which must also be disgusting to his natural instincts. Thus, the portion relating to animal sacrifice cannot be the work of those who knew *tapas* (personified as Agni) to be the cause of salvation, but must have been added subsequently under some evil influence.

The evolution of Hinduism can now be traced with greater lucidity in the light of the above observations. Born in the poetic imagination of mystic *ṛishis*, as a means of perfecting the soul by chanting its praises, in the form of songs addressed to its various divine qualities, it descended to the succeeding generations as a collection of beautiful hymns, which, in course of time, were accepted as revealed truth, and formed the *nucleus* of a new faith as soon as the emblematic nature of their composition was lost sight of by men. The earliest hymns were probably those which now compose the Rig Veda, with the exception of such of them as sanction or indirectly lend countenance to animal sacrifice. Their true significance was probably the common property of a large number of men at the time of their composition, and as they were not only regarded as beautiful from a purely literary point of view, but were also of material assistance in developing the soul, they were readily committed to memory, and employed in their daily meditation by mystically inclined poets and saints. Their sanctity increasing with age, they became, with the lapse of time invested with the fullest amount of veneration paid to revealed truth, and were given credit for all sorts of miraculous powers by men. Thus it was that the later generations received these hymns with more veneration than understanding of their true import and regarded them as the divine charter of their faith. Having been set up as a scripture of divine authorship, the compilation of sacred hymns became the starting point of mysticism, and was encroached upon and enlarged from time to time. The very first noteworthy addition that was made owes its origin to some evil influence* for all concerned;

* The following account of this inhuman innovation is to be construed with the aid of the Jaina Puranas. In the reign of *rājā* Vasu, long long ago, there arose a

for while it meant suffering and pain to those innocent beings whose sacrifices were thenceforth to be offered to gods, it destined the sacrificer himself and all those concerned in the taking of life, under the pretext

dispute between one Nārada and his co-pupil, Parbat, as to the true meaning of the word *ajā* which denoted an object used for the worship of Gods. The word now means both grains of rice more than three years old, which cannot take root, as well as a he-goat. Parbat, who had probably acquired a taste for flesh, maintained that the word meant only a he-goat, while Nārada defended the old significance. Parbat was defeated by the force of public opinion, the sanctity of long established custom and the argument of his adversary, but he appealed to the *rājā*, who also happened to be a pupil of his father. To win over the *rājā* to the side of Parbat, the latter's mother secretly visited him at the palace, demanded the unpaid *guru-dakṣiṇa* (teacher's remuneration or fee), due to her husband, and begged him to allow her to name the boon. Vasu agreed, little thinking what would be asked of him, and gave his word. The mother of Parbat demanded that he should decide the issue in favour of her son; and would not permit him to break his word. The next day the matter was referred to Vasu, who gave his opinion in favour of Parbat. Thereupon Vasu was destroyed, and Parbat was turned out of the kingdom in disgrace; but he resolved to preach and spread his doctrine to the best of his ability. While he was still meditating as to the course he should follow, he was met by a demon from Pātāla who approached him in disguise of a Brahman saint. This demon, who introduced himself to Parbat as Bāṇḍilya ṛṣi, was, in his previous birth, a prince known by the name of Madhupingala, who had been tricked into surrendering his would-be bride by an unscrupulous rival. It so happened that Madhupingala had the best chance of being selected at the *svayamvara* of a certain princess, Sulas, having been privately accepted by her mother. His rival, Sagar, came to know of the secret arrangement, and, blinded by his passion for Sulas, consulted his *mantri* (minister) as to what should be done to win the princess. This wretch composed a spurious work on physiognomy, and secretly buried it under the *svayamvara* pavilion; and when the invited princess had taken their seats in the assembly, he pretended to divine the existence of an old and authentic *śāstra* (scripture) underground. To cut a long story short, the forged manuscript was dug out and the man was requested to read it in the assembly.

He began its perusal, and soon came to the description of eyes for which Madhupingala was particularly noted. It was with great relief and zest that this enemy of Madhupingala emphasized every passage of the forgery which condemned the type of Madhupingala's eyes, describing them as unlucky and their possessor, as ill-starred, unfortunate and the cause of bad luck to his friends and family. Poor Madhupingala broke into tears, and left the assembly. Crushed, humiliated and defeated in this vile manner, he tore off his garments, and gave up the world to lead the life of a mendicant. Just then Sulas entered the pavilion, and accepted Sagar as her husband.

A short time after this, Madhupingala heard from a physiognomist that he had been tricked and taken in and deprived of the bride of his choice by unscrupulous means, and died in a paroxysm of rage which followed the discovery. He was reborn as a fiend in a region of the Pātāla, recollected the fraud practised upon him in his

of religion, to suffering and pain hereafter, and ultimately also brought discredit on the sanctity of the original and genuine Veda itself.

last life on earth, and vowed to be revenged upon its perpetrators. He set out immediately for the world of men, and encountered Parbat just after he had been turned out of the city of Vasa and at the time when he was meditating on the best course to pursue to popularise his interpretation of the word *nja*. Finding Parbat a useful and ready tool for wreaking his dreadly vengeance on his hated rival, he promptly offered to assist him in his vile mission. According to this unholy compact between man and fiend, Parbat was to proceed to Sagar's city where Mahākālā—this was the real name of the demon—was to spread all kinds of plague and pestilence which would be removed at Parbat's intercession, so that he might acquire respect in the eyes of the people whom he intended to convert to his views. The demon kept his word, and Parbat found the whole population suffering from malignant diseases, which he began to treat successfully with his incantations. But for every disease that was cured two others appeared in the fated kingdom, till people began to believe that they had incurred the wrath of gods, and sought the advice of Parbat, whom they had now begun to look upon as their chief benefactor. Some time passed away in this manner, and at last it was thought that the moment favourable for the introduction of the new system of sacrificial rite had arrived. At first there was considerable opposition to the idea of animal sacrifice; but long and intolerable suffering, great respect bordering on veneration for Parbat, and, the most important of all, faith in his miraculous power, built, as it was, on an actual demonstration of the practical utility of his system, inclined less stout hearts to carry out his suggestion. Meat was first of all given as a remedy for certain diseases, and it never failed in the promised effect. What Parbat had failed in establishing by argument, he succeeded in proving by this method of practical demonstration with the the help of his demon accomplice. Gradually and steadily the number of converts to his views increased, till at last an *ajamedha* was celebrated, on Parbat's assurance that the victim suffered no pains and went direct up to heaven. Here also Mahākālā's powers were relied upon, and they did not fail him either, for just as the victims writhed and groaned under the 'sacred' knife, Mahākālā created, by his power of *Māyā*, a *vimāna* (a kind of aerial chariot) carrying a he-goat, 'happy and smiling,' heavenward. Nothing more was needed to convince the demoralised inhabitants of Sagar's kingdom; the *aja-medha* was followed by a *go-medha* (cow-sacrifice); that by an *asva-medha* (horse-sacrifice), and finally *puruṣa-medha* (human-sacrifice) was also celebrated with great eclat, each one immediately bearing the fruit ascribed to it. In each case the animal or man slaughtered was also shown to be ascending to heaven. As time wore on, people got over their early prejudices against sacrificing living beings and eating their flesh, till, finally, sacrifice came to be regarded as the shortest cut to heaven for the victim. A statement to this effect was actually incorporated in the text of the sacrificial works composed at the time; and so great was the faith people acquired in these rites that many persons came willingly forward to offer themselves as victims, believing that they would reach heaven at once by so doing. Finally, Sula and her deceitful lover, Sagar, also offered themselves as sacrificial offering to propitiate the gods, and were cut up on the altar!

But the more thoughtful of men soon began to perceive that the efficacy of sacrifice was more imaginary than real, and felt convinced that the shedding of blood could never be the means of one's own or the victim's salvation. The custom had, however, taken deep root, and could not be eradicated in a day. It was only after the lapse of a long long time that the wave of reaction against this cruel practice acquired sufficient force to render an alteration of the sacrificial text

The demon's vow was thus fulfilled; he had the full 'pound' of his vengeance, and departed to the nether regions. His departure considerably affected the artificial efficacy of sacrifice, but as it also carried away the source of plagues and pestilence, it was not immediately noticed. The inability to demonstrate the statement of the newly compiled 'sacred' text, which laid down that the victims of sacrifice went direct up to heaven, was explained by the suggestion of some error in pronunciation or proper recitation of the holy mantras that used to be chanted at the time, or in some other similar way. In the meantime, elaborate directions had been prepared for the officiating priests, and a whole code of ceremonial ritual had been arranged in which minute details were carefully studied. Probably some of the older hymns (of the Rigveda period) had also been altered to suit the requirements of the new order of things established by Parbat and his underlings. From Sagar's province the new doctrine spread far and wide; and, even after the departure of the demon to his own place, the powers of the priests acquired, by the practising of animal magnetism, yoga and the like, in which departments of knowledge they seem to have been well instructed, sufficed to attract fresh converts to Parbat's unholy cause.

The above narration receives direct confirmation and support from an account given in 335th section of the Santi Parva of the Mahabharat itself, according to which Vasu was a great raja and had an aerial car given to him by Indra. He was called upon to arbitrate between certain devas and rishis as to the meaning of the word *aje*. The former were contending that the word only meant a he-goat, but the rishis did not admit their claim. They urged :

"The Vedic Sruti declares that in sacrifices the offerings should consist of (vegetable) seeds. Seeds are called *ajes*. It behoveth you not to slay goats. Ye deities, that cannot be the religion of good and righteous people in which the slaughter of animals is laid down. This, again, is the *krita* age. How can animals be slaughtered in this epoch of righteousness?"

Vasu was then appointed the sole arbitrator between them, and he decided the point against the rishis, who thereupon cursed him, so that he was engulfed by the earth. In the 337th section of the same Parva it is also stated that Vasu was a righteous king who abstained from doing any injury to any creature, and that he had performed an *ashvamedha yajna* (horse-sacrifice), in which no animals were slain, all the requisites of the sacrifice consisting of the productions of the wilderness. This account is also to be found in the Hindi Vihwakośa, Vol. vii. 433.

a matter of necessity. But this was no easy matter to accomplish, for once the sanctity attaching to scripture is deliberately denied in respect of a single verse, the whole foundation of a mystic creed, whose binding force is inseparably associated with its supposed revelation, must necessarily become undermined. The pruning of the Vedas was, therefore, out of the question, and the enlightened reformer had to resort to symbolism, the only other method of introducing reform without interfering with the sanction of authority revelation is invested with. Accordingly, a symbolical, hence, an esoteric, basis was sought for the interpretation of the Vedic text, and the features of distinction of the principal types of sacrificial beasts as well as the etymological significance of their names was made use of to construct a theory of hidden interpretation. Thus it was that the ram, the he-goat and the bull, three of the most common beasts in the category of sacrificial animals, came to be recognised as emblems* of certain negative tendencies whose eradication is necessary for spiritual evolution and the attainment of *moksha*. The device had the desired effect; for while it left the authority of the Veda, as a revealed scripture, untouched, on the one hand, it put a stop to the harmful and inhuman system of sacrifice, and turned men's thoughts in the right direction in this respect; on the other.

But the seed of evil which had been sown proved to be endowed with greater vigour than could be nipped by the spiritualising of the sacrificial cult. For the whole of the mystic world, which seems to have always taken its cue in the sacred lore, principally from the fountain-head of mysticism (see 'The Fountain-head of Religion' by Ganga Prasad, M.A.) in Bhāratavarsa (India)—whatever might have been its boundaries at the time—had imbibed the new doctrine of getting into heaven through the agency of sacrificial blood, and could not be persuaded to discontinue a practice which almost directly sanctioned their favourite food, the animal flesh. It is not always possible, at this remote period of time, to follow the waves of action and reaction set up by the changing attitude of Hindu thought in the outside world; but we are not altogether without a strong actual parallel. This is furnished by the teaching of Judaism which seems

* See ante, chapter VIII.

to have passed through the same kinds of mental changes toward the sacrificial cult as those of Hinduism. The text (1 Sam. xv. 22)—

"Has the Lord as great a delight in burnt offerings and sacrifices, as in obeying the voice of the Lord? Behold, to obey is better than sacrifice, and to hearken than the fat of rams."—

is a strong condemnation of a practice in vogue. The attempt to spiritualise the text became clearly marked when it was said:

"I will take no bullock out of thy house, nor he-goats out of thy folds.....If I were hungry I would not tell thee.....will I eat the flesh of bulls, or drink the blood of goats? Offer unto God thanksgiving; and pay thy vows unto the most high."—(Ps. li. 9—16.)

Jeremiah further develops the idea, and makes the Lord say:—

".....I spake not unto your fathers, nor commanded them.....concerning burnt offerings or sacrifices: but this thing commanded I them, saying, obey my voice.....and walk ye in all the ways that I have commanded you, that it may be well unto you."—Jeremiah, vii. 21—23.

These passages furnish too close a resemblance to the vicissitudes of Hindu faith to be a mere coincidence, and betray the hand of the same agency whom Deussen encountered in the Brihad-Aranyakam (The System of the Vedānta, p. 8), engaged in spiritualising the sacrificial cult. The practice, however, continues to this day. The result is that Hinduism now finds itself face to face with its own progeny, brought up and reared in a foreign land, defying its authority, and also finds its own scripture furnishing its adversaries with arguments in support of the now heartily abhorred *go-medha*. In recent years, Swami Dayānanda Sarasvatī, a talented grammarian, and the founder of the Arya Samāj, tried to tide over the difficulty by boldly denying that the Vedas had anything to do with animal sacrifice and by challenging, in a wholesale manner, their current translations by European scholars; but an attempt of this kind is hardly likely to succeed in the face of facts which speak for themselves. Old established usage certainly points to the followers of the Vedas having actually followed the sacrificial cult. Even today there are high caste Hindus who perform animal sacrifices, with *Brahmanas* officiating as priests. This state of things could never have been openly tolerated in a purely vegetarian creed, and points to a more general prevalence of the cult in the past. Meat-eating, too, is not uncommon among the Hindus, including the *Brahmanas*; and it has its own tale to tell. It is not

that it is eaten in secret; but that those who take it are not supposed to be any the less Hindus for that reason, though many do not take it by choice. This general recognition of its suitability, as an article of food, could never have been possible in the past, in view of the rigid observance of the rules of good conduct and caste-exclusiveness by all classes of Hindus, unless flesh had come to be sanctioned by some high authority, which cannot but be that of the sacrificial text. We therefore conclude that the Arya Samajist's version is not the true reading of the Vedas.* So far as the English translations are concerned,

* To determine the merit and worth of their interpretation still further, we must examine the Aryasamajists' rendering of Agni and Indra which according to Mr. Guru Datta, a follower of B. Dayānanda and the famous author of the Terminology of the Vedas, only imply heat or the science of training horses and a governing people, respectively. Mr. Guru Datta challenges the accuracy of the translations of the Vedas made by modern Orientalists, Max Müller and others, and contends that their error has arisen from their treating general terms as proper nouns. European scholars, it will be seen, have followed in the footsteps of certain Hindu commentators—Mahidhara, Sayana and others—but Mr. Guru Datta adheres to the method laid down by Yaska, the author of Nirukta, which consists in reading every word in the light of its derivative sense. We have already sufficiently criticised the European version, and shall, therefore, now proceed to determine the merit of Mr. Guru Datta's reading by comparing it with that of Prof. Max Müller. The passage selected by us for the purposes of a comparison is the one selected by Mr. Guru Datta himself, and consists of the first three mantras of the 102nd sukta of the Rig Veda. Mr. Guru Datta's version as well as that of Prof. Max Müller are both given in the Terminology of the Vedas, and read thus:—

Mr. Guru Datta.

Prof. Max Müller.

1. " We shall describe the power-generating virtues of the energetic horses endowed with brilliant properties, or the virtues of the vigorous forces of heat which learned or scientific men can evoke to work for purposes of appliances (not sacrifice).

2. " They who preach that only wealth earned by righteous means should be appropriated and spent, and those born in wisdom, who are well-versed in questioning others elegantly, in the sciences of forms and in correcting the unwise, these and such alone drink the potion of strength and of power to govern.

1. " May Mitra, Varuna, Aryaman, Ayu, Indra, the Lord of the Ribhus, and the Maruts not rebuke us, because we shall proclaim at the sacrifice the virtues of the swift horse sprung from the gods.

2. " When they lead before the horse, which is decked with pure gold ornaments, the offering, firmly grasped, the spotted goat bleats while walking onwards; it goes the path beloved by Indra and Pushan.

it is not likely that they would be wrong altogether, since they are based on the readings of recognised Hindu commentators themselves; nor have they been condemned by the Hindus generally.

3. "The goat possessed of useful properties yields milk as a strengthening food for horses. The best cereal is useful when made into pleasant food well-prepared by an apt cook according to the modes dictated by specific knowledge of the properties of foods."

3. "This goat, destined for all the gods, is led first with the quick horse, as Pushan's share; for Trishtri himself raises to glory this pleasant offering which is brought with the horse."

The *śloka* are ours; and their force will be appreciated by any one who will but bear in mind the statement of Sri Sri Dayananda that the *sūtra* in question "is an exposition of *akṣa vidyā* which means the science of training horses and the science of heat which pervades everywhere in the shape of electricity" (The Terminology of the Vedas, p. 33). Unfortunately for this reading, the relevancy of training horses or of excellence in the culinary art is not in any way made clear or established by good reason.

There is little, if any, merit, indeed, in the other version also, if taken in a literal sense; but its relevancy is apparent from its general conformity to an actually prevalent usage which has undoubtedly descended from great antiquity.

It is, no doubt, true that the Vedic terms are almost wholly *gaugic* (derivative), as opposed to *ṛarhi* whose sense is arbitrarily fixed by man; but it is equally true that practically the whole vocabulary of the Sanskrit language consists of words coined from simple roots by definite etymological processes. This peculiarity has extended itself even to proper nouns—names of persons especially, e.g., Rama is he who causes delight or is delightful and pleasing. Thus, it is always possible to question the validity of any particular version from one point of view or another, but it is evident that no satisfactory results can be arrived at in this manner.

In many instances root-meaning will be a sufficient index to the sense of words, but often it will be necessary to resort to the current or acquired expression to get at the truth, care being taken not to sacrifice away the sense of relevancy of things by an overzealous attitude of the mind to establish a favourite view. For this reason, it will not be correct to say that *Indra* always means 'the governing people' and nothing but the governing people, *Agni*, never anything other than the science of training horses or heat, and so forth. *Agni*, as heat, and *Indra*, as a governing people, can, surely, have no claim to a special importance to be entitled to have a very large number of the Vedic hymns 'dedicated' to themselves, especially when their opposites—respectively, cold and a nation that is ruled by another—are given no place in the gallery of the Vedic 'gods' (*devatās*). There are innumerable other sciences, professions, arts, and the methods of training animals which are no less important or useful than *agni* and *indra* as understood by Mr. Gurn Datta, yet we find no hymns dedicated to them in the Vedas! Neither the science of training

To revert to the evolution of Hinduism, the validity of our conclusions will be apparent to any one who will give full consideration to the following facts:—

(1) The Vedas, if literally interpreted, do enjoin animal and even human sacrifice.

horses nor a governing people are included in the six categories of things to be known—(i) time, (ii) locality, (iii) force, (iv) human spirit, (v) deliberate activities, and (vi) vital activities—laid down in the Terminology of the Vedas (see pages 53 and 54), notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Guru Datta's classification was made expressly for the purpose of determining the class of the Vedic deities, and is neither scientific nor philosophically sound by any means. Heat may, indeed, be said to fall in the category of force, as it no doubt does; but as a member of its class its special claim to precedence over the other forces of nature remains to be established.

We, thus, find ourselves forced to acknowledge the fact that Agni and Indra, as two of the deities of the Vedic hymns, do not signify heat, the science of training horses or a governing people, but must represent certain aspects or faculties of the soul. For similar reasons, Dyauṣ and Prithivī are not the sky and earth, but spirit and matter, respectively. But the most important of gods are 33, which number comprises eleven Rudras, eight Vasus, twelve Adityas, Indra and Prajapati.

The Rudras represent those functions of life the cessation of which signifies death. They are called Rudras (from *rud* to weep) because of the association of the idea of weeping with death, the friends and relation of a dead man having been observed to mourn his loss. In all probability they refer to eleven important functions of the soul, namely, those of the five organs of sensation, five of action and the mind.

The eight vasus probably symbolise the eight principal karman, or rather the functions performed by the soul under their influence. According to some writers the vasus are emblematic of eight kinds of abodes, namely, (i) heated cosmic bodies, (ii) planets, (iii) atmospheres, (iv) superterrestrial places, (v) suns, (vi) rays of ethereal space, (vii) satellites, and (viii) stars (the Terminology of the Vedas, p. 55). They are, however, more likely to be the functions residing in the bodily organs, because they are different manifestations of the energy of the soul. In a passage in the Atharva Veda (see the Terminology of the Vedas, p. 54) they are described as different kinds of organic functions; while according to the Brihad Aranyaka Upaniṣad, "the path leading to the discovery of the thirty-three gods starts from the *akāśa* in the heart" (the Permanent History of Bharata Varsha, vol. i. p. 402).

We now come to Adityas whose number is said to be twelve. It is, however, evident that they have not always been considered so many. According to W. J. Wilkins (see The Hindu Mythology, p. 18) :—

"This name [Adityas] simply signifies the descendants of Aditi. In one passage in the Rig Veda the names of six are given: Mitra, Aryaman, Bhaga, Varuna, Dakṣa and Ansa. In another passage they are said to be seven in number, though

* In his "Oggāṅ Science in India," p. 116, Louis Jacotot shows on the authority of Manu, that the soul itself is regarded as the assemblage of gods.

(2) The Hindus are now strongly opposed to cow-killing and human sacrifice, both of which are enjoined in their scriptures (if taken literally) under the 'sacred' names of *go*-and *purusa-medhas* respectively.

their names are not given. In a third, eight is the number mentioned; but 'of the eight sons of Aditi, who were born from her body, she approached the gods with seven, and cast out Maritanda (the eighth). As the names of these sons given in different parts of the Vedas do not agree with each other, it is difficult to know who were regarded as Adityas. In the 'Satapatha Brahmana' and the Puranas the number of the Adityas is increased to twelve."

"Adityas," says the Bhavishya Purana (see the Permanent History of Bharatavarsha, Vol. I, pp. 481 and 495). "is so named because of his being the *adi* or first among the Devas." According to certain other writers, Adityas are only the twelve months of a solar year (the Terminology of the Vedas, p. 55), and so named because they extract every thing from this world. It is not easy to follow what is precisely meant by this; but it seems more probable that the Adityas represent the primary functions of spirit whose pure essence is symbolised by Surya, the Sun, which is an excellent emblem for jñāna (knowledge). Hence the Adityas, whatever be their number—for that depends on human classification—are only the different aspects of the soul with respect to its special function of knowing. Thus, Varuna, who cuts a ludicrous figure as one of the months of a solar year, is the impersonation of heroic force for 'he witnesses man's truth and falsehood' (Hindu Mythology, page 39). His function seems to have been enlarged in another place to embrace the whole range of phenomena, for he 'knows the flight of the birds in the sky, the course of the far travelling wind, the paths of the ships in the ocean, and beholds all things that have been or shall be done.' Varuna is said to be the presiding deity of the sea probably because of the sea being the symbol of *samsara* (transmigration).

Other Adityas, similarly, cannot represent the months of a solar year, but different functions of the soul. On the whole, we are inclined to identify these Adityas with the eight kinds of knowledge (see the Practical Path, Chapter V) and the four kinds of perceptions, namely, the all-embracing, the clairvoyant, the visual and the non-visual forms of perception (Ibid., Chap. V).

There remain Indra and Prajapati to be dealt with. Of these, the former has already been described in this book,* but the latter is the *pati* (Lord) of *prajā*s (progeny, hence the numerous functions of life), and is a symbol for the controlling function of the heart (see the Permanent History of Bharatavarsha Vol. I, pp 492 and 493).

The above explanation practically disposes of the Hindu pantheon, though the number of its 'gods' is said to be no less than thirty-three crores (a crore is equal to ten millions); for the remaining members of the divine household are only the metaphysical 'offspring' of the more important thirty-three, which are reducible to three, and, in the ultimate analysis, to the one supreme divinity, the Soul of the worshipper himself. Our explanation, it will be seen, avoids not only the element

* See also The Confluence of Opposites.

(3) *Aja-medha* has died out altogether; and the same is the case with *aja-medha*, notwithstanding that goat's flesh is still offered to propitiate certain gods and goddesses by a few superstitious men.

of irrelevancy in Mr. Gura Datta's reading and of inconsistency in the European version, but also enables us to catch a full view of the Hindu mind engaged in taking a census of its 'gods.' Many of the conundrums and puzzles connected with the pedigrees of these gods, which have stubbornly defied investigation, find an easy solution in their metaphysical origin; for with the numerous functions of life being in a manner interdependent on one another, it must at times happen that the mythological rendering of the metaphysical conceptions of their origin should present features of incongruity in their relationship which in an uninitiated mind appear to be irreconcilable, and, therefore, false. Some of the 'gods,' it will be observed, are said to be the fathers of their own fathers, while some are co-eval with their progenitors. Such accounts, though highly misleading in their nature, are not peculiar to Hinduism alone: they are to be found in all systems of mythology and mysticism, e.g., the dogma of the co-existence of the 'Father' and the 'Son' in the Christian creed. Their explanation is simple and easy when the metaphysical origin of their conceptions is known, but tortuous and misleading otherwise. He who would solve the mystery of the celestial kingdom and the hierarchy of gods, should, first of all, procure the lubricant of *nayavāda* (the philosophy of standpoint) without which the key of intellectualism does not turn in the rusty mythological locks that have remained unopened for ages. He should then make a bundle of his personal beliefs and private prejudices, and throw it away from him before entering the adytum of the 'powers' that control the destinies of all living. Thus alone would he discover the truth as it exists in and for itself, and avoid falling a victim to error and prejudiced belief. The intelligent reader will now find that the soul personified as India in its aspect of the enjoyer of matter through the *indriyas* (senses), is the progeny of *Dyaus* and *Prithivi* (Spirit and Matter), and yet the father of his own father in the sense that the *śuddhātman* (a pure perfected spirit) is actually the residue of the impure ego itself stripped of its impurities: That these conceptions are not always quite scientific does not detract from the merit of the explanation, since we are merely concerned in unravelling the mystery of mythology, not in proving it to be scientific against facts. As a general rule it will be found that the element of contradiction and incongruity in the mythologies is a sure index to a mixing up, in a manner unwarranted by strict metaphysics, of the results obtained from different standpoints. It is, therefore, safe to say that whatever is found to be irreconcilable to reason and rationalism in religion is not a representation of a 'fact,' whether it mean a being or a state of existence in nature, but essentially and truly a mental concept, formed with the aid of some general principle or other in the factory of a somewhat extravagant imagination. The most remarkable of the post-Vedic conceptions, the one which has now practically usurped the whole field, not only of the Hindu world, but of almost three-fourths of the human race—the idea of a supreme creator and ruler of the universe—furnishes about the most striking illustration of this rule. Probably the nucleus of thought which has served as a foundation for this conception is to be found in *Viśvakarma*,

(4) The sacrificial text still forms part of the Hindu scriptures, though it is clear that its interpretation has been changed from a literal to an esoteric sense.*

the artificer of the celestials and an embodiment of the post-sage's idea of the form-making, i.e., the mechanical aspect of nature. The Hindu mind, puzzled at the natural functioning of substances, seems finally to have arrived at the conclusion that it could not be devoid of a cause, and unable to conceive a rational basis for this vague and shadowy supposition of its own to have promptly created a new category of force, labelling it *advīta*, the unknown (from *a*, not, and *dvīta*, perceived, hence known). In obedience to the same personifying impulse to which the other gods of the pantheon are indebted for their existence and being, the *advīta* became, in due course of time, clothed with all the attributes of divinity; and being, *ex-hypothesi*, the source of the activities of all other '*devatās*,' and, therefore, the most powerful of them all—whence the word *īśvara* signifying he who is invested with *śakti*, i.e., power, dominion or mastery—was finally ushered into the world as the Great Unknown. Having been set up as the most supreme divinity of the Hindu pantheon, the Unknown began to extend its dominion beyond the Hindu world, and like some of its predecessors, Mitra and others, soon managed to instal itself in other lands, in some of which he is regarded as the creator of good and bad both. Accordingly, Isaiah regards his god as the creator of good and evil alike (see Isaiah, xiv. 6-7). Muhammad, too, contented himself with Isaiah's view, and declared that good and evil were both created by god, there being no other creator in the world. This, no doubt, is the vulgar view, which ignores the underlying truth; but the fallacy is the most popular one in this instance, and has to be reckoned with. As the creator of good and evil, the simple *advīta*, conceived perhaps in the mind of a forest recluse not particularly noted for his philosophical acumen, has now that its metaphysical origin has been lost sight of in the din and fury of a hot controversy concerning its nature and existence, become the repository of all kinds of discrepancies and incongruities. It could not even be otherwise, for being conceived in the imagination of men as the solitary source of all movement and function, it could not well refuse to accept responsibility for the different kinds of activities—*karmic*, functional and the like. In more recent times the personification has also come to be associated with the ideal of the soul, which is conceived to consist in becoming absorbed in the godhead. Thus, the original metaphysical concept of ultimate force now represents at least four different things, namely, (1) the mechanical side of nature, (2) the function of pure spirit and other substances, (3) the force of karma and (4) the final goal of the soul. It is the combination of these four distinct and irreconcilable notions, loosely formed by a metaphysically inclined mind, which is the fruitful source of error and dispute in the world of thought today.

* Cf. the following from Deussen's *System of the Vedānta* (English translation by Charles Johnston, p. 8):—

" it is the fact that in them [the *śraṅgākas*] we meet abundantly a wonderful spiritualising of the sacrificial cult: in place of the practical carrying out of the ceremonies, comes meditation upon them, and with a symbolical change of meaning, which then leads on farther to the loftiest thoughts. Let the opening passage

(6) The language of the text could not have been the work of a Perfect Being (God), or of vegetarian saints; for the former would never directly or indirectly encourage an evil practice, nor employ misleading language, and the latter would never resort to a symbolism of flesh and blood.

To these must be added the fact that the Vedic text generally is intelligible only on the hypothesis of an esoteric philosophy underlying the surface meaning of words, though we may not be able to explain all the impersonations employed by the *ṛishis* in their sacred poetry. Quite a large number of these personifications become intelligible with the aid of the details given in the *Puranas*; and, although it is not usually permissible to read the statements of a later work into an earlier one, it cannot be denied that the *Puranic* descriptions of the Vedic

of the *Bṛihad-Āraṇyaka* (which is intended for the *Adhvaryu*), in which the Horse Sacrifice is treated, serve as an example :

" 'Om!—Dawn verily is the head of the sacrificial horse, the sun is his eye, the wind his breath, his mouth is the all-pervading fire, the ear is the body of the sacrificial horse; heaven is his back, space is his belly, the earth is his foot-stool (*Cank*). The poles are his loins, the intermediate quarters are his ribs, the seasons are his limbs, months and half-months are his joints, day and night are his feet, the stars are his bones, the clouds are his flesh. The deserts are the food which he consumes, rivers are his entrails, the mountains his liver and lungs, plants and trees his hair: the rising sun is his fore quarters, the setting sun is his hind quarters; when he yawns, that is the lightning, when he neighs, that is the thunder, when he waters, that is rain; his voice is speech. Day verily arises after the horse as the sacrificial vessel, which stands before him: its cradle is in the eastern ocean; night verily arises as the sacrificial vessel, which stands behind him: its cradle is in the western ocean; these two sacrificial vessels arise to surround the horse. As a racer he carries the gods, as a war-horse the *Gandharvas*, as a steed the demon, as a horse, mankind. The ocean is his companion, the ocean his cradle.'

" Here the universe takes the place of the horse to be offered, perhaps with the thought in the background, that the secret is to renounce the world (*cf.* *Bṛih.* 5, 3, 1; 4, 4, 22), as the father of the family renounces the real sacrificial gifts. In just the same way, the *Chhandogya-Upanishad* (1, 1) which is intended for the *Udgater*, teaches in the true *adipitha*: to be recognised and honoured the syllable 'om,' which is a symbol of Brahman (*paramātma-pratīkam*); and the *uktam* (hymn) which belongs to the *Hotar* is subjected to a like transformation of meaning in *Āitareya-Āraṇyaka* (2, 1, 2).—Compare *Brahma-sūtra* 3, 2, 55-56, where the thought is developed that symbolical representations (*pratīpaka*) of this kind have validity not only within the *Śākhā*, in which they are found, but also in general."

gods and goddesses are merely enlargements of their original conceptions in the Vedas.* It is also to be borne in mind that the cessation of the worship of Vedic gods—Indra, Varuna, and the like—is also indicative of the fact that it was due to the discovery of their true nature, so that when people discovered them to be pure personifications of mental abstractions they desisted from the worship which used to be performed for their propitiation. Probably the key to the interpretation of the Vedas and the character of Vedic gods was never completely lost sight of, however much the laity and even the ordinary *Brahmanas* and *sādhus* might have remained ignorant of its existence. The wave of intellectualism, which followed the reaction against sacrificial ritualism of the Brahmana period, seems, towards its end, to have been characterised by a too free use of this key. A whole host of gods and goddesses, whose number has been popularly estimated at 330,000,000, thus sprang from the original and limited Vedic stock in the Epic and the Puranic periods. A few additional personifications, such as that of Krishna, also seem to have been made by the authors of Hindu *Puranas*. It is, however, only fair to add that, while the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata*, and the *Puranas* also, introduced a lot of confusion in history by dressing up real historical figures in mystic and symbolical garb,† they at the same time effected immense reform in religious

* Cf. "The Puranas could.....with equal consistency be pronounced to be earlier productions than the Vedas themselves as could be proved by the following quotation :

“ प्रथमं सर्वशास्त्रानां पुराणं ब्रह्मशास्त्रतमम्
अनन्तरम्ब्रह्ममेवो देवास्तस्यविनिर्मुक्तः ।
अङ्गानि चर्मशास्त्रम्च व्रतानि नियमांस्तथा ॥

ब्रह्माण्डपुराणम् ॥”

—The Permanent History of Bharat Varsha, Vol. i. p. 8.

[Rendered into English the above Sloka reads :

Of all the Shastras first the Purana was heard by Brahma; and then the Vedas, Angas, Dharmashastra, vow and rules came out of his mouth.]

† As an instance of this kind of personification may be mentioned Draupadi, who, according to the *Mahabharata*, was the common wife of all the five Pandava brothers. The Jaina Puranas of the Digambara sect dispute the correctness of this statement, and affirm that she was the married wife of Arjuna alone, who had won her hand in an open *sanyasara*. It is certainly not likely that men whose sense of

worship by showing up the real character of their gods to consist in pure personifications. Great as this reform undoubtedly was, it

right and wrong was so highly developed as that of the Pandavas would have been so much wanting in morality as to force her into a union with no less than five husbands at one and the same time. The truth is that the author of the great epic has distorted and twisted the facts of history to suit his allegorical requirements, leaving it to the good sense of his readers to get at his real meaning. The arrival of the young Draupadi, as a bride, in the family of the five Pandavas, furnished too striking a resemblance to the relation between life and the five organs of sensation to be ignored by his versatile genius, and he promptly employed her as an impersonation of the living essence in his great military drama, a huge allegory of the final combat between the higher and the lower forces of the soul and the complete vanquishment of the latter (see the 'Permanent History of Bharatavarsha' by K. N. Iyer, vol. II). Thus, while the real Draupadi was regarded as their daughter by Yudhishthira and Bhishma, her husband's elder brothers, and as a mother by Nakula and Sahadeva, who were younger than Arjuna, her mythological 'double' came to be known as the common wife of them all, to complete the resemblance between the five senses and life. According to another myth associated with her personality, she had been given a wonderful bowl by Surya (an impersonation of pure Spirit) from which all kinds of food and other things could be obtained by a mere wish. The explanation of this desire-fulfilling bowl is to be found in the fact that the soul is all-sufficient by nature, and independent of outside help. The failure of the wicked Duhshasana to expose her charms to the public gaze by removing her robe, which became interminable miraculously, is a circumstance which tends to emphasize the nature of life, for in the condition of bondage (described as the sensual impurity of Draupadi) the soul is always enwrapped within interminable layers of matter, so that it is impossible to catch a glimpse of its naked glory by any means.

The Japanese legend of Lady Kaguya furnishes another beautiful impersonation of life. Her five lovers represent the five senses, all of which only play her false, by endeavouring to palm off on her base and worthless substitutes for the real articles she asks them for, and the Mikado is the physical personality whom she jilts to return to the Kingdom of Moon (Yuri-loka, the regions of the *yūrei* or masses) with the moon-folk.

Draupadi must, however, be distinguished from Indra who is another impersonation of life or soul. The difference between the two personifications lies in the fact that, while Draupadi represents life in its relation to the senses, Indra does so in a very much wider sense. The character of Indra, if taken as an historical figure, or a living deity, is sufficient to excite the intensest feeling of disgust for the Hindu notions of morality, civilisation and divinity, for he not only commits adultery with the wife of his preceptor, Gautama, but is also made handsomer by Brahmā, who, far from punishing the seducer, actually turns the ugly marks of sin on his body into so many eyes, at his merest prayer. The true significance of the legend, however, has nothing to do with history, and reveals a tremendous amount of insight into the nature of spirit, and an unrivalled capacity for the employment of poetical metaphor in its author.

nevertheless failed to hit the mark; for the departure of the family of purely mythical gods opened the door to the worship of semi-mythological characters taken from history, while a few of the deities of recent origin and older type also became installed as the objects of worship and devotion. Rama and Krishna belong to the former class, and Siva to the latter. None of them is to be found in the Vedas—a circumstance which tends to confirm the opinion of the European critics charging the Hindus with having changed their gods. The blame for this, however, lies not so much with the Hindus themselves as with the spirit of mystification which pervades their creed; for, where the teaching is couched in a language which means one thing in its literal sense and quite another in an esoteric one, men are apt to feel mystified, and must be excused if errors are committed by them. The *Upaniṣads* tried to remove this mystic and misty uncertainty from

It will be noticed that the intercourse with matter is absolutely forbidden to the soul, since *moksha* only implies their separation from each other. Hence the penetration of spirit into matter is a forbidden act, and is for that reason described as adultery. Now, since matter is the principal object of knowledge for the intellect (Gautama=wise), which is the tutor of will, the intercourse between spirit and matter becomes an act of adultery with the preceptor's wife. The result of the entry of spirit, conceived as an abstract whole, into matter is the formation of an infinity of *jīvas* each of which becomes encoiled in a body of material particles, and, under the blinding influence of matter, resembles an ugly spot. These, however, soon attain Self-consciousness by the knowledge and acknowledgment of 'Self' (metaphorically, the worshipping of Brahmā), and attain to perfection and omniscience. Hence, they are said to have been converted into 'eyes.'

Indra is also said to be a lover of the Soma-juice which corresponds to the *sharab-i-takfir* of Muslim theology. It is a 'wine' which exhilarates but does not mebriate, and is a pure symbol for the *svabhāvic ānanda* (natural *de-light* or joy) of the soul.

The mount of Indra is an elephant which is symbolical of bulk and weight; hence matter. The idea underlying the conception is that spirit is unmoving by itself, but may do so with the help of matter. Further development of this thought is traceable in the description of the elephant itself, which is conceived as possessing three trunks projecting from one head,—an ingenious symbolism designed to put the nature of the personification beyond dispute, the three trunks standing for the triple *guṇas* (properties) of matter, that is to say, for the attributes of *sattva* (intelligence), *rajas* (activity) and *tamas* (inertia) which the system of Sāṅkhya discovers to be the essential properties of *prakṛiti* (matter). The power of expansion and contraction which is peculiar to life is illustrated by Indra's growing strong by praise, and assuming a microscopical body to hide within the fibre of a lotus-stalk (probably the spinal column with the coronalplexus), when separated from his consort, Sachi (virtue).

their religion, and went a long way in breaking up the dark dungeons of ignorance and superstition; but the torch of intellectualism which they lighted seems to have burnt only in a fitful manner. They are not even altogether free from mystic symbology, and the light which they shed neither penetrates into all the dark corners of their faith nor is always to be distinguished from shade. The six famous schools of philosophy which followed the *Upaniṣad* period exhaust themselves in refuting one another, and give different and contradictory explanations of the world-process, the only point of agreement among them being the infallibility of the Vedas, as revealed truth. Shut out from a wider field of research, and with the horizon narrowed down by the supposed revelation of their mystic scripture, they failed to appreciate even the true philosophical standpoint, and became entangled in the meshes of a one-sided absolutism which lies in wait for the unwary.*

* Only a very little reflection would show that these systems of philosophy are neither happily conceived, nor characterised by a scientific or philosophical precision. They even miss the philosophical standpoint, and in most cases display complete ignorance of the kinds or sources of *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge). Their enumeration of the *tattvas* is also unscientific and misleading.

To begin with the philosophical standpoint, even learned Hindus feel constrained to confess that none of their six *darsanas* is philosophically sound. The passage already quoted on page 477 ante from the preface to the ninth volume of the Sacred Books of the Hindus may be taken to be a fair expression of the Hindu mind in this regard.

No doubt, the Hindus now try to justify the defects of their philosophy, on the ground of the immature understanding of the people; but surely that cannot justify the inculcation of untruth, and, in the absence of anything proving the perfection of knowledge in the teachers, the argument can only be deemed to be inspired by faith rather than by reason. We are, however, not concerned here with the soundness or otherwise of the justification, but with the merit of the original systems, and as to their insufficiency the admission is clear and ringing. It is significant that the compilers of the *darsanas* themselves condemn one another, without reserve, as will be evident from the following from the Six Systems of Hindu Philosophy (see page 256), which sums up the *Saṅkhya* criticism of the teaching of Vedānta:—

"If there were one *puruṣa*, as the Vedāntins hold, then if one were happy, all would be happy; if one were unhappy, all would be unhappy, and so on in the case of the people affected by trouble, confusion of race, purity of race, health, birth, and death. Hence, there is not one *Puruṣa*, but many, on account of the manifoldness indicated by form, birth, abode, fortune, society or loneliness."

In respect of the sources of valid knowledge also there is no agreement among these systems, the *Vaiśeṣikas* holding direct observation and inference to be the only admissible forms of proof, the *Naiyāyikas* bringing in testimony and analogy in addition to these two, and the *Mīmāṃsikas* further adding *arthāpatti* (corollary or inference by

The result is that, instead of clearing up the doubts and difficulties of men which is the aim of true metaphysics, they made their own creed

implication) and, at times, also, *anupalabdhi* (inference by negation). But analogy is evidently nothing other than a form of *anumānābhāsa* (fallacy of inferences) pure and simple, while *arthāpatti* (corollary) and *anupalabdhi* are included in the true logical inference. The remaining three, namely, direct observation, inference and reliable testimony, are, broadly speaking, the proper sources of *pramāṇa*, in spite of the refusal of the Vaiśeṣikas to admit the last named; for reliable testimony is the sole means of a knowledge of things beyond perception and inference both. The Sāṅkhyan school, no doubt, recognises these three forms of *pramāṇa*, but it *assumes* the infallibility of the Vedas, and its logical processes include inference by analogy, e.g., the conclusion that all mango trees must be in blossom, because one is seen to be in that condition (The Sāṅkhya-Karika, Eng. Trans., publ. by Mr. Tucka Ram Tatyā, p. 80). One might as well infer that all dogs have their tails cut on seeing one with a cut-off tail!

We now come to the *tattvas* without a clear determination of which in headway can be made in philosophy or religion. The *tattvas* signify the essential points, or heads, under which the subject of enquiry is to be studied, and must be determined rationally, that is to say not in a haphazard manner, but by the exact methods of scientific analysis. The scope and aim of religion being the prosperity and, ultimately, also the salvation of living beings, its investigation is directed to the ascertaining of the nature of the soul as well as of the causes which go to cripple its natural freedom and energy and those that enable it to attain the Supreme Seat. The true *tattvas*, therefore, are only those—*jīva*, *aśva*, and the like—which are laid down in the Jaina Siddhanta, all others being forms of *tattvābhāsa*—a falsehood masquerading in the garb of a *tattva*.

Bearing these observations in mind, we shall see how far the six schools may be said to have got hold of the right *tattvas*. To begin with the Sāṅkhyan philosophy, which lays down the twenty-five *tattvas* enumerated in the tenth chapter, we have seen that it has but little to commend it to commonsense, the semblance to a *tattva* being traceable only in the case of *parma* and *pratyakṣi* which alone are eternal. It leaves out of enumeration such important substances as Time and Space, while unimportant things, e.g., organs of action, are given separate places. It does not even appear what is the basis of their selection, since many important functions of a similar kind, e.g., those of digestion and circulation of blood, are altogether ignored. The whole system is supposed to be a scientific and highly rational explanation of the subject of *karma*, transmigration and *moक्षा*, yet no endeavour is made to explain anything in this connection, and the whole of this most important department of the spiritual science is conspicuous by its absence among the *tattvas*.

The Naiyāyikas posit sixteen principles as follows:—

- (i) *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge),
- (ii) *prameya* (objects of knowledge),
- (iii) *samśaya* (doubt),
- (iv) *prayojana* (purpose),
- (v) *dṛṣṭānta* (exemplification),

more uncertain than ever, and their practical value is confined to the useless hair-splitting which is endlessly going on among the followers of the Vedas.

-
- (vi) *siddhānta* (established truth, or the last word),
 - (vii) *anuyāya* (limbs of a syllogism),
 - (viii) *tarka* (reason),
 - (ix) *nirpāya* (elucidation),
 - (x) *vidā* (discussion),
 - (xi) *jalpa* (wrangling in discussion),
 - (xii) *vitandā* (a frivolous controversy),
 - (xiii) *hetuābhāsa* (fallacy of argument),
 - (xiv) *chhala* (duplicity in discussion),
 - (xv) *jāti* (a futile answer, also finding fault with a faultless argument), and
 - (xvi) *nigrahasthana* (occasion for rebuke).

Here also a glance at these sixteen principles is sufficient to show that they are only calculated to impart a knowledge of logic. But logic certainly is not religion, though it is a useful department of knowledge, like grammar, mathematics and the other sciences. If the rules of logic could be called *tattvas*, we should have to dub the parts of speech—noun, verb, and the like—and the rules of arithmetic, etc., also *tattvas*. But this is clearly absurd. The Naiyāyikas try to get over the difficulty by the inclusion in their second category of twelve kinds of objects, namely, (i) soul, (ii) body, (iii) the organs of sensation, (iv) *artha* (which comprises colour, taste, smell, touch and sound), (v) *buddhi* (intellect), (vi) *manas* (mind), (vii) *pravṛtti* (application through speech, mind or body), (viii) *doṣa* (fault which means affection, hatred and stupidity), (ix) *pretya-bhava* (life after death), (x) *phala* (fruit or reward), (xi) *duḥkha* (pain), and (xii) *apavarga* (freedom from pain). But the result is a hopeless muddle, since the second category has reference to the objects of knowledge, and as such embraces all things that can be known, hence all that exists, and cannot, therefore, be confined to twelve objects alone. The illogical nature of the classification is also apparent from the fact that it altogether leaves out of account many of the most important things to be known—e.g., *ātman*, *bandha*, *samvara* and *nirvāra*—and lays undue emphasis on such unimportant matters as touch, taste, and the like. The enumeration of such matters as *jalpa* (wrangling), *vitandā* (cavil, i.e., a kind of wrangling) and *chhala* (quibble), to say nothing of *jāti* (futile argumentation), as separate *tattvas*, is also an instance of extreme logical clumsiness.

The Vaiśeṣikas lay down the following *padārthas* or predicables:—

- (i) substance,
- (ii) attribute,
- (iii) action,
- (iv) general features, or genus,
- (v) special characteristics, or species,
- (vi) combination, and,
- (vii) non-existence.

The fact is that, owing its origin to an earlier scientific creed, the symbolical poetry of the Rig Veda; the true basis of modern

But the arrangement is more like an enumeration of what are called categories in the systems of Aristotle and Mill than *tattvas*. Accordingly, the writer of the learned introduction to Major B. D. Basu's edition of the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* of Kanāda felt it as a pious duty to apologise for the shortcomings of this system. He writes :—

"The *Vaiśeṣika* philosophy looks at things from a particular well-defined point of view. It is the point of view of those to whom the lectures of Kanāda were addressed. It is not, therefore, so much a complete, independent system of philosophic thought, as an elaboration, an application, according to the immediate environment of its origin, of the teaching of the Vedic and other ancient sages who had gone before its author."

The real attempt of the *Vaiśeṣikas* at the enumeration of *tattvas* may be said to begin with their classification of substances, attributes and actions. Substances are said to be nine in number, viz., (i—iv) four kinds of atoms, namely, atoms of earth, water, fire and air, (v) ether, (vi) time, (vii) the principle of localization, (viii) soul, and (ix) mind. Attributes are of the following kinds, namely, colour, taste, smell, touch, number, quantity or measure, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, understanding or cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition. But sound is said to be a property of ether. Actions are of five kinds, viz., throwing upwards, throwing downwards, contraction, expansion and translation or motion. Such is the enumeration of substance, attribute and action given by the *Vaiśeṣikas*, but here also we do not find any attempt to enumerate the true *tattvas*. The whole scheme is vague and methodless in the extreme. The generalisations are defective; the classification of actions, meaningless, and the division of attributes inartistic and unscientific. Air, water, fire and earth are not four different substances, but only different forms of one and the same substance—matter; and sound is not a property of ether, but a mode of motion, arising from the agitation of material bodies. The enumeration of mind as a kind of substance is also clearly illogical, for apart from spirit and matter mind is not a separate substance.

Thus, three of the most famous systems of Hindu metaphysics only betray random unphilosophical thought, and possess no title to a strictly logical basis. The remaining three, that is the systems of Yoga, Vedānta and the Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini, also fare no better in this respect. They do not proceed by defining or determining the *tattvas*, and, therefore, need not engage our attention any longer.

Exaggerated importance has been claimed, in recent times, for the school of the *advaita* (monistic) Vedānta, which maintains that one need only know Brahman to become 'That,' but the Vedāntist is unable to say why in spite of his knowing Brahman he has not as yet become Brahman. If the system had been placed on a scientific basis of thought, it would have been recognised that knowledge and realisation are two different things, even though knowledge is absolutely indispensable for the very commencement of the process of realisation of the great ideal of the soul. Here, also, we learn from Jainism that the 'Path' consists in Right Faith, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct, but not in any of them singly or separately. Even Patanjali exhausts himself in generalities, and is not able to describe the nature and causes of

Hinduism, has received so many additions and alterations in the past that its very origin has been lost sight of by men, one set of whom, the scholars of modern fame, see in it nothing beyond the out-pouring of the immature mind of the race, and the other, the devout followers of the faith, a divine revelation in every syllable and word.

If the hypothesis evolved out in these pages is correct, neither of these theories can be said to be true, for the poet-sages were not intellectual babes, as they are supposed to be, nor were they inspired by an omniscient God. Hinduism in its very inception was an offshoot of Jainism, though it soon set itself up as an independent system of religion. In course of time it fell under demoniacal influence, the reaction against which is characterised by the intellectualism of the *Upanishads* and the metaphysical subtlety of the world-famous *Darśanas* (schools or systems of philosophy)—Nyaya, Vedanta and the like. Having set itself up as an independent system, it was naturally forced to regard Jainism as a hostile creed, and some of the *Darśanas* actually contain *sūtras* which aim at refuting the Jaina views, though what they actually refute is not the Jaina *Siddhānta* as it is understood by Jainas, but their own fanciful notions concerning its teaching.

We thus conclude that the question of the greater antiquity* of the two systems of religion must be decided in favour of Jainism, and that the creed of the Holy *Pīrthamkaras*, far from being a daughter or a rebellious child of Hinduism, is actually the basis of that un-

the bondage of the soul; nor has he ought to say as to the *why* and the *wherefore* of the method he himself lays down for separating pure spirit from the undesirable companionship of matter.

* The objection that the Vedas are composed in a language that appears to be centuries older than the language of the Jaina *Siddhānta* is of no force, for the common practice of mankind in the past with respect to the preservation of the Sacred Lore was to transmit it by word of mouth alone. Both the Jaina and the Hindu Scriptures used to be transmitted in this manner, and writing was resorted to only, in recent historical times. Now, the Vedas are composed in poetry, which means that the language of the Vedic hymns is fixed unalterably, so that they will always refer back to the period of their composition, whatever the date on which they are actually reduced to writing. This is not the case with Jainism which had no fixed composition. Hence the language of the Jaina Canon is the language in use on the date of its redaction. The test of language fails for this reason in the case of Jainism whose age can be determined only by a comparison of the intrinsic evidence furnished by the scriptures of the rival creeds.

doubtedly ancient creed. Dr. Hermann Jacobi is undoubtedly right when he says: "In conclusion let me assert my conviction that Jainism is an original system of religion, quite distinct and independent of all others, and that, therefore, it is of great importance for the study of philosophical thought and religious life in India" (see the *Jaina Gazette* for 1927, p. 106).

To sum up, Hinduism owes its origin to the brilliant poetical genius of men who personified, in their unbounded enthusiasm, the secret and divine attribute of the soul. They were not savages, nor do their writings represent the uncultured and primitive notions of a period when humanity may be said to have been in a state of mental infancy; on the contrary, their knowledge was grounded upon the unassailable philosophy of the Science of Life, supported, as it is, by true revelations from the *Purthamkars*. Lapse of time then effected a complete separation between the mother and the daughter who subsequently fell into evil hands. This resulted in the whole host of the family of sin (sacrificial ritualism) which arose under some terrible influence for evil. She next appears in the rôle of a penitent living in the seclusion of forests under the protection of the *Upaniṣad-ṛṣis*; and still later we encounter her in the University of Thought, arranging her six new and variegated, though ill-fitting, robes. And now that the x-ray intellectualism of modern research is trying to demonstrate her most valuable and valued adornments to be the handiwork of the primitive man, soon after his emergence from the *hanyamān* (monkey)* race,

* The world-riddle will always baffle evolutionists unless and until they can manage to acquire a proper insight into the nature and potentialities of the soul, which, as has been fully proved in the earlier portions of this book, is endowed with potential omniscience. This potentiality of an all-embracing knowledge does not need the acquisition of anything from without to become an actuality of experience, but only the removal of that which the soul has absorbed of foreign matter. Thus, the simpler the life, the better the chances of the unfoldment of the higher types of *jñāna*. Hence the ancients who were given to simple living and high thinking were better qualified for true wisdom than we, their remote descendants of this age, may be willing to give them credit for. That this is actually the case is borne out by ancient tradition—*Parasars* and the like—which receive circumstantial verification from the intrinsic evidence furnished by the marvellous perfection of thought underlying the teaching of religion in general and of the Jaina Siddhānta in particular. It would thus appear that far from having eclipsed the ancients by our greater attainments, we have actually squandered away, to a great extent, the legacy of wisdom left by them.

she is trying to recall her long forgotten past which has caused her so much trouble. Herself the offspring of the most illustrious Mother, we can already imagine her thoughtful face lit up with joy as she faintly recalls her earlier surroundings, when her great poet-admirers used to render her spiritual lessons more attractive and easier to remember, by versifying their substance in symbolic thought. Her Mother is still waiting to receive her back with open arms, and though she has aged considerably since, she is as full of love and forgiveness and affection as she has been all her life. It will undoubtedly be an auspicious moment which marks the full realisation of the family relationship between Jainism and Hinduism; and may the happy reunion between mother and daughter bring peace and happiness to all concerned!

and have not little more than our changing fashions and unproductive materialism to be proud of. This certainly does not look like a stride in the path of progress, but is essentially one in a retrograde direction!

GLOSSARY OF NON-ENGLISH WORDS

A

- Āchārya [आचार्य], the spiritual leader of an order of saints; also a philosopher.
- Adharma [अधर्म], a kind of substance the function of which is to be helpful in the cessation of motion.
- Adho Loka [अधोलोका], the nether regions.
- Advaita [अद्वैत], Monistic Vedānta.
- Aghātiya [अघातिय], not *ghātiya* (which see).
- Agni [अग्नि], the god of Fire; fire.
- Agurulaghutva [अगुरुलघुत्व], a quality of substances which preserves them as such.
- Aham [अहम्], 'I' or I-ness.
- Ahaṁkāra [अहङ्कार], individuality, egoity; pride of personality.
- Āharaṇa śarīra [आहारकशरीर], a kind of body.
- Ahimsa [अहिंसा], non-injuring.
- Aja [अजः], a he-goat, or ram; the soul; old seeds or grains.
- Ajiva [अजीव], that which is not *jīva*; the unconscious substance; the second *latva*.
- Ākāśa [आकाश], Space, Ether.
- Alōka [अलोक], that part of space which lies beyond the universe.
- Ānanda [आनन्द], bliss.
- Anekānta [अनेकान्त], many-sided.
- Antahkarana [अन्तःकरण], mind, comprising *mana* (attention), *chitta* (mind-, or memory-stuff), *buddhi* (intellect) and *ahamkāra* (egoity).
- Antara [अंतर], not exceeding; within; less than.
- Antaraya [अन्तराय], the group of *karmic* forces which interfere with the freedom of action.
- Arhat or Arhant [अर्हत, अर्हन्त], a Deified Being, who has destroyed his *ghātiya karmas*.
- Āsana [आसन], posture.

Āsarira [अशरीर], a pure disembodied Soul ; a *Siddha*.

Āsat [असत्], non-existent.

Āśrama [आश्रम], one of the four stages—brahmacharya [ब्रह्मचर्य] the period of study, grihaṣṭha [गृहस्थ] the period of married life, vṛṇapraṣṭha [वनप्रस्थ] the period of retirement, and saṇnyāsa [संन्यास] the period of homelessness—of life.

Āśrava [आश्रव], the inflow of matter into the soul ; the third *tatva*.

Astikāya [अस्तिकाय], having a body or magnitude.

Ātman [आत्मन्], a spirit or soul ; the substance of consciousness.

Avadhī-jñāna [अवधिज्ञान], a sort of clairvoyance which includes a knowledge of some of the past lives of the soul.

Āyuh [आयुः], the group of *karmic* forces which regulate and determine longevity or duration of life.

B

Bandha [बंध], a bond, chain or fetter ; the fourth *tatva*.

Bhakta [भक्त], a devotee ; one who follows the path of Bhakti Yoga.

Bhakti [भक्ति], devotion ; one of the four principal paths of Yoga.

Bhūta [भूत], a phantom or demon.

Brahman [ब्रह्म], God ; the Absolute.

Brahmanpurā [ब्रह्मपुरा], the abode of Brahman ; the heart.

Buddhi [बुद्धि], intellect.

C

Chakra [चक्र], a psychic centre.

Chatusṭāya [चतुष्टय], fourfold ; quartette.

Chela [चेल], a disciple.

Chit [चित], intelligence, consciousness.

Chitta [चित्त], the material substratum of memory ; the mindstuff.

D

Darśana [दर्शन], simple perception as distinguished from detailed knowledge ; faith ; a school of philosophy.

Darśanāvaraṇīya [दर्शनारवरीय], the group of *karmic* forces which obstruct perception.

Deva [देव], a God or an angel; a resident of heaven.

Dharma [धर्म], religion, duty, merit; a kind of substance, Ether.

Dharaṇa [धारण], concentration, the process of holding the mind on to one particular point; a thought form for contemplation.

Dhyāna [ध्यान], contemplation, meditation.

Digambara [दिगम्बर], a sect of Jainas.

Dveṣa [द्वेष], hatred.

E

Ekāntic [एकान्तिक], one-sided.

G

Gāṅgā [गंगा], the Ganges.

Gāyatrī [गायत्री], the name of a goddess.

Ghanavāṭavulaya [घनवातवलय], the dense air-envelope surrounding the universe.

Ghanodadhivāṭavulaya [घनोदधिवीतवलय], the humid air-envelope surrounding the universe.

Ghāṭiya [घातिya], *Jñānavarṇiya*, *Dardavārṇiya*, *Mohaniya* and *Antarvāya karmas* are called *ghāṭiya karmas*, because they interfere with the natural attributes of pure spirit.

Go [गौ], a cow; mythologically, that which moves, hence the senses.

Gopi [गोपी], a milkmaid. Generally, the word 'Gopi' refers to the women who joined Krishna in the *Rāsa-līlā* (dancing).

Gopika [गोपिका], after the manner of a *gopi*.

Gotra [गोत्र], the group of *kārmic* forces which determine the *gotra* (family, or lineage) of an individual.

Graiveyaka [गैवेयक], the heavenly abode of a certain kind of Devas.

Guṇa [गुण], a quality.

Guru [गुरु], a teacher; a spiritual guide.

Gyāna [ज्ञान], see *Jñāna*.

H

Harī [हरिः], the name of a god.

Hatha-yoga [हठयोग], a branch of Yoga.

Himsā [हिंसा], injury.

I

Iblis [إبليس], Satan.

Ichchhā [इच्छा], desire; will; pleasure.

Indra [इन्द्र], one of the Vedic gods: the title of the king of the residents of heaven.

Īśvara [ईश्वर], the Creator.

Isim [اسم], name.

J

Jagrata [जाग्रत], the waking state of consciousness.

Jambū Dvīpa [जम्बूद्वीप], the central part of the *Madhya Loka*.

Jarā [जर], unconscious.

Jehād [جهاد], a holy war.

Jina [जिन], a Conqueror, a Perfected Soul.

Jiva [जीव], the Spirit substance; the soul; the first *tattva*.

Jivan-mukta [जीवनमुक्त], one who enjoys the state of *Jivan-mukti*.

Jivan-mukti [जीवनमुक्ति], the state of being redeemed or saved while still living in the physical body.

Jīvātma [जीवात्मा], a soul.

Jivik [जीविक], pertaining to a *jiva*.

Jñāna [ज्ञान], knowledge.

Jñānasvarūpa [ज्ञानस्वरूप], embodiment of knowledge, or of the form of knowledge.

Jñānāvaraṇīya [ज्ञानावरोधीय], knowledge-obstructing group of *karmas*.

Jñāna-yoga [ज्ञानयोग], a branch of *Yoga*.

Jñāni [ज्ञानी], a follower of *Jñāna Yoga*; a conscious being or knower.

K

Kāla [काल], Time; the substance of Time; death.

Kāla-puruṣa [कालपुरुष], a symbolical human figure, corresponding to the Zodiac.

Kalpa [कल्प], a cycle.

Kāma [काम], passion, sexual love.

Karapa-sarira [कारपाशरीर], an inner body.

Karma [कर्म], action; the principle of bondage of souls; a kind of force,

Kārmāṇa-sarīra [कार्माणशरीर], the body of *karmic* forces.

Kathanahit [कथञ्चित], somehow; in a way; from a particular point of view.

Kathā [कथा], a narrative or biography.

Kevala [केवल], pure, perfect.

Kevalin [केवलिन्], omniscient.

Khayāl [خیال], thought; imagination.

Khudā [خدا], God.

Krodha [क्रोध], anger.

Kundalini [कुण्डलिनी], a kind of psychic energy.

L

Laḥaul [لا حول], the formula uttered by Muhammadans to exercise or frighten away evil spirits.

Langoti [लंगोटी = لنگوٹی], a bare strip of cloth worn round the loins.

Laub-i-malūf [لوح محفوظ], the Tablet of Destiny, the Perspicuous Book.

Līlā [लीला], play; sport.

Līgam [लिंगम्], the male organ.

Lobha [लोभ], greed.

Loka [लोक], the universe of 'matter and form.'

Lokakāśa [लोककाश], the portion of space occupied by the universe.

M

Madhya Loka [मध्यलोक], the central or middle region of the universe.

Mahat [महत्], intelligence.

Mahātma [महात्मा], a great or pious soul.

Mahūrta [मुहूर्त], a period of time equal to 48 minutes.

Manahpariyaya-jñāna [मनःपरिवर्तज्ञान], knowledge of the thoughts and ideas of others as well as of past lives.

Manas [मनस्], the seat of desires; the lower mind; attention.

Mantram [मन्त्र], a holy text or formula.

Mārga [मार्ग], a path or road.

Matī-jñāna [मतिज्ञान], knowledge obtained by means of the senses and mind.

Māyā [माया], illusion; trickery; the power of imagination.

Mayavio [मायाविक], illusory.

Maada (Zend), God.

Mimamsa [मीमांसा], a system of philosophy.

Mithya [मिथ्या], falsehood.

Mohaniya-karma [मोहनीयकर्म], the group of *karmic* forces which produce delusion.

Moksha [मोक्ष], freedom from births and deaths ; nirvana.

Mukti [मुक्ति], liberation ; freedom from bondage ; salvation.

Muladhara [मूलाधार], the basic plexus.

Muni [मुनि], an ascetic ; a saint.

N

Nafs [نفس], breath ; animalism ; sensuality ; the lower nature.

Nama [नाम], the group of *karmas* which determine the type of the body.

Nigoda [निगोद], the lowest part of the universe ; the lowest state of development of the soul.

Nikshepa [निक्षेप], nomenclature ; naming.

Nirjara [निर्जरा], destruction of *karmas* ; the sixth *tattva*.

Nirvana [निर्वाण], emancipation ; redemption ; freedom from transmigration.

Nischaya [निश्चय], that which is true under all circumstances and conditions ; certain ; one of the standpoints of Jain philosophy. There are several standpoints according to Jainism of which the *nischaya* and the *vyavahara* are the most important. Of these, that which describes things with regard to their nature, qualities or attributes, is called the *nischaya*, while the other, which only takes into account their forms, conditions and changes, is the *vyavahara*.

Niyama [निवम], one of the eight steps or accessories of *yoga* ; a vow taken for a fixed period.

Nyaya [न्याय], one of the six schools of Hindu Philosophy.

P

Pancha-Parmesthi [पञ्चपरमेष्ठी], the collective name for the five kinds of divine souls, namely, Arhats, Siddhas, Acharyas, Upadhyayas, and Munis.

Pandit [पण्डित], a learned man.

- Paramāṇu [परमाणु], an atom of matter.
 Paramātmān [परमात्मन्], God.
 Pātāla [पाताल], the nether regions.
 Phala [फल], fruit; consequence.
 Pradeśa [प्रदेश], an imaginary point as big as a single particle of matter.
 Prakṛti [प्रकृति], nature, material qualities, or matter; a kind of force.
 Prāṇa [प्राण], life; vitality; breath.
 Prāṇāyāma [प्राणायाम], the process of controlling breath or vitality (prāṇa); breathing.
 Prarabdhā [प्रारब्ध], destiny; a kind of *karmic* force.
 Pratibimba [प्रतिबिम्ब], a reflection; an image.
 Pratyāhara [प्रत्याहार], the process or method of controlling the mind.
 Preta [प्रेत], a hobgoblin; a demon.
 Pudgala [पुद्गल], lit. that which can become fused with other things; matter.
 Purāṇa [पुराण], sacred history; written or oral ancient tradition.
 Puruṣa [पुरुष], spirit; one of the primal causes of the world-process, according to Sāṅkhya; a person of the male sex.

R

- Rāga [राग], attachment; love.
 Rājā [राजा], a king.
 Rājas [रजस], the quality of activity.
 Rājasic [राजसिक], pertaining to Rājas.
 Rāja Yoga [राजयोग], a branch of Yoga.
 Rīṣi [ऋषि], a sage or holy man; an ascetic.

S

- Sachchidananda [सच्चिदानन्द], Sat-Chit-Ananda, lit. Existence-Consciousness-Bliss, hence God.
 Sadhū [साधु], a muni; an ascetic.
 Sāgara [सागर], an ocean.
 Saguna [सगुण], possessing qualities.
 Sahastrāra [सहस्रार], the plexus of the brain.
 Samādhi [समाधि], the trance of self-contemplation.
 Samaya [समय], the smallest part of time.

- Samsāra [संसार], the cycle of transmigration ; the world.
 Samsārī [संसारी], belonging to the samsāra.
 Samvara [संवर], the stoppage of āsrava ; the fifth *tattva*.
 Sannyāsa [संन्यास], retirement from the world to practise asceticism ; the adoption of the vows of a *muni*.
 Saptabhaṅgī [सप्तभंगी], lit. sevenfold, a mode or system of predication, peculiar to Jainism.
 Śarīra [शरीर], body.
 Sat [सत्], existence.
 Satsaṅga [सत्संग], the association or company of pious men.
 Satavarūpa [सत्स्वरूप], the quality of being ; existence ; own nature.
 Satta [सत्ता], essence ; substantiveness ; existence.
 Sattva [सत्त्व], the quality of intelligence.
 Sattvic [सत्त्विक], possessing the quality of intelligence.
 Satya [सत्य], truth.
 Śāstra [शास्त्र], a sacred book, or scripture.
 Śruta-jñāna [श्रुतज्ञान], knowledge obtained by means of words, signs, etc., and by their interpretation.
 Siddha [सिद्ध], a Perfect Soul living at the top of the universe.
 Siddhanta [सिद्धान्त], established truth ; the final conclusion.
 Siddhatman [सिद्धात्मन्], see Siddha.
 Siddha Śīla [सिद्धशिला], the topmost part of the universe, corresponding, in all probability, to the *arsh-i-ma'alla* [عرش معلی] of Muslim Cosmogony, where the Perfect Souls reside.
 Siddhi [सिद्धि], an occult or psychic power.
 Siyāna [सियाना = ५५], a medium or magician.
 Śrāvaka [श्रावक], a Jain householders.
 Śhūla-śarīra [शूलशरीर], the gross body.
 Sūkshma-śarīra [सूक्ष्मशरीर], a kind of subtle body.
 Suṣumṇā [सुषुम्णा], the hollow canal in the spinal column.
 Suṣupti [सुषुप्ति], deep sleep.
 Svabhāva [स्वभाव], nature.
 Svapna [स्वप्न], a dream.
 Svarūpa [स्वरूप], form ; nature.
 Svastika [स्वस्तिक], the form 卐.
 Svādhiṣṭhāna [स्वाधिष्ठान], a nervous centre in the spinal column.

Swami [स्वामी], a master ; a spiritual guide.

T

Tamas [तमस्], the quality of inertia.

Tamasik [तामसिक], pertaining to *tamas*.

Tannātra [तन्मात्र], an atom, or particle.

Tanuvātalaya [तनुवातवल्लय], the rarified air-envelope, surrounding the universe.

Tapas [तपस्], austerities.

Taqdir [تقدیر], destiny.

Tat twam asi [तत्त्वमसि], that thou art.

Tattva [तत्त्व], an ultimate principle, subject or head of study.

Taijasa-sarira [तेजस्यरीर], a kind of body.

Tirthankara [तीर्थंकर], a title of the 24 Holy Ones of Jainism.

Turiya [तुरीय], super-consciousness, blissfulness.

Tyāga [त्याग], renunciation.

U

Upādhyāya [उपाध्याय], a learned saint.

V

Vach [वाक्], speech.

Vaikriyaka-sarira [वैक्रियक-शरीर], a kind of body.

Vairāgya [वैराग्य], renunciation ; non-attachment.

Vāsana [वासना], an impression or idea ; desire.

Vāyu [वायु], air.

Veda [वेद], lit. knowledge ; one of the four famous Scriptures of the Hindus.

Vedaniya [वेदनीय], the group of *karmic* forces which govern the experiences of pleasure and pain.

Vedānta [वेदांत], lit. the end of knowledge ; one of the six schools of Hindu philosophy.

Veerya [वीर्य], power.

Viṇa [वीणा], a kind of banjo.

Viveka [विवेक], discrimination.

Vyavahāra [व्यवहार], one of the standpoints of philosophy.

Y

Yajña [यज्ञ], a sacrificial rite.

Yoga [योग], the method of self-realisation.

Yogi [योगी], one who practises Yoga; a follower of the Yoga school of philosophy.

Yoni [योनि], the female organ.

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ADDENDA AND CORRIGENDA

TO

THE KEY OF KNOWLEDGE

NOTE

As a new edition of the Key of Knowledge will be an expensive undertaking, and is, therefore, not expected for a long time to come, and as it is desirable to embody in the existing edition all the important changes and additions, these pages have been issued to give the reader the fullest and the most accurate information on all points. The changes are generally due to the further elucidations of allegorical texts and to the interpretation by the most authoritative amongst ancient teachers on the subject. Many citations that appeared to be of doubtful authority and value have also been eliminated.

THE AUTHOR.

Page xiii, add the following at the end of the last paragraph, as a separate paragraph.

One word more : many authors and books have been quoted in the following pages, and at times approvingly ; but it is not to be taken that because a passage is approved of from a writer or from a book, therefore all of what he or it says is acceptable. The reader should apply his own critical faculty when accepting or rejecting a doctrine, a statement or a piece of evidence. Let him only accept that which is acceptable to Reason.

Page 19, last four lines on the page, strike out the sentence beginning with the words 'A mystic script', and also strike out the two lines of the quotation.

Page 20, strike out the first nineteen lines from the top, and down to "Nothingness" in the 20th line. In the same line for the words that which read For that which.

Page 34, strike out lines 18 to 26.

Page 37, line 6th from the bottom, place an asterisk on the word chicanery and add the following footnote at the end of the page.

*With reference to the claim of "spirit photography" which is claimed by the spiritualists to be the clearest evidence of the truth of their cult, Professor A. M. Low writes as follows in the "Armchair Science" for May 1930 :—

"I have had my photograph taken on plates which had been obviously split from their collodion edging, and misty faces which might represent anything to the hopeful sitter conveniently appeared behind my shoulder. When I proceeded to go one better by placing an easel against the wall and recording a photograph of Mrs.

signed by myself, on a plate which had been sealed in innumerable sheets of black paper, I was told that I had obtained my result by psychic means but that I had claimed the aid of mechanism to bring grist to my mill. The only grist which entered into the case was the money it cost me to put an X-ray apparatus behind the wall and to prepare a silhouette in lead paint with my signature underneath the print. I find that if I go to a spirit meeting and say that I see a crocodile, everybody tells me I am a psychic and that they see crocodiles as well. If I venture to explain that I saw no such thing, I am told that my strong will has impressed itself upon the mind of the medium and that I have no business to take such risks."

Page 40, the last 12 lines from the bottom, strike out the whole passage beginning with the words. If the opinion of men.

Pages 41 and 42, strike out the whole pages.

Page 50, strike out the first paragraph.

Page 89, strike out the whole passage beginning with the words The following in the 5th line from the top down to the word that in the 23rd line; and for a bungling, blundering creator read A bungling, blundering creator in that (the 23rd) line.

Page 94 line 14th from the bottom, after the word Clement add the following :

whose authority stands very high among the early 'fathers' of the Christian Church, and who, according to Methodius, was the disciple of Peter, the the Apostle, and a friend and fellow-labourer of the other Apostles (see The Writings of Methodius: A. N. C. Lib., pp. 365 and 367).

Page 95 in the footnote for the Science of Thought read Jaina Psychology.

Page 120 last line, strike out the words

Eve symbolizes the intellect (the Sanskrit *Buddhi*);

Pages 121 and 122 and the two lines at the top of p. 123 strike out, and substitute the following in place thereof:

Eve symbolizes 'Pleasure'* (Yonge's Philo Judæus Vol. 1) and the Serpent stands for the lower or sensuous mind (*manas*). Pleasure is to the Will, or Life, what the wife is to the husband—the source of infinite joy. The word woman, from the Saxon *wifman* ('*wif*' in Saxon and '*weib*' in German, from *weben*, to weave), signifies the one who weaves, and is symbolical of the action of Pleasure which weaves new sensations into the feeling-tone of the organism. The one fatal consequence of this is that matter is constantly finding lodgment into the constitution of the soul, and it is the union of spirit and matter that is the cause of all trouble to the embodied life, as we shall see later on. As for the Serpent (*manas*), its deadly nature directly depends on the pleasure-seeking tendency of life. For this reason, Eve is first tempted by the serpent, in the story of the fall, and she then tempts her husband. Struck with

*Philo's interpretation being authoritative and to the point is accepted by us in preference to any other

the intimate connection between the ego and pleasure, the compiler of the Pentateuch likened it to that of husband and wife. The ego loves pleasure as a husband loves his wife, and the latter provides him with joys and comforts, and clings to him as a woman does to her husband.

With this necessary prelude, we may now proceed to elucidate the nature of the powerful curses pronounced on the transgressors. Accused of disobedience by the 'still small voice' of intuition, Adam at once throws the blame on the woman, that is Pleasure or the pleasure-seeking impulse; and she, in her turn, points to the Serpent as the cause of error and temptation. The anger of the Lord flashes first of all against the Serpent, and the terrible curse is uttered: "Upon thy belly shalt thou go, and dust shalt thou eat all the days of thy life." Hence, the serpent (*manas*, the carnal mind) 'goes on its belly', *i.e.*, lives and moves in dust, or, in other words, is confined to the phenomenal, that is, chained to matter. The food of the lower mind is composed of the dainties and delicacies of matter which reach it through the *media* of the senses; therefore, it is doomed to eat dust. The enmity put between the woman and the serpent psychologically symbolizes the relation between the pleasure-seeking tendency of the will and *manas* (the lower

mind). The latter loves to wander from place to place, and is in its element when roving about. It constantly bites the heel of Pleasure, to urge it on to further thrills. *Manas* (the carnal mind) is the Minotaur (man and beast) of the Greek Mythology, its human part representing Will and the bovine, pure animalism, that is uncontrolled sensuality. Serpent is the embodiment of sensuality. The enmity put between the woman and the serpent—"it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel,"—is thus the natural result of the lack of satiety, that is, of an insatiable thirst for sensuality, neither Desire nor Pleasure ever crying halt in respect of pleasure-seeking. In other words, Pleasure expects a perpetual urge from Desire, for further excitement, and Desire demands newer and newer thrills from Pleasure!

The curse on the woman, that is Pleasure—"I will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception"—is significant of Pleasure's trend, that expresses itself in a variety of novelties and is bored with old and familiar tastes. In sorrow has it to cast about for fresh dainties and delicacies, and the sources of joy. Hence, is Eve to bring forth children in sorrow. The identity between Eve and Pleasure is put beyond doubt by the text (Genesis 111. 20)—'Adam called his wife Eve,

because she was the mother of all living.' The description cannot possibly apply to the human female, because she cannot be regarded as the mother of all living beings in any sense, but is fully applicable and appropriate to Pleasure, because it is the one source of embodiment and re-incarnation for all souls. As we shall see later, matter continually pours into the soul through the door ways of the senses, on account of pleasure, and the fusion of Spirit and Matter is the cause of all forms of embodied life. Hence is Pleasure, the mother of all living.

Desire is personified in Hindu Mythology as the hundred-headed hydra, the Serpent-king Kaliya, who is finally subdued by the child Krishna. The lesson to be learnt from the story is that in order to attain nirvana, and in Christian terminology, to be saved, one must subdue the fiery serpent of one's (lower) mind, the sensuous *manas*, at an early date in life.

Page 124, lines 8 to 13 from the top, strike out the sentence beginning with the words In order, however, and ending with the words worst aspect. Also strike out the first five words in the 13th line; and substitute for them the following :

It is centred round the faculty of Intellect which is much extolled. Certainly, it is the only guide to the fallen ego, in the first instance, in as much as redemption

or emancipation is simply out of the question without its guidance, since it is the only instrument of knowledge for the finite man.

Page 124, lines 18 to 20, strike out the whole sentence beginning with the words For this reason.

Page 131, lines 17 and 18 for Eve, *i.e.*, the Intellect, read Eve.

Page 136, strike out the rest after the sentence ending with the words sides of life in the 17th line.

Page 137, strike out the first 13 lines and the first six words in the 14th.

Page 154, to the footnote add the following :

In the sixth Chapter of II Esdras, the mystery of Esau and Jacob has been explained in the following significant words : " . . . For Esau is the end of this world, and Jacob is the beginning of it that followeth. The beginning of a man is his hand, and the end of a man is his heel ; between the heel and the hand seek thou nought else. "

Page 173, lines 19 to 20 strike out the sentence beginning with the words The soul and ending with the word joys.

Page 186, footnote, add the following :

As for the sexlessness of the soul Clement clearly stated the Christian belief when he said : " Souls are neither male nor female " (Ante Nicene Christian Library Vol. XII, 362). In Islam, too, the soul is regarded as sexless :

ایک از تانیث جان را پاک نیست
روح را با مرد و زن اشراک نیست

(1) Life has no concern with femininity ; the soul has nothing in common with the male or the female sex !

Page 188, line 11th from the top for the world read
Pleasure.

Page 222, line 19th to 27th, strike out the passage
beginning with the words The Thesophists
down to the end of the quotation.

Page 225, line 13th to 24th, strike out the passage be-
ginning with the words Dr. Beseant and
ending with the word endure.

Page 264 strike out the two quotations and the
sentences introducing them.

Page 265-266, strike out the quotation and the sentence
introducing it.

Page 267, remove the asterisk from the word concentra-
tion in the 3rd line from the bottom
and strike out the footnote.

Page 275, strike out the words A simple in the eleventh
line and the rest of the passage in the
12th to the 22nd lines from the top and
substitute for them the following :

It is the enthusiasm of the masses
which rouses enthusiasm in individuals.
Generally, the former is augmented by the
latter; and again diffuses itself in the
assembly to be reinforced once more in
its turn.

Page 279, delete the quotation from the middle of the
page.

Page 285, strike out 26 lines from the top and substitute
therefor the following :

facts of the subjective mind are performed. It sees without the
natural organs of vision. It has also the power to read the
thoughts of others, even to the minutest details; to read the contents
of sealed envelopes and closed books. In short, it is the subjective

mind which possesses what is popularly designated as clairvoyant power, and the ability to apprehend the thoughts of others without the aid of the ordinary means of communication. In point of fact, that which for convenience I have chosen to designate as the subjective mind appears to be a separate and distinct entity and the real distinctive difference between the two minds seems to consist in the fact that the objective mind is merely the function of the brain, while the subjective mind is a distinct entity, possessing independent powers and functions, having a mental organisation of its own, and being capable of sustaining an existence independently of the body. In other words, it is the soul."

The subjective mind controls the functions, sensations, and conditions of the body, and is itself amenable to control by suggestion. The body is like a confederation, composed of cells, permeated with life.

Page 296, footnote, add the following to the footnote:

The "News of the World" bearing date December, the 23rd 1934 also gives an account of certain very important experiments carried out by a group of scientists in America. This is how the account reads: Amazing test on Sheep electrocuted and then restored to Life! New York, Saturday.—For seven years, it is now revealed, scientists in the Bell Telephone Laboratories, in co-operation with physiologists at Columbia Presbyterian Medical Centre, have been electrocuting sheep and restoring them to life a few minutes later by administering counter electric shocks.

The same animals have died over and over again without being in the least affected. The experiments have been conducted to determine the varying shock responses of different organs, and thus ultimately to prevent accidents from electrical shock.

Sheep were chosen because some of their organs are similar to those of man, and because they are easy to replace as laboratory specimens.

At present resuscitation is possible under laboratory conditions only, and the application of the experiment on humans is considered impracticable because of the time element and the equipment needed at the scene of the shock.—Central News.

Page 297, footnote, substitute the following for the last 2 sentences in the footnote :

Lazarus, similarly, might well stand for Right Conduct, the brother of Right Faith and Right Knowledge (which the two maries represent). Right Conduct now lies buried in the grave, that is unfunctioning, owing to the influence of powerful destructive passions, but is revived in no time at the call of the Ideal. Similar spiritual import will have to be read into the other allegorical miracles : for they take place in the land of the spirit or soul substance, and not in the physical world outside it.

Page 298, at the end of the first paragraph add the following as a new paragraph :

The esoteric meaning of the raising of the daughter of Jairus is not difficult to guess. Jairus, who commands movements of men, is Will ; Jesus is the Ideal of Divinity and Perfection, whose touch revives the dead soul ; Peter, John and James represent Right Faith, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct, respectively ; and the dead girl is the lost Glory of soul nature itself. She is revived as soon as the Ideal lies stretched full over her, in other words, as soon as the soul is fully saturated with its divinity and receives its full impress.

Page 305, sixth line, from the bottom, put a full stop after the word estimation, and strike out all the rest down to and including the last line on the page.

Page 315, line 26th add the following :

Apart from this, a creator of the physical body can, in no sense of the word, be a friend of the soul ; for the body is like

a prison for it and is the greatest obstacle on the Path. The soul is robbed of its inherent divinity only because of the association of the body of matter.

Page 318, line 8th from bottom add the following :

It is not even possible to make real progress on the path unless the mind be first stabilised and steadied by Right Faith and illuminated by Right Knowledge, without whose light it is not possible to distinguish between right and wrong practices, exercise and ritual. It is thus not possible to attain the Goal in the absence of Faith and Knowledge of the right sort from the very commencement. This has been overlooked both in Raja and Hatha Yogas, which are, therefore, inadequate to lead to salvation.

Page 225, strike out everything after the word poem in the 14th line.

Page 326, strike out the first 13 lines on page 326 and substitute for it the following :

The effect of rhythmic breathing is that it sets every fibre of the body vibrating with vitality, so that when all the motions of the body become rhythmical the body itself becomes, as it were, a gigantic battery of will.

In rhythmic breathing the main thing to be grasped is the idea of rhythm.

All the three processes of breathing, namely, inhalation, retention and exhalation, are to be performed rhythmically to

the accompaniment of pulsation. The rhythmic time is based on the heart beat of the individual himself. This is how it should be done for easy accomplishment : place the left index finger on the pulse in the right wrist and count 1, 2, 3, 4 ; 1, 2, 3, 4 ; and so on till the rhythm becomes firmly fixed in the mind, with a swing, so to speak. This being done, take off the finger from the wrist and inhale for the space of 4 heart beats, retain for the space of 4 beats ; and exhale slowly during 8 beats. Some systems recommend slightly different durations for these processes, but no particular importance need be attached to such differences, except that the duration of retention may be increased by steady practice.

Pages 327-328, strike out the entire quotation and the sentence introducing it on p. 327.

Page 336, line 12th from the bottom for the sentence beginning with the words We agree substitute the following :—

As said before, the punishing of the innocent so that the guilty may escape is a subversion of the moral sense ; it does not even reform the sinner.

Page 336-337, strike out the quotation in its entirety.

Page 337, lines 6 to 10 strike out the sentence beginning with the words "The revelation and ending with the words with him."

Pages 346-347, substitute the following for the corresponding quotations :

1. "The sacrificer is himself the victim. It (the sacrifice) takes the very sacrificer himself to heaven."—(Tait. Br. 2. 8. 2).

2. "The animal is ultimately the sacrificer himself."—Tait. Br. ii. 2. 8. 2)

3. "The sacrificer is indeed the sacrifice."—(Tait. Br. 1. i. 2. 8.)

4. "Now the sacrifice is the man. The sacrifice is the man for the reason that the man spreads it; and that in being spread it is made of exactly the same extent as the man: this is the reason why the sacrifice is the man."—(Shatapatha Brahmana, I 3. 2. 8; Sacred Books of the East vol. xii, p. 173.)

Page 349, eliminate the quotation and the sentence introducing it.

Page 350, strike out 26 lines from the top and in their place substitute the following:—

But the doctrine of the vicarious atonement by 'the first and the only begotten Son of God,' if taken literally, comes to grief at the very commencement. There is and can be no such thing as a son begotten of God. Jehovah declares (Isaiah xliii. 11):

"I, *even I*, am the Lord; and beside me *there is no saviour*."^{*}

To the same effect is the following from Ecclesiastes (iv. 8):—

"There is one *alone*, and *there is not a second*; yea, he hath neither child nor brother."^{*}

Page 360, line 16th from the bottom strike out the whole passage after the words own person, and substitute the following in its place.

Let us suppose that he suspended his animation on the cross and came back to life in the tomb. Such a thing is not quite inconceivable or unheard of.

Pages 361 to 364, and 28 lines from the top on p. 365 to be left out. The incomplete end of the

^{*}In its secret or true sense this text refers to the soul itself, who has neither a child nor brother, and who is its own saviour.

sentence ending with the words to dead on physical pain also to be struck out.

Page 366, strike out lines 17 to 23 and also the words resurrection. Certainly in the 24th, and substitute the following in their place :

Let us suppose that Jesus kept himself alive by the suspension of animation and emerged from the tomb after a time. But

Page 372, lines 1 to 4 substitute the following therefor :

The life of Jesus will not pass the historical test even if we regard him as an advanced *yogi*. It is full of discrepant circumstances and incongruous events.

Page 381. substitute the following for the matter thereof :

been cleverly concealed, under suggestive names, by the Gospel—writers. Such, for instance, is the story of the two thieves who are said to have been crucified with Jesus.

What is really meant by them is good and evil, the pursuit of which keeps us entangled in the realm of matter and deprives us of the natural abundance of life in *nirvana*. Because of this they are called thieves. They have to be killed before the wholeness of salvation can be obtained. The effect of their activities is preserved in the modifications of the will and the disposition in general. The friendly thief of St. Luke is presumably Good which naturally chides Evil, and is promised heaven as his reward.

These are also, apparently, the two angels, who, according to Al-Koran, are deputed to take an amount of a man's behaviour, "one sitting on the right hand, and the other on the left: he uttereth not a word, but there is with him a watcher, ready to note it" (Chapter L). "The angel who notes down a man's good actions has the command over him who his evil actions" (The Koran by Sale, p. 384). Thus understood, these passages acquire great significance, but in the historical sense they only go to create confusion.

We may profitably utilize the present opportunity to look into the nature of the personality of John, the Baptist, whose figure is one of the most puzzling in the whole Bible. The discrepancies which are found to exist in connection with him are so numerous and serious that it is impossible to look upon his doings as historical events.

Page 385, strike out lines 25 to 30 from the top.

Page 388, lines 20 to 21 from top for a type of a mystic adept trying to perfect himself read an agglomeration—a bundle—of loose attributes and traits.

In the same page 5th line from bottom, after the words wonders, add the following :

The ' wonder ' that was to be worked was itself in the nature of a deception, since death was only to be simulated on the cross, not actually courted !

Page 389, add the following at the end of the footnote :

Hindu Scriptures are also full of such genealogies some of which, *e.g.*, the daughters and descendants of Daksha and Dharma, are given in Wilson's Vishnu Purana (Introduction XCIV-XCVI and Chapter VII).

Page 390, at the end of the first paragraph add the two following paragraphs :—

Independent European Research has also reached the same conclusion (see " Did Jesus Ever Live " by L. Gordon Rylands).

It is a necessity with an allegorical personification that it should be like a bundle of incongruity and contradiction, since it represents, not the life-story of a living being, but a portrayal of stray doctrinal points, expressed in concealed script. The events in the life of the Gospel Jesus which we have found to be irreconcilable to reason and commonsense, even when read as the acts of a gifted *yogi*, all fall into line with the Doctrine of Truth, and cease to be irreconcilable as such. This is the clearest proof of the fact that they are not historical in their nature, but the inventions of a poetic imagination, bent on disguising things in the garb of history and narrative biography.

Page 422, lines 9th to 7th from the bottom of the page, strike out the sentence beginning

with the words These are set and the remaining matter in the 7th line.

Page 423, strike out 28 lines from the top of the page and substitute the following in place thereof:

The movement then travels towards the perceptive centre in the brain; and finally, there is the mental response, without which there can be no perception of anything, as we have already seen. But the perceptions being simple, that is to say, partless and non-composite in their nature, are not composed by the stimulus, in the sense in which clay things are said to be composed of clay, or in any other sense, except that they correspond to the incoming *stimuli*. On the mass of the *stimuli* that come from the 'without' the ego reacts with its own innate impressions or forms, to ascertain their quality and nature. What interests the ego most is naturally the subject of enquiry in the first instance; hence objects are isolated and singled out from the mass of sensory excitation with the aid of the innate mental forms of understanding, though the whole of the external picture is 'reflected' in a general way in its warp and woof, so to speak. This accounts for the perception of individuals, as distinguished from the general sense of awareness of things *en masse*.

The sensory system in the organism is not like a single chord, but a mass of chords in which the external ends are well designed to catch up the vibrations of different qualities, intensities and pitch, that come from the objects outside. Perception is accomplished because the mind produces from its own depths ideas and impressions that are pre-existing and that resemble the external excitation in every way, and fit it completely.

Page 424, strike out lines 13 to 15 ; and in the 20th line for mental read nervous.

Page 428, strike out 23 lines from the top and replace them with the following :
saints not only perceived the past lives of men, but their future incarnations as well.

The current of the tendencies of life may be likened to a thinned and sharpened point which is constantly pressing against the future, and from which radiate motor impulses in all directions in the body, enabling it to act on the surrounding bodies in the world.

Page 438, strike out the paragraph in the middle of the page and replace it with the following :

The last stage is *dhārnā* (literally, grasping), which means putting on or retaining. By the process of isolation of individuals in the presentations are set up memory *nuclei* or clues in the will; and these tend to stick more and more firmly with repetition. In other words, by

dwelling upon a presentation or sensation repeatedly is set up a special formation—a sort of nodule or protuberance—composed of subtle invisible matter round the will, which when excited or agitated will yield, that is to say, call up again, the appropriate corresponding impression. This is *dhāraṇā*. This happens through the modification of what is known as the feeling tone of the organism. All perceptions are accompanied by changes in the feeling tone which is being modified from moment to moment, and is never the same twice in life. When the sensory *stimulus* merely knocks at the door of the senses we have perception; when it penetrates further it produces a change in the existing state of the feeling tone which is an indication of its having become absorbed into the will's disposition.

Page 440, in the footnote, for 'The Science of Thought' read 'Jaina Psychology.'

Page 442, last line but one, for 'Practical Path' read 'Practical Dharma.'

Pages 461 to 464, and the first paragraph on p. 465 are to be eliminated, and to be replaced with the following :

not to be disclosed to the profane. Arnobius openly condemns the very notion of creation (A. N. C. L. XIX. 112-115).

So far as the New Testament is concerned, the six days' creation is nowhere

set up in it, not even once. There is only one instance where there is a faint allusion to creation. This is in the Gospel of St. Mark, in the tenth chapter, and is in reply to certain Pharisees, who were enquiring whether it was lawful for a man to put away his wife. This is how the 'debate' proceeded:

"And he answered and said unto them, What did Moses command you? And they said, Moses suffered them to write a bill of divorcement, and to put her away. And Jesus answered and said unto them; For the hardness of your hearts he wrote you this precept. But from the beginning of the creation God made them male and female. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and cleave to his wife, and they twain shall be one flesh." (Mark X. 3-7). Now, this is the barest allusion, and if we remember that the Pharisees were trying to trip and entrap the teacher in a snare (see verse 2) it becomes clear that the reply merely alludes to a popular belief of the Pharisees themselves, so as to convict them out of their own mouths, so to speak. Matthew also records the debate. But the reply of Jesus he records reads very differently in his Gospel. This is how it runs (See Matt. XIX. 4):—"And he answered and said unto them; Have ye not read that he which made them at the beginning male

and female (etc.), . . . for this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and they twain shall be one flesh."

There is certainly no support in these words to the creation of heaven and earth and the sun and the moon, etc., by a God. On the other hand, St. Paul explains the most important part of this reply as being in the nature of a mystery (See Ephesians V. 31-32). And this is what he says in explanation of the mystery :

"For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall be joined unto his wife, and they two shall be one flesh. This is a great mystery ; but I speak concerning Christ and the Church."

St. Paul's explanation leaves no room for putting any other interpretation than the allegorical one on the text in question, even if we were to forget that it was uttered by way of a 'crooked answer to a cross question.' There is also a reference of a much feebler type in Mark XIII. 19 which reads :

"For in those days shall be affliction such as was not from the beginning of the creation which God created unto this time, neither shall be." But Matthew gives it very differently (See XXIV. 21) .

"For then shall be great tribulation, such as was not since the beginning of the

world to this time, no, nor ever shall be."

Now, since the beginning of the world is not the same thing as the creation of the world by a God, even this proves to be no real support to the notion of creation. There is yet one more text in the New Testament which might be deemed to support the notion. It is in the Gospel of St. Luke (XL 40) and reads as follows:

"Ye fools, did not he that made that which is without make that which is within also?"

But, surely, it is too fragile a peg on which to hang such a heavy load as the doctrine of creation. Why should it not be taken to refer to Life, which makes the body both within and without (the inside and the outside of the cup and the platter)?

The same remark applies to God clothing the grass of the field. Why not Life clothing grass from within it? It is clear that none of these texts can be cited to show that the New Testament writers were setting up or supporting the exoteric Old Testament teaching about the six days' creation by a God. Indeed, the Old Testament itself contradicts the account of creation of the first chapter of the Book of Genesis in chap. 2 (see verses 4-7). This is at too great a variance with the earlier story to leave it undamaged. There

remains St. John's version of the Logos, or Word, making all things, but this is a pure allegory which has been explained in the " Vision of St. John ", and has exactly the same significance as creation by Brahma has in Hinduism. In its literal sense it contradicts all other Biblical accounts and is not supported by any other writer or text.

The details of the process of creation or rather re-creation and renovation acquire fresh interest in the light of the above remarks, and we shall pause here to look into them somewhat closely.

Starting from the condition of false belief and mental confusion in which the soul is involved prior to the dawn of Right Discrimination, we are told that the earth was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep. This is literally true of every soul that is involved in ignorance and falsehood ; it is devoid (void) of goodness and without form (that is definite ideas), hence involved in confusion of thought. In this state the pall of ignorance (darkness) lies thick on the face of the waters of the deep (mind). Then there is the change towards faith, the turning towards Light and Life. Hence, we are told : the Spirit of God, that is, the Light Divine internal, moved on the face of the waters ! The result is the birth of the Light of Discri-

mination, that distinguishes between right and wrong beliefs. Night (ignorance) and day (inner illumination) thus come to be established in the new world for the first time.

On the next stage there is the appearance of a firmament in the midst of the waters to "divide the waters from the waters." This is the well balanced Understanding which fixes up definite landmarks in the midst of chaotic thought, seeking to approach the purity of Spiritual nature (heaven).

Dry land appears on the third day, and brings forth grass and herbs and the fruit trees of which grass is the food for the cattle (according to Philo (Judaens), herbs represent scriptural text (as in Hinduism), and the tree of the field is man's life (character).

On the fourth day we have the creation of the sun and the moon and the stars which signify the conceptions and associations of personality (see the Vision of St. John).

The next stages are characterized by the creation of different kinds of living beings, including man. The animals are the different tendencies of the soul, good and evil (*vide* "The Letter of Aristeas"). The interpretation, it may be mentioned, is the foundation of the distinction between the clean and the unclean

animals. concerning which Tertullian wrote :—

" The literal prohibitions about the clean and unclean kinds of foods would be quite contemptible "—(Farrar's *History of Interpretation*, 178.)

This view was fully current amongst the leaders of Esoteric thought in the early Christian church (Ante Nicene Christian Library, Vol. IX. 72—74 ; Origen's *Philocalia*, 131 ; Clement's Writings, Vol. II. 251-252 & 488). St. Barnabas also advocated this interpretation (Farrar's *History of Interpretation*, 169 and *The Epistle of Barnabas*, 18—20). Amongst the Jewish authors who held this view may be mentioned Aristobulus whom Barnabas follows (Farrar's *History of Interpretation*, 169).

The righteous rational soul is man, who is made in the image of God ; for God's form is only that of Perfect Man. He (man) is made male and female, which terms are explained by Moses Maimonides to mean form (male) and substance (female), in the *Guide to the Perplexed* (see page 207). Man is thus made in the image of God, both in substance and in form !

The work of creation is now finished ; man himself has now got to subdue the earth (the flesh or the body) and bring it under subjection :—

" Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it : and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of

the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth."—
(Genesis i. 28.)

The sixth day therefore sees the termination of the work ; and the seventh is the Sabbath *i.e.*, attainment of Right Faith which is followed by rest*

We shall now revert to the Hindu Trinity to study the character of its third member a title more closely than we have done thus far.

Siva is the third member of this Trinity, and is represented as a *yogi* with matted hair, and with serpents entwined round his person. He takes swallow-wort and other intoxicating and poisonous things, and wears a garland of skulls. His consort is Parvati, the daughter of Himalayas, who also assumes various other forms, such as Durga, Kali, and the like. His most popular name is Bholānāth ; he is easily pleased, and grants boons to his worshippers readily, and, at times, even foolishly. Now, Siva represents will inclined toward and dedicated to *Vairāgya* (renunciation), which, as such, is free from formal sophistry. On account of his freedom from worldly wisdom, he is called the simple-minded—the Un-worldly, or Unsophisticated—and because he knows no trickery, he is the Bholā (innocent, guileless) Nāth (Lord).

*See " The Vision of St. John,"

The intoxication of Siva is due to Self-realization which is the emotion of pure Self-feeling. It is this emotion of Self-feeling that constitutes the mystic's joy, which no wine can produce, and for which those who have experienced it renounce the world and become Self-centred. This comes only from Self-contemplation, *i.e.*, the *Samādhi* of Yoga, in which Will, finding itself free from the thralldom of desire, feels its own inherent Joy. We feel truly free in this state of extreme Self-centredness in the course of whose attainment the energy of life, which was being dissipated all round, is wound up, as it were, into an indivisible impulse of feeling.

According to the mysticism of Yoga, this state can be attained by the rousing of the Kundilini which lies dormant in the *Mulādhāra*, the basis *plexus* in the spinal column. It is roused into activity in the course of advancement on the path. The plexus *Mulādhāra* is also the seat of three spiritual currents, collectively called *Trīḥeni*, that is, the confluence of the three streams, the Ganges (*Idā** whose colour is that of the sun), the Jumna (*Pingalā*, which is of the colour of the moon), and the Saraswati (Spirituality), which becomes visible only in the heaven,

* *Idā* and *Pingalā* are the two currents of breath, the former flowing through the left and the latter through the right nostril.

i.e., the plexus of the heart. Now, in order that the individual should derive any real benefit from the confluence of these potent forces, they must touch his whole being from the *mulādhāra* to the plexus in the head; but in order to do so, the Spiritual current must pass upwards through the hollow tube of the *Susumnā*, energizing all the nervous *plexi* on the way, thus enlivening him from within. When the current reaches the brain, the individual becomes perfect like Śiva. Man can achieve this much coveted consummation by mentally bathing at this internal confluence daily, if possible constantly. The supposed *Tribeni* at Allahabad, in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, is an ingenious symbolism for this confluence of the three spiritual currents, though its esoteric import being unknown to the generality of men, it is now resorted to by all classes of Hindus as a place of pilgrimage.*

The garland of skulls worn by Śiva is intended to suggest the destructive element in pure Self-contemplation, since all kinds of good and evil tendencies have to be destroyed for spiritual emancipation. It

*For the secret import of the names of the other sacred places of the Hindus, and for a proper appreciation of Hindu Mythology in general the reader is referred to the comprehensive work, '*The Permanent History of Bharatvarsha*,' by K. Narayana Iyer, B.A.

is worthy of note that virtue is as much a cause of bondage as vice, though the fruit of the former is pleasant and that of the latter bitter, and, at times, very painful.

The consort and constant companion of the god is Parvati, who is the daughter of (the) Himalayas. But it would be foolish to take the Himalayas as a mountain ; the goddess represents that much-desired state of the soul which arises from steady, immutable *dhyāna* (concentration of mind); in a word, she personifies the state of *Nirvana* which is immutable.

Page 495, first line of the footnote,
for his spiritual
read a Brahmana

Page 496, strike out lines 2 to 4 from the top, and put
instead of them the following :
Book of Life, to get to the infinity of
knowledge within.

Page 502, after the 10th line from the top add the
following as a new paragraph :

Tertullianus quotes, with apparent approval, the earlier Greek Philosophers in the following words (A. N. C. L. xv p. 439) :—

" These philosophers maintain the unity of the soul as diffused over the entire body and yet in every part the same."

The Great Muslim Philosopher, Al-Ghazzali, too, holds that the soul is diffused over the entire body.

Page 506, after the 12th line from the top add the following :

A certain class of mystics today consider their god to be a kind of power, like electricity. But what kind of consolation they can possibly derive from a god that is not a being, but a huge agglomeration of a blind, unconscious force, it is not easy to perceive. A god without individuality can have no marketable value for a devotee of mysticism, and within the range of material forces not one form of power can have a more extended individuality than that comprised within the four corners of an atom or the boundaries of an electron. It is not even possible to roll up all the atoms or electrons into one huge individual, and to term it god, since such a being will be an unintelligent compound (a bundle) of atoms and perishable like all compounds !

Page 533, lines 12 to 17, strike out the sentence beginning with the words 'This tallies.'

Page 537, after line 20th add the following as a new paragraph :

The argument that because the soul has always existed in the condition of union with matter, therefore it can never be separated from it, ignores two good points, namely, firstly, that Spirit and Matter are two separate substances and therefore may be separated, by suitable means, from each other, and, secondly, that the same

particles of matter even have not been in union with the soul always. The case is like that of a tank in which fresh water is pouring in from success a channel at the same time as its volume is diminishing by evaporation, so that if the mouth of the channel be closed the tank must naturally dry up one day. Similarly, if the further influx of matter be stopped from pouring into the soul, it must become speedily rid of matter altogether.

Page 543, strike out the last paragraph.

Page 544, strike out lines 15 to 29, leaving the word itself in the 15th and the word Remembering in the 29th line.

In the same page strike out the last incomplete sentence.

Page 545, strike out the first two lines.

In the same page, in lines 18-19,
for throws his concentrated gaze
read is able

Page 549, omit the 2 sentences in the 15th to 19th lines.

In the same page strike out lines 20th to the end of the page, and substitute the following in their place :

The old percepts are all upset ; the sun seems to lose its light, the moon its brightness ; the stars* are seen to fall,

*The Sun, the Moon and the stars in Christian symbolism signify the Associations and conceptions of the lower ego in the mind, which are broken up and destroyed in the course of the progress of the soul (see the Vision of St. John or Revelation).

making the very heavens shake and tremble ; and visions of all sorts float before the eyes. When these signs appear, the point of concentration should be turned on the Self, or, as Jesus put it, one should ' stand in the holy place,' with the injunction : ' whose readeth, let him understand' (Matt. xxiv. 15). This state of affairs is the prelude to the vision divine, but Nirvana is not yet, inasmuch as it is a step beyond this stage. We can now understand why Jesus said : " Verily I say unto you : This generation shall not pass, till all these things be fulfilled. Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away " (Matt. xxiv. 34 and 35). His last declaration that not a hair of the head of those who possessed their souls in patience, in spite of calamities, tribulation.

Page 551, strike out lines 8th to 35th and substitute the following therefor :

The expressions 'all the tribes of the earth shall mourn' (Matt. xxiv. 30), and the like, are mystic allegories, which refer to the attributes and associates of the lower personality.

The coming of the Son of man, thus, was an expression employed to denote the dawning of God-consciousness in the soul, not the appearance of an ' historical ' saviour in the world of men.

Page 553, strike out the first twenty-one lines from the top and replace with them the following:

its vision be clarified by the removal of the material filth that obstructs it, it can regain its pristine glory at once, since its real nature has in nowise changed. So long, however, as it is engrossed in the pursuit of fleshly lusts, its attention remains turned away from itself, and directed to the perception of the outside world. Religion aims at turning its attention on itself, informs it of its omniscient nature, and advises it to actually behold its own glorious vision to realise its divinity. But in order to see itself the soul must, first of all, purge itself of the material filth which it has absorbed ; and the only method of being rid of the harmful stuff is to scatter it about by the force of asceticism, *i.e.*, the power of dispassion and self contemplation. It is under the influence of passion, that is to say, attachment and aversion, which are the fruits of the discrimination in the nature of good and evil, that the matter absorbed by the soul, through the senses, acquires stickiness and forms a kind of coat or veil on the soul-substance. Hence, the withdrawal of the outgoing energy of attention, and its inner concentration are required to enable the soul to behold its own glory.

Self-contemplation has a two-fold effect on the soul. Firstly, it checks the incoming stream of the molecules of *karmic* matter through the doorways of the senses; and, secondly, through, dispassion it disposes of the molecules already present, by depriving them of their stickiness and thereby dispersing them, and destroying their *bandhās* (groupings or bonds). When this is accomplished, the self-luminous soul, freed from the taint of matter, sees and realizes its true nature, and feels the utmost joy. It is then called *jina* (conqueror).

Page 568, 9th line from the bottom

for Jesus a great *yogi*,

read the founder of Christianity an
enthusiastic preacher,

Page 593, omit the word telepathy in the 4th line from
the top.

Page 606, omit the first 23 lines from the top and
substitute the following in their place:

practical? Which is more practical,
the pursuit of ideals which must invariably
lead to regions of pain and suffering after
death, followed by subsequent incarnations
in undesirable surroundings in this world,
or of the Ideal which confers immortality
and bliss on the soul? There can be only
one answer, and that in favour of the
latter alternative. If any one still thinks
that this world is going to afford him
lasting joy, let him bestow a glance at the

pain and suffering of life to realize how terrible is the struggle for existence in which all living beings are involved. The World is full of trouble and suffering ; death, disease, privation and misery have all in their grip. Can a life so full of misery, so full of pain and trouble, so full of grim evil, where the spectre of death stalks about unchecked, with no certainty of anything even in the very next moment, be compared with the eternal peace, tranquillity and calmness of the blessed state of perfection, called *turiya* in Vedanta ? Think and reflect, and then realize that the soul is divine and divinely blissful, but the body is the abode of disease and death, and filthiness.

Page 623, lines 12-13 from the top

for attachment, aversion,

read zest, boredom,

Page 626, line 4th from the bottom

for Attachment read zest

for Aversion read Boredom

Page 635, line 8th from the top

for pride

read non-appreciation

Page 647, in the 4th column

for attachment read zest

for aversion read boredom

Page 674, strike out lines 15th to 20th and substitute the following in place thereof :

Even amongst Muhammadans, the Sufis and Dervishes believe in becoming God.

Page 683, strike out 27 lines from the top of the page and replace them with the following :

We have seen that the teaching of Christianity and Zoroastrianism* recognises these twenty-four Gods. The Hindu Scriptures also acknowledge some of the Holy Ones, and the first *Tirthamkara*† is even mentioned by name in the Bhagavata Purana and other works. Islam alone of the other more important creeds can be said to be silent about them, but enlightened Muslim thinkers and teachers have ever taught the fact of men having attained salvation in the past (see the Gems of Islam vol. i.) which comes to the same thing.

We thus find that Islam also has the same teaching as to the nature of Godhead as is to be found elsewhere. But for this Muhammad would never have said, "Man know thyself," nor 'God,' "I am nearer to you than your jugular vein."

As for the remaining ideas of God, we have had occasion to point out that the notion of the Absolute is quite untenable philosophically. It has, however, largely entered into modern thought, and some sects lay stress on positing it by itself,

*Judaism also acknowledges the being of the four and twenty Tirthamkars (see the "Vision of St. John").

†The Hindu Philosopher Sir S. Radha Krishnan has shown that the second Tirthamkara Ajit Nath, is also mentioned in the Vedas (see Hindu Philosophy by S. Radha Krishnan).

describing it as the Unmanifested. Certain easy-going Muslim Philosophers, too, have fallen into error on this point, they maintain :—

Page 686, between the 7th and the 8th lines from the bottom add the following as a new paragraph.

The scriptural text relating to creation in Hinduism, Judaism and Christianity has been seen to be allegorical, and in no sense teaches the existence of a creator or the creation of the world by any one in time.

Page 690, strike out the last 11 lines on the page and replace them with the following:

In Islam the soul is regarded as a simple essence as in other systems (see the *Keemya-i-Sa'dat* by Al Ghazzali). The Prophet himself was asked to explain the nature of the soul, and he declared that '*Ruh*' (spirit or soul) was by the command God ('The Philosophy of Islam,' by Khaja Khan, p. 14).

So far as the evangelists are concerned they did not define the soul in philosophical terms; but they distinctly recognized that it could attain the perfection of Gods. The 'fathers' held it to be a simple substance, uncreate and eternal, and capable of attaining to Godhood (see "Jainism Christianity and Science").

Page 704, after the 6th line add the following :—

This is precisely what Mirza Abu'l Fazl, the author of the '*Life of Muhammad*'

says (see p. 69) : " The ' Night Journey is an allegory of easy explanation. The Burrak—the white steed of wonderful form and qualities, unlike any animal ever seen, and, in truth different from any animal ever described—which signifies lightning, is thought, which moves more swiftly than the electric fluid, and the ladder of light by which Muhammad is said to have ascended up to heaven, was contemplation, by which man passes through all the heavens up to the Throne of God ; and the wonderful cock, whose crowing God took delight in hearing, was the prayer of the just ; and so on with all the rest." Ladder (*Shreni* in Sanskrit) is actually the term used in Jainism for Self-contemplation by a Jaina saint (see " The Practical Dharma ").

Page 705, at the end of the footnote add the following:

According to certain Muslim mystics, Gabriel represents the tongue (which probably means speech).

Page 709, strike out the first 9 lines of the footnote and the words Calendars of Muslim Origin, from the 10th ; and substitute the following in their place :

*The true Muslim conception of unity in relation to God has little in common with the popular idea ; but refers to the unity, that is to say, the indivisibility of the soul-substance. Sufis very clearly understood this, and said so with very little attempt at secrecy.

The Sufi doctrine, as a matter of fact, is the exact copy of Jainism (see *Gems of Islam* Vols. 1 and 2). To what extent these bold free-thinkers of Islam went is apparent from the following

complet of Abu Sa'id ibn Abi'l Khyar (see 'The Mystics of Islam,' p. 90) :—

Page 712, strike out lines 13 to 31 and the last 5 lines of the footnote.

Page 715, strike out lines 6 and 7 from the top and replace them with following—

Finally, when I have become non-est like an organ (*i.e.*, melody), I shall be told 'That all of us shall return unto 'Ilm.' "

Page 716, strike out lines 5 to 10 from the bottom.

In the same page add the following as a new paragraph after the 14th line from the top.

But Jalal-ul-din himself leaves no room for doubt on the subject, and even shows that the souls of men might be reborn as animals. He says—

اے دریدہ یوسفون یوسفان - گرگ برخیزی ازین خواب گران

The English equivalent of the Persian composition is as follows: O thou that tearest the skin of Josephs among men: thou shalt find thyself transformed into a wolf when this terrible dream comes to an end! Surely, there is nothing of "circular movements" in this.

Page 718, place a full stop after the word god in the 19th line from the top and strike out the rest of the sentence and the next paragraph of 4 lines, and also the footnote.

Page 732, strike out the last three paragraphs, then add the following:—

It is worth noticing that Jalal-ul-din Rūmi has given the same explanation of

the legend, though not in the detailed manner in which we have dealt with it here. As his authority ranks very high in the Muslim—especially in the Sufi—world we reproduce his verses for the reader's benefit here (see the *Ilham-i-Manzum*, vol. ii. pp. 157-158) :—

- (۱) تاز زخم لبت یادم من حیات
چون قتل از گاؤ موسی ای نجات
(۲) تاز زخم لبت گرم خویش شوم
همچو کشته گاؤ موسی کش شوم
(۳) زنده شد کشته ز زخم دم گاؤ
همچو من زرد میشود از کینه
(۴) کشته برجست و بکفت اسرار را
وانمود آن زمره خونخوار را
(۵) گشت روشن کاین حجاب کشته اند
تضم این آشوب ایشان کشته اند
(۶) چونکه کشته گرد این جسم گران
زنده گردد هستی اسرار دان
(۷) جان او بلند بوش و ناز را
باز داند جملة اسرار را
(۸) وانما نهد خویشان دیو را
وانما نهد دام خدعه و ربه را
(۹) گاؤ کشتن هست از شرط طریق
ناشود از زخم دهن جان معنی
(۱۰) گاؤ نفس خویش را ز تر بکش
تا شود روح خفی زنده بهی

Rendered into English these verses will read as follows :—

1. That I, too, may, O good man ! obtain, from the wound of the heart, the Life which was obtained by the Murdered Man (in the story) from Moses' Cow !

2. So that from the bleedings of the Cow I may attain to happiness, becoming its destroyer, like the Murdered Man in the story of Moses and the Cow !

4. The dead come to life by the Cow's bleeding tail, as copper becomes gold on being touched by the alchemical elixir !

5. The Deadman rose and related the mysteries ; he revealed the existence of the terrible gang (*i.e.*, of the powerful forces that are inimical to the soul-nature) !

6. He clearly declared that he had been killed by that band ; that they had sown the seed of his suffering !

(The rule is) that when the body is 'killed,' (then) the soul which is the knower of secrets is brought to life !

7. The soul perceives the heaven and the hell ; it knows all secrets naturally !

8. It shows who are the destroying enemies ; it breaks up all the meshes of cunning and deceit !

9. The killing of the Cow is enjoined in the Law, so that from its bleeding tail Life may attain to sensibility (Self-consciousness) !

10. Kill the Cow of thine nafs (نفس) as soon as thou canst, so that the (insensible (literally, hidden) soul may become alive in Self-consciousness !

It may be added that Methodius has given the same interpretation of the sacrifice of the heifer enjoined in the Mosaic law

(The Writings of Methodius : Ante Nicene Christian Library, p. 44).

We might pause here to dwell on the allegorical nature of the composition of the Qur'an. Early Muhammadan thinkers, especially Sufis, there can be no doubt, were fully aware of the fact that the language of the sacred text of the Qur'an was hidden allegory. The Batinites were amongst those who had applied the allegorical method to the interpretation and the elucidation of the Quranic text. As is shown in the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (Vol. ix. 881), "extreme mystics, rationalist, and free-thinkers, all came in this way to the same results." Mr. Khaja Khan has brought together much valuable evidence in his informing book, entitled 'Studies in Tasawwuf,' which goes to show that the sacred book of Islam is really couched in the allegorical style. The views of Muslim Dervishes, collected by Mr. J. P. Brown in his interesting brochure. "The Dervishes," also directly support the case for the allegorical view. We shall quote the following from the "Dervishes" :

"Paradise and hell and all the dogmas of positive religion are only so many allegories, the spirit of which is only known to the Sufes."—(The Dervishes, p. 11.)

"Most parts of the Koran have a hidden, inner or spiritual significance, called by them *ma'nanat Bateene* [hidden sense]."—(Ibid., 106)

Page 730, after the first paragraph add the following as a separate paragraph :—

Advanced Saints in Islam were credited by the popular belief, with the faculty of being able to dispense with food altogether (see "Mysticism and Magic in Turkey" by Lucy M. J. Garnett, pages 37-38). According to Jainism those who attain to Omniscience neither need nor partake of food at all.

Page 742, add the following as a separate paragraph after the 9th line from the top :

There is a certain amount of correspondence in regard to geography between Jainism and Islam. The seven continents or Kingdoms of the latter are presumably the seven divisions of the Jambu Dwipa in Jainism. Koh-i-Kaf (the Mt. Caucasus) which is the abode of fairies is the mount Meru of Jainism, where live a people that can fly in the air. The Grand Pearl which a horse would require very many years to go over from side to side, is the Dharma Dravya (Ether) in Jainism.

Page 751, at the end of the 7th line from the bottom add the following :—

If Satan be taken to be Desire which leads the soul by the nose, he rightly refuses to acknowledge the superiority of Adam (embodied soul), as such.

Pages 753-4, strike out the long quotation at the end of page 753 and the sentence introducing it.

Page 759, at the end of the page add the following :—

In other words, every action which is not founded on the belief in the Divinity of the soul is sinful :

" for whatsoever is not of faith is sin."—Romans xiv. 23.

